I.From January 1 to September 30, 2025, a total of 3,003 sorties of various types of PLA aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait middle line or entered our southwestern and eastern airspace. In addition, 2,000 sorties of various PLA naval vessels operated within Taiwan’s air-defense identification and contingency zones. It has been observed that the PLA conducts so-called “joint combat readiness patrols” at a frequency of three to four times per month, with an increasing number of aircraft and vessels crossing the Taiwan Strait middle line. These actions compress Taiwan’s early-warning and response time, heighten tensions across the Taiwan Strait, and raise the risk of ‘‘transitioning from training to exercises, from exercises to actual war.
II.On March 17, 2025, the R.O.C. Armed Forces detected for the first time that the PLA conducted two “joint combat readiness patrols” within a single day. From April 1 to 2, the PLA Eastern Theater Command carried out the “Strait Thunder-2025A” military exercise, which involved live-fire drills off the coast of Zhejiang, further intensifying its targeted coercive actions against Taiwan. In addition, the P.R.C. has routinely increased deployments of coast guard vessels to patrol the waters surrounding Kinmen and Matsu, repeatedly crossing the median line or entering restricted and prohibited maritime zones near Taiwan’s offshore islands to carry out harassment activities. These operations not only test Taiwan’s response measures but also aim to advance the objective of “turning the Taiwan Strait into its internal waters.”
III.It has also been observed that the P.R.C. recently used the expanded military parade on September 3 to actively showcase and promote a wide range of weapons and equipment, aiming to demonstrate its growing military power—some of which have already entered mass production and active service. In response, the R.O.C. Armed Forces, adhering to the principle of “preparing for the worst-case scenario,” continue to closely monitor, assess, and analyze such developments. While the PLA seeks to enhance its military deterrence toward neighboring countries, these actions also underscore that the P.R.C. has become a multifaceted threat and challenge to the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region and even to global security.
IV.In response to the PLA’s activities in the air and maritime areas surrounding Taiwan, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) has continued to develop long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with high-resolution imaging, radar, and infrared sensors to enhance the range and accuracy of the R.O.C. Armed Forces’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. At the same time, through the Common Intelligence Imagery System, intelligence data from multiple sources are integrated to achieve information sharing and real-time situational awareness, thereby strengthening overall intelligence sensing capabilities. Furthermore, by leveraging international exchange and cooperation channels to share intelligence resources and technology, Taiwan is better positioned to anticipate regional developments, closely monitor key indicators of PLA military activity, and assess both current and potential enemy courses of action. These measures aim to secure early warning and enable rapid and effective responses, thereby preventing the enemy from launching a sudden attack.
Excerpt from: R.O.C. National Defense Report, 4th Session of the 11th Legislative Yuan