

中共對日本的政治作戰：威脅會有多大？

凱瑞 K·葛雪尼克(Kerry K. Gershaneck)

美國夏威夷全球風險管控基金會區域安全部資深研究員

前言：日本2040年

2040年1月1日晨，當陽光穿越東京冷颼颼、灰濛濛的東方地平線時，日本感到有些孤單。在曾經充滿民族自豪感與自信心的東京街頭及首相府，瀰漫著士氣低落和失敗氣氛。由於中共侵略性、技巧性及持續性的政治作戰，事實上，日本此刻是中華人民共和國之附庸國：政治上處於孤立；軍事、外交及經濟上無能為力；充滿恐懼和不確定性。¹

中共海軍彈道飛彈及攻擊潛艦自臺灣東海岸到日本南部進行例行性地部署，而中國人民解放軍的海、空軍飛機和水面艦艇則在東海及南沙群島實施中國（中華人民共和國）「捍衛主權」並穿越南海及渤海海峽。當臺灣（中華民國）屈服於中共無情的政治作戰，並於2031年不甘情願地接受中共吞併時，所謂「第一島鏈」防線（日本是其中不可分割的一部分）已破碎到無法修復。解放軍早已立即佔領臺灣軍事基地，以確保徹底征服---並報復---所謂「叛變省」的人民。從政治局的角度來看，更重要的是，臺灣現在是中共武力的投射平台。佔領的解放軍空、海及陸軍迅速將彈道飛彈部署於臺灣各地。現在，數百枚飛彈主要瞄準日本。因菲律賓自2024年廢除與美國協防條約以來，並未對中國構成威脅，且允許解放軍自由進出其軍事設施。

在日本西南部，朝鮮半島的前景同樣黯淡。在韓國於2036年廢除韓美聯盟之前，中共軍隊例行性地從曾是美軍在韓專用的基地航行與飛行。中共海軍艦隊從釜山及浦項出發，協同其他艦隊，在朝鮮海（前稱日本海）和東海並深入西南諸島水域進行實彈演習。臺灣現正落在北京掌控中，琉球群島即是中共計畫下一個要征服的重點地區。日趨暴力的「沖繩獨立運動」，絕大部分由中國附屬組織資助，幾乎每天都會對沖繩縣的日本自衛隊設施發動抗議、罷工及恐怖攻擊，因為中國駐沖繩新聞媒體全年持續無休地為琉球民眾提供密集的親中文宣。

在日本西北部，中共軍隊與俄羅斯軍隊構成的威脅也隱約出現不祥的徵兆，自2026年俄羅斯和中國簽署《安全與共同防禦條約》以來就是如此。現在俄羅斯和中共聯合艦

1 引言中描述的理想主要來自美國戰略和預算評估中心 (CSBA) 的研究中所設想2035年中國區域擴張的可能性。出自於 “Which Way the Dragon? Sharpening Allied Perceptions of China's Strategic Trajectory” by Ross Babbage, Jack Bianchi, Julian Snelder, Toshi Yoshihara, Aaron Friedberg and Nadège Rolland, (August 6, 2020), Ch. 3, pp. 23-26, <<https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/which-way-the-dragon-sharpening-allied-perceptions-of-chinas-strategic-trajectory>>.

隊以及戰機編隊定期環繞日本群島航行，北京及莫斯科對日本外交官在首都提出的和緩措詞不屑一顧。隨著對日本北、南及西部海上交通線進行有效地封鎖，並受到北京法令制約，日本海上商業、漁船及海洋資源開採業蒙受巨大損失。

看向日本以外更遙遠的地平線，政治和軍事局勢也同樣令人沮喪。東埔寨、泰國及緬甸也為中共人民解放軍部隊提供全日均可使用的基地。東南亞國家協會(ASEAN)實際上刻正由北京的附屬國們所主導，它加入中國定期在政治及經濟上對日本進行打擊行動，以懲罰日本在歷史上及最近犯下的錯誤和經察覺未能兌現的承諾。

在遙遠的南方，大洋洲也淪為有越來越多中國「移民」的殖民地，並在中國「一帶一路」倡議(BRI)的支持下，陷入不可承受的債務貸款陷阱。斐濟和所羅門群島為中共海軍及空軍提供基地通道，有效地打破「第二島鏈」。這一通道讓在海上部署的中共海軍陸戰隊遠征部隊成為該地區唯一可見到的外國軍事力量。紐西蘭在「一帶一路」中的地位穩固，並定期接待中共海、空軍訪問人員。澳洲刻正遭到包圍---不願意冒著激怒北京的風險去支持日本經濟或安全需求。

對於日本西部而言，東京唯一的盟友美國，距離遙遠且渺小，在2039年底已從日本撤出最後一支作戰部隊。象徵性的司令部參謀人員留守在橫田、橫須賀及座間基地，以便根據《共同防禦條約》進行雙邊軍事接觸。依據2025年1月的國家安全戰略，美軍作戰部隊開始從亞洲撤退到關島、夏威夷及美國西海岸。到2035年，美國關閉在日本的大部分設施或移交給日本自衛隊。

對於那些關注日本的人們而言，日本2040年陷入嚴峻困境的軌跡，幾十年來一直清晰可見。一個戰敗的日本(*Haiboku Shita Nihon*)是中共100多年來的主要目標之一，正如中共政治局長期設想的那樣，中共不需採取動態性作戰行動即能技巧地達成此一目標。它取得這一驚人勝利的主要武器是一個組織龐大、資源充足、由中央指揮的政治作戰機構。當中國在2020年代初加速其原本已具有高度侵略性的政治作戰運動，以奪取印太地區的主導地位時，日本（及其條約盟友美國）表達不滿---但未採取任何有效因應反制措施。該地區的其他國家也未能及時因應，並於隨後提出訴訟。

回顧過去，令人驚訝的是，大多數日本領導人選擇無視中國的威脅或淡化中國的攻擊本質，直到為時已晚。當選的官員及決策人士在瞭解生存威脅方面幾乎沒有任何作為。因此，無法建立急需的戰力以偵測、嚇阻、作戰手段擊敗中共的無情攻擊。²

這些領導人為中國擊敗日本創造理想條件。由於無知、無能、故意漠視及貪婪，那些本應教育和保護日本免受此生存威脅的人士，辜負了人民與國家。因此，日本民眾未能接受政府或新聞媒體，提供有關如何反制中共政治作戰的教育訓練，而無能力向政府

2 Dr. Robert D. Eldridge, "Lecture on Chinese Communist Party Political Warfare against Japan" (Webinar Lecture, Ateneo School of Government, Quezon City, Philippines, April 21, 2021); and Russell Hsiao, "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan," *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation 19, no. 12 (June 26, 2019), <<https://jamestown.org/program/a-preliminary-survey-of-ccp-influence-operations-in-japan/>>.

請願以成功對抗及擊敗中共。在戰敗的日本，受害最深的將是這些普通百姓，而非日本精英人士。

幸好，至少就目前而言，日本作為中國的戰敗附庸國的暗淡前景當然仍是虛構的想像。但不幸的是，日本似乎正朝著讓這一假設的未來情景成為其暗淡事實的方向前進。

為改變日本自我毀滅軌跡，並創造一個自由、主權及尊嚴得到保障的積極未來，日本領導人及國民須瞭解中共政治作戰，並策定戰勝中國的國家意志及能力的方針。鑑此，本文希望為這一教育提供基礎。至於有關適用於日本有效反擊的進一步建議，則可參閱《政治作戰：打擊中國「不戰而勝」計畫的戰略》一書的第9章。³

中國的政治作戰：入門

中華人民共和國與日本交戰，正如它與臺灣、美國及世界其他大部分國家交戰一樣，但這不是傳統意義上的戰爭。中國正在為全球影響力及控制權而戰，以實現其擴張主義的中國夢。⁴ 中國在這場戰爭中的武器包括脅迫、腐敗、欺騙、恐嚇、假新聞、假訊息、社群媒體戰、網路攻擊和暴力秘密行動，包括暗殺、人身攻擊、綁架和運用裝備精良的代理人軍隊。中華人民共和國更願意透過不發射一槍一彈來贏得這場戰爭，但其日益強大的軍力和準軍事力量在幕後隱現，並積極支持其影響力不斷擴大的戰爭。

在中國共產黨（中共）統治者的思想中，這場戰爭旨在恢復中國以往宏偉的帝國王朝，使其再次成為中國統治者所稱的「天下萬物」，即全能的霸權力量（霸權）。⁵ 這是一場確保中共完全控制中國人口與資源之戰，以及中國歷史上所稱的野蠻國家的人口與資源，特別是其長期憎惡的鄰國日本。

與天朝鼎盛時期的皇帝一樣，中共有效地將其他野蠻國家區分為承認中國霸權的朝貢國或潛在敵人蠻邦。⁶ 儘管總書記習近平的中國夢，體現簡單、和平的「民族復興」意圖，但中共卻表現出擴張主義意圖，其行動並未展現追求國家間平等的意願。⁷ 相反的，中共旨在向其他較小國家施加其所認為包羅萬象的優越文明，其理論與一位解放軍官所提供有關習近平的中國夢之意識形態基礎的一本書，可說並無二致。⁸ 最令人擔憂

3 Kerry K. Gershaneck, *Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China's Plan to "Win without Fighting,"* First (2044 Broadway Drive, Quantico, VA 22134: Marine Corps University Press, 2020), <https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/Political_Warfare_web.pdf>.

4 「中國夢」是習近平自2013年以來提倡的一個術語，用來描述中國在個人或國家上的一種精神和理想狀態。Graham Allison, "What Xi Jinping Wants," *Atlantic*, May 31, 2017.

5 Steven W. Mosher, *Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World* (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), pp. 1-2.

6 *Celestial Empire*一詞意指中國用語「天朝」在文學和詩詞上的英文翻譯。Mosher, *Hegemon*, p. 3.

7 Xi Jinping, "Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" (speech, 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, China, October 18, 2017).

的是，習近平的中國夢卻是一個頑固的極權性馬克思—列寧主義。⁹

對中共而言，這是一場爭奪地區和全球霸權的全面戰爭，其形式包括軍事、經濟、資訊，特別是政治作戰。政治作戰的簡單定義如下：

政治作戰運用國家指揮的一切手段，而非用武力戰達成國家目標。這些手段包括從政治聯盟、經濟措施及公共外交等公開行動到脅迫、假訊息、心理戰、暗殺、犯罪活動、暴力攻擊及支持代理人軍隊和叛亂等秘密行動。

自習近平2012年上台以來，他領導政治作戰大規模擴張，投入新能量、關注力及資源以實現全球野心。¹⁰ 他將政治作戰重要性納入廣泛推動以實現中國民族復興及中共兩個百年目標的一部分。這兩項野心勃勃的計畫，旨在實現國家繁榮，並在21世紀中葉之前在印度—亞太地區取得主導地位。¹¹

身為中國統治者的中共持續採用所謂的「三戰」(Three Warfares)，以奠定其全面政治作戰的基礎。這三戰包括一個動態的、具有高度欺騙性的三維戰爭／作戰過程：它們包括心理戰、法律戰（也稱為合法戰）和媒體戰（也稱為輿論戰）。¹² 在政治局密切指導下，3種作戰對日本的持續自由和主權構成了獨特的威脅。

中華人民共和國的政治作戰本質是具防禦性與攻擊性的。它採取超限戰的形式，在全球範圍內進行。超限戰是中國採取以任何手段，包括使用生物戰及恐怖攻擊合理化的手段，藉以實現中共目標，無論中國是否與該國正式交戰。¹³ 單獨使用或與其他「作戰」結合使用的24種「作戰」之一的一個例子是「化學生物戰」。北京的政治作戰機構現正進行一項大規模的全球作為，旨在轉移對新冠疫情的責任。新冠疫情始於中國，在中國遭掩蓋，隨後在全球造成460萬人死亡。為此，中共正在「中國異議人士間散播混亂與不和」。¹⁴

8 The highly confrontational, expansionist nature of PLA Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu's 303-page book "China Dream" is discussed in this blog: "China's Intentions and Her Place in the World," *U.S. Naval Institute Blog* dated 1 March 2010, <<https://blog.usni.org/posts/2010/03/01/chinas-intentions-and-her-place-in-the-world>>.

9 Bill Birtles, "China's President Xi Jinping Is Pushing a Marxist Revival-but How Communist Is It Really?," Australia Broadcasting Corporation, May 3, 2018.

10 Szu-Chien Hsu and J. Michael Cole, editors, *Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy* (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2020), pp. xxix-xxxix.

11 Gitter and Erdahl, "Telling China's Story Well: An Investigation into Chinese Influence Operations Targeting American Chinese-Language Media Outlets," (Center for Advanced China Research, June 15, 2020), pp. 2-4.

12 Stefan Halper, *China: The Three Warfares* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), p. 11.

13 Qiao Liang and Col Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999).

14 WHO Staff, "WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard September 8, 2021" (WHO COVID-19 Homepage: World Health Organization (WHO), September 8, 2021), <<https://covid19.who.int>>; and David Gitter, Sandy

除了殘酷鎮壓中國人民，中共還證明其能夠有效利用世界其它國家民主制度的開放性漏洞，以實現對這些民主國家的霸權運用。如果可能的話，中國更加傾向和平的統治：沒有真正鬥爭，而是在理想情況下沒有熱戰—不需「發射一槍一彈」。¹⁵ 然而，中國一再表示，其目前擁有足夠的實力和信心打一場戰爭以實現霸權，即使最後仍須付出巨大的代價。¹⁶

為了威脅日本和其他國家，中國正在迅速建立一支海軍，8年後，其規模將大約是美國海軍規模的兩倍，「或許在素質上與美國相當，並建造一個高超音速核武庫」。¹⁷ 北京利用其海軍和其他海上力量經常影響日本領土主權，對東海（甚至沖繩）的日本島嶼提出主權要求，並威脅如果日本在中國進犯臺灣時協助民主的臺灣，將使用核武予以摧毀。

前美國副國家安全顧問博明(Matthew Pottinger)這樣描述中國的意圖：¹⁸

「中國佔領臺灣是為了解日本無法發動戰爭，無法自衛，甚至無法自給自足，……如果臺灣遭到佔領，基本上中國將能夠主宰該地區，使日本變得無關緊要。」

隨著軍事實力的增強，北京藐視國際法，越來越迴避現有的國際法則與規範。¹⁹ 據美前任副總統彭斯(Michael R. “Mike” Pence)表示；中共仰賴利用強迫和賄賂手段以達到其經濟、軍事和外交目的。現任美國主管印度洋—太平洋事務的助理國防部長拉特納(Ely Ratner)也指稱，北京戰略包括「分裂和佔領區域國際機構，以避免其升高對中國行

Lu, and Brock Erdahl, “China Will Do Anything to Deflect Coronavirus Blame,” *Foreign Policy*, March 30, 2020.

15 Jonas Parello-Plesner and Belinda Li, *The Chinese Communist Party's Foreign Interference Operations: How the U.S. and Other Democracies Should Respond* (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2018); and Author's discussions with senior PRC political warfare officers (active duty and retired), Fu Hsing Kang (Political Warfare) College, National Defense University, Taipei, January 2018-August 2021.

16 Tara Copp and Aaron Mehta, “New Defense Intelligence Assessment Warns China Nears Critical Military Milestone,” *Defense News*, January 15, 2019.

17 “China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure: Pathway to Hegemony,” May 17, 2018, (testimony, CAPT James E. Fanell, USN [Ret], House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence); Nick Danby, “China's Navy Looms Larger,” *Harvard Political Review*, 5 October 2019; and Liu Zhen, “China's Latest Display of Military Might Suggests Its ‘Nuclear Triad’ Is Complete,” *South China Morning Post*, 2 October 2019.

18 John Feng, “China State Media Says Frequent Warship Activity Near Japan a Warning,” *Newsweek*, June 2, 2021, <<https://www.newsweek.com/china-state-media-says-frequent-warship-activity-near-japan-warning-1596856>>; and Bill Gertz, “Japan Sees China as a Threat, Ties Security to U.S. Defense of Taiwan,” *Washington Times*, June 4, 2021.

19 Michael J. Pence, “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy Toward China” (speech, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, October 4, 2018).

為的集體關注，並恐嚇那些尋求合法開採資源和捍衛主權的亞洲海洋國家。」²⁰

除了策劃良好旨在摧毀敵人和聯合中共支持者的統一戰線行動，中國還控制著世界各地資源最重要的宣傳工具。²¹ 透過國營電視、印刷、廣播和散布在世界各地的網路線上組織的解說，北京尋求指導對釣魚台、南海、日美安全聯盟及海外中國新殖民主義等問題進行說明。²² 中國所青睞及最具破壞力的宣傳陳述之一是，中共專制統治風格不僅是良性的，中國模式現在還被推銷到所有開發中國家當作是理想模式，民主制度遭到中共嘲弄是無效且危險的。²³

在詳細研究中國如何對日本發動政治作戰之前，重要的是要研究中共如何利用政治作戰支持其內部鎮壓以及支持其全球霸權野心。

對內部鎮壓的支持

殘酷的內部鎮壓是中共政治作戰的一種獨特形式。美國和其他政府以及人權觀察和國際特赦等非政府組織，已將中共侵犯人權的行為稱為「種族滅絕」，這些行為與破壞維吾爾族社會有關，並將至少100萬維吾爾族人關押至所謂的再教育營中。²⁴

事實上，鎮壓維吾爾族和其他穆斯林教派，是一更加潛在禍害趨勢之一：《華盛頓郵報》編輯委員會評估表示：「中國有系統地反穆斯林運動及後續對基督徒和藏傳佛教的鎮壓，可能是世界上最大規模的官方對宗教自由的攻擊。」²⁵ 2019年末，中國秘密

20 *Hearing on "The China Challenge, Part I: Economic Coercion as Statecraft,"* 115th Cong. (24 July 2018)

(prepared statement by Ely Ratner, vice president and director of studies, Center for a New American Security, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, United States House of Representatives), hereafter Ely Ratner hearing.

21 Donald J. Trump, "United States Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China," White House, May 20, 2020.

22 Elizabeth Bachman, "Black and White and Red All Over: China's Improving Foreign-Directed Media" (Center for Naval Analysis, August 2020), p. 76.

23 Sarah Cook, "The Implications for Democracy of China's Globalizing Media Influence," *Freedom and Media Report 2019: Media Freedom: A Downward Spiral* (Freedom House, 2019), <<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-and-media/2019/media-freedom-downward-spiral>>.

24 維吾爾人(Uighurs)是亞洲內陸講突厥語的民族，主要居住在中國西北部的新疆維吾爾自治區，也有少數居住在中亞的國家。Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, "Determination of the Secretary of State on Atrocities in Xinjiang" (Washington D.C., January 19, 2021); "China's Repressive Reach Is Growing." *Washington Post*, September 27, 2019; Mya Wang et al, "'Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots' China's Crimes against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims," *Human Rights Watch*, April 19, 2021, <<https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting>>; and "Up to One Million Detained in China's Mass 'Re-Education' Drive," Amnesty International, September 2018.

25 "China's Repressive Reach Is Growing," *Washington Post*, September 27, 2019.

「中國電文」發布證實對維吾爾族人的嚴重暴行與殘酷鎮壓。²⁶ 這些電報提供無可辯駁的證據，證明中國對其少數民族運用政治作戰的力量及強度。

從歷史上觀之，中國內部政治鎮壓比宗教鎮壓和思想控制更具殺傷力。在大躍進（1958～60年）、文化大革命（1966～76年）和1989年天安門廣場屠殺暴行等災難性大規模恐怖統治期間，數百萬中國人民的死亡都是由中共造成的。包括香港歷史學家弗蘭克·迪克特(Frank Dikötter)在內的學者們根據中國的檔案證實，僅在大躍進時期，「就發生對中國農民系統性進行酷刑、殘暴、饑餓和殺害……在這4年中，中國至少有4,500萬人遭強制工作、飢餓或毆打致死。」²⁷ 文化大革命導致至少200萬人以上被殺，「另有100萬至200萬人在其他運動中遭到殺害，如20世紀50年代的土地改革和『反右』運動。」²⁸ 中共以政治作戰手段對付其人民而造成直接或間接死亡人數的估計，引起了激烈爭論，但是在風平浪靜的承平時，死亡人數竟也高達7,000萬人。²⁹

儘管有關中共殺害的中國人總數存有爭議，但毫無疑問，對這起大規模謀殺事件應該負責的中國共產黨仍然牢牢掌握著中國的權力韁繩，而且持續崇敬這位指揮鎮壓的領導人：毛澤東。中共黨中央繼續崇敬毛澤東的證據包括《中國日報》所描述的習近平採「前所未有的」虔誠和尊敬以及中國共產黨在2019年10月的70周年奢華慶典上對毛澤東所表現的尊崇場面。³⁰

對中國的霸權野心的支持

儘管中國的文宣機器「掌握大眾媒體中代表和象徵主義的力量」，許多中國人仍熱切渴望地接受其超民族主義的愛國主義教育計畫。居住在中國大陸的人民也面臨著審查制度和思想控制，這是大多數自由民主國家人民無法想像的。³¹ 更令人擔憂的是，中共的審查和思想控制已經走向全球：透過其廣泛的文宣和影響力觸角，北京無視國際規範或行動，即在中共的觀點中，「包含」中國的權力或「傷害中國人的感受」。³² 中國外交部和文宣機構譴責批評其侵犯人權行為的人是「不道德的」，反對海外華人惡意影響活動的人是「種族主義者」。³³

26 Colm Keena, "China Cables: 'The Largest Incarceration of a Minority since the Holocaust'," *Irish Times*, November 24, 2019.

27 Arifa Akbar, "Mao's Great Leap Forward 'Killed 45 Million in Four Years'," *Independent*, September 17, 2010.

28 Ian Buruma, "The Tenacity of Chinese Communism," *New York Times*, September 28, 2019; and Ian Johnson, "Who Killed More: Hitler, Stalin, or Mao?," *New York Review of Books*, February 5, 2018.

29 Ian Johnson, "Who Killed More?"

30 Laurence Brahm, "Nothing Will Stop China's Progress," *China Daily*, October 2, 2019.

31 Li Yuan, "China Masters Political Propaganda for the Instagram Age," *New York Times*, October 5, 2019.

32 Liu Chen, "US Should Stop Posing as a 'Savior'," *PLA Daily*, September 27, 2019; and Amy King, "Hurting the Feelings of the Chinese People," *Sources and Methods* (blog), Wilson Center, February 15, 2017.

中共嚴厲的審查制度使美國國家籃球協會等機構陷入困境，中共對該協會的施壓遭《華盛頓郵報》編輯委員會譴責為「從根本上向美國輸入了中國對言論自由的否定」。³⁴此外，越來越嚴厲的北京，現在定期審查世界知名品牌，如萬豪、聯合航空、國泰航空、紀梵希和凡賽思(Givenchy and Versace)。³⁵好萊塢已被列為「避免中國共產黨認為敏感問題和製作軟宣傳電影，這些電影向全球觀眾描繪中國是一個積極正面的國家。」³⁶正如《環球時報》的標題所反映的，北京在傳達強制審查要求方面非常明確：「全球品牌最好遠離政治」。這篇文章譴責所謂的「言論自由」，並對那些不遵守中共路線的人進行明示與暗示的威脅。³⁷

北京還向其他國家輸出暴力，以支持其海外政治作戰活動。有一個例子是它使用代理人軍隊。中國支持其在緬甸的代理軍，如佤邦聯合軍隊販毒集團，對許多當代外交官、學者和記者而言似乎是一種違反國際規範的現象，但自中華人民共和國成立以來，這種支持一直是中共的常態。³⁸中共在東南亞的代理人軍隊讓美國及其在該地區的盟友分心，並在40多年的冷戰中付出了沉重代價。³⁹

在中共利用其全球一帶一路倡議的承諾，建立《中國日報》所稱的「世界經濟合作的新平台」⁴⁰之後，經濟脅迫已成為中國政治作戰的特別明顯工具。時任美國主管東亞和太平洋事務的助理國務卿大衛·史迪威(David R. Stilwell)在國會證詞中特別提到中共以「一帶一路」和相關的中國經濟脅迫已突顯其缺乏善心並表示：「北京…(利用)扭曲市場的經濟誘因和懲罰、影響行動及恐嚇來說服其他國家遵循其政治與安全議程。」⁴¹時任副總統邁克·彭斯在2018年10月4日的外交政策演講中，具體闡述美國對中國利用具有破壞性的對外國直接投資、市場通路和債務陷阱迫使外國政府順從其欲獲取利益的擔憂。⁴²

33 “China Slams Use of Bringing up Human Rights Issues with Political Motives as ‘Immoral’,” *Global Times*, December 12, 2018; and Ben Blanchard, “China’s Top Paper Says Australian Media Reports Are Racist,” *Reuters*, December 11, 2017.

34 “The Day the NBA Fluttered before China,” *Washington Post*, October 7, 2019.

35 Amy Qin and Julie Creswell, “For Companies in China, Political Hazards Are Getting Harder to See,” *New York Times*, October 8, 2019.

36 Ross Babbage, *Winning without Fighting: Chinese and Russian Political Warfare Campaigns and How the West Can Prevail*, vol. I (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019), p. 36.

37 “Global Brands Better Stay Away from Politics,” *Global Times*, October 7, 2019.

38 Bertil Lintner, “A Chinese War in Myanmar,” *Asia Times*, April 5, 2017.

39 Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice* (New York: Citadel Press, 1970).

40 Yang Han and Wen Zongduo, “Belt and Road Reaches Out to the World,” *China Daily*, September 30, 2019.

41 *Hearing on U.S. Policy in the Indo-Pacific Region: Hong Kong, Alliances and Partnerships, and Other Issues*, 116th Cong. (September 18, 2019) (Statement, David Stilwell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs).

42 Pence, “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China.”

助理國防部長拉特納表示，同樣令人擔憂的是中國在國內外形成的輿論；「破壞學術自由，審查外國媒體，限制資訊自由流通，遏制公民社會」。⁴³不幸的是在全世界，各國對中國外交、經濟和軍事利益，以及北京的惡意影響程度，已經滲透到家門口都覺醒的太遲。澳洲、紐西蘭、歐洲、大洋洲及太平洋島嶼、南美洲、北極國家和許多非洲國家，正開始痛苦地意識到中共滲透及顛覆的程度。⁴⁴加拿大和美國同樣對中國在其境內收買機構、組織、人員以及其他形式的脅迫、鎮壓和暴力襲擊的統一戰線行動效力，總算也猛然覺醒。⁴⁵

中國對抗日本的政治作戰

中國以各種理由對日本發動政治作戰。簡言之，中共試圖讓日本屈服，在軍事上無能為力；懲罰它過去無論是真實或是虛構的罪行；並獲取其資源及科技。中共政治作戰具體目標包括：使美軍在日設施於軍事應急作戰中失去作用，破壞日美軍事同盟，奪取釣魚台列島（日本稱尖閣列島）及其海底資源，在地區及全球孤立日本，在國際上使日本難堪，阻止日本在外交或軍事上援助臺灣，囊獲日本的科技。⁴⁶

中共對日本使用的戰略及戰術和對抗臺灣、美國、澳洲、韓國和其他國家的戰略和戰術類似。包括攏絡精英人士，統一戰線和友好組織、孔子學院和中國學生協會、軍事威脅和恐嚇、吸收退休和現役軍人、經濟勸誘、推動沖繩縣脫離日本的運動、支持暴力激進份子、以及各種心理戰、輿論戰、法律戰、積極措施和網路作戰行動，詳述如下。⁴⁷

43 Ely Ratner hearing.

44 John Garnaut, "Australia's China Reset," *The Monthly* (Australia), August 2018; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, "Mapping China-in-Germany," *Sinopsis*, October 2, 2019; Austin Doehler, "How China Challenges the EU in the Western Balkans," *Diplomat*, September 25, 2019; Grant Newsham, "China 'Political Warfare' Targets US-Affiliated Pacific Islands," *Asia Times*, August 5, 2019; Derek Grossman et al., *America's Pacific Island Allies: The Freely Associated States and Chinese Influence* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2019), <<https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2973>>; C. Todd Lopez, "Southcom Commander: Foreign Powers Pose Security Concerns," U.S. Southern Command, October 4, 2019; Andrew McCormick, "'Even If You Don't Think You Have a Relationship with China, China Has a Big Relationship with You'," *Columbia Journalism Review*, June 20, 2019; and Heather A. Conley, "The Arctic Spring: Washington Is Sleeping Through Changes at the Top of the World," *Foreign Affairs*, September 24, 2019.

45 Tom Blackwell, "How China Uses Shadowy United Front as 'Magic Weapon' to Try to Extend Its Influence in Canada," *National Post* (Canada), January 28, 2019; and Alexander Bowe, *China's Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018).

46 Eldridge, "Lecture on Chinese Communist Party Political Warfare against Japan," and Author's interviews with Japanese and U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement officials and academics, 1977-2021.

47 Kerry K. Gershaneck, "'Faux Pacifists' Imperil Japan While Empowering China," *Asia Times*, June 10, 2018, <<https://www.asiatimes.com/2018/06/article/faux-pacifists-imperil-japan-while-empowering-china/>>.

攏絡精英人士

中國對日本的「攏絡精英人士」行動是針對具行使權力，可以直接影響中共利益的決策人士。運作方式包括對目標人士進行宣傳、款待和資助軟弱且意志不夠堅定的政治人物、新聞媒體和學術機構，以及安排學者、政府官員、新聞媒體和其他意見領袖赴中國旅遊參訪的行程。經鎖定的友中政治人物往往來自自民黨的田中／竹下派系等；公明黨的宗教運動為自民黨執政聯盟之一部；自民黨內的和平主義和假和平主義派系；和反對派聯盟中的強大派系。根據作者對日本知識淵博的官員和學者的採訪，日本政府和縣市政府官員以及其他具關鍵影響力人物受到中國特務的誘惑。誘惑包括性服務及金援，許多遭鎖定對象往往遭勒索，以確保他們依從中國目的意圖行事。⁴⁸ 正如蕭其良(Hsiao)所指出的，這些攏絡精英人士活動及管道「通常最難對其加以明確分析、發現以及保持警覺和敏銳度」。

統一戰線與「友誼」組織

中國對日政治作戰採用強大的統一戰線，中共透過統一戰線發揮巨大的影響力。紐西蘭聯合陣線專家安妮·瑪麗·布雷迪(Anne-Marie Brady)表示，在日本，這些行動通常包括中國學者、立法議員與日本對應人士之間的「友好交流」所組成以及吸引日本學生和商人到中國訪問並對其進行吸收及培養的「中國人民組織」。⁴⁹ 中國還利用統一戰線支持激進份子卡吉·卡蘇多卡(Kagekiteki Katsudoka)及所謂和平主義者（假和平主義者）。從事親中、反日防衛活動。

中共統戰部在日本的附屬機構包括中國和平統一促進會的日本分會和其附屬分會，如全日本華僑中國和平統一委員會、中華全國和平統一促進會、日本華僑聯合會。這些組織促進與民間社會的溝通和交流，並努力影響地方論述。除了直接隸屬於（或附屬於）中共的統戰部前線組織外，蕭其良表示「日本也有合法的地方組織與中國統戰部及其他政治作戰組織進行合作，有些可能是有意的，有些則不是」。7個以日本為基地，積極推動日中「文化交流」的知名中日友好協會包括日中友好協會、日本國際貿易促進協會、日中文化交流協會、日中經濟協會、日中友好立法聯盟、日中協會以及日中友好中心。⁵⁰

孔子學院與中國學生會

孔子學院是中國在許多國家進行宣傳、影響和脅迫的重要工具，日本也不例外。日

48 Russell Hsiao, "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan," and Author's interviews with Japanese and U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement officials and academics, 1977-2021.

49 Scott W. Harold, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Jeffrey W. Hornung, "Chinese Disinformation Efforts on Social Media," *Research Reports* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2021), p. 111, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4373z3.html>.

50 Russell Hsiao, "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan."

本有15所孔子學院和8間孔子教室，與亞太地區其他國家相比，此數量相對較高。日本政府越來越意識到孔子學院完全受中共控制，對主辦機構的學術自由產生不利影響。與中國境內美國大使館對海外中國學生協會的控制一樣，包括間諜和學術恐嚇，日本當局越來越關注中國學生和學者協會的活動以及如何由中國駐日本大使館控制。⁵¹

中國國際友好聯誼協會

對日本國家安全尤其危險的是，中國極為成功地運用政治作戰行動，吸收退休的外國高級軍官和國防官員代表中國進行遊說。例如，中國人民解放軍透過「中國國際友好聯誼協會」(Chinese Association for International Friendly Contact, CAIFC)等組織成功地遴選外國將級軍官為對象。⁵² 中國國際友好聯誼協會成立於1984年12月，作為中國人民解放軍的政治作戰平台，其「主要職能是與國外高級國防和安全界精英人士建立並保持密切關係，包括退休高級軍官與議員。」⁵³ 該協會「透過中華人民共和國外交、國家安全、統一戰線、文宣系統和軍事系統」更有助於增進行動影響力，⁵⁴並經常贊助外國退休軍官免費訪問中國，進行政治灌輸與招募。在招募方面，為了吸引外國退休軍官，「中國國際友好聯誼協會是通往中國更廣泛商業社區的機會之窗。」在某些情況下，要求外國退休官員「同意發表支持中國立場的社論……以換取在中國的商務發展支持。」⁵⁵

就日本而言，中國國際友好聯誼交流協會還參與日本社會的廣泛領域，包括宗教組織，如阿寒宗運動(Agon Shu movement)。此外，該協會還聯繫建築師、書法協會和全球印刷公司，並舉辦由日本玩家參與的流行桌遊「圍棋」比賽。⁵⁶

軍事威脅：殺傷性、心理性和媒體作戰的關係

中國例行性進行軍事恐嚇和灰色地帶行動，並在釣魚台列島所有權、日美安全聯盟

51 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, "China's Long Arm Reaches Into American Campuses," *Foreign Policy*, March 7, 2018, <<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/07/chinas-long-arm-reaches-into-american-campuses-chinese-students-scholars-association-university-communist-party/>>; and Russell Hsiao, "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan" .

52 Gertz, "Chinese Military Engaged in Political Warfare Against the United States," and Shirley A. Kan, *U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), pp. 33-34.

53 Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, *The People's Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics* (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2013), p. 24.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid; and Capt David L. O. Hayward, RAN (Ret), "The Sovereignty Dispute in the South China Sea, Economic Considerations for the Military & Economic Security of Australia" (lecture, Royal United Service Institute Queensland, Victoria Barracks, Brisbane, September 13, 2017).

56 Russell Hsiao, "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan."

及日本對臺灣的支持等問題上脅迫日本。⁵⁷ 中共利用其媒體戰器材設備，擴大恐嚇的心理影響；事實上，中國現在有足夠的勇氣公開宣傳其透過核武攻擊摧毀日本的意願與能力。⁵⁸ 每天對日本的心理及媒體戰就反映在中共英文宣傳報刊《環球時報》的下列標題中。⁵⁹ 在這些文章中，中共威脅對日本進行軍事攻擊，以懲罰其在釣魚台列島爭端和日美安全聯盟等問題上宣稱的立場。某些文章指責日本採取縝密行動，例如對中共滲透日本工商業之調查。

- 〈中共軍艦在太平洋經宮古海峽進行的演習「顯示其已增強遠海作戰能力，向日本提出警告」〉，刊出日期：2021年6月2日。⁶⁰
- 〈中國發佈釣魚臺列嶼報告，以「重申主權，警告日美勾結」〉，刊出日期：2021年4月26日。⁶¹
- 〈中國人民解放軍055型驅逐艦首次進入日本海〉，刊出日期：2021年3月19日。⁶²
- 〈中國駐日本大使館表示，日本不應受到別有用心人士的影響〉，刊出日期：2020年12月30日。⁶³
- 〈日本配合美國戰略進行危險的賭博〉，刊出日期：2020年8月18日。⁶⁴
- 〈部署美製侵略性武器將損害日本安全局勢〉，刊出日期：2020年8月19日。⁶⁵

57 Kishi Nobuo, "Defense of Japan 2021" (Ministry of Defense, Japan), 2021.), pp. 17-18, <https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2021/DOJ2021_Digest_EN.pdf>.

58 Jamie Seidel, "China Threatens to Nuke Japan If Country Intervenes in Taiwan Conflict," *News.Com.Au*, July 19, 2021, <<https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/china-threatens-to-nuke-japan-if-country-intervenes-in-taiwan-conflict/news-story/d9af14dc6b90628082e79ab4c77629e1>>; and Jennifer Zeng, "CCP Vows to Nuke Japan Continuously Until It Surrenders Unconditionally for the Second Time," July 13, 2021, <<https://www.jenniferzengblog.com/home/2021/7/13/ccp-vows-to-nuke-japan-continuously-until-it-surrenders-unconditionally-for-the-second-time>>.

59 *China Daily* is the PRC's national English-language newspaper. It frequently runs paid supplements called "China Watch" in a variety of prestigious foreign newspapers. For a breakdown of PRC media organizations, see Elizabeth Bachman, "Black and White and Red All Over: China's Improving Foreign-Directed Media," pp. 14-16.

60 Xuanzun Liu, "Drill by PLA Warships in Pacific via Osumi Strait 'Indicates Far Sea Capability Boost, Warning to Japan,'" *Global Times*, June 2, 2021, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202106/1225229.shtml>>.

61 Hui Zhang and Xiaojing Xing, "China Issues Report on Diaoyu Islands to 'Reaffirm Sovereign Rights, Warn Japan and US Collusion,'" *Global Times*, April 26, 2021, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202104/1222162.shtml>>.

62 Xuanzun Liu, "PLA's Type 055 Destroyer Enters Sea of Japan for 1st Time," *Global Times*, March 19, 2021, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1218908.shtml>>.

63 Xing Xiaojing, "Japan Should Not Be Influenced by People with Ulterior Motives: Chinese Embassy," *Global Times*, December 30, 2020, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202012/1211468.shtml>>.

64 Song Zhongping, "Japan Makes Perilous Gamble by Coordinating with US Strategy," *Global Times*, August 19, 2020, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1198119.shtml>>.

65 Dongxu Wei, "Deploying Aggressive US Weapons Will Damage Japan's Security Situation," *Global Times*, August 19, 2020, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1198251.shtml>>.

- 〈專家表示日本不應該像澳洲那樣與美國站在同一陣線〉，刊出日期：2020年5月28日。⁶⁶

做為中國對日本持續攻擊的一部分，這些威脅和脅迫性聲明幾乎每天都透過傳統與社群媒體刊出和廣播。而且通常非中文的新聞媒體將逕自播報與引用依照中共宣傳的敘事方向。⁶⁷

目標：沖繩

沖繩縣是日美安全聯盟基礎設施的關鍵點，也是反美軍／反美軍事基地抗議之熱點，是中國特別關注的焦點。日本公共安全情報局罕見地公開承認中國對沖繩的政治作戰威脅，宣稱中國試圖「在沖繩形成有利於自己的輿論」。2012年前後，中國開始公開發布有關其文宣部宣稱的「琉球人身分未定論」的假訊息。日本公共安全情報局報告指稱，在中國設計沖繩的藉口下，中國開始「促進學術交流，深化組織成員的關係，呼籲『琉球獨立』」。公共安全情報局報告指稱，中國派遣官員前往沖繩與這些組織接觸以促進獨立。除了對學術與組織滲透，中國還透過媒體戰支持沖繩獨立運動，如《環球時報》頭條新聞「中國應履行其大國支持沖繩獨立的責任」（2012年9月17日）和「我們應該稱之為獨立的琉球，而不是沖繩」（2016年8月12日）可引以為證。北京一直在「靜靜地不時挑起此一問題。」在邁阿密大學教授中國國家安全課程的政治學教授金德芳博士 (Dr. June Teufel Dreyer)（他也是外交政策研究所亞洲計畫的高級研究員）表示，提供沖繩中國學生協會的資金，其中「一些資金也可能會用於支持反美基地的沖繩人士。」⁶⁸

心理戰行動包括致力「教育」沖繩百姓，他們與中國人「來自同一個母親的子宮」----也就是說，說服他們在種族上與中國的連結關係，因此他們應效忠中國而非日本。⁶⁹ 另一個策略是中國聲稱琉球群島在1879年日本廢除皇室政府之前，一直是一個王國，歷史上屬於中國。⁷⁰

66 Global Times Staff, "Japan Should Not Stand with US like Australia: Experts," *Global Times*, May 28, 2020, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1189871.shtml>>.

67 As one example related to the June 2, 2021 *Global Times* report cited on the previous page, see Feng, "China State Media Says Frequent Warship Activity Near Japan a Warning."

68 "Annual Report 2016: Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations" (Tokyo, Japan: Public Security Intelligence Agency (Japan), January 2017), p. 23, <<http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001255169.pdf>>; Gordan G. Chang, "Now China Wants Okinawa, Site of U.S. Bases in Japan," *The Daily Beast*, June 26, 2017, <<https://www.thedailybeast.com/now-china-wants-okinawa-site-of-us-bases-in-japan>>; and Scott W. Harold, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Jeffrey W. Hornung, "Chinese Disinformation Efforts on Social Media," p. 109.

69 Author's interviews with a U.S. counterintelligence official and Japanese academics, September 2015.

70 Patrick Boehler, "Okinawa Doesn't Belong to Japan, Says Hawkish PLA General," *South China Morning Post*, May 15, 2013, <<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1238080/okinawa-doesnt-belong-japan-says-hawkish-pla-general>>.

與上述《環球時報》頭條相關的一項重要媒體戰策略是，中國成功地在沖繩左翼（和其他日本）新聞媒體組織，與中共領導的中國相對人士間建立直接聯繫。羅伯特·艾爾德裏奇博士(Dr. Robert Eldridge)在沖繩工作近十年時間，密切觀察中國在沖繩的政治作戰。他的報告指稱：中國也在沖繩進行政治干預，並對美國基地和日本自衛隊在沖繩的活動進行敲詐、勒索、賄賂及假消息文宣。還有證據顯示，中國廣泛滲透沖繩和日本本土的大學。⁷¹

經濟戰

支持中國對日政治作戰的經濟活動種類繁多，從禁運到投資不等。例如，2010年中國在釣魚台列島問題上與日本對峙時，北京限制對日「稀土」出口，迫使東京受制於中國的要求。「稀土」之所以被稱為「稀土」，是因為它們是生產許多先進高科技設備的重要原料，包括許多國防用途設備，但很難找到及提煉。這一禁運嚴重影響日本高科技部門發展與運作。

最近，中共在對日政治作戰中使用經濟武器，包括中國在沖繩的大量投資，特別是在沖繩北部，那裡正在為嚴重擁擠的美軍沖繩中部基地遷移而修建設施。中國在沖繩和北海道投資的相關經濟／政治作戰目標是在所謂的「南北夾擊」中發展政治和經濟槓桿。此外，在新冠病毒導致日本國際旅遊幾乎停擺之前，中國近年派出越來越多遊客赴沖繩旅遊。由於中國已將旅遊業當作武器以對抗其他國家，迫使他們順從，顯然增加旅遊人數的目的，至少在一定程度上是為了建立沖繩對中國遊客的經濟依賴。這也是獲得和更多政治及經濟精英接觸和直接觀察美國和日本軍事設施的有效手段。⁷²

激進份子

有證據顯示，中國直接或間接支持日本共產主義和激進份子組織。韓戰期間，日本共產黨和其他激進份子，抗議日本支持聯合國部隊對抗中共與北韓侵略。當他們抗議日本支持世界歷史上一個更具壓迫和兇殘的南韓時，共產主義激進份子為冷戰後期及其影響後果設定模式：攻擊和破壞自由主義民主國家，並為共產主義獨裁者提供支援。⁷³ 激進份子總是指責軍國主義的民主和法西斯侵略，而忽視（或捍衛）共產主義獨裁政權的

71 Eldridge, "Lecture on Chinese Communist Party Political Warfare against Japan," ; Gershaneck, " 'Faux Pacifists' Imperil Japan While Empowering China," ; Russell Hsiao, "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan," ; and Scott W. Harold, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Jeffrey W. Hornung, "Chinese Disinformation Efforts on Social Media," p. 109.

72 Russell Hsiao, "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan" and Author's interviews with Japanese and U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement officials and academics, 1977-2021.

73 Kerry K. Gershaneck, "Taiwan's Future Depends on the Japan-America Security Alliance," *The National Interest*, June 7, 2018, <<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/taiwans-future-depends-the-japan-america-security-alliance-26167?page=show>>.

超民族主義法西斯侵略。自韓戰以來，中國已與日本的反防衛、反軍事基地組織建立統一戰線，阻撓軍事改革，癱瘓並阻礙沖繩美國海軍陸戰隊普天間(Futenma)替代設施竣工。⁷⁴

這一模式已經確立，可以預測，而且明顯是虛偽的。激進份子的新聞媒體和反防衛團體總是對日本加強防禦姿態的任何作為吹毛求疵，但他們絕不會對中國的大規模軍事集結、非法占領爭議島嶼、破壞南海、建設大規模海空軍基地、威脅亞洲和大洋洲的生態恐怖主義吭聲。

然而，他們的暴力行為證明了這些激進份子是和假和平主義者，並將簡單的偽善帶到了不同的層面——犯罪性的人身攻擊和相當於恐怖主義的積極軍事破壞。激進份子為了推動其反防衛議程，對婦女、學童和軍事設施的員工進行暴力襲擊，向日本自衛隊和美國基地以及成田機場發射迫擊砲彈，企圖導致飛機墜毀，於軍事設施安裝詭雷裝置，破壞軍事裝備，封鎖設施大門，干擾基地重要緊急應變功能。⁷⁵

根據蘭德公司(RAND Corporation)的一份報告指稱，在涉及沖繩和日本全境的美國和日本自衛隊基地的中國相關危機中，中共將利用其政治作戰機器將目標鎖定在這些軍事設施附近的社區。基於他們過去的反基地立場和行動，幾乎可以確定卡吉·卡蘇多卡份子和其他假和平主義人士會支持中共的作為。中共特工人員將試圖透過謠言、假訊息和暴力，在衝突前和衝突期間破壞和削弱美國在這些基地的軍事行動。假訊息運動可能與中共組織的抗議活動相結合，將「透過引發群眾的反對，全力阻止軍事行動；給人留下軍方正在掩蓋事故、犯罪或軍事挫敗的印象；在中國反對的情況下散佈對軍事行動是否明智和必要的疑慮，以打擊士氣或鼓勵更廣泛的政治反對。反對美國華府作出的決定，包括全力分裂任何聯盟作戰的作為」。⁷⁶

中國政治作戰重點、組織和資源

為了更加理解中華人民共和國是如何取得這些對日政治作戰勝利的成果，重要的是要檢視中共對遂行這場戰爭中分配的總體戰略指導、組織和資源。

政治作戰目標

普林斯頓大學亞倫·弗里德伯格教授(Aaron L. Friedberg)指出中共四大戰略目標，從而確定中共政治作戰行動的三個戰略目標。

第一，也是最重要的，是維護中共的權力。第二，使中國恢復到其政權認為是歐亞

74 Author's interviews with Japanese and U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement officials and academics, 1977-2021; and Chang, "Now China Wants Okinawa, Site of U.S. Bases in Japan."

75 Gershaneck, " 'Faux Pacifists' Imperil Japan While Empowering China," ; and Author's interviews with Japanese and U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement officials and academics, 1977-2021.

76 Harold, Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Hornung, "Chinese Disinformation Efforts on Social Media," p. 6.

大陸東部優越實力的適當歷史地位。第三，成為一個真正的全球參與者，其權力、存在及影響力與美國不相上下，最終超越美國。⁷⁷

此外，弗里德伯格教授表示；中國嘲諷地抨擊自稱為「所謂普世價值觀」的概念：言論和宗教自由、代議制民主、法治等等，這些都威脅著中共的合法性。因此，中國一直「公開和積極地確保專制的安全，或至少確保共產黨繼續統治中國。」他表示；自2012年習近平掌權以來，中國共產黨的作為已明顯增強。⁷⁸

2018年哈德遜研究院(Hudson Institute)的一項研究為中國政治作戰目標、目標群眾和戰略提供另一個有用的視角，此觀點既適用於日本，也適用於美國：

美國的地緣戰略權力被黨視為最終威脅，其目標是長期干預與影響運動，馴服美國的權力和自由，部分透過限制及調和美國對中共的討論。言論自由、個人權利及學術自由等自由價值觀是黨及其內部運作體系的眼中釘。⁷⁹

中國共產黨透過改變民主國家對中華人民共和國的言論和思維方式，正在為其持續崛起創造世界安全。然而，正如弗里德伯格所證明的，中國的政治作戰目標遠遠超出中共的生存需求。這些目標包括恢復中國中間王國的合法地位，特別是在歐亞大陸東部，但也跨越更遠的大陸和海洋。為此，中國試圖將美國趕出亞太地區，征服日本，並實際佔領臺灣。

弗里德伯格評估，中國「加緊利用影響力行動，試圖破壞和削弱其他國家抵制其作為的能力。最終，北京似乎想建立一個新的區域體系，以中國為中心，透過基礎設施和貿易協定將歐亞大陸連接起來。日本及其他民主國家若不是整合和附屬的，就是削弱與孤立的，如果美國不與東亞在一起，就只能閃邊站。」⁸⁰

以下簡要介紹中國為達成這些目標而致力於政治作戰的作為，包括概述中國政治作戰的特徵及屬性、資源及組織，以及中共如何在涉及日本的軍事對抗中運用政治作戰。

特徵和屬性

中國政治作戰的戰略共同特徵，包括中共透過統戰部和解放軍等組織對政治作戰進行強有力的集中指揮。這些組織提供清晰願景、思想意識及戰略，利用公開和隱蔽的方法以影響、脅迫、恐嚇、分裂和顛覆敵對國家，迫使其順從。

中國政治作戰計畫的主要特質包括對國內人口的嚴格控制和對目標國家的詳細瞭解。為了實現其目標，中共在協調行動中採用了一系列廣泛的手段。同樣重要的是，中共表現出願意接受因活動暴露而帶來的高度政治風險。

77 *Smart Competition: Adapting U.S. Strategy Toward China at 40 Years*, 116th Cong. (May 8, 2019) (statement of Aaron L. Friedberg, professor of politics and international affairs, Princeton University).

78 Aaron L. Friedberg, *Smart Competition*.

79 Parello-Plesner and Li, *The Chinese Communist Party's Foreign Interference Operations*, p. 4.

80 Aaron L. Friedberg, *Smart Competition*.

組織

一些黨和國家組織負責指導及支援中國共產黨的政治作戰行動，而瞭解關鍵要素相互之間關聯性非常重要。

中國的政治作戰組織隸屬中共最高決策機構中央政治局。在政治局內部是一個錯綜複雜且讓人迷惑的組織網。在中國共產黨／中華人民共和國的階級制度下，政治局常務委員會似乎是個「有關政治作戰決策的集散地」。⁸¹ 接受政治局指導的有中央外交委員會、中央軍事委員會、中央國家安全委員會、中國人民政治協商委員會（政協）、中央統一戰線領導小組、中央文宣思想領導小組和中央財政經濟委員會。⁸²

中國共產黨的總體政治作戰策略是由政協制定的。最高統戰官員擔任政協主席，是政治局常務委員會排名第四的成員。另外兩名政治局高層官員分別領導中宣部（也稱宣傳部）和中央統一戰線領導小組。他們兩人還任職中共秘書處；「該秘書處被授權每日就黨國的例行性集會作出決定。」⁸³

人民政協「整合參與政治作戰作為的各類人士包括：情報官員、外交官、文宣人員、黨內元老、軍官、統一戰線工作人員、學者、媒體工作者及商人」。政協常務委員會指導其他各委員會策劃戰略，然後交由各組織及機構執行。執行政協指示的機構包括解放軍、統戰部及中宣部、國務院新聞室／對外宣傳室、臺灣事務室、各部委，「以及其他社會中的大量其他人士（基金會、智庫、組織犯罪、個人）和企業」。這一戰略的有效執行取決於目標社會中對應方的合作。⁸⁴

文宣和媒體戰結構

中宣部在對日本遂行媒體戰和文宣方面負有重大責任。特別是該部門，誠如政治作戰專家彼得·馬蒂斯(Peter Mattis)所記載的；「負責黨的理論研究；引導公眾輿論；指導和協調中央通訊社的工作……指導文宣和文化系統」。⁸⁵ 中宣部的眾多職責之一是發布指導方針，明確指導如何構建新聞媒體報導以及哪些議題應該予以審查。

中國國務院新聞辦公室是最突出和最重要的黨和國家組織，負責對外宣傳工作。該辦公室實際上有兩個名稱：一個用於外部，以產生該辦公室是一個「國家」實體組織的印象；另一個用於內部，以反映實際上，它是一個共黨機關：對外宣傳辦公室。中國

81 Szu-Chien Hsu and J. Michael Cole, *Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy*, p. 4.

82 Ibid, p. 49.

83 Peter Mattis, "U.S. Responses to China's Foreign Influence Operations," testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, United States House of Representatives, 115th Congress, March 21, 2018. See also Szu-Chien Hsu and J. Michael Cole, *Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy* (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2020), pp. 3-39.

84 J. Michael Cole, "Democracy Under Fire: China's Political Warfare Against Taiwan During President Tsai Ing-Wen's First Term" (Macdonald-Laurier Institute, July 2020), p. 9, <www.MacdonaldLaurier.ca>.

85 Peter Mattis, "U.S. Responses to China's Foreign Influence Operations."

國務院新聞室／對外宣傳室在媒體戰中扮演重要角色，藉著管理在中國境內營運的外國新聞機構、分析黨國的國際大眾輿論、發布新聞稿和出版政府白皮書以及監督重大事件的外部報導。它由9個職能局和管制部門組成，下屬多個組織從事對外宣傳工作，從出版社到專業協會。中宣部指導中國國務院新聞室／對外宣傳室，其負責人為中宣部副部長。⁸⁶

情報組織

與蘇聯和當前的俄羅斯政治作戰爭模式不同，據報導：中國情報機構像是中國情報局和國務院安全部，在對外國影響行動中扮演次要角色。政治作戰專家彼得·馬蒂斯表示，經指派負責影響行動的個人很少是情報員，但通常是瞭解中共國際目標並熟練管理外國人的黨內精英。

儘管如此，重要的是要體認到，國務院安全部是「影響行動的關鍵角色」⁸⁷，國務院安全部、中國情報局和中央軍事委員會聯合參謀部情報局的情報收集是政治作戰工作整體的一部分，亦是成功執行和取得行動成果的基礎。⁸⁸

統戰部

馬蒂斯表示，統戰部是中共國、內外「統一戰線工作的執行機構」。統戰部「在政黨體系的各個層面運作」，其範圍包括「港澳臺事務、民族和宗教事務、國內外文宣、企業家和無黨派人士、知識份子以及民間交流。」以及國務院僑務辦公室。統戰部還領先成立中外企業黨委會。⁸⁹

國務院僑務辦公室在團結世界各地的僑民並與傳播和影響這些僑民的新聞媒體保持聯繫至為重要。國務院僑務辦公室的使命是「強化海外華人社區的團結和友誼；與海外華人媒體和華文學校維持聯繫並給予支持；增進海外華人和國內民眾在經濟、科學、文化和教育相關事務上的合作與交流。」⁹⁰為此，它定期邀請海外華人社區的研究人員、媒體人士和社區領袖返國參加各種會議。

美中經濟和安全審查委員會的亞歷山大·鮑伊(Alexander Bowe)寫道：統戰部由9個局和4個辦公室組成，所有這些部門在一定程度上都能在媒體戰中發揮作用。值得注意的是，「香港、澳門、臺灣和海外聯絡局」直接針對日本，但鮑伊對每一個局、室的分析的單位會影響日本目標民眾。以下為鮑伊的分析，每個局、室的名稱後面附有簡要的說明：⁹¹

86 Elizabeth Bachman, "Black and White and Red All Over: China's Improving Foreign-Directed Media," pp. 6-7.

87 Szu-Chien Hsu and J. Michael Cole, *Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy*, pp. 65, 69.

88 Peter Mattis, "A Guide to Chinese Intelligence Operations," *War on the Rocks*, August 18, 2015.

89 Peter Mattis, "U.S. Responses to China's Foreign Influence Operations."

90 Peter Mattis, "U.S. Responses to China's Foreign Influence Operations."

- 黨務局：「處理中國八個非共產主義政黨事務。」
- 民族和宗教工作局：「關注中國的少數民族。」
- 香港、澳門、臺灣和海外聯絡局：「處理這些地區和海外華人事務。」
- 幹部局：「培育統一陣線人員。」
- 經濟局：「負責中國低度開發地區聯絡事宜。」
- 獨立無黨派知識份子工作局：「負責中國知識份子聯繫工作。」
- 西藏局：「培養西藏忠誠度，鎮壓分裂主義。」
- 新社會階層代表工作局：「促進中國中產階級的政治支持。」
- 新疆局：「培養新疆忠誠度，鎮壓分裂主義。」
- 綜合辦公室：「協調業務和行政工作。」
- 黨委會辦公室：「負責思想和紀律事務。」
- 政策研究室：「研究統一戰線理論和政策，協調文宣。」
- 退休幹部辦公室：「執行有關離職／退休人員政策。」

鮑伊寫道，「中共的一系列軍事和民間組織也積極開展統一戰線工作，一方面直接為統戰部工作，一方面接受政協更廣泛的領導。」例如，促進中國大陸和臺灣統一的中國和平統一促進會，在90個國家中至少有200個分會，包括先前討論過的日本分會。⁹²

儘管許多其他黨國組織並未特別專注在中共的政治作戰工作上，卻也作出相當貢獻。馬蒂斯報告中指稱：「許多機構以掩護或魁儡組織方式參與影響行動，這些平台有時會在適當的時候借給其他機構使用。」這些黨國組織的例子包括民政部、文化部、教育部、外交部、國家安全部、國家外專局、新華社、中國社會科學院、媒體相關機構（於後續章節介紹）以及解放軍政治工作部聯絡局。⁹³

資源：資金和經濟措施

中國並未公布其在政治作戰行動中的投資金額，但中國是世界第二大經濟體，顯然中國共產黨在海外影響力行動中投入巨大資源。據消息來源指出，中國在2015年對外政治作戰的投資估計為100億美元。⁹⁴ 然而，就2015年的估計可能過低，就像2009年《南華早報》一篇文章援引中國官員所述，僅僅為了「改善國家國際形象」，在媒體戰行動上就投資了約60億美元。⁹⁵ 無論2015年確切金額為何，在2021年終發表此研究同時，這

91 Alexander Bowe, *China's Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018), p. 5.

92 Bowe, *China's Overseas United Front Work*, 8.

93 See Peter Mattis, "U.S. Responses to China's Foreign Influence Operations" and Szu-Chien Hsu and J. Michael Cole, *Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy*, p. 57.

94 David Shambaugh, "China's Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect," *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 4 (July/August 2015), pp. 99-107.

95 Elizabeth Bachman, "Black and White and Red All Over: China's Improving Foreign-Directed Media," p. 23.

類政治作戰投資金額水平肯定是要高得多。

資金在這場全球政治作戰中極為重要。透過公開或秘密的軍事，經濟或其他攻擊的威脅來增加資金實屬必要。與冷戰時期不同的是，意識形態在當前與中國衝突中的角色不重。如同中國與美國的作者們所言：相較全球影響力的解釋，「幾乎沒有任何國家渴望採用中國模式。毛澤東災難性的大躍進、文化大革命、集體農場、國有企業、平等主義貧困（黨內特權人士除外），除了其他獨裁政權外，專制政府幾乎沒有甚麼吸引力。」⁹⁶然而，北京過去30年的經濟增長現象已提供不同的模式。僅憑中國的一帶一路計畫提供巨大額外資源來支持政治和媒體戰，因為一帶一路被視為正確的全球統戰策略。⁹⁷

隨著中國經濟規模及相對快速的增長，中共確實以近乎慷慨的方式協助許多新聞媒體、政治和其他有影響力的精英人士脫離貧困。正如所述，資金已被證明是支持和實踐中國全球野心最強而有力的動機。對於那些從慷慨資助中受益的人們來說，他們的決定似乎為大規模擴張的中國軍力以及其虎視眈眈的政治作戰和情報機構予以合理化。

北京也經常在其政治作戰行動中武裝其經濟手段。中國幾乎是所有西太平洋國家的最大貿易夥伴，其商譽對這些國家的發展和繁榮至關重要。巴貝奇指出：「因此，如果中國政權希望對一個地區國家或關鍵企業領導人施加壓力，它有許多經濟手腕可操弄，而它的確做到了。」一個值得注意的案例是中國的旅遊制裁、抵制樂天(Lotte)零售連鎖店，以及在首爾承諾主導美國飛彈防禦系統後，對韓國報復。⁹⁸中國經常運用其他經濟手段，向先前討論過的向稀土國家施壓，扣留來自日本的稀土、旅遊制裁、抵制跨國公司和運動聯盟、抵制臺灣鳳梨、澳洲葡萄酒等商品，以及其他報復手段。⁹⁹

解放軍在政治作戰中的角色

解放軍在中國政治作戰組織中扮演重要角色。在中共中央軍事委員會的領導下，解放軍政治工作部擔任其政治作戰指揮部。政治工作部及其前身「解放軍總政治部」，被描述為「在政治、金融、軍事行動和情報的聯系運作的聯結董事會」。¹⁰⁰解放軍戰略支援部隊和「311基地」及解放軍新聞媒體中心提供政治工作部大部分的三種作戰能力。

中共對日本作戰中的政治作戰

96 Thomas Lum et al., *China and the U.S.: Comparing Global Influence* (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2010), p. 7.

97 Anne-Marie Brady, "Exploit Every Rift: United Front Work Goes Global," in *Party Watch Annual Report 2018* (Washington, DC: Center for Advanced China Research, 2018), p. 36.

98 Babbage, *Winning Without Fighting*, vol. I, pp. 38-39.

99 Ibid.

100 J. Michael Cole, "Unstoppable: China's Secret Plan to Subvert Taiwan," *National Interest*, March 23, 2015; and Szu-Chien Hsu and J. Michael Cole, *Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy*, p. 66. The People's Liberation Army General Political Department was reorganized as the CMC Political Work Department in 2016.

透過政治作戰運用，中共已取得不戰而屈人之兵的戰略勝利顯著戰果。但是，如果中國的統治者洞悉，單靠政治作戰不能達成他們所望的戰果----例如，釣魚台列島和東海或南海 -----他們可以選擇使用傳統作戰並透過非傳統作戰增援來實現目標。在追求其灰色區域和軍事脅迫的情況下，戰爭也有可能意外地被中國過分積極的行動引發。¹⁰¹無論意外事件如何引發衝突，中國都將在所有敵對行動之前、中、後期進行政治作戰行動。前美國資深海軍情報官海軍上校詹姆斯·艾爾·馮爾斯(James E. Fanell)評估在任何武裝衝突中，「中國為輿論的戰鬥將是其第二戰場」，在此一戰場，中共將遂行「廣泛」的政治作戰行動。¹⁰²

中共採用政治作戰支持以往眾多的軍事行動，包括介入1950年的韓戰、1951年的吞併西藏、1962年中印戰爭、1969年中蘇聯盟邊境衝突、1974年與越南對於西沙群島的作戰、1979年中越戰爭、1988年攻擊越南南沙群島、1995年佔領菲律賓的美濟礁、2017年與印度和不丹在都蘭的軍事對峙及2020年與2021年和印度部隊對抗。

具體而言，中共運用政治作戰以維持良好士氣，在國內外取得公眾支持，削弱敵人作戰意志，並改變敵人情勢評估。媒體戰在取得「對實施心理及法律戰的主導權」方面特別重要。中國「團結友邦，瓦解敵人」的原則，將指導其在武裝衝突期間的政治作戰措施，如同中共策畫對事件、行動和政策的宣傳說詞，以引導國際對話並影響其友邦和對手的政策。¹⁰³

中國戰略文學特別強調，倘若真的爆發衝突，在衝突爆發之前以「三戰」克服敵人的角色，以確保勝利。因此，政治作戰將被用來破壞其對手在衝突中所採取立場的合法性，特別是日本和美國，並試圖破壞盟國以武力捍衛這些立場以支持日本和美國的意願。¹⁰⁴

「三戰」確立了「戰場認知準備，被視為在和平與戰爭期間增進中國利益的關鍵」。中共軍官在其職業生涯早期熟悉運用此三種作戰方式，隨著官階高升，它們深入研究軍事戰略的各種理念，包括軍官學校的軍事科學、國防大學的軍事戰略及輿論戰入門、心理戰和法律戰。¹⁰⁵透過研究戰史和兵棋推演，中共高級官員和解放軍指揮官們學習運用媒體戰、心理戰與法律戰在作戰前及作戰中來操控敵人的認知過程，並針對敵國和戰

101 Cortez A. Cooper III, "China's Military Is Ready for War: Everything You Need to Know," *National Interest*, August 18, 2019.

102 CAPT James E. Fanell, USN (ret), "China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure: Pathway to Hegemony," testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States House of Representatives, 115th Congress, May 17, 2018.

103 Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, *The People's Liberation Army General Political Department*, p. 3.

104 Stefan Halper, "China: The Three Warfares (Prepared for Andy Marshall, Director, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense)," pp. 13, 162.

105 Elsa Kania, "The PLA's Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares," Jamestown Foundation, *China Brief* 16, no. 13, August 22, 2016.

區指揮編組和前進部署部隊為目標。¹⁰⁶

在支援戰鬥部隊方面，宣傳部、戰略支持部隊、統戰部，和其他從事政治作戰單位，將積極支持攻勢和守禦作戰。在攻擊作戰行動中，這些單位的重點將是「取得先制」以建立資訊優勢。在防禦作戰行動中，他們將被用來對抗日本和美國的資訊作為，並確保解放軍人員和一般中國民眾不會暴露於對手的情資中，或不讓這些資訊在民眾心中紮根。

根據過去二十年的危機經驗，在危機或衝突的初始階段，中國的政治作戰目標和行動可能會以下列方式展開：¹⁰⁷

1. 建立中國事件的版本。中共完全明白，無論哪一方先公布事件始末，就取得輿論優勢。因此，公開發布的聲明，包括用於廣播、網路和印刷傳播的精美產品都要預先準備（或者，如果衝突爆發是非計畫的，則在危機爆發後立即採取行動），以確立中國對所發生事件的立場。

2. 頒布解決事件的原則聲明。中國官員通常會在任何談判開始時使用這些「原則」，當作設定討論的參數以及最低限度可接受的決議基準，以符合北京對中國民眾的承諾。三戰將用於向國內外觀眾傳播中國對這些原則的承諾公開聲明。

3. 關閉非官方但正常的資訊管道。中共將迅速建立資訊管制和掌控媒體播送，以不斷框架和塑造隨後的辯論。美國高級官員、記者及學者常常抱怨他們的中方對應人員拒絕溝通，包括在可能發生危機開始時經由個人渠道的溝通。這將是中共在武裝衝突中對日本的標準作業程序一貫作法。

4. 強調北京對中日關係的承諾。藉堅決表達其本身對雙邊關係的承諾，中國意指東京（或美國或任何其他目標國家或聯盟）並沒有認真地看待這種關係，並且應該譴責武裝衝突對雙邊關係所造成的所有潛在損害。藉傳達統一戰線和三戰的訊息，中共將試圖將危機成為測試日本的善意和意圖的試點。

除了在武裝衝突中運用三種作戰之外，中國可能會採用像俄羅斯在2014年併吞克里米亞的一樣方式，使用「混合戰」和其他「積極手段」。¹⁰⁸ 無論是透過實際報導還是作為更廣泛的欺騙行動的一部分，中國很有可能透過其媒體通路處理其混合戰行動。科爾特斯·庫珀(Cortez A. Cooper)寫道；混合戰涉及「軍事和準軍事部隊作戰，是在戰爭門檻下作戰，例如增加出現在捕魚船隊和支援海上民兵和海軍艦艇爭議水域的次數」，這有可能「在菲律賓、越南或日本反對中方聲討領土主權作出回應時引發衝突」。¹⁰⁹ 中華人民共和國已經對日本進行混合戰，中共肯定會持續加強這種類型作戰，作為攻擊日本的準備。¹¹⁰

106 Stefan Halper, "China: The Three Warfares (Prepared for Andy Marshall, Director, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense)," pp. 90-94.

107 Ibid, pp. 73-74.

108 James E. Fanell, USN (ret), "China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure."

109 Cooper, "China's Military Is Ready for War."

一旦武裝衝突爆發，中共很可能會配合其政治作戰行動，以支持和掩護混合戰。為此，法內爾(Fanell)認為中國「將使用非傳統作戰以擴大傳統軍事作戰的效果，例如破壞，假信息和錯誤信息（現在通常被稱為「假新聞」）和網路攻擊。以網路對心理戰的運作是此一策略的關鍵。」解放軍將運用其媒體和心理作戰部隊，特別是位於福州的311基地，該基地隸屬於解放軍戰略支援部隊並和網軍部隊密切作業。¹¹¹

如前所言，中國將在其啟動任何敵對行動之前，中、後期間進行政治作戰行動。在軍事對抗之前，其政治作戰將支持一場全球政治戰運動，該運動利用統一陣線組織和其他支持者發起抗議和支持「和平」集會，以阻撓國際反應。除了所謂的和平集會之外，中國還將鼓勵日本的激進份子對軍事基地、重要交通節點和其他戰略地點執行暴力行動以影響日本和美國的軍事回應。¹¹²

在其媒體戰中，中共將使用互聯網、社群媒體戰、電視和廣播傳播宣傳，進行心理戰，並實施精密的欺騙措施。歷史證明，政治作戰往往與中國的戰略欺騙行動相關，這些行動旨在敵人作出有效反應前，混淆或延遲其防禦行動。¹¹³

解放軍可能會在戰爭的初始階段透過「第一擊」來掌握先制權。中國的政策規定，「觸發中國軍事回應的第一擊未必是軍事行動；政治和戰略領域的行動也可以證明是有效的中國軍事回應。」¹¹⁴ 如此對回應的觸發行動可能被認為是輕微的外交溝通不良，或是政府官員的聲明，該聲明足以讓中國感到不快，需要做出回應。

當中國人民解放軍及其輔助部隊對日本進行熱戰時，中國將利用政治作戰來困擾和讓日本決策者心灰意冷，同時也試圖從「騎牆派」（初期尚未決定的國家）那裡爭取對中國立場的支持。法內爾表示，「除了標準的宣傳外，還將使用假訊息和欺騙手段，例如不實報導國家政府或軍隊投降、暴行和／或其它違反國際法的行為，以及其它旨在轉移或癱瘓〔美國〕及其友邦和聯盟國決策的報導。」

在國內，支持作戰行動的中共政治作戰，對於動員群眾支持中華人民共和國的作戰行動具有重要意義。無論作戰勝利還是失敗，這種政治作戰將在與日本的軍事對抗後持續運作。¹¹⁵

日本對中共政治作戰的回應

本文為日本面臨中國政治作戰戰略、戰術、科技及各項過程無情、多方面的猛烈攻

110 David R. Ignatius, "China's Hybrid Warfare against Taiwan," *Washington Post*, December 14, 2018.

111 James E. Fanell, USN (ret), "China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure."

112 Author's discussions and interviews with Japanese officials and academics and U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement officials, 1977-2021.

113 James E. Fanell, "China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure."

114 Anthony H. Cordesman and Steven Colley, *Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2015: A Comparative Analysis* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015), p. 109.

115 Fanell, *China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure*.

擊提出論證。和許多其他民主國家一樣，日本也未做好充分準備以面對和擊敗這一對其自由、繁榮和主權的潛在生存威脅。埃爾德里奇博士和其他可靠的消息來源引用了日本許多未能有效偵測、阻止和擊敗中國政治作戰的原因，如下所述：¹¹⁶

- 脆弱、無效的反情報和反間諜法。
- 資金不足的反情報能力。
- 脆弱和無效的保密法。
- 脆弱和無效的外國土地採購法。
- 入籍文件處理不當，難以追蹤中國特工人員。
- 對外國居民的監管不力（中國居民佔大多數）。
- 對外國學生和研究人員的監督不足（中國佔大多數）。
- 日本歷史上主政的執政黨遭親中派分裂。
- 執政黨（兩黨）聯盟內有一個親中國的政黨。

因此，日本的政府官員、新聞媒體和學界就此存在威脅的議題公開披露一些非機密的媒體報導和學術研究論文。在政府和機構層面，日本缺乏實際能力認識中共政治作戰的威脅、教育其精英和官員瞭解政治作戰、將對抗政治作戰的資源優先化，並計畫和實施嚇阻、反擊和擊敗政治作戰。換言之，日本正為變成「戰敗的日本」創造出完美的處方。

面對北京的政治作戰，日本早該重新評估其脆弱性、能力和戰略以對抗並建立戰勝它的意志和能力。

日本對有關中國政治作戰挑戰和2040年命運的選擇其實相當簡單：

日本政府必須培育為民主和主權而戰的意志力和能力，否則日本人民必須學會在慘敗中向殘酷鎮壓、種族滅絕、極權主義的中國共產黨磕頭。

翻譯／黃基禎，備役上校（陸），英國Newcastle大學政治學博士；現職美國喬治梅森大學政府與政策學院客座副教授。

譯審／孫百順，美國東南大學企管碩士；現職國防大學語文中心英語教師。

116 Eldridge, “Lecture on Chinese Communist Party Political Warfare against Japan” and Author's discussions and interviews with Japanese officials and academics and U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement officials, 1977-2021.

參考文獻

- “Annual Report 2016: Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations” (Tokyo, Japan: Public Security Intelligence Agency (Japan), January 2017), p. 23, <<http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001255169.pdf>>.
- “China Slams Use of Bringing up Human Rights Issues with Political Motives as ‘Immoral’,” *Global Times*, December 12, 2018.
- “China's Intentions and Her Place in the World,” *U.S. Naval Institute Blog* dated 1 March 2010, <<https://blog.usni.org/posts/2010/03/01/chinas-intentions-and-her-place-in-the-world>>.
- “China's Repressive Reach Is Growing,” *Washington Post*, September 27, 2019.
- “Global Brands Better Stay Away from Politics,” *Global Times*, October 7, 2019.
- “The Day the NBA Fluttered before China,” *Washington Post*, October 7, 2019.
- “Up to One Million Detained in China's Mass ‘Re-Education’ Drive,” *Amnesty International*, September 2018.
- Akbar, Arifa, “Mao's Great Leap Forward ‘Killed 45 Million in Four Years’,” *Independent*, September 17, 2010.
- Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany, “China's Long Arm Reaches Into American Campuses,” *Foreign Policy*, March 7, 2018, <<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/07/chinas-long-arm-reaches-into-american-campuses-chinese-students-scholars-association-university-communist-party/>>.
- Allison, Graham, “What Xi Jinping Wants,” *Atlantic*, May 31, 2017.
- Author's interviews with Japanese and U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement officials and academics, 1977-2021.
- Babbage, Ross, Bianchi, Jack, Snelder, Julian, Yoshihara, Toshi, Friedberg, Aaron, and Rolland, Nadège, “Which Way the Dragon? Sharpening Allied Perceptions of China's Strategic Trajectory,” *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)*, August 6, 2020, Ch. 3, pp. 23-26, <<https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/which-way-the-dragon-sharpening-allied-perceptions-of-chinas-strategic-trajectory>>.
- Babbage, Ross, *Winning without Fighting: Chinese and Russian Political Warfare Campaigns and How the West Can Prevail*, vol. I (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019).
- Bachman, Elizabeth, “Black and White and Red All Over: China's Improving Foreign-Directed Media,” (Center for Naval Analysis, August 2020), pp. 14-16, 76.
- Birtles, Bill, “China's President Xi Jinping Is Pushing a Marxist Revival-but How Communist Is It Really?,” Australia Broadcasting Corporation, May 3, 2018.
- Blackwell, Tom, “How China Uses Shadowy United Front as ‘Magic Weapon’ to Try to

- Extend Its Influence in Canada,” *National Post* (Canada), January 28, 2019.
- Blanchard, Ben, “China's Top Paper Says Australian Media Reports Are Racist,” *Reuters*, December 11, 2017.
- Boehler, Patrick, “Okinawa Doesn't Belong to Japan, Says Hawkish PLA General,” *South China Morning Post*, May 15, 2013, <<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1238080/okinawa-doesnt-belong-japan-says-hawkish-pla-general>>.
- Bowe, Alexander, *China's Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018).
- Brady, Anne-Marie, “Exploit Every Rift: United Front Work Goes Global,” in *Party Watch Annual Report 2018* (Washington, DC: Center for Advanced China Research, 2018), p. 36.
- Brahm, Laurence, “Nothing Will Stop China's Progress,” *China Daily*, October 2, 2019.
- Buruma, Ian, “The Tenacity of Chinese Communism,” *New York Times*, September 28, 2019.
- Chang, Gordan G., “Now China Wants Okinawa, Site of U.S. Bases in Japan,” *The Daily Beast*, June 26, 2017, <<https://www.thedailybeast.com/now-china-wants-okinawa-site-of-us-bases-in-japan>>.
- Chen, Liu, “US Should Stop Posing as a ‘Savior’ ,” *PLA Daily*, September 27, 2019.
- Cole, J. Michael, “Democracy Under Fire: China's Political Warfare Against Taiwan During President Tsai Ing-Wen's First Term” (Macdonald-Laurier Institute, July 2020), p. 9, <www.MacdonaldLaurier.ca>.
- Cole, J. Michael, “Unstoppable: China's Secret Plan to Subvert Taiwan,” *National Interest*, March 23, 2015.
- Conley, Heather A., “The Arctic Spring: Washington Is Sleeping Through Changes at the Top of the World,” *Foreign Affairs*, September 24, 2019.
- Cook, Sarah, “The Implications for Democracy of China's Globalizing Media Influence,” *Freedom and Media Report 2019: Media Freedom: A Downward Spiral* (Freedom House, 2019), <<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-and-media/2019/media-freedom-downward-spiral>>.
- Cooper III, Cortez A., “China's Military Is Ready for War: Everything You Need to Know,” *National Interest*, August 18, 2019.
- Copp, Tara and Mehta, Aaron, “New Defense Intelligence Assessment Warns China Nears Critical Military Milestone,” *Defense News*, January 15, 2019.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. and Colley, Steven, *Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2015: A Comparative Analysis* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015).
- Danby, Nick, “China's Navy Looms Larger,” *Harvard Political Review*, 5 October 2019.

- Doehler, Austin, “How China Challenges the EU in the Western Balkans,” *Diplomat*, September 25, 2019.
- Eldridge, Robert, D., “Lecture on Chinese Communist Party Political Warfare against Japan” (Webinar Lecture, Ateneo School of Government, Quezon City, Philippines, April 21, 2021).
- Fanell, James E. USN (ret), “China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure: Pathway to Hegemony,” testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States House of Representatives, 115th Congress, May 17, 2018.
- Feng, John, “China State Media Says Frequent Warship Activity Near Japan a Warning,” *Newsweek*, June 2, 2021, <<https://www.newsweek.com/china-state-media-says-frequent-warship-activity-near-japan-warning-1596856>>.
- Garnaut, John, “Australia's China Reset,” *The Monthly* (Australia), August 2018.
- Gershaneck, Kerry K., “‘Faux Pacifists’ Imperil Japan While Empowering China,” *Asia Times*, June 10, 2018, <<https://www.asiatimes.com/2018/06/article/faux-pacifists-imperil-japan-while-empowering-china/>>.
- Gershaneck, Kerry K., “Taiwan's Future Depends on the Japan-America Security Alliance,” *The National Interest*, June 7, 2018, <<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/taiwans-future-depends-the-japan-america-security-alliance-26167?page=show>>.
- Gershaneck, Kerry K., *Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China's Plan to “Win without Fighting,”* First (2044 Broadway Drive, Quantico, VA 22134: Marine Corps University Press, 2020), <[https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/Political Warfare_web.pdf](https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/Political%20Warfare_web.pdf)>.
- Gertz, Bill, “Japan Sees China as a Threat, Ties Security to U.S. Defense of Taiwan,” *Washington Times*, June 4, 2021.
- Gitter, David A. and Erdahl, Brock M., “Telling China's Story Well: An Investigation into Chinese Influence Operations Targeting American Chinese-Language Media Outlets,” (Center for Advanced China Research, June 15, 2020), pp. 2-4.
- Gitter, David, Lu, Sandy, and Erdahl, Brock, “China Will Do Anything to Deflect Coronavirus Blame,” *Foreign Policy*, March 30, 2020.
- Global Times Staff, “Japan Should Not Stand with US like Australia: Experts,” *Global Times*, May 28, 2020, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1189871.shtml>>.
- Grossman, Derek, et al., *America's Pacific Island Allies: The Freely Associated States and Chinese Influence* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2019), <<https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2973>>.
- Hayward, David L. O., RAN (Ret), “The Sovereignty Dispute in the South China Sea, Economic Considerations for the Military & Economic Security of Australia” (lecture, Royal United Service Institute Queensland, Victoria Barracks, Brisbane, September 13, 2017).
- Halper, Stefan, *China: The Three Warfares* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense,

2013), p. 11.

Harold, Scott W., Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Nathan, and Hornung, Jeffrey W., “Chinese Disinformation Efforts on Social Media,” Research Reports (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2021), pp. 109, 111, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4373z3.html>.

Hearing on U.S. Policy in the Indo-Pacific Region: Hong Kong, Alliances and Partnerships, and Other Issues, 116th Cong. (September 18, 2019) (Statement, David Stilwell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs).

Hsiao, Russell, “A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan,” *China Brief, Jamestown Foundation* 19, no. 12 (June 26, 2019), <<https://jamestown.org/program/a-preliminary-survey-of-ccp-influence-operations-in-japan/>>.

Hsu, Szu-Chien and Cole, J. Michael, *Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy* (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2020).

Johnson, Ian, “Who Killed More: Hitler, Stalin, or Mao?,” *New York Review of Books*, February 5, 2018.

Kan, Shirley A., *U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), pp. 33-34.

Kania, Elsa, “The PLA's Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares,” Jamestown Foundation, *China Brief* 16, no. 13, August 22, 2016.

Keena, Colm, “China Cables: ‘The Largest Incarceration of a Minority since the Holocaust’ ,” *Irish Times*, November 24, 2019.

King, Amy, “Hurting the Feelings of the Chinese People,” *Sources and Methods* (blog), Wilson Center, February 15, 2017.

Lintner, Bertil, “A Chinese War in Myanmar,” *Asia Times*, April 5, 2017.

Liu, Xuanzun, “Drill by PLA Warships in Pacific via Osumi Strait ‘Indicates Far Sea Capability Boost, Warning to Japan,’ ” *Global Times*, June 2, 2021, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202106/1225229.shtml>>.

Liu, Xuanzun, “PLA's Type 055 Destroyer Enters Sea of Japan for 1st Time,” *Global Times*, March 19, 2021, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1218908.shtml>>.

Lopez, C. Todd, “Southcom Commander: Foreign Powers Pose Security Concerns,” U.S. Southern Command, October 4, 2019.

Lum, Thomas, et al., *China and the U.S.: Comparing Global Influence* (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2010).

Mattis, Peter, “A Guide to Chinese Intelligence Operations,” *War on the Rocks*, August 18, 2015.

Mattis, Peter, “U.S. Responses to China's Foreign Influence Operations,” testimony before the

- House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, United States House of Representatives, 115th Congress, March 21, 2018.
- McCormick, Andrew, “ ‘Even If You Don't Think You Have a Relationship with China, China Has a Big Relationship with You’ ,” *Columbia Journalism Review*, June 20, 2019.
- Mosher, Steven W., *Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World* (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), pp. 1-2.
- Newsham, Grant, “China ‘Political Warfare’ Targets US-Affiliated Pacific Islands,” *Asia Times*, August 5, 2019.
- Nobuo, Kishi, “Defense of Japan 2021” (Ministry of Defense, Japan), 2021.), pp.17-18, <https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2021/DOJ2021_Digest_EN.pdf>.
- Parello-Plesner, Jonas and Li, Belinda, *The Chinese Communist Party's Foreign Interference Operations: How the U.S. and Other Democracies Should Respond* (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2018).
- Pence, Michael J., “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy Toward China” (speech, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, October 4, 2018).
- Qiao, Liang and Wang, Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999).
- Qin, Amy and Creswell, Julie, “For Companies in China, Political Hazards Are Getting Harder to See,” *New York Times*, October 8, 2019.
- Secretary of State Pompeo, Michael R., “Determination of the Secretary of State on Atrocities in Xinjiang” (Washington D.C., January 19, 2021).
- Seidel, Jamie, “China Threatens to Nuke Japan If Country Intervenes in Taiwan Conflict,” *News.Com.Au*, July 19, 2021, <<https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/china-threatens-to-nuke-japan-if-country-intervenes-in-taiwan-conflict/news-story/d9af14dc6b90628082e79ab4c77629e1>>.
- Shambaugh, David, “China's Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect,” *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 4 (July/August 2015), pp. 99-107.
- Smart Competition: Adapting U.S. Strategy Toward China at 40 Years*, 116th Cong. (May 8, 2019) (statement of Aaron L. Friedberg, professor of politics and international affairs, Princeton University).
- Song, Zhongping, “Japan Makes Perilous Gamble by Coordinating with US Strategy,” *Global Times*, August 19, 2020, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1198119.shtml>>.
- Stokes, Mark and Hsiao, Russell, *The People's Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics* (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2013), p. 24.
- Taber, Robert, *The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice* (New

York: Citadel Press, 1970).

Tatlow, Didi Kirsten, “Mapping China-in-Germany,” *Sinopsis*, October 2, 2019.

Trump, Donald J., “United States Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China,” White House, May 20, 2020.

Wang, Maya, Richardson, Sophie, Adams, Brad, Ross, James, and Saunders, Joseph, “ ‘Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots’ China's Crimes against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims,” *Human Rights Watch*, April 19, 2021, <<https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting>>.

Wei, Dongxu, “Deploying Aggressive US Weapons Will Damage Japan's Security Situation,” *Global Times*, August 19, 2020, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1198251.shtml>>.

WHO Staff, “WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard September 8, 2021” (WHO COVID-19 Homepage: World Health Organization (WHO), September 8, 2021), <<https://covid19.who.int>>.

Xi, Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (speech, 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, China, October 18, 2017).

Xing, Xiaojing, “Japan Should Not Be Influenced by People with Ulterior Motives: Chinese Embassy,” *Global Times*, December 30, 2020, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202012/1211468.shtml>>.

Yang, Han and Wen Zongduo, “Belt and Road Reaches Out to the World,” *China Daily*, September 30, 2019.

Yuan, Li, “China Masters Political Propaganda for the Instagram Age,” *New York Times*, October 5, 2019.

Zeng, Jennifer, “CCP Vows to Nuke Japan Continuously Until It Surrenders Unconditionally for the Second Time,” July 13, 2021, <<https://www.jenniferzengblog.com/home/2021/7/13/ccp-vows-to-nuke-japan-continuously-until-it-surrenders-unconditionally-for-the-second-time>>.

Zhang, Hui and Xing, Xiaojing, “China Issues Report on Diaoyu Islands to ‘Reaffirm Sovereign Rights, Warn Japan and US Collusion’,” *Global Times*, April 26, 2021, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202104/1222162.shtml>>.

Zhen, Liu, “China's Latest Display of Military Might Suggests Its ‘Nuclear Triad’ Is Complete,” *South China Morning Post*, 2 October 2019.

China's Political Warfare Against Japan: How Great is the Threat?

Kerry K. Gershaneck

Senior Fellow for Regional Security & Geopolitical Trends with the Global Risk Mitigation Foundation in Honolulu, Hawaii

Introduction: Japan 2040

As the sun's rays break through the Tokyo's cold, gray eastern horizon on the morning of January 1, 2040, Japan stands alone. On Tokyo's streets and in the prime minister's office, where once national pride and confidence abounded, a sense of demoralization and defeat pervades. As a result of the China's aggressive, skillful, and persistent political warfare, Japan is now, in effect, a vassal state of the People's Republic of China: politically isolated; militarily, diplomatically, and economically impotent; fearful and uncertain.¹

To Japan's south, Chinese Navy ballistic missile and attack submarines routinely deploy from Taiwan's east coast, as People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and Air Force aircraft and surface warships enforce China's "settled sovereignty" across the East China Sea and through the Nansei Shoto, down through the South China Sea and the Bohai Channel. When Taiwan (Republic of China) succumbed to China's relentless political warfare and reluctantly accepted annexation by the communist state in 2031, the "First Island Chain" (of which Japan is an integral part) was irreparably broken. PLA forces immediately occupied Taiwan's military bases, to ensure complete subjugation of--and retribution against--the population of the so-called "renegade province." More important from the Politburo's perspective, Taiwan is now a power projection platform for China's military might. The occupying PLA air, naval and ground forces brought with them ballistic missiles that were quickly emplaced throughout Taiwan. Hundreds of these missiles are now aimed primarily at Japan, since the Philippines has not posed a threat to China since 2024 when it abrogated its defense treaty with the U.S. and allowed the PLA unconstrained access to Philippine military facilities.

¹ The scenario described in the *Introduction* is based primarily on plausible PRC regional expansion through 2035 envisioned in the *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments* (CSBA) study "Which Way the Dragon? Sharpening Allied Perceptions of China's Strategic Trajectory" by Ross Babbage, Jack Bianchi, Julian Snelder, Toshi Yoshihara, Aaron Friedberg and Nadège Rolland, (August 6, 2020), Ch. 3, pp. 23-26, <<https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/which-way-the-dragon-sharpening-allied-perceptions-of-chinas-strategic-trajectory>>.

To Japan's southwest, the Korean peninsula offers equally bleak prospects. The PLA routinely sails and flies from bases in the Republic of Korea once reserved for American forces, before South Korea abrogated the ROK-US alliance in 2036. Chinese Navy flotillas sail from Pusan and Pohang to join other PLA Navy fleets for live-fire exercises in the Korean Sea (formerly called the Sea of Japan) and East China Sea, and deep within Nansei Shoto waters. With Taiwan now in Beijing's hands, the Ryukyu islands are now the focus for Beijing's next planned regional conquest. An increasingly violent “Okinawa Independence Movement”, funded in large part by CCP-affiliated organizations, initiates near-daily protests, strikes, and terrorist attacks on Japan Self Defense Force facilities in the prefecture, as CCP-affiliated Okinawan news media feed the Ryukyuan population intense pro-PRC propaganda on a 24/7/365 basis.

To Japan's northwest, the threat posed by the PLA and Russian forces looms ominously, as it has since Russia and the PRC signed their *Treaty of Security and Mutual Defense* in 2026. Combined Russian and Chinese flotillas and aircraft formations now routinely circumnavigate the islands of Japan, with Beijing and Moscow disdainful of the meek demarches put forth in their capitals by Japanese diplomats in response. With its sea lanes of communications effectively blocked north, south, and west and subject to Beijing's decrees, Japan's seaborne commerce, fishing fleets, and ocean resources extraction industries suffer tremendously.

Throughout Japan's more-distant horizons, the political and military situation is similarly dismal. Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar also provide fulltime basing to PLA forces. The Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), now effectively comprised of tributary states of Beijing, join the PRC routinely to batter Japan politically and economically as punishments for Tokyo's alleged wrongdoings and perceived failures, both historical and recent.

To the far south, Oceania is increasingly colonized by overwhelming numbers of Chinese “migrants” and co-opted by unsustainable debt-trap loans provided under the auspices of China's *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI). Fiji and the Solomon Islands provide basing access for the PLA Navy and Air Force, effectively breaking “The Second Island Chain”. This access allows afloat PLA Marine Corps expeditionary groups to provide the only consistent visible foreign military force in the region. With New Zealand firmly entrenched in the BRI and routinely hosting PRC naval and air force visits, Australia—now surrounded—is unwilling to risk Beijing's wrath to support Japan's economic or security needs.

To Japan's west Tokyo's only ally, America, appears small in the far distance, having withdrawn its last operational military forces from Japan in late 2039. Token headquarters staffs

remain at Yokota, Yokosuka, and Camp Zama for bilateral military engagement, consistent with the Treaty of Mutual Defense. America's combat forces began falling back from Asia to Guam, Hawaii, and the U.S. West Coast consistent with its *National Security Strategy* of January 2025. Most U.S. facilities in Japan were shuttered or turned over to the JSDF by 2035.

Japan's trajectory to its stark predicament in 2040 was clearly discernable for decades, to those paying attention. *Haiboku Shita Nihon*—a defeated Japan—was one of the CCP's main objectives for more than 100 years, and just as its Politburo long envisioned, without resorting to major kinetic combat operations China skillfully achieved that objective. Its chief weapon in achieving this astonishing victory was a massive, powerfully resourced, and centrally directed *Political Warfare* apparatus. As the PRC accelerated its already hyper-aggressive political warfare campaign in the early 2020's to seize dominance across the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region, Japan (and its treaty ally America) expressed displeasure—but failed to respond with any effective countermeasures. Other countries in the region noted the failure to respond and followed suit.

In retrospect, it is astonishing that most of Japan's leaders chose to ignore the threat or downplay the nature of the PRC's attack until it was too late. Elected officials and policymakers invested little effort in understanding the existential threat. Consequently, they failed to establish the desperately needed capabilities to detect, deter, combat, and defeat China's relentless attack.²

These leaders set the ideal conditions for China's victory over *Haiboku Shita Nihon*. Through ignorance, ineptitude, willful disregard, and greed, those who should have educated and protected Japan from this existential threat failed their people and their country. Consequently, Japan's citizens were not educated by their government or the news media about China's political war against them, and thus were incapable of petitioning their government to successfully confront and defeat it. It is these average citizens—not Japan's elites—that will suffer most in *Haiboku Shita Nihon*.

This retrospective vision of Japan's bleak future as a defeated vassal state of the PRC is fiction, of course—at least for now. But Japan is well on the pathway to allowing this hypothetical future scenario to become its bleak reality.

2 Dr. Robert D. Eldridge, "Lecture on Chinese Communist Party Political Warfare against Japan" (Webinar Lecture, Ateneo School of Government, Quezon City, Philippines, April 21, 2021); and Russell Hsiao, "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan," *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation 19, no. 12 (June 26, 2019), <<https://jamestown.org/program/a-preliminary-survey-of-ccp-influence-operations-in-japan/>>.

To alter Japan's self-destructive trajectory and deliver a positive future of assured freedom, sovereignty, and dignity, Japan's leaders and citizens must learn about the PRC's political warfare and devise the national will and capability to defeat it. This paper provides a foundation for that education. Specific recommendations applicable to Japan to effectively fight back may be found in Chapter 9 of the book *Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China's Plan to 'Win Without Fighting'*.³

China's Political Warfare: A Primer

The PRC is at war with Japan, just as it is at war with Taiwan, the United States, and much of the rest of the world. But it is not a war in the traditional sense. The PRC is fighting this war for global influence and control to achieve its expansionist *China Dream*.⁴ The PRC's weapons in this war include coercion, corruption, deception, intimidation, fake news, disinformation, social media warfare, cyberattacks, and violent covert operations that include assassination, physical assault, kidnapping, and well-armed proxy armies. The PRC prefers to win this war by never having to fire a shot, but its increasingly powerful military and paramilitary forces loom ominously in the background and actively support its expanding war of influence.

In the minds of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rulers, this war is designed to restore China's former imperial grandeur as the Middle Kingdom—to once again be what China's rulers have called “Everything Under the Sun,” the all-powerful Hegemon Power (*Baquan*).⁵ It is a war to ensure the CCP's total control over the Chinese population and resources, as well as those of what China has historically called the *barbarian states*--and particularly its long-detested neighbor Japan.

Much like the emperors of the Celestial Empire at its zenith, the CCP effectively classifies other barbarian nations as either *tributary states* that recognize the PRC's hegemony or as *potential enemies*.⁶ Despite the professed intention of simple, peaceful “national rejuvenation” reflected

3 Kerry K. Gershaneck, *Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China's Plan to "Win without Fighting,"* First (2044 Broadway Drive, Quantico, VA 22134: Marine Corps University Press, 2020), <https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/Political_Warfare_web.pdf>.

4 *China Dream* refers to a term promoted by Xi Jinping since 2013 that describes a set of personal and national ethos and ideals in China. Graham Allison, “What Xi Jinping Wants,” *Atlantic*, May 31, 2017.

5 Steven W. Mosher, *Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World* (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), pp. 1-2.

6 The term *Celestial Empire* refers to a literary and poetic translation of *tianchao* or heavenly dynasty. Mosher, *Hegemon*, p. 3.

in General Secretary Xi Jinping's China Dream, the CCP has demonstrated expansionist intentions and its actions reflect no desire for equality among nations.⁷ Rather, it seeks to impose its all-encompassing civilization on other, lesser states, consistent with the book by a PLA officer that provided the ideological foundation of Xi's China Dream.⁸ Of greatest concern, Xi's China Dream is one of unrepentant totalitarian Marxist-Leninism.⁹

For the CCP, this is a *total war* for regional and global supremacy, and it takes the form of *military, economic, informational*, and—especially—*political warfare*. A simple definition of *Political Warfare* follows:

Political Warfare employs all means at a nation's command—short of kinetic war—to achieve its national objectives. These means range from such overt actions such as political alliances, economic measures, and public diplomacy, to such covert operations, including coercion, disinformation, psychological warfare, assassination, criminal activities, violent attacks, and support for proxy armies and insurgencies.

Since Xi ascended to power in 2012, he has led a massive expansion in political warfare, investing new energy, attention, and resources to achieve global ambitions.¹⁰ He framed the importance of political warfare as part of his broader push to achieve China's *National Rejuvenation* and the CCP's *Two Centenary Goals*. Both are ambitious programs for reaching national prosperity and achieving dominance in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region by the mid-21st century.¹¹

What China's rulers call *The Three Warfares* lay the foundation for its general *Political*

7 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (speech, 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, China, October 18, 2017).

8 The highly confrontational, expansionist nature of PLA Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu's 303-page book “China Dream” is discussed in this blog: “China's Intentions and Her Place in the World,” *U.S. Naval Institute Blog* dated 1 March 2010, <<https://blog.usni.org/posts/2010/03/01/chinas-intentions-and-her-place-in-the-world>>.

9 Bill Birtles, “China's President Xi Jinping Is Pushing a Marxist Revival-but How Communist Is It Really?,” Australia Broadcasting Corporation, May 3, 2018.

10 Szu-Chien Hsu and J. Michael Cole, editors, *Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy* (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2020), pp. xxix-xxxix.

11 Gitter and Erdahl, “Telling China's Story Well: An Investigation into Chinese Influence Operations Targeting American Chinese-Language Media Outlets,” (Center for Advanced China Research, June 15, 2020), pp. 2-4.

Warfare. The Three Warfares comprise a dynamic three-dimensional war-fighting process that is highly deceptive: they include *Psychological Warfare*, *Legal Warfare* (also called *Lawfare*), and *Media Warfare* (also called *Public Opinion Warfare*).¹² Under close direction from the Politburo, the *Three Warfares* pose a unique threat to Japan's continued freedom and sovereignty.

The PRC's political warfare is both defensive and offensive in nature. It takes the form of *unrestricted warfare*, and it is conducted on a global scale. *Unrestricted Warfare* is China's rationalization that any means, to include biological warfare and terrorist attacks, are justified to achieve CCP objectives, whether China is formally at war with that nation or not.¹³ One example of one of the 24 “warfares” identified for use, alone or in combination with other “warfares”, is “Chem-Bio Warfare”. Beijing's political warfare apparatus is currently engaged in a massive global effort aimed at redirecting blame for the COVID-19 pandemic, which began in China and was covered up there and has subsequently killed 4.6 million people globally. To this end, the CCP is “sowing confusion and discord among China's detractors”.¹⁴

In addition to brutally repressing China's population, the CCP has proven it can effectively leverage the openness of democratic systems to achieve hegemony over those democracies. It prefers to achieve dominance peacefully if possible: not really without a *struggle* but ideally *without major kinetic combat*—without “firing a shot.”¹⁵ However, the PRC has repeatedly signaled that it is now strong and confident enough to fight a war to achieve that hegemony, even if it must pay a very large price.¹⁶

To threaten Japan and other nations, the PRC is rapidly building a navy that will, in eight years, be roughly twice the size of the U.S. Navy “perhaps qualitatively on a par with it, and

12 Stefan Halper, *China: The Three Warfares* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), p. 11.

13 Qiao Liang and Col Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999).

14 WHO Staff, “WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard September 8, 2021” (WHO COVID-19 Homepage: World Health Organization (WHO), September 8, 2021), <<https://covid19.who.int>>; and David Gitter, Sandy Lu, and Brock Erdahl, “China Will Do Anything to Deflect Coronavirus Blame,” *Foreign Policy*, March 30, 2020.

15 Jonas Parello-Plesner and Belinda Li, *The Chinese Communist Party's Foreign Interference Operations: How the U.S. and Other Democracies Should Respond* (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2018); and Author's discussions with senior PRC political warfare officers (active duty and retired), Fu Hsing Kang (Political Warfare) College, National Defense University, Taipei, January 2018-August 2021.

16 Tara Copp and Aaron Mehta, “New Defense Intelligence Assessment Warns China Nears Critical Military Milestone,” *Defense News*, January 15, 2019.

building a hypersonic nuclear arsenal” .¹⁷ Beijing uses its navy and other maritime forces to routinely impinge on Japan's territorial sovereignty, with claims on Japanese islands in the East China Sea (and even Okinawa) and threats to destroy Japan with nuclear weapons if it assists democratic Taiwan in the event of a PRC invasion.

Former U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger describes PRC intentions this way:

*“China is going to take Taiwan in order to render Japan unable to wage war, unable to even defend itself, unable to even supply itself, ... if Taiwan were taken, basically China would be able to dominate the region and render Japan irrelevant.”*¹⁸

As it builds military strength, Beijing flouts international law and increasingly eschews existing rules and norms. According to former U.S. Vice President Michael R. “Mike” Pence, the PRC relies instead on coercion and corruption to achieve its economic, military, and diplomatic aims.¹⁹ Beijing's strategies include “fracturing and capturing regional institutions that could otherwise raise collective concerns about China's behavior, and intimidating countries in maritime Asia that seek to lawfully extract resources and defend their sovereignty,” according to Ely Ratner, who is now the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Affairs.²⁰

In addition to well-orchestrated *United Front* operations designed to destroy enemies and unite CCP supporters, China controls the world's most heavily resourced set of propaganda tools.

17 “China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure: Pathway to Hegemony,” May 17, 2018, (testimony, CAPT James E. Fanell, USN [Ret], House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence); Nick Danby, “China's Navy Looms Larger,” *Harvard Political Review*, 5 October 2019; and Liu Zhen, “China's Latest Display of Military Might Suggests Its ‘Nuclear Triad’ Is Complete,” *South China Morning Post*, 2 October 2019.

18 John Feng, “China State Media Says Frequent Warship Activity Near Japan a Warning,” *Newsweek*, June 2, 2021, <<https://www.newsweek.com/china-state-media-says-frequent-warship-activity-near-japan-warning-1596856>>; and Bill Gertz, “Japan Sees China as a Threat, Ties Security to U.S. Defense of Taiwan,” *Washington Times*, June 4, 2021.

19 Michael J. Pence, “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy Toward China” (speech, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, October 4, 2018).

20 *Hearing on “The China Challenge, Part I: Economic Coercion as Statecraft,”* 115th Cong. (24 July 2018) (prepared statement by Ely Ratner, vice president and director of studies, Center for a New American Security, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, United States House of Representatives), hereafter Ely Ratner hearing.

²¹ Beijing communicates its narratives through state-run television, print, radio, and online organizations whose presence is proliferating around the world. Through its propaganda organs and foreign media it controls, Beijing seeks to guide the narrative on issues like the Senkaku Islands, the South China Sea, the Japan-US security alliance, and China's neo-colonialism overseas.²² One of China's favored—and most destructive—narratives is that the CCP's authoritarian governance style is not simply benign: the *China Model* is now marketed as *the ideal* model for all developing countries, with democracy derided as ineffective and dangerous.²³

Before examining in detail how the PRC wages political warfare against Japan, it is important to examine how CCP employs political warfare to support its *internal repression* as well as to support its *global hegemonic ambitions*.

Support of Internal Repression

Brutal internal repression is one well-documented form of the PRC's unique brand of political warfare. The U.S. and other governments as well as NGOs such as *Human Rights Watch* and *Amnesty International* have cited as “genocide” the CCP's human rights abuses associated with the destruction of Uighur society and imprisoning at least a million Uighurs in so-called reeducation camps.²⁴

In fact, the repression of Uighurs and other Muslim sects is part of a much more insidious trend: the *Washington Post* editorial board assesses that “China's systematic anti-Muslim campaign, and accompanying repression of Christians and Tibetan Buddhists, may represent

21 Donald J. Trump, “United States Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China,” White House, May 20, 2020.

22 Elizabeth Bachman, “Black and White and Red All Over: China's Improving Foreign-Directed Media” (Center for Naval Analysis, August 2020), p. 76.

23 Sarah Cook, “The Implications for Democracy of China's Globalizing Media Influence,” Freedom and Media Report 2019: Media Freedom: A Downward Spiral (Freedom House, 2019), <<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-and-media/2019/media-freedom-downward-spiral>>.

24 Uighurs are the Turkic-speaking people of interior Asia, who live primarily in northwestern China in the Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang and a small number live in the Central Asian republics. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “Determination of the Secretary of State on Atrocities in Xinjiang” (Washington D.C., January 19, 2021); “China's Repressive Reach Is Growing,” *Washington Post*, September 27, 2019; Mya Wang et al, “‘Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots’ China's Crimes against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims,” *Human Rights Watch*, April 19, 2021, <<https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting>>; and “Up to One Million Detained in China's Mass ‘Re-Education’ Drive,” *Amnesty International*, September 2018.

the largest-scale official attack on religious freedom in the world.”²⁵ The late-2019 release of the PRC's secret “China Cables” provides confirmation of the gross atrocities and brutal repression against Uighurs.²⁶ The cables provide irrefutable evidence of the power and intensity with which the PRC uses political warfare against its minorities.

Historically, the PRC's internal political repression entails brutality much more lethal than religious suppression and thought control. The CCP is responsible for the deaths of millions of Chinese people during disastrous large-scale reigns of terror such as the *Great Leap Forward* (1958-60), the *Cultural Revolution* (1966-76), and smaller-scale atrocities such as the *Tiananmen Square Massacre* in 1989. Scholars such as Hong Kong-based historian Frank Dikötter have confirmed, based on the PRC's archives, that during the *Great Leap Forward* alone, “systematic torture, brutality, starvation and killing of Chinese peasants [occurred] At least 45 million people were worked, starved or beaten to death in China over these four years.”²⁷ The Cultural Revolution resulted in the murder of at least 2 million more, and “another 1 to 2 million were killed in other campaigns, such as land-reform and ‘anti-rightist’ movements in the 1950s.”²⁸ Estimates of Chinese killed directly or indirectly through CCP political warfare against its own population are strongly debated, but they range as high as 70 million deaths--during peacetime and in generally good weather.²⁹

While there is debate regarding the total number of Chinese killed by the CCP, there is no doubt that the *Chinese Communist Party* that is responsible for this mass murder still tightly holds the reins of power in the PRC and that it reveres the man who presided over the deadliest repression: Mao Zedong. Evidence of the CCP's continued reverence for Mao includes what *China Daily* described as the “unprecedented” respect and “piety” Xi and the CCP displayed for Mao during the 70th anniversary of the PRC extravaganza in October 2019.³⁰

Support of China's Hegemonic Ambitions

Although the PRC's propaganda machine “has mastered the power of symbol and

25 “China's Repressive Reach Is Growing,” *Washington Post*, September 27, 2019.

26 Colm Keena, “China Cables: ‘The Largest Incarceration of a Minority since the Holocaust’,” *Irish Times*, November 24, 2019.

27 Arifa Akbar, “Mao's Great Leap Forward ‘Killed 45 Million in Four Years’,” *Independent*, September 17, 2010.

28 Ian Buruma, “The Tenacity of Chinese Communism,” *New York Times*, September 28, 2019; and Ian Johnson, “Who Killed More: Hitler, Stalin, or Mao?,” *New York Review of Books*, February 5, 2018.

29 Ian Johnson, “Who Killed More?”

30 Laurence Brahm, “Nothing Will Stop China's Progress,” *China Daily*, October 2, 2019.

symbolism in the mass media” and many Chinese eagerly embrace its hyper-nationalistic patriotic education programs, those residing in the PRC also face censorship and thought control unimaginable to most citizens of liberal democracies.³¹ Of even greater concern, the CCP's censorship and thought control have gone global: through its extensive propaganda and influence tentacles, Beijing disregards rules or actions that, in the CCP's view, “contain” China's power or “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.”³² The PRC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and propaganda organs lambast as “immoral” those who criticize its egregious human-rights abuses and as “racist” those who object to overseas Chinese malign influence activities.³³

The CCP's draconian censorship ensnares American institutions such as the *National Basketball Association*, which was chastised by the *Washington Post* editorial board for “essentially importing to the United States China's denial of free speech.”³⁴ Further, an increasingly punitive Beijing now routinely censors world-famous brands, such as *Marriott*, *United Airlines*, *Cathay Pacific Airways*, *Givenchy*, and *Versace* as well.³⁵ Hollywood has been co-opted “to avoid issues that the Chinese Communist Party would consider sensitive and produce soft propaganda movies that portray China in a positive light to global audiences.”³⁶ Beijing is very clear in conveying its coercive censorship requirements, as reflected with the *Global Times* headline: “Global Brands Better Stay Away from Politics.” The article condemned “so-called ‘freedom of speech’ ” and carried explicit and implicit threats to those who did not tow the CCP line.³⁷

Beijing also exports violence to other countries in support of its political warfare activities abroad. One example is its use of proxy armies. The PRC's support of its proxy armies in Myanmar, such as the *United Wa State Army* drug cartel, seems an anomaly to many contemporary

31 Li Yuan, “China Masters Political Propaganda for the Instagram Age,” *New York Times*, October 5, 2019.

32 Liu Chen, “US Should Stop Posing as a ‘Savior’,” *PLA Daily*, September 27, 2019; and Amy King, “Hurting the Feelings of the Chinese People,” *Sources and Methods* (blog), Wilson Center, February 15, 2017.

33 “China Slams Use of Bringing up Human Rights Issues with Political Motives as ‘Immoral’,” *Global Times*, December 12, 2018; and Ben Blanchard, “China's Top Paper Says Australian Media Reports Are Racist,” *Reuters*, December 11, 2017.

34 “The Day the NBA Fluttered before China,” *Washington Post*, October 7, 2019.

35 Amy Qin and Julie Creswell, “For Companies in China, Political Hazards Are Getting Harder to See,” *New York Times*, October 8, 2019.

36 Ross Babbage, *Winning without Fighting: Chinese and Russian Political Warfare Campaigns and How the West Can Prevail*, vol. I (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019), p. 36.

37 “Global Brands Better Stay Away from Politics,” *Global Times*, October 7, 2019.

diplomats, academics, and journalists, but such support has been the norm for the CCP since the founding of the People's Republic of China.³⁸ Its proxy armies across Southeast Asia kept the United States and its allies in the region distracted and cost them dearly for more than four decades of the Cold War.³⁹

Economic coercion has become a particularly visible PRC political warfare tool, as the CCP uses the promise of its global *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI) to build what *China Daily* describes as “a new platform for world economic cooperation.”⁴⁰ Then-U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, David R. Stilwell, characterized BRI and related PRC economic coercion less charitably in Congressional testimony: “Beijing ... [employs] market-distorting economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and intimidation to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda.”⁴¹ Then-Vice President Mike Pence's foreign policy speech of 4 October 2018 specifically details American concerns regarding the PRC's use of destructive foreign direct investment, market access, and debt traps to compel foreign governments to acquiesce to its wishes.⁴²

Of equal concern, the PRC shapes public opinion inside and outside its borders “to undermine academic freedom, censor foreign media, restrict the free flow of information, and curb civil society,” according to Ely Ratner.⁴³ Worldwide, countries have belatedly awakened to the remarkable degree to which the PRC's diplomatic, economic, and military interests—and Beijing's malign influence—have infiltrated their regions. Australia and New Zealand as well as countries across Europe, Oceania and the Pacific Islands, South America, the Arctic nations, and many African countries are painfully beginning to realize the degree of CCP infiltration and subversion.⁴⁴ Canada and the United States have had equally rude awakenings regarding the

38 Bertil Lintner, “A Chinese War in Myanmar,” *Asia Times*, April 5, 2017.

39 Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice* (New York: Citadel Press, 1970).

40 Yang Han and Wen Zongduo, “Belt and Road Reaches Out to the World,” *China Daily*, September 30, 2019.

41 *Hearing on U.S. Policy in the Indo-Pacific Region: Hong Kong, Alliances and Partnerships, and Other Issues*, 116th Cong. (September 18, 2019) (Statement, David Stilwell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs).

42 Pence, “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy Toward China.”

43 Ely Ratner hearing.

44 John Garnaut, “Australia's China Reset,” *The Monthly* (Australia), August 2018; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Mapping China-in-Germany,” *Sinopsis*, October 2, 2019; Austin Doehler, “How China Challenges the EU in the Western Balkans,” *Diplomat*, September 25, 2019; Grant Newsham, “China ‘Political

efficacy of the PRC's United Front operations to co-opt institutions, organizations, and people and other forms of PRC coercion, repression, and violent attacks within their borders.⁴⁵

China's Political Warfare Against Japan

China wages Political Warfare against Japan for a variety of reasons. In simplest terms the CCP seeks to *keep Japan subservient and militarily impotent; to punish it for its past crimes, both real and invented; and to reap its resources and technology*. Specific CCP political warfare goals and objectives include *rendering U.S. military facilities in Japan useless in a military contingency, breaking the Japan-America military alliance, seizing the Senkakus and its seabed resources, isolating Japan regionally and globally, embarrassing Japan internationally, preventing Japan from assisting Taiwan diplomatically or militarily, and acquiring Japan's technology*.⁴⁶

Strategies and tactics used against Japan are similar to those the PRC uses against Taiwan, the U.S., Australia, the Republic of Korea, and other countries. These strategies and tactics include *elite capture, United Front and Friendship Organizations, Confucius Institutes and Chinese Student Associations, military threats and intimidation, co-option of retired and active-duty military personnel, economic inducements, campaigns to divide Okinawa Prefecture from Japan, support for violence and radical activists*, and a wide range of psychological warfare, media warfare, legal warfare, active measures and cyberwarfare operations, as detailed briefly below.⁴⁷

Warfare' Targets US-Affiliated Pacific Islands," *Asia Times*, August 5, 2019; Derek Grossman et al., *America's Pacific Island Allies: The Freely Associated States and Chinese Influence* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2019), <<https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2973>>; C. Todd Lopez, "Southcom Commander: Foreign Powers Pose Security Concerns," U.S. Southern Command, October 4, 2019; Andrew McCormick, "'Even If You Don't Think You Have a Relationship with China, China Has a Big Relationship with You'," *Columbia Journalism Review*, June 20, 2019; and Heather A. Conley, "The Arctic Spring: Washington Is Sleeping Through Changes at the Top of the World," *Foreign Affairs*, September 24, 2019.

45 Tom Blackwell, "How China Uses Shadowy United Front as 'Magic Weapon' to Try to Extend Its Influence in Canada," *National Post* (Canada), January 28, 2019; and Alexander Bowe, *China's Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018).

46 Eldridge, "Lecture on Chinese Communist Party Political Warfare against Japan," and Author's interviews with Japanese and U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement officials and academics, 1977-2021.

47 Kerry K. Gershaneck, "'Faux Pacifists' Imperil Japan While Empowering China," *Asia Times*, June 10, 2018, <<https://www.asiatimes.com/2018/06/article/faux-pacifists-imperil-japan-while-empowering-china/>>.

Elite Capture

The PRC's “elite capture” operations against Japan are targeted against those who exercise power and can make policy decisions that directly affect CCP interests. Operations include propagandizing the target audiences; entertaining and funding pliable politicians, news media, and academic institutions; and hosting trips visits by academics, Government of Japan (GOJ) officials, news media, and other opinion leaders to the PRC. The targeted politicians have often come from pro-PRC factions or parties such as the Tanaka/Takeshita faction of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP); the religious movement-based Komeito, which is part of the ruling-LDP coalition; pacifist and *faux pacifist* factions within the LDP; and powerful factions within the opposition coalitions. Based on the author's interviews with knowledgeable officials and academics in Japan, there is a strong pattern of Government of Japan (GOJ) and Prefectural officials as well as other key influentials being enticed by PRC agents. Enticements include sexual services and financial support, and many of those targeted are often subsequently blackmailed, to ensure their compliance with PRC objectives.⁴⁸ As Hsiao notes, these elite capture activities and channels are “often the most difficult to definitively analyze and uncover, given caution and sensitivities over the matter.

United Front and “Friendship” Organizations

China's political warfare against Japan employs a strong *United Front* through which the CCP wields tremendous influence. New Zealand *United Front* expert Anne-Marie Brady reports that in Japan these operations often consist of “friendly exchanges” between Chinese academics and legislators and their Japanese counterparts, as well as “Chinese people's organizations” that bring Japanese students and businesspeople to China for visits where they can be wooed and cultivated.⁴⁹ China also employs its United Front to support radical activists (*kagekiteki katsudoka*) and so-called pacifists (*faux pacifists*) engaged in pro-Beijing, anti-Japan defense activities.

The PRC's United Front Work Department (UFWD)-affiliated organizations in Japan

48 Russell Hsiao, “A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan,” and Author's interviews with Japanese and U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement officials and academics, 1977-2021.

49 Scott W. Harold, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Chinese Disinformation Efforts on Social Media,” *Research Reports* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2021), p. 111, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4373z3.html>.

include the Japanese branch of the UFWD's *China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification* (CCPPR) and affiliate branches of the CCPPR such as the *All-Japan Overseas Chinese China Peaceful Reunification Council*, the *All-Japan Chinese Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Unification of China*, and the *Japan Overseas Chinese Federation*. These organizations facilitate communications and exchanges with civil society exchanges and work to influence local discourse". In addition to UFWD front organizations directly subordinate to (or affiliated with) the CCP, Hsiao reports "there are also legitimate local organizations in Japan that engage with UFWD and other PRC political warfare organizations—some perhaps doing so knowingly, and others not". Seven known Sino-Japanese friendship associations based in Japan that actively promote "cultural exchanges" between Japan and China include the *Japan China Friendship Association*; the *Association for the Promotion of International Trade, Japan*; the *Association of Japan-China Cultural Exchange*; the *Japan-China Economic Association*; the *Japan-China Friendship Legislative Alliance*; the *Japan-China Association*; and the *Japan-China Friendship Center*.⁵⁰

Confucius Institutes and Chinese Student Associations

Confucius Institutes are an important vehicle for PRC propaganda, influence, and coercion in many countries, and Japan is no exception. There are 15 Confucius Institutes in Japan and eight Confucius Classrooms, a relatively high number compared to other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese government is increasingly aware that the Confucius Institutes are fully under the control of the CCP and have detrimental impact on academic freedom in the host institutions. Like concerns within the United States over the PRC Embassy's control over Chinese student associations overseas, including espionage and academic intimidation, Japanese authorities are increasingly concerned about the activities of Chinese students and scholars' associations and how they are controlled by the PRC Embassy in Japan.⁵¹

Chinese Association for International Friendly Contact

Of particular danger to Japan's national security is the PRC's highly successful employment of political warfare operations to co-opt retired foreign senior military officers and defense

50 Russell Hsiao, "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan."

51 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, "China's Long Arm Reaches Into American Campuses," *Foreign Policy*, March 7, 2018, <<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/07/chinas-long-arm-reaches-into-american-campuses-chinese-students-scholars-association-university-communist-party/>>; and Russell Hsiao, "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan" .

officials to lobby on behalf of PRC objectives. For example, the PLA has successfully co-opted foreign military flag and general officers through organizations such as the *Chinese Association for International Friendly Contact* (CAIFC).⁵² Established in December 1984 as a PLA political warfare platform, CAIFC's "main function is establishing and maintaining rapport with senior foreign defense and security community elites, including retired senior military officers and legislators."⁵³ CAIFC facilitates influence operations "through PRC foreign affairs, state security, united front, propaganda systems, and military systems."⁵⁴ It routinely sponsors retired military officers of foreign nations for free visits to the PRC for what amounts to political indoctrination and recruitment sessions. Regarding recruitment, to entice foreign retired military officers, "CAIFC serves as a window to China's broader business community." In some cases, foreign retired officers have been required to "agree to publish editorials supporting China's positions ... in exchange for business development support in China."⁵⁵

In Japan's case, CAIFC also engages with a wide range of sectors in Japanese society, to include religious organizations, such as the *Agon Shu* movement. In addition, CAIFC engages architects, calligraphy associations, and global printing companies, and hosts competitions involving Japanese players of the popular board game "Go".⁵⁶

Military Threats: The Nexus of Kinetic, Psychological, and Media Warfare

China routinely engages in *military intimidation* and *gray zone operations* to coerce Japan on such matters as ownership of the Senkakus,⁵⁷ the Japan-America Security Alliance, and Japan's support for Taiwan. It utilizes its Media Warfare apparatus to amplify the psychological impact of the intimidation; in fact, China is now sufficiently emboldened that it has openly publicized

52 Gertz, "Chinese Military Engaged in Political Warfare Against the United States," and Shirley A. Kan, *U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), pp. 33-34.

53 Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, *The People's Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics* (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2013), p. 24.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid; and Capt David L. O. Hayward, RAN (Ret), "The Sovereignty Dispute in the South China Sea, Economic Considerations for the Military & Economic Security of Australia" (lecture, Royal United Service Institute Queensland, Victoria Barracks, Brisbane, September 13, 2017).

56 Russell Hsiao, "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan."

57 Kishi Nobuo, "Defense of Japan 2021" (Ministry of Defense, Japan), (2021.), pp. 17-18, <https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2021/DOJ2021_Digest_EN.pdf>.

its *willingness and ability* to devastate Japan through *nuclear attack*.⁵⁸ A small sampling of the daily *Psychological* and *Media Warfare* against Japan is reflected in the following headlines from PRC's English-language propaganda organ *Global Times*.⁵⁹ In these articles, the CCP threatens Japan with military attack to punish it for its alleged positions on issues such as the Senkakus dispute and the Japan-America Security Alliance. Some articles scold Japan for taking prudent actions such as investigating CCP infiltration in Japanese business and industry.

Drill by PLA warships in Pacific via Osumi Strait 'indicates far sea capability boost, warning to Japan' Published: June 2, 2021⁶⁰

China issues report on Diaoyu Islands to 'reaffirm sovereign rights, warn Japan and US collusion' Published: April 26, 2021⁶¹

PLA's Type 055 destroyer enters Sea of Japan for 1st time Published: March 19, 2021⁶²

Japan should not be influenced by people with ulterior motives: Chinese embassy
Published: December 30, 2020⁶³

58 Jamie Seidel, "China Threatens to Nuke Japan If Country Intervenes in Taiwan Conflict," *News.Com.Au*, July 19, 2021, <<https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/china-threatens-to-nuke-japan-if-country-intervenes-in-taiwan-conflict/news-story/d9af14dc6b90628082e79ab4c77629e1>>; and Jennifer Zeng, "CCP Vows to Nuke Japan Continuously Until It Surrenders Unconditionally for the Second Time," July 13, 2021, <<https://www.jenniferzengblog.com/home/2021/7/13/ccp-vows-to-nuke-japan-continuously-until-it-surrenders-unconditionally-for-the-second-time>>.

59 *China Daily* is the PRC's national English-language newspaper. It frequently runs paid supplements called "China Watch" in a variety of prestigious foreign newspapers. For a breakdown of PRC media organizations, see Elizabeth Bachman, "Black and White and Red All Over: China's Improving Foreign-Directed Media," pp. 14-16.

60 Xuanzun Liu, "Drill by PLA Warships in Pacific via Osumi Strait 'Indicates Far Sea Capability Boost, Warning to Japan,' " *Global Times*, June 2, 2021, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202106/1225229.shtml>>.

61 Hui Zhang and Xiaojing Xing, "China Issues Report on Diaoyu Islands to 'Reaffirm Sovereign Rights, Warn Japan and US Collusion,' " *Global Times*, April 26, 2021, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202104/1222162.shtml>>.

62 Xuanzun Liu, "PLA's Type 055 Destroyer Enters Sea of Japan for 1st Time," *Global Times*, March 19, 2021, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1218908.shtml>>.

63 Xing Xiaojing, "Japan Should Not Be Influenced by People with Ulterior Motives: Chinese Embassy," *Global Times*, December 30, 2020, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202012/1211468.shtml>>.

Japan makes perilous gamble by coordinating with US strategy Published: August 18, 2020⁶⁴

Deploying aggressive US weapons will damage Japan's security situation Published: August 19, 2020⁶⁵

Japan should not stand with US like Australia: experts Published: May 28, 2020⁶⁶

As part of China's sustained assault on Japan, such threats and coercive statements are published and broadcast through traditional and social media on a near daily basis. Often, the PRC's narrative is picked up by non-PRC news media.⁶⁷

Target: Okinawa

Okinawa Prefecture, a critical node in the Japan-America Security Alliance infrastructure and a flash point for anti-military/anti-bases protests, is the focus of special PRC attention. In a rare public acknowledgement of the PRC Political Warfare threat pertaining to Okinawa, Japan's *Public Security Intelligence Agency* (PSIA) reports that China has attempted “to form public opinion in Okinawa in its favor”. Around 2012, China began a public disinformation campaign regarding what its propaganda organs assert is the “undetermined status of the Ryukyus”. Under this pretext for China's designs on Okinawa, reports PSIA, China began “promoting academic exchanges and deepening relations with members of organizations calling for the ‘independence of the Ryukyus.’” The PSIA report asserts that China sends its officials to Okinawa to contact these groups and promote independence. In addition to this academic and organizational infiltration, the PRC supports the Okinawan independence movement with Media Warfare, as evidenced by *Global Times* headlines such as “*China should implement her major power's responsibility to support the independence of Okinawa*” (September 17, 2012) and “*We should call it Independent Ryukyu instead of Okinawa*” (August 12, 2016). Beijing

64 Song Zhongping, “Japan Makes Perilous Gamble by Coordinating with US Strategy,” *Global Times*, August 19, 2020, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1198119.shtml>>.

65 Dongxu Wei, “Deploying Aggressive US Weapons Will Damage Japan's Security Situation,” *Global Times*, August 19, 2020, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1198251.shtml>>.

66 Global Times Staff, “Japan Should Not Stand with US like Australia: Experts,” *Global Times*, May 28, 2020, <<https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1189871.shtml>>.

67 As one example related to the June 2, 2021 *Global Times* report cited on the previous page, see Feng, “China State Media Says Frequent Warship Activity Near Japan a Warning.”

has been “quietly stoking the issue from time to time,” funneling cash to Chinese student associations in Okinawa, according to Dr. June Teufel Dreyer, a political science professor who teaches courses on China and national security at the University of Miami. “Some funds may also find their way into support of Okinawans who are anti-U.S. bases,” noted Dreyer, who is also a Senior Fellow in the Asia Program at Foreign Policy Research Institute.⁶⁸

Psychological Warfare operations include efforts to “educate” Okinawans that they are “from the same womb” as the Chinese—that is, to persuade them they are ethnically linked to China so their allegiance is to China and not Japan.⁶⁹ Another gambit has been for the PRC to claim that the Ryukyu islands, a kingdom until Japan abolished the royal government in 1879, historically belongs to China.⁷⁰

An important Media Warfare strategy related to the *Global Times* headlines cited above is the PRC's successful efforts to establish direct linkages between leftist Okinawan (and other Japanese) news media organizations to CCP-directed PRC counterparts. Dr. Robert Eldridge, who worked on Okinawa for nearly a decade and observed PRC political warfare there closely, reports the PRC also is engaged in political interference there, as well as extortion, blackmail, bribery, and disinformation campaigns about U.S. bases and Japan Self Defense Force activities there as well. There is also evidence of extensive PRC infiltration of universities on Okinawa and mainland Japanese.⁷¹

Economic Warfare

68 “Annual Report 2016: Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations” (Tokyo, Japan: Public Security Intelligence Agency (Japan), January 2017), p. 23, <<http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001255169.pdf>>; Gordan G. Chang, “Now China Wants Okinawa, Site of U.S. Bases in Japan,” *The Daily Beast*, June 26, 2017, <<https://www.thedailybeast.com/now-china-wants-okinawa-site-of-us-bases-in-japan>>; and Scott W. Harold, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Chinese Disinformation Efforts on Social Media,” p. 109.

69 Author's interviews with a U.S. counterintelligence official and Japanese academics, September 2015.

70 Patrick Boehler, “Okinawa Doesn't Belong to Japan, Says Hawkish PLA General,” *South China Morning Post*, May 15, 2013, <<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1238080/okinawa-doesnt-belong-japan-says-hawkish-pla-general>>.

71 Eldridge, “Lecture on Chinese Communist Party Political Warfare against Japan,” ; Gershaneck, “ ‘Faux Pacifists’ Imperil Japan While Empowering China,” ; Russell Hsiao, “A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan,” ; and Scott W. Harold, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Chinese Disinformation Efforts on Social Media,” p. 109.

Economic activities supporting the PRC's political war against Japan are varied and range from embargos to investment. For example, as the PRC confronted Japan regarding the Senkaku Islands in 2010, Beijing restricted “rare earth” exports to Japan to force Tokyo to submit to the PRC's demands. “Rare earths” are called “rare” for a reason: they are vital materials used in the production of many advanced high-tech devices, including many with defense applications, but they are difficult to find and extract. This embargo severely impacted Japan's high-tech sector.

More recent use by the CCP of economic weapons in its political warfare against Japan include heavy Chinese investment in Okinawa, especially the northern part where facilities are being constructed for U.S. military forces relocating from the heavily congested central part of the island. A related economic/political warfare objective for the PRC investment in Okinawa and Hokkaido is to develop political and economic leverage in what has been termed “a North-South Pinch”. Further, until COVID-19 brought international travel to Japan to a near halt, the PRC sent increasing numbers Chinese tourists to Okinawa in recent years. As the PRC has weaponized tourism against other countries to coerce their compliance, it is clear the increased tourism is designed at least in part to build Okinawan economic dependence on Chinese visitors. It is also an effective means to gain greater access to political and economic elites and observe firsthand U.S. and Japanese military facilities.⁷²

Radical Activists

There is evidence that China directly and indirectly supports Japanese communist and radical activist organizations, often referred to as the *kagekiteki katsudoka*. During the Korean War, Japanese communists and other radical activists protested Japan's support for the United Nations (UN) forces fighting Communist Chinese and North Korean aggression. As they protested Japan's support the defense of South Koreans from one of the more oppressive, murderous states in world history, the *kagekiteki katsudoka* set their pattern for the rest of the Cold War and its aftermath: attack and undermine liberal democracies and provide support for communist dictatorships.⁷³ The radical activists always accuse the democracies of militarism and fascist aggression, while ignoring (or defending) hyper-nationalistic, fascist aggression

72 Russell Hsiao, “A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan” and Author's interviews with Japanese and U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement officials and academics, 1977-2021.

73 Kerry K. Gershaneck, “Taiwan's Future Depends on the Japan-America Security Alliance,” *The National Interest*, June 7, 2018, <<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/taiwans-future-depends-the-japan-america-security-alliance-26167?page=show>>.

from communist dictatorships. Since the Korean War, China has built United Fronts with anti-defense, anti-bases organizations in Japan to obstruct military reform and to paralyze completion of the U.S. Marine Corps' *Futenma Replacement Facility* on Okinawa.⁷⁴

The pattern is well established, predictable, and blatantly hypocritical. Radical activist news media and anti-defense groups always find fault with any efforts by Japan to strengthen its defensive posture—yet they will never utter a word of criticism about the PRC's massive military buildup, illegal occupation of disputed islands, and ecological terrorism in destroying the South China Sea to build massive naval and air bases to threaten Asia and Oceania.

It is their *violence*, however, that proves the *kagekiteki katsudoka* to be *faux pacifists* and takes simple hypocrisy to a different level—to criminal physical assault and active military sabotage that amounts to *terrorism*. In pursuit of their anti-defense agenda, radical activists have violently attacked women, schoolchildren, and employees at military installations; fired mortars against JSDF and US bases and at Narita Airport; attempted to cause aircraft to crash; booby-trapped military facilities, sabotaged military equipment, and blocked off gates to installations to interfere with essential emergency base functions.⁷⁵

In a China-related crisis involving U.S. and Japan Self Defense bases in Okinawa and across Japan, the CCP will employ its Political Warfare apparatus to target communities near those military facilities, according to a RAND Corporation report. Based on their past anti-bases position and actions, it is a near certainty that the *kagekiteki katsudoka* and other *faux pacifists* will support the CCP's efforts. Operatives will attempt to disrupt and degrade U.S. military operations from those bases in advance of--and during--the conflict, through rumors, disinformation, and violence. Disinformation campaigns, likely combined with CCP-organized protests, will “strive to shut down operations by generating popular opposition; create an impression that the military is engaged in covering up accidents, crimes, or military setbacks; sow doubt about the wisdom and necessity of undertaking military operations in the face of Chinese opposition as a way to degrade morale; or encourage broader political opposition to decisions made in Washington, D.C., including by striving to split any allied war effort” .⁷⁶

74 Author's interviews with Japanese and U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement officials and academics, 1977-2021; and Chang, “Now China Wants Okinawa, Site of U.S. Bases in Japan.”

75 Gershaneck, “ ‘Faux Pacifists’ Imperil Japan While Empowering China,” ; and Author's interviews with Japanese and U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement officials and academics, 1977-2021.

76 Harold, Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Hornung, “Chinese Disinformation Efforts on Social Media,” p. 6.

PRC Political Warfare Focus, Organization, and Resources

To better understand how the PRC is able to achieve these political warfare successes against Japan, it is important to examine the overarching *strategic guidance, organization, and resources* that the CCP allocates to its conduct of this war.

Political Warfare Goals

Princeton's Professor Aaron L. Friedberg identifies four strategic goals for the CCP, and hence for its political warfare operations:

*First and foremost, to preserve the power of the CCP. Second, to restore China to what the regime sees as its proper, historic status as the preponderant power in eastern Eurasia. Third, to become a truly global player, with power, presence and influence on par with, and eventually superior to, that of the United States.*⁷⁷

Further, Freiberg asserts the PRC assails concepts it derisively refers to as “ ‘so-called universal values’ : freedom of speech and religion, representative democracy, the rule of law, and so on,” which threaten the legitimacy of the CCP. Accordingly, the PRC has worked “openly and vigorously to make it safe for authoritarianism, or at least for continued CCP rule of China.” He says the PRC's efforts have intensified markedly since the rise to power of Xi Jinping in 2012.⁷⁸

A 2018 Hudson Institute study provides another useful perspective of PRC political warfare goals, target audiences, and strategies that is as applicable to Japan as it is to the U.S.:

*With the United States, whose geostrategic power the Party perceives as the ultimate threat, the goal is a long-term interference and influence campaign that tames American power and freedoms, in part by limiting and neutralizing American discussions about the CCP. Liberal values such as freedom of expression, individual rights, and academic freedom are anathema to the Party and its internal system of operation.*⁷⁹

77 *Smart Competition: Adapting U.S. Strategy Toward China at 40 Years*, 116th Cong. (May 8, 2019) (statement of Aaron L. Friedberg, professor of politics and international affairs, Princeton University).

78 Aaron L. Friedberg, *Smart Competition*.

79 Parelllo-Plesner and Li, *The Chinese Communist Party's Foreign Interference Operations*, p. 4.

The CCP, by changing how democracies speak and think about the PRC, is making the world safe for its continued rise. However, as Friedberg testified, PRC political warfare goals extend well beyond CCP self-preservation. These goals include restoring China to what the CCP sees as its rightful place as the *Middle Kingdom*, particularly in eastern Eurasia but also across more distant continental and maritime domains. To these ends, it seeks to drive the United States from the Asia-Pacific region, to subjugate Japan, and to take physical possession of Taiwan.

Friedberg assesses that the PRC has “stepped up its use of influence operations to try to undermine and weaken the ability of other countries to resist its efforts. Ultimately Beijing appears to envision a new regional system extending across Eurasia, linked together by infrastructure and trade agreements, with China at its center. Japan and other democracies are either integrated and subordinated or weakened and isolated, and the United States pushed to the periphery, if not out of East Asia altogether.”⁸⁰

A brief examination of the ways and means the PRC devotes to its political warfare efforts to achieve these goals follows, including a brief overview of the PRC's political warfare characteristics and traits, resources, and organization, as well as how the CCP might employ political warfare in a military confrontation involving Japan.

Characteristics and Traits

Common characteristics of the PRC's political warfare strategy include such elements as a *strong centralized command* of political warfare operations by the CCP through organizations like the United Front Work Department and the PLA. These organizations provide a *clear vision, ideology, and strategy*, and they employ *overt and covert means* to influence, coerce, intimidate, divide, and subvert rival countries to force their compliance.

Key traits of the PRC's political warfare programs include *tight control over the domestic population and detailed understanding of targeted countries*. To achieve its goals, the CCP employs a comprehensive range of instruments in coordinated actions. As important, the CCP exhibits a willingness to accept a high level of political risk from the exposure of its activities.

Organization

⁸⁰ Aaron L. Friedberg, *Smart Competition*.

A number of party and state organizations direct and support the CCP's political warfare operations, and it is important to understand the key elements interrelate.

The PRC's Political Warfare organization flows down from the *Central Committee Political Bureau* (Politburo), the CCP's highest policy-making body. Within the Politburo, it is a tangled and often deceptive web. The *Politburo Standing Committee* (PSC) appears to be the “central place for decision-making about political warfare” in the CCP/PRC hierarchy.⁸¹ Among those receiving PSC direction are the *Central Foreign Affairs Commission* (FAC), *Central Military Commission* (CMC), *Central State Security Commission* (CSSC), *Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference* (CPPCC), *Central United Front Small Leading Group* (CUFLSG), *Central Propaganda and Ideology Small Leading Group*, and *Central Financial and Economic Commission* (CFEC).⁸²

The CCP's overall political warfare strategy is set by the CPPCC. The top United Front official serves as chairman of the CPPCC and is the fourth highest-ranking member of the PSC. Two additional top Politburo members direct the *Central Propaganda Department* (also known as the *Central Publicity Department*) and the UFWD, respectively. The two also sit on the CCP Secretariat, “which is empowered to make day-to-day decisions for the routine functioning of the party-state.”⁸³

In turn, the CPPCC “brings together the various participants in this effort: intelligence officers, diplomats, propagandists, party elders, military officers, workers with the United Front, academics, media workers, and businesspeople.” The CPPCC Standing Committee directs the various other committees that orchestrate strategy that is then implemented by various organizations and agencies. Organizations implementing CPPCC direction include the PLA, the *United Front Work Department* (UFWD), the *Central Propaganda Department* (CPD), the *State Council Information Office* (SCIO)/*Office of External Propaganda*, the *Taiwan Affairs Office* (TAO), various ministries, “and a plethora of other actors within society (foundations, think tanks, organized crime, private individuals) and enterprises”. Implementation of this strategy

81 Szu-Chien Hsu and J. Michael Cole, *Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy*, p. 4.

82 Ibid, p. 49.

83 Peter Mattis, “U.S. Responses to China's Foreign Influence Operations,” testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, United States House of Representatives, 115th Congress, March 21, 2018. See also Szu-Chien Hsu and J. Michael Cole, *Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy* (Manchester, UK: Eastbridge Books, 2020), pp. 3-39.

depends upon the “capture” (or co-optation) of counterparts in the targeted society.⁸⁴

Propaganda and Media Warfare Structure

The Central Propaganda Department (CPD) has significant responsibilities for conducting Media Warfare and propaganda against Japan. Specifically, this department is the “party's theoretical research; guiding public opinion; guiding and coordinating the work of the central news agencies ... guiding the propaganda and cultural systems,” writes political warfare expert Peter Mattis.⁸⁵ Among the CPD's many responsibilities is the issuance of guidance explicitly directing how to frame news media coverage and what topics should be censored.

The most prominent and important Party-State organization charged with executing external propaganda work is the *State Council Information Office* (SCIO). The SCIO actually has two names: one for external consumption to create the impression that it is a “state” entity (SCIO), and one for internal use to reflect that in reality, it is a CCP organ: *Office of External Propaganda* (OEP). SCIO/OEP plays a key role in media warfare by managing foreign press agencies operating in the PRC, analyzing international public opinion for the party-state, disseminating press releases and government white papers, and overseeing external reporting on major events. It is composed of nine functional bureaus and controls has a variety of subordinate units engaged in external propaganda work, ranging from publishing houses to professional associations. The CPD guides the SCIO/OEP, and its head serves as a deputy CPD director.⁸⁶

Intelligence Organizations

Unlike the USSR and current Russian models of political warfare, PRC intelligence agencies such as the *Chinese Intelligence Service* (CIS) and *Ministry of State Security* (MSS) reportedly play a subordinate role in foreign influence operations. Reports Peter Mattis, individuals assigned to these influence operations are rarely intelligence officers themselves but are generally party elite who understand the CCP's international objectives and are skilled in managing foreigners.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that MSS is a “key player in influence

84 J. Michael Cole, “Democracy Under Fire: China's Political Warfare Against Taiwan During President Tsai Ing-Wen's First Term” (Macdonald-Laurier Institute, July 2020), p. 9, <www.MacdonaldLaurier.ca>.

85 Peter Mattis, “U.S. Responses to China's Foreign Influence Operations.”

86 Elizabeth Bachman, “Black and White and Red All Over: China's Improving Foreign-Directed Media,” pp. 6-7.

operations”⁸⁷ and that intelligence collection by MSS, CIS, and the CMC Joint Staff Department Intelligence Bureau is an integral part of political warfare work as a foundation for both the successful execution and outcome of operations.⁸⁸

United Front Work Department

The UFWD is the “the executive agency for united front work” both within the PRC and abroad, reports Mattis. UFWD “operates at all levels of the party system,” and its purview includes “Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan affairs; ethnic and religious affairs; domestic and external propaganda; entrepreneurs and non-party personages; intellectuals; and people-to-people exchanges.” as well as the OCAO. The UFWD also leads the establishment of party committees in both Chinese and foreign businesses.⁸⁹

The OCAO is particularly important in rallying the worldwide diaspora and engaging with news media that informs and influences this diaspora. The mission of OCAO is to “enhance unity and friendship in overseas Chinese communities; to maintain contact with and support overseas Chinese media and Chinese language schools; [and] to increase cooperation and exchanges” between overseas Chinese and China's domestic population in matters relating “to the economy, science, culture and education.”⁹⁰ To this end, it routinely brings researchers, media figures, and community leaders from Chinese communities in foreign nations back to China to attend conferences and meetings.

Alexander Bowe at the *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission* writes that the UFWD is organized into nine major bureaus and four additional offices, all of which have a role in Media Warfare to some degree. Of note, the “Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and Overseas Liaison Bureau” directly targets Japan, but each of the other entities in Bowe's breakdown below can impact upon Japanese target audiences. The name of each entity is followed by Bowe's brief description of it:⁹¹

87 Szu-Chien Hsu and J. Michael Cole, *Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy*, pp. 65, 69.

88 Peter Mattis, “A Guide to Chinese Intelligence Operations,” *War on the Rocks*, August 18, 2015.

89 Peter Mattis, “U.S. Responses to China's Foreign Influence Operations.”

90 Peter Mattis, “U.S. Responses to China's Foreign Influence Operations.”

91 Alexander Bowe, *China's Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018), p. 5.

- Party Work Bureau: “Deals with China's eight non-Communist political parties.”
- Ethnic and Religious Work Bureau: “Concerns China's ethnic minorities”
- Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and Overseas Liaison Bureau: “Deals with those areas and the international Chinese diaspora.”
- Cadre Bureau: “Cultivates United Front operatives.”
- Economics Bureau: “Liaises with less developed regions of China.”
- Independent and Non-Party Intellectuals Work Bureau: “Liaises with Chinese intellectuals.”
- Tibet Bureau: “Cultivates loyalty and suppresses separatism in Tibet.”
- New Social Class Representatives Work Bureau: “Cultivates political support of the Chinese middle class.”
- Xinjiang Bureau: “Cultivates loyalty and suppresses separatism in Xinjiang.”
- General Office: “Coordinates business and administrative work.”
- Party Committee: “Responsible for ideological and disciplinary matters.”
- Policy Research Office: “Researches United Front theory and policy and coordinates propaganda.”
- Retired Cadres Office: “Implements policy concerning departing/retired personnel.”

Bowe writes “a range of CCP military and civilian organizations are [also] active in carrying out United Front work, either working directly for the UFWD or under the broader leadership of the CPPCC.” For example, the *China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification* (CCPPR), which promotes the reunification of the PRC and Taiwan, has at least 200 chapters in 90 countries, including chapters in Japan discussed previously.⁹²

Numerous other party-state organizations also contribute to the CCP's political warfare although they do not specifically focus on this work. “Many of these agencies share cover or front organizations when they are involved in influence operations,” Mattis reports, “and such platforms are sometimes lent to other agencies when appropriate.” Examples of these party-state organizations include the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of State Security, State Administration for Foreign Expert Affairs, Xinhua News Agency, the China Academy of Social Sciences, media-related organs described later in this chapter, and the Liaison Bureau of the PLA's Political Work Department.⁹³

92 Bowe, *China's Overseas United Front Work*, 8.

93 See Peter Mattis, “U.S. Responses to China's Foreign Influence Operations” and Szu-Chien Hsu and J. Michael Cole, *Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy*, p. 57.

Resources: Funding and Economic Measures

The PRC does not publicize the amount of money it invests in its political warfare operations, but the PRC is the world's second-largest economy, and clearly the CCP invests enormous resources into influence operations abroad. According to one source, the estimated PRC investment in its foreign political warfare in 2015 was \$10 billion a year.⁹⁴ However, the 2015 estimate is likely too low, as a 2009 *South China Morning Post* article cited PRC officials were investing roughly \$6 billion USD in its Media Warfare operations alone to “improve the country's image internationally.”⁹⁵ Regardless of the exact amount in 2015, at the time of the publishing of this study in late 2021, that funding level is certainly much higher.

Cash is king in this global political war, augmented as needed by threats of overt or covert military, economic, or other attacks. Unlike the Cold War, ideology plays a very small role in this current conflict with the PRC. As the authors of *China and the U.S.: Comparing Global Influence* explain, “At hardly any time did countries aspire to adopt the Chinese model. Mao's disastrous Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, collective farms, state owned enterprises, egalitarian poverty (except for Party insiders), and repressive government had little appeal except to other dictatorial regimes.”⁹⁶ However, Beijing's phenomenal economic growth over the past three decades has now provided a different model. The PRC's BRI programs alone provide access to massive additional resources to support political and media warfare, since the BRI is rightly viewed as a global UFDW strategy.⁹⁷

With the scale and relatively rapid growth of the Chinese economy and seeming largess, the CCP is indeed helping many news media, political, and other influential elites worldwide come out of poverty. As stated, *cash* has proven to be the most compelling motivator for those supporting and enabling the PRC's global ambitions. For those benefitting from this largess, their decisions seem justified by massive expansion of both the PRC's military capabilities and its ever-watchful political warfare and intelligence apparatuses.

94 David Shambaugh, “China's Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect,” *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 4 (July/August 2015), pp. 99-107.

95 Elizabeth Bachman, “Black and White and Red All Over: China's Improving Foreign-Directed Media, p. 23.

96 Thomas Lum et al., *China and the U.S.: Comparing Global Influence* (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2010), p. 7.

97 Anne-Marie Brady, “Exploit Every Rift: United Front Work Goes Global,” in *Party Watch Annual Report 2018* (Washington, DC: Center for Advanced China Research, 2018), p. 36.

Beijing also frequently *weaponizes* economic instruments in its Political Warfare campaigns. The PRC is the largest trading partner for nearly all countries in the western Pacific, and its goodwill is important for their development and prosperity. “Hence,” notes Babbage, “if the Chinese regime wishes to apply pressure on a regional country or on key corporate leaders, it has many economic levers it can pull and, periodically, it does. One notable case was China's tourism sanctions, boycott of the Lotte retail chain, and other reprisals against South Korea following Seoul's commitment to host American missile defense systems.”⁹⁸ China routinely employs other economic measures to apply pressure to countries such as the previously discussed withholding of rare earths from Japan, tourism sanctions, boycotts of multinational corporations and sports leagues, boycotts of goods such as Taiwan pineapples and Australian wine, and other reprisals.⁹⁹

The PLA's Role in Political Warfare

The PLA plays a significant role in the PRC political warfare organization. Under the leadership of the CCP's Central Military Commission, the PLA's Political Work Department (PWD) serves as its principle political warfare command. The PWD and its predecessor, the PLA General Political Department, have been described as “an interlocking directorate that operates at the nexus of politics, finance, military operations, and intelligence.”¹⁰⁰ The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) and its “311 Base” along with the PLA News Media Center (PLANMC) provide much of the PWD's *Three Warfares* operational capability.

PRC Political Warfare in Combat Operations involving Japan

Through the use of political warfare, the PRC has achieved notable strategic victories without fighting. However, if the PRC's rulers perceive that political warfare alone will not deliver the results they desire—regarding, for example, the Senkakus and the East or South China Seas—they may choose to achieve their goals through conventional combat operations augmented by unconventional warfare. It is also possible that a war could ignite inadvertently from the PRC's overly aggressive actions in pursuit of its *gray zone* and military coercion

⁹⁸ Babbage, *Winning Without Fighting*, vol. I, pp. 38-39.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ J. Michael Cole, “Unstoppable: China's Secret Plan to Subvert Taiwan,” *National Interest*, March 23, 2015; and Szu-Chien Hsu and J. Michael Cole, *Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy*, p. 66. The People's Liberation Army General Political Department was reorganized as the CMC Political Work Department in 2016.

operations.¹⁰¹ Regardless of what incident sparks the conflict, the PRC will conduct political warfare operations before, during, and after any hostilities. Former U.S. senior Naval Intelligence officer U.S. Navy Captain James E. Fanell assesses that in any armed conflict, “the PRC's fight for public opinion will be [its] second battlefield,” on which it will conduct a “wide range” of political warfare operations.¹⁰²

The PRC has used political warfare to support numerous military operations in the past, to include its 1950 intervention in the Korean War, its 1951 annexation of Tibet, the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1969 Sino-Soviet Union border conflict, its 1974 battle for Vietnam's Paracel Islands, the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War, its 1988 attack on Vietnam's Spratly Islands, its 1995 occupation of the Philippines' Mischief Reef, the 2017 standoff with India and Bhutan at Doklam, and its confrontations with Indian forces in 2020 and 2021.

Specifically, the CCP will employ political warfare to preserve friendly morale, generate public support at home and abroad, weaken an enemy's will to fight, and alter an enemy's situational assessment. Media Warfare will be particularly important in gaining “dominance over the venue for implementing psychological and legal warfare” . The PRC's principle of “uniting with friends and disintegrating enemies” will guide its political warfare measures during armed conflict, as the CCP devises its narrative of events, actions, and policies to lead international discourse and impact the policies of both its friends and adversaries.¹⁰³

Chinese strategic literature particularly emphasizes the role of the *Three Warfares* to subdue an enemy before conflict can break out or ensure victory if conflict does occur. Accordingly, political warfare will be employed to undermine the legitimacy of positions taken by its opponents in the conflict, particularly Japan and the U.S., and it will seek to undermine allied willingness to support Japan and the U.S. in any efforts to defend those positions with military force.¹⁰⁴

The Three Warfares establish “a perceptual preparation of the battlefield that is seen as

101 Cortez A. Cooper III, “China's Military Is Ready for War: Everything You Need to Know,” *National Interest*, August 18, 2019.

102 CAPT James E. Fanell, USN (ret), “China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure: Pathway to Hegemony,” testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, United States House of Representatives, 115th Congress, May 17, 2018.

103 Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, *The People's Liberation Army General Political Department*, p. 3.

104 Stefan Halper, “China: The Three Warfares (Prepared for Andy Marshall, Director, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense,” pp. 13, 162.

critical to advancing [PRC] interests during both peace and war.” PLA officers become acquainted with employing the Three Warfares early in their careers, and as they rise in rank they study the concept in depth in various texts on military strategy, including the PLA Academy of Military Science and PLA National Defense University editions of *Science of Military Strategy* as well as *An Introduction to Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Legal Warfare*.¹⁰⁵ Through study of history and war games, senior CCP officials and PLA commanders learn to employ Media Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Lawfare to manipulate an adversary's cognitive process both prior to and during a conflict by targeting national and theater command structures and forward deployed units.¹⁰⁶

In support of the operational combat forces, the Propaganda Department, Strategic Support Forces, UFWD, and other organs engaged in the political warfare apparatus will actively support both offensive and defensive operations. In offensive operations, their focus will be on “pre-emption” to establish the information advantage. In defensive operations: they will be employed to counter Japan and American information efforts and ensure PLA personnel and the general PRC population is not exposed to opponents' messaging or that such messages do not take root within the public psyche.

Based on experience in crises over the past two decades, in a crisis or initial phase of a conflict PRC political warfare objectives and operations will likely unfold as follows:¹⁰⁷

1. Establish the PRC's Version of the Incident. This CCP fully understands that whichever side gets its story out first has the public opinion advantage. Accordingly, statements for public release, to include polished products for broadcast, online, and print dissemination, will be prepared in advance (or, if conflict initiation is unplanned, as soon as possible after initiation of the crisis) that will establish the PRC position on exactly what happened.

2. Issue Statement of Principles for Resolution of the Incident. PRC officials will usually use these “principles” at the start of any negotiations as setting the parameters for the discussions to come and as the benchmarks for a minimally acceptable resolution that meets Beijing's commitments to the PRC public. The Three Warfares will be used to broadcast a public

105 Elsa Kania, “The PLA's Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares,” Jamestown Foundation, *China Brief* 16, no. 13, August 22, 2016.

106 Stefan Halper, “China: The Three Warfares (Prepared for Andy Marshall, Director, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense),” pp. 90-94.

107 Ibid, pp. 73-74.

statement of China's commitment to these principles, for both foreign and domestic audiences.

3. *Shut Down Unofficial but Normal Information Channels.* The CCP will quickly establish information control and dominance of the media airwaves to continuously frame and shape the ensuing debate. U.S. senior officials, journalists, and academics often complain that their Chinese counterparts refuse communication, including via personal channels once a probable crisis begins. This will be the CCP's standard operating procedure with Japan in an armed conflict as well.

4. *Emphasize Beijing's Commitment to the PRC's relationship with Japan.* By firmly expressing its own commitment to bilateral relations China implies that Tokyo (or the U.S. or any other target country or coalition) does not take the relationship as seriously and is to blame for any potential damage to relations resulting from the armed conflict. By messaging through United Front and Three Warfares capabilities, the CCP will attempt to make the crisis a testing point of Japan's good will and intentions.

In addition to employing the Three Warfares in an armed conflict, it is likely that the PRC will engage in “hybrid warfare” and other “active measures” comparable to those used by Russia in its 2014 annexation of Crimea.¹⁰⁸ The PRC will very likely address its hybrid warfare operations through its media outlets, either through actual reporting or as part of broader deception operations. Cortez A. Cooper writes that hybrid warfare involves “military and para-military forces that operate below the threshold of war, such as increased presence in contested waters of fishing fleets and supporting maritime militia and navy vessels,” which may “spark conflict when an opposing claimant such as the Philippines, Vietnam, or Japan responds.”¹⁰⁹

The PRC is already engaged in hybrid warfare against Japan, and the PRC will surely increase this type of operation in preparation for an attack Japan.¹¹⁰

Once armed conflict ignites, the CCP would quite likely coordinate its political warfare activities to support and perhaps conceal its hybrid warfare. To this end, Fanell contends that the PRC “will augment conventional military operations with non-conventional operations, such as subversion, disinformation and misinformation (now commonly referred to as ‘fake

108 James E. Fanell, USN (ret), “China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure.”

109 Cooper, “China's Military Is Ready for War.”

110 David R. Ignatius, “China's Hybrid Warfare against Taiwan,” *Washington Post*, December 14, 2018.

news') and cyberattacks. The operationalization of [psychological warfare] with cyber is key to this strategy.” The PLA will employ its media and psychological warfare forces, especially at the 311 Base in Fuzhou, which is subordinate to the PLA's Strategic Support Force and works closely with the nation's cyberforces.¹¹¹

As stated, the PRC will conduct political warfare operations before, during, and after any hostilities that it initiates. Prior to military confrontation, its political warfare will support a worldwide political warfare campaign that employs united front organizations and other supporters to initiate protests and support “peace” rallies to stymie international response. In addition to so-called peace rallies, Japan's radical activists will be encouraged by the PRC to conduct violent operations to undermine Japan and U.S. military response to the conflict, at military bases, key transportation nodes, and other strategic locations.¹¹²

In its Media Warfare campaign, it will use the internet, , social media warfare, television, and radio to disseminate propaganda, conduct psychological operations, and implement sophisticated deception measures. History proves that political warfare actions are often tied to the PRC's strategic deception operations, which are designed to confuse or delay adversaries' defensive actions until it is too late to effectively respond.¹¹³

The PLA will likely seize the initiative in the opening phase of war by “striking the first blow.” PRC policy stipulates that “the first strike that triggers a Chinese military response need not be military; actions in the political and strategic realm may also justify a Chinese military reaction.”¹¹⁴ Such a trigger could be a perceived slight, diplomatic miscommunication, or statement by a government official that upsets China enough to warrant a response.

As the PLA and its auxiliary forces engage in kinetic combat against Japan, the PRC will employ political warfare to confuse and discourage Japan's decision makers while also attempting to win support for the PRC's position from “fence sitters” (initially undecided nations). Fanell states, “In addition to standard propaganda, disinformation and deception will be employed, such as false reports of surrender of national governments and/or forces, atrocities and other

111 James E. Fanell, USN (ret), “China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure.”

112 Author's discussions and interviews with Japanese officials and academics and U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement officials, 1977-2021.

113 James E. Fanell, “China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure.”

114 Anthony H. Cordesman and Steven Colley, *Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2015: A Comparative Analysis* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015), p. 109.

violations of international law, and other reports intended to distract or paralyze decision making by the [United States] and its friends and allies.”

Internally, the PRC political warfare campaign in support of the combat operations will be important in mobilizing mass support for the PRC's actions. This political warfare campaign will continue through the military confrontation with Japan and after—regardless of the success or failure of the operation.¹¹⁵

Japan's Response to PRC Political Warfare

This paper argues that Japan faces a relentless, multifaceted onslaught of PRC political warfare strategies, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Like many other democracies, Japan is ill-prepared to confront and defeat this insidious existential threat to its freedom, prosperity, and sovereignty. Dr. Eldridge and other credible sources cite many reasons for Japan's failure to effectively detect, deter, and defeat the PRC's political warfare, as listed below:¹¹⁶

- Weak, ineffective counterintelligence and anti-spying laws
- Underfunded Counter-Intelligence capabilities
- Weak and ineffective secrecy laws
- Weak and ineffective foreign land purchases laws
- Poor handling of naturalization files, which makes it difficult to track PRC agents
- Poor monitoring of foreign residents (Chinese represent most of them)
- Little oversight of foreign students and researchers (Chinese represent most)
- Japan's historically dominant ruling party has been divided by pro-China factions
- The ruling (two-party) coalition has a pro-China party in it

Consequently, Japan's government officials, news media, and academia provide few unclassified public disclosures, media reports, and academic research papers on the topic of this existential threat. At the governmental and institutional levels, Japan has no real ability to recognize the political warfare threat, educate its elites and officials about it, prioritize resources to engage it, and plan and conduct operations to deter, counter, and defeat it. In other words, Japan created the perfect prescription for becoming *Haiboku Shita Nihon*.

115 Fanell, *China's Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure*.

116 Eldridge, “Lecture on Chinese Communist Party Political Warfare against Japan” and Author's discussions and interviews with Japanese officials and academics and U.S. counterintelligence and law enforcement officials, 1977-2021.

It is long past time for Japan to re-assess its vulnerabilities, capabilities, and strategies in the face of Beijing's political warfare campaigns against it and build the will and capability to defeat it.

Japan's choice regarding China's political warfare challenge and its fate by the year 2040 is actually quite simple:

The Government of Japan must develop the will and capability to fight for Japan's democracy and sovereignty—or the people of Japan must learn to kowtow in abject defeat before a brutally repressive, genocidal, totalitarian Chinese Communist Party.