



Why We Should Stop Teaching Clausewitz?

兵聖不再?評克勞塞維茨之軍事理論

譯者簡介



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Foreword

前言

Carl von Clausewitz is one of the most profound military thinkers of all time. His famous book *On War* is our bible and he is a god among military strategists. But we should stop teaching Clausewitz in the U.S. military.

西方兵聖克勞塞維茨(Carl von Clausewitz)，是史上深具影響力的軍事思想家之一。他著名的《戰爭論》被吾人奉為聖經，且個人被封為軍事戰略之神。然而，我們應停止在美國軍隊中，講授克勞塞維茨的一切論述。

Most will view this discussion as blasphemy. How dare I advocate that we stop teaching the divine inspirations of Clausewitz. Sean McFate provides a similar discussion in his new book *The New Rules of War*: "A hagiography exists around the man, and his book *On War* is enshrined in Western militaries as a bible. When I teach this text to senior officers at the war college, the room grows silent with reverence. His ideas constitute the DNA of Western strategic thought."

眾人將本文視為褻瀆克勞塞維茨之作，憑甚麼主張我們要停止傳授克勞塞維茨的神著。麥克菲特(Sean Mcfate)在其新書《戰爭新法則》中是這麼敘述的：「被聖化的克勞塞維茨，且其著作《戰爭論》被奉為西方軍事學家的聖經。當我在戰爭學院為高階軍官講授這本書時，教室卻因為尊崇這本書而保持沉默。克勞塞維茨的思想，已成為西方戰略思想的基因。」

On War was published in 1832 and we continue to look to it for timeless principles of warfare, but why? As Ian T. Brown wrote in *A New Conception of War*, "We must move beyond the past."

《戰爭論》於1832年出版，且我們持續視其為戰爭聖典，為什麼呢？如同布朗(Ian T. Brown)在其著作《新戰爭概念》中所言：「我們必須超越過去。」

Brown went on to discuss how Air Force Col. John Boyd desired a new framework, "because he believed that the uncritical adoption of older mental models deliberately deprived one of new data that could be useful to one's decisions and actions."

布朗延續探究空軍上校波依德(John Boyd)所渴望之新戰爭架構，「因他深信，全盤接受固有的心智模型，將會剝奪其在決策與行動時，找出有用的新方法。」

Using Boyd's opening remarks in *Patterns of Conflict* to further argue this point, Brown wrote, "For those people [who] use Clausewitz as the lens filter to look at the problem, you're going to make a horrible mistake." Boyd continued, "Your thinking hasn't proceeded beyond 1832, and a lot of things have happened since 1832."



布朗借用波依德在《衝突脈絡》書中的序言，進一步地評析此觀點，渠寫道：「對那些運用克勞塞維茨當作透視鏡去看待問題的人們，將會犯下恐怖的錯誤。」波依德更說：「你的想法自1832年就沒有進展，而到目前為止已經發生了許多事情。」

I am not insisting that Clausewitz does not provide valuable lessons. But by focusing on Clausewitz we miss important discussion that should be brought to military education. This leads me to the purpose of this article, for which I have two primary goals. First, to point out specific things which Clausewitz got wrong and reasons why we should stop teaching *On War*. Think of it like moving from a devotional reading of *The Bible* to a historical critical examination of it. Second, to identify what we should start teaching more of in all military education.

我並不是強調克勞塞維茨未提供有價值的經驗。但是，當我們著眼在克勞塞維茨時，我們卻忽略了我們在軍事教育上的施教重點。這點促使我寫下這篇文章，本文有兩個重點：第一，點出克勞塞維茨的問題，且指出我們為何要停止講授《戰爭論》的原因。就如同我們從一種虔誠地閱讀聖經態度轉成對其進行具史觀的批判；第二，在各層級的軍事教育中確認我們應該開始講授更多的內容。

Let's first look at what Clausewitz got wrong.

首先來看看克勞塞維茨的錯誤。

This article 本 文

1.Strength on Strength

1.針鋒相對

Russell Weigley, author of *American Way of War*, points out that Clausewitz' leading principle of war was that of annihilation, which is more in line with attrition warfare where the goal is to wear down the enemy. This is an absolute waste.

《美式戰爭》的作者威格力(Russell Weigley)指出，克勞塞維茨對於戰爭的首要原則就是殲滅敵人，等同於將敵人徹底消耗殆盡為目的之消耗戰。這簡直是浪費。

Sun Tzu informs us that force is the fool's way of war, and that battlefield victory was the

mark of an inept general. *Sun Tzu* brilliantly informed us that "the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting."

孫子兵法中睿智的告訴我們，「善用兵者，屈人之兵而非戰也」，而最愚蠢的就是用軍隊來決勝。

The indirect approach is the ideal approach. Sean McFate illustrates this point in *The New Rules of War*. McFate points out that, "wit beats muscle." Similar to *Sun Tzu*, he informs us that we should use the indirect approach.

間接路線為理想的路線，麥克菲特於《戰爭新法則》以「以智勝力」來闡述這個論點，此與孫子兵法中上兵伐謀的概念類似，麥克菲特認為我們應該採取間接路線。

2. We won every battle, but lost the war

2.我們贏了每場戰役，卻輸掉戰爭。

Gen. William Westmoreland unintentionally, yet brilliantly summarized a huge error in reading too much Clausewitz, at a press conference in 1967: "Militarily, we succeeded in Vietnam. We won every engagement we were involved in out there." Blinded by Clausewitz, Westmoreland remarked, "He [North Vietnam] has nothing to show for his investment."

魏摩蘭(William Westmoreland)將軍在1967年的記者會上的一番話，不經意但是睿智地下了結論——讀過多的克勞塞維茨是個大錯，他說道：「軍事上來說，我們在越南是成功的，我們贏得了每場戰鬥。」又說：「他(北越)無用武之地。」這番話就是受到克勞塞維茨的影響。

In *On Strategy* by Harry Summers, we are provided with a conversation between a U.S. colonel and a North Vietnamese colonel that, again, brilliantly, but unintentionally summarized this error: "You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," said the American colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. "That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelevant."

在桑摩斯(Harry Summers)《戰略論》的書中有一段美軍上校與北越軍上校的對話，這段話跟上段話有異曲同工之妙，美軍上校說：「你知道你們北越從來沒有在戰場上打贏我們嗎？」北越上校思考了一下回應：「也許吧！但是這跟戰爭勝負無關。」



In addition, Michael Handel points out in *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The Art of War and On War Compared*, that, "despite Clausewitz's recognition of the primacy of politics, his study of war is concerned primarily with that which occurs once hostilities have commenced. According to him, it is possible, even advisable, to distinguish between the preparatory, as opposed to combat and operations, phases of warfare."

此外，亨德爾點出孫子的《孫子兵法》與克勞塞維茨的《戰爭論》的異同：「儘管克勞塞維茨點出政治為首要的概念，但他對戰爭的研究主要關注的是對敵軍行動的反應。據他的看法，分辨出戰爭階段中的準備階段與作戰階段是可行且可接受的。」

So, is it any surprise that we, the U.S. military, win nearly all tactical engagements, yet fail to win the actual war? Our devotion to Clausewitzian principles prevents us from seeing reality.

所以，我們美軍軍隊贏得每一場戰術層級的戰鬥，卻沒有贏得戰爭，這會讓人驚訝嗎？我們過於執著在克勞塞維茨的戰爭原則，以致於我們看不到現實面。

3. Conventional War

3. 傳統戰爭

Another important point McFate discusses is that of conventional war.

另一個麥克菲特的重點為傳統戰爭。

"There is just one problem with conventional war: no one fights this way anymore," he writes. "There is nothing conventional about it, because war has moved on. Despite this problem, conventional war remains our model, and this is why the West continues to lose against weaker enemies who do not fight according to our preferences. To win, we must ditch our traditional way of fighting, because it's obsolete. It is neither timeless nor universal. On the contrary, conventional war has a beginning, middle, and end."

「傳統戰爭的唯一問題在於，沒有人打傳統戰爭了。」他又寫道：「戰爭沒有什麼傳統不傳統的了，因為戰爭早就跳脫了傳統的規範。儘管如此，我們還是奉傳統戰爭為圭臬，這也是我們西方為何總是輸給比我們弱但是不跟我們進行傳統戰爭的敵軍。為了求勝，我們必須拋棄傳統的作戰模式，因為它已經過時了，它並非永恆不變或普世性。相反地，傳統的戰爭模式走向了衰退與終結。」

He argues that Clausewitz is the father of conventional war, where Sun Tzu is the father of unconventional war: "Clausewitz curses chaos and the fog of war as barriers to victory; Sun Tzu creates chaos and weaponizes it for victory. Clausewitz believes cunning ruses are the weapon of the weak; for Sun Tzu they are the weapon of choice. Clausewitz thinks spies untrustworthy and intelligence reports unreliable; Sun Tzu finds them indispensable."

他提出克勞塞維茨是傳統戰爭之父，而孫子為非傳統戰爭之父。他寫道：「克勞塞維茨破除混沌與戰爭迷霧，走向勝利；孫子創造及運用混沌來引領勝利。克勞塞維茨深信弱者才會運用詭計作為武器；孫子認為詭計只是武器選項之一。克勞塞維茨認為間諜及其情報未必值得信任；孫子則認為用間是必要的。」

So why did Clausewitz lead us down this path? Because it was the only kind of warfare he knew. But that does not mean we should still teach it today.

為何克勞塞維茨引領我們走向傳統戰爭呢？因為他只知道傳統戰爭。但是，這不代表我們仍應講授克勞塞維茨。

4.Center of Gravity Fallacy

4.重心理論之謬誤

A fallacy brought on by a devotional reading of Clausewitz is the center of gravity. I posed the following question in *Clausewitz is Wrong*: What happens when there is no center of gravity? Better yet, can the center of gravity exist in a location where nothing exists? The example I provided was that of a donut: Where is the center of gravity in a donut?

重心是拜讀克勞塞維茨之著作所產生的謬論。我在〈克勞塞維茨是錯的〉一文中提出了下列問題：當沒有重心的時候會如何？抑或，當沒有實體存在時，仍然要找到重心的位置嗎？我以甜甜圈為例：甜甜圈的重心在哪呢？

Furthermore, does God have a center of gravity? As William S. Lind and Marine Lt. Col. Gregory A. Thiele point out in *the 4th Generation Warfare Handbook*, when we examine intangible centers of gravity, "The Soviet Army, which focused on operational art, could not operationalize a conflict where the enemy's strategic center of gravity was God. This was not



very capable, despite its vast technological superiority over the Afghan mujahideen."

再者，上帝有重心嗎？如同林德(William S. Lind)與陸戰隊中校帝勒(Gregory A. Thiele)在《第四代戰爭手冊》中指出，當我們檢視無形的重心，「蘇聯陸軍重視的是戰役理論，當敵人的戰略重心為阿拉時，即使蘇聯陸軍在科技上較阿富汗的聖戰部隊優越，仍無法與其抗衡。」

So, if we are not going to teach Clausewitz, then who or what should we teach? I argue that we should teach the following.

所以，假如我們不講授克勞塞維茨，那麼，我們應該教什麼？我提出我們應該講授下列內容。

5. Never start a land war in Asia... unless you are Genghis Khan

5.若非成吉思汗，別妄想亞洲發動陸上作戰。

One of the biggest disappointments during my time at the command general staff college (CGSC) was that we didn't discuss Genghis Khan. That's if you don't include the best part about CGSC - The Red Team School.

我在指揮參謀學院就讀期間，最失望的一點就是我們沒有談論到成吉思汗。假如你沒有參加指揮參謀學院中最棒的課程——假想敵學校的話，此感尤甚。

The Mongol conquest of China should be required study for the U.S. military, especially if we are branding China as one of our opponents. We completely ignore the fact that the Mongols conquered the whole of China in 1279.

蒙古人征服中國大陸應該被納為美軍軍事研究，尤其是我們現在視中國大陸為對手。我們徹底忽視了蒙古人曾在1279年征服了整個中國大陸的事實。

Timothy May wrote in *Genghis Khan's Secrets of Success* that the Mongols possessed a highly developed and complex military structure. May remarked, "this provided them an edge in warfare over their opponents, but a key to Mongol success in war and conquest was the melding of traditional and still effective steppe tactics with new tactics and forms of warfare they encountered. Throughout the expansion of their empire, the Mongols remained pragmatic and open to incorporating new methods of waging war and adopting new weapons and tactics."

梅伊(Timothy May)在《成吉思汗成功的秘密》書中寫道，蒙古人擁有一個高度發展且複雜的軍事體系。梅伊說：「這個體系提供蒙古人在戰爭中對於對手的優勢，但是，結合傳統與草原戰術所產生的新戰術戰法，也讓蒙古人於戰爭與征戰中取勝。在蒙古擴張版圖的過程中，仍然持續地接納新的戰法並且採用新的武器與戰術。」

May concluded, "Finally, due to their extensive planning, the Mongols were better informed about their opponents than most medieval armies. The outcome was that for more than 150 years of conquest from Asia to Europe they suffered no serious defeats."

梅伊做出了結論，「最後，由於蒙古人計畫內容廣泛，使其更瞭解他們的對手。就結局來看，蒙古人在長達150年西征歐洲的過程中，從未遭遇嚴重的挫敗。」

Mongol military tactics should be required study. We should even strive to create algorithms for drones and swarming tactics that mimic Mongol tactics. In essence, instead of looking to the wisdom of Clausewitz, let's look to the wisdom of Genghis Khan.

蒙古人軍事戰術應該被研究。我們應該致力於創造類似蒙古戰術的無人機及蜂群戰術。因此，我們要來研究成吉思汗的智慧，而非克勞塞維茨。

6.Shadow War

6.黑影戰爭

Moreover, we should also require military education to discuss more of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and the *Thirty-Six Stratagems*. Where Clausewitz clearly preferred pitting strength on strength, Sun Tzu, if fighting was the only option, preferred the indirect approach. He also advocated for heavy reliance on intelligence, deception, surprise, and the use of psychological means.

再者，我們應該將《孫子兵法》與《三十六計》納入軍事教育的課程中。克勞塞維茨喜好兩軍決戰，然孫子認為，假如戰爭是唯一選項，則採取間接路線。孫子也建議大量依賴情報、欺敵、奇襲與心理戰。

Clausewitz considered intelligence to be less than reliable. An opposing view is the *Thirty-Six Stratagems*. This is a Chinese text with a series of stratagems focusing on psychological warfare and deception. In my opinion, these texts match reality much closer



than does *On War*.

克勞塞維茨認為情報不值得信任。《三十六計》集中華軍事謀略之大成，其內容則抱持著與克勞塞維茨不同的內涵，因為文中著重於心理戰與欺敵。依我所見，《三十六計》的內容比《戰爭論》更貼近於現實。

McFate discusses the concept of the shadow war in his new book. He says, "In shadow war, subversion is the strategy and plausible deniability the tactic. Rather than fight the forces of durable disorder, shadow wars harness them by creating chaos and using it. In other words, the essence of shadow war is to keep the enemy guessing."

麥克菲特於他的新書中探討黑影戰爭。他說道：「在黑影戰爭中，顛覆是戰略與推諉不知情戰術的結合。」相較之下，與其致力於維持秩序，倒不如運用黑影戰爭，創造且運用混沌來傷敵。換句話說，黑影戰爭的要義就是使敵人不斷地猜疑。

McFate continues, "The *Thirty-Six Stratagems* offer some ideas on how to achieve this, and in all of them, cleverness wins over brutality. The shadow warrior is skilled in attack if the enemy does not know what to defend, and an expert in defense if the enemy does not know what to attack."

麥克菲特接著說，「《三十六計》提供了如何達到此目的，且驗證了智慧勝過殘暴。黑影戰士善於攻時敵不知何所守，守時敵不知何所攻。」

7. Legionnaires

7. 傭兵

Another intriguing idea offered by McFate is his discussion of legionnaires. He argues how we, the U.S. military, should use legionnaires to replace military contractors. He argues that legionnaires would be held accountable for their actions under military law and that paying for the legion would be easy.

麥克菲特提出了一個關於傭兵的奇特想法。他提出美國軍隊應該運用傭兵來取代軍事合約商。他認為傭兵將會遵循軍事法律來行動並負起應當的責任，且將薪資交付給所屬軍團發放的方式較為簡單。

To this last point, McFate remarks, "It would replace private military contractors and take

their budget. In 2010, during the Iraq War, The Pentagon appropriated \$366 billion for contracts - that's five times the United Kingdom's entire defense budget." McFate continues, "The legion would serve the US government first, with no shareholders to please. Additional funds could come out of the defense budget by cutting one F-35."

最後，麥克菲特說道：「僱傭軍團可取代私人軍事合約商並且運用原屬他們的預算。2010年的伊拉克戰爭期間，五角大廈花了3,660億美金在合約上——這是英國整體國防預算的5倍。」麥克菲特又說：「軍團將會以服務美國政府為優先，不需要討好其他人。所需經費僅需刪減購買一架F-35的國防經費中獲得。」

8. John Boyd and Maneuver Warfare

8. 波依德與機動作戰

The best military handbook I have ever read is without a doubt the *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* by William S. Lind. As Marine Col. John C. Studt (Ret.) remarked in the foreword of Lind's book, "It is pure intellectual innovation."

毫無疑問地，我讀過最棒的軍事手冊為林德(William S. Lind)所著之《機動作戰手冊》。如同海軍陸戰隊備役上校史都特(John C. Studt)在書中的序言所評，「這是純粹的智能創新。」

Lind points out that the word "maneuver" means Boyd Cycling the enemy faster through however many OODA (Observe - Orient - Decide - Act) Loops it takes until the enemy loses cohesion. Col. John Boyd is the father of maneuver warfare and (in my opinion) the greatest military theorist of all time.

林德指出，「機動」一詞代表我軍創造出較敵軍快速的波依德循環：觀察—定向—決策—行動(Observe, Orient, Decide, Act, OODA)，進而使敵軍戰力無法凝聚。依我所見，波依德上校是機動作戰之父與史上最偉大的軍事理論家。

If we were to follow the ideas outlined in this handbook, we could then create a military education program centered on teaching "how" to think, instead of teaching "what" to think. Lind describes education as the following: education develops the ability to put immediate situations into a larger context built of history, philosophy, and an understanding of the nature of man. Inherent in education is the ability to think logically, to approach problem-solving



methodically, but without a predetermined set of solutions.

假如我們依據書中提列的要義，我們就能夠打造軍事教育計畫，著眼在如何思考，而不是思考什麼。林德對於教育的敘述如后：教育在於培養能夠依據當前狀況，融合歷史、哲學以及人類特質等內涵進行處置。教育是在培育思考模式符合邏輯，運用方法論瞭解並解決問題，但是，不先預設立場與解決方案。

Lind argued that we should teach students to make quick decisions through a coherent, logical thought process while under pressure. We should stress that there are no right answers, which he backs up with a quote from Gen. F. W. von Mellenthin, a 1937 graduate of the German War College:

林德指出我們應該教育學生在壓力下，運用具完整性與邏輯性的思維模式快速下達決心。林德引用了1937年德國戰爭學院畢業的梅倫廷將軍的一段話，來強調標準答案並不存在。

"A student was never told his decision was wrong. He was criticized for only two things: failure to make a timely decision, and inability to give a logical, coherent explanation for his decision. But if he made either of these errors, he was criticized severely."

「學生從來沒有被告知其決心為錯誤。學生通常只會被批評兩件事：無法即時下達決心，與無法對其決心做出合理且完整的解釋。但是，當學生同時犯了這兩個錯，必將受到嚴厲批評。」

9. Real Mission Command

9.真正的任務式指揮

If we read and follow the ideas outlined in Lind's handbook, we could actually conduct real Mission Command. We could finally move past our love of Command and Control (while attempting to call it Mission Command).

當我們閱讀且遵循林德手冊中的概念，我們得以執行真正的任務式指揮。我們終於可以超越我們固有的指揮管制作為(我們稱新的指揮管制方式為任務式指揮)。

Lind proposes using the following three mental filters or reference points to help guide our thoughts:

林德提倡運用下列三層心智濾鏡或參考點，來協助引導我們的想法：

(1) Mission-type Orders.

The key is decentralization, which is essential for the OODA Loop. Provides the subordinate commander with the "what" or the mission; leaving the "how" to accomplish the "what" to the subordinate. The commander's intent (boundaries) is a long-term contract and the "what". The mission is the short-term contract and the "how".

(1) 任務式命令

分權負責是關鍵，也是波依德循環之基礎。任務式命令賦予下級指揮官工作或任務，而令其找出達成任務之道。指揮官企圖(範疇)是個長期的約定，且重視在該做的事情，而任務是個短期的約定，著重於如何達成。

(2) Schwerpunkt (Focus of Effort). The Schwerpunkt or focus of effort is where the commander believes he or she can achieve a decisive decision. This is the focus enabling a force to direct its power to one purpose. Lind posits that it is the medium through which the contracts of the intent and the mission are realized. It pulls together the efforts of all the subordinates and guides them toward the goal - toward the desired output of the commander.

(2) 幾何中心(聚焦點)

幾何中心或是聚焦點，係指揮官相信他或她可以下達關鍵決策之處。這可使部隊直接運用其力量達成目的。林德認為聚焦點是鏈結企圖與任務的媒介，其可整合下級部隊的總力並且引領它們朝向終點——朝向指揮官的所望戰果。

(3) Surface and Gaps. The last filter is where you should place your Schwerpunkt. Lind defines the third filter as:

(3) 戰線與戰力缺口

最後一層的濾鏡是應該將你的幾何中心置於何處。林德將第三層濾鏡定義為：

(A) Surface (enemy strengths).

Think of the "surface" as a line of enemy defenses. As Lind points out, we should strive to avoid the "surface" and place our strengths against the enemy's weaknesses.

(A) 戰線(敵軍戰力)

想像戰線為敵軍的防禦線。如同林德指出，我們應該致力於避免敵軍的防禦



線，且運用我們的優勢來對抗敵軍的弱點。

(B) Gaps.

A "gap" is a hole in the "surface" or line. We should strive to place our Schwerpunkt opposite a gap, not a surface. Commander's should seek to find or create gaps, then exploit them.

(B) 戰力缺口

缺口是戰線或是防禦線的間隙。我們應該致力將我們的幾何中心來對抗敵人的間隙，而非戰線。指揮官應該找尋或創造戰力缺口並利用它們。

In conclusion

結 論

If we continue to read and preach Clausewitz as a god, while refusing to question his divine words, then we will continue to throw away the lives of U.S. troops. As McFate points out regarding the inheritors of Clausewitz's legacy, "They could think only in terms of force and attrition."

若我們持續深研與神化克勞塞維茨，且拒絕質疑他的內容時，等同我們置美軍弟兄性命於不顧。如同麥克菲特的見解，克勞塞維茨的追隨者們，「能想到的，就只是兵力與消耗。」

And if we continue to follow the scripture found in *On War*, we will continue to lose. Instead of finding a new and relevant way to wage war, doubters will continue to dig their heels in and refuse to change course.

假如我們繼續遵循《戰爭論》的內容，我們將會失敗。不尋找新的方法去面對戰爭，懷疑者將繼續深陷其中並拒絕改變方向。

Clausewitz is no different than the South Park character Captain Hindsight, where the priests of the Clausewitzian Church arrive at the scene explaining what should have happened to prevent something, instead of resolving the actual situation. My critics will point out that, if we would only have listened to Clausewitz or understood what he meant, then we would have won.

克勞塞維茨如同「南方公園」影集中的事後諸葛亮隊長，克勞塞維茨教會的牧師到

達事發現場時，說明應該如何做能夠避免類案發生，而不是解決實際的狀況。我評斷，假如我們僅聽從克勞塞維茨所言，我們無法獲勝。

As Bruce Fleming discusses in *Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us From Future Mistakes?*, "This is the reason why evoking Clausewitz at every turn is both so satisfying and ultimately so pointless. When war turns out according to his timeless theories, Clausewitz told us to expect it. When it turns out otherwise, Clausewitz told us to expect that too."

如同弗雷明(Bruce Fleming)於《拜讀克勞塞維茨可使我們從未來的錯誤中得到救贖嗎？》中所述：「這就是為什麼每次談論克勞塞維茨時，大家都很有滿意，卻沒有任何意義。」無論戰爭是否依據其理論發展時，克勞塞維茨總是告訴我們應該去預想後續發展。

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