



改變國防部「設計計劃預算制度」： 第二階段報告（譯稿）之二 Changing the Pentagon's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System: Phase 2 Report

●熊光明譯

貳、結構上的改變 Structural Changes

一、調整「產出」

Restructuring the “Outputs”

PPB 制度最初努力的主要目的之一係將國防部的決策重點置於「產出」而非「投入」。如同恩索文和史密斯（Alain Enthoven and Wayne Smith）所述：的確，按照類別彙整對政治領袖有用的資訊是國防部 PPB 制度的主要目的。例如，PPB 制度將諸如採購及人員維持等投入之國防預算轉換成諸如戰略報復及海、空運等兵力，再轉換成諸如已摧毀之目標或已完成部署之部隊等產出。¹

One of the major aspirations of the initial PPBS effort was to focus Defense Department decision-making on “outputs” rather than “inputs.” As Alain Enthoven and Wayne Smith noted: Indeed, organizing information along lines that would be useful to political leaders was a main purpose of PPBS in the Pentagon. For example, PPBS translated the defense budget from inputs, such as procurement and personnel, into forces, such as strategic retaliatory forces and airlift and sealift forces, and from forces into outputs, such as targets destroyed or troops deployed.²

用來讓「產出」在思維及方向上產生相當明顯改變的主要工具為「五年國防計畫」（the Five Year Defense Program—FYDP）。這麼做的

用意在因應由泰勒將軍（General Maxwell Taylor）所發現的一項主要缺點，該項缺點並在其1959年《不定的號角》（The Uncertain Trumpet）著作中提到：「當想到作戰功能時，我們是以橫向面來檢視兵力；但推估國防預算時，我們卻是以縱向面來檢視兵力。」³ 這項評論可謂觀察敏銳，頗具意涵，但對許多國防政策制定者卻少有領會。

The major vehicle used to make this rather significant transformation in thinking and orientation was the Five Year Defense Program（FYDP）. The intent of this effort was to address a major shortcoming identified by General Maxwell Taylor who had argued in his 1959 book The Uncertain Trumpet that, “we look at our forces horizontally when we think of combat functions, but we view them vertically in developing the defense budget.”⁴ It was an astute observation with broad implications, but with narrow understanding by many making defense policy.

甘迺迪當選總統後，泰勒將軍被徵召回役擔任「總統軍事代表」，最後回到國防部擔任參謀首長聯席會議主席。泰勒成為國防部長麥納馬拉所召集成立新管理團隊的核心人物，團隊成員尚包括麥氏「神童」（whiz kids）恩索文和史密斯，負責掌理剛成立的「系統分析」處（systems analysis）。⁵ 恩索文和史密斯顯然與泰勒的觀點一致，認為國防戰略、兵力和預算三者彼此間關聯薄弱。他們認為「國防預算編製（defense budgeting），實際上與軍事戰略毫無相關」，⁶

預算過程（the budgeting process）不是一個「整合戰略、兵力和成本的機制；實質上，它只是各軍種與科目間劃分預算的記帳工具，同時也是用來限制國防支出無效率的工具。」⁷

Following the election of President Kennedy, General Taylor was recalled to active duty as the “Military Representative of the President,” and eventually returned the Pentagon as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Taylor became a central figure in the new defense management team assembled by Secretary McNamara that included McNamara's “whiz kids,” Enthoven and Smith, who ran the newly created office of “systems analysis.”⁸ Enthoven and Smith clearly shared Taylor's perspective that defense strategy, forces, and budgeting were only tenuously connected. In their view, “defense budgeting was, in effect, conceived as being largely unrelated to military strategy,”⁹ and that rather than “a mechanism for integrating strategy, forces and costs, it（the budgeting process）was essentially a book-keeping device for dividing funds between the services and accounts and a blunt instrument for keeping a lid on defense spending.”¹⁰

一到國防部，麥納馬拉和其團隊就察覺到一項迫切的問題，即缺乏一套可掌握有關各種部隊及武器系統全部成本的會計制度。¹¹ 雖然編報給國會的預算需求有現成的會計科目，但在軍種間並未有一致的標準。武器研究和採購成本資料雖可獲得，但是額外相關成本諸如長期作業、人力、維持、訓練和設施等卻普遍缺乏；更糟的



是，國防部不但沒有建立一套可用來比較各種武器運用於不同軍種間執行相同任務之成本效益的基礎，而且也未建立判斷取捨（trade-offs）的決策機制。


Upon arrival at the Pentagon, an immediate problem perceived by McNamara and his management team was the absence of an accounting system capturing the full range of costs associated with various forces and weapons systems.¹² Although accounting categories existed for preparing and presenting budget requests to Congress, these were not uniform among the services. Research and procurement costs of weapons were available, but additional related costs such as longer-term operating, manning, maintenance, training, and facilities costs, generally were not. More bothersome, there was neither an established basis for comparing the cost-effectiveness among weapons in different services performing similar missions, nor a decision structure for making trade-offs.

為了提供建立各任務領域中、遠程目標之架構，以表徵國防部之期望「產出」，並同時為了獲得分析與比較所使用之全部系統成本，麥納瑪拉和其幕僚發展出「五年國防計畫」。最初「五年國防計畫」結構係由十個「主要兵力計畫」（MFPs）組成，明定該期間內各軍種必須完成之主要任務。「主要兵力計畫」中用以支援期望「產出」的特定單位或系統，稱之為「計畫要素」（program elements），一般簡稱 PEs。每一「計畫要素」所需之資源，諸如人力、工程、作

戰、發展及採購，均須予確認，並涵蓋五年期程：包括正在執行的年度預算與後續未來四年需求。藉此方式擴展計畫，國防部領導階層在期望某特定產出持續性需求時，方能針對系統或兵力下達何時汰舊換新之決策。五年國防計畫「橫向」產出與「縱向」投入交叉結構，參見圖 1：

To provide a structure for developing goals and objectives within the mission areas representing the desired “output” of the Defense Department, while simultaneously capturing holistic systems costs for analytical and comparative purposes, McNamara and his staff developed the Five Year Defense Plan. This original FYDP structure was built around ten major force programs (MFPs) identifying the principal missions the armed forces of that period needed to perform. Within MFPs, specific units or systems providing the desired outputs were identified as “program elements” commonly referred to as PEs. The resources required for each PE, such as manpower, construction, operations, development, and procurement, were identified and extended five years into the future, a period covering the current budget year being developed and the four years to follow. Extending the programs in this manner allowed the Pentagon leadership to make determinations on when systems or forces were to be phased out, and new forces phased in if there was an expectation of a continuing need for a particular output. Graphically, the FYDP structure of “horizontal” outputs crossing “vertical” inputs is shown in Figure 1:

圖一



許多人認為以這種方式建立「五年國防計畫」架構，同時將「兵力和軍事活動」與「任務和產出」整合列為計畫之重點是整個 PPB 制度主要的貢獻。如同恩索文和史密斯描述此概念的用意：「五年國防計畫供作為一項工具，國防部長能藉以下達計畫決策，並將其納入年度預算編列。」¹³ 在五年國防計畫建立當時，某位任職於國防部的資深軍官說到：即使將近四十年過去以後，他仍然會認為評估計畫產出的企圖一直是那段期間最有意義的事。¹⁴ 斯勒辛格（Schlesinger）博士於 1960 年代末期寫文章表達其支持「五年國防計畫」所代表的概念：「將經費支出的產出結果加以排序代表在結構上已大幅改善。」¹⁵ 他在註解中進一步詳細闡述：「部辦室（OSD）希望藉由種種作為以作出更好的選擇—其中包括 (1) 檢視替代決策的隱含成本；(2) 依據「計畫」來計算成本及思考，而非「投入種類」；(3) 有系統地考量替代方案與取捨。」¹⁶ 這些也是他後來三

十多年所抱持的基本觀點。

Establishing the FYDP structure in this way, and focusing it on aggregations of forces and activities more closely related to missions and outputs, was considered by many to be the major contribution of the entire PPBS effort. As Enthoven and Smith described the intent of the concept, “The FYDP provided a vehicle by which the Secretary of Defense could make program decisions and tie them into the preparation of the annual budget.”¹⁷ A senior military officer working in the Pentagon at the time the FYDP was established stated that even with the passage of nearly forty years, he still considered this attempt to evaluate program output to have been the most significant of the period.¹⁸ Dr. Schlesinger writing in the late 1960s expressed support for the concept the FYDP represented stating that, “the output-ordering of expenditures represents an enor-



mous structural improvement.”¹⁹ He added further elaboration in noting, “OSD hopes to make better choices by doing a variety of things—among them, (1) looking at the cost implications of alternative decisions, (2) costing and thinking in terms of “programs” rather than “input categories,” and (3) considering alternatives and trade-offs systematically.”²⁰ These remain fundamental views he retains over thirty years later.

「五年國防計畫」橫向機制所管理與整合之國防計畫面臨兩項基本挑戰：(1)重新定義與更新「主要兵力計畫」使其更能反映當前戰略環境；(2)對預期產出與結果提供指導。第二項挑戰因與「國防計畫指導」（DPG）之結構有關，將於稍後討論。

There are two fundamental challenges to managing and integrating the defense program using the horizontal mechanism represented by the FYDP: (1) re-defining and updating the MFPs themselves to make them more reflective of the current strategic environment; and (2) providing guidance on expected outputs and outcomes. The second challenge will be discussed later as it relates to the structure of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

圖1所顯示之十大「主要兵力計畫」大都與麥納瑪拉時期所確認之任務領域（或產出）相同；「五年國防計畫」結構唯一顯著改變是新增了第十一項主要兵力計畫—特種作戰部隊，這項改變是由國會於1988和1989會計年度國防授權法中主導促成。²¹國會採取這項措施之目的在於增加特種作戰部隊的能見度，且能符合國防部所預期之重要「產出」，同時增加各軍種對該型部隊支持度的可能性。

The ten MFPs shown in Figure 1 are, for the most part, the same mission areas, or outputs, that were identified in the McNamara period. The only truly significant change to the FYDP structure has been the addition of MFP 11, Special Operations Forces, a change directed by Congress in the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988/89.²² The intent of Congress in taking this step was to give additional visibility to special operations forces, believed to be an increasingly important “output” expected from the department, and increase the likelihood of support for these forces across the services.

假如「主要兵力計畫」的目的是在確認國防部執行其戰略時所必須履行之主要任務，那麼其目前之結構並無法適度反映過去四十年來在戰略、國內及科技環境上所發生的重大改變。例如，轉換成「全募兵制」（all-volunteer force）後，「人員維持」（personnel）項目較早先所代表之意義與重要性已大為增加；「醫療照護」（health care）項目在國防部致力於控制成本和達成預期目標的同時，如今已變成國防經費主要支出項目；再者，「通用部隊」（general-purpose forces）一詞，對各軍種目前所談論的眾多作戰任務而言可能過於廣泛。近期退休某空軍將領歸結此狀況表示：「美軍目前缺乏清楚明確的任務目標。」²³

If the MFPs were intended to identify the major missions that the Defense Department was to perform in executing its strategy, then the current structure inadequately reflects the enormous changes that have occurred in the strategic, domestic, and technological environments over the past forty years. For example, after transitioning to an all-volunteer

force, personnel pose a significantly different and important category than earlier. Health care has now emerged as a major item of expense for the department as it struggles to control costs and meet expectations. Finally, general-purpose forces may be too broad a term for the numerous operational missions currently being addressed by the services. A recently retired Air Force General summed up the situation recently by stating that “the US military today lacks clear, mission-oriented focus.”²⁴

值得一提的是過去三十年中，亦曾偶爾嘗試考量採用更具代表戰略意圖「產出」的「五年國防計畫」與預算編製結構。例如，冷戰期間，美國通用部隊任務重點主要運用於北大西洋公約組織以擊敗蘇聯在歐洲可能發動的攻擊。在七〇年代，部分國會議員的確曾鼓勵國防部將其預算需求分割成數個可能戰區的預算需求；惟國防部基於「通用部隊」並未標示專屬某一特定戰區，卻可運用於任何需要之地區為由而抗拒該項構想。這種「依任務編製預算」（mission budgeting）的方法目前在學術界外幾乎不被認同。

It is worth noting that over the last three decades there have been occasional efforts to consider introducing FYDP and budgeting structures even more representative of intended strategic outputs. For example, during the Cold War, the major focus of US general-purpose forces was the NATO defeat of a potential Soviet attack in Europe. Indeed, during the 70s some in Congress encouraged the Defense Department to partition its budget requests into each of the several potential theaters of operation. DoD resisted these efforts on the basis that the

“general purpose forces” were not earmarked exclusively for a particular theater, but would be used where needed. This “mission budgeting” approach currently has few proponents outside academia.

其次，對於構成「主要兵力計畫」之「計畫要素」的數量與配置，同樣也曾受到關切。「主要兵力計畫」裡之「計畫要素」的數量是逐漸累積而成的，目前累計數將近 5,000 個；另外 1,000 個「計畫要素」則載存於「五年國防計畫」資料庫中，但均為閒置狀態（inactive）。將近 83% 絕大多數的「計畫要素」與三軍及特種作戰部隊有所關聯，其次依序為部辦室（OSD）和國防健康活動（Defense Health Activity – DHA）。分配給部辦室和國防健康活動之計畫要素總數約為國防情報局、國家安全局及國防後勤局三單位計畫要素總數的兩倍。既然已知國防情報重要性與國防後勤規模與日俱增，此狀況顯示「計畫要素」的數量與配置應予重新檢討。假定我們身處亟需大量情報而且需求不斷擴大的一段期間，卻僅以極少數量的計畫要素反映該領域計畫的重要性，這顯示兩者間可能失去連結。

There is also concern about the number and distribution of the smaller program elements comprising the historic MFPs. Within the MFPs, an enormous number of PE's have slowly developed, currently numbering slightly less than five thousand. Another thousand are carried in the FYDP database, but are “inactive.” The overwhelming majority of these PE's, nearly 83%, are associated with the three services and the special operations forces. The next highest number of PE's is owned by OSD itself followed



by the Defense Health Activity (DHA). The combined PE's assigned to OSD and DHA are nearly twice the number of the combined PE's assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency. This suggests that the number and distribution of the PE's merit some re-examination given the increased importance of defense intelligence and the size of defense logistics. Given that we are in a period when the needs of intelligence seem to be relatively large and expanding, while this area's programmatic importance is reflected in a relatively small number of program elements, suggests a potential disconnect.

數年前，陸軍一份對其「計畫要素」內部檢討資料顯示：許多「計畫要素」被歸屬到不當的「主要兵力計畫」，而且幾乎未做修正以反映冷戰結束後環境的變遷。因為「計畫要素」應該反映基本架構模組（building blocks）以提供某一主要兵力計畫之軍事能力，若將其錯置或誤配則可能扭曲結果並阻礙高階領導者對重要議題的確認。

An internal examination by the Army of its PE's a few years ago indicated that many were assigned to the wrong MFPs, and few had been updated to reflect the changed circumstances following the end of the Cold War. Since PE's should reflect the fundamental building blocks providing military capability to an MFP, having them misaligned or mis-assigned would potentially distort results and hamper the identification of major issues deserving senior leadership attention.

國防部部長柯恩（William Cohen）屢次提

到，1997年四年國防總檢（QDR）所確立的一項國防戰略係根據「型塑、反應及整備」（Shape, Respond, and Prepare）之需求而制定的。²⁵此項戰略中之「型塑」要件係根據部隊日常接觸、操演、訓練、協同作戰及前進部署等因素制定，使軍隊成為促進地區穩定、降低潛在威脅及嚇阻侵略與壓迫的利器。「反應」則與執行全面傳統軍事任務有關，從主要戰區戰爭，如1991年波灣戰爭，到小規模突發事件（SSCs），如海地與波士尼亞。「整備」則強調兵力現代化之必要性，以面對未來可能之威脅與挑戰。

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 1997 established a defense strategy frequently described by Defense Secretary William Cohen as built around the needs to: “Shape, Respond, and Prepare.”²⁶ The “shaping” component of this strategy was built around daily contacts, exercises, training, arms cooperation, and forward deployments where military forces serve as instruments promoting regional stability, reducing potential threats, and deterring aggression and coercion.

“Responding” referenced the mission to execute the full spectrum of more traditional military missions from major theater warfare, such as the 1991 Gulf War, to smaller-scale contingencies, such as Haiti and Bosnia. “Preparing” focused on the necessity of modernizing the force to meet the more likely future threats and challenges.

每一個構成要件都有其各自的一套任務需求。1997年四年國防總檢一項重要評論指出：雖然報告鑑定出某一分散不連貫的需求以凸顯小

規模突發事件的負擔；但兵力結構上卻未做任何調整，以滿足這項需求。誠然，鑒於關切各軍種過度致力於小規模突發事件，四年國防總檢確實也做了許多決定，例如進一步削減陸軍現役與預備部隊人力；但這些決定，對大多數人而言，與公布的戰略需求並不一致。舉例而言，國防委員會（National Defense Panel—NDP）對四年國防總檢之評論——該會依法成立後按規定應提報之資料——聲稱：

Within each of these categories resides a certain set of mission requirements. A major criticism of the QDR was that although it identified a separate discrete need to address the burdens of the small-scale contingencies (SSCs), it made no adjustments to the force structure to meet this need. Indeed, given the concern that the services were too heavily engaged in these SSCs, many of the decisions the QDR did make -- such as further reductions in Army active and reserve manpower--seemed to many to be inconsistent with the declared strategic need. For example, the National Defense Panel (NDP) critique of the QDR, a critique required by the legislation establishing the NDP, declared that:

〔四年國防總檢〕所確立之戰略為國防部在不對稱戰爭與較小規模突發事件中所面臨的挑戰提供了更豐富的觀點。除主要戰區戰爭（MTW）威脅外，它還坦言小規模突發事件對兵力結構、行動速度（OPTEMPO）及動員速度（PERSTEMPO）仍具有顯著需求。然而，報告中亦指出戰略的一端與兵力結構、作戰概念及採購決策的另一端彼此間並未充分連結。²⁷

The strategy [of the QDR] provides a much

richer view of the challenges facing the DOD in asymmetric warfare and Smaller-Scale Contingencies (SSCs). In addition to the dangers of Major Theater Warfare (MTW) it also recognizes the significant demands SSCs place on force structure, Operation Tempo (OPTEMPO), and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO). However, in the report there is insufficient connectivity between strategy on the one hand, and force structure, operational concepts, and procurement decisions on the other.

國防委員會在說明四年國防總檢時所確認，但尚未併入其計畫調整之兵力結構特性時指出：「這些描述我國兵力同樣的動力必須與獲得程序一樣置入 PPB 制度之中。」²⁸ 但這該如何達成？

In describing the attributes of the force structure that the QDR had recognized, but not incorporated into its program adjustments, the NDP noted that, “These same dynamics that describe our forces must be imbedded in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) as well as the acquisition process.”²⁹ How might this have been done?

有項措施能將國防計畫、預算與已公布的戰略做較佳的連結，即重新定義「五年國防計畫」中的「主要兵力計畫」。圖 2 即在顯示這個較佳連結的情形：當四年國防總檢獲致戰略方向之後，同時藉由調整「五年國防計畫」的主要產出種類，以反映自 1960 年代初期以來所發生的外在重大改變。


One step that could be taken to better link the defense program and budget to the declared strategy would have been a redefinition of the FYDP MFPS.



Figure 2 shows how this might have been reflected after the QDR capturing its strategic direction while simultaneously adjusting the FYDP's major output

categories to mirror the significant external changes that have occurred since the early 1960s:

圖二



遵循這種方式調整「五年國防計畫」將更能與四年國防總檢所預期的產出密切結合。第一計畫「戰略部隊」，重大調整與條約談判（如 START III 第三階段削減戰略武器條約）的主題，仍將會是未來國防計畫中的主要構成要素；第二計畫「主要戰區戰爭」，為四年國防總檢所列之主要任務，將置重點於從事該戰爭所必需的部隊與裝備；第三計畫主要為應付小規模突發事件所必需的部隊；第四計畫的部隊將專注於特種作戰；第五計畫為平衡全面兵力的戰略部署能力需求。這五大兵力計畫組合起來構成國防計畫的「作戰計畫」（teeth）。

A restructuring of the FYDP along these lines would have better aligned it to the outputs expected from the QDR strategy. Program 1, Strategic Forces,

still the subject of significant adjustments and treaty efforts, such as START III, will remain a major component of the defense program for some time to come. Program 2 would focus on the forces and equipment required to fight the MTWs that the QDR retained as a major mission. Program 3, by contrast, would contain forces primarily necessary for dealing with the small-scale contingencies, while Program 4 forces would retain those dedicated to Special Operations. Program 5 would balance the strategic deployability needs of the overall force. Together, these five programs comprise the “teeth” of the defense program.

後續六大兵力計畫則反映出國防部的「維持計畫」（tail）：第六計畫「情報與指管通資

情」，使日形重要且須結合網路中心作戰概念之情報、指揮及控制架構更為清晰；第七計畫「科技」，強調必要的基本研究以厚植未來能力，作為四年國防總檢所預期兵力轉型之基礎，以達成軍事事務革新目標；第八計畫「醫療」，顯示國防健康計畫核心要素的意義與規模，該計畫之預算目前已高達 170 億元，而且自 1990 年代初期歷經國防部助理部長管理強化以來已經成為嚴密審查之重點；第九計畫「中央補給與維持」，須予以高度重視；第十計畫「人員」，概略顯示吾人大約在 30 年前改制成全募兵制，同時欲招募新進人才以符合素質標準是項日形艱鉅的任務；³⁰ 第十一計畫「國際活動」，涵蓋各種正在進行，且持續引起國防重視與耗用預算資源的訓練與安全支援活動。這六大兵力計畫組合起來構成國防計畫的「維持計畫」（tail）。這些「維持計畫」過去一直未受到重視，甚至當其預算支出已佔較大比例時亦復如此；再者，這些計畫最適合以具有較明確評量標準與獎勵機制之企業解決方法予以處理。

The next six MFPs reflect the department's tail. Program 6, Intelligence and C4I, makes more visible the increasingly significant intelligence, command and control structures needed to operationalize any network centric warfare concept. Program 7, Science and Technology, highlights the fundamental research effort necessary to seed future capabilities that underlay the QDR's expressed desire to transform the force in a manner capturing the promise of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Program 8, Medical, would recognize the size and significance of the central elements of the defense health prog-

ram, which has grown to over \$17 billion and has been the subject of increasing scrutiny since its consolidation in the early 1990s under the management of an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Program 9, Central Supply and Maintenance, needs significant attention. Program 10, Personnel, would reflect the simple realization that we transitioned to an all-volunteer force nearly thirty years ago, and attracting the right numbers of new recruits meeting established quality standards is an increasingly difficult task.³¹ Program 11, International Activities, would capture the wide range of on-going training and security support activities that continue to attract defense attention and budgetary resources. Together, these six programs comprise the “tail” of the defense program. These “tail” programs are the ones that have received less concentrated attention over time even as they have grown to consume a larger share of the budget. Moreover, these programs are the one-most amenable to business-based solutions having more identifiable metrics and reward structures.

以這種方式建構的五年國防計畫不僅能將國防部最根本之預算結構與其所公布的戰略目的予以結合，同時更能清楚地區分作戰計畫與維持計畫。多份已發表的報告顯示，60-70%的國防預算都用於構成維持計畫的基礎建設與支援活動上。³² 這項比例（或失衡）不易降低的原因之一是由於目前五年國防計畫結構、基本計畫要素分配及欠缺足夠透明度遮掩了問題的真相。例如，經美國會計總署（The General Accounting Office）確認高達 45%的現役軍職人員，大約 66 萬人，被分派從事基礎建設活動。³³ 因此，審慎分析這



項維持性基礎建設之規模、範圍及內容，並使其更透明化，將會是有效降低其比例的第一步。

Structuring the FYDP in this manner not only aligns the department's most fundamental budgetary structure with its declared strategic intent, but it also more clearly differentiates the programs that provide combat capability from support. Numerous reports have been released suggesting that as much as 60-70% of the DoD budget is dedicated to the infrastructure and support activities that comprise the defense “tail.”³⁴ One reason that this proportion (or disproportion) has proved so difficult to reduce is that the current FYDP structure and underlying PE distribution, and the absence of sufficient transparency, masks the dimension of the problem. The General Accounting Office determined, for instance, that up to 45% of active duty military personnel, about 660 thousand people, were assigned to infrastructure activities.³⁵ Carefully analyzing the size, scope, and content of the support infrastructure, and making it more visible, would be a useful first step in reducing it.

以這種方式調整五年國防計畫顯然將會是個複雜的工作，尤其是假如目前其所包括之細節都不得變動。再者，如何將某些部隊分類並歸屬到相關的計畫要素也是一項爭論的議題。就僅以航空母艦戰鬥群為例，它到底屬於第二計畫主要戰區戰爭部隊，抑或屬於第三計畫干預與派駐部隊？顯然地，在某些方面它係根據情況來執行必要功能。1996年部署於台灣海峽的航空母艦即展現干預與派駐的能力，而平息了台海危機；然而，假如情況有不同的發展，航空母艦可能成為

主要戰區戰爭的優勢兵力。在「通盤檢討（BUR-the Bottom Up Review）」中，亦即四年國防總檢之前導，當時國防部長阿斯平（Aspin）在作戰需求之外，額外配賦一艘航空母艦納入核定的海軍兵力結構中，以明確滿足「派駐」之需求。產出導向的目的即在為決策者提供選擇方案以決定如何分配資源與分散風險。

A restructure of the FYDP in this manner obviously would be a complex undertaking, particularly if the amount of detail currently contained were retained. Furthermore, how to categorize and assign certain forces and their related program elements would be a matter of debate. Are carrier battle groups, to use but one example, to be considered Major Theater War forces in Program 2, or Intervention and Presence forces in Program 3? Obviously, in some ways they can perform either function depending on the circumstance. The carrier deployment to the Taiwan Straits in 1996 demonstrated an intervention and presence capability that calmed a brewing crisis by providing visible presence. Had circumstances developed differently, however, the carriers would have been the leading edge of a major theater war force. In the Bottom Up Review (BUR), the precursor to the QDR, then Secretary Aspin included one additional carrier in the approved Navy force structure over and above the warfighting needs, explicitly to meet the needs of “presence.” The purpose of having an output orientation is to offer options to decision-makers on how they want to allocate assets and distribute risks.

四年國防總檢坦承「主要戰區戰爭」與「小

規模突發事件」對兵力會產生不同需求，過去這些年來國防部如果有得到教訓的話，那就是每當探討兵力結構時，「單一型態部隊通常無法滿足所有作戰需求」。如同斯勒辛格曾觀察到的現象：

The QDR recognized the different demands on the force posed by MTWs and SSCs, and if there is one lesson the Department should have learned over the years it is that “one size usually does not fit all” when it comes to force structure. As James Schlesinger once observed:

執行兵力規劃時最主要的問題在於：部隊將投入何種戰爭或衝突？部隊是否須為某一特定型態的衝突作最適化的調整？如果是的話，那將是何種型態的衝突？無疑地，以最可能或最具威脅的衝突施予部隊最適化調整將可增強其因應該類衝突的能力，但相對地也會以犧牲通用目的實用性作為代價。儘管過去五年來通用部隊的戰力已有長足的提升，但問題是國防部對前述觀點是否已有充分的警覺。³⁶

In force planning the paramount question remains: In what war or conflict will the forces be engaged? Are the forces to be optimized for a specific kind of conflict, and, if so, which one? Optimization of forces for what appears to be the most probable or most threatening conflict will, no doubt, enhance the capability for that type of engagement, but may do so at the expense of their general purpose utility. Despite the vast improvement of the general purpose forces in the past five years, there is some question as to whether OSD has been sufficiently alert to this point.³⁷

為了認同並明確反映這項論點所建構的五年

國防計畫，將使得國防部與國會所有成員更意識到願以何種代價來獲得期望的（作戰）能力。某策略規劃權威人士曾經提到：探討該主題相關文獻認為，在企業界「策略和計畫本身之間的連結是最弱的一環」。³⁸ 五年國防計畫的目的即在成為建立此一連結的機制。

Organizing the FYDP so that it acknowledges this point, and clearly reflects it, would make all in the Pentagon and Congress considerably more alert to the capabilities they are likely to get for the price they are willing to pay. One authority on strategic planning once noted that in business “the link between strategies and programs themselves is among the weakest” in the literature addressing the topic.³⁹ The FYDP was intended to be a mechanism establishing this link.

註 釋

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2. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough?* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 39.
3. Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 123.
4. Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 123.
5. A reasonably full discussion of the relationship between President Kennedy and General Taylor is contained in H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997),



- pp. 8-23. Kennedy was particularly attracted to Taylor's advocacy of a new strategic approach known as "Flexible Response," intended to replace the "Massive Retaliation" strategy of the Eisenhower Administration.
6. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971) , p. 13. Hereafter cited as "Enthoven and Smith."
7. Ibid., p. 11.
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10. Ibid., p. 11.
11. Interview with the Honorable Robert S. McNamara, Washington, DC, 18 September 1998.
12. Interview with the Honorable Robert S. McNamara, Washington, DC, 18 September 1998.
13. Enthoven and Smith, p. 52.
14. BENS interview 020899.
15. See James R. Schlesinger, "Organizational Structures and Planning," in *Selected Papers on National Security, 1964-1968*, Santa Monica: The Rand Press, 1974, p. 73. The *Selected Papers on National Security* are hereafter cited as "Schlesinger."
16. Ibid., from "Defense Planning and Budgeting: The Issue of Centralized Control," May 1968, p. 123.
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18. BENS interview 020899.
19. See James R. Schlesinger, "Organizational Structures and Planning," in *Selected Papers on National Security, 1964-1968*, Santa Monica: The Rand Press, 1974, p. 73. The *Selected Papers on National Security* are hereafter cited as "Schlesinger."
20. Ibid., from "Defense Planning and Budgeting: The Issue of Centralized Control," May 1968, p. 123.
21. See Section 1211 (b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1988 and 1989. Subsection (e) directs establishment of a major force program for special operations forces to be managed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Special Operations Command.
22. See Section 1211 (b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1988 and 1989. Subsection (e) directs establishment of a major force program for special operations forces to be managed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Special Operations Command.
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28. Ibid., p. 3.
29. Ibid., p. 3.
30. See M. Thomas Davis, “Operation Dire Straits,” The Washington Post, Outlook Section, 16 January 2000.
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32. See for instance, GAO Report NSIAD-97-127BR, Defense Budget, p. 2.
33. Ibid.
34. See for instance, GAO Report NSIAD-97-127BR, Defense Budget, p. 2.
35. Ibid.
36. See Schlesinger, p. 65.
37. See Schlesinger, p. 65.
38. J.C. Camillus, “Corporate Strategy and Executive Action: Transition Stages and Linkage Dimensions,” Academy of Management Review (VI, 2, 1981:253-259) as quotes in Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning (New York: The Free Press, 1994), pp. 77. Hereafter cited as Mintzberg.
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