

# 改變國防部「設計計劃預算制度」： 第二階段報告（譯稿）之一 Changing the Pentagon's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System: Phase 2 Report

◎熊光明譯

## 壹、前言

於第一階段報告裡，我們介紹了國防部 PPB 制度的簡史及現行實務，並界定了該制度所面臨某些挑戰性因素。現在接續列舉可能解決方案並據以作成建議，期能改進現行制度流程的靈活性與反應能力。

Having provided a brief history and description of the current practice of the Defense Department's PPBS in the Phase 1 Report, and framed certain elements of the challenges it faces, we now shift to listing possible solutions, and extracting recommendations from them that might improve the agility and responsiveness of the current process.

在著手研提改革建議之前，必須承認本研究

於進行無數次訪談中有一項令人相當訝異的發現，即儘管一般認為 PPB 制度為一過時的管理方法，但整個聯邦政府部門（除國防部外）及負責跨部會業務的行政單位裡的資深官員，幾乎一致認為 PPB 制度優於政府部門裡其他任何資源分配流程。例如，目前及過去任職於預算管理局（OMB）的資深官員均堅信，國防部以理性態度致力將戰略與預算結合的努力遠優於其他政府機構；再者，他們深信國防部資料管理的機制亦優於其他聯邦政府單位。<sup>1</sup> 然而，某些事件的結果及國防部無法有效處理一些逐漸呈現的問題，才是導致對 PPB 制度發出警訊的主因。

Before proceeding with suggestions for change, one rather surprising observation from the numerous interviews conducted during this study should be acknowledged. Despite the common view that PPBS



reflects an out-dated management approach, senior officials throughout the federal government in agencies other than DoD, and from executive branch offices having multi-departmental responsibility, almost universally perceived PPBS to be superior to any other resource allocation process in the executive branch. For instance, senior officials from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), both past and present, felt strongly that the Pentagon's efforts to link its strategy to its budget in a rational manner were far superior to those of other agencies. Furthermore, there was a strong perception that the Pentagon had better data management discipline than that common elsewhere in the federal government.<sup>2</sup> Nonetheless, certain outcomes and the DoD's inability to address meaningfully several looming problems were a cause for alarm.

假如 PPB 制度在國家和國防部裡普遍運作良好的話，是否還真須要改進嗎？我們認為是肯定的。自從 PPB 制度於 1960 年代初期建立以來，我國部隊運作所處的戰略及科技環境已大為改變。全面調整國防管理制度以因應這些變化，則需要一個能有助於而非阻礙變革的戰略規劃流程。許多人愈發擔心國防部現行流程無法通過這項簡單的考驗。

If PPBS has generally served the Pentagon and the nation well, are changes really required? We feel they are. The strategic and technological environ-

ment within which our military forces operate has changed enormously since PPBS was instituted in the early 1960s. Adjusting the overall defense management system to address these changes requires the utilization of a strategic planning process that facilitates rather than hinders change. Many are increasingly concerned that current processes in the Pentagon are not passing this simple test.

多年來國防部宣稱其刻正尋求兵力結構與現代化方案的基本改變，用以追求新興的「軍事事務革新」（Revolution in Military Affairs），一般稱之為「RMA」。RMA 之前提係認為未來戰爭型態將與過去大為不同，未來兵力本質上將更要求戰略機動、作戰靈活、戰術存活，以及配備精巧網路系統能對不同目標施行遠距精準打擊；再者，這些兵力的設計與作戰部署必將更講求「聯合」的觀念。這方面主要理論專家為長期任職於國防部淨評估室（Office of Net Assessment）主任馬歇爾先生（Mr. Andrew Marshall）。<sup>3</sup>

For several years the Pentagon has declared that it is pursuing fundamental changes to its force structure and modernization program that are designed to capture an emerging “Revolution in Military Affairs,” commonly called the “RMA.” The premise of the RMA is that future wars will be much different than those of the past and that future forces will have to be substantially more strategically mobile, operationally agile, tactically survivable, and equipped

with an elaborate network of systems allowing for the precise attack of distinct targets from great ranges. Furthermore, these forces will have to be much more “joint” in their design and operational deployment. The leading theorizer of this approach is the long-serving Director of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, Mr. Andrew Marshall.<sup>4</sup>

最近在布魯金斯研究院（Brookings Institution）一場發表會上，馬歇爾先生以歷史類推法提出他對 RMA 快速轉型的觀點。回憶起 1990 年他開始認真思考新興 RMA 可能性時，馬歇爾認為：當時國防建構的狀況與第一次世界大戰之後的情況一樣並無改變。他感嘆地表示：「回溯到 1990 年，我以為我們大概身處在 1923 年；現在，十年過後，我還以為我們是身處在 1924 年。」這種幽默式的說法傳達出一項重要訊息：國防部藉以提出重大議題與制定重大決策的流程已變得遲緩與笨拙。如果國防部欲為未來預作準備，其決策流程須具備更廣泛資訊、決策須更快速且更為果斷。

At a recent presentation at the Brookings Institution, Mr. Marshall offered his view of the rapidity of the RMA transformation using a historical analogy. Recalling that he began to seriously consider the possibility of an emerging RMA back in 1990, Marshall stated his view that the position of the defense establishment then was similar to that following World War I. “Back in 1990,” he lamented, “I thou-

ght we were at about 1923. Now, after the passage of ten years, I think we have reached 1924.” It was a humorous observation conveying a serious message. The processes by which the Pentagon raises major issues and makes major decisions have become slow and ponderous. If the Defense Department is to be prepared for the future, its decision-making processes must be better informed, swifter and more decisive.

1939 年 9 月第二次世界大戰於歐洲爆發之時，美軍高級將領如馬歇爾將軍（General George Marshall）認定美國終將捲入這場衝突，而且又無充裕時間將那些大多僅是思想前瞻人士心中想法的新概念與組織予以具體化。大戰發生後前十年，一些構想及觀念經實驗後，美國軍事計畫人員發展出裝甲作戰、戰略轟炸、兩棲攻擊及原子武器等贏取戰爭的能力，並塑造了其後的冷戰世界。目前的挑戰是在缺乏像第二次世界大戰那種傷亡和突發性事件的狀況下，發展出能激發同樣創新與轉變的制度流程。要實現如此重大的變革，對任何大型組織都是項艱鉅的任務，尤其對一個近期成就斐然備受眾人關注的組織（國防部）而言更是如此。

When World War II erupted in Europe in September 1939, senior American military leaders such as General George Marshall recognized that the United States would eventually be drawn into the conflict, and that they had a very short amount of time to



operationalize numerous new concepts and organizations, many of them only thoughts in the minds of forward-thinking people. From ideas and concepts experimented with in the preceding decade, American military planners developed armored warfare, strategic bombing, amphibious assault, and atomic weapons – the capabilities that won the war, and shaped the Cold War world that followed. The current challenge is to develop processes that stimulate and produce similar innovation and transformation in the absence of a traumatic, precipitating event such as World War II. Effecting such significant change is a daunting task for any large organization, especially one with a widely regarded record of recent success.

## 一、與公營部門的差異

### a. Distinctions with the Public Sector

由於本研究報告的主要重點係將 PPB 制度之運作方式與其他公、民營部門現行之策略規劃流程作比較，因此我們必須承認在執行彈性與管理要求上，不論現在或未來，公、民營部門兩者間都存有顯著差異。

Since a major focus of this effort is to compare the functioning of PPBS with contemporary strategic planning processes elsewhere in the private and public sectors, it must be acknowledged that there are, and will remain, significant differences in exec-

utive flexibility and management demands between the two sectors.

公、民營部門組織兩者間運作之限制與激勵方式明顯不同。如同某位退休民營部門主管評論有關奇異公司（General Electric）執行長傑克·威爾許（Jack Welch）所主張的管理概念：「如果傑克當了國防部長，他將永遠無法執行任何像他在奇異公司裡所做的變革。」<sup>5</sup>當然，無論是在公營或民營部門，對管理任何一個大型、多樣化組織的要求有其共通性；但其重大差異性亦不容忽視。

Public sector organizations operate with a significantly different set of constraints and incentives from those of the private sector. As one retired private sector executive commented regarding the management concepts advocated by General Electric's legendary CEO Jack Welch, "If Jack were made the Secretary of Defense he would never be able to execute anything approaching the magnitude of the change he has made in General Electric."<sup>6</sup> Certainly there are similarities in the requirements for managing any large, diverse organization whether in the public or private sectors, but there are significant dissimilarities that cannot be disregarded.

就聯邦政府而言，與民營部門主要差異在於政府部門受到國會監督。國防部與其他聯邦機構所具備這項管理上的特點，在民營部門並無類似情形。或許有些人辯稱大公司裡之股東和董

事會所提供的監督多少有點類似，但該種監督在細節和意圖上均不若國會監督來的密集與多樣。

In the federal government, a major distinction is the oversight role of the Congress. This dimension of the management of the Defense Department, and all other Federal Agencies, has no close counterpart in the private sector. Some may argue that the oversight provided by stockholders and Boards of Directors for major firms is in some ways analogous, but such scrutiny is neither as intense in detail nor as diverse in intent.

股東和董事有項主要利益：即公司創造投資報酬的年度績效。董事從事協助提昇績效、處分資產、擴展、更新產品或捨棄、修改老舊生產線等領域的管理。這些作為中有個常見的脈絡：即提昇績效與更高邊際利潤—亦即民營部門最終共同評量標準。

Stockholders and Directors have one major interest: the company's annual performance in creating a return on investment. Directors will assist management in looking for areas for improved performance, divestiture, expansion, a transition into new products, or an abandonment or modification of older product lines. In these efforts there is a very common thread: improved performance and greater profit margin – the ultimate common metric of the private sector.

國會關注的利益不盡相同。由於國會大部分主要工作均在委員會中完成，而且這些委員會代表著動態民主社會中各種不同的利益，故有關國防議題的焦點僅侷限於少數委員會。雖然國會扮演監督的角色，但其下兩個預算委員會（參眾議院各一）並無法直接影響國防計畫裡的特定內容；惟藉由對國防支出設定一合理可行的多年「上限」額度（multi-year “top line”），兩個預算委員會對國防部的靈活性確實有其重要影響力。而對國防計畫細節具有影響力的四個主要委員會—參、眾議院軍事委員會和參、眾議院國防撥款小組委員會（the House and Senate Armed Service Committees and Defense Appropriations Sub-Committees）—擁有 113 位委員，約佔國會成員 21%。除了關切約佔聯邦年度自由裁量性支出（discretionary spending）50%的國防預算細節外，這些委員會也提出廣泛的國防政策議題，但耗盡他們大部分時間卻是預算審議過程和計畫細節。

The interests of Congress are not nearly as focused. Given that most of the primary work of Congress is done in committees, and these committees represent a diverse set of interests reflective of a dynamic democratic society, focus on national defense issues is limited to a small number of committees. Although playing a role, the two Budget Committees do not directly impact the specific content of the def-



ense program, but do have a major impact on DoD's flexibility by setting a reasonably well enforced multi-year “top line” for defense spending. The four major committees that do impact the details of the defense program, the House and Senate Armed Service Committees and Defense Appropriations Sub-Committees, have 113 members. This represents about 21% of the congressional membership. Although these committees also address broad defense policy issues in addition to the details of a defense budget that comprises nearly half of annual federal discretionary spending, it is the budget process and the program specifics that consume the majority of their time.

在關切代理利益的同時，許多主要國會監督和撥款委員會委員的確試圖從超越地方利益的整體國家觀點來檢視國防。相較之下，那些非主要國防委員會委員只有在國防計畫影響其選民時，才有可能關切國防安全利益。此種情形對國防計畫與預算會有正、反兩面的影響。如同某位國會職員評論到：委員對利益關切的程度總是會成比例的影響各州與選區的就業環境。<sup>7</sup> 此論點清楚地反映出美國前眾議院議長蒂普·歐尼爾（Tip O'Neill）著名的看法，「所有的政治都具有地方性質（All politics is local.）」。

Many members of the major defense oversight and appropriation committees, while keeping a close

eye on constituent interests, do attempt to view defense from a holistic, national perspective that transcends local interest. Members not on the major defense committees, by contrast, are far more likely to have national security interests only insofar as they are directly related to the impact of defense programs on their constituents. This can have either positive or negative impacts regarding defense programs and budgets. As one congressional staffer commented, the intensity of member interest will always be proportional to the impact on employment circumstances in states and districts.<sup>8</sup> This clearly reflects the famous observation of former House Speaker Tip O'Neill that, “all politics is local.”

對選民未能從國防計畫直接獲利的委員而言，因國防部年度預算規模可供作國內其他重要計畫的財源，使其成為一誘人目標。就此觀點，國防支出象徵著由醫療、教育、職訓及基礎設施維護等經費所支付的一項主要機會成本。不同於公司董事會之成員，許多國會「主管」認為國防預算過於龐大，且應於美國國家生存無任何重大威脅時期予以刪減。簡言之，亦即公司的「邊際利潤」應予降低或重新配置。因此他們對增加支出與投資的觀點與民營部門公司主管在實務經驗上的看法迥異。

For those whose constituents see little direct gain from the defense program, the size of the

Pentagon's annual budget makes it a tempting target for funding other important domestic programs. From this perspective, defense spending represents a major opportunity cost paid by health care, education, job training, and infrastructure repair. Unlike members of a corporate board, many congressional “directors” advance the view that the defense budget is too large and should be reduced in a period where the United States faces no single, major threat to national survival. In short, the corporate “profit margin” should be lowered or reallocated. Making the case for increased spending and investment to those with such a perspective is very different from the experiences of private sector corporate executives.

在公、民營預算編列實務上另一項重大差異，為因應意外事件的作法不同。大部分民營預算認為要精確預測未來計畫可能發生之所有成本—通常為「首創」（first of a kind）計畫，確有其困難度，而且民營預算允許增加成本。相反地，國會要求國防部只能納編可確認活動之預算—至少在二年之前。由於不認同國防計畫中有些變更是必要而且無可避免，導致國會高度關切而使計畫延宕，並將該計畫預算轉支應另一項計畫意外增加的成本。因此對「未知狀況」提供合理撥款以改善國防計畫的穩定性除有待努力外，而且可增加對 PPB 制度流程的信心。合理撥款以因應突發事件的必要性特別擴及美軍運用兵力

以應付海外危機時所需。目前支應此類因應行動所需經費，除非國會提供追加撥款，否則須由其他正在執行中的訓練、維修及其他支援活動預算檢討分攤。對因應前述未來突發事件提供適度常態性撥款，將可肯定目前國際安全情勢存有不可預測性，而且可使國防部核心計畫與其預算獲得過程更有保障。

Another significant difference between public and commercial budgeting practice is in providing for unforeseen contingencies. Most commercial budgets recognize the difficulty in accurately predicting the likely future costs of complex, often “first of a kind” projects, and allow for cost growth. In sharp contrast, Congress demands that DoD budget only for specifically identifiable activities – at least two years in advance. This failure to recognize that some changes will inevitably be needed leads to highly disruptive actions to delay one defense program to pay for unexpected growth in another. A reasonable appropriation providing for “unknowns” would go a long way toward improving the stability of the many DoD programs and increase confidence in the PPBS process itself. This need for reasonable appropriations to cover contingencies extends particularly to the use of US military forces to respond to overseas crises. Funding for such operations is currently ripped out of other ongoing training, maintenance



and other support activities until such time as Congress provides a “supplemental” appropriation if it does. A modest regular appropriation for such unspecified future operational contingencies would recognize the unpredictability of the current international security situation and further stabilize the core DoD program and program/budget process.

自 1960 年代初期開始，國會逐漸加重其監督的角色。1960 年之後，隨著對授權程序愈加重視及 1970 年代中期以後其他制度性的變革，使得國會更加擴大其監督的範圍。因此，國防預算較以往做了更多修正，更多報告受到指導，在授權程序中用於辯論的天數也為之增加，以及更多的修正案被提出。這樣的結果一直受到某種程度的探討，即在民營部門，除了公司客戶於決定接收或取消其訂貨時之日常採購決策外，並無類似情形。<sup>9</sup> 近年來由於授權法案通常較撥款法案延遲公布，因而降低了授權委員會的影響力，致其監督角色的份量似乎有點過重。

Since the early 1960s, Congress has performed its oversight role in an increasingly detailed manner. With greater attention given to the authorization process after 1960, and other institutional changes in Congress after the mid-1970s, Congress has greatly expanded the dimensions of its oversight. More changes are made to the defense budget than in the past, more reports are directed, more days of debate are

used in the authorization process, and more amendments are offered. The result has been a degree of review that has no counterpart in the private sector other than in the daily purchase decisions of a company's customers as they acquire or avoid its products.<sup>10</sup> In recent years this degree of oversight has often seemed somewhat redundant as authorization bills have routinely lagged behind appropriations bills reducing the impact of the authorization committees.

除了國會監督的角色外，尚有許多其他因素用以區分公、民營管理；其中一項主要差異為績效評估。對任何公司管理團隊而言，仍存有少數定義明確、廣為接受及為人完全理解的評量「成功」的標準，如投資報酬率（Return on investment）、資產報酬率（return on assets）、營運利潤率（operating margin）及上市公司股東價值（for publicly owned firms, shareholder value）。這一套互連的評量標準常被討論並運用於評量績效與公司體質。在 1999 年 11 月，美國國防部副部長約翰·哈姆瑞（John Hamre）於陸軍主辦的會議上提到：由於國防工業廠商並沒有像國防產業以外其他高科技公司有著耀眼的高獲利率，使其受到華爾街股市不公平地對待，為此他感到訝異。<sup>11</sup> 本質上，哈姆瑞曾主張，雖然國防廠商生產的產品精良，且經 1999 年春季科索沃衝突所驗證，但是市場上所採用的績效評量標準並不適合用來衡量在此獨特競爭環境下運作的公司之營

運績效。

In addition to the oversight role of Congress, several other factors distinguish public from private management. A major difference is in metrics of performance. For any corporate management team, there exist a handful of well-defined, widely accepted, and thoroughly understood measures of success. Return on investment, return on assets, operating margin, and for publicly owned firms, shareholder value. These represent an interconnected set of metrics that are frequently discussed and cited in measuring performance and corporate health. In November 1999, Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre raised eyebrows when he stated at an Army-sponsored conference that Wall Street had unfairly penalized defense firms because they had not scored the impressive rates of return experienced by other high technology firms outside the defense sector.<sup>12</sup> In essence, Hamre was arguing that although the defense industry was producing superior products, as evidenced by the Spring 1999 conflict in Kosovo, the standard measures of performance employed by the market were not as useful for judging the performance of firms operating in such a unique competitive environment.

國防部本身內部績效評量標準亦多是如此。雖然民營公司對接收因管理決策而使重組、擴充或縮減生產線，及擴充或縮減市場等策略成功回

饋的資訊相當明確，但是國防部內部同樣的資訊回饋卻反而更為模糊。如同許多人士評論的觀點，評量各軍種成功的標準在於國家是否贏取或輸掉最近一場衝突戰爭，以及是否有能力嚇阻或贏取下一場戰爭。正如 2000 年總統大選所反映的情況，要下此結論可能頗具爭議性。儘管經過多年的努力及不斷的探討，至於我們到底贏了、或應該要贏了、還是輸掉越戰，以及我們能從越戰經驗中有效汲取那些教訓，至今看法仍非常分歧。<sup>13</sup>

Much the same can be said about internal measures of performance within the Defense Department itself. Although private firms receive rather unambiguous feedback on the success of managerial decisions to reorganize, expand or restrict product lines, and expand or restrict markets, similar feedback within the DoD is much more ambiguous. As many have commented, the measure of success for the military services is whether the nation won or lost the latest conflict and is perceived as being able to deter or win the next one. Making such a determination, as reflected in the 2000 presidential campaign, can be quite contentious. Despite years of effort and countless critiques, there is still a wide difference of opinion as to whether we won, could have won, or lost the Vietnam War and what lessons might usefully be drawn from the experience.<sup>14</sup>



最近，雖然普遍（若非全部）觀點認為美國在 1991 年與伊拉克的衝突戰爭勝出，但是軍種間對何者提供較多必要作戰能力的看法甚為分歧。從空軍的觀點，顯然空中武力才是決定性因素，同時也是美國部隊中最有效的兵力；相反地，對陸軍而言，空軍提供了主要攻擊能力，惟經過一個月的密集轟炸，伊拉克裝甲部隊仍對科威特構成威脅，故並未能排除地面作戰的需要予以壓制。<sup>15</sup> 後續的研究既未解決這項爭議，亦未明顯改變國防支出的歷史模式。

More recently, although there is a general (if not universal) view that the United States prevailed in its conflict with Iraq in 1991, there is a wide difference of views among the services as to which provided the more indispensable capability. From the perspective of the Air Force, clearly air power was the decisive element and the most valuable tool in the American kitbag. For the Army, by contrast, air power provided a major enabling capability, but it did not obviate the need for a ground campaign against Iraqi armored formations that still threatened Kuwait after a month of intensive bombardment.<sup>16</sup> Subsequent studies have neither settled the issue, nor resulted in a significant change to historical defense spending patterns.

各軍種與其他單位績效的評量，一直都是國防部內部和所有公營部門的一項主要挑戰。最近

一份有關這項主題的著作提到：「政府一向精於評量一件事：支出…。政府一向拙於評量的是經由該項支出與行動所完成的結果。」<sup>17</sup> 國防部的情況雖優於許多其他政府機構，但也無法免於遭受這樣的批評。

Measures of effectiveness across services and other functions remain a major challenge within the Pentagon, and throughout the public sector. As one work on this topic recently noted, “Governments have always been good at measuring one thing: spending… What government has been really lousy at is measuring what was accomplished through that spending and action.”<sup>18</sup> The Defense Department, although better than many other government agencies, is certainly not immune from this criticism.

公、民營管理上最後一項主要差異為激勵制度。民營部門具備很有效的激勵機制以持續鼓勵員工努力尋求降低公司營運成本的方法。這種動力十分重要。較低成本在沒有降價的壓力下可直接轉化為較高利潤；為因應降價的壓力而縮減的成本可直接轉化為生存的本錢。簡言之，民營企業經理人在壓低成本的同时，藉由維持（產品）品質來增加獲利，以獲取應有的獎勵。

A final major distinction between public and private management is in the incentive structure. In the private sector there are powerful incentives, and a continuous effort, to discover ways that lower a

firm's operating costs. The motivation is quite fundamental. Lower costs in the absence of downward price pressures directly translate to greater profits, and lower costs in response to downward price pressures directly translate to survival. In short, by maintaining quality while lowering costs, private managers reap rewards in terms of greater profitability.

在公營部門大都缺少這樣的激勵方式，而且情況通常與之相反。公營公司從上級行政單位或立法部門所分配之預算來產生其「收入」；降低營運成本的結果可能導致下年度的營運預算被刪減。「不用則損失」（Use it or lose it）對從事公共管理的人而言只是一項基本常識。簡言之，在民營部門降低成本導致利潤或競爭力的提昇；而在公營部門的結果正好相反。為這些根本互異的激勵機制尋求解決之道，會使將民營企業管理實務運用於公共活動上的效果顯得事倍功半。

In the public sector, such incentives are largely absent and are commonly quite the opposite. Public firms generate their “income” from the budget allocations of their governing executive or legislative body. Lowering costs of operations is likely to result in a lower operating budget for the following year “Use it or lose it” is a common piece of wisdom to those in public management. In short, lowering costs in the private sector results in an improved profit or competitive condition, while doing so in the

public sector may result in just the opposite. Finding mechanisms to deal with these fundamentally different incentive mechanisms significantly complicates efforts to transpose private management practices onto public activities.

雖然國防部不是一家企業，而且在許多方面也無法以企業的方式經營；但這並非意謂要放棄應有的努力，即尋求營造類似企業針對計畫與投資之預期利潤（報酬）、策略（競爭）環境中顯著的變化、以及審慎考量全盤計畫成本之後下達決策的環境。PPB 制度建立之初，其目的即在獲取許多這類的考量因素。這點應列為其最根本的目的。

Although the Pentagon is not a business, and in many ways cannot be managed as one, this does not mean that efforts should be abandoned that seek to develop an environment where business-like decisions are made in response to expected benefits (returns) from programs and investments, in response to observable changes in the strategic (competitive) environment, and following careful consideration of full programmatic costs. In its original inception, PPBS was intended to capture many of these considerations. This should remain as its ultimate purpose.

## 二、改變的種類

### b.Categories of Change



如前所述，儘管公、民營部門間存在著明顯差異，但本研究主要目的，在確認現代策略規劃與管理方法是否可運用來改進現行 PPB 制度的流程。雖然在許多方面，公、民營部門的管理哲學或動機少有共同點；然而在其他方面只要進行某些修正，就有足夠的共通性可明顯改善目前國防部戰略規劃的方式。

As stated, the major objective of this study is to identify modern strategic planning and management approaches that might be useful for improving the current PPBS process despite the clear distinctions that exist between the public and private sector. Although in many areas there is little overlap in management philosophies or motivations, in other areas there is sufficient commonality that certain changes would clearly improve the current DoD's approach to strategic planning.

現行 PPB 制度流程可修正部分區分為三大類：結構上的、程序上的，以及技術上的。第一類著重於影響 PPB 制度的因素，只要作部分的修正，在 PPB 制度實務上關鍵因素的結構便可獲得改善。第二類探討結構上健全，但程序上利用不足或效率上無法同步的項目。最後一類將各種努力集中投注於適合大型公營組織的會計制度及績效與效率評量標準的發展。每一類將以具體建議逐一討論。

Possible changes to the current PPBS process

fall into three general categories: the structural, the procedural, and the technical. The first category focuses on elements of PPBS where the structure of key elements in the practice of PPBS would benefit from some modification. The second category discusses items that are structurally sound, but procedurally under-utilized or ineffectively synchronized. The last category comprises efforts focused on accounting and the development of measures of performance and effectiveness useful for a large public sector organization. Each will be discussed with specific proposals raised.

## 註 釋

- 1.BENS interview 052400.
- 2.BENS interview 052400.
3. There are numerous references throughout the Pentagon's 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to the RMA and the pressing need to undertake a significant transformation of our forces to achieve it. Despite this declared intention, numerous reports, including the 1997 Report of the National Defense Panel (NDP) do not believe this process has been enthusiastically engaged. See, for example, "Warfighting Transformation Strategy Missing, DSB Tells Pentagon,"

- Aerospace Daily, 19 January 2000, p. 89; and the QDR Report, pp. 14-18.
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5. Discussion held at BENS, 17 November 1999.
6. Discussion held at BENS, 17 November 1999.
7. BENS interview 012299.
8. BENS interview 012299.
9. See for a discussion of the evolved role of the Congress since 1960, James M. Lindsay, "Congress and Defense Policy," in Peter L. Hays, Brenda J. Vallance, and Alan R. Van Tassel, eds., American Defense Policy, 7th Edition ( Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997 ) , pp. 81-92.
10. See for a discussion of the evolved role of the Congress since 1960, James M. Lindsay, "Congress and Defense Policy," in Peter L. Hays, Brenda J. Vallance, and Alan R. Van Tassel, eds., American Defense Policy, 7th Edition ( Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997 ), pp. 81-92.
11. See " A Conversation With John J. Hamre," Washington Post, 28 February 2000, p. F12.
12. See " A Conversation With John J. Hamre," Washington Post, 28 February 2000, p. F12.
13. See for example, Robert McNamara, Thomas Biersteker, James Blight and Robert Brigham, Argument Without End ( London: Perseus, 1999 ); and Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam ( New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999 ) . Although McNamara continues to believe the war in Vietnam was unwinnable, but could have been less costly to both sides had better communications between senior leadership levels existed, Sorley argues that by 1972 the war had been won. In Sorley' s view the decision to withdraw from Vietnam was what caused defeat, not performance on the battlefield.
14. See for example, Robert McNamara, Thomas Biersteker, James Blight and Robert Brigham, Argument Without End ( London: Perseus, 1999 ) ; and Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexa-



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15.The Air Force view is well reflected in Rebecca Grant, *Airpower and the Total Force: The Gift of Time* ( Arlington: Iris Research, 1997; the Army view is concisely reflected in an Army Vision 2010, published during the period of the 1997 QDR where the Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis Reimer, stated that although there was a view that power projection and national military strategy could primarily be carried out through precision strikes using technologically advanced air and naval forces, “Reality proved that theory to be invalid.”

16.The Air Force view is well reflected in Rebecca Grant, *Airpower and the Total Force: The Gift of Time* ( Arlington: Iris Research, 1997; the Army view is concisely reflected in an Army Vision 2010, published during the period of the 1997

QDR where the Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis Reimer, stated that although there was a view that power projection and national military strategy could primarily be carried out through precision strikes using technologically advanced air and naval forces, “Reality proved that theory to be invalid.”

17.Jonathan Walters, *Measuring Up* ( Washington: Governing Books, Inc., 1998 ) , pp. 48-49.

18.Jonathan Walters, *Measuring Up* ( Washington: Governing Books, Inc., 1998 ) , pp. 48-49.

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