Deck Landing At Night Chiang Chien Chung AbstractˇG 1.Ship deck landing is a high risk operation, if that isn't a schedule d training, then it happened usually at the end of a flight mission. W hen the hello finished the mission and lands on the ship, usually acco mpanied with two features: first, the hello almost runs out of the fue l and second are pilots already tired down after 3 to 4 hours flight. At this moment, if we proceed from the objective of facts, something h ided may happen. For example: land on the ship at night, with low visi bility, aircraft system degrade and malfunction risk, pilot that encou nter vertigo or disorentation causing much of the pilot psychological and physiological reaction. It usually affects pilot's judgment capabi lity. 2.To acknodege of vertigo and disorientation during a night flight, on ly base on some discussions at the preflight briefing is certainly not enough, because at that moment may accompany with some system malfunc tion or others. Using the simulator to simulate that kind scenario at routine training will be the best option for a smart pilot. 3.The purpose of risk Management is to avoid risky operation. However, proceeding from the objective of fact still have some risk which can' t be predicted and avoided, as if it happened being only based on airc rew's well training during ordinary time. Of cause the training should include the subject of risk management on both aviation community and surface ship community. Ship deck landing is a high risk operation, if that isn't a scheduled training, then it happened usually at the end of a flight mission. Whe n the hello finished the mission and lands on the ship, usually accomp anied with two features: first, the hello almost runs out of the fuel and second are pilots already tired down after 3 to 4 hours flight. At this moment, if we proceed from the objective of facts, something hid ed may happen. For example: land on the ship at night, with low visibi lity, aircraft system degrade and malfunction risk, pilot that encount er vertigo or disorientation causing much of the pilot psychological a nd physioloayical reaction. It usually affects pilot's judgment capabi lity. In this article, we will use a real case happened in the US navy, to m ake some research on this subject. First, reading the story (For easy understanding, using the main-rolev iew point of description). Time: Summer mid night of past time Location: US Navy FFG-7 cruise at yellow sea (Korea territory) Main role: US navy HSL-xx LTJG Tom (pilot of SH-60B) We were operating from a cruiser in the Yellow Sea in the middle of a dark night-and I donˇ¦t mean just any ordinary dark night. As we eventually would learn, we were within 200 yards of the ship (as reported by the ASTAC), with the crew shining every possible light at high power, including two SAR lights from the flight deck and two mor e from the bridge. The crew also was dropping smokes down the starboar d side from the LSO tank-commander hatch. Nevertheless, we couldn't se e the ship, even with our NVGs. I still find it hard to believe this r eally happened. It had been foggy all afternoon, but the fog had started to burn off t oward evening. The forecast called for light fog at our land divert mo re than 90 miles away, and visibility at our location was about one to three miles. Ar our brief time, we could see the last of the daylight sky peeking through the 1,500-to-3,000-foot ceiling. Although the wat ers off the Koreas are notorious for low visibility and fog during the summer, we gave little thought to the weather once the conditions sta rted clearing up. We had good forward-looking-infrared-radar (FLIR) ranges, and we had i dentified many fishing vessels. We also had encountered occasional IMC conditions in isolated areas. The flight had been relatively uneventful, and we headed back to the s hip about 30 minutes before recovery time. As we flew toward mother, w e went popeye and descended from 1,000 to 500 feet, hoping to come out below the layer. Still in the clouds at 500 feet, we crept down to 20 0 feet, searching for better conditions as we set ourselves up behind the ship. A quick check of the gas indicated about 1+100 until min fue l. We found that 200 feet didnˇ¦t have much more to offer than 500 fee t, so we began an alternate approach sequence and descended to 100 fee t. We also slowed to 50 knots and tried to locate the ship by one-half mile. The approach was standard, with a fairly stable platform, but, when we got to one-half mile, we couldnˇ¦t see a thing. We waved off and brou ght it back around. With the pucker meter pegged, we started to crunch our numbers for our alternate. We decided if we singled up the engine s, we could get there. We told control and the LSO about not locating the ship, and then turned inbound for another run. This time, we reque sted the shipˇ¦s lights to be turned on and explained that we planned on descending to 50 feet and slowing up earlier. The second approach had a few close altitude calls. We tried to get lo w and slow and bring the ship in a bit closer to see if we could captu re it within one-quarter mile. Waving off again, we started to get dis oriented from being in continuous IMC conditions while varying the air speed. We instructed our aircrewman to back us up, as usual, with closure and range calls. The ASTAC gave us our position relative to our base-reco very course (BRC), along with heading calls. We recaged ourselves, swa pped controls, and descended to try again. This time, we asked that al l the lights on the ship be turned on high power, and we reported our current state of 0+45. With our divert airfield now out of range, we h ad no choice but to recover to the ship. Knocking out the automatic-approach checklist, we dialed in 50 feet an d 20 knots of forward groundspeed and engaged the approach at two mile s out. As we descended, we were on the gauges and backing up each othe r on altitude and airspeed. Coming into a slow forward creep, the rada lt warning went off as the aircraft descended below our set altitude o f 40 feet. Pulling in power, we recalled how this particular aircraft had a tendency to momentarily dip below the dialed-inaltitude. This re collection was too late, however; our BDHIs started spinning as the fl ying pilot experienced vertigo. Swapping controls again, we pulled in an armpit full of collective and climbed to 600 feet until we could wo rk on forward airspeed. We turned away from the ship and went out to f our miles to take a break, catch our breath, and again recage ourselve s. Already performing emergency-low-visibility-approach (ELVA) procedures with the ASTAC, we requested an emergency-smokelight approach and set up for our next run. As we turned inbound, we dialed our approach to a more standard 80 feet, instead of 50 feet-we had learned from our pr evious effort. We decided to get direction from the ASTAC to position us two miles from the stern, on top of the wake, on BRC, and then enga ge our automatic approach and ride it down to a hover. From there, we planned to creep in as previously briefed. The front half of the third approach began uneventfully. As we progres sed forward, nearly stable in our hover, we received a call from the A STAC, saying we were nearly 180 degrees out on our heading. Our sensor operator (SO) confirmed the bad heading. We recalled the spinning dir ectional gyros on the previous approach, which had led us not to trust our instruments. We briefly selected alternate altitude-gyro-control assembly (AGCA) mode for our gyros and put in a big correction to get back on course.We momentarily experienced vertigo once more and pulled away from the water. Recovering at about 1,100 feet, we reexamined our instruments under so me welcome starlight. We probably had the correct heading but were in a side drift, which, therefore, had us going the wrong way, according to both the SO and the ASTAC. Confident we had the situation licked, we went in for another try. As before, we descended to 50 feet and established a forward ground speed of 30 knots for the entire approach. With a few smokes in the water t o help, we were certain to acquire the ship this pass. Coming up on on e-quarter mile, we slowed to a near crawl. Not until the ASTAC called us 200 yards off the fantail, though, did we wave off to the port side , with still no ship or light in sight, and all the while still on NVG s. Nervous again, we set up and reexamined the whole procedure; we were s ure our methods were sound. The LSO assured us all the lights were tur ned on bright, including two SAR spotlights brought from below, and se veral smokes were in the water. Also, all available personnel were mus tered to man the deck and listen for our aircraft, and then to make ve ctoring hand signals to the LSO. Once more, we proceeded inbound. Down to 40 feet and creeping forward at 30 to 40 knots, we were about two miles out when the shipˇ¦s TACAN went down. Venting our frustrations at the control tower, we switched to our aircrewman for closure and range calls, using our radar. Establ ished in a hover and receiving range, closure and position calls from the ASTAC and SO, and as the nonflying pilot backed up airspeed, altit ude, and heading, we came to within one-half mile when the TACAN came back up. With no ship or visual reference in sight, we crept forward, holding 1 0 to 15 knots of ground speed. Inside of 150 yards, one of us picked u p a faint light that quickly developed into a glorious, bright, green glow of a burning smoke. Looking farther, we made out a few more smoke s but no ship. As we headed down the smoke trail, we began to detect, with our NVGs, a faint light through the fog. Straining to make out a ship, the dim lights began to take form. The nonflying pilot, as brief ed, came off his goggles and kept a lookout for the ship. Seeing lineu p lights and bright spotlights, the nonflying pilot took controls from the flying pilot, whose goggles were blooming out. Fighting the onset of vertigo, we picked up a visual scan and oriented ourselves to the shipˇ¦s stern. We brought on our searchlight and got a verbal confirma tion from the LSO of our position off the shipˇ¦s fantail. Switching c ontrols another couple times, we finally found ourselves in a hover ov er our flight deck, surrounded by spotlights and smokes. Stunned, we s at there in a hover, exhaled a sigh of relief, and lowered the helicop ter into the trap. Reports from the lookouts later claimed we had overflown the ship on t wo separate occasions, while the ASTAC reported the night-capable, fli ght-deck camera couldnˇ¦t even see the flight deck through the fog. Th e LSO said we broke out over the harpoon launchers when we flipped on our searchlight. The HCO in the tower said she briefly had lost sight of us, even as we were coming over the flight deck. Grateful to be aboard, we completed our post-flight inspection. As I t ook the opportunity to reflect, I couldnˇ¦t help but gain a whole new respect for the sea. Besides, this experience allowed me to appreciate the aircraft a bit and actually switch my gyro out of the alternate m ode selection for other than system checks. This article brings up several issues of interest for helo ops from sm all-boy ships. First, the bridge and CIC watch teams are vital cogs in the CRM and ORM machines. Obviously, the OOD knew the ship was encoun tering fog. Timely notification to the helo crew of degrading visibili ty conditions would have given them more options and time to make deci sions, but that didnˇ¦t happen in this case. Second, in-depth knowledg e of the divert and the ability to get updates on its weather conditio ns are essential to give aircrew the tools needed to make an informed decision whether or not to diver. Naval Safety Center. Though, the national condition is different. However the way to procee d a deck landing are no different, In this article might be too partia l for aviation territory, however surface officer is not necessary to take too much notice at the flight portion .The value of concerning as follows: 1.The purpose of risk Management is to avoid risky operation, however, proceeding from the objective of facts, there still have some risk not being predicted and avoided, as if it happened only can based on airc rew's well training during ordinary time. Of cause the training should include the subject of risk management on both aviation community and surface ship community. 2.Emergency low visibility approach (ELVA i.e. ship's radar guiding ap proach) and smoker approach, should be familiarize at ordinary time by surface officer. Proceed the aircrew and ship-crew coordinate trainin g at day time and good visibility can pre-check the critical or high r isk portion, then take correct action to fix the problem before it hap pen .Non of any aircraft controller or pilot or ship captain will feel comfortable,when we deal with this procedure at first time, no one ca n promise this,then which one have the confidence? In addition, smoke marker mentioned in this case on surface ship that should notice that smoke markers are not only using on ASW operation, it can be also supported as a navigation lighting at low visibility si tuation, so it should be carried with ship equipped the navigation equ ipment. 3.In this story US navy sea hawk (SH60B) are slightly different with R OC navy thunder hawk (S-70C) in addition USN. Sea hawk had equip with FLIR and NVG system .However as pilot encounter vertigo, disorientatio n or system degrade or malfunction,FLIR or NVG are helpless. Try to image that you are sitting in the cabin of the static train,thr ough the window seeing the other train that moves to oppose direction, you probability will feel dizzy or you might think the train you pick in is moving. Of cause after you cross check with the platform, you r ealize that your train doesn't moving at all it still remains static. On same theory, pilot can see nothing through the windshield.But in da rk night, when the compass roes on the instrument panel begin to rotat e that mean the helo heading is changing. The pilot immediately thinks the helo is turning, if it were real or j ust an illusion caused by failure equipment?Pilot needs to cross check AI. (Attitude indicator) or until that compass is sure' what happenin g? No matter helo is turning or NAV. sys failure, most likely it will cau se the pilot encounters vertigo or disorientation, when there is no ou tside feature for reference (EX' low visibility or dark night). 4.How to verify the truth when encounters system degrade or failure du ring night deck landing? Pilot needs to recall the system diagram in m ind then makes a correct judgment take necessary correction. So it rea lly is based on pilot's knowledge and training. A wrong judgment may l ead a wrong decision. After the third trial of deck landing still can' t succeed; pilot is going to face the pressure of running out fuel. It leads the pilot to make some incorrect or very rough decision or losi ng confidence. All of this should not be allowed, because it doesn't g et ready during ordinary times. Conclusion In this article has mentioned crew CRM (Cabin Resource Management) and ship crew's ORM (Operation Resource Management) during flight quarter setting. The most valuable portion for ROCN is practice to those flig ht safety scenario during the helo detachment on board the ship. These actions increase both aircrew and ship crew capability of critical si tuation. It greatly helps improving the flight safety of helo shipboar d operation.