Winning before the War
A Case for Consolidation of Gains
勝兵先勝：鞏固戰果的案例

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In October 2022, the Army released its newest operational doctrine at the Association of the United States Army's annual meeting. Field Manual （FM） 3-0, Operations, heralded the first holistic revision of the Army's warfighting methodology since AirLand Battle forty years prior. FM 3-0 is intended to be much more than an iterative outgrowth of legacy practices. Rather, it enshrines a new operational concept of warfighting and has initiated a top-to-bottom revision across the body of doctrine. The ambition long espoused by the Army's top officer, Gen. James McConville, is to inspire a "transformational change" rather than incrementally improving the Army. To this end, FM 3-0 refocuses numerous familiar terms and constructs while proffering novel others to orchestrate the application of Army capabilities in support of the joint force.

2022 年 10 月美國陸軍協會年度盛會上，美陸軍公布新版作戰準則。地空整體作戰問世 40 年後，美陸軍野戰教範 3-0《作戰術》首次大修，全面修訂美陸軍作戰方式。其實，《作戰術》本次大修並非定期修編，而是詮釋全新作戰概念，由上而下修訂整個準則體系。長期以來，美陸軍高階將領詹姆·麥康維爾上將心心念念，矢志「徹底轉型改革」美陸軍，而非循序漸進提升美陸軍戰力。[1]為此，《作戰術》重新聚焦數個類似術語與架構，同時引進其他全新術語與概念，重塑美陸軍戰力運用方針，支援聯合部隊遂行作戰。

[1] James McConville, "General James McConville on Army Operations and Priorities" （remarks, Association of the U.S. Army Breakfast Series, Fort Belvoir, VA, 21 January 2020）, accessed 2 August 2023, https://www.c-span.org/video/?468316-1/general-james-mcconville-army-operations-priorities.

The central tenet of FM 3-0 is a concept called multidomain operations, defined as “the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages.” This definition certainly appears intuitive on its surface. After all, the concerted employment of modern combined arms has been a principle of near-axiomatic status since well before the muddy trenches of World War I. But this belies the complexity inherent in the concept’s contemporary application and its potential impact in increasingly dynamic operating environments. Further, even though multidomain operations have been in the Army’s doctrinal vernacular for several years, its importance in the new FM 3-0 is more than an attempt to pass off “old wine in a new bottle.” It is not a variation of a legacy concept but rather reflects a maturation that codifies lessons acquired in tandem with the changing operational environment over the last four decades.

美陸軍野戰教範 3-0《作戰術》的核心概念為多領域作戰，也就是「整合運用兵科特性，形塑美陸軍與聯合部隊整體戰力，進而創造與加大戰場相對優勢」。[2]就字義上來看，這段定義看似合乎常理。畢竟，早在第一次世界大戰壕溝戰之前，當前兵種協同作戰概念幾乎就是不證自明的公理。然而，前述定義卻掩飾這項概念作戰運用過程中的複雜內涵，以及在日趨詭譎多變作戰環境下，可能面臨的潛在衝擊。再者，即便過去幾年，多領域作戰概念早已成為美陸軍準則的熱門詞彙，但本次美陸軍野戰教範 3-0《作戰術》大修，絕對不只是將多領域作戰概念「重新包裝」。實質上，這本準則內的多領域作戰並不是老生常談，而是結合當前作戰環境變化與過往 40 年實戰經驗，去蕪存菁後的實戰驗證概念。

To be sure, this new doctrine is well designed and tempered by years of testing and evaluation. Yet despite its many strengths, FM 3-0 remains incomplete in articulating and analyzing one of the Army’s fundamental contributions—the consolidation of gains （CG）. In fact, “consolidation of gains” is a term used so frequently and in various contexts throughout FM 3-0 that it defies singular meaning or clarity of purpose. It is a strategic role, an outcome of multidomain operations, an imperative, and a set of operational efforts. These inconsistencies undermine the crucial impact achieved through CG while obfuscating that this function is deeply ingrained in the Army’s DNA and organic to its mission.

無庸置疑，這本全新準則蒐集網羅過往數年測評結果，嚴謹編排章節內容。然而，即便《作戰術》具備諸多優點，但在論述與分析美陸軍鞏固戰果基本概念部分

[2] Field Manual （ FM ） 3-0, Operations （ Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2022 ）, 1-2.

仍有所不足。其實，「鞏固戰果」頻繁出現在《作戰術》準則各個章節，這個術語的實質內涵無法一言以蔽之。「鞏固戰果」是一種戰略思維、多領域作戰成果、作戰要務及一系列作戰術應用的作為。[3]

Expanding upon FM 3-0 will further define the meaning and subsequent value in CG. Doing so will demonstrate why the Army is the service best postured to lead CG efforts on behalf of the joint force. To achieve these aims, the article will first define the purpose for consolidating gains before briefly describing the term's evolution and inherent prominence in the Army's mission. It will then apply examples from doctrine and recent experience to demonstrate the utility of consolidated gains in preparing for, deterring, and winning war as part of a whole-of-government strategy. The article will next discuss risk should gains be poorly consolidated and conclude by offering tools and approaches for planners to consider.

精讀《作戰術》就會進一步瞭解鞏固戰果的內涵與價值。如此一來，亦可瞭解美陸軍為何最足以代表聯合部隊，主導鞏固戰果相關作為。因此，本文首先說明鞏固戰果之目的，簡要說明這個軍事術語的演進，以及在陸軍各項任務中所扮演的關鍵角色。接著，引用準則內部資料與近期案例，闡述如何運用鞏固戰果進行備戰、嚇阻及克敵制勝，達成整體政府戰略目標。再者，探討未妥善鞏固戰果的風險，最後列舉計畫人員得以善加運用的工具與手段。

Consolidation of Gains: A Value Proposition

鞏固戰果：價值不斐的方案

Unit-level commanders employ forces for specific tasks that provide physical or non-physical value. These might include possession of terrain, positional advantage, support of a population, moral standing, or the denial of any of these to an adversary. But battlefield actions, if appropriately designed and integrated into the sweep of strategic art, are rarely intended to be isolated events. These independent tactical actions are undertaken as part of a complex choreography and, holistically, are interwoven to form the tapestry of a given conflict. Each activity is intended to present additive dilemmas to the enemy, thus providing a position of

[3] For context on the Army's strategic roles, see FM 3-0, Operations, 1-1; outcomes of multidomain operations, 1-2; imperatives, 3-8; and examples of operational efforts, 6-20.

advantage over one's opponent to influence theater outcomes or end states. Therefore, CG is a value proposition for the joint force, as the sum of lowcost tactical investments are brought together under an operationally sound purpose to achieve a high-yield strategic effect.

各級部隊指揮官派遣部隊遂行特定行動，達成實質與非實質戰果。這些行動包含占領地形要點、掌握地利、爭取特定群體支持、維持道德標準，以及避免敵方取得前述優勢。然而，戰場行動如能妥善規劃，納入全盤戰略規劃，就鮮少會陷入孤掌難鳴、各自為政的窘境。其實，這些獨立戰術作為是錯綜複雜與縝密規劃戰略目標之一環，疊加之後就成為一場衝突。每項戰術行動都企圖阻撓敵軍，爭取我軍相對優勢，進而左右戰爭結果與終戰狀態。因此，鞏固戰果對聯合部隊至關重要，而低成本戰術作為必須化整為零，支持作戰階層目標，最終發揮影響深遠的戰略效益。

In pursuit of national aims, civilian and military strategists must look for all such circumstances or opportunities favorable to attaining the desired end. These outcomes, whether achieved intentionally or otherwise, can be considered as "gains." While gains are often referred to by category, such as "security gains" or "political gains," all provide value even if isolated within their respective typology. "Consolidation" involves integrating these gains under a strategic purpose. The resulting synergy of consolidating these gains combine to present multiple dilemmas to the enemy. In short, we define CG as the deliberate recognition of outcomes that benefit desired ends, and the appreciation of these gains within a framework that accounts for their cumulative effects.

追求國家戰略目標過程中，文職與軍職戰略規劃人員必須盱衡全般狀況，掌握我方可乘之機，伺機達成所望目標。精心規劃與出乎意料的結果通稱「戰果」。雖然戰果通常會分門別類，如「安全層面戰果」或「政治層面戰果」，但所有戰果都有價值，即便是特定領域的獨立行動也存在效益。「鞏固」涉及整合某項戰略目標下的各領域戰果，頓挫敵軍。簡言之，本文將鞏固戰果定義為仔細審視達成所望目標的初期成果，接著再依循特定架構，逐漸累積各式戰果。

Understanding the value of consolidated gains requires that the Army unlearn several misnomers associated to the term's historical usage. Contrary to prior interpretations where gains would be consolidated on the objective as part of reorganization and preparation for the next operation, the contemporary application

is not limited to matters of a tactical or kinetic nature. Rather, it now enables leaders at all levels to achieve better results by integrating the full array of relevant efforts and actors spanning military, civilian, allies, and partner activities. The advantages achieved in any one of these can have a cumulative effect upon the others across the conflict continuum. CG—when done well—serves as a binding agent that transcends strategic contexts （competition, crisis, or conflict） to cohere disparate activities undertaken within the Army's other strategic roles （see figure 1）.

在深入探討鞏固戰果的價值前，美陸軍必須先釐清過往對鞏固戰果此術語的部分誤解。過去，鞏固戰果其實只是兵力重整與未來作戰整備的一環；現在，戰果並非僅侷限於戰術或動能屬性。其實，鞏固戰果促使各階層指揮官，運用諸般手段，充分整合軍、民、同盟及夥伴的關鍵作為。前述個別戰果日積月累後，就會在整個衝突各階段中襲擾敵人方面累積影響。若能適切鞏固戰果，即可整合競爭、危機或衝突階段的各式戰略目標，累積美陸軍其他戰略任務下的個別行動成果（如圖一）。



鞏固戰果整合美陸軍各項戰略責任（形塑、反制、戰勝），在衝突各階段（競爭、危機、衝突）支援聯合部隊。

Figure 1. Consolidation of Gains Is in the Army's DNA

圖一：鞏固戰果深植於美陸軍的基因內

The Army increasingly recognizes the importance of CG as evinced by its burgeoning presence within doctrine. However, the institution seemingly continues to underappreciate the fullness of its contribution to the effort. As the premier landpower service, the Army is capable of leading discreet partners and priorities

together across time and space to maximize their value to the joint force. Consolidating gains involves contributions from across the joint force to build upon the Army's access, capabilities, and capacity. At the strategic level, consolidating gains involves carefully orchestrating diplomatic, informational, military, and economic （DIME） instruments of national power.

美陸軍逐漸體認鞏固戰果的重要性，準則也不斷出現這個術語。然而，美陸軍似乎仍忽略鞏固戰果對整體作戰的影響。美陸軍為主要地面作戰軍種，得以隨時隨地統籌指揮夥伴遂行任務與律定作戰程序，彰顯軍種在聯合部隊的存在價值。鞏固戰果包括運用美陸軍陣地、戰力及武器系統，整合聯合部隊所屬各單位作為。就戰略層面來看，鞏固戰果包括投入國家力量，統合外交、資訊、軍事及經濟手段，達成所望目標。

More than Postconflict Actions in the Assembly Area

不僅是集結地區的衝突後行動

Following the experiences of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, CG activities have remained closely associated with stability operations at the tactical level, and primarily as a follow-on phase to combat operations. The new FM 3-0 does an admirable job reframing this narrative, but the connotation can still be found elsewhere in doctrine. For example, Joint Publication （JP） 3-31, *Joint Land Operations*, discusses CG exclusively under "Stability" and as a means to "capitalize on operational success and set conditions for a stable environment and eventual transition to legitimate authorities." In fact, CG includes activities that permeate the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, and span across the competition, crisis, and conflict continuum. Figure 2 provides a broad depiction of the breadth of CG activities, leading to important insights about the concept.

根據「伊拉克自由作戰」與「持久自由作戰」的實戰經驗，鞏固戰果仍與戰術層面的維穩行動息息相關，主要也是作戰行動的後續作為。新版《作戰術》準則重新潤飾遣詞用字，但過往鞏固戰果的概念仍在準則隱約可見。舉例來說，聯戰書刊3-31《聯合地面作戰》將鞏固戰果特別納入「維穩作戰」章節，且視為「運用作戰術層面戰果，創造未來穩定局勢，最終成為合法政權」的手段。[4]實質上，鞏固戰果

[4] Joint Publication （JP） 3-31, Joint Land Operations （Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010）, V-7.

包括戰術、作戰術及戰略層面，橫亙競爭、危機及衝突階段。圖二簡要列舉鞏固戰果各項作為，點出其中的重要概念。



Consolidation of gains activities permeate all levels of war across the conflict continuum

鞏固戰果貫穿各個衝突階段、涉及各階戰爭層級

席媧·凱利（Heiva Kelley）繪製

Figure 2. Ubiquitous Influence of Consolidating Gains

圖二：鞏固戰果的影響力無遠弗屆

The U.S. Army undertakes a leading role in the preponderance of CG activities at the tactical level, given its multidomain capabilities at scale, staying power in austere conditions, and strong presence within the land domain where humans reside. Conversely, consolidating gains at the operational level, requires greater coordination, resources, and effects that demand contributions from across the joint force to build upon the Army's access, capabilities, and capacity. At the strategic level, achieving gains depends upon the coordination and application of DIME instruments.

美陸軍具備大規模多領域戰力、戰場持久戰力及陸上大規模兵力，得以主導戰術層面多數鞏固戰果行動。相對地，作戰術層面鞏固戰果植基於美陸軍陣地、戰力及武器裝備，過程中需要大量協調作業、各方資源及不斷累積戰術成果。在戰略層面，取得戰果的基礎是善用外交、資訊、軍事及經濟手段，戮力協調工作。

Optimal CG employment builds upon nested activities at each level of war to yield increasingly greater synergistic effects. For example, CG activities at the tactical level may involve an Army civil affairs team that works with a small village

to understand and address a grievance. At the operational level, CG may combine to impact larger societal groups, such as a joint task force that brings together many foreign humanitarian assistance activities to reduce human suffering and help bring stability to a given nation or region. At the strategic level, CG may leverage the relationships that were built through the aforementioned activities to gain military access to critical ports and airfields within the host nation's borders.

鞏固戰果必須充分整合各作戰術層面作為，產生加乘效應。舉例來說，在戰術層面，美陸軍民事單位必須深入小型村莊，傾聽與緩解當地居民的不滿情緒。在作戰術層面，鞏固戰果的對象是大型社會群體。例如，聯合特遣部隊整合他國人道援助行動，減緩人道危機，穩定地主國或特定地區動盪情勢。在戰略層面，鞏固戰果運用前述兩個層面建立的友好關係，派遣軍隊駐紮地主國境內重要港口或機場。

When CG efforts are organized along the conflict continuum, distinct purposes emerge for competition, crisis, and conflict activities. In competition, CG contributes to setting the theater and reducing "latent risk" through actions, such as improving living conditions and physical infrastructure that help to build goodwill and good governance with partner nations. In a crisis, CG activities aim to leverage relationships to gain access to critical airfields, ports, and staging areas that impose costs and deter potential adversaries. Finally, in a conflict, CG serves the joint force by helping to secure lines of communication, defeating enemy remnants behind forward lines, and setting the stage for transition to a focus on stabilization activities. Accordingly, the preponderance of CG investments should occur during competition to best posture the joint force during crisis and conflict. Envisioning CG activities in this way may assist the joint force in gaining a better appreciation for its potential impact across the conflict continuum and at all levels of war.

鞏固戰果作為必須進行跨階段整合，但各階段目的不盡相同。在競爭階段，鞏固戰果有助於建立戰場與消弭「潛在風險」，藉由改善當地居民生活情況與整建實體基礎設施，釋出自身善意與建立後續攜手夥伴共同治理的基礎。在危機階段，鞏固戰果旨在運用既有關係，進駐重要機場、港口及集結地區，以嚇阻敵軍、提高對手後續進駐成本。最後在衝突階段，鞏固戰果有助於聯合部隊建立通信線、掃蕩敵軍後方地區殘餘兵力，並為後續維穩行動創造有利態勢。因此，競爭階段必須進行鞏固戰果的先期整備，聯合部隊方可在危機與衝突階段掌握有利態勢。如此一來，聯合部隊也更能掌握衝突全程與戰爭各個層級的潛在衝擊。

Winning before the War
勝兵先勝

Winning before the war requires much more than U.S. military forces conducting CG activities in a vacuum. At the grand strategic level, the Department of State （DOS） and the U.S. Agency for International Development （USAID） drive diplomatic and development efforts with other nations across the competition continuum. When combined with support from the Department of Defense （DOD）, they collectively impact local populations, partner-nation governance, and civil society systems to win in competition and avoid escalation to crisis or conflict.

若要勝兵先勝，除了美軍部隊鞏固戰果外，其他政府部門也要貢獻一己之力。在大戰略層面，美國國務院與國際發展署在競爭階段中，必須攜手其他國家採用外交與發展手段。國務院與國際發展署如果整合國防部資源，攜手改善當地居民生活、夥伴國治理及公民社會系統，在競爭階段先發制人，就可避免競爭白熱化，進一步升溫成危機或衝突。

Within the DOD, the size and mission of the Army makes it uniquely capable of leading CG efforts within the joint force. As a service, the Army maintains a force structure that allows it to engage directly and integrate closely with local populations, international partners, allies, the interagency, and the joint force. This advantage helps establish lasting gains in ways that better position the joint force to respond if escalation to crisis or conflict occurs.

在美國國防部內，美陸軍肩負特定任務，具備獨特兵力結構，得以在聯合部隊中主導鞏固戰果相關作為。美陸軍現行兵力結構能夠直接與當地民眾、國際夥伴、同盟、跨部會機構及聯合部隊進行互動、密切合作。美陸軍這種優勢得以維持戰果，提升聯合部隊戰力，應對後續危機或衝突。

Security cooperation （SC） is a great example of CG prior to conflict. SC enables the joint force to leverage the capabilities of our partners and allies to meet strategic objectives by building combat power, maintaining freedom of action, increasing understanding of the operational environment, and increasing the commander’s decision space. SC provides an example of a whole-of-government approach to strategic leadership. The DOS leads the whole-of-government approach and provides oversight to SC; most activities are carried out and coordinated by, with, or through the theater Army. SC occurs under the broader

umbrella of foreign assistance. The Office of Foreign Assistance is responsible for the supervision and overall strategic direction of foreign assistance programs administered by the DOS and the USAID. When all efforts are brought together in a coherent, deliberate manner the U.S. government efforts are more effective and impactful.

安全合作是未發生衝突前，鞏固戰果的最佳案例。聯合部隊若透過鞏固戰果，逐漸強化戰力、維持行動自由、瞭解戰場環境及提升指揮官決策空間，就能統合夥伴與同盟的現有戰力，達成戰略目標。安全合作是戰略領導階層運用全政府手段的案例。美國國務院主導全政府手段、督導安全合作，而多數安全合作工作都由戰區美陸軍執行與協調。安全合作屬於廣泛外交援助工作的一環。外交援助辦公室全盤規劃與監督國務院與國際發展署外交援助計畫整體戰略方針。所有工作若能縝密整合，美政府整體作為必定更具效益。[5]

Security force assistance （SFA） assists in the setting of conditions for future gains, helping to integrate and reinforce partnerships and shared understanding of the strategic competitive environment and realistic objectives. SFA enables the right capabilities, in the right place, at the right time, to support and shape joint and multinational security and diplomatic efforts; in short, SFA is foundational to later consolidating gains. SFA forces must be prepared to adjust and expand SFA activities to CG made in competition. SFA, when implemented and utilized correctly, will provide a critical step in consolidating gains at the regional level.

維和部隊援助協助打造未來有利作戰條件、整合與強化夥伴關係，以及瞭解戰略競爭環境與實質目標。維和部隊援助孕育戰力，適時適切支援與形塑聯合與多邊的安全暨外交作為。簡言之，維和部隊援助為後續鞏固戰果的基石。維和部隊援助必須先行整備，適時調整與強化，以滿足競爭階段的鞏固戰果需求。維和部隊援助若能適切執行、妥善運用，即可成為地區鞏固戰果的墊腳石。

When trying to simplify and generalize CG, it must be recognized that, at minimum, there must be a safe and secure environment to achieve strategic goals. The complexity comes into CG as practitioners try to understand the interplay of factors that must be considered to consolidate all the actions that are required to realize this. To consolidate gains, practitioners must establish the security

[5] JP 3-20, Security Cooperation （Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2017）, accessed 2 August 2023, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf.

conditions necessary to support: civil security, civil control, essential services, governance, economic, and infrastructure development. Understanding these functions within the proper CG context is crucial to achieving strategic goals. For example, SC and SFA activities in modern-day Iraq may help the joint force deter in crisis, and if necessary, win in conflict during a future fight with a regional opponent.

簡化與歸納鞏固戰果內涵時務必有所體認，鞏固戰果至少要營造安全環境，達成戰略目標。深入瞭解後即可發現，各項因素會相互影響，鞏固戰果的過程相當複雜。因此，必須通盤考量、密切整合相關作為。為了鞏固戰果，必須建立相應安全環境（如民間保防、民間管控、必要服務、公共治理、經濟及基礎設施建設）。[6]在鞏固戰果架構下深入檢視前述作為，乃為達成戰略目標之關鍵。舉例來說，在當前伊拉克地區，安全援助與維和部隊援助作為，可提升聯合部隊危機階段嚇阻成效，必要時，也能在未來區域衝突中克敵制勝。

A Case Study for Early Investment
先期整備經營案例研究

The U.S. approach to CG and how it was （or was not） implemented to achieve overall success and strategic goals are examined by the fourth report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan. This report highlights the need for a cohesive, planned, tailored, and consolidated response to Afghanistan, thus underscoring the need for planners to have a thorough understanding of CG as part of a whole-of-government approach to achieve the political aim.

美軍特別督察長《阿富汗重建與維穩：美國的阿富汗經驗教訓》第四份報告充分檢視，美國鞏固戰果方針與其對整體作戰行動暨戰略目標之貢獻。報告指出，美國必須先期規劃、量身訂做及同步整合對阿富汗相關作為，計畫人員也必須全盤瞭解，鞏固戰果如何融入全政府作為，達成政治目標。[7]

Stabilization, in most cases, has been seen as just the reconstruction or calming down of factors exacerbated during the conflict. This, however, is only part

[6] U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction（Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009）, 2–8.

[7] John F. Sopko et al., Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan（Arlington, VA: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2018）, accessed 2 August 2023, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-18-48-LL.pdf.

of the problem when looking at regions with a longer, more pragmatic view. “Even under the best circumstances, stabilization takes time. Without the patience and political will for a planned and prolonged effort, large-scale stabilization missions are likely to fail.” A deliberate CG focus during competition may, at best, deter opponents from conflict, and at minimum, set advantageous conditions if crisis or conflict ensues. CG helps inform leaders to better understand the conditions, players, and dynamics within the operational environment. Military stabilization activities contribute to CG through the deliberate integration of efforts into a coherent, comprehensive approach to achieve and overall objectives of partners, allies and the interagency.

維穩大多指重建與緩和衝突期間的各項不穩定因素。然而，若從更長遠與務實的觀點來看，這其實只是部分答案。「即便是最好的情況，維穩還是需要時間。如果無法耐住性子與維持政治信念，一步一腳印規劃長期作法，大規模維穩行動很可能會以失敗告終。」[8]若運用得當，競爭階段鞏固戰果可以嚇阻對手，避免釀成後續衝突；最差的情況下，也能在危機或衝突發生前，先行取得優勢。領導階層透過鞏固戰果，更能瞭解作戰環境內的敵我態勢、人員動態及作戰進程。軍事綏靖若能密切整合，形成協調一致的整體行動，成為鞏固戰果的一環，就能達成夥伴、同盟及跨機構的共同目標。

The military has long championed the requirement for physical security as amplified in the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction report, which calls “physical security … the bedrock of stabilization.” Additionally, security and governance must be considered simultaneously from the tactical to strategic levels. These findings reinforce the idea that CG efforts cannot be relegated to post-conflict activities. Instead, CG should be a deliberately targeted set of preconditions, actions, and effects to defeat security threats across the conflict continuum. The Army is structured and missioned to set and improve security as part of overall U.S. government efforts across the continuum, thus, enabling broader efforts to address challenges within all other sectors. In turn, it reinforces the need for constant collaborative planning across the conflict continuum to achieve results that advance and are informed by ally, partners, and interagency equities.

[8] Ibid., xii.

長期以來，美軍視實體安全為圭臬。如同特別督察長《阿富汗重建與維穩：美國的阿富汗經驗教訓》報告中所述：「實體安全……是維穩的基石。」[9]此外，必須從下至戰術、上至戰略層面，通盤兼顧安全與治理兩個面向。[10]這些說法再次說明，鞏固戰果不應只是衝突後的相關作為。相反地，在衝突各個階段，鞏固戰果應該集中資源、預判情勢、策定行動及初估成效，以消弭各式安全威脅。美陸軍已完成任務編組、持續強化整體安全，並配合衝突各個階段的全政府作為，因應未來各領域的諸多挑戰。反過來說，這也說明衝突各個階段必須持續整合計畫作為，以確保同盟、夥伴及跨機構的多方利益。

Empowering the Joint Force to Deter and Win
強化聯合部隊嚇阻能力與克敵制勝

The *National Security Strategy* defines integrated deterrence as “the seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh the benefits.” Integrated deterrence imposes sustained effects on capable competitors across the DIME elements of national power. It synchronizes joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational activities, while operating in all theaters and across all domains. The Army supports integrated deterrence through CG by providing the joint force with positional （multidomain capability, posture, presence）, preparational （interoperability, theater-setting）, and strategic advantage （influence）, while presenting multiple dilemmas to potential adversaries.

美國《國家安全戰略》將整合嚇阻定義為「無縫整合各種能力，使潛在對手認為，敵對行動的代價遠大於利益」。[11]整合嚇阻運用外交、資訊、軍事及經濟手段，持續對競爭者發動嚇阻作為。整合嚇阻同步運用聯合、跨機構、跨政府及跨國資源，同時發動各戰區與各領域行動。美陸軍透過鞏固戰果支援整合嚇阻，提供聯合部隊特定範疇（多領域戰力、兵力態勢及陣地部署）、先期整備（作業互通、劃定戰區）及戰略層面（影響力）優勢，迫使敵方陷入四面楚歌窘境。

Historically, the joint force has recognized the Army as the service lead for consolidating joint force gains and supporting positional integrated deterrence within the land domain. Even so, some leaders underestimate many of the Army’s capab

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., 171.

[11] The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America（Washington, DC: The White House, 2022）, 22, accessed 2 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.

ilities that operate in nontraditional air, maritime, cyber, and space domains. As the joint force looks for low-cost options that provide high-impact results, Army posture and presence provides both psychological and physical effects to help deter potential adversaries and, when necessary, to fight and prevail in large-scale combat operations. Furthermore, the service supports integration of joint, multidomain effects to seamlessly seize and secure key terrain across the conflict continuum. As political leaders face growing threats within the operational environment, the Army offers both large and small-footprint capabilities that present multiple dilemmas to potential adversaries and draw from a total Army inventory of more than one million Active Component, National Guard, and Reserve soldiers. Army posture and presence has and continues to support combatant command requirements across the globe by providing measurable deterrence effects on potential adversaries, while reassuring allies and partners of U.S. commitment in key regions of the globe.

綜觀歷史，美軍聯合部隊認為美陸軍是鞏固戰果的先導部隊，也是陸上整合嚇阻作為的領頭羊。[12]即便如此，部分領導階層仍低估美陸軍諸多非傳統空中、海上、網路及太空領域的戰力。[13]當聯合部隊尋求低成本、高效益的作戰成果時，美陸軍兵力態勢與全球駐軍兼具心理與實質層面效益，得以嚇阻潛在對手，同時也能在必要時遂行大規模作戰行動、克敵制勝。[14]

再者，美陸軍協助整合衝突各個階段的聯合與多領域作為，即時奪取地形要點。[15]當政治領袖面臨與日遽增的戰場環境威脅時，美陸軍得以派遣大型或小型部隊牽制潛在對手，以及調度現役、國民兵及預備役等超過一百萬人的兵力。[16]美陸軍兵力態勢與全球駐軍不斷支援全球作戰司令部作戰需求與嚇阻潛在對手，同時確

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[12] JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations, IV-2.

[13] Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War （Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1996）, 12–15. Pape argues that deterrence is the attempt to persuade a nation-state not to initiate action by convincing them that the perceived gains do not justify the costs involved. Pape separately describes coercion by denial as the use of military means to prevent an adversary from attaining their political objective（s）.

[14] Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third （Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979）, 196–99. Luttwak explains that military power efficiency is measured by its psychological influence and inversely proportional to a nation-state's reliance on force that requires human and material means.

[15] James McConville, Army Multidomain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict, Chief of Staff Paper #1 （Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 16 March 2021）, 9, accessed 2 August 2023, https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/03/23/eeac3d01/20210319-csa-paper-1-signed-printversion.pdf.

[16] The Army fiscal year 2022 end-strength targets include "485,000 in the Active Component, 336,000 in the Army National Guard, and 189,500 in the Army Reserve." Mark Cancian, U.S. Military Forces in 2022: Peering into the Abyss （Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Institutional Studies, March 2022）, vi.

保關鍵地區的同盟與夥伴安全無虞。[17]

In addition, the Army provides the joint force with preparatory support to integrated deterrence. Preparation includes bilateral and multilateral training exercises at echelon to build readiness while improving human, procedural, and technical interoperability. The Army also provides critical theater-setting and sustainment capabilities to consolidate gains well before a crisis or conflict surfaces. Every day, the Army is helping to lay a firm architectural framework of sustainment that enables the joint force to fight and win during large-scale combat operations. Future Army sustainment efforts are under development that will include “webs” of protection, communication, and sustainment capabilities, thus providing joint force commanders with a position of advantage over potential adversaries.

此外，美陸軍協助聯合部隊進行整合嚇阻先期整備。先期整備包含各個層級雙邊與多邊演訓，以強化戰備整備，同時精進人員、流程及技術互通性。在危機或衝突浮上檯面前，美陸軍也運用形塑戰區與後勤維保能力鞏固戰果。日復一日，美陸軍持續建置完善後勤維保架構，確保大規模作戰行動期間，聯合部隊能夠遂行戰、克敵制勝。未來，美陸軍將持續強化後勤維保作為，包含戰力防護「網」、通信系統及後勤維持能力，支援聯合部隊指揮官取得應對潛在對手的相對優勢。[18]

Finally, the Army strengthens integrated deterrence by consolidating gains through the influence of leaders within the security apparatus of partner and allied nations. Many training activities and security engagements with partners and allies at the tactical level plant the seeds of trust, which produce a harvest of strategic commitment for years to come. As nation-states often rely on ground force commanders to provide advice concerning security agreements, Army leader relationships with host-nation counterparts can provide a decisive advantage. From longstanding U.S. Army presence in NATO-member nation-states, to remote security cooperation activities in lesser-known islands across the Pacific, the Army’s ability to consolidate gains through the influence of partners and allies plays a vital role in supporting integrated deterrence.

最後，美陸軍透過鞏固戰果強化整合嚇阻，並在安全無虞的情況下，善用領導階層在夥伴與同盟國家間的影響力。諸多夥伴暨同盟的戰術層面的訓練與安全活動，

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[17] Sir Michael Howard, “Lessons of the Cold War,” Survival 36, no. 4 （1994）: 161, 166, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339408442768.

[18] McConville, Army Multidomain Transformation, 6.

成為孕育多邊信任的種子與未來戰略互信的基礎。[19]主權國家通常仰賴地面部隊指揮官提供安全協議相關建言，美陸軍領導階層與地主國同僚的關係也會左右關鍵優勢。舉凡美陸軍在北約成員國境內的長期駐軍，以及太平洋鮮為人知島嶼上的安全合作活動，美陸軍皆透過夥伴與同盟影響力鞏固戰果，儼然成為整合嚇阻的重要支柱。

Isolated Gains: Reducing the Risk of Poor Consolidation
特地區域之個別戰果：降低未落實鞏固作為的風險

The U.S. military must systematically employ CG activities in all operations, across the conflict continuum because: competitors are actively competing to secure gains now; if the United States does not consolidate gains, a competitor will; and, successfully implementing CG reduces risk to force and risk to mission in later phases of the conflict continuum.

在各種作戰行動與衝突各個階段，美軍都必須井然有序、有條有理地鞏固戰果，因為競爭對手正在積極確保戰果。如果美國未落實鞏固戰果，競爭對手就會捷足先登。而且，如果落實鞏固戰果，就得以降低後續衝突階段的部隊作戰風險、提高任務達成率。

Over 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu remarked, “Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.” More so than any other near-peer competitor, the People’s Republic of China （PRC） leverages whole-of-nation CG to establish footholds across the globe without fighting. The PRC displays a pattern of behavior in international relations that has proven effective in creating conditions favorable for strategic advantage. Through diplomatic engagements, the PRC recognizes nations that （in many cases） initially seek minimal engagement while hedging against or altogether avoiding the great power politics at play. The PRC effectively converts economic investments into access and influence through the Belt and Road Initiative. Concurrently, private Chinese companies normalize Chinese activities and further create leverage for follow-on national objectives. A final example lies in the PRC’s use of the People’s Liberation Army to expand China’s borders through the military construction on disputed reefs and atolls throughout the South China Sea.

[19] Ibid., 13.

2,500 多年前，孫子曰：「不戰而屈人之兵，善之善者也。」[20]中共更是所有勢均力敵競爭者中的最佳寫照，其善用傾國之力鞏固戰果，不費一兵一足就在世界各地取得一席之地。在國際關係領域中，中共奉行特定行為準繩，有效形塑戰略優勢。中共針對初期抱持觀望態度的國家進行外交斡旋，試圖抵制或聯手避開大國政治的權力角逐。此外，中共透過《一帶一路倡議》等經濟手段，取得區域准入權與發揮特定區域影響力。同時，假借中國大陸私人企業名義行官方活動之實，為後續實踐國家目標創造有利條件。最後，中共運用軍事力量開疆拓土，不斷在南海爭議島礁填海造陸。[21]

While hard to quantitatively demonstrate causality between the contributions of CG and the achievement of strategic goals, it is clear the absence of deliberate integration of gains creates a geo-strategic vacuum. This, in turn, provides competitors and potential adversaries with the time and space necessary to shore up their own interests in the region. To compete and win in these environments, the United States must wisely engage other nations by providing a proposition of equal or greater value that includes traditional democratic values, personal freedoms, and a free market economy. In addition, the United States has benefited by offering Army-led CG initiatives on the ground that provide tangible improvements to the security and stability of participating partner nations.

雖然難以量化鞏固戰果與戰略目標間的因果關聯，但很明顯地，無法妥善整合戰果將會導致地區戰略真空。接著，競爭者與潛在對手就會見縫插針，把握時機鞏固自身區域利益。美國若想在這種情況下制敵機先，就必須運用靈活外交手腕，以相應或更宏大的價值觀（如傳統民主價值、個人自由及自由市場經濟）拉攏其他國家。此外，指派美陸軍領銜遂行陸上鞏固戰果作為，美國不僅相得益彰，也可順勢強化夥伴國安全保證與確保局勢穩定。

The benefits achieved through Army-led CG activities undoubtedly help steward our Nation's finite resources for influence abroad. In addition, these relatively low-cost investments reduce risk to force and risk to mission by imposing substantial costs to potential adversaries. If the United States leverages these

[20] Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. and trans. Ralph Sawyer（New York: Fall River Press, 1994）, 177.

[21] Kapil Bhatia, "Coercive Gradualism through Gray Zone Statecraft in the South China Seas: China's Strategy and Potential U.S. Options," Joint Force Quarterly 91（October 2018）, accessed 2 August 2023, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1676965/coercive-gradualism-through-grayzone-statecraft-in-the-south-china-seas-chinas/.

additive advantages during periods of cooperation or normalized competition, it may provide leaders with a position of advantage needed to deter in crisis, and if necessary, win in conflict.

無庸置疑，美陸軍為首的鞏固戰果行動，提升國家有限資源運用效益與境外影響力。此外，這些相對低成本的投資降低部隊作戰風險、提高任務達成率，以及對潛在對手造成實質衝擊。若美軍在合作與正規競爭期間善用前揭附加優勢，領導階層就得以取得優勢、嚇阻危機，以及在衝突無法避免時克敵制勝。

Approaches and Considerations for Effective Consolidation

有效鞏固方針與考量因素

Attempting to achieve CG will remain a difficult endeavor with many different facets that must be accounted for. As a starting point in contending with these inherent challenges, Army and joint force planners should understand the relevant doctrine and policy that provides guidance. Since 2017, doctrine has made great strides in codifying the value of Army-led CG activities in support of the joint force. Additional insights for CG are contained in the *U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability*; the *Stabilization Assistance Review* （SAR）; the *Global Fragility Act* （GFA）; DOD Instruction 3000.05, *Stabilization*; and JP 3-07, *Joint Stabilization Activities*.

達成鞏固戰果目標的過程中，必須披荊斬棘、多方考量。首先，美陸軍與聯合部隊計畫人員必須瀏覽相關準則與政策，研議未來指導。自 2017 年起，準則深入剖析美陸軍為首的鞏固戰果作為，如何支援聯合部隊作戰需求，彰顯鞏固作為的價值。此外，《美國預防衝突暨促進維穩戰略》、《維穩援助總檢討》、《全球脆弱法案》、國防部訓令第 3000.05 號《維穩》，以及聯戰書刊第 3-07 號《聯合維穩活動》皆論及鞏固戰果內涵。[22]

[22] Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability （Washington, DC: Department of State, April 2022）, accessed 3 August 2023, https://www.state.gov/united-states-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability/; Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Department of Defense, Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas （Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2018）, accessed 2 August 2023, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/SAR-Final.pdf; Global Fragility Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-94, 133 Stat. 3060 （2019）; Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations （Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009）; JP 3-07, Joint Stability Activities （Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2022）.

The SAR was jointly promulgated by the secretaries of defense and state and the USAID administrator to codify the responsibilities of the three agencies. Congress recently passed the GFA to enforce many of the SAR's principles and lessons learned through congressional and presidential endorsement. This act marks stabilization as an essential national security function and requires implementing a stabilization strategy in select countries. These strategies clearly articulate the plan for stabilization and, ultimately, CG in highly fragile locations. While the GFA is focused on specific countries not in the midst of armed conflict, it provides insight into how the effort to CG can and should work in competition. The SAR and GFA provide policy and strategic-level guidance for the design of country or regionally specific strategies. They provide principles that must be applied when developing country or theater-specific goals linked to interagency processes, such as integrated country strategies, theater campaign plans, or country development cooperation strategies.

美國國防部部長、國務卿及國際發展署署長聯合頒布《維穩援助總檢討》，闡述前述三個機關的權責。近期，美國國會通過《全球脆弱法案》，企圖透過國會與總統權責，將《維穩援助總檢討》案內原則與經驗教訓正式立法。前述法案將維穩視為關鍵國力，必須對特定國家採取維穩戰略。這些戰略清楚闡釋綏靖計畫內容，最後也會論及高度動盪地點的鞏固戰果作為。雖然《全球脆弱法案》聚焦特定國家非武裝衝突期間作為，但卻深入剖析前述鞏固戰果作為如何在競爭期間發揮效益。《維穩援助總檢討》與《全球脆弱法案》為國家與特定區域戰略的戰略層面指導與政策方針。研議國家或特定戰區目標的跨機構流程時（如整體國家戰略、戰區戰役計畫或國家發展合作戰略），必須納入這些必要原則。

DOD Instruction 3000.05 and JP 3-07 are the DOD's policy and doctrine, on stabilization and are foundational for understanding, planning, and executing Army and joint force stabilization activities to consolidate gains and achieve overarching U.S. government objectives. JP 3-07 specifically provides key concepts and a coherent approach to stabilization harmonized with the policy governing how DOS and USAID approach and execute stabilization and seek to consolidate U.S. government gains.

國防部訓令第 3000.05 號《維穩》與聯戰書刊第 3-07 號《聯合維穩活動》為美國國防部穩定作為主要政策與準則，也是美陸軍與聯合部隊探討、規劃及執行維穩作為，試圖鞏固戰果、達成美國政府全般目標的基礎。《聯合維穩活動》特別列舉重要概念，研擬統一維穩方針，確保美軍作為符合國務院與國際發展署政策，鞏固

美國政府所望戰略目標。[23]

The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Stability Operations Institute's *Defense Support to Stabilization（DSS）: A Guide for Stabilization Practitioners* is a comprehensive reference guide on how DOD supports U.S. government stabilization efforts, missions, and activities. This tool consolidates law, policy, strategy, and information on relevant organizations and entities into one document. It will enable Army and joint force planners and practitioners to understand and access the resources required to ensure military operations lead to consolidated gains.

美陸軍維和維穩作戰機構的《維穩作為國防支援：維穩實務工作者手冊》是一份全方位指引，充分闡述美國國防部如何支援美政府綏靖作為、任務及活動。[24]這份文件提及法律、政策、戰略及資訊的重要機構與實體，確保美陸軍暨聯合部隊計畫人員與實務工作者瞭解內涵，取得軍事作戰必要資源，達到鞏固戰果目標。

Conclusion

結論

Doctrine is a product of theory and experience that affords a handrail to guide the collective efforts of complex organizations against adaptive threats. Therefore, it is never complete and rarely comprehensive enough to address all scenarios. So rather than deconstructing FM 3-0 to find fault or criticism, this article has sought to amplify the document's utility by clarifying a central but overshadowed aspect within its pages. Despite the often-unrecognized prominence of CG in everyday efforts as well as its latent potential as an operational and strategic multiplier, the military maintains a languid appreciation for CG and a turbid understanding of its value.

準則蒐集網羅理論與實務經驗，統合錯綜複雜組織的個別作為，應對瞬息萬變的威脅。因此，準則永遠無法包羅萬象，設想所有可能情境。正因如此，本文並未對美陸軍野戰教範 3-0《作戰術》挑三揀四，反而戮力抽絲剝繭、挖掘字裡行間的重要概念，彰顯前述教範的實用價值。雖然，鞏固戰果常為人所忽略，但在日常生活中卻無所不在，也具備作戰術與戰略層面的加乘效果。美軍仍未嚴正看待鞏固戰果，顯然也低估其真實價值。

There is a certain irony that an institution transfixed on integrating kinetic

[23] JP 3-07, Joint Stability Activities.

[24] Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute（PKSOI）, Defense Support to Stabilization（DSS）: A Guide for Stabilization Practitioners（Carlisle Barracks, PA: PKSOI, November 2022）, accessed 2 August 2023, https://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/index.php/defense-support-to-stabilization-dssa-guide-for-stabilization-practitioners/.

effects in operations would leave so much on the table by not capitalizing on countless investments found elsewhere across the conflict continuum. Such a disaggregated approach— whether by design or disregard—fails to fully realize the potential that collective efforts might engender. This directly impacts the military's ability to create and sustain the competitive advantage necessary for decisive victory. Though less visceral and harder to quantify, such isolated efforts can also render associated costs in terms of lost opportunity or idle investments during competition and crisis.

諷刺的是，作戰期間，美陸軍汲汲營營整合動能武器與相關作為，反倒忽略衝突各個階段可資利用的其他資源。不論是無心疏漏或刻意為之，如此偏廢的作法，都顯示美陸軍忽略集體作為的潛在效益，甚至會進一步阻礙軍隊創造與維繫相對優勢，無法取得關鍵勝利。雖然未經實際驗證也難以量化，但如此各自為政，將會導致衝突與危機期間錯失良機、虛擲資源，徒增不必要的成本。[25]

The first step toward rectifying this shortfall is further elevating joint force appreciation for CG from its historic relegation as a post-operation tactical task list. Effective CG is fundamental throughout the competition continuum. Treating this function as simply the fourth and last in a series of strategic roles or as a postscript to operational endeavors is not sufficient. Rather, CG is an integral and inseparable component that must manifest in very deliberate measures throughout activities occurring during competition, crisis, and conflict. Though this paradigm shift is slowly occurring in theory and doctrine, such as the improvements found within FM 3-0, the value of CG must become equally visible in practice.

改正上述缺憾的第一步，就是跳脫既定印象，改變聯合部隊看待鞏固戰果的角度，不得再視之為戰後戰術任務。在競爭的各個階段，落實鞏固戰果相當重要。將鞏固戰果視為第四順位的戰略目標，甚或是無關緊要、可有可無的作戰要務，都稍嫌輕忽怠慢。其實，鞏固戰果至關重要且不可分割，必須融入競爭、危機及衝突階段的相關作為，先行完成縝密規劃。雖然，目前已經逐步修訂理論與準則（如修訂《作戰術》教範），但必須落實鞏固戰果實質作為。

The next step is to recognize the Army's prominent role in orchestrating this function and to leverage this relationship to its fullest. No other branch of service

[25] The history of U.S. military interventions is replete with examples on the impact of uncoordinated activities and unleveraged gains. See Carter Malkasian's The American War in Afghanistan: A History （Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021）; Emma Sky's observations on the Iraq War in The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq （New York: PublicAffairs, 2015）; and contemporary analysis on competing with China for influence and relative advantage in the Asia-Pacific.

has the forces, footprint, or focus to undertake this responsibility so effectively on behalf of the joint force. Army capabilities are attuned and balanced to operate in the human dimension—not just to win wars but to positively engage other nations through security cooperation and partner-building. In addition, the Army has a global presence that is not beholden to platforms or restricted to domains removed from the societies we seek to influence. Lastly, the Army has a mission that explicitly accommodates a focus on CG by leveraging all relevant U.S. government efforts to engender influence and exploit advantage on land.

接著，就是要有所體認，美陸軍身為鞏固戰果的領頭羊，務必充分發揮鞏固戰果成效。其他軍種都不具備相應兵力、全球部署及作戰重心，無法擔此重任，代表聯合部隊有效遂行相關任務。美陸軍官兵文武兼備，不僅得以遂行作戰，也可透過安全合作與建立夥伴關係的形式與他國進行交流。此外，美陸軍部隊的足跡遍布全球，各項行動不會受制於武器載臺或特定作戰領域而裹足不前。最後，鞏固戰果也屬美陸軍作戰任務的一環，必須運用美國政府諸般資源，發揮最大影響力，形塑陸上相對優勢。

Consolidation of gains presents an opportunity to aggregate the common utility of disparate activities, while maximizing the value of whole-of-government efforts and interactions with allies and partners abroad. While such opportunities abound, however, inverse vulnerabilities born of indifference lurk just over the horizon. The void where advantages remain unpressed will be filled by other actors with interests perhaps inimical to our own. This does not need to be the case since the recourse already resides within the Army's DNA. The institution only needs to reframe how it understands its full contributions to the joint force and harness its existing means for CG. In doing so, the Army will continue to play a pivotal role in creating the conditions necessary to deter or defeat our Nation's enemies.

鞏固戰果可以整合諸般作為，發揮化整為零效益。同時，彰顯整合政府、夥伴及同盟多元資源的效益。然而，即便此種機會比比皆是，但因漠視而衍生的缺憾卻近在眼前。這塊真空若未能即時填補，就會被其他行為者捷足先登、納為己用，甚至反過來損及美國利益。美陸軍不須打掉重練，因為鞏固戰果早就深植於軍種文化。美陸軍只須重新檢視鞏固戰果對聯合部隊的效益，以及精進當前執行作法。如此一來，美陸軍就可繼續扮演要角，形塑未來嚇阻與擊退敵人所需的有利態勢。[26]

[26] Eric M. Burke and Donald P. Wright, eds., Enduring Success: Consolidation of Gains in Large-Scale Combat Operations（Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2018）, accessed 2 August 2023, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/LSCO/Enduring-Success.pdf.

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