

BAITING THE ENEMY: DECEPTION CAN CONFUSE OPPONENT TARGETING

誘敵-欺瞞迷惑對手之道

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Battalion and squadron command posts will always face limitations in their ability to disperse and hide in terrain. Equipment availability significantly impacts how each unit executes command post operations. Synchronizing operations and increasing the likelihood of mission success is best achieved by bringing warfighting functions together in one location.

營級指揮所經常得面對在現地執行疏散、隱蔽的能力與限制，現有裝備的撥補數，大幅影響各單位指揮所的運作。將作戰功能統合在所望地點，係戰力整合及任務順遂之關鍵。

Due to equipment shortfalls, our unit, the 4th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, out of Fort Carson, Colorado, had a limited capacity to run an expeditionary-style command post during National Training Center Rotation 24-02 at Fort Irwin, California. Squadron headquarters became aware that our expandable command platform would become a prime target for the enemy. Balancing the value of functionality versus survivability is a continuous problem.

我們單位是駐紮於柯羅拉多州卡森堡，隸屬第 4 步兵師第 3 裝甲聯兵旅第 10 騎兵團的第 4 大隊，由於裝備短缺，讓我們在加州愛爾文堡國家訓練中心進行 24-02(2024 年第 2 梯次)遠征型指揮所輪訓任務時吃足苦頭。大隊指揮部的部署讓我們瞭解到，四處分散的指揮載台與載具，將成為敵軍首要的打擊目標。如何兼顧功能價值與存活能力，始終是個難題。

As a squadron, we decided to adopt a different approach. Instead of dispersing our equipment, we chose to present the enemy with an identifiable target, diverting attention from more critical assets.

由於大隊係任務型編組，我們決定採取不同以往的作法，不將裝備分散，調整將識別度較高的裝備直接呈現在敵軍眼前，這可以轉移敵人對重要武器裝備的注意力。



Maj. Nicholas ‘Nick’ Lund, left, a co-author of this article, returns to his squadron’s command post during a rotation at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. (Credit: U.S. Army)

尼可拉斯·倫德少校本文的共同作者之一(位於砲塔左方)，於加州愛爾文堡國家訓練中心輪訓時返回大隊指揮所途中。

High-Value Objective

Throughout the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team’s training cycle in preparation for National Training Center Rotation 24-02 in October and November and 4th Squadron’s deployment into the training area, the squadron’s observer coach/trainer team consistently warned headquarters elements about how the opposing force, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, nicknamed “Blackhorse,” would seek to identify and target command posts to disrupt operations. Just like we have a high-payoff

target list, which informs artillery targeting, the enemy also is hunting for key logistics, maintenance and command and control nodes. This holds true not only for the training environment, but also is seen in the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

高價值目標

第3裝甲聯兵旅在2023年10、11月，第4大隊進駐訓練場地，執行國家訓練中心24-02梯進訓任務整備期間，其所屬的觀察員及訓練小組(以下簡稱觀訓小組)即不斷警告該大隊指揮部，俗稱「黑馬」的假想敵第11裝甲騎兵團將會用盡諸般手段找出並鎖定各級指揮所的位置，使其無法運作，就像我軍會列出高效益目標，請砲兵予以標定。因此，敵人也會獵殺我軍關鍵後勤、維保及指管等設施，這不會只發生在訓練情境中，就在目前烏俄戰爭中也是屢見不鮮。

Unfortunately, at the squadron/battalion level, the ability to disperse, disguise and deceive is limited. There are constraints on specialized functions provided by vehicles, power generation and coaxial cables' reach. Despite having maximized our squadron's command post mobility with an expandable truck platform for staff functions, we found ourselves with a large vehicle sporting numerous antennas and power generation in tow, indicators that screamed of the importance of these vehicles.

很不幸地，在營或大隊層級的分散、偽裝及欺敵等能力是不足的，尤其是提供專業功能的車輛載具、發電機及同軸電纜等裝備器材，更是捉襟見肘。儘管為滿足參謀作業功能，增加卡車的數量可提高大隊指揮所的機動力，但我們仍發現自己身陷夾雜在天線、發電機的大型車陣之中，此舉更彰顯避免車輛載具暴露的重要性。

During mission preparation, a co-author of this article, who is the operations officer for the 4th Squadron, discussed the issue with the operations shop NCOs, particularly assistant operations NCO Staff Sgt. Samuel Guerrero. Guerrero initially proposed to replicate the shape of our tactical operations center (TOC) on a different truck using camouflage netting and poles.

在任務整備階段，本文其中一位作者，任職於第4大隊的作戰官，曾經就此問題與作戰中心的參謀士官研討，作戰士山姆·蓋雷洛上士提議，以帳棚及天線桿架設於卡車上，複製成我軍戰術作業中心(TOC-國軍稱為機動指揮所)的模樣。



The 4th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Team, 4th Infantry Division, command post at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. The unit tried to mask its command post by setting up a mock one nearby. (Credit: U.S. Army)

圖示為第4步兵師第3裝甲聯兵旅第10騎兵團的第4大隊位於加州愛爾文堡國家訓練中心的指揮所，該單位試圖在其指揮所附近佈置指揮所模型作為偽裝欺敵措施。

With multiple inputs from the squadron staff, the staff decided to create a fake command post footprint using less-critical vehicles and equipment. This led to creation of the deception tactical operations center, or mock TOC.

隨著更多大隊所屬參謀人員的意見加入，參謀們決議以較不重要的車輛及裝備來製造偽戰術作業中心的跡像，以此來進行欺敵作業。

The Right Mix

While staging for force-on-force training, the squadron staff experimented with different layouts for the squadron's TOC. We strategically placed our Satellite Transportable Terminal closer to the mock TOC and positioned drone-busters and Stinger manportable air defense systems at observation posts. We positioned

mobile command vehicles far enough away from the mock TOC to minimize damage from artillery fire.

以假示真

展開實兵對抗訓練時，大隊所屬參謀人員按各參謀群的功能，將大隊的戰術作業中心(TOC)進行排列佈置試驗。我們為使計畫成功，將可攜式衛星終端裝備部署在偽戰術作業中心附近，並在觀測所配置無人機干擾器及單兵攜行式刺針防空飛彈系統。我們更將各機動指揮車盡量遠離偽戰術作業中心，以減少敵軍砲火可能造成的危害。

Additionally, life support and vehicle traffic was staged in the deception zone to reduce observable patterns of life around the actual TOC. By placing the deception area to the rear, we hoped the enemy would prioritize targeting the rearmost element, assuming it to be of higher importance.

此外，野戰急救及後勤輜重等設施則配置在欺敵地區之內，以減少真實戰術作業中心附近的活動暴露。鑑由欺敵區域設置於後方，希望敵軍會將最後方的部隊視為高度機敏的目標，而列入首要攻擊目標。

Following Magruder's Principle, which states that it's easier to maintain an enemy's preexisting beliefs than try to change their beliefs, we aimed to exploit enemy assumptions about traditional command posts. These usually include the maxims that the largest vehicle cluster likely is a command post, and that communications equipment, power generation and antennas typically are close to the command post. 依據馬格魯德原則指出：與其試圖改變敵人的想法，不如保留他們的既存信仰，較為容易；因此我們試著利用敵軍對我軍傳統指揮所的直覺。這些觀點包含讓敵軍覺得大型車輛集中之處，就是指揮所之所在，以及通信設備、發電機及天線等，通常都會靠近指揮所的刻板印象。



The command post of the 4th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, as set up at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. (Credit: U.S. Army)

圖示第 10 騎兵團的第 4 大隊設立於加州愛爾文堡國家訓練中心內的指揮所設施。

Collecting Information

Even during prebattle training, Blackhorse could use unmanned aerial vehicles to collect information on 4th Squadron's formation. Only after our initial movement into the training area did we enter the range of Blackhorse's indirect fire. We attempted to maximize terrain during the early battle period, but Blackhorse managed to detect us using unmanned aerial vehicles. The enemy had to choose which group of our vehicles would be the center of its 30-rocket volley.

情資搜集

既使在接戰前的訓練，假想敵「黑馬」也會運用無人機蒐集第 4 大隊的兵力部署，只要我軍的初始運動至訓練區域內，就進入了「黑馬」的曲射火力射程內。敵軍會將我方的車輛群視為目標，而身陷多管火箭的集火區內。

Regrettably and fortunately, the mock TOC was destroyed. Regrettably, we “lost” equipment and some personnel. Fortunately, the main TOC was not targeted—further proof our concept was working.

此一作為，其效果為一體兩面，偽戰術作業中心遭敵火摧毀。令人惋惜的是，我們可能痛失裝備及部分人員；但幸運的是，真實指揮所並未遭到鎖定而得以存活，進一步驗證我們的想法奏效了。

Unfortunately, we lacked necessary vehicle dispersion to prevent damage to other TOC vehicles. This provided us with just enough time and space to rapidly deploy most of our vehicles away from any repeated artillery strikes. Mission Command vehicles quickly conducted a survivability move and reassumed control of squadron operations.

很可惜，我們缺乏執行車輛分散作業所需的載具，無法防止其他戰術作業中心車輛之損失，雖然這讓我們擁有足夠的時間及空間調遣大部分車輛，遠離敵軍砲火的持續打擊。任務式指揮下車輛快速執行戰場存活所需的移動，大隊長再度恢復對單位的指揮掌握。



A soldier with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment throws a smoke grenade during a capabilities demonstration at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. (Credit: U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Elizabeth Bryson)

第 11 裝甲騎兵團所屬官兵於加州愛爾文堡國家訓練中心舉行的戰力展示中，投擲烟幕手榴彈。

Using Terrain

During our first implementation of the mock TOC, we learned two crucial lessons. First, if we could not achieve dispersion, we needed to place a terrain feature

between the fake and real TOCs. Second, opposition forces had to balance what they found first with what appeared more important. We needed to ensure that the opposing forces saw something convincing early on so they might stop looking elsewhere.

善用地形

我們在首次運用偽戰術作業中心時，學到兩項重要經驗教訓。首先，我們在設置真實與偽戰術作業中心時，須要配合地形、地貌之特性，而做不到所謂的疏散。其次，敵軍須要在所見目標與主從之間作抉擇。因此，我們也必須確保敵軍所觀測到的目標，讓其信以為真，而不會將注意力轉移至他處。

In the second battle period, we moved into a mountainous area full of natural berms, called wadis. We strategically placed the squadron TOC in a 30-foot-deep wadi and used a parallel wadi 100 meters west to host the mock TOC and an observation post armed with drone-busters. Terrain separated both features, and observers could easily misidentify them as separate entities if viewed from above.

在第二次戰鬥階段，我們機動到都是天然土堤的山區地形，即所謂的乾谷區。我們發揮巧思將大隊的戰術作業中心設置在約 10 公尺深的谷地中，並運用在西邊約 100 公尺處一條平行走向的谷地，設置偽戰術作業中心及配置無人機干擾器的觀測所。地形將上述兩者作了區隔，如果搜尋者從空中向下俯視，會輕易地將它們視為不同的個體。

For multiple days, 4th Squadro staff successfully defeated drones before Blackhorse could identify the TOC location. Our main command post remained unidentified throughout the period, and we never needed to move due to indirect fire.

幾天下來，第 4 大隊的參謀團隊在假想敵「黑馬」發現戰術作業中心的位置之前，成功地欺騙過了敵人的無人機偵測。在此期間，我們的主要指揮所從未遭敵軍發現，也未因敵軍的曲射火力而須要去移動。

During 4th Squadron's defense, enemy vehicles finally infiltrated past other friendly forces with the task of identifying our primary obstacle belt. The enemy vehicles identified and destroyed the mock TOC. This, again, provided time to maneuver combat platforms to a position to destroy the enemy vehicles in our area. The team in our deception area continuously provided us with early warning and convinced opposition forces that they had destroyed the area's command post.

在第 4 大隊防禦期間，敵軍的無人機最終因成功辨識我軍的主要障礙地帶，而得以滲透穿越過其他友軍陣地，此舉造成我們的偽戰術作業中心，被敵軍無人機發現並遭到摧毀。因此，也讓我們有時間去調動其他的戰鬥機具就位，在我軍陣地內將無人機摧毀。我們的參謀團隊，連續在我軍的欺敵區域內，提供了預警，並讓假想敵誤判我軍在這個地區內的指揮所可能已遭到摧毀。

Simultaneously with the defense, the observer coach/trainers targeted every command post participating in training with indirect fire. Due to the terrain that we selected for the squadron TOC, we were assessed to have no damage to any vehicle inside the wadi. We were the only TOC that did not need to relocate during the battle period due to the enemy's inability to pinpoint our location or place effective indirect fires on our position.

在我們實施防禦戰鬥的同時，觀訓小組運用曲射火力鎖定參與演訓的每個指揮所，但是由於我軍設置戰術作業中心的地形選用得宜，我們得以躲過所有無人機對谷地內的偵察作為。此外，由於敵軍無法標定我軍的位置，致曲射火力對我們毫髮無損，因此也是戰鬥期間，唯一被評定為不用轉移位置的戰術作業中心。

Adaptive Concept

The mock TOC concept continued its effectiveness throughout 4th Squadron's time at the National Training Center. We learned and adapted the concept based on enemy actions through the training event.

臨機應變

偽戰術作業中心的概念在第 4 大隊進訓國家訓練中心期間持續奏效，我們學到經驗教訓並且依據敵軍行動，適時作出應變。

First, the enemy looks for clusters of vehicles, communication equipment and antennas. Unmanned aerial vehicle video quality can only be so clear. Giving the enemy a convincing cluster of large items to look at forces it to choose what to expend its artillery assets on.

首先，敵軍會尋找車輛的集用場、通信設備以及天線，這些都逃不過無人機的法眼，讓敵軍眼見且深信聚集的大型裝備，值得調派砲兵火力加以摧毀。

Second, remove unnecessary equipment from the TOC area and add to the deception. The unusual collection of assets at the mock TOC sowed additional

doubt in the Blackhorse targeting team and helped keep our headquarters off the enemy targeting list.

其次，將非必要裝備自戰術作業中心轉移位置，用以欺瞞敵人。在偽戰術作業中心打破常規地集中各式裝備器材，會引發假想敵「黑馬」所屬情報蒐集團隊的顧慮，此舉已將我軍的指揮部自敵軍目標清單中移除。

Third, show them the deception first. Enemy forces have limited time to detect and act before the target moves again. In our case, the mock TOC would absorb most of the artillery.

再者，讓敵軍一眼就看見我軍的欺敵作為，使其沒有時間進行偵察並且在目標再次移動前動手。就我方立場，就是以偽戰術作業中心吸引敵軍的大部砲火。

Finally, enable the deception area as an observation post with capabilities to defeat certain threats. Placing drone-busters and Stingers in our observation posts and using the mock TOC as bait proved effective.

最後，可讓欺敵區域成為有能力擊毀特定威脅的觀測所，亦即部署無人機干擾器及刺針防空飛彈，並且以偽戰術作業中心為誘餌，證明此一招數的效用。

Combining terrain-masking and deception proved crucial to our squadron command post's survivability. It also created a unique motivational source for the staff as the idea and effort to make the mock TOC look more realistic grew. Destruction of the mock TOC on multiple occasions served as both an annoyance and source of pride as our experiment continued to succeed.

結合地形遮蔽及欺敵作為，證明上述舉措對我軍指揮所的存活至為關鍵，激發了所有參謀的創意，可以讓偽戰術作業中心的巧思與技巧，得以日益精進。隨著偽戰術作業中心數度遭假想敵摧毀，我們的驗證越見成效，更為敵人的挫折懊惱而感到自豪。

Other organizations could adopt this general concept and improve on it for both training and combat. We developed the idea with equipment on hand and with limited ability to improve.

其他單位亦可採用此一概念，並運用於實際作戰與演訓中，因為我們僅運用現有裝備及有限能力，開發此一構想並加以精進。

With proper planning, units wouldn't need to use vehicles as targets and could construct the deception plan with expendable materials and extra antennas. A larger

unit could scatter fake command posts and logistics nodes across the battlefield, making the enemy guess with lower probability of success.

各單位只要計畫得當，並不須要使用車輛作為目標，以消耗性物資與多餘的天線，即可研擬有效的欺敵策略。大單位可在戰場上，散佈假指揮所及後勤設施，讓敵軍猜不透真假而信以為真。

Methods to implement this simple idea are bound only by creativity and resources. 憑藉創意及手上的資源，將上揭簡單的構想付之實現。

作者簡介

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