



Decided among the Cities: The Past, Present, and Future of War in Urban Environments

決戰城鎮：城鎮戰的過去、現在 及未來

譯者簡介



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Cities not only possess cultural and psychological value for combatants, but they are also sociologically and geographically anchored to multiple aspects of military key terrain. Cities sit astride, near, or encompass major ground routes (road and rail), major water crossings such as large bridges, and logistical and power projection hubs for sea and air. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine provides an immediate example of the importance of cities themselves and what cities contain. Moreover, the importance of cities is apparent with a study of history. However, even with history and current events, there is faint acknowledgement of the importance of the urban fight in military theory, and it has limited coverage in U.S. Army doctrine. When acknowledged, urban operations are largely

discussed in commentary on their inherent difficulty, the natural aversion to costly fighting characteristic of urban combat, and with the recommendation to bypass or avoid city fights altogether. However, as history and recent examples in Ukraine demonstrate, conflicts often are decided among the cities. The physical and infrastructure characteristics of cities naturally and geographically can make control of them critical for victorious military campaigns. The one who can seize and hold the city controls, or just denies, crucial capabilities to military operations.

對戰士來說，城鎮不僅有文化與心理之價值，也符合多面向關鍵軍事地形要點之各種社會與地理要素。城鎮是跨越、接近或擁有地面要道(鐵、公路)、跨越大河的橋樑，以及海空後勤與兵力投射的集結點。正在進行的烏克蘭戰爭就是一個現成案例，說明城鎮本身的重要性與其所含之價值。何況，研究戰史中亦可發現城鎮的地位。然而，即便古今史實昭昭、相關戰事案例繁多，軍事理論與準則對於城鎮戰的重要性卻都著墨不深。即便瞭解城鎮戰的重要，有關論述也大多以探討作戰窒礙，打從心底排斥城鎮戰須投入的高昂代價，以及建議繞越城鎮或避免遂行類似之作戰。然而，戰史與近期烏克蘭戰爭顯示，城鎮正是衝突中決定輸贏的關鍵。城鎮擁有各項物資與基礎建設，自然也就成為兵家必爭之地。占領與固守城鎮(或使其不能為敵所用)的一方，就能掌握軍事作戰的關鍵要素。

Early observations indicate Russia's war in Ukraine hangs in the balance and appears it will be won or lost in the cities. Ukraine's defiance in the northeast, holding Kyiv and denying Russian advances in Chernihiv and Kharkiv, altered Russia's operational calculus. The prolonged resistance in Mariupol consumed multiple Russian tactical battle groups that could have been better employed to support other offensives; the stoutest resistance for weeks was in the four square miles of the Azvostol Steel Plant with its complex, dense collection of buildings and intricate woven underground passageways. Even the seemingly casualty-accepting Russian President Vladimir Putin called off further offensive advances into the plant to preserve Russian lives. While the overall performance of the Russian military has surprised many, its poor performance in urban fighting has not. Russian forces were unprepared for much of this war, but most distinctly for urban operations. While they had attempted to modernize in platforms and weapon systems, their military training and organization from the short-term conscript system to the lack of a definitive noncommissioned officer corps set them up for failure beyond combined arms to also include in urban terrain.

俄烏戰爭初期，雙方勢均力敵，而城鎮顯然是勝負之關鍵。烏克蘭在東北部地區頑抗不退、固守基輔並阻止俄軍在切爾尼戈夫與哈爾科夫之進展，打亂俄羅斯原有作戰構



想。¹馬立烏波爾的頑強抵抗，消耗許多俄羅斯戰術戰鬥群的兵力，使其無法支援其他攻勢作戰。其中，俄羅斯在亞述鋼鐵廠面臨最頑強抵抗，雙方僵持數週之久，四平方哩的廠房周邊建物複雜密集、地下通道交織遍布。²即便看似可以接受戰場傷亡的俄羅斯總統普丁，也下令俄軍停止向鋼鐵廠繼續推進，以避免俄人之傷亡。³雖然俄軍整體戰場表現出乎許多人意料，但城鎮戰表現惡劣完全不令人意外。大體來說，俄軍對此戰戰備整備不周延，尤以城鎮戰為然。⁴雖然俄軍戮力推動作戰載台與武器系統之現代化，源自短期徵兵倖存的軍事訓練與組織架構，缺乏一個有效的士官團，使得他們無法遂行聯合兵種作戰，當然也包括了城鎮地形作戰。⁵

The Symbolically Driven 民心士氣之所繫

The battle for Kyiv mattered as a symbolic Russian attempt to delegitimize Ukrainian sovereignty and swiftly conduct regime change. History is replete with examples of the importance of cities, both successful and failed attempts from Carthage and Rome in the Carthaginian Wars to Richmond in the American Civil War, and to a more modern example of Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The symbolism of cities as a wartime measure of psychological importance and their influence on morale even expands beyond that of a simplistic capital city sociopolitical center-of-gravity concept. Other cities draw decisive battles beyond capitals. For Ukraine and Russia, Mariupol became a symbol of resistance with a distinct past as it had been a city that changed hands in 2014. These so-called “hero cities” in

- 1 John Spencer, Lionel Beehner, and Liam Collins, “Op-Ed: Why Russia Likely Won’t Win the Fight in Ukraine’s Cities,” Los Angeles Times (website), 18 April 2022, accessed 10 January 2023, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-04-18/ukraine-russia-mariupol-urban-warfare?_amp=true.
- 2 Adela Suliman et al., “Putin Claims ‘Success’ in Mariupol as Russia’s Annual Victory Day Nears,” Washington Post (website), 21 April 2022, accessed 1 September 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/21/ukraine-mariupol-azovstal-negotiate-russia-surrender/>.
- 3 Brendan Cole, “Putin Cancels Mariupol Assault over Concern about Russian Casualties,” Newsweek (website), 21 April 2022, accessed 1 September 2022, <https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-russia-putin-mariupol-siege-cancel-shoigu-1699575>.
- 4 Aaron Steckelber et al., “Why Russia Gave up on Urban War in Kyiv and Turned to Big Battles in the East,” Washington Post (website), 19 April 2022, accessed 1 September 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/kyiv-urban-warfare-russia-siege-donbas/>.
- 5 Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design,” War on the Rocks, 2 June 2022, accessed 1 September 2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/>.

the current war have evolved beyond the importance of their physical terrain and into cities with psychological and morale importance all their own. This status further draws forces into city fighting not only to secure the physical terrain that may or may not be operationally or strategically important but also because the mere resistance to capture from the city has grown to be seen as symbolically important. In history, a city of similar psychological importance stands out from the Second World War: Stalingrad. And in an Asia-Pacific example, the fierce urban fight over Manila during Gen. Douglas A. MacArthur's Philippines liberation campaign shows a city's importance in drawing armies into an unwanted urban fight.

直搗基輔的舉動，象徵俄羅斯試圖顛覆烏克蘭領土主權與快速地推翻現行政權，因此極其關鍵。戰史一再重演城鎮之重要。從迦太基與古羅馬的「布匿克戰爭」、美國內戰「里奇蒙戰役」，到最近巴格達的「伊拉克自由作戰」，一再顯示城鎮之重要性的成功與失敗案例比比皆是。⁶戰時，城鎮是官兵心理與部隊士氣的重要指標。然而，並非只有首都才具備這種社會與政治層面的戰略重心地位，其他城鎮也會成為兵家必爭之地。俄烏戰爭中，馬立烏波爾象徵烏克蘭民眾的頑強抵抗，因為該市在2014年曾經攻防易手。⁷當今所謂的「英雄城鎮」不僅具備實質之地利優勢，奪下後還能強化民心士氣。這種狀況促使部隊爭相投入城鎮戰，不僅因為占領城鎮可以取得野略或戰略層面的實質優勢，也因為該鎮居民的頑強抵抗足具象徵意義。歷史上，第二次世界大戰期間，史達林格勒就具備類似心理層面效益。⁸太平洋戰場上也有類似案例。馬尼拉頑強抵抗麥克阿瑟將軍收復戰役，都突顯了城鎮的重要性，甚至讓部隊被迫陷入原本避之唯恐不及的城鎮作戰泥淖。⁹

A military's tactical inability to successfully wage urban warfare, whether it wants to or not, can have decidedly psychological and morale impacts on the larger operational and strategic, even political, aspects of the conflict. But cities have an unavoidable effect over wartime success beyond the symbolic or political. The symbolic can be managed by deftly skilled information operations, and politically potent targets can always be moved. Capital

6 Donald Stoker, *The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 141-50; Joel D. Rayburn and Frank K. Sobchak, eds., *The U.S. Army in the Iraq War: Volume 1, Invasion-Insurgency-Civil War, 2003-2006* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019), 58-60.

7 Frank Gardner, "Mariupol: Why Mariupol Is so Important to Russia's Plan," BBC News, 21 March 2022, accessed 1 September 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60825226>.

8 Antony Beevor, *Stalingrad* (New York: Penguin Press, 2007), 97-98, 123-24.

9 Dale Andrade, *Luzon: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History), 7-14.



cities have fallen in the past, but combatants stubbornly kept fighting, such as the evacuation of Moscow in 1812 and again in 1941, and the burning of Washington, D.C., in the War of 1812. However, the loss of these capitals did not end their respective wars.

部隊若無法在戰術層面成功從事城鎮戰，都會衝擊到較大的野略、戰略，甚至政治層面的民心與士氣、左右衝突走向，而城鎮戰的大捷除了能超越政治或象徵意義，還有其他無法避免的外溢效應。嫻熟的資訊作戰可以左右民意，而且政治性目標淪陷後，當局仍可另起爐灶。以往首都淪陷後，將士仍堅守陣地、抵死不退的情況所在多有，如1812年與1941年莫斯科堅壁清野、1812年焚城華盛頓特區等。因此，首都的淪陷並不代表該場戰爭的終結。¹⁰

The Logistics-Driven Fights over Cities 城鎮的後勤補給效益

Over time, cities naturally grow up around major ground lines of communication. Lines of communication can be militarily key terrain, and their possession can decide operational success or failure. Russian logistics are driven by rail. Ukrainian cities of Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Izyum across the northeast and east of the country matter because they contain or are near railheads. Seizing these rail hubs is a must for Russia, and these railheads naturally exist within urban environments. Russia had to seize the crucial rail areas associated with Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv in its opening northeastern operation to take Kyiv. Russia's failure or delays in securing these cities with their surrounding infrastructure interrupted and contributed to its logistical failures, resulting in its inability to advance and successfully envelop Kyiv. Russia's tactical failures resulted in an aborted northeastern operation at Kyiv and a shifted strategic focus because of the inability to take certain cities.

時間一久，環繞著交通要道就會自然而然形成城鎮。交通線可能屬於軍事地形要點，瞰制這些交通線則可決定作戰成敗。俄羅斯後勤運補主要仰賴鐵路系統，¹¹ 烏克蘭蘇梅、切爾尼戈夫、哈爾科夫及伊久姆等東北部與東部城鎮因鄰近或設有鐵路車站，具有重要戰略地位。奪占這些鐵路樞紐就成為俄羅斯的必要任務，而這些樞紐當然位於城鎮內。於發起奪取基輔的東北作戰之時，俄羅斯必須奪取蘇梅、切爾尼戈夫及哈爾科夫

10 Eugene Tarle, *Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), 205-15; Timothy A. Wray, *Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front during World War II, Prewar to March 1943* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1986), 49; Charles P. Neimeyer, *The Chesapeake Campaign, 1813-1814* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2014), 37, 56-57.

11 Emily Ferris, "Russia's Military Has a Railroad Problem," *Foreign Policy* (website), 21 April 2022, accessed 1 September 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/21/russias-military-has-a-railroad-problem/>.

等地之鐵路重要設施。俄羅斯未對或遲遲奪取不下這些城鎮與其周遭設施，將會中斷並導致後勤之失利，結果便無力推進並包圍基輔。俄羅斯戰術失敗導致基輔東北部作戰行動被迫中止，不得不轉移戰略焦點，其原因在於未能奪取這些城鎮。

Cities naturally form around railheads. During the American Civil War, and building up to then Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's Vicksburg campaign, the critical seizure of the railroad hub city of Corinth cut off rebel supply and reinforcements from Vicksburg and opened those same lines to the U.S. Army's continued encirclement of the river bastion city. During World War II, the Allies' strategic bombing campaign revolved in part around targeting logistical hubs, specifically found in large cities, in accordance with air power theorists such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell. While admittedly not winning the war solely from the air by bombing these railways, it disrupted Axis efforts and supported the Allies' ground forces' seizure of those cities.

城鎮通常是環繞車站而成。在美國內戰期間的維克斯堡戰役，尤利西斯·格蘭特少將就是奪取鐵路樞紐柯林斯，切斷叛軍從維克斯堡之增援與補給，並將這條鐵路轉為陸軍後勤補給之用，藉此同一交通線持續包圍叛軍河岸設有要塞之城鎮。¹² 第二次世界大戰期間，盟軍依據空權理論家朱利奧·杜黑與比利·米契爾的理論，以戰略轟炸行動，輪番瞄準軸心國後勤樞紐，特別是大型城鎮。¹³ 雖然盟軍並非單靠轟炸這些鐵路就取得勝利，但此舉確實打亂軸心國的各項作為，成功支援盟軍地面部隊奪取這些城鎮。

Road network hubs, much like rail hubs, also commonly have urban development in their immediate vicinity, which is a natural sociological and economic condition. As Russia withdrew from its initial Kyiv access and refocused on the eastern Donbas region, extensive road network intersections such as those around the small city of Izyum became important, leading to multiple operations and counteroffensives to fight over these road intersection cities. Much like the importance of Bastogne during the Second World War, the resistance and contest over Izyum played into Russia's encirclement attempts. Contemporary motorized and armored armies require hard surface roads to provide the high-demand sustainment for large-scale combat and flexibility in operational maneuver. Without securing multiple road networks and hubs, forces are even more anchored to railways, airfields, and ports.

公路系統樞紐與鐵路樞紐大同小異，沿線地區通常也會在其周邊緊鄰地域逐漸形成

12 Stoker, *The Grand Design*, 131, 136-37.

13 The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys: European War, Pacific War (Maxwell, AL: Air University Press, 1987), 9-10, 82-83; Tami Davis Biddle, *Air Power and Warfare: A Century of Theory and History* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019), 13-15, 18-20.



城鎮聚落——這也屬於常態性的社經發展脈絡。俄羅斯部隊撤出原先的基輔占領區，轉而指向東部頓巴斯地區，使得小型城鎮伊久姆周邊綿延的道路交通網變得舉足輕重，雙方也為了爭搶這些道路交通樞紐而形成拉鋸戰。與第二次世界大戰期間巴斯通所具備的重要戰略地位類似，伊久姆當地反抗勢力與俄軍反覆爭奪，正好說明俄羅斯試圖包圍周邊地區的企圖。¹⁴ 現代摩托化與裝甲部隊必須在硬質路面上行駛，方可滿足大規模作戰的支援兵力需求與機動作戰靈活性。若未能鞏固各地公路網與陸上交通樞紐，軍隊就會更加依賴鐵路、機場及港口。

Additionally, large inland waterways spanned by extensively reinforced heavy-tonnage bridges commonly are in or near developed cities. Historical examples of the importance of major bridges crossing large bodies of water include the World War II failures at Arnhem during Operation Market Garden and the successful seizure of the bridge over the Rhine in Remagen. In the opening push of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the First Marine Division's plan revolved around the seizure of An Nasiriyah and holding the large bridge over the Euphrates. And bridges and their surrounding urban development have become a common scene of major fighting in the Donbas theater of the Ukraine conflict around the devastated city of Sievierodonetsk. Fights for cities span more than just railroad hubs, road networks, seaports, and airfields to support sustainment; they increase in importance in their broader, even more critical role as power projection sites, inherently dominated by the urban sprawl that inevitably grows around major ports and airfields. Moreover, the seizure and security of the cities either through direct action or encircling efforts reduced resistance.

此外，大型的內陸水道其耐重橋樑通常都位於大型城鎮市區或近郊。戰史上不乏大型橋樑跨越大河的重要性先例。例如，第二次世界大戰期間，盟軍未能奪下安恆市區主要橋樑，導致「市場花園作戰」失敗以後，占領雷馬根地區橫跨萊茵河的橋樑。¹⁵ 「伊拉克自由作戰」初期，第1陸戰師規劃奪取奈西利雅與橫跨幼發拉底河的大型橋樑而成功。¹⁶ 俄烏戰爭中，頓巴斯地區北頓涅茨克市滿目瘡痍，橋樑與周遭蓬勃發展的城鎮已經成為參戰部隊爭相奪取的目標。¹⁷ 城鎮戰參戰部隊爭奪鐵路樞紐、道路交通網、海港及機場，不僅當作後勤支援要點，也可當作重要兵力投射的地點。這些地點座落於城鎮

14 John C. McManus, "Hallowed Ground: Bastogne, Belgium," HistoryNet, 31 May 2018, accessed 10 January 2023, [https:// www.historynet.com/hallowed-ground-bastogne-belgium/](https://www.historynet.com/hallowed-ground-bastogne-belgium/).

15 Charles B. MacDonald, "The Decision to Launch Operation Market-Garden," in *Command Decisions*, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), 430, 440-42; Edward N. Bedessem, *Central Europe: the U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History), 3-9.

16、17 於下頁。

近郊，自然而然沿著主要港口與機場發展成聚落。此外，透過直接的軍事行動與圍城來奪取城鎮、鞏固戰果，可有效減緩當地民眾之反抗。

The Power Projection and Resistance Fights over the Cities 城鎮之兵力投射與抵抗

The Russian efforts in Mariupol and Odesa along Ukraine's southern coast center on their importance as port cities to the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, respectively. These ports and their outgrowth urban environments influence the security of the Russian Black Sea fleet based out of Crimea, control shipborne export/import trade, and are directly tied to military operations over-the-water logistics and power projection of forces. Russia expended significant effort in taking Mariupol by creating its land bridge from Crimea to Russia and sealing off the Sea of Azov. It also served as a symbolic victory over Ukrainian resistance but at a heavy cost. Even as Russia is suffering limitations in operational reach, it still threatens Odesa as another major Black Sea port it desires to further cut Ukraine off territorially from the sea. Control of these ports would allow Russia to project power from the Black Sea fleet with troop and logistics movements from what is still contested key terrain.

俄軍進犯烏克蘭南部沿岸，主要是因為馬立烏波爾與敖德薩分別是進出亞述海與黑海的重要港口城鎮。¹⁸ 這些港口與周邊城鎮，左右克里米亞黑海艦隊的安危，掌握海上進出口貿易，並與海上後勤補給與兵力投射等軍事行動息息相關。俄羅斯費盡心思奪下馬立烏波爾，搭建連接克里米亞與俄羅斯的陸橋，並封鎖亞述海。此舉象徵俄羅斯成功鎮壓烏克蘭抵抗活動，但也因此付出極大的代價。即便俄羅斯作戰行動進展不如預期，仍然宣稱敖德薩是下一個企圖占領的黑海城鎮，以期進一步瓜分烏克蘭領土。掌握這些港口後，俄羅斯就可以從黑海艦隊投送部隊與後勤輜重，避開仍在爭戰中之關鍵地形要點。

The American Civil War's coastal actions demonstrate the importance of securing an opponent's coastline and cutting them off, which involved efforts against cities. In these cases, it was not about Charleston, Wilmington, or New Orleans specifically, though the fall of

16 Michael S. Groen et al., *With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003: No Greater Friend, No Worse Enemy* (Quantico, VA: History Division, Marine Corps University Press, 2006), 190-203.

17 Orla Guerin, "Lysychansk: Russia Erasing History in Ukraine's 'Dead City,'" BBC News, 13 June 2022, accessed 1 September 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61785806>.

18 Tanvi Chauhan, "Why Are Warm-Water Ports Important to Russian Security? The Cases of Sevastopol and Tartus Compared," *Journal of European, Middle Eastern, and African Affairs* 2, no. 1 (Spring 2020): 60-65.



each had significant additional benefits beyond port access. It was about cutting off the rebel southern states from trade and transport.

美國內戰時之沿海作戰顯示，箝制敵軍海岸線與切斷補給的重要性，其中包括直接指向都市之軍事作為。這些案例並非僅適用查爾斯頓、威明頓或紐奧良等特定城鎮，雖然攻克以上城鎮確實可以取得箝制港口等邊際效益。其實，最重要的是切斷南方各州之貿易與交通運輸。

Similarly, in the Second World War, the Allied efforts to besiege Brest also exemplifies the urban actions involved in seizing critical, large ports. It was more about having port access to supply the ground forces in Western Europe than to control the cities of Brest, Le Havre, Antwerp, or Cherbourg. Ports dominated the logistical calculus for strategic advances and drove operational planning. The siege of Brest and the efforts to take Cherbourg after the successful Normandy landings regulated the advances across Western Europe. Even Adolf Hitler's final major offensive across the Ardennes, however improbable, had prioritized the targeting of the large city port of Antwerp as the focal point to cripple the Allies' advance.

同樣地，第二次世界大戰期間，盟軍包圍布列斯特港也是運用城鎮戰奪取重要大型港口的案例。此戰役旨在奪取港口，確保西歐地面部隊後勤補給無虞，反而不是要搶占布列斯特、勒阿弗爾、安特衛普或瑟堡。港口左右戰略推進的後勤規劃與驅動後續作戰計畫作為。¹⁹ 盟軍成功登陸諾曼第後，包圍布列斯特與奪取瑟堡，主宰著盟軍在西歐之攻勢進展。縱然不切實際，希特勒最後還是在亞爾丁地區發起攻勢，將大型海港城鎮安特衛普列為首要目標，以遲滯盟軍部隊推進。²⁰

Manila serves as another example. Commodore George Dewey seized the harbor at the opening of the Spanish-American War but had to wait for the arrival of a ground force to then envelop and take the port by land. As exemplified by Manila, any power projection operations in the Asia-Pacific will necessarily be designed around ports across the various archipelagos and littoral regions, which inherently are encompassed by built-up urban areas required to be taken to hold and operate the seaports.

馬尼拉也是另一個案例。美西戰爭初期，喬治·杜威奪占馬尼拉港灣，但必須俟地

19 Roland G. Ruppenthal, "Logistics and the Broad-Front Strategy," in Greenfield, *Command Decisions*, 423, 425, 439.

20 Charles V. P. von Luttichau, "The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes," in Greenfield, *Command Decisions*, 454-55.

面部隊登陸後，方可從陸路包圍與占領港口。²¹如之前的馬尼拉案例中清楚可見，亞太地區任何兵力投射行動勢必指向在不同群島與沿岸地區港口，而港口周邊群島環繞、灘岸遍布，而各港口腹地就是箝制海港、兵家必爭的城鎮地區。

Airports fall into the same category as seaports in that they are a means to rapidly envelop and project combat power quickly, forward operate air support, and again serve as logistics centers. Large-capacity airports are commonly located around cities. An example of the critical importance of such airfields is the ferocious, back-and-forth fighting over the Hostomel airfield in the outer suburbs of Kyiv during the opening days of the war. It was the scene of some of the bloodiest fighting early in the war, and some of Russia's best troops were sacrificed during their efforts to take it to flow in more troops quickly for a rapid thrust on Kyiv. In Operation Just Cause, the rapid seizure of the Panamanian airport to flow in additional U.S. forces was crucial to the operation and involved incursions into the city. For Operation Iraqi Freedom, there were early planning efforts for airborne and air assaults to take then Saddam International Airport prior to the unexpectedly rapid mechanized operations into Baghdad that took the airport and opened it to coalition use. Operations utilizing these airports involved control of the surrounding cities through urban operations. The larger the city, the larger the airport, and the more sizable platforms and higher numbers of aircraft it can take. If large, paved airports are needed, urban operations will be included in their control.

機場具備快速包圍、投射兵力之效益，亦可前推做空中支援或後勤中心，故屬與海港同類之地形要點。高運量機場通常都位於城鎮周邊。以下案例可以說明是類機場的關鍵地位：俄烏戰爭初期，雙方為了奪占基輔近郊霍斯托來爾機場而形成拉鋸戰。²²這是戰爭初期少數幾場血淋淋的戰鬥，俄羅斯希望占領機場，快速運送大量兵力橫掃基輔，但部分俄軍最精銳部隊在本波攻勢中損失慘重。「正義之師作戰」中，快速攻占巴拿馬機場以及後續攻略城鎮至關重要，為美軍部隊大舉增援形塑了有利態勢。²³「伊拉克自由作戰」中，美軍早就規劃運用空降與空中突擊手段，先奪取巴格達國際機場，再派

21 "Battle of Manila Bay," Naval History and Heritage Command, 5 October 2020, accessed 1 September 2022, <https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/publications/documentary-histories/united-states-navy-s/the-battle-of-manila.html>.

22 Abbie Shull, "Ukrainian and Russian Forces Have Been Fighting for Hours over a Critical Airfield Just Outside Kyiv," Business Insider, 24 February 2022, accessed 1 September 2022, <https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-russia-fight-over-airfield-outside-kyiv-2022-2>.

23 R. Cody Phillips, Operation Just Cause: The Incursion into Panama (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990), 20.



遣機動迅速、出敵意表之機械化部隊深入巴格達鞏固機場，以利後續聯軍部隊著陸增援。²⁴ 奪占機場的各項作戰行動，都必須運用城鎮戰先行控制周邊城鎮。城鎮幅員愈大，機場占地就愈廣，起降面積與運量也會相對增加。城鎮戰是奪取攻占大型且設施完備的機場不可或缺之作戰子計畫。

Lastly, resistance fighters are becoming more urban. No longer is effective guerrilla activity springing up in the woods; it is originating in the urban sprawl of cities. Kherson is but one example of this in the current Ukrainian conflict, where Russia is experiencing significant resistance activities against its imposed occupational government. This is largely because the nature of urban terrain strongly benefits the resistance in anonymity, access to media, presence of civilian congestion ripe for information operations and messaging for exploitation of occupiers' overreaction, manipulated disinformation of occupier actions, or even fictitious actions. Whereas in open, uncongested, and less dense terrain, reconnaissance and surveillance technologies strongly benefit the counterguerrilla for locating, tracking, and targeting resistance forces, the ability for guerillas to hide in urban sprawl neutralizes much of those technologies.

最後，抵抗的戰鬥人員也逐漸趨向城鎮化。叢林游擊戰已不如過往那樣，令人聞風喪膽，現在都改由城鎮周邊發動。赫松當地的抵抗行動就是當前俄烏戰爭中的一個案例，俄羅斯在當地扶植的政府面臨當地激烈反抗，²⁵ 主因就是城鎮地形有利於匿名抵抗、網路媒體宣傳及公民活動，也更進一步成為資訊作戰與訊息戰的溫床，藉此醞化占領者的過度反應、散布占領行動的假訊息或未有實際作為之佯動。在開闊、人口密度不高及人口稀少的地形上，偵蒐科技有助於反游擊行動，可有效定位、追蹤及鎖定抵抗部隊，然而游擊部隊藏匿城郊地區卻使得這些科技毫無用武之地。²⁶

A Cautionary Conclusion 小結

Even with the importance of the city fight demonstrated in warfare throughout history, the U.S. military swings back and forth in placing emphasis on understanding urban warfare and how to effectively conduct it. Intellectually, the U.S. Army's former Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) filled a learning and training gap for the U.S. Army regarding combat in dense

24 Rayburn and Sobchak, *The U.S. Army in the Iraq War*, 58, 92, 97.

25 "Ukraine's Partisans Are Hitting Russian Soldiers Behind Their Own Lines," *Economist* (website), 5 June 2022, accessed 1 September 2022, <https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/06/05/ukraines-partisans-are-hitting-russian-soldiers-behind-their-own-lines>.

26 David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 238-39.

urban terrain with subterranean elements. The AWG, formerly headquartered at Fort Meade, Maryland, had training sites at Fort A. P. Hill, Virginia, and a robust mobile training team that travelled to hosting units, training multiple brigade combat teams in urban warfare. However, AWG was closed along with the Army's Red Team Academy out of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. To address the fears of the group's shuttering, the Army released a statement: "The functions of AWG, including the solutions to current and emerging threats, will transition to other Army organizations. Also, to ensure the utility of the organization's work over the past fourteen years is not lost, all lessons learned will be maintained by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), via the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Centers of Excellence (COEs), and other TRADOC enterprise stakeholders." The Army also maintains an urban warfare study with the Modern Warfare Institute's Urban Warfare Project, and Fort Leavenworth's Army University Press hosts a Primer on Urban Operations section; each one continues the intellectual support to the Army's understanding of urban warfare, if one specifically seeks it out.

即便以往戰役顯示城鎮作戰至關緊要，但美軍迄今仍未痛下決心，矢志深入瞭解城鎮戰之內涵，有效遂行此項作戰行動。此時，陸軍前「不對稱作戰群」(AWG)恰如即時雨，填補美軍地面部隊在人口稠密區教育訓練之不足。不對稱作戰群先前駐紮馬里蘭州米德堡，訓練基地位於維吉尼亞州希爾堡，下轄一支機動訓練小組，輪流至承辦單位施訓，目前已針對多個旅級戰鬥部隊進行城鎮戰訓練。然而，不對稱作戰群隨著陸軍「紅隊學院」撤出堪薩斯州李文渥斯堡而走入歷史。為了安撫大隊官兵的恐慌情緒，陸軍公開發表聲明：「不對稱作戰群原職掌(包含應對當前迫切威脅的解決方案)將會由其他陸軍單位承接。此外，為了保留過往14年期間，不對稱作戰群累積的寶貴經驗，相關歷史資料統一移交陸軍兵種協同作戰中心，分由陸軍經驗獲得中心、卓越中心及訓練暨準則司令部相關單位依權責管理運用。」²⁷ 同時，陸軍也運用現代戰爭研究所負責之城鎮戰專案，以及李文渥斯堡陸軍大學出版社城鎮作戰學術論文專區，持續推動城鎮戰相關研究，強化官兵城鎮戰學理知識。²⁸

Even with this intellectual support, the Army has shifted away from a deliberate urban training focus as it pivots more concertedly toward large-scale conventional combined arms fights. This shift has only been passionately heightened and embraced with the focus

27 Todd South, "The Army Is Shuttering Down Its Highly Praised Asymmetric Warfare Group," Army Times (website), 2 October 2020, accessed 20 September 2022, <https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2020/10/02/the-army-is-shutting-down-its-much-lauded-asymmetric-warfare-group/>.

28 "Urban Warfare Project," Modern War Institute at West Point, accessed 20 September 2022, <https://mwi.usma.edu/urban-warfare-project/>; "Primer on Urban Operations," Army University Press, accessed 20 September 2022, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Online-Publications/Primer-on-Urban-Operations/>.



on Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, though there are now some positive undercurrents of acknowledging the realities and a "relearning" of urban fighting. The Army is not alone in shifting away from this. The U.S. Marine Corps had embraced the deliberate study and training for urban fighting before a reprioritization shifted focus. Out of its innovative Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory in Quantico, Virginia, in 2019, the Marines had a planned program called Project Metropolis II with a four-year life cycle as part of the Warfighting Lab's own urban focus. However, as the Marine Corps shifted toward a littoral focus, it canceled the urban study project after only one year. The first Project Metropolis was instituted during a three-year life cycle in the late 1990s under then Marine Corps commandant Gen. Charles Krulak to embrace urban operations. It had resulted in experimental equipment to include initial drone use, robotics, and communications, as well as changes in doctrine and tactics for urban operations and training for marksmanship and sustainment. Many people ascribe these benefits from Project Metropolis I to the success of Marine urban operations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom in places such as Ramadi and Fallujah.

即便持續進行相關學術研究，但陸軍卻不再以城鎮作戰為訓練重點，轉而專注於大規模傳統聯合兵種作戰。以上訓練重點之調整，充其量也只是呼應2022年2月俄羅斯大舉入侵烏克蘭，雖然私底下也瞭解到城鎮戰的作戰實況，體認美軍必須重新認識城鎮戰。²⁹ 其實，不是只有陸軍逐漸漠視城鎮戰訓練。調整訓練重點前，美陸戰隊曾經針對城鎮作戰進行密集訓練與研究。2019年，透過維吉尼亞州寬提科陸戰隊作戰實驗室之創新，陸戰隊發起四年期「大都會二期專案」，開始聚焦城鎮戰相關之研究。³⁰ 然而，後來陸戰隊轉向聚焦於濱海作戰，之前的專案遂於一年後突然叫停。³¹ 1990年代，陸戰隊時任司令查理斯·庫拉克上將倡議研究城鎮作戰，因而發起三年期的「大都會一期專案」，內容包含執行各式武器測評(如無人機、機器人及通信裝備)、修頒城鎮作戰準則與戰術，以及精進射擊戰技與持續作戰支援能力。許多人認為，「大都會一期專案」研究成果，與陸戰隊「伊拉克自由作戰」期間的拉馬迪及法魯賈大捷息息相關。³²

29 "Armies Are Relearning How to Fight in Cities," Economist (website), 17 August 2022, accessed 14 October 2022, <https://www.economist.com/international/2022/08/17/armies-are-re-learning-how-to-fight-in-cities>.

30 Gina Harkins, "Inside Project Metropolis: Marines Prepare to Wage Big-City Battles," Military.com, 23 June 2019, accessed 20 September 2022, <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/06/23/marines-urban-warfare-tactics-are-outdated-heres-how-they-plan-fix.html>.

31 Todd South, "Corps Cancels Dense Urban Warfare Experiment to Focus on Marine Littoral Regiment," Marine Corps Times (website), 8 October 2020, accessed 20 September 2022, <https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2020/10/08/corps-cancels-dense-urban-warfare-experiment-to-focus-on-marine-littoral-regiment/>.

32 Ibid.

To bridge the gap from intellectual understanding and theory to practice, there have been calls in and out of the military profession for a more pointed embracing of the primacy of urban combat. These calls have included the creation of an urban warfare school and specialized professional military education. It has also included some calls for specialized urban-focused units. Even Congress became involved when the House of Representatives placed instructions for studies and reports by the Department of Defense on lessons learned from the urban operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, in the same National Defense Authorization Act of 2020, Congress proposed a specific urban training center. In the last few years, Gen. Mark A. Milley, first as the Army chief of staff and most recently as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made multiple public statements before and after the onset of the latest hostilities in Ukraine discussing the criticality of urban operations now and in the future of war. Limited though important progress has been made, including the standing up of the Army's Urban Operations Planner Course.

為了銜接學術理論研究與實務落差，軍事專業人士大聲疾呼，重新聚焦城鎮戰學術研究，包括設置城鎮戰學校、建立軍職專長軍事專業教育流路³³及編成城鎮戰專責部隊。³⁴甚至連美國國會也開始重視：眾議院提出要求，美國國防部提交美軍於伊拉克與敘利亞對抗伊斯蘭國的城鎮作戰經驗教訓之專案報告。此外，在同一份2020年《國防授權法案》中，國會提議設立專責城鎮戰訓練中心。³⁵過去幾年，曾任陸軍參謀長的現任參謀首長聯席會議主席麥克·密利上將，曾在俄烏戰爭前後多次公開表示，城鎮戰在當前與未來作戰扮演著舉足輕重的角色。³⁶雖然美軍各軍種推廣成果有限，但目前已有重

33 Michael G. Anderson, "Fight for the City: Creating the School of Urban Warfare," Modern War Institute at West Point, 30 August 2022, accessed 20 September 2022, <https://mwi.usma.edu/fight-for-the-city-creating-the-school-of-urban-warfare/>.

34 John Spencer, "Four Transformational Steps the US Army Should Take to Get Serious About Urban Operations," Modern War Institute at West Point, 21 July 2020, accessed 20 September 2020, <https://mwi.usma.edu/four-transformational-steps-the-us-army-should-take-to-get-serious-about-urban-operations/>; John Amble and John W. Spencer, "Prepare the Army for Future Urban Battlefield," Association of the United States Army, 16 May 2018, accessed 20 September 2022, <https://www.ausa.org/articles/prepare-army-future-urban-battlefield>.

35 Comm. on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, H.R. Rep. 116-120, at 98 (2019), accessed 20 September 2022, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-116hrpt120/html/CRPT-116hrpt120.htm>.

36 "Ukraine Fight Holds Lessons for US Army," Association of the United States Army, 4 July 2022, accessed 20 September 2022, <https://www.ausa.org/news/ukraine-fight-holds-lessons-us-army>; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "A Perfect Harmony of Intense Violence: Army Chief Milley on Future War," Breaking Defense, 9 October 2019, / accessed 20 September 2022, <https://breakingdefense.com/2018/10/a-perfect-harmony-of-intense-violence-army-chief-milley-on-future-war>.



要進展，例如陸軍開設了城鎮作戰計畫參謀課程。³⁷

Even as there is give-and-take in the prioritization of understanding urban warfare through resilient intellectual commitment to its study, there is a wider gap in its practice. Current U.S. Army doctrine that does exist for urban fighting is largely rooted in the tactical fight: tactics, techniques, and procedures; battle drills; and small-unit skills. While the urban fight is truly a decentralized small-level fight in execution, these squad-level block-by-block fights will not be conducted in a vacuum but in the growing expanse of dense urban terrain and rapid mass global urbanization. The joint Army/Marine Corps manual, *Urban Operations*, provides a foundation to build from but needs expansion and continued updating to current realities. Ongoing revisions to the current doctrine are critically important and must make use of contemporary observations, informed by the study of the past and merged with developing theory for applied practice before the U.S. military finds itself in a sustained, high-intensity conflict inevitably involving dense urban terrain. This calls for the expansion of operational level doctrine for large-scale urban operations. Fighting in a city has never been wished away by commanders and statesmen historically, and even now it is not the case. Sustained fighting in dense urban environments must be embraced doctrinally. Modern doctrine needs to be formulated, created, or updated, accounting for siege-like activities and large-scale sustained engagement across megacities and sprawling urbanization, and with incumbent cross interagency and partner coordination requirements and civil disturbance occurrences. There are studies and various lessons learned formats from the Center for Army Lessons Learned and the now shuttered Asymmetric Warfare Group that provide a foundation for this development; however, these documents, though providing framework, do not provide the authoritative guiding nature that official doctrine holds over the force and in professional military education and training.

雖然在城鎮戰學術研究工作推展過程中必須有所取捨，但實務工作上卻存在更多不足之處。陸軍現行城鎮戰相關準則大多以戰術、技術及程序、戰鬥行動及小部隊攻防為重點。³⁸ 雖然實際執行過程中，城鎮戰其實就是分散指揮的小部隊作戰，但這些班級逐區戰鬥不能墨守成規，必須隨著城鎮面積與日俱增、全球都市化面積大量增加，逐步調

37 John Spencer and Rob Wooldridge, "What We Learned Creating the Army's First Urban Planners Course," Modern War Institute at West Point, 29 November 2021, accessed 20 September 2022, <https://mwi.usma.edu/what-we-learned-creating-the-armys-first-urban-planners-course>.

38 Training Circular 90-1, *Training for Urban Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], May 2008); Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.8, *Infantry Platoon and Squad* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, April 2016).

整相關作法。美軍應以聯合陸軍/陸戰隊手冊《城鎮作戰》當作基礎，依照當前作戰環境，逐步增修訂準則內容。³⁹務必參照實際觀察情況、過往研究成果，以及蒐整執行過程之反饋意見，搶在美軍深陷長期、高強度的人口稠密地區城鎮戰前，完成現行準則修訂作業。其中，也包括增編野略層級大規模城鎮作戰準則。綜觀歷史，部隊指揮官與政治家從未竭力避免城鎮作戰，目前也不例外。人口稠密地區持久作戰理應納入準則內容。當前準則應增列章節與更新內容，納入包圍行動、大型城鎮與都市化作戰環境遂行大規模持久作戰等作戰型態，並考量現行跨機關與跨夥伴協調要項及公民暴亂等實際情況。陸軍經驗獲得中心與當前裁撤的不對稱作戰群都有各式研究報告與過往資料，可當作未來準則發展參據。然而，這些資料雖然可當作準則編纂架構，但卻無法滿足官方準則權威特質，影響部隊事務、專業軍事教育及部隊訓練。⁴⁰

While battles are fought across varied terrain, the emphasis of this argument is that it is the fights in the cities over either the city itself, what the city contains, or what is in its immediate vicinity that it dominates that often determines the success of military operations. It is difficult to find a significant port, airfield, or rail hub in the middle of open, rural plains or an isolated coastline. These key infrastructures are often naturally surrounded, collocated, and have their access dominated by the inevitable urban environment they spawn over time. The future wars, as those often of the past, will be won in the cities, not always because of the cities themselves but because of what the cities possess. For this reason, the study, focus, resources, and training for urban planning and operations must be prioritized based on lessons from contemporary conflicts and history, with emphasis placed in developing military theory and expanding current doctrine to address the urban fight.

雖然作戰地形複雜多變，但本文置重點在探討城鎮戰中，城鎮本身、內部關鍵基礎設施及周邊環境如何左右軍事作戰之成敗，鮮少看到重要港口、機場或鐵路樞紐座落於開闊鄉村平原地形或獨立海岸線上，以上關鍵基礎設施大多緊鄰城鎮周邊不斷發展而成。未來戰爭(或過去多數戰爭)大多決戰於城鎮，不全然因為城鎮本身特性，而是因為城鎮內部的相關設施與周邊環境。有鑑於此，本稿件必須聚焦研究能量與相關資源，優先針對城鎮戰計畫與作戰進行相關訓練，參照過往戰史與當前戰事，專注發展軍事理論、充實當前準則內容，方可滿足城鎮作戰需求。

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39 ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B, Urban Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, July 2022).

40 Mosul Study Group, What the Battle for Mosul Teaches the Force (Fort Eustis, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 2017); Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Urban Operations Catalog: A Resource Guide (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, 2016).