

跳脫框架：成功在中東以外地區遂行安全部隊援助任務*

Thinking outside of the Sandbox: Succeeding at Security Force Assistance beyond the Middle East

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Background

The bulk of American military training programs over the past two decades has primarily centered on building security forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the United States spending \$128 billion on those two countries alone.¹ Such security force assistance (SFA) activities in the Middle East have been a revolving door, (re) building partner security forces nearly from scratch every year. The guiding framework for SFA in these two countries has been the strategic objective of making partner forces effective enough to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) missions—all without U.S. advisors having to oversee their activities.² This idea rose to codified prominence in 2009 with then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates advocating for the indirect approach of building partner forces to deal with security challenges.³

背景

過去二十年來，美國軍事訓練計畫的重點為在阿富汗與伊拉克建立安全部隊，美國光在這兩個國家就花費了 1,280 億美元，¹ 雖然在中東地區這類安全部隊援助任務一直頻繁在進行中，但每年在檢視建立（重建）夥伴國安全部隊成果時幾乎收效甚微。在這兩個國家中，美軍安全部隊援助任務的戰略目標與指導架構，為讓夥伴國部隊擁有遂行反叛亂與反恐任務的能力，同時不再需要美軍顧問來監督其各項活動。²安全部隊援助理念係在 2009 年受到推崇，因為時任國防部部長羅伯特·蓋茲提倡用強化夥伴國軍隊的間接方法來因應安全挑戰。³

* 本文屬於公開出版品，無版權限制。

1 “Security Aid Dashboard,” Security Assistance Monitor, <http://securityassistance.org/content/security-aid-dashboard>.

2 Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker, “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 41, no. 1-2 (2018): 89–142; Jahara Matisek and Joshua Williamson, “Limited Wars in the Periphery: The Dilemma of American Military Assistance,” *Expeditions with MCUP* (May 2020), <https://doi.org/10.36304/ExpwMCUP.2020.03>.

3 Robert Gates, “A Balanced Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 1 (January-February 2009): 29–30, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2009-01-01/balanced-strategy>.

Such a narrative has translated into American and allied special operations forces increasingly relying on the “By-With-Through” approach to training host-nation special purpose forces to conduct COIN/CT. In many cases, by, with, and through enables partners to target actors and groups who are perceived as a national security threat to U.S. interests.⁴ While effective at creating highly capable niche military units such as the Iraqi Golden Division and ten Afghan special operations kandaks, the creation of such elite forces has caused neglect in regular army units in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵ Residing outside of the focus and monitoring of Western military advisors, conventional forces in Iraq and Afghanistan succumb to the pathologies of corruption and patronage. In many cases, soldiers are loyal to their unit commanders for parochial reasons such as religious sect, political party, and/or tribe/clan/kinship rather than to the government of Baghdad or Kabul. This can be frustrating to the average advisor who views the military as a professional organization that is supposed to be political and meritocratic. Yet, in the armies of most countries in the Middle East, societal norms and culture influence military behavior, translating into security institutions serving narrow purposes and interests, and in which professionalism can be considered a dangerous trait to display.⁶ This is because such demonstrations of capability and effectiveness appear threatening to political elites and senior government officials.

安全部隊援助理念之實踐方法就是「並肩合作」，美軍與盟軍特種作戰部隊用該方法來訓練地主國的特種任務部隊，以利遂行反叛亂與反恐行動。在許多情況下，「並肩合作」方法讓夥伴國得以鎖定特定行為者或團體，因為這類人士被視為是美國國家安全與利益的威脅者。⁴雖然美軍在為對方建立高效能、高戰力部隊取得成效，如伊拉克黃金師、阿富汗特戰營（共計 10 個營），但在建立這些精銳部隊的同時卻忽略伊拉克與阿富汗的常規軍，⁵又因為不在西方軍事顧問團的關注重點與監督範圍之內，兩國常規軍容易陷入貪腐與用人唯親的風氣之中。

4 Michael X. Garrett, “The ‘By, With, and Through’ Approach: An Army Service Component Command Perspective” (white paper, Shaw Air Force Base, SC: U.S. Army Central, 7 September 2017).

5 David M. Witty, Iraq’s Post-2014 Counter Terrorism Service (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018); Todd C. Helmus, Advising the Command Best Practices from the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015). The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service was formed in 2003 through U.S. Special Forces (USSF) support and became its own command in 2007. The first Afghan Commando Corps unit was created in 2007 under USSF supervision and formed into the Special Operations Command in 2011. 伊拉克反恐局在美軍特戰部隊協助下於 2003 年成立，指揮權自主始於 2007 年；首支阿富汗突擊隊在美軍特戰部隊監督下於 2007 年成立，接著又在 2011 年編成特戰指揮部。

在許多情況下，官兵對單位指揮官的忠誠是基於狹隘的原因，諸如宗教派系、政黨，以及（或是）部落/氏族/親屬關係，反而不是那種對巴格達或喀布爾政府的效忠，這種現象讓美軍顧問團人員感到沮喪，因為他們認為軍隊應該是無黨派色彩並具專業職能的組織。然而，在中東地區大多數國家中，由於軍隊受到社會規範與文化的認知影響，導致這類負責安全的機構侷限於狹隘目的與利益之下，也就是具專業武力職能可能會被視為是一種危險的呈現，⁶另一個原因是這些武力與作戰效能對於政治菁英與政府高層明顯具有威脅性。

After years of “pushing a rope,” it has become abundantly clear that most militaries in the Middle East will not adopt American military institutions, let alone liberalized forms of democratic governance. This can be vexing for U.S. military leaders and policy makers, as SFA planners provide utopian-looking PowerPoint slides and white papers with objectives and lesson plans on how SFA will be organized and implemented. For many advisors, no matter how much proper planning and preparation is undertaken with doctrinally correct lines of effort, host-nation forces inevitably fall short of the standards expected by their American counterparts. It is in this planning phase that many advisors improperly believe that a foreign military unit will adapt to their Western military institutions and training programs. Difficulties with achieving desired end states when building partner capacity is why Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland, then U.S. Army Special Operations commander, used to describe “BPC [building partner capacity] efforts as random acts of touching.”⁷

在歷經數年艱難推動之後，結果卻是大多數中東國家軍隊對於美軍這套制度興致缺缺，遑論推行自由民主的治理形式。然而，這種問題困惑著美軍領導階層與決策者，因為安全部隊援助的計畫人員在投影片簡報與白皮書中，提出相當理想化的目標與教學計畫，也律定了安全部隊援助的協訓與執行方式。對於許多軍事顧問團人員而言，無論在正確的教則與工作上做多少規劃與準備，地主國軍隊總是無法達到美軍期望的標準，光是在規劃這個階段而已，許多軍事顧問就天真以為地主國軍隊一定能適應西方的軍事制度與訓練計畫。由於在建立夥伴國軍隊能量上總是無法順利達成所望目標，這也是為何時任美陸軍特戰指揮官查理斯·克里夫蘭中將把成功建立夥伴國軍隊能量反諷說成，「你只是碰巧得到而已」。⁷

6 Michael J. Eisenstadt and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Training Better Arab Armies,” *Parameters* 50, no. 3 (Autumn 2020): 95–111.

7 Author firsthand knowledge. 作者第一手資訊。

Advisors from the U.S. general purpose force, ad hoc advisory elements such as military transition teams, and specifically trained advisory units such as the Army's security force assistance brigades (SFAB) have often returned from tours in Iraq and Afghanistan exasperated by their experiences. Many of these advisors discover near the end of their deployment that the security forces they worked with still lack proficiency. For those lucky enough to do a follow-on deployment with the partner forces they worked with on a previous tour, their frustration will grow into rage when they learn the unit has likely regressed. Such frustration is understandable, as the Iraqi army collapsed against a much smaller Islamic State fighting force in 2014, and in 2021, the Afghan National Army struggles to defend their checkpoints and convoys against the growing power and influence of the Taliban and the Islamic State Khorasan.⁸ These disappointments are commonplace despite the typical senior officer engaging in the time-honored annual tradition of saying that this time their SFA efforts have finally made progress and taken root.⁹ Worse, even when their efforts are successful, such as they were during the wide-area security and advise, assist, and enable missions with Kurdish militias in the Iraq-Syria region, progress was strategically upended and credibility undermined by a hasty 2019 withdrawal of U.S. forces.¹⁰

不管是抽調自美軍一般部隊來組成的顧問團，或像是軍事過渡團這種臨時顧問單位，抑或是美陸軍安全部隊援助旅（或稱安全合作旅，參見表 1）這種經特別訓練的顧問單位，他們往往對於在伊拉克與阿富汗的協訓經歷感到挫折，因為許多這些軍事顧問在部署即將結束時發現，與美方合作的地主國安全部隊竟然還無法精通戰技，尤有甚者，當在後續部署任務有幸再次與夥伴國軍隊共事時，一旦發現對方竟毫無長進時，心中的挫折感頓時升級為憤怒。這種令人沮喪的案例發生於伊拉克軍隊在 2014 年對付弱小的伊斯蘭國時卻吃敗仗；阿富汗國民軍在 2021 年面對不斷增長勢力與影響力的塔利班和伊斯蘭國呼羅珊分支時，卻只能艱辛地捍衛自身邊防關卡與車隊。⁸儘管高階軍官每年都例行性宣稱安全部隊援助工作已取得進展並向下扎根，但現實中的情況仍是令人相當失望。⁹還

8 Bill Roggio and Alexandra Gutowski, "Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan," FDD's Long War Journal, <https://www.longwarjournal.org/mapping-taliban-control-in-afghanistan>.

9 The irony of this annual performance of almost winning the war was best pointed out by the satirical site Duffel Blog by Cat Astronaut, "'We're Making Real Progress,' Say Last 17 Commanders in Afghanistan," <https://web.archive.org/web/20201103190135/https://www.duffelblog.com/2017/02/were-making-real-progress-say-last-17-commanders-in-afghanistan/>. This parodies real-world examples, including Richard H. M. Outzen, "Eight Signs our Afghan Efforts are Working," Joint Force Quarterly 80, no. 1 (2016): 6–16; Gerry J. Gilmore, "Iraqi Troops Demonstrate 'Tremendous Progress,' Colonel Say

有更糟糕的是，即使軍事顧問團在攸關庫德斯坦民兵（位於伊拉克與敘利亞交界區）的地域安全、軍事建議、軍事援助及任務協防上有所貢獻，但此一成果卻被 2019 年美國倉促宣布自中東撤軍所導致的戰略失利與信任瓦解而抵銷殆盡。¹⁰

表 1 美軍安全部隊援助旅簡介

緣起	時任美陸軍參謀長密利（Mark Milley）上將於 2015 年上任後，藉自身 15 年外國內部防禦行動經驗來籌組顧問部隊，專門用於訓練盟國軍事單位。
目的	降低美軍直接介入戰事並避免激起當地勢力反彈，至於一般美軍作戰部隊則可專注於自身本務。
協訓方式	安全部隊援助旅在部署至海外國家後，會以友邦士兵身分填補地主國基層空缺，以利迅速、組織化訓練大批地主國軍隊。
編制	■ 編制計有安全部隊援助指揮部（主官編階准將）及部本部第 353 訓練團第 3 營（3-353rd REGT），第 1、第 2、第 3、第 4、第 5、第 54 安全部隊援助旅（主官編階上校），各旅 800 至 1 千人不等且擁有豐富部隊培訓經驗的美軍官兵，整體編裝架構仍相當於一般步兵旅或裝甲旅。 ■ 安全部隊援助旅所屬官兵都須前往軍事顧問訓練學校（MATA），接受醫療、語言、外國兵器、聯合火力觀測員等課程訓練。 ■ 美陸軍自 2017 年起成立多支安全部隊援助旅後，先期以營、連、排方式編組協訓，後來改由 4 至 12 名官兵的任務編組（小部隊部署），由 1 名上尉領軍，停留時間也拉長至數個月到 1 年，以提升友軍戰力。 ■ 安全部隊援助旅被納編至南方、中央、印太、歐洲、非洲等地域型作戰司令部底下，旨在讓這些戰區單位能有效運用其協訓能量。
效益	雖然對盟國與夥伴國只有戰技協訓能力，卻能在軍事外交等領域產生戰略影響，甚至能動搖中共與俄羅斯長年經營的成果。

資料來源：郭正原編譯，〈美陸軍安全部隊援助旅，部署全球協訓盟邦〉，青年日報，2021 年 10 月 15 日，<http://www.ydn.com.tw/news/newsInsidePage?chapterID=1453199>；〈新聞辭典：安全部隊援助旅〉，青年日報，2018 年 10 月 23 日，轉引自奇摩新聞 <https://tw.news.yahoo.com/%E6%96%B0%E8%81%9E%E8%BE%AD%E5%85%B8-%E5%AE%89%E5%85%A8%E9%83%A8%E9%9A%8A%E6%8F%B4%E5%8A%A9%E6%97%85-sfab-160000854.html>；“Security Force Assistance Brigades,” U.S. Army, <https://www.army.mil/sfab#org-our-units>。本表為譯者為輔助讀者理解而補充之資料。

Despite these disappointments, SFA continues to be relied upon as an instrument of power, especially for demonstrating commitments to partner governments and forces that genuinely want to absorb security assistance to improve its military effectiveness. As outlined in the 2017 *National Security Strategy*, this takes on a particularly important focus as the Department of Defense attempts to pivot from COIN/CT to great-power

s,” Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs, 4 September 2008, <https://www.dvidshub.net/news/23215/iraqi-troops-demonstrate-tremendous-progress-colonel-says>; Matthew W. Markel, “Building Partner Security Forces: Sometimes War Is the Answer,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 42 (2006): 76–79.

¹⁰ Eli Lake, “The Kurds Have Paid Dearly for Trump’s Recklessness,” *Bloomberg*, 17 September 2020, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-09-17/kurds-have-paid-dearly-for-trump-s-reckless-withdrawal-from-syria>; Jahara Matisek and Michael W. Fowler, “The Paradox of Security Force Assistance after the Rise and Fall of the Islamic State in Syria-Iraq,” *Special Operations Journal* 6, no. 2 (2020): 118–38, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2020.1820139>.

competition.¹¹ Competition for influence against China, Iran, and Russia requires the United States to cultivate alliances and security partnerships around the world. In this context, SFA remains a viable means of maintaining the necessary level of engagement and influence while empowering allies and partners to take on local and regional security threats. Great-power competition occurs as a fight for influence in the “unquiet frontier,” smaller periphery nations located along the seams between global powers.¹²

雖然安全部隊援助任務存在前文所述的落差，但其仍不失為是一項好的國力工具，特別是用以實現夥伴國政府及其軍隊想要提升自身軍事效能的期望，誠如 2017 年《國家安全戰略》報告指出，美軍值此從反叛亂與反恐轉型因應大國競爭衝突之際，遂行安全部隊援助任務至關重要。¹¹美國與中共、伊朗、俄羅斯在爭奪世界各國的影響力時，需要的是培養與盟國的安全夥伴關係；鑒此，安全部隊援助任務就成為一種可行手段，以維持美國交往深度及對他國影響力，於此同時，盟國與夥伴國也能藉此培養因應區域安全威脅的能力。吾人必須理解，大國競爭是一種在動盪邊緣地帶，對全球各大國周邊縫隙小國的影響力之爭。¹²

To effectively conduct SFA in these frontier regions, military advisors working in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, peripheral Europe, or the Indo-Pacific will need to be judicious about what lessons to take from years of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military needs to closely evaluate the advising culture it has developed in these two conflicts and be prepared to evolve and adapt to new challenges. These challenges are especially important with the creation of SFABs, specifically designed to conduct the advise, support, liaise, and assess mission in the area of responsibility of each geographic combatant command.¹³ Such a shift toward the advise, support, liaise, and assess paradigm is meant to move beyond the narrow scope of the train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan, describing a more expansive view of what advisors do, particularly in the area of security cooperation with partners who have near-peer military capabilities.

為有效在邊緣地帶遂行安全部隊援助任務，軍事顧問團人員在撒哈拉以南非洲、拉丁美洲、歐洲周邊地區從事相關工作時，必須以伊拉克與阿富汗多年經驗為基礎，審慎行事。此外，美軍還需要仔細評估在伊拉克與阿富汗這兩場衝突

11 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017).

12 Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell, *The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017).

中發展而成的軍事顧問文化，是不是要做一些改良才能因應各項新挑戰，更何況這些新挑戰是安全部隊援助旅所要面對的，因為其職責為在各個地域型作戰司令部的責任區內進行建議、支援、聯絡及評估等任務。¹³至於這種朝向建議、支援、聯絡及評估等方式之轉變，意味著已經超越以往在阿富汗地區所從事的訓練、建議及援助等較狹隘範圍，這種轉變不僅擴展軍事顧問團人員的視野，而且也進一步強化與軍事實力相近夥伴國的區域安全合作。

Successful conduct of SFA outside of the Middle East requires American advisors to be comfortable with narrower objectives, goals, and outcomes driven by the host nations themselves, along with a true adoption of the philosophy of mission command. At the same time, advisors need to be prepared to accept more risk as the conditions of a highly active insurgency as experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq are substantially different from the operating environment in other nations. This is especially important in the COVID-19 era, which has brought substantial challenges to how SFA advisors develop and maintain relationships with allied and partner forces.

為了成功在中東以外地區遂行安全部隊援助任務，美軍顧問團人員必須自在接受地主國自身訂下較狹隘的目標以及所帶來的成果，而且也要真正放手去執行任務式指揮的用兵理念。不僅如此，軍事顧問團人員還要準備接受在中東以外不同環境所存在的不同風險，可能不會只面對在阿富汗與伊拉克那種高度叛亂活躍的風險，例如在新冠肺炎疫情期間，美軍顧問團人員就要在疫情種種限制下仍持續發展並維持跟盟國與夥伴國軍隊的安全部隊援助任務，在這過程中就充滿不少挑戰。

A New SFA Paradigm: Different Context Means Different Advising

Military advisors with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan may have become engrained with a “thinking inside the sandbox” mentality. Such experienced advisors need mental flexibility that allows them to be comfortable narrowing the scope of their mission and objectives when working with partner forces in other regions. This is due to a significant difference in the strategic context: the United States is not trying to simultaneously nation-build and fight an insurgency in the Indo-Pacific or Africa. Where the objectives in recent wars

13 “2d SFAB, Deployed to Iraq,” Army.mil, 1 October 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/227919/2d_sfab_deployed_to_iraq. 譯註：美軍共有 11 個統一作戰司令部(Unified Combatant Command)並區分成兩種類別：一是地域型，二是功能型。非洲司令部、中央司令部、歐洲司令部、北方司令部、印太司令部、南方司令部、太空司令部等 7 個是地域型；特種作戰司令部、戰略司令部、運輸司令部、網路司令部等 4 個是功能型。

have been to build security forces capable of shouldering the bulk of daily fighting from the United States and its allies, the objectives in other regions of the world will likely be much more limited to the confines of demonstrating strategic resolve and helping a partner develop some modicum of deterrence capabilities in the era of great-power competition. This translates into competing for relationships and influence with host-nation officials and delivering on security assistance and cooperation promises.

新的安全部隊援助範式：不同背景要有不同作法

美軍顧問團人員在受伊拉克與阿富汗經驗影響下，可能已形成根深蒂固觀念，無法跳脫框架。鑒此，他們需要彈性調整自身心態，才能與其他地區的夥伴國軍隊在合作時，自在看待這種在協訓時只做到較小任務與目標的情況。況且當前戰略背景已大不相同，以往遠大戰略目標為在亞太地區或非洲同時進行國家重建與反叛亂這兩件事，如今則要因地制宜。以近期的作戰行動目標而言，旨在協助地主國建立安全部隊能力並讓其承擔大部分的日常戰鬥任務，以減輕美國及其盟國的負擔，至於在世界其他地區的目標可能會限縮於只展現戰略決心，或是協助夥伴國在大國競爭時代中發展某種程度的嚇阻能力。由此可見，唯有與地主國官方建立良好關係並強化美軍影響力，才能兌現美軍所望的安全援助與合作。

During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, American military advisors faced the overwhelming task of building a conventional force nearly from the ground up while engaged in an ongoing fight against insurgent forces. Because the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan were being rebuilt from scratch, American and allied advisors were responsible for every facet of training and equipping military forces as well as supporting them on the battlefield. Every stage of training—from basic training for newly recruited soldiers to educating senior officers at command and staff colleges—had American or allied money and people behind it. When employed in combat, Iraqi and Afghan units frequently relied on support from American airpower, artillery, transport, and logistics. This showed especially in the 2014 setbacks the Iraqi army suffered as the U.S.-led buildup created a brittle force of combat units without the necessary supporting framework of logisticians, engineers, and intelligence personnel.¹⁴ Corruption and graft among officers at all levels further hampered the equipping and sustainment of Iraqi units.¹⁵ The Iraqi army had been trained and equipped to fight but not to support itself in doing so. When faced with the

daunting task of building a new national security force in Afghanistan after 2001, U.S. and allied advisors found themselves with the time and resources to build only the “tooth” and not the “tail.” The Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) are no better in 2021, where logistics are the biggest impediment to maintaining forward presence and in being able to defend ANDSF checkpoints. No amount of SFA will compel ANDSF logistics personnel to take their jobs seriously enough to not pilfer the supplies.¹⁶

在伊拉克與阿富汗衝突期間，美軍顧問團人員面臨一項艱鉅挑戰，也就是持續在與叛亂分子作戰的同時，還要幾乎從頭開始建立一支常規部隊，舉例而言，伊拉克與阿富汗的安全部隊就是從頭開始建立，美國及盟國的軍事顧問團人員要負責軍隊的訓練與裝備等各個面向，甚至還要在戰場上提供支援。每個訓練階段，不管是從新兵的基礎訓練乃至高階軍官的指參教育，不管是美國或協訓盟國都要出錢出力，尤其是在戰鬥部署時，伊拉克與阿富汗軍隊往往都要靠美軍的空中火力、砲兵、運輸及後勤補保，像是伊軍在 2014 年的挫敗就凸顯一個重大問題：美軍主導建立的戰鬥部隊缺乏必要的支援架構，如後勤補保人員、工兵及情報人員，¹⁴再加上伊軍各級軍官中三不五時出現的貪腐情事，也進一步阻礙軍隊的裝備採購與後勤補保。¹⁵此外，伊拉克軍隊雖然經過訓練也獲得裝備，但卻無法獨立自主進行作戰，另在 2001 年後的艱鉅任務為協助重建阿富汗新的國家安全部隊（或稱阿富汗國防軍暨安全部隊），美國及其盟國的軍事顧問人員卻發現，所擁有的時間與資源只夠建立作戰部隊，對於後勤部隊則無能為力。即使到了 2021 年，阿富汗國防軍暨安全部隊依然沒有改善以往問題，後勤仍無法有效支援前線駐軍，況且防守各檢查站所需的物資同樣無法滿足，還有一種情況是無論安全部隊援助任務做得再好，都無法讓阿富汗國防軍暨安全部隊的後勤人員端正其職責，監守自盜的情事更時有所聞。¹⁶

Given the fact that American advisors have been working to build host-nation security forces while these same forces are actively engaged in a fight

14 Michael Knights, *The Future of Iraq's Armed Forces* (Baghdad: Al-Bayan Center, 2016); Jahara Matisek, “The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and Fabergé Egg Armies,” *Defense & Security Analysis* 34, no. 3 (2018): 267–90, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2018.1500757>.

15 Kirkpatrick, David, “Graft Hobbles Iraq's Military in Fighting ISIS,” *New York Times*, 23 November 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/world/middleeast/graft-hobbles-iraqs-military-in-fighting-isis.html>.

16 Fieldwork and interviews, Kandahar, Afghanistan, January–September 2020. 譯註：美國在 2001 年 9 月 11 事件恐攻後，罪魁禍首蓋達組織首腦賓拉登經常出入阿富汗並受塔利班之庇護，美國決定以軍事干預方式推翻塔利班政權，消滅恐怖主義勢力，同時也協助阿富汗國防軍暨安全部隊在 2002 年重建完成，時至 2021 年美國總統拜登上任，基於撤軍已是民主、共和兩黨與大多數美國人的共識，於是在 2021 年時宣布美軍撤離阿富汗。

for control of their countries, the instinct to attempt a full-scale overhaul is understandable. American advisors deploying to countries in the Indo-Pacific and Africa, however, will not face the task of building new security forces while in combat and must resist attempting the wholesale reconstruction of host-nation forces. This is not to say that either region is not without its specific challenges such as the militaries in Libya, Mali, Philippines, and Somalia; each have their own specific pathologies that make defense institution building difficult to codify in the long term.¹⁷ However, it does mean accepting that the military structures and models in place are there for a reason, and as an advisor, it is necessary to maximize the potential within the given military system, whether for U.S. political purposes, lack of SFA resources, or host-nation capabilities.

鑒於美軍顧問團人員的工作一直是協助地主國建立安全部隊，而同樣這支安全部隊還要參與國家控制權的爭奪，在這種情況下，本能地認為地主國應進行全面改革是可以理解的。然而，美軍顧問團人員派駐至印太地區與非洲時，將不會面臨要建立新的安全部隊來從事戰鬥這種工作，文化背景不同，所以不能抱持要全面改革地主國軍隊的心態。我們不能說該區域國家沒有其特定挑戰，像是利比亞、馬利、菲律賓、索馬利亞等國軍隊都有各自要解決的問題，況且在長期處於內亂的情況下，國防機構之建設自然難以制度化，¹⁷這意味著美軍事顧問人員雖然得要接受地主國既有的軍事結構與模式，但其職責是要讓各國特定的軍事體制發揮最大作用，不論是出於美國政治目的、缺少安全部隊援助資源、抑或是地主國能力等考量。

While abilities among armed forces in Africa or the Indo-Pacific vary considerably, many current or likely U.S. partners at the edges of potential conflict already have well-established military institutions, typically referred to as tier one militaries. Rather than going into a country with the mindset that the host-nation armed forces must be overhauled, American advisors are far more likely to find themselves employed in assisting with marginal improvements and in finding ways of maximizing efficiencies, especially at the staff levels. This can be attributed not only to the existing capabilities in an established military but also to the fact that U.S. advisors will be there at the pleasure and invitation of a host nation that might request specific focus areas for their American

17 Alexandra Kerr and Michael Miklaucic, eds., *Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for Defense Institution Building* (Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2017).

guests. Within this context, an advising force must invest substantial time in learning the structure of the partner/ally security forces. This is because advising will primarily focus on process improvements, such as planning capabilities, but with marginal gains. Furthermore, U.S. advising objectives at the operational and strategic levels might be less focused on improving the capability of a host-nation military than they are on improving interoperability and security relationships with particular countries. For example, the Japan Self-Defense Force is a capable, professional, all-volunteer military force that does not require SFA. However, both the Japan Self-Defense Force and the United States could benefit from senior American advisors working with Japanese brigade and division staffs on more complex staff processes such as multi-domain targeting or operational design. Focusing on more sophisticated headquarters functions with upper-tier partners enables better integration and interoperability with these allies and partners in the event of an armed conflict against a common adversary. SFA missions such as this will require a substantial shift in the mindset of American advisors drawing on their firsthand experience of working with the Iraqis and Afghans. Advisors working with more capable allies and partners will need to be prepared to emphasize the “liaise” mission more heavily than the “advise” or “support” missions.

非洲與印太地區的武裝部隊能力差異很大，所幸許多當前或可能位於潛在衝突邊緣的美國夥伴國都已擁有完善的軍事制度，堪稱一級軍隊，所以美軍顧問團人員原本準備要大刀闊斧改革地主國武裝部隊，到了之後卻發現既有體制並無切入點，只能從對方參謀作業能力較為不足的小地方，來設法提升參謀層級的作業效能，這種情況發生是因為地主國在熱情邀請美軍顧問團來之後，會提出這類希望特定協訓的領域，對此，顧問團人員得要花費大量時間在學習夥伴國與盟國安全部隊的架構，這是因為協訓要求主要集中在程序改進，諸如改善規劃能力，但這種工作的收效甚微。此外，美軍顧問團人員在作戰與戰略層級的目標，可能不會是著重於提升地主國軍隊的能力，反而是改善與特定國家的作業互通和安全關係。例如，日本自衛隊是一支既有能力又專業的全志願役部隊，其實不太需要美國的安全部隊援助計畫，但資深美軍顧問與日本自衛隊旅團、師團幕僚若能在多領域作戰目標處理或作戰設計等較為複雜的參謀作業程序進行合作，會讓美日兩國軍隊相互受益。再者，置重點於與一流軍隊夥伴國進行較為複雜的指揮部指揮職能合作，未來一旦發生須共同對抗敵人的武裝衝突時，雙方就能有更好的整合與作業互通。美軍顧問團人員雖然在伊拉克與阿富汗獲致第一手經

驗，但在中東以外地區從事安全部隊援助任務時，美軍顧問人員須轉變自身心態，也就是在與更有能力的盟國與夥伴國共事時，最重要的工作是「相互聯繫」，反而不是「提供建議」或「給予支援」。

While American advisors and the services that they are drawn from are primarily focused on large-scale combat operations and combined arms maneuver, advisors also need to be prepared to adjust their mission and objectives for the needs of a partner force that may not be focused on conventional force-on-force combat. Many U.S. allies and partners around the world, such as the Republic of Korea or the Baltic states, are indeed focused on defending against a conventional military threat. This might mean focusing on ways of increasing the deterrence capabilities of these partner forces. However, many U.S. partners in this and other regions have historically employed their militaries in other ways. Using their forces to deploy elsewhere in support of UN peacekeeping operations, some Indo-Pacific militaries are focused more heavily on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, a state of affairs that will likely continue in a region increasingly threatened by global climate change. In other instances, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand face internal security threats, employing their militaries for COIN/CT operations and law enforcement roles.

雖然美軍顧問人員及其職責為專注於大規模作戰行動和聯兵戰鬥，但他們也應視情況隨時調整其任務與目標，以因應夥伴國軍隊的訓練需求可能不會是常規軍兵力對抗。在世界各地的許多美國盟國與夥伴國，諸如南韓、波羅的海三小國，它們確實將重點置於防禦常規軍事威脅，這也代表這些夥伴國軍隊需要的是提升嚇阻能力的各種方法。此外，這些國家或其他地區的美國夥伴國軍隊也會從事其他任務，諸如支援聯合國維和行動，至於印太地區的軍隊會從事人道援助與災害救濟的任務，而且在全球環境變化的日益威脅下，這類任務有增無減，還有像是在菲律賓、斯里蘭卡和泰國的情況則是面臨國內動亂威脅，軍隊須從事反叛亂與反恐任務並充當執法人員角色。

More importantly, U.S. advisors must be cognizant of the history, tradition, and culture surrounding the institutions and employment of host-nation armed forces and tread carefully in countries where the military has previously been a tool of repression for authoritarian regimes. The varying roles and responsibilities of military forces in different partner nations require deliberate engagement at the political and strategic levels prior to employing advisors to

signal that the U.S. military is present for truly noble purposes. In some cases, this will require American military advisors to eschew combined arms maneuver in favor of the logistical and medical training so integral to humanitarian and disaster relief efforts. Moreover, advisors will need to become more comfortable with host-nation forces that focus on their own objectives rather than American national security interests. In this complicated sociopolitical milieu, American interests can be indirectly achieved with partnerships via newfound relations that establish long-term dialogue and influence.

更重要的是，美軍顧問團人員必須了解與地主國軍隊制度與運作相關的歷史、傳統及文化，因為在某些國家中，軍隊曾是威權政權用來壓迫人民的工具，如此才能審慎行事。由於不同夥伴國軍隊的作用與職責各不相同，美軍顧問團在奉令派遣之前，應先在政治與戰略層級進行密切往來，才能彰顯美軍協訓是出於真正崇高之目的。在某些情況下，美軍顧問團應將協訓重點從聯兵戰鬥，轉變成對於人道主義與災害援助至關重要的後勤和醫療，並自在調整心態專注於地主國軍隊所想要的，而不是優先以美國國家安全利益為考量，經由建立長期對話與影響力這種新型態關係，即使在各國這種複雜的社會環境下，同樣也可以間接達成美國利益。

In recent conflicts, eagerness to hand off the war to a host-nation security force often resulted in American advisors pushing their Iraqi or Afghan partner forces toward American-designated objectives. Advisors often struggled to align host-nation force objectives with their own, as factors such as corruption, competing tribal or personal loyalties, or a simple lack of capability could stymie a partner force's ability to achieve an objective. However, in an environment where "handing off the fight" to the host nation is not the mission of a U.S. advisory force, advisors must be more comfortable with enabling the host nation to pursue their own objectives. This is because great-power competition requires empowering allies to take ownership of their domestic and regional security considerations in support of a more robust regional security architecture; the American advisor presence signals a strategic willingness to support and enable such actions. Organizing joint training programs and exercises in this framework can solidify their willingness to take ownership of defense institution building on their own terms so that it becomes self-sufficient once advisors depart.

回顧近期的衝突事件，期望將戰爭交還給地主國安全部隊的想法，讓美軍顧問團人員在協訓伊拉克或阿富汗夥伴國軍隊時，往往導向美國所望的目標，但現實是他們難以讓地主國軍隊目標與美軍所望一致，因為存在著貪腐、部落競爭、個人忠誠度，甚或單純軍事能力不足等問題，這些都是夥伴國軍隊實現目標的障礙。然而，若不把戰鬥自主權交還給地主國，將有違美軍顧問的初衷，他們要做的是讓地主國自願追求自身目標，這是因為在大國競爭格局下，需要讓盟友擁有對國內與區域安全的自我判斷力，才能共同形塑一個更強大的區域安全架構，再加上美軍顧問團之存在展現美國支持並促成這些作為的戰略意志，於是在這種框架下籌組聯合演訓計畫，除了可以促成盟國願意承擔建立自身國防體制的責任，也讓顧問團在離開後，地主國自己就能獨立從事戰鬥任務。

“One Captain, One Team, One Country”: Mission Command and Risk Acceptance

To conduct effective SFA in these frontier states, the U.S. military needs to fully embrace the principles of mission command at the strategic level to enable advisors operating at the tactical levels. This enables them to improvise and adapt to a dynamic and ambiguous context where Chinese and Russian officials may be creating a hypercompetitive environment to provide SFA. Commanders who properly exercise mission command philosophy in this perplexing environment give their subordinate leaders wide latitude to accomplish the commander's intent as the subordinate sees fit, providing the subordinate leader the flexibility necessary to adapt to the situation on the ground and seize fleeting opportunities.¹⁸ Decentralized COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which companies and platoons conducted independent operations out of small outposts, often represented tactical application of mission command. However, the overall strategy and mission of defeating insurgencies while building host-nation security forces capable of independently securing their own countries remained uniform across those regions. The essential job of an infantry company commander in Mahmudiya District, Iraq, was little different than that of a company commander two thousand miles away in Dara-I-Pech District, Afghanistan, not to mention both had to maintain constant vigilance against insider attacks.¹⁹ However, those same two captains leading advisory teams in Singapore and Thailand might have two fundamentally different missions depending on a variety of factors.

「帶隊官、團隊、地主國」關係：任務式指揮與接受風險

為了在這些邊緣地帶國家有效遂行安全部隊援助任務，美軍必須採取任務式指揮的領導哲學，從戰略層級向下授權，才能讓美軍顧問團在基層的戰術層級順利執行任務。由於中共與俄羅斯同樣也跟美國一樣對他國提供安全部隊援助計畫，在這種高度競爭環境下，任務式指揮可讓美軍顧問團人員擁有自主裁量權，以利因應多變、模糊地帶的情況。在這種渾沌不明環境下，指揮官若能適切運用任務式指揮，所屬領導幹部就能擁有廣泛自主權，並依其自身判斷來達成指揮官意圖，如此一來，領導幹部就能擁有必要彈性，以利因應當前情況並掌握不可多得的機會。¹⁸在伊拉克與阿富汗的作戰行動中，也有出現任務式指揮的分權式戰術運用案例，像是連與排在小型前哨站的獨立作戰行動。此外，美國在中東各國的整體戰略規劃與任務是一致的，也就是擊敗叛亂分子並協助地主國建立獨自保衛國家的安全部隊，就好比一位在伊拉克馬赫穆迪亞區步兵連連長與一位遠在兩千哩外、位於阿富汗達拉佩奇區的連長，兩者職責幾乎沒有不同，同樣都需時時警惕來自國內的攻擊；¹⁹然而，在中東以外地區，兩位分別在新加坡與泰國領導顧問團的上尉軍官，在不同因素影響下會有不同的任務行動要項。

The differences might include the form and shape of security relationships of each country with the United States. This can be further broken down into what the host nation has asked American advisors to do and what mandate advisors have in providing different types of aid and training (i.e., lethal versus nonlethal assistance). Matters can be further complicated by virtue of host-nation relationships with competitors (e.g., China, Russia); internal conflicts and security challenges; the professional and political foundations of each country's security forces; and the unique history, culture, and politics of each state. The SFAB employment model of "one team, operating semi-autonomously in support of a country led by a single officer" requires comfort with the philosophy of mission command scaled up to the strategic level.²⁰ It means giving freedom of movement and decision-making space to tactical-level advisors to make strategic-level decisions; otherwise, advisors might find themselves engaging in ad hoc arrangements that undermine the purpose of their mission.²¹

18 Demetrios A. Ghikas, "Taking Ownership of Mission Command," *Military Review* 93, no. 6 (2013): 23–30.

19 Austin Long, "'Green on Blue': Insider Attacks in Afghanistan," *Survival* 55, no. 3 (2013): 167–82, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.802860>; Stavros Atlamazoglou, "Are US and Allied Units in Iraq in Danger of Insider Attacks?," *SOFREP* (Special Operations Forces Report), 5 January 2020, <https://sofrep.com/news/are-us-and-allied-units-in-iraq-in-dangerof-insider-attacks/>.

其中差異或許可歸因於每個國家與美國之間有不同的安全關係與形式，更進一步來說，就是地主國要求美軍顧問團幫忙做什麼，或是要求美軍顧問團幫忙提供致命、非致命武器及裝備使用訓練。不過，在這個過程中會因為以下情況而讓事情複雜化，像是地主國與美國競爭者（如「中」、俄）的關係、國內衝突與安全挑戰、各國安全部隊的專業程度與政治基礎，以及各國獨特的歷史、文化和政治。安全部隊援助旅的部署模式是「由單一**帶隊官**帶領一個**團隊**，並以半自主方式支援一個**地主國**」，因此需要任務式指揮的領導哲學並獲得來自戰略層級的授權。²⁰唯有給予戰術層級的美軍顧問團人員行動自由與決策空間，才能達成戰略層級下達的決策目標，否則只會讓他們覺得都是不停在打遭遇戰，還會破壞任務所應達成之目的。²¹

Successful mission command, according to Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, relies on seven elements: competence, mutual trust, shared understanding, commander's intent, mission orders, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance.²² Most of these elements require particular considerations in the context of the advisory mission. To ensure competence and set the groundwork for mutual trust, advisors need to be drawn from the top-performing leaders of the military at all levels, from junior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to senior field grade officers. Rather than creating an advisor functional area, the most tactically proficient personnel with demonstrated leadership ability need to rotate between advisory units and the rest of the operating force. The qualities that make an officer or NCO a good leader of American troops are the same ones that make a good advisor to foreign troops.

根據美陸軍準則出版品第 6-0 號，《任務式指揮：陸軍部隊的指揮與管制》所述，成功的任務式指揮有下列七項要素：能力、互信、共同理解、指揮官意圖、任務命令、有紀律的主動作為、接受風險。²²鑒此，在美軍顧問團的任務背景之下，應特別思索這些要素之運用，而且為了確保領導幹部能力並奠定與地主國互信基礎，納編到美軍顧問團人員，需要從美軍各層級的初級士官至資深校級軍官中，選拔出最優秀的領導者。此外，與其創建出顧問職能這種專長，還不如讓那

20 Kyle Rempfer, "Army SFAB Enterprise Changes Leaders as It Begins Sending Smaller Teams Out Globally," *Army Times*, 5 August 2020, <https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2020/08/05/army-sfab-enterprise-changesleaders-as-it-begins-sending-smaller-teams-out-globally/>.

21 William Reno, "The Politics of Security Assistance in the Horn of Africa," *Defence Studies* 18, no. 4 (2018): 498–513, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2018.1463819>.

22 Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Force* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 31 July 2019).

些戰術能力出眾、具領導統御能力的人，在作戰部隊與顧問單位之間輪調，這種美軍向來培養優秀軍官與士官的模式，同樣也能適用於培養將派駐國外軍隊的優秀顧問人員。

Ad hoc advisory efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan (e.g., military transition teams) were sometimes treated as economy of force missions, which means those roles were filled at times by the donor unit's less capable leaders. However, the Army is currently on the right track to improve its security assistance endeavor, manning its SFABs with officers and NCOs who have completed key leadership assignments and advertising these units as a broadening assignment for high performers. It must persist in this effort to recruit top talent by maintaining SFABs as a coveted assignment for high performers and prevent it from becoming a dumping ground for the mediocre. A similar effort is underway in the British military with the creation of the specialised infantry group, which mirrors many aspects of the American SFAB approach, attracting their most talented officers and NCOs to advise foreign forces. The emergence of the specialised infantry group presents another avenue for SFABs to excel at advising by cooperating with a close ally on codifying best practices and coordinating advisor missions to maximize influence and partnerships that can counter China and Russia.

美軍在伊拉克與阿富汗的短期顧問任務，如軍事過渡團的編組有時會被視為是次要任務，這意味著人員編成可能來自美軍各單位中能力較弱的領導幹部。所幸，美陸軍已著手改善這個安全部隊援助的問題，也就是把那些完成重要領導職的軍官與士官納編至安全部隊援助旅，並把到這些單位的任職視為表現優異者才有的機會。無論如何，這項作為必須持續下去，只有將任職安全部隊援助旅形塑為表現優異者才能選擇的，才能招攬到頂尖人才並防止成為平庸人才的集散地。同樣地，英軍所成立的專業步兵團，其在許多方面類似於美軍安全部隊援助旅，也是為了要吸引最優秀軍官與士官來擔任外國部隊的顧問。專業步兵團之出現也成為除了安全部隊援助旅以外，另外一條產製優秀顧問的管道，擇優編成的顧問團才能在協訓任務上，有效與盟國進行協調合作並達成最佳實踐成果，藉此最大化對夥伴國的影響力，進而反制中共與俄羅斯之挑戰。

Senior commanders of advisor units should be comfortable with a degradation in shared understanding as advising in-country becomes a highly fluid and dynamic experience. In many cases, immediate decisions and actions might be required by forward deployed leaders that cannot wait for the lengthy

routing of staff summary sheets and memorandums for record. As described in numerous interviews with foreign military personnel, waiting on approval from a faraway chain of command is precisely what makes American advisors look weak to foreign military leaders.²³

顧問團高階指揮官應自在面對當地處於變化頻繁的動態環境時，將形成與地主國共同理解的弱化，在多數的情況下，立即性的決策與行動須獲得前進部署指揮官的同意，還要經過冗長的參謀總結報告與備忘錄記載等程序，但這些決策與行動根本就無法在那邊空等。誠如在許多國外軍事人員的訪談中所述，等待遠方指揮鏈的上級同意，已弱化美軍顧問團在地主國眼中的地位。²³

With advisor teams spread out to multiple countries across a geographic command, battalion- and brigade-level commanders will be unable to develop the deep situational understanding necessary to make decisions on the minute details of a mission. They must trust the judgment of their subordinate officers and NCOs who are immersed in the operational environment daily. Furthermore, commander's intent issued to subordinate leaders will need to account for a broader variety of stakeholders. A captain charged with executing a colonel's intent must also balance that against the goals and objectives of the U.S. ambassador and interagency country team. Senior commanders must issue intent that is broad enough to be tailored to the integrated country strategy that each ambassador is charged with carrying out. Taken a step further, leaders on the ground could even be issued commander's intent that specifically authorizes them to reasonably deviate from that intent in support of the country team's objectives (i.e., exercise disciplined initiative). This might even include giving financial authority and discretion to a certain dollar amount and enabling the authority of advisor decisions to signal conditionality to partner forces when they cross "red-lines." Finally, applying mission command to successful SFA missions will require senior commanders to reexamine and adjust their acceptance of prudent risk.

隨著顧問團派駐至各地域型作戰司令部下轄責任區，顧問團中的營級與旅級指揮幹部若無法獲致必要的深入情勢分析，將無法下達任務中各階段的細部決定，他們必須信任那些每天在作戰環境中所屬軍官與士官的情勢判斷。基層領

23 Author fieldwork and interviews with military personnel from NATO member states, Afghanistan, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 2011–2020. 作者在 2011 至 2020 年間對來自北約成員國、阿富汗、哥倫比亞、衣索比亞、伊拉克、約旦、盧安達、塞內加爾、烏干達、烏克蘭、阿拉伯聯合大公國等進行的田野調查與訪談。

導幹部在執行指揮官意圖時，也要考慮到更廣泛的利害關係者，例如一位上尉連長（隊長）在執行上校指揮官之意圖時，必須考量美國大使館的目標、目的是否與跨機構國家團隊之間取得平衡。此外，高階指揮官在傳達意圖時要從大處著眼，才能對準並符合當地美國大使所執行的整體國家戰略。更進一步來說，讓基層領導者可以收到指揮官的意圖，明確授權他們在支持地主國跨機構國家團隊的目標下，可以合理偏離該意圖（即行使有紀律的主動作爲），甚至包含一定金額的財務授權、自由裁量權及賦予顧問團決策權，以利在夥伴國踰越「紅線」時可發揮約束作用。最後，任務式指揮要成功運用在安全援助部隊任務上，將需要高階指揮官再次檢視並調整自己須接受適當風險。

Advisors engaging in SFA missions in other regions of the world outside of Iraq and Afghanistan will often need to be comfortable with lower levels of force protection while working with host-nation counterparts. One of the most painful memories of advising in Iraq and Afghanistan has been the problem of insider attacks, where trained host-nation soldiers have turned their weapons on their American advisors in “green on blue” attacks.²⁴ While U.S. military tactics and techniques have evolved to partially mitigate the threat of insider attack, such as the use of “guardian angels” to provide overwatch protection to advisors, these tragedies loom understandably large in the minds of military leaders up and down the chain of command. Engagements between American advisors and host-nation militaries are accompanied by robust security details, and photographs of Afghan officers with their American advisors nearly always depict the American wearing body armor and helmet, while the Afghan counterpart wears none.

之前沒在伊拉克與阿富汗地區從事安全部隊援助任務的美軍顧問團人員，他們也要有一個認知，就是地主國只能提供程度較低的武力防護規格，例如之前派駐在伊拉克與阿富汗的顧問團人員所遭遇最痛苦的內部攻擊回憶：地主國受過訓的臥底士兵發動所謂「友軍攻擊」事件，將槍口對準美軍顧問團。²⁴雖然美軍戰術與戰技之運用已能部分減輕地主國內部攻擊的威脅，又如美空軍的「守護天使部隊」可為美軍顧問團人員提供監視防護，但眾所周知，這些悲劇在指揮鏈上下領導幹部心中的恐懼仍揮之不去。美軍顧問團人員與地主國軍隊在往來共事時，一些對安全細節的重視也從照片上表露無遺，像是阿富汗軍官與美軍顧問

24 David BaMaung et al., “The Enemy Within? The Connection between Insider Threat and Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 41, no. 2 (2018): 133–50, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1249776>.

團人員在一起時，後者總是穿著防彈背心並戴頭盔，但前者卻沒有穿戴。

While every SFA mission begins with a detailed analysis of the local threat and resources available to determine the protective posture required, there may be a temptation among senior advisors to revert to what they became accustomed to during multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Being mentally prepared to accept a certain level of risk with force protection applies across the most mundane details of a military advisors' work—where they live, how they travel, what they wear, if and how they are armed, etc. A force protection posture in the Indo-Pacific or sub-Saharan Africa that resembles what military advisors have adopted in Iraq and Afghanistan will only serve to alienate partner forces in much safer countries. This also translates into advisors getting cellphones that operate in any given country, with WhatsApp installed, so that they can stay in constant communication with partner forces and provide real-time updates to their advisor team and leadership. While some may see this as a security violation, this is the harsh reality of any advising mission, and partner forces will want to develop a relationship with their advisor through text messages and group threads. Partaking in such activities will signal an advisor's willingness to develop interpersonal relationships with ally and partner forces for the greater good of the mission.

雖然每個安全部隊援助任務都會先詳細分析當地威脅與可用資源多寡，以確定所需的防護態勢，但在資深美軍顧問團人員身上可能會發現，他們會不自覺受制於之前在伊拉克與阿富汗多次協訓的框架，也就是在執行任務各項細節工作時，在心態上認為地主國在一定程度上會有自身武力防護不足的風險，所以不管是住在哪裡、去哪裡，又即使是已穿戴防護裝具或攜帶各式武器，都無法掉以輕心。然而，美軍事顧問人員在印太地區或撒哈拉以南非洲，若仍受制於伊拉克與阿富汗的武力防護不足思維，就只會讓那些環境相對安全的夥伴國軍隊認為更格格不入而已。此外，美軍顧問團人員也應配備在任何特定國家都可以使用的手機，並安裝 WhatsApp（Meta 公司旗下一款用於智慧型手機的跨平臺加密即時通訊應用程式），以利他們能與夥伴國軍隊隨時保持聯繫，並向顧問團本部或領導層級提供即時更新訊息，雖然有些人可能會認為這種作法違反資訊安全，但如何順暢溝通是美軍顧問團在執行任務時會面臨的嚴峻現實問題，況且夥伴國軍隊認為與顧問團關係之鞏固，應透過文字訊息與線上群組管道方式。美軍顧問團若能著手這項作法，將展現他們願意與盟國與夥伴國軍隊進一步發展人際關係交流，對於任務執行有莫大助益。

Conclusion

As the United States continues to emphasize great-power competition, its Armed Forces will undertake an increasing number of military advisory missions as the Nation vies to maintain global influence.²⁵ The future of successful SFA engagements outside of the Middle Eastern sandbox is increasingly dependent on a nimble advising force that can tailor mission sets in alignment with the U.S. national security interests of empowering partners and allies. This requires breaking free of the mental traps of operating in failed states where state-building collided with fighting an insurgency. It means reemphasizing the importance of working with already capable military partners that will have their own institutionalized way of conducting affairs.

結論

隨著美國持續強調大國競爭的格局，又致力於維持全球影響力，其武裝部隊勢必承擔愈來愈多的軍事顧問團任務。²⁵未來，成功在中東以外地區遂行安全部隊援助任務，將日益依賴一支靈活的美軍顧問團，如此才能因地制宜調整任務的組成，以利符合美國國家安全利益中培養強大的盟國與夥伴國能力。此外，失能國家往往處於邊重建，邊因應叛亂行動的情況，美軍顧問團人員要跳脫在這些國家中的既定運作思維陷阱，不能一概論之；換言之，顧問團應尊重那些已經具備軍事能力的夥伴國，讓對方維持自身的做事制度。

American advisors will need to become comfortable assisting capable partners with making marginal improvements, especially in less glamorous areas such as logistics, maintenance, and record-keeping details (e.g., administrative work). They will need to accept the goals and outcomes of the host nation to a far greater degree than they might have during a massive COIN campaign. Additionally, the senior commanders of American advisor units will need to fully embrace mission command to allow junior advisors the flexibility to modify the execution of their mission to better integrate with the U.S. country team's objectives.

美軍顧問團人員在協訓本身就有能力的夥伴國時，應放寬心針對一些小地方做改進，像是在後勤維保、紀錄文件保存等行政工作的瑣事，也應更加認同地主國的目標與成果，不亞於在大規模反叛亂行動期間的認同感。此外，美軍顧問

25 Jahara Matissek, "International Competition to Provide Security Force Assistance in Africa," PRISM: Journal of Complex Operations 9, no. 1 (2020): 102–113, <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2383173/international-competition-to-provide-security-force-assistance-in-africa-civil/>.

團的高階指揮官應充分採用任務式指揮，才能讓底下的軍事顧問人員可以靈活調整任務的執行，進而與美國國家的目標相結合。

Finally, the model of deploying small advisor teams across a geographically broad area of operations will require no small amount of risk acceptance by the senior leadership of the U.S. military. Advisors accustomed to an entourage of armored vehicles and infantry squads from their experience in previous operations will ultimately fail in their new mission if they are unable to accept prudent risk to build genuine trust with their partner force. Without authentic trust at the leading edge between advisor and partner, any security force assistance mission, and ultimately, the strategic partnership within which it occurs, has limited chances of success. Advisors and their senior leaders need to get comfortable with the uncomfortable, such as conducting SFA through WhatsApp, and start thinking outside of the sandbox because strategic competitors are unrestrained in their desire to box out American influence.

最後，美軍領導高層必須要有承擔一定風險的心理準備，尤其是在地理範圍廣泛作戰區域派駐小型顧問團的作法。美軍顧問團人員若無法接受在適當風險下與夥伴國軍隊建立真正信任，還是習慣於行動中都有裝甲車與步兵班的保護隨行在側，最終迎接他們的將是任務失敗；再者，若顧問團與地主國軍隊無法在領導統御上建立互信，不管是安全部隊援助任務或是到最後要建立戰略夥伴關係，最終成功的機會都將有限。美軍顧問團及其高階指揮官也要試著放下，不要糾結一個過不去的坎，像是在安全部隊援助任務時使用 WhatsApp，該是跳脫框架的時候了，因為美國的戰略競爭者會用諸般手段擠掉美國對世界各國的影響力。

譯後語

安全部隊援助任務為美軍行之有年的軍事合作或軍事外交作法，藉由協訓名義將美軍顧問團人員派駐至地主國，旨在提升友軍部隊戰技、作業互通，進而強化國與國之間的關係，專責執行這項任務的單位就是安全部隊援助旅（或稱安全合作旅），當然還有一些臨時編組單位如協訓伊拉克的「軍事過渡團」（Military Transition Team），協訓阿富汗的「隨隊訓練團」（Embedded Training Team）、「作戰指導與聯絡團」（Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team）。美國這項政策的戰略考量，為陷入內部動盪的國家將損及美國國家利益，但若直接駐軍介入所耗費成本又過於高昂，甚至還可能會引起當地勢力反彈，所以就研擬出安全部隊援助的模式。

雖然美軍在檯面上都宣稱在中東的安全部隊援助任務獲致一定成效，但現

實面卻是經協訓後的軍隊在實戰時往往吃下敗仗或是勉強保住顏面，究其原因為當地軍隊文化充滿安插親信、貪腐頻傳，甚至把軍援資金用在不當地方。由此可見，唯有地主國願意從根源下重藥，否則安全部隊援助任務的成效並無法有效提升，只能落在日復一日循環之中。安全部隊援助任務成功關鍵雖然在於地主國本身，但美軍應做到的是採行任務式指揮的分層授權模式，才能讓派駐各地的安全部隊援助旅或顧問團有施展手腳的空間，如此一來，才能達到事半功倍之效。本文所探討的美軍安全部隊援助的任務內涵、所處困境、顧問人員心態、精進作法等，可供國軍相關單位參考，進而強化領導幹部軍事知識。

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