

建構未來走向：美陸軍在印太地區值得關注的五大事件 (CHARTING THE COURSE: 5 THINGS TO WATCH IN THE INDO-PACIFIC)

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The Chinese Communist Party cannot picture peaceful coexistence of President Xi Jinping's rejuvenated China and the United States' democratic way of life within the liberal world order. Accordingly, the People's Republic of China continues its work to coercively rewrite norms and underwrite irresponsible behavior that undermines global order, including its own missile launches over Taiwan, North Korean missile tests and Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

中國大陸共產黨無法想像，其領導人習近平主席振興中國大陸的目標與美國在自由世界秩序中的民主生活方式是可和平共存的。為此，中共持續地強制改變世界現有規則與秩序，並參與破壞全球秩序的不負責任行為，包括對台灣周遭海域實施導彈射擊演習、支持北韓飛彈試射以及俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭等事件。

In this environment, many think the U.S. Army plays a small role in a so-called air and maritime theater named for two oceans. At best, these arguments are misinformed. At worst, they're dangerously wrong. The Indo-Pacific is a joint theater with challenges so complex that only a fully integrated joint force can solve them.

在這種氛圍下，許多人認為美國陸軍在以空中與海上戰場為主的印太作戰地區所能扮演的角色非常渺小。然而，上述論點是錯誤的。印太地區是一個充滿挑戰的聯合戰區，若沒有一個完成整合的聯合部隊是無法解決這些挑戰的。



Soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, and Malaysian troops train together during an exercise in a Malaysian jungle. (Credit: U.S. Army/Pfc. Wyatt Moore)

第 25 步兵師第 3 步兵旅級戰鬥隊的士兵在演習中與馬來西亞部隊在馬來西亞叢林裡共同訓練。(圖片來源：美國陸軍/一等兵懷亞特·摩爾)

Though underdiscussed and poorly understood, the Army plays a powerful role in Asia to defend our nation and maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Army is warfighting, campaigning and war-gaming to increase joint readiness, build capacity and confidence with our allies and partners, and deny key terrain to adversaries. Here are five things to watch in 2023 that underscore the Army's Indo-Pacific role:

儘管很少被討論而且外界也知之甚少，但美陸軍在亞洲地區的角色對於保衛國家安全及維護印太地區航行的自由開放發揮著強大作用。陸軍透過持續性的演練作戰、戰役模式和兵棋推演來提高聯合戰備的能力，增強與盟友和夥伴的能力和信心，並拒止敵對的一方掌控進出印太地區關鍵航道與地區。下述五項發生在 2023 年的活動顯示了陸軍在印太地區的關鍵角色：

1. Unified Pacific War Games

Partnering with the Navy's Global series of war games, the Army chief of staff's Unified Pacific Wargame Series (UPWS) delivers a joint Indo-Pacific campaign of learning, providing analytics to shape and posture the joint force. Unified Pacific 2022 delivered seven key insights, including insight No.1: The People's Republic of China holds advantages of mass, munitions depth and interior lines—operating from a central position that enables an army to move faster than opposing forces can

counter—that will take the entire joint force to deny its military objectives. Unified Pacific 2023 war games are digging deeper into two parts of the fight: intelligence support to joint targeting (UPWS 23-1) and joint theater logistics and sustainment (UPWS 23-2).

一. 聯合太平洋兵棋推演

透過與海軍的跨國聯合兵棋推演合作，陸軍參謀長在聯合太平洋兵棋推演(UPWS)時吸取印太地區戰役模式演習的教訓，提供數據分析並形塑聯合部隊。在 2022 聯合太平洋兵棋推演後得出了七項重要見解，其中第 1 項：中國大陸擁有軍隊人數、彈藥數量和內線作戰的優勢—從中心位置對外作戰，使自身部隊的行動速度快於敵對部隊可以反制的速度—這將使整個聯合部隊必須完成整合軍力後，再實施拒止中共達成軍事目標。2023 聯合太平洋兵棋推演深入探討了戰鬥的兩個部分：分別是：聯合目標處理的情報支持（UPWS 23-1）與聯合戰區後勤補給（UPWS 23-2）。



A soldier with the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, trains at Pohakuloa Training Area, Hawaii. (Credit: U.S. Army/Sgt. Daniel Proper)

第 25 步兵師第 2 步兵旅戰鬥隊的一名士兵在夏威夷波哈庫洛亞訓練區訓練。(圖片來源:美國陸軍/丹尼爾·普羅珀中士)

In January, UPWS 23-1 examined intelligence support to targeting with the U.S. military's Five Eyes partners. Five Eyes is an intelligence alliance among Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S. The war game improved the U.S. Army's understanding of indications and warnings, examined the transition to targeting support in conflict and identified collection capability shortfalls. It reinforced the importance of land-based collection when aerial and space-based platforms are

disrupted. The U.S. Army's work alongside Five Eyes partners also drove home the need for our armies to learn together in the Indo-Pacific.

一月份時，聯合目標獲得情報支持(UPWS 23-1)審查了美軍與五眼聯盟情報夥伴的情報資料。五眼聯盟是澳洲、加拿大、紐西蘭、英國與美國之間的情報聯盟。而透過聯合太平洋兵棋推演提高了美陸軍對各項徵候與警訊的理解，檢視轉換至軍事衝突時期的目標獲得支援能力，並點出情報蒐集能力的不足部分。此演習強調了當空中與太空的情報蒐集載具受到干擾時，地面情報蒐集載具的重要性。美陸軍與五眼聯盟的合作也讓陸軍各層級認知到他們必須在印太地區增進並互相分享經驗。

The capstone war game, UPWS 23-2, examined joint theater logistics and sustainment at the scale and speed of war. In 2022, Unified Pacific highlighted a missing joint logistics framework that supported new service concepts; issues compounded over time. Logistics networks drove operational endurance, and they made attractive targets, meaning they needed to be survivable: distributed, mobile, hardened, networked and defended.

UPWS 23-2 兵棋推演成果驗收時，檢視了在戰爭規模與時序下的聯合戰區後勤補給能力。2022 年聯合太平洋兵棋推演時點出了在新的作戰型態下現有的後勤補給程序顯有所缺失；問題隨時間推移已變得複雜。雖然後勤補給利用補給體系提高了作戰持久力，但也使得補給網路本身成為敵人重視的目標，也就意味著補給體系具有生存能力：需要是散佈的、機動的、強化的、網路化與被保護的。

In UPWS 23-2, a simulated joint logistics command synchronized the enterprise as we war-gamed pre-conflict pre-positioning to buy down risk, factored in allied sustainment capacity and assessed key capabilities in the reserve component and active-duty force.

This summer, U.S. Army Pacific will publish top-secret, secret and unclassified reports on Unified Pacific 2023. Continuing the joint campaign of learning, these Army war games will inform Navy's Global 17 starting conditions this fall.

在 UPWS 23-2 演習中，模擬聯合後勤指揮部使各組織企業化，隨著時序推演實施戰前補給部署以降低風險，其中考量了盟軍的補給能力並評估了預備役部隊和現役部隊的影響因素。

今年夏天美國陸軍太平洋司令部將發布關於《聯合太平洋兵棋推演 2023》的絕密、機密和非機密報告。並繼續執行戰役經驗研討，而陸軍藉著兵棋推演將為今年秋天海軍的 Global 17 演習提供相關成果資訊。



Indonesian troops take direction from Staff Sgt. Jeremy Mireles, a U.S. Army adviser, during maneuvers at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. (Credit: U.S. Army/Spc. Aleksander Fomin)

印尼部隊接受美陸軍安和旅顧問傑米·米雷斯上士的指導，在夏威夷斯科菲爾德營區進行演練。（圖片來源：美國陸軍/Spc. Aleksander Fomin）



Troops from the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment, conduct field reconnaissance at Pohakuloa Training Area. (Credit: U.S. Army/Sgt. Daniel Proper)

第 11 砲兵團第 2 營的人員在波哈庫洛亞訓場進行現地偵察。（圖片來源：美陸軍/丹尼爾·普羅珀中士）

2. Campaigning Through Pathways

Retired Gen. Vincent Brooks, who commanded Army Pacific from 2013 to 2016, taught me that maneuver plays a distant third in the Indo-Pacific. If you can't sustain or command and control them, maneuver forces are useless. Beyond being able to “sink ships, neutralize satellites, shoot down missiles, and hack or jam the enemy,” as described in 2016 by then-U.S. Pacific Command commander Adm. Harry Harris Jr., the Army must be—as Army Secretary Christine Wormuth puts it—the “backbone” of joint operations in the Indo-Pacific.

二. 通過演習路徑進行戰役模式演練

曾在 2013 至 2016 年間指揮太平洋陸軍的退役上將文森·布魯克斯 (Vincent Brooks)，告訴我目前部隊機動與調動在印太地區扮演遙不可及的第三順位。若不能有效的維持或指揮與管制，機動部隊就會失去它的意義了。正如前太平洋司令部司令哈里斯上將以及陸軍部長克里斯汀·沃穆斯所述，陸軍除了要能夠“擊沉船隻、癱瘓衛星、擊落飛彈、駭入或癱瘓敵人網路”另外，陸軍也必須成為印太地區聯合行動的“骨幹”。

That backbone is built on the foundation of collection, protection, sustainment and command and control. It requires interior lines from Southeast Asia and Australia through the first and second island chains. Today, however, the U.S. military's interior lines are concentrated in the north, in South Korea and Japan, with permanent posture elsewhere in Asia remaining a persistent challenge. Building interior lines requires a creative approach.


而這一個骨幹是建立在情報蒐集、保護、後勤補給及指管的基礎上。它所需要的是從東南亞和澳洲穿過第一和第二島鏈的內線航線。然而現今，美軍的內線活動主要集中在北部的韓國和日本，但在亞洲其他地區的常態活動仍然是一個持續的挑戰。構建內部活動的管道仍需要創造性的方法。

Operation Pathways is the Army's operational approach to campaign and build interior lines. With more than 20,000 forces forward-deployed for regional exercises each year, the U.S. Army is layering in the people, supplies, equipment, connectivity and leadership to improve the joint force's ability to collect, sustain, command and control, and protect. In 2022 and 2023, Operation Pathways has focused on sustainment. In 2022, the Army built activity sets, a versatile counterpart to Army pre-positioned stocks, to increase equipment and supplies in theater. We used Army watercraft to support joint and multinational forces across the western Pacific. And we employed Army Prepositioned Stock-3—our afloat stocks—for the first time since establishment in two Philippines-based exercises.

作戰行動路徑演習是陸軍戰役接近路線和內線作戰的形式。美國陸軍每年都會前置部署超過兩萬名部隊進行地區演習，並透過持續投入的人力、補給、裝備、通信力與領導力等方面，以提高聯合部隊的情報蒐集、戰鬥持續力、指管以及保護能力。在 2022 年和 2023 年間，作戰行動路徑演習置重點於戰鬥持續力的維持。2022 年時陸軍為了預先部署的物資而建造了多功能設施，可讓陸軍預先部署庫存，以增加戰區的裝備和補給。我們在演習中使用了陸軍的船隻來支援西太平洋的聯合部隊與跨國部隊，並在菲律賓兩次的演習中首次建立並使用了陸軍預置的編號 3 庫存補給品(Stock-3)。

Operation Pathways 2023 expands our contested logistics capability. Working with the U.S. Army Materiel Command and the joint logistics enterprise, the 8th Theater Sustainment Command is directing six months of continuous operations across Southeast Asia, Australia and the island chains, culminating with joint logistics-over-the-shore at Exercise Talisman Sabre in Australia. Combined with advancements like the new U.S. Army Composite Watercraft Company in Japan and the Philippines' decision to expand Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement sites, Operation Pathways is laying interior lines groundwork through focused investments, actions and rehearsals that will improve every year.

2023 年作戰行動路徑演習突顯出我們備受爭議的後勤補給能力。第 8 戰區後勤司令部與美國陸軍裝備司令部與聯合後勤相關企業合作，指揮在東南亞、澳洲、以及島鏈上進行為期六個月的連續演習，最後在澳洲岸上的護身軍刀演習中執行岸上聯合後勤補給行動。結合日本新成立的美國陸軍複合船舶公司和菲律賓決定擴大《增強防務合作協議》等進展，作戰行動路徑演習正在透過逐年演習所累積的內線作戰方式的建立、集中資源、行動執行與演練。



Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment, plot coordinates during training near Helemano Military Reservation, Hawaii. (Credit: U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Miguel Pena)

第 11 野戰砲兵團第 2 營的士兵在夏威夷赫萊馬諾軍事訓練廠附近的訓練中繪製坐標。(圖片來源：美國陸軍/上士米格爾·佩納)

3. Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center

Established in 2022, the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC) is the Army's Indo-Pacific regional combat training center. It executes three annual rotations for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command-assigned forces: one across the Hawaiian archipelago, one in Arctic Alaska and one exportable rotation with an ally or partner west of the international date line. Each rotation enables units to train and fight in Indo-Pacific conditions.

三. JPMRC 聯合太平洋跨國戰備中心

聯合太平洋跨國戰備中心(JPMRC)成立於 2022 年，是陸軍在印太區域的作戰訓練中心。它每年可容納美國印太司令部指派的部隊執行三次輪訓的流路：一次在夏威夷群島進行輪換，一次在阿拉斯加北極地區進行，另一次是與國際換日線以西的盟友或合作國家提供境外輪訓。每次輪訓都使部隊能夠在印度、太平洋的環境條件下訓練。

More importantly, the JPMRC facilitates joint training to stress-test interservice proficiencies. At JPMRC 23-1 in Hawaii, joint forces practiced the Air Force's Agile Combat Employment concept, and the Army's 1st and 3rd Multi-Domain Task Forces exercised with the Marine Corps' new Marine Littoral Regiment. Generating readiness with the United States' allies and partners, the 25th Infantry Division also trained alongside Thai, Indonesian and Philippine forces from Oahu to the Army's massive Pohakuloa Training Area. JPMRC is also yielding unexpected gains. After the Army's first Arctic combat training center rotation in 2022, the Indian army relocated Yudh Abhyas, its annual army-to-army exercise with the 11th Airborne Division, to the Himalayas near India's border with China.

更重要的是，JPMRC 可以透過聯合演訓來測試跨軍種的抗壓性。在夏威夷的 JPMRC 23-1 號演習中，聯合部隊演練了空軍的敏捷作戰運用概念，而陸軍第一和第三多領域特遣部隊與海軍陸戰隊新型態的陸戰隊濱海團進行了演練。為了與美國的盟軍與合作國做好準備，第 25 步兵師與泰國、印尼和菲律賓部隊一起從歐胡島到陸軍龐大的波哈庫洛亞訓練區進行訓練。而 JPMRC 也取得了意想不到的收益，自 2022 年陸軍首次於北極作戰訓練中心輪訓後，印度陸軍與美國陸軍第 11 空降師的年度“戰爭準備”陸軍演習(Yudh Abhyas)，遷移至靠近印度與中國大陸邊境的喜馬拉雅山地區。

Throughout fiscal 2023, the U.S. Army is expanding training with allies—including South Korea, Japan and Australia—by networking their combat training centers with the JPMRC. We are also collaborating with partners seeking to build their own regional training centers.

在整個 2023 年美國陸軍正在透過 JPMRC 的訓練中心網路來擴大與韓國、日本和澳洲等盟國的訓練。此外，我們也與試圖建立自己訓練中心的夥伴合作。

4. Improved Combined Warfighting

Beyond the JPMRC, the Army is reshaping military exercises into better warfighting rehearsals. Australian Chief of Army Lt. Gen. Simon Stuart observed that multinational interoperability is complex. It requires mutual understanding of “how you force project, how you do logistics, and who’s going to contribute what to which part of any potential fight,” Stuart said—and that has to be practiced.

四. 強化聯合作戰職能

除了 JPMRC 之外，陸軍正在重塑軍事演習使其轉變為更好的作戰演練準備。澳洲陸軍參謀長西蒙·斯圖爾特中將指出，建構跨國協同作戰能力是非常複雜的。斯圖爾特表示，協調作戰能力需要相互理解對方如何兵力部署、如何執行後勤工作，以及誰將在未來的戰鬥做出貢獻，都是必須事前完成演練的。

In June, the theater army will recertify as a combined joint task force during U.S.-Australian Pacific Sentry 23, with Army Pacific overseeing joint combined operations. I Corps, Indo-Pacific Command’s operational Army command, will take this further in Talisman Sabre, as it leads a combined U.S.-Australian joint forcible entry operation across northern Australia. Other major exercises with treaty allies will undergo similar upgrades to realism and complexity this year, including Balikatan in the Philippines, Yama Sakura in Japan and Cobra Gold in Thailand.

6 月時，印太戰區內的陸軍部隊將在美澳太平洋哨兵演習 23 號期間重新進行聯合特遣隊驗證，並由太平洋陸軍負責督導一切聯合行動。印太司令部所屬的陸軍作戰指揮部第一軍，將在護身軍刀演習中進一步推進這一行動，領導美澳聯合部隊積極參與澳洲北部的演習行動。今年與結盟之同盟國的其他重大演習，也將針對模擬真實景況和複雜度進行類似的提升，包括與菲律賓的肩並肩演習、日本的山櫻花演習和泰國的金色眼鏡蛇演習。

5. LANPAC and IPACC

Allies and partners form the decisive counterweight to destabilizing forces in the region. Across the Indo-Pacific and Asia, armies are often the stabilizing institution. Partnering with them, the U.S. Army understands—and improves joint and national understanding of—regional security demands in a way only possible through persistent presence and engagement.

五. 太平洋地面部隊論壇(LANPAC)與印太陸軍參謀長會議(IPACC)

盟友與合作夥伴是抗衡地區內不穩定因素的關鍵力量。而在整個印太和亞洲地區，軍隊往往是穩定的力量。透過與他們的合作，美國陸軍了解並提高聯合與國家層面對地區安全的需求，而這種方式只有通過持續的部隊駐紮和交流才能實現。

Each year, the Army hosts two large regional forums: Land Forces Pacific (LANPAC) and the Indo-Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference. Following a 2022 post-COVID-19 relaunch, LANPAC 2023 will bring together allies and partners in Hawaii in May to address emerging changes to warfare. In September, the Indian and U.S. armies will co-host the chiefs conference, assembling the chief of staff and sergeant major of the Army's regional counterparts in New Delhi.

陸軍每年都會舉辦兩場大型區域論壇：太平洋地面部隊論壇(LANPAC)和印太地區高層將領論壇(IPACC)。繼 2022 年 COVID-19 疫情之後重新啟動後，LANPAC 2023 將於 5 月在夏威夷召集盟友與合作夥伴，以應對戰爭中出現的新變化。9 月時印度將和美國陸軍各級單位在新德里共同主辦印太陸軍參謀長會議，並召集地區陸軍的參謀長與士官長們與會。

These events foster shared ideas, strengthen relationships and address security concerns. They are a powerful message of unity and collective commitment, and a direct counter to China's efforts to fracture regional relationships and stability. In Asia, this land power network is the glue that binds the region's security architecture together.

這些活動促進共識、加強關係並提出相關的安全問題。傳遞了團結與集體承諾的重要性，也是對中共試圖破壞地區關係和穩定的直接反擊。在亞洲，這個與各國連結的陸權合作架構是將該地區的安全架構固定在一起的重要因素。



Soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 11th Airborne Division, drill with Indian army soldiers during an exercise in India. (Credit: U.S. Army/Benjamin Wilson)

美國第 11 空降師第 2 步兵旅戰鬥隊（空降旅）的士兵在印度舉行的一次演習中與印度陸軍士兵進行訓練。（圖片來源：美國陸軍/本傑明·威爾遜）

Pushing Back

Leon Trotsky, an initial member of the Soviet Politburo and Red Army creator, said, “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” We have chosen warfighting as our profession. We must prepare for war. We must talk unabashedly about war to better recognize if it is coming toward us. Nations are pushing back against coercive, authoritarian People’s Republic of China actions, and there is urgency in our counterparts’ eyes and voices as they describe China’s actions and their future fights. We must get positioned—geographically, physically, intellectually, emotionally—to fight war if it should come. And it may come. Individuals and nations before us thought world war couldn’t happen on their watch, and they paid dearly for it. By being ready for war, we do our part to deter it. But, as Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin frames integrated deterrence, our ultimate measure of success is no war. How do we know if we’re succeeding?

反制

前蘇聯政治局最初成員與紅軍建軍元老里昂·托洛斯基曾說：“你不一定對戰爭感興趣，但戰爭會對你感興趣。”我們已經選擇將戰爭當成我們的職業，所以我們就必須做好戰爭準備。我們須毫不掩飾的探討戰爭，以便更精準的判斷戰爭是否正向我們侵襲而來。各國正在反制中共的脅迫與獨裁行為，而我們的盟友在描述中國大陸的行動和未來的鬥爭時，眼神和聲音中都透露出緊迫感。我們必須在環境上、身體上、智力上、情感

上做好準備，以便在戰爭爆發時做好戰鬥準備，因為它隨時可能會到來。在歷史中認為世界大戰不會在他們的統治下發生的個人與國家，均為此付出了高昂的代價。透過為戰爭做好準備，我們盡自己的一份力量來阻止戰爭。但是，正如國防部長勞埃德·奧斯丁所制定的綜合威懾策略，我們衡量成功的最終標準是沒有戰爭，那麼我們如何知道我們是否成功？

Teamwork in Action

Watching the local news in Sydney, Australia, in early August last summer, I was struck by two sequential clips: the first was footage of the People's Republic of China launching missiles over Taiwan. Five landed in Japan's exclusive economic zone. In the second, I was standing with diplomatic and military leaders from 14 countries at a news conference in Sumatra, Indonesia, during Exercise Garuda Shield.

The latter was a clear expression of the teamwork that keeps the Indo-Pacific free and open. It stood in stark contrast to the People's Republic of China's actions after then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's Taiwan visit.

進行中的合作

去年八月初我在澳洲雪梨觀看當地新聞時，被兩則新聞片段所震撼：第一則是中共向台灣發射導彈的畫面，其中五枚落在日本經濟海域。第二則新聞是我與 14 個國家的外交和軍事領導人一起出席在印尼蘇門答臘島舉行的超級神鷹之盾演習期間的新聞發布會。

後者清楚地呈現了保持印太地區自由和開放的團隊合作。這與時任眾議院議長南希·佩洛西訪問中華民國後中共的行動形成鮮明對比。

Garuda Shield used to be a small bilateral exercise. In 2022, it evolved into a joint exercise with 4,000 forces representing 14 nations. It is but one example of a host of new multilateral initiatives. New Caledonia's Exercise Croix Du Sud 23 brought together the Blue Pacific nations of Oceania for the first time since the COVID-19 pandemic. Indonesia invited Thailand to participate in Garuda Shield 23. Later this year, Indian and Japanese forces will conduct their first exercise together in Japan.

嘉魯達之盾演習曾經僅是一項小型雙邊演習。2022 年時，它演變成由 14 個國家 4000 名部隊參加的聯合演習；這只是一系列新的多方合作例子之一。新喀里多尼亞的南十字演習第 23 號，首次在 COVID-19 疫情後凝聚了「藍色太平洋夥伴」。印尼邀請泰國參加「超級嘉魯達之盾 23 號」演習。2023 年後期印度與日本將在日本首次舉行聯合演習。

To me, this multilateral cooperation is the cornerstone of integrated deterrence. States are empowered to improve their sovereign defenses; they are strengthened from within a coalition. Countries have observed how the Ukrainians have outperformed the Russians. Many are eager to reap the same advantages. These ideas point to Western leanings, and they present us with important opportunities in the future of our regional relationships.

對我來說，這種多邊合作是綜合威懾的基礎。各國都有捍衛其主權的權利，並藉由結盟策略來強化彼此，藉此在同盟內部得到加強。諸多國家都觀察到烏克蘭人的表現優於俄羅斯人。許多人渴望獲得同樣的優勢，並樂於向西方各國取經，為我們未來在區域關係上提供了重要機遇。

The People's Republic of China's policy is "a constant search for leverage," a U.S. official told The Washington Post in February. Ours is contributing to a free and open Indo-Pacific, and we are living up to our promise. The U.S. Army is doing incredible things in Asia and the Indo-Pacific, but what we do in the next few years will chart our course for the next two decades. We have a big challenge ahead of us. We must do more, and I am confident the Army will deliver for the joint force and our nation.

一位美國官員二月份對《華盛頓郵報》表示，中共的政策是“不斷尋求超越的機會”。我們正在為自由開放的印太地區做出貢獻，並兌現我們的承諾。美國陸軍正在亞洲和印太地區做出各項創舉，但我們在未來幾年所做的事情將帶領我們未來二十年的走向。因此在面臨著巨大的挑戰下，我們必須做得更多，並且我相信陸軍將為聯合部隊和我們的國家做出貢獻。

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Gen. Charles Flynn assumed command of U.S. Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, in June 2021. Previously, he served as deputy chief of staff of the Army for operations, plans and training. He has served in a variety of command, staff and leadership positions from platoon leader to division commander, with many of those positions in the Indo-Pacific Theater. He holds a master's degree in national security and strategic studies from the U.S. Naval War College and a master's degree in joint campaign planning and strategy from the National Defense University.

查爾斯·弗林將軍於 2021 年 6 月擔任美國太平洋陸軍司令(位於夏威夷沙夫特堡)。此前，曾擔任陸軍副參謀長，負責作戰、計畫和訓練。曾任排長到師長等各項指揮、參謀和領導職務，其中許多職位都在印太戰區。他擁有美國海軍戰爭學院-國家安全和戰略研究碩士學位以及國防大學聯合戰役規劃和戰略碩士學位。