

## 中共使用武力之估算\*

### China's Calculus on the Use of Force:

### Futures, Costs, Benefits, Risks, and Goals

取材：美國國防大學專書彙編《跨越海峽：共軍攻臺之準備》

(Cross the Strait: China's Military Prepares for War with Taiwan)，2022年出版

作者：施道安(Andrew Scobell)中國大陸研究名譽研究員

譯者：劉宗翰

The People's Republic of China (PRC) considers Taiwan a rogue province—the last holdout from the long-suspended Chinese Civil War. Since 1979, the PRC has formally adopted a policy of “peaceful reunification” and officially embraced a strategy of political reconciliation with the island. Despite this significant change from the Mao Zedong—era mantra of “liberation,” it is noteworthy that the PRC's Communist rulers have refused to renounce the use of armed force to unify Taiwan with the mainland. Indeed, for decades the central warfighting scenario for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been the Taiwan Strait.

#### 前言

中國大陸將臺灣視為一個分離省份，為中國國共內戰中長期懸而未決的最後一塊拼圖，隨著時間推移，中國大陸在 1979 年以後對臺正式採取「和平統一」政策並採取政治和解策略。雖然這是從毛澤東時代堅持「解放臺灣」政策以來的重大改變，但值得注意的是，中共領導人從未放棄武力犯臺，以達成兩岸統一之目的。的確如此，因為數十年來，共軍的作戰核心想定仍是以臺海區域為主軸。

Most observers assume that, when it comes to Taiwan, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is gravely serious about optioning the use of armed force. Unification with Taiwan is a CCP central objective and the PLA's most important military objective.<sup>1</sup> Yet any use of armed force across the Taiwan Strait would entail a major military operation the likes of which the PLA has not conducted in more than 40 years. Moreover, four decades of mostly conciliatory and peaceful cross-strait ties have provided a foundation for an

\* 本文屬於公開出版品，無版權限制。

unprecedentedly vibrant and dense web of relations between the island and the mainland. These interactions have produced considerable prosperity and economic dynamism for the PRC.

大多數觀察家認為，中共在論及臺灣議題時往往都極為認真看待動武選項，因為兩岸統一為北京當局的核心目標及共軍最重要的軍事目標。<sup>1</sup>不過，只要是兩岸兵戎相見，都將引起重大的軍事衝突，況且共軍也已超過 40 年未進行此類戰爭。再者，超過 40 年的兩岸和解與和平關係，兩岸之間已建立前所未有的經貿合作及相互交織的關係網，中共也是這種蓬勃互動關係發展下的受益者。

Is Beijing prepared to use armed force against Taiwan in the 21st century? Under what circumstances Beijing might be prepared to use force across the strait? This chapter unpacks the assumption that Beijing is prepared to use armed force, considering the circumstances under which the PRC might use force, the ends force might serve, and how force might be employed. China's calculus regarding the use of force against Taiwan will be explored by considering five variables: alternative futures, costs, risks, benefits, and goals.

中共將在 21 世紀期間準備以武力統一臺灣嗎？在何種情況下，中共準備在臺海吹起戰爭號角？本文將探討中共對臺動武的各項假設前提，分析在何時準備動武、何時可能動武、動武欲達成何種目的，以及兵力如何部署。本文提出五項變數：不同樣貌的未來、成本、風險、利益、目標，作為中共考量對臺動武的因素。

This chapter adopts a medium- to long-term perspective (looking out 10 to 30 years) to assess Beijing's calculus of coercion against Taiwan. There are two main reasons for this perspective. First, the Taiwan issue is not likely to be resolved peacefully in the near term, and a cross-strait standoff will likely persist for decades. Both sides are adamant in their respective stances: Beijing is highly unlikely to renounce its claim on the island in the near future, and Taipei will almost certainly refuse to concede to the PRC's demands to unify under the auspices of the CCP. Second, neither Beijing nor Taipei is likely to engage in extreme behavior in the coming months or years because leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are currently operating in the domain of gains. In other words, at present, Beijing and Taipei both assess

---

<sup>1</sup> Bonnie S. Glaser, "The PLA Role in China's Taiwan Policymaking," in *PLA Influence on China's National Security Policymaking*, ed. Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 166.

that their own respective situations are acceptable, and neither is disposed to take costly actions that risk losing what they already possess.

本文以中、長期較長時間軸(展望 10 至 30 年)的觀點來評估中共對臺的脅迫算計，之所以用較長時間是因為有以下兩個主要原因：其一是臺灣問題無法在短期內獲得和平解決，而且兩岸對峙情況仍將可能持續數十年。在兩岸雙方立場都堅定不移情況下，中共不太可能在短期內放棄其主張，中華民國肯定會斷然拒絕中共所要求的「一國兩制」。其二是不管是兩岸雙方都不太可能在未來數月或數年期間做出極端行為，因為大家都共享臺海穩定所帶來的利得。換言之，當前兩岸認為維持現狀穩定為雙方可以接受的選項，也不想貿然挑起衝突讓現有利得化為烏有。

The chapter is organized into four sections. The first section sketches out the framework and approach employed, including assumptions, concepts, and definitions. The second section describes Beijing's grand strategy and outlines alternative futures for China. The third section builds on these alternative futures by exploring five alternative Taiwan Strait scenarios sketched out according to a range of possible cost-benefit calculations that Beijing might make. The final section offers some tentative conclusions.

本文區分四個部分：第一部分先說明本文採用的架構與方法，包含命題、定義及概念；第二部分指出中共大戰略與中共未來發展樣貌；第三部分為探討五個不同的臺海想定(架構於中共可能考量的成本與利益)，將分別出現在中共哪個樣貌的未來；第四部分為提出一些初步結論。

## Framework and Approach

This section first identifies fundamental assumptions and defines key terms and concepts. It then outlines a framework adapted from prospect theory to analyze China's calculus of coercion against Taiwan.

### 架構與方法

本部分先界定基本命題並定義關鍵詞彙和概念，接著採用前景理論架構來分析中共對臺的脅迫算計。

### Assumptions

This chapter makes four fundamental assumptions. First, it assumes that Taiwan will continue to be a high priority for the ruling CCP. Beijing classifies Taiwan as a “core interest” —the PRC's version of what the United States would label a “vital national security interest.”<sup>2</sup>This designation underscores the island's continuing central importance to the CCP and strongly suggests

that Beijing believes Taiwan is worth fighting for. Indeed, authoritative Chinese documents articulate this very position. The 2019 PRC Defense White Paper states, “China must be and will be reunited. . . . We [China] make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. . . . The PLA will resolutely defeat anyone attempting to separate Taiwan from China and safeguard national unity at all costs.”<sup>3</sup>

#### 四大假設

本文界定出四個根本命題：假設一，臺灣問題仍是中共主政下的高優先事項，北京當局將臺灣歸類為「核心利益」，這種認知比照美國所稱的「重大國家安全利益」，<sup>2</sup>也因為持續認定臺灣為重要的核心議題，所以相信值得為此不惜一戰。的確，中共官方文件也闡明此一立場，2019年《新時代的中國國防》白皮書指出，「中國必須統一，也必然統一……我們不承諾放棄使用武力，保留採取一切必要措施的選項……如果有人要把臺灣從中國分裂出去，中國軍隊將不惜一切代價，捍衛國家統一。」<sup>3</sup>

Second, this chapter assumes that the PRC’s political and military rulers are fundamentally rational within the bounds of their particular situational context.<sup>4</sup> However, all individuals possess cognitive biases; psychological factors, including perceptions and misperceptions, also play significant roles in decisionmaking.<sup>5</sup> While Taiwan clearly constitutes an emotional and even personal issue for CCP and PLA leaders, the regime’s approach to the issue is largely logical and pragmatic. Hence, decisions by the PRC’s senior political leadership about a course of action vis-à-vis Taiwan almost certainly will be made after weighing the perceived costs, benefits, and risks against the desired goal. Since regime perpetuation remains the highest priority, deliberations about the use of force against the island include consideration of the essentiality of such action to the continued rule by the CCP and the risks to the Party’s survival in the case of a serious military setback.

假設二，假設中共政軍高層領導在特定情境下都是理性行為者，<sup>4</sup>但無法排除的是每個人心中仍存在認知偏見、認同與否的心理因素，都將在決策過程中

<sup>2</sup> 習近平出席解放軍代表團全體會議，《人民網》，2014年3月12日，<<http://lianghui.people.com.cn/2014npc/n/2014/0312/c376707-24609511.html>>。

<sup>3</sup> State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “Section II: China’s Defensive National Defense Policy in the New Era,” in *China’s National Defense in the New Era* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2019), available at <[http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c\\_138253389.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm)>.

<sup>4</sup> Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man: Social and Rational* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957).

發揮重大作用。<sup>5</sup>雖然臺灣顯然對共黨及其領導人構成一種情感上甚至是個人目標的問題，但北京當局在處理這個問題上幾乎都是合乎邏輯並務實以對。因此，中共高層做出對臺行動方案的決策必定也是基於評估過成本、利益及風險等因素，由於維持共黨政權永久統治仍是最高優先要務，北京當局會審慎考量對臺動武是否會影響國內政權，以及發生嚴重軍事挫敗時是否會影響共黨存續。

Third, this chapter assumes that any decision to use military force against Taiwan will be made by the top echelon of CCP leaders. The PRC's senior political leadership has decided every significant employment of armed force since 1949, always pursuant to the wishes of the most prominent individual at the apex of the power structure. This includes Mao Zedong (1949–1976), Deng Xiaoping (1978–1989), Jiang Zemin (1989–2002), Hu Jintao (2002–2012), and Xi Jinping (2012–present). For the purposes of analytic elegance, this chapter treats PRC senior leadership as a unitary rational actor. However, this is not to say that multiple individuals and entities will not influence the outcome. Indeed, while the ultimate decision will be made at the top, this decision will almost certainly be made only after input from, or in consultation with, military leaders.<sup>6</sup>

假設三，假設任何動武決策都是由共黨領導高層所決定。中共政治領導高層自 1949 年以來就全權掌握軍隊的每一項重大部署，也就是決策架構取決於權力結構最頂端領導者的意圖，諸如毛澤東(1949 至 1976 年)、鄧小平(1949 至 1976 年)、江澤民(1978 至 1989 年)、胡錦濤(1989 至 2002 年)、習近平(2012 年迄今)等歷任領導人都是如此。本文為了獲致精確分析結果，將中共領導高層都視為理性行為者，但這並不是說其他的人或單位組織就不會影響結果，只是因為決策最後都是在高層產出，而且在做出決策之前幾乎肯定會先與軍事領導高層完成協商。<sup>6</sup>

Fourth, this chapter assumes that, under most circumstances, the PRC's military leaders will obey the orders of their political superiors and execute a campaign plan against Taiwan. Indeed, where Taiwan is concerned, “there is no evidence that the PLA has ever acted in contradiction to [CCP] orders.”<sup>7</sup> This dictum has certainly been the case for the largest military operations, including the dispatch of armed forces into Korea in 1950 and the invasion of

<sup>5</sup> Martie G. Haselton, Daniel Nettle, and Paul W. Andrews, “The Evolution of Cognitive Bias,” in *Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology*, ed. David M. Buss (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 724–746.

<sup>6</sup> Saunders and Scobell, *PLA Influence on China's National Security Policymaking*.



Vietnam in 1979.<sup>8</sup> The cases of the military being directed to restore order in the late 1960s during the most tumultuous phase of the Cultural Revolution and the PLA being ordered to clear the streets of Beijing in 1989 after weeks of popular protests are each complicated and convoluted. And yet, in both instances, once the paramount leader issued clear-cut orders, the armed forces obeyed.<sup>9</sup>

假設四，假設在大多數情況下，共軍領導高層都將遵守政治高層所下達對臺動武命令，這種絕不質疑的現象令人擔憂，因為目前沒有證據指出，共軍會有違背政治高層命令的時候，<sup>7</sup>尤其是在大型軍事行動上更是如此，諸如 1950 年為韓戰派兵、1979 年為越戰派兵。<sup>8</sup>至於在國內的案例上，在 1960 年代末最混亂的文化大革命期間，共軍接獲高層指示要恢復社會秩序，接著在 1989 年天安門事件時，共軍接獲指示要清除長達數週在街道抗議的群眾，雖然國內的任務都極為複雜又棘手，但只要高層一聲令下，共軍一定使命必達。<sup>9</sup>

### Definitions and Concepts

This chapter defines the use of armed force in expansive terms.<sup>10</sup> It does not require actual combat between the armed forces of two states, any loss of life, or a formal declaration of war.<sup>11</sup> An instance of the use of force involves the employment of overt military or paramilitary power, including the explicit credible threat of military or paramilitary action backed by troop movements, exercises, missile or artillery tests, or the construction or expansion of military installations at or beyond a state's boundaries.<sup>12</sup> This definition, as applied to China, is broader than actual warfighting and encompasses combat and noncombat actions by other elements of the PRC's armed forces, including the People's Armed Police, the China Coast Guard, and the People's Militia.

### 定義與概念

本文是以較寬鬆定義方式來界定使用武裝部隊，<sup>10</sup>也就是說兩國之間並不一定要發生實際戰鬥事件、任何人員傷亡或是正式宣戰。<sup>11</sup>使用武力的情況涉及運用公開軍事力量或準軍事力量，其中包含部隊集結移動、軍演、飛彈或火炮試

<sup>7</sup> Glaser, "The PLA Role in China's Taiwan Policymaking," 167.

<sup>8</sup> Andrew Scobell, *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapters 4, 6.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., chapters 5, 7.

<sup>10</sup> Andrew Scobell, "Reassessing China's Use of Military Force," in *The PLA Beyond Borders: Chinese Military Operations in Regional and Global Context*, ed. Joel Wuthnow et al. (Washington, DC: ND U Press, 2021), 183–197.

<sup>11</sup> Scobell, *China's Use of Military Force*, 10.

射，以及軍事設施在國內外的增建或擴張等，軍事或準軍事行動所呈現的明確威脅。<sup>12</sup>此處適用於中共的定義較實際作戰更為寬鬆，同時也涵蓋中共其他武裝部隊如武警、海警及海上民兵等戰鬥與非戰鬥行動。

According to this definition, it is clear that the PRC has been willing to use armed force against Taiwan on multiple occasions since 1949. The Taiwan Strait has been the location of battles and skirmishes, as well as artillery barrages and serial crises, across the decades. These crises have involved troop movements, military exercises, missile tests, and periodic credible threats of the use of violence.<sup>13</sup> This chapter, however, focuses on Beijing's decisionmaking calculus for launching major large-scale military operations against Taiwan. Lesser actions will receive only limited attention.

就本文定義而言，中共自 1949 年以來顯然多次願意對臺動武，因為過去數十年來，臺海區域一直是戰爭、小規模衝突、砲擊、飛彈危機等所在地，這些危機事件都涉及部隊集結移動、軍演、飛彈試射、定期明顯使用武力的威脅。<sup>13</sup>本文聚焦於中共對臺發動重大規模軍事行動的決策算計，暫不考慮各種零星行動所帶來的影響。

Beijing will weigh the anticipated costs of the use of armed force against Taiwan with the anticipated benefits. Political and military leaders will assume that achieving their objective concerning Taiwan will almost certainly incur significant costs, although expected costs may not be equivalent to actual costs. The costs could be material or nonmaterial. The former includes military costs (budgetary allocations for the effort, the human toll in personnel killed and wounded, and equipment and armaments destroyed), economic costs (direct and indirect via sanctions and changed partner behavior), and diplomatic costs (sanctions and damage to bilateral relations with a range of countries). Nonmaterial costs include the impact on the reputation of the Party or PLA in the eyes of the Chinese people. There might also be costs to China's image as a peaceable power outside of the country. The nonmaterial costs could be net positive or negative depending on the outcome of the operation. As for benefits, Beijing must consider what it currently possesses compared with possible future benefits. Beijing's decision to employ force against Taiwan

<sup>12</sup> Scobell, *China's Use of Military Force*, 9–10.

<sup>13</sup> Thomas E. Stolper, *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1985); and James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., *Crisis in the Taiwan Strait* (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1997).

would involve some form of cost-benefit analysis, although these assessments would be subjective, based on incomplete information, and prone to cognitive biases.

中共將權衡對臺動武的預期成本與利益，政軍領導高層認為奪取臺灣的目標必定會產生巨大成本，然預期成本可能不等同於實際成本，還要考慮實質與非實質成本，前者包含軍事成本(編列動武的國防預算，以利支應人員傷亡、裝備武器毀損後的人物力再生)、經濟成本(直接或非直接經濟制裁並改變經貿往來模式)、外交成本(受到他國制裁或損及與他國的雙邊關係)；後者包含影響共黨或共軍在中國大陸人民眼中的聲譽、中共對外界形塑愛好和平的大國形象，當然這種正面與負面的觀感是可以受人為操作。在利益考量上，中共須思考當前與未來臺海發生戰爭後的利得落差，一旦決定對臺動武，將牽扯某種程度的成本與利益分析，況且評估過程將是主觀的，因為會受到資訊不完全、認知偏見等影響。

### **Risk Management**

While a cost-benefit analysis would be a key component of any decisionmaking calculus about whether to launch a large-scale military campaign against Taiwan, it almost certainly would also involve some evaluation of the associated risks. A key factor would be the degree of military and political risk acceptable to PRC leaders. Such an assessment of risk would be situationally dependent and colored by the outlook of decisionmakers in Beijing at a particular point in time. Chinese leaders may be quite conservative and risk averse under some circumstances, while under other circumstances they may be more adventurous and risk acceptant. These risks are explored in five scenarios later in the chapter.

### **風險管理**

成本與利益分析攸關是否對臺發動大規模軍事戰役的決策算計，幾乎肯定將涉及一些相關風險之評估，其中關鍵因素之一是中共領導高層對政軍風險的接受程度，至於該風險之評估將視情況而定，而且中央決策者將受特定時間點的願景所影響。在某些情況下，中共領導高層或許會相當保守、規避風險，但在其他情況下，他們可能更喜歡冒險並接受風險，下文將探討五個想定所構成的風險程度。

A review of the PRC's use of armed force across the decades reveals that Beijing has long demonstrated a willingness to take calculated risks.<sup>14</sup>



However, that level of risk tolerance has fluctuated over time. This chapter uses prospect theory to explore China's calculus of coercion vis-à-vis Taiwan and of when, why, and how Beijing might use armed force against the island.

從中共數十年來動武的視角而言，吾人可以發現其長期以來都願意接受經評估過的風險，<sup>14</sup>不過，風險容忍度是隨著時間推移而變動。本文運用前景理論來探討中共對臺的脅迫算計，以及何時、為何及如何對臺動武。

Prospect theory suggests that an actor is more likely to be risk averse when operating in the domain of gains and risk acceptant when operating in the domain of losses.<sup>15</sup> In essence, individuals tend to fear losing something they already possess more than they value gaining something they do not have. Take, for example, the behavior of a gambler at a casino. An individual who is on a winning streak is often more cautious in subsequent wagers to protect his winnings. An individual who is on a losing streak, by contrast, is likely more daring in subsequent wagers to compensate for earlier losses. Of course, an individual on a winning streak could become overconfident and emboldened, while an individual after a string of losses could decide it is time to leave the casino.

前景理論指出，一個行為者在利得環境下很有可能會採取風險規避，而在利失環境下，很有可能會接受風險。<sup>15</sup>基本上，人都是傾向害怕失去現在所擁有的，反而較不重視去獲得所沒有的，我們可以列舉賭徒在賭場的例子，一個連贏好幾把的人通常會在之後的下注更為謹慎，以保住先前贏得的錢；相反地，一個連輸好幾把的人往往會會在之後的下注更為大膽，因為想要贏回先前輸的錢。當然，一個連贏的人將會變得過於自信與膽大妄為，一個連輸的人，可能會決定是時候該離開賭場了。

Whether it be the case of a casino gambler or of Beijing weighing a decision to use large-scale force in the Taiwan Strait, the psychological impact of an actor assessing whether he or she is operating in the domain of gains or in the domain of losses will be significant. Under most circumstances, Chinese leaders emphasize protecting what they already possess. In the domain of gains, Beijing may be risk averse and focused more on successfully deterring Taiwan from pursuing independence and sustaining regime perpetuation than

<sup>14</sup> Scobell, "Reassessing China's Use of Military Force"; and Allen S. Whiting, "China's Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan," *International Security* 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001), 103–131.

<sup>15</sup> Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," *Econometrica* 47, no. 2 (March 1979), 263–292.

on achieving unification.

無論是在賭場的賭徒或是中共權衡是否在臺海動用大規模武力，行為者自身在評估利得或利失時將深受心理因素所影響。所幸在大多數情況下，中共領導高層重視保護現在所擁有的，就利得而言，中共將追求風險規避並置重點於嚇阻臺獨，維持政權永久統治為優先，達成兩岸統一則為次之。

In a time of crisis or conflict, however, if Chinese leaders perceive that they have lost or are in imminent danger of losing what they already have, their coercive calculus regarding Taiwan would likely change. In the domain of losses—if Taiwan is assessed to be independent or almost independent, and/or if PRC regime survival is at stake—Beijing may be more disposed to risk using armed force to achieve unification or ratcheting up coercion to accelerate unification. Indeed, Chinese leaders do perceive that domestic political security and the status of Taiwan are intimately intertwined.<sup>16</sup> Hence, when in the domain of gains, Chinese leaders would focus on risk-averse strategies to perpetuate CCP rule, whereas in the domain of losses Chinese leaders would pursue risk-acceptant strategies aimed at ensuring CCP survival.

當處於危機或衝突時刻，若中共領導高層認知他們將失去所擁有的或面臨即將失去的危機，他們就有可能會改變對臺的脅迫算計。就利失而言，若臺灣即將或已宣布獨立，就會危及共黨的政權統治，則中共可能會更容易加速威脅兩岸須統一的進程，或是冒著動武之風險來實現兩岸統一。的確，中共領導高層認為國內政治安全與臺灣地位彼此密切相關。<sup>16</sup>總言之，在利得方面，中共領導高層重視風險規避策略，以利維持政權永久統治；在利失方面，中共領導高層將採取風險接受策略，以利確保政權之存續。

The logic of prospect theory is readily applicable to extreme situations, such as when an actor has recently experienced either a series of spectacular wins or devastating losses. In the China-Taiwan context, these extreme situations would occur during political-military crises and deliberations over whether to use large-scale armed force.<sup>17</sup> However, top-level Chinese leaders have more on the line concerning Taiwan than does a highstakes casino gambler—not only large sums of money but also sizable armed formations

---

<sup>16</sup> Timothy R. Heath, "The 'Holistic Security Concept': The Securitization of Policy and Increasing Risk of Militarized Crisis," *RAND Blog*, June 27, 2015, available at <<https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/06/the-holistic-security-concept-the-securitization.html>>.

and expensive military assets, as well as sustaining CCP rule.

前景理論的邏輯同樣也適用於極端情況，尤其是當一個行為者近期已歷經一連串的重大輸贏之後，套用在兩岸關係的背景，這些極端情況將發生在政軍危機與是否對臺大規模動武的審議中。<sup>17</sup>然而，中共領導高層對臺之關注更勝於高風險的賭場賭徒，因為不僅須投入巨額資金，還須維持大規模軍事編隊與所費不貲的軍事裝備，甚至也要維持共黨的統治威權。

This chapter adopts a modified version of Kai He's political survival prospect model in formulating two propositions.<sup>18</sup> First, when PRC leaders' political survival status is framed in the domain of gains, they are more likely to behave in an accommodating way and select risk-averse coercive courses of action (COAs) vis-à-vis Taiwan. Second, when PRC leaders' political survival status is framed in the domain of losses, they are more likely to behave in a coercive way and select risk-acceptant coercive COAs concerning Taiwan.

本文在制定兩項主張時採用何凱教授的政治存活前景模式(修改版)。<sup>18</sup>主張一，假設中共領導高層的政治存活地位為架構在利得，那他們通常就會以寬容方式行事並選擇風險規避的威懾行動方案。主張二，假設中共領導高層的政治存活地位為架構在利失，那他們通常就會以高壓方式行事並選擇風險接受的對臺行動方案。

Although no eventuality can be ruled out, Taiwan's leaders recognize that an extreme action or declaration would automatically trigger a harsh response from Beijing, which almost certainly would include the use of armed force. There is also always the possibility that a small step or series of incremental steps by Taipei may provoke the PRC. Yet Beijing would be reluctant to engage in any extreme action in the near term because Chinese leaders remain uncertain that using armed force against Taiwan would be successful. In other words, the risks are too great and the costs too high. The CCP is currently operating in the domain of gains, and hence, PRC leaders are risk averse and reluctant to incur costs associated with the use of armed force against Taiwan. At present, China's economy remains robust because the country seems to have weathered COVID-19 better than any other Great Power in the world, and the CCP enjoys strong popular support. Therefore,

<sup>17</sup> Kai He, *China's Crisis Behavior: Political Survival and Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

discussion about the increased likelihood of Beijing using force against the island in 2020 constituted stimulating but unsubstantiated speculation.<sup>19</sup>

雖然無法排除任何的可能結果，但臺灣領導高層理解偏激行動或宣布獨立，無疑將引起中共的強烈回應，幾乎可以肯定包含動武手段，甚至於臺灣一個小動作或是一連串漸進式舉動也都會激怒中共。然中共一定也不願意在短期內發起任何激進行動，因為領導高層仍不確定對臺動武是否會成功，也就是說風險與成本太高了。中共當前正享受利得所帶來的好處，因此領導高層傾向採取風險規避，也不願意付出對臺動武的高成本代價。當前中共經濟仍處於強勢，因為其似乎比任何其他大國更能因應新冠肺炎疫情，而且共黨政權也正享受著人民的大力支持，至於先前 2020 年中共對臺動武的說法，雖然引起高度關注，但現已證實是不實的傳聞。<sup>19</sup>

The mainland defense establishment is currently involved in a comprehensive reorganization and upgrading of weaponry and training; however, these transformations will take a decade or two to complete.<sup>20</sup> It is far too early for China's armed forces to be reaping the fruits of Xi's massive defense overhaul that was initiated in 2015. Commander in chief Xi's admonitions to the military to "fight and win informatized wars" remain aspirational. The PLA candidly acknowledges that it remains in the process of mechanization, with informatization as the next challenge.<sup>21</sup> Ongoing organizational restructuring is necessary but insufficient to realize this goal: more inputs must be incorporated, and more time needs to elapse. China's military has embraced a "system of systems approach"<sup>22</sup> as it plans for a future of conducting "integrated joint operations," whereby the PLA will master "very complex combinations of systems and subsystems to [be able to] kinetically or non-kinetically defeat or paralyze key point nodes in enemy operational systems all within the enemy's decision cycle."<sup>23</sup> Hence, the PLA would prefer to postpone military action against Taiwan at least until the 2030s. Of course, circumstances could change; if Beijing assesses that its situation has become bleak, then CCP and PLA leaders could become more risk

---

<sup>19</sup> Tim Willasey-Wilsey, "The Question: Why Would China Not Invade Taiwan Now?" *Military Review* 100, no. 5 (September–October 2020), 6–9. The essay originally appeared June 4, 2020, in the *Cipher Brief*, available at <<https://www.thecipherbrief.com/thequestion-why-would-china-not-invade-taiwan-now>>. For a more plausible analysis, see Dan Blumenthal, "Is China Getting Ready to Start a War over Taiwan?" *The National Interest*, October 29, 2020, available at <<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/china-getting-ready-start-war-over-taiwan-171611>>.



acceptant.

中共近期的國防建軍涉及全面改組、提升武器裝備及精進訓練，不過完成這個轉型過程需要 10 或 20 年的時間。<sup>20</sup>現階段要談到共軍在習近平 2015 年啟動軍改後所獲致的成果，似乎還言之過早，而且習近平對共軍寄予的期望是「打贏資訊化戰爭」。共軍也坦承目前仍處於機械化的過程中，至於下一項挑戰則是資訊化。<sup>21</sup>共軍當前組織再造是必要的，但不足以達成資訊化的目標，仍需更多的投入，也需時間的醞釀。共軍在規劃未來「一體化聯合作戰」時，已採取「系統體系的方法」，<sup>22</sup>這意味著軍隊須精通「非常複雜的系統和子系統之組合，才能在敵決策循環中，以動能或非動能手段擊敗或癱瘓敵作戰系統中的關鍵節點。」<sup>23</sup>鑑此，共軍可能傾向將對臺軍事行動至少推延至 2030 年以後；然而，情況也有可能改變，只要北京當局評估情況已變得不如預期，那麼中共領導高層及黨中央可能會變成更傾向接受相關風險。

### Beijing's Grand Strategy and Alternative China Futures

PRC political and military leaders are best characterized as ambitious alarmists, focused on the medium and long term.<sup>24</sup> While conventional scholarly wisdom defines Beijing's paramount goal as regime survival, this term is rather misleading in ordinary circumstances.<sup>25</sup> The word survival implies that the mindset of China's Communist rulers is one of desperation—that they are fearful of near-term collapse or being overthrown. This could be so in a crisis or conflict situation as noted above. But in ordinary circumstances, CCP leaders are less worried about the end coming next week, next month, or next year than they are about being able to meet the challenges of the medium and long term. While day-to-day vigilance is essential, CCP leaders are consumed with regime perpetuation, which means paying considerable attention to planning. If CCP leaders were consumed with immediate threats, why would they put so much effort into formulating and implementing multiyear over-the-horizon planning in areas ranging from economics and technology to national defense?

<sup>20</sup> Andrew Scobell et al., *China's Grand Strategy: Trends, Trajectories, and Long-Term Competition* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020), 96.

<sup>21</sup> Michael S. Chase et al., *China's Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015). See also Andrew Scobell, "China's Post-Pandemic Future: Wuhan Wobbly?" *War on the Rocks*, February 3, 2021, available at <<https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/chinas-post-covid-futurewuhan-wobbly/>>.

<sup>22</sup> Jeffrey Engstrom, *Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese People's Liberation Army Seeks to Wage Modern Warfare* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018).

<sup>23</sup> Scobell et al., *China's Grand Strategy*, 85.

## 中共大戰略與中共不同樣貌的未來

中共政軍領導高層的顯著特徵是充滿野心的杞人憂天者，並將重點置於中、長期的規劃。<sup>24</sup>傳統學術見解將中共首要目標定義為「政權存續」，惟這個詞語在一般情況下可能會產生誤導。<sup>25</sup>「存續」這個詞彙代表中共統治者心態是絕望的，這表示他們害怕近期内政權崩解或被推翻，也就是說在面對危機或衝突情況也是不安的。在一般情況下，共黨領導高層較不擔憂短期像是下週、下個月或明年度會發生的問題，反而較為重視如何因應中、長期的挑戰。雖然日常的警覺性確有必要，但領導高層主要是忙於維繫政權永久性，也須付出更大心力於整體規劃上，如果說他們只顧眼前的立即威脅，那麼為何要花大量精力在制定並實施多年制的各項計畫，範圍從經濟、科技到國防領域不等呢？

The PRC possesses a grand strategy, defined as “the process by which a state relates long-term ends to means under the rubric of an overarching and enduring vision to advance the national interest.”<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, adoption of this long-term view does not imply that there is no near-term possibility of military action against Taiwan. Indeed, the dynamics and factors discussed in this chapter will also be in play in the coming few years. Yet, as long as its calculus of coercion regarding Taiwan remains in the domain of gains, Beijing is unlikely to decide to use armed force against the island—and the near-term outlook seems relatively positive.

中共擁有「大戰略」，我們可以將之定義為「在整體與長久願景架構下，一個國家將長期目的與手段結合的過程，以利促進國家利益。」<sup>26</sup>不過，中共領導高層的這種長期觀點，並非意味著近期内沒有對臺動武的打算。事實上，下文將討論的動態與因素，也代表未來幾年可能發生的情況。好在只要對臺脅迫算計仍架構於利得上，中共就不太可能決定對臺動武，至少就近期來看是相對樂觀的。

In thinking about China's long-term future out to 2050, it is useful to consider a range of scenarios depending on the degree of success Beijing might have in executing its grand strategy. China's grand strategy since 2004 can be labeled national rejuvenation.<sup>27</sup> Beijing has four strategic priorities that have been consistent across the decades: maintaining political control and

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 25–26.

<sup>25</sup> John W. Garver, *China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

<sup>26</sup> Scobell et al., *China's Grand Strategy*, 5.

social stability, sustaining economic growth, advancing science and technology, and modernizing the national defense establishment.<sup>28</sup> Broad targets have been identified in each of these areas to be attained in the coming decades.<sup>29</sup> In national defense, the target is the PLA becoming a “world-class military” by midcentury. As M. Taylor Fravel notes, this does not mean “being the single best” but rather “to be among the best.”<sup>30</sup> In Beijing’s eyes, the gold standard for a world-class military is the U.S. Armed Forces. Being a true peer or near-peer competitor of the U.S. national defense establishment is therefore the overarching goal.

吾人在思考中共未來到 2050 年的長期規劃時，有用的作法是以北京當局在大戰略中各項目標的達成度而設計的一系列想定，而且自 2004 年以來，中共將「國家復興」定調為大戰略的目標之一。<sup>27</sup>中共從數十年來就一直存在四個戰略優先事項：一、維持政治控制與社會穩定；二、維持經濟成長；三、促進科技；四、國防建設現代化，<sup>28</sup>同時各優先事項中的大目標也已律定要在未來數十年內完成。<sup>29</sup>在國防領域的大目標是將共軍在本世紀中葉建設成為「世界一流軍隊」，誠如傅泰林教授所言，共軍願景不只是成為區域中最強的，而是要擠入世界軍隊的前段班。<sup>30</sup>在中共眼中，世界一流軍隊的表率是美軍，而且在國防建設的總體目標是上要真正趕上美軍，甚至到最後能並駕齊驅。

Recent RAND research has sketched out four alternative futures depending on how successful CCP leaders would be in achieving their grand strategic goals in the coming decades.<sup>31</sup> In a triumphant China future, Beijing is remarkably successful in realizing its grand strategy. In an ascendant China future, Beijing is successful in achieving many, but not all, of the goals of its grand strategy. In a stagnant China future, Beijing fails to achieve its longterm goals. In an imploding China future, Beijing is besieged by a multitude of problems that threaten the existence of the Communist regime. Currently, Beijing appears to be on an ascending China trajectory, although the specter of a stagnant China may be looming. Whatever the future holds for China, central to Beijing’s calculus of coercion toward Taiwan will be the level of risk it is prepared to tolerate and the costs it is willing to accept versus the perceived

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 17–18.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 18–19.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., chapters 3, 4, 5.

<sup>30</sup> M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s ‘World-Class Military’ Ambitions: Origins and Implications,” *The Washington Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (2020), 85–99, quotes on 85.

benefit. Risk tolerance and cost acceptance will likely fluctuate according to the degree of success that China achieves in realizing its grand strategic goals.

近期智庫蘭德公司的研究報告指出，中共在未來數十年的四個可能不同樣貌的未來，這取決於領導高層達成大戰略中各項目標的多寡。<sup>31</sup>在勝利的未來中，中共在實現大戰略上做得相當成功；在崛起的未來中，中共將達成許多但非全部大戰略中的各項目標；在停滯的未來中，中共將無法實現長期目標；在內部緊繃的未來，中共將深陷眾多威脅共黨政權的問題。近期，雖然中共整體經濟處於往上升的趨勢，但蕭條停滯的言論仍是甚囂塵上。不管中共將走向哪種未來，其對臺的脅迫算計將視對風險容忍度而定，以及在付出成本與所獲利益之間的權衡考量。至於風險容忍度與成本接受度將與中共實現多少大戰略中各項目標一起連動。

### Targeting Taiwan? Alternative Cross-Strait Scenarios

Unification with Taiwan is implicitly part and parcel of the PRC fully attaining its grand strategy of national rejuvenation, although no explicit deadline or timeline has been identified for realizing this outcome.<sup>32</sup> In the meantime, maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, which entails deterring any perceived steps by Taiwan toward de jure independence, is a high priority. Beijing thus has little motivation to resort to a major use of armed force. Status quo, however, is defined differently by each of the major actors in this drama—China, Taiwan, and the United States. But, objectively speaking, each actor has been responsible for some related change. In the 1990s and the 2000s, change was driven by developments on the island: democratization and efforts by political leaders to expand Taiwan's international space. In the 2010s, particularly the latter part of that decade, the change came from the United States, as Washington gradually sought to enhance its relationship with Taipei in official and quasi-official ways. Will it be the PRC's turn to drive change in the 2020s and beyond?

### 直指臺灣？不同樣貌的臺海想定

兩岸統一意味著中共可以完全實現大戰略中的國家復興目標，只是這個目標並未有確切時間或時間表，<sup>32</sup>於此同時，維持臺海現狀並嚇阻任何走向法理臺

<sup>31</sup> Scobell et al., *China's Grand Strategy*, 102–111.

<sup>32</sup> 中國共產黨第十九次全國代表大會報告，2017年10月28日，<[http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zt\\_topic19/zywj/201710/20171002661169.shtml](http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zt_topic19/zywj/201710/20171002661169.shtml)>。



獨的任何舉動是中共的高優先事項，也因為如此，中共缺少對臺大規模動武的動機。不過，所謂的現狀在中共、中華民國及美國等眼中都有各自定義與解讀，整體而言，美「中」臺三方是臺海關係變化的關鍵者。在 1990 年代與 2000 年代，中華民國的現狀發展是其民選政治領導人不斷拓展臺灣的國際空間，到了 2010 年代，特別是在 2010 年至 2020 年間，美國的轉變是逐步提升美臺間的官方與準官方關係，然目前尚不清楚的是 2020 年以後是否輪到中共發生轉變了？

Unsurprisingly, the PRC has never been a completely passive actor across the decades. Yet, from Beijing's perspective, it has been quite consistent and unwavering in its approach to the island. Beijing believes that change has been instigated by Taiwan and the United States, while "change" on its part has been only in reaction to actions by Taipei or Washington. Nevertheless, the PRC itself has changed, if only by growing economically stronger and more militarily powerful. As a result, the China-Taiwan balance of power has become ever more skewed in favor of the PRC. If significant change in the cross-strait status quo occurs during the 2020s or in subsequent decades, it would likely be triggered by Beijing.

毫不令人意外的是，中共在過去數十年來從來都不是一位被動者，從北京當局自身觀點來看，中共對臺政策一直是相當一致且堅定不移。中共認為現狀改變是由美臺雙方所煽動，至於「中」方的改變是為了因應美臺雙方的片面行動。再者，中共本身也發生改變，經濟與軍事都變得愈來愈強大，所以兩岸權力平衡的天秤已逐漸偏向中共，這意味著在 2020 年之後的數十年，兩岸現狀若發生重大變化，極有可能是北京所引起。

To explore Beijing's calculus on the launch of a large-scale military campaign against Taiwan in a more concrete manner, it is useful to examine five specific scenarios, considering for each the levels of benefit and cost, Beijing's risk propensity in conjunction with alternative Chinese future, and possible outcomes (see table 1). The five notional scenarios—each framed in terms of relative cost and benefit accruing to Beijing—are: (1) low cost/high benefit; (2) high cost/high benefit; (3) low cost/no benefit; (4) very high cost/low benefit; (5) ultimate cost/no benefit.

為了以更具體方式探討中共對臺發動大規模軍事戰役的算計，吾人可以檢視五種不同想定並從中思考各想定中的利益與成本，以及中共在不同樣貌未來中的風險傾向和可能結果（參見表 1）。以下五個想定為從中共立場所設定的成

本與利益之關係：一、低成本／高利益；二、高成本／高利益；三、低成本／無利益；四、很高成本／低利益；五、最高成本／無利益。

Beijing's priorities and goals vis-à-vis Taiwan are likely to vary according to the alternative future China follows. Thus, the level of risk PRC rulers are prepared to entertain (see table 2) and the cost-benefit assessment they make (see table 1) will likely depend on the future scenario in which they find themselves.

中共對臺的優先事項與目標將根據不同樣貌的未來而有所不同，所以領導高層將面對不同的風險程度（參見表 1），以及不同樣貌的未來將呈現出不同的成本與利益考量（參見表 2）。

**Table 1. Unification by Force: Cost/Benefit, Futures, Scenarios, and Military Campaigns**

| BENEFIT<br>(unification) | COST                                                                          |                                                                        |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                          | LOW                                                                           | HIGH                                                                   |
| ACHIEVED                 | TRIUMPHANT FUTURE<br>Taiwan succumbs to coercion without a major use of force | ASCENDANT FUTURE<br>Scenario 1<br>INVASION                             |
| FAILURE                  | STAGNANT FUTURE<br>Scenario 2<br>BLOCKADE                                     | IMPLODING FUTURE<br>Scenario 3 and Scenario 4<br>FIRESTRIKE/FIRESTRIKE |

表 1 武統：成本/利益、未來樣貌、想定及軍事戰役

| 統一成本<br>統一利益 | 低                  | 高                                       |
|--------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| 達成           | 勝利的未來<br>• 不戰而屈人之兵 | 崛起的未來<br>• 想定一：侵臺                       |
| 失敗           | 停滯的未來<br>• 想定二：封鎖  | 內部緊繃的未來<br>• 想定三：火力打擊(展示)<br>• 想定四：火力打擊 |

**Table 2. Beijing's Calculus of Coercion Against Taiwan: Priorities, Goals, and Risks**

| FUTURE     | PRIORITY | GOAL         | RISK PROPENSITY |
|------------|----------|--------------|-----------------|
| Triumphant | Top      | Solve        | Risk averse     |
| Ascendant  | High     | Compel/Solve | Risk tolerant   |
| Stagnant   | Medium   | Deter/Manage | Risk tolerant   |
| Imploding  | Low      | Distract     | Risk acceptant  |

表 2 中共對臺威脅算計：優先事項、目標及風險

|         |      |       |      |
|---------|------|-------|------|
| 未來的貌樣   | 優先事項 | 目標    | 風險傾向 |
| 勝利的未來   | 很高   | 解決    | 風險規避 |
| 崛起的未來   | 高    | 逼迫／解決 | 風險容忍 |
| 停滯的未來   | 中    | 嚇阻／管理 | 風險容忍 |
| 內部緊繃的未來 | 低    | 分化    | 風險接受 |

**Scenario 1: Low Cost/High Benefit**

This scenario would most likely play out in a future in which the CCP achieves stunning success in attaining its grand strategic objectives. A triumphant China would view unrealized unification with Taiwan as especially frustrating.<sup>33</sup> However, in this scenario, cross-strait unification could occur peacefully if Taipei concludes that further stalling or resistance is futile in the face of an overwhelming and growing imbalance of hard power in favor of Beijing. PRC assurances, if credible, could make this undesirable outcome more acceptable to the people of Taiwan.<sup>34</sup> In a triumphant future, achieving complete national unification would be a top CCP priority, although Beijing would tend to be risk averse. Hence, if Taipei did not readily accept outright peaceful reunification, then PRC leaders would intensify an array of measures, including using the military, paramilitary, and nonmilitary means to coerce (or persuade) Taiwan into accepting unification. These measures would not involve largescale use of armed force. Rather, this effort would constitute a whole-of-government and whole-of-society COA conducted entirely below the threshold of actual military conflict. From Beijing's perspective, this would be a low cost/maximum benefit COA (see table 1). Beijing might also consider this COA low risk because it would conclude that the United States, Japan, and

other countries would be hesitant to confront an extremely powerful and triumphant China. Moreover, Taipei might harbor grave doubts over whether third countries would continue to back the island and thus would be more likely to succumb to Beijing's coercion.

#### 想定一：低成本／高利益

該想定最有可能發生的情況是中共成功達成大戰略中的各項目標，在勝利的未來中，如未能達成兩岸統一的目標將特別令人受挫。<sup>33</sup>不過，在這種想定下，如果臺灣認為中共具壓倒性的硬實力優勢，進一步遲滯或抵抗都可能徒勞無功，則兩岸和平統一是有可能是發生；再者，若中共對臺承諾為人民所信，將更可能發生這種不樂見的結果。<sup>34</sup>在勝利的未來中，達成兩岸統一目標將是共黨的最高優先事項，只不過北京當局仍是傾向風險規避作法。因此，臺灣若不接受和平統一方案，中共就會加強一系列措施，像是使用軍事、準軍事和非軍事手段來威嚇(或勸服)臺灣接受此方案。雖然這些措施不會涉及大規模動武，但態樣將是在未達實際軍事衝突下動員整個政府與社會的行動方案。就中共的觀點而言，這是屬於低成本／高利益的行動方案（參見表 1）。北京當局採取這個行動方案是因為風險程度低，況且美國、日本及其他國家在面對一個既強大又成功的中共時將有所忌憚。至於臺灣可能會嚴重懷疑第三方國家是否會提供支援，或是它們也有可能屈服於中共的威嚇之下。

#### Scenario 2: High Cost/High Benefit

This scenario would most likely unfold if Beijing were able to achieve many, but not all, of its grand strategic goals. For an ascendant China future, unrealized unification with Taiwan would almost certainly be near the top of the agenda (see table 2). Taiwan would be “a significant source of frustration” across the decades as the PRC approached midcentury.<sup>35</sup> CCP leaders would feel considerable self-imposed pressure to complete national unification, especially as high-profile commemorations approached, notably the centenary of the PLA and the PRC in 2027 and 2049, respectively. This latter date would carry special psychological weight because of Xi's designation of midcentury as the deadline for realizing national rejuvenation. While popular expectations could likely be managed, top CCP leaders could feel psychologically burdened by their own failure to deliver on a prominent and publicly announced

<sup>33</sup> Scobell et al., *China's Grand Strategy*, 105.

<sup>34</sup> Phillip C. Saunders and Scott L. Kastner, “Bridge over Troubled Water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement,” *International Security* 33, no. 4 (Spring 2009), 87–114.



commitment. Hence, there could be a sense of urgency to compel Taipei to accept unification, and Beijing might be risk tolerant (see table 2) and prepared to bear considerable costs (see table 1) to achieve the goal.

### 想定二：高成本／高利益

該想定最有可能發生的情況是中共達成許多但並非全部大戰略中的各項目標。在崛起的未來中，兩岸統一幾乎肯定是接近議程的首要事項（參見表 2）。隨著時間逐步邁入本世紀中葉，未能統一臺灣將成為中共數十年來的一個重大挫敗，<sup>35</sup>領導高層在兩岸統一進程上也會備感壓力，尤其是 2027 年共軍建軍百年與 2049 年中共建國百年的高規格紀念活動即將來臨。2049 年的期程之所以讓人更有心理壓力，是因為習近平將本世紀中葉(2050 年)訂為實現兩岸統一的時間點。雖然公開的預期不一定就是把話說死，但共黨領導高層可能會因為無法兌現公開承諾而產生一定的心理壓力。因此，可能會有一種迫切感要讓臺灣接受兩岸統一，北京可能成為風險容忍者（參見表 2），並準備接受巨大成本（參見表 1）來達成目標。

Chinese leaders might conclude that the prospects for unification were promising enough to seek final resolution via invasion. Under such circumstances, Beijing could be ready to pay a high cost, and PRC civilian and military leaders might be more prepared to solve the Taiwan issue once and for all. In other words, Beijing would aim to seize control of the island via armed force. As a top priority, PRC and PLA leaders would be willing to accept a high price for attaining the goal—including significant military losses, considerable damage to the Chinese economy, and diplomatic ostracism.

中共高層可能會得出結論認為可望達成統一前景，進而尋求入侵臺灣的解決方案。在這種情況之下，中共可能準備付出高成本，軍文職領導高層也可能會接受可以一勞永逸解決臺灣的方案，意即藉由動武方案來奪取對臺灣本島的控制權。由於是高優先事項，政軍領導高層將願意接受高成本代價來達成目標，包含重大軍事損失、經濟重挫及外交官員遭驅逐。

However, while significant costs in blood and treasure would be acceptable in the event of success, Beijing would be wary of risking a high-profile military catastrophe because top leaders would worry that this could call into question their judgment within a key constituency—the PLA. This uncertainty could mean that all campaign options would be on the table

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 107.

and that Chinese leaders would be prepared to engage in a protracted military effort to achieve unification. Yet Beijing could begin with less risky military operations and gradually increase the costs of resistance to Taipei.<sup>36</sup> This method could include a military operation to seize one of Taiwan's offshore islands. Beijing could then ratchet up military operations to a blockade and then a fire strike campaign.

不過，重大的人員死傷與財政損失只要能換來勝利，這一切都是值得的，但中共仍須警惕國內可能會發生一場軍事災難，因為對臺動武反對者可能會引發一連串批評共軍的連鎖效應。軍事行動選項將為中共帶來許多不確定性，領導高層也須準備好在進行武力統一方案時，將面臨臺灣的持久抵抗。中共可以從風險較低的軍事行動開始，之後慢慢增加對臺的軍事行動成本，<sup>36</sup>像是奪取臺灣的外離島，作法是先封鎖島嶼後再進行火力打擊。

### **Scenario 3: Low Cost/No Benefit**

This scenario would likely take place in a stagnant China future. In such circumstances, unification with Taiwan would be less of a priority (see table 2) since Beijing would confront a considerable number of other serious challenges. Nevertheless, the island's continued de facto independent status would remain a matter of "frustration."<sup>37</sup> Beijing would likely be inclined to manage cross-strait relations while staying alert to a Taipei tempted to opportunistically exploit the CCP's difficulties to move closer to independence. This situation could prompt Beijing to be risk tolerant (see table 2) while undertaking low-cost coercive actions (see table 1). The goal would be to deter Taipei from moving toward independence and work to manage cross-strait relations (see table 2). Under such circumstances, the CCP would be most likely to launch coercive activities below the threshold of war, including stepping up military exercises and missile tests in the vicinity of Taiwan, increasing incursions into the island's waters and airspace, and conducting multiple barrages of cyber attacks against the island.

#### **想定三：低成本／無利益**

該想定最有可能發生在內部緊繃的未來，而在這種情況下，兩岸統一的優

<sup>36</sup> Statement of Lonnie Henley, *PLA Operational Concepts and Centers of Gravity in a Taiwan Conflict*, Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on Cross-Strait Deterrence, February 18, 2021, available at <[https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/Lonnie\\_Henley\\_Testimony.pdf](https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/Lonnie_Henley_Testimony.pdf)>.

先順序會往後排（參見表 2），因為中共須先處理相當多的嚴重挑戰，至於臺灣保持事實上的獨立，對中共將是一種挫敗。<sup>37</sup>中共在管理兩岸關係的模式會變成警告臺灣不要趁共黨內部動盪之際伺機走向獨立立場。這種情況也會讓中共成為風險容忍者並採取較低成本的威懾行動（參見表 1），旨在嚇阻臺灣走向獨立並藉此管理兩岸關係（參見表 2），這時候中共最有可能發動未達戰爭程度的威懾活動，諸如在臺灣周遭舉行軍演、試射飛彈，增加闖入臺灣海、空域的次數，以及對臺灣發起一連串的網路攻擊。

These PRC provocations would likely generate alarm and anger in Taiwan and heighten concern in Washington that Beijing might gear up for large-scale military action against the island. In response, the United States would issue stern public and private warnings to Beijing and ramp up its air and naval presence in the vicinity while urging restraint to Taipei. In the face of this U.S. response, if Taipei refrained from high-profile pro-independence actions and inflammatory pro-independence rhetoric, the PRC would be unlikely to escalate. Indeed, Beijing would likely wind down its provocations and declare victory. The PRC would claim that it had successfully deterred separatists in Taipei from achieving independence, similar to how Beijing declared victory following the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.<sup>38</sup> Yet in reality, the benefits achieved and costs incurred would be low (see table 1): no tangible progress on unification but no major costs in military hardware or casualties, along with a likely modest but discernible hit to China's already stagnant economy after weeks of elevated tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

中共這類挑釁行為將讓臺灣更為不滿並保持警戒，同時也會激起美國擔憂中共可能準備好對臺發起大規模軍事行動。作為因應，美國將對中共發出公開與私下的嚴正警告，並在臺海周邊進行海、空軍巡視，而臺灣在美國的聲援下，只要不採取高調的獨立舉動和煽動性言論，中共就不太可能讓情勢進一步升溫。中共會緩和其挑釁行為並高調聲稱此次勝利：成功遏制分離主義者從事獨立舉動，這種場景就像是在 1995 年至 1996 年臺海危機後的勝利宣示一樣。<sup>38</sup>這種作法實際上都屬於低利益與低成本（參見表 1）：結果為在兩岸統一進程上無實質進展，在軍事上也沒有裝備耗損與人員傷亡，此外，在數週臺海情勢緊張過後，中共原本已呈現停滯的經濟將更受到顯著影響。

<sup>37</sup> Scobell et al., *China's Grand Strategy*, 108.

<sup>38</sup> Andrew Scobell, "Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis," *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 2 (June 2000), 227–246.

#### Scenario 4: Very High Cost/Low Benefit

This scenario would likely play out in a future beset by daunting multiple crises at home and abroad. In an imploding China future, Taiwan would be a low priority for Beijing.<sup>39</sup> Emboldened by a mainland roiled by chronic chaos, Taipei could take steps that amount to a unilateral declaration of independence. Under these circumstances, Beijing's only alternative might be to respond with a large-scale use of armed force. PRC leaders would realize that doing so would be a high-risk (see table 2) and high-cost operation (see table 1). Beijing would perceive that the very survival of the regime was at stake and hence prepare to roll the dice. Launching a large-scale military operation against Taiwan would invite U.S. intervention. Given the level of chaos and turmoil within the borders of the PRC, the PLA would experience considerable challenges as it prepared to mount fire strikes and/or an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. These difficulties would delay preparations, and indicators of mobilization would probably be readily discernible to Taipei and Washington. As such, the armed forces of Taiwan and the United States would likely have a week or more of warning, giving them time to prepare for a Chinese attack.

#### 想定四：很高成本／低利益

該想定最有可能發生的情況是中共未來遭受國內外各種危機所困擾。在內部緊繃的未來中，中共會將臺灣問題列為低優先順序。<sup>39</sup>在中共深陷內部混亂之際，臺灣若在這個時候選擇單方面宣布獨立，這個舉動可能將碰觸北京當局底線並引發對臺大規模動武，雖然中共高層理解這麼做會付出高風險（參見表 2）與高成本軍事代價（參見表 1），但因為他們認知政權生存已岌岌可危，勢必將孤注一擲。不過，中共對臺大規模動武將引起美國干預，況且在內部處於動盪不安之際策動軍事打擊或兩棲登陸作戰，共軍勢必將面臨諸多挑戰，這些種種問題將遲滯共軍的戰備整備工作，而大規模動員跡象也在提醒美臺雙方須做好先期準備，所以美臺部隊將有數週或數週以上時間做好預備工作，爭取時間來防範中共入侵行動。

Thus, the potential for the PRC to be decisively defeated by the combined military responses of Taiwan and the United States would be high. The upshot could easily be regime collapse or the ouster of one or more top CCP leaders,

<sup>39</sup> Scobell et al., *China's Grand Strategy*, 109–111.



who would become the scapegoats of a colossal and humiliating military failure in the Taiwan Strait. The costs would be high in terms of military losses and domestic political fallout without any discernible benefit—save the regime just barely staving off collapse. Indeed, the scope and array of crises in an imploding future might overwhelm the regime and call into question the assumption of Beijing as a unitary actor. The pressures could fracture the Party and the armed forces. This future would generate considerable volatility in the outcomes and implications, which would be difficult to predict. In an imploding China with fractured political elites but a relatively unified PLA, the specter of a military coup could loom. A cohesive military could proclaim it was acting on behalf of the CCP and scapegoat the ousted political leadership for the cross-strait fiasco and political-economic morass.

在美臺部隊做好軍事準備的情況下，共軍吃下敗仗的機率非常高，最終結果將引發政權崩潰，或是一名或多名領導高層被迫下臺以示負責，這些人會成為臺海戰役失敗的代罪羔羊。所以，不管是在軍事損失成本與國內政治效應上都不會有好處，就算勉強維繫住政權，恐怕也搖搖欲墜。事實上，在內部緊繃的未來所出現的一系列危機，可能會壓垮政權並讓人質疑中共這個兩岸統一的假設與執行成效，壓力會在共黨與共軍內部炸鍋，未來的波動結果與影響將難以預測。在內部緊繃的未來中，若出現分裂的政治高層與意見相對一致的共軍高層，則不排除軍事政變正在醞釀中。一個具凝聚力的共軍高層可以假黨中央之名行事，並將那些被迫下臺的政治人物塑造成對臺戰爭失利與政經衰敗的頂罪者。

A more likely variant of this scenario would be deep fissures in both the CCP and the PLA, which would increase the potential for risk-prone behavior by one or more Chinese actors. Such a situation raises the real prospect of multiple armed factions deciding to launch missile strikes against Taiwan. This possibility is frighteningly plausible if Taipei decided to take advantage of a mainland in complete chaos to formally declare itself a separate and independent state, with heightened expectations that some third countries might be brave enough, in the face of a PRC in total disarray, to officially recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. In this variant, regime survival would be far more tenuous, and interventions by third countries would be highly plausible. These interventions could be prompted by the desire to secure loose nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles, stabilize conditions and contain

refugee outflows, seize territory, and/or carve out spheres of influence. Third-country interventions might be executed unilaterally, with little or no coordination between states, or they might be conducted multilaterally with close cooperation or coordination. Nevertheless, third-country interventions would not necessarily preclude the survival of a rump PRC.

該想定下的另一個可能情況為在共黨與共軍出現分裂後，出現一個或多個冒險主義的武裝派系，則這些贊成對臺動武立場者，可能引發對臺發射飛彈攻擊的真實場景。若臺灣決定趁中共內部混亂之際宣布獨立，同時也期待一些第三方國家無懼中共而正式承認臺灣是獨立國家的地位，這也是有可能發生的場景。在這種情況下，共黨政權的存活將極為脆弱，第三方國家介入支持臺灣也極有可能，相關介入作為有可能是鬆綁臺灣核武限制與發展彈道飛彈距離、穩定情勢、防範難民潮、瓜分領土及／或劃分勢力範圍。這種第三國家的干預可以是單方面執行，國家間很少或根本沒有協調合作，也可以是多方面執行，國家間在密切合作下執行。然而，第三方國家干預也不能排除會協助共黨的殘餘組織。

### **Scenario 5: Ultimate Cost/No Benefit**

This scenario would also likely happen in an imploding China future beset by daunting multiple crises at home and abroad. These circumstances would make unification with Taiwan a low priority for Beijing.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless, faced with specific developments in the Taiwan Strait, Beijing could feel pressure to use armed force. A plausible scenario would be a Beijing desperate to distract the Chinese people from upheaval at home. Rather than top leaders purposely launching a diversionary war, Beijing could initiate heightened provocations in the Taiwan Strait with the intention of keeping these acts below the threshold of war and avoiding the use of large-scale military operations.<sup>41</sup> PRC leaders would be risk acceptant in terms of the potential for unintended escalation (see table 2) because they would perceive themselves as operating in the domain of losses, with the survival of CCP rule on the line. The goal behind instigating provocations against Taiwan would be a desperate attempt to rally support for a regime in crisis and build a semblance of unity among disparate factions. Under these circumstances, however, PRC leaders would be reluctant to accept a high cost, especially in terms of military losses since the armed forces would be needed to deal with internal unrest.

### 想定五：最高成本／無利益

該想定最有可能發生在的內部緊繃的未來，中共遭逢國內外各種危機所困擾，在這種情況下，兩岸統一將成為中共的低優先順序。<sup>40</sup>不過，中共在國內不穩定之際若臺海出現特殊發展時，其在動武方面定將備感壓力。一個可能的場景是，北京與其拼命分散人民對國內動盪的注意力，還不如由領導高層發動一場轉移注意力的戰爭，可以在臺海發起挑釁並將這些行動維持在戰爭門檻以下，以利避免大規模軍事作戰情事發生。<sup>41</sup>在不預期的情勢升溫情況下，中共領導高層將成為風險接受者（參見表 2），因為他們認為共黨政權統治已處於岌岌可危的利失之中。至於中共對臺發起的挑釁主要是為了藉危機來爭取人民對政權支持，並佯裝不同派系間團結一致的假象。在這種情況下，中共領導高層將不願意接受高成本代價，特別是在軍事方面的損失，因為軍隊須優先用來應付內部的動盪。

In the end, Beijing could pay the ultimate cost without accruing any benefit (see table 1). Beijing would be playing an intricate two-level game: a provocation in the Taiwan Strait would not only aim to rally domestic constituencies around the flag but also seek to signal to external audiences in Taipei, Washington, and elsewhere not to trifle with a PRC in distress.<sup>42</sup> At the same time, with multiple major crises, Beijing would seek a low-cost action to preserve its forces and capabilities for other contingencies, and thus aim to avoid large-scale use of armed force. Despite Beijing's desire to keep actions in the Taiwan Strait at the level of a "diversionary spectacle,"<sup>43</sup> a series of miscalculations and misperceptions could trigger a set of action-reaction spirals that would escalate to a massive conventional conflict and perhaps even a nuclear exchange with the United States.<sup>44</sup> The result would almost certainly be the complete collapse of CCP rule.

最後，中共將面臨無利益可圖下還須付出最高成本（參見表 1）。北京當局打的如意算盤可能具有兩種意涵：在臺海的挑釁行為旨在獲得國內人民的支持，並向美臺雙方釋出訊息不要趁中共內部不穩時搞小動作。<sup>42</sup>在面對多重危機之際，中共將尋求低成本行動，以利保存軍隊戰力去因應其他的應急事件，同時也會避免大規模動武。儘管中共在臺海的各種行動旨在達到轉移國內人民的注意力，

<sup>40</sup> Scobell et al., *China's Grand Strategy*, 109–111.

<sup>41</sup> Amy Oakes, *Diversionary War: Domestic Unrest and International Conflict* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

<sup>42</sup> Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988), 427–460.

<sup>43</sup>但一不小心的誤判將引起不必要反應，致使情事升溫並引起大規模衝突，甚至不排除與美國爆發核戰的可能性，<sup>44</sup>最終結果幾乎可以肯定的說，中共的政權統治將因此崩潰。

## Conclusion

At the start of the third decade of the 21st century, three centenaries loomed for Beijing: those of the CCP in mid-2021, of the PLA in 2027, and of the PRC in 2049. Each of these commemorations serves not only as a celebration of regime accomplishments but also as a reminder of unfinished business. The issue of Taiwan was certainly the most significant piece of unfinished business in July 2021, and this sentiment will likely remain in August 2027, and perhaps in October 2049.

## 結論

在即將邁入 2030 年，中共已歷經 2021 年中的共黨成立 100 周年大會，後續將迎接 2027 年共軍建軍百年與 2049 年中共建國百年紀念活動，這三個紀念活動中的每一個除了慶祝政權的成就外，也是在提醒中共尚有未竟事業。在 2021 年中的共黨大會中，臺灣問題儼然成為未竟事業中的最重要工作，這種認知將可能會持續至 2027 年 8 月即將舉辦的共軍建軍百年大會，甚至一直持續至 2049 年建國百年大會。

A—if not the—key determinant in Taiwan's future will be the status of the PRC because Beijing's readiness to employ armed force against the island is likely to correlate with the CCP's perceived degree of success in achieving its grand strategic goals in the coming decades. The higher the level of overall success, the more willing Beijing will be to accept higher costs, but at the same time less willing to accept risk, to realize unification. Meanwhile, the greater the degree of failure in achieving its grand strategic goals, the less willing Beijing will be to accept higher costs but the more willing it will be to tolerate risk. Fortunately, the most ominous alternative Chinese futures for Taiwan are also the least likely: a triumphant China or an imploding China. In the former, Beijing could be prepared to use force no matter the cost, although

---

<sup>43</sup> Oakes, *Diversionary War*.

<sup>44</sup> Lonnie D. Henley, "War Control: Chinese Concepts of Escalation Management," in *Shaping China's Security Environment: The Role of the People's Liberation Army*, ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 81–104; Andrew Scobell, "Perception and Misperception in U.S.-China Relations," *Political Science Quarterly* 135, no. 4 (September 2020), 637–664.



PRC leadership is likely to be risk averse. In the latter, Beijing could be prepared to use force against the island and willing to take considerable risks to do so. Nevertheless, the most likely futures—an ascending China or a stagnant China—while less ominous for Taiwan, also hold significant peril for the island. In the former, Beijing could experience considerable pressure to “do something” about Taiwan and be risk tolerant. In the latter, Beijing would be risk tolerant and cost averse.

臺灣未來的關鍵決定性因素將視中共未來的貌樣而定，因為對臺動武的依據可能是北京當局在未來數十年間將成功達成多少大戰略中的各項目標。整體的成功度愈高，中共將愈有意願接受較高成本，而在兩岸統一上就較不願意成為風險接受者（改變現狀）；反過來說，大戰略中的各項目標達成度愈低，中共將愈不願意接受較高成本，將較傾向成為風險容忍者（維持現狀）。對臺灣而言，最不想看見的中共未來樣貌就是勝利與內部緊繃的未來，在前者情況下，儘管領導高層抱有風險規避想法，中共可能仍將不顧成本代價準備對臺動武；在後者情況下，中共願意冒險一搏準備對臺動武。不過，中共最有可能發生的未來樣貌是崛起與停滯的未來，這對臺灣至少相對好一點，但仍無法排除有重大風險的可能性，在前者情況下，中共將承受相當大的壓力要對臺灣做點什麼，但仍是抱持風險容忍態度；在後者情況下，中共除了抱持風險容忍態度外，也傾向成本規避。

Taiwan will certainly persist as a long-term regime priority, but Beijing's specific short-term goals vis-à-vis Taiwan will inevitably fluctuate according to changing conditions. The PRC's calculus of coercion against the island will be determined by how Beijing weighs costs, benefits, and risks against specific short-term goals. These assessments will change in the coming decades depending on the future trajectory of the PRC.

中共長期優先事項仍是臺灣問題，而對臺短期特定目標之所以隨著環境變化而有所改變，是因為對臺的脅迫算計取決於權衡特定短期目標中的成本、利益及風險等事項，然就未來數十年（長期）而言，中共呈現出何種貌樣的未來，將反應出這些評估事項的關係變化。

### 譯後語

本文在中共對臺動武之評估上主要是以長期觀點看待，先將中共的未來區分成四種不同樣貌：勝利的未來、崛起的未來、停滯的未來、內部緊繃的未來，並在各種不同未來樣貌中評估中共權衡成本與利益高低後，可能採取的行動與作法，這種質化分析法，可資國軍參考並運用於兵棋推演上。

臺海區域一直是戰爭熱點區之一，正所謂戰爭為國之大事，危及到國家興亡與人民生死，國軍建軍備戰不可不慎。臺灣擁有臺灣海峽天險在一定程度上得以嚇阻共軍不敢輕舉妄動，但在共軍已逐漸強化裝備武器、遠程打擊火力，這種優勢將逐漸消失，強化我國國防戰力與提升國防自主一刻都不容停歇。

中共領導人向來以大局為重，對於習近平而言，當前重點是妥處並改善美「中」關係、維持國內經濟成長、確保周邊環境和平穩定等，以利延續國家發展戰略機遇期，臺灣問題當前並非須迫切處理議題，只要不去碰觸北京當局底線，就不易引起中共對臺動武之迫切性。再者，就軍事面向而言，只要我國國防戰力讓共軍毫無勝算可言，民心士氣團結一致向外，這種有形與無形戰力就能成為一股有效嚇阻中共武力犯臺之力量。

### 作者簡介

Andrew Scobell is a distinguished fellow for China at the United States Institute of Peace. Previously, he was a senior political scientist at RAND. He was born in Hong Kong and earned a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. His recent publications include *China's Grand Strategy: Trends, Trajectories, Long-Term Competition* (RAND, 2020), *Command and Control in U.S. Naval Competition with China* (RAND, 2020), and *Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms* (NDU Press, 2019).

施道安為美國和平研究所中國大陸研究名譽研究員，他先前為智庫蘭德公司的資深政治學家，出生於香港，擁有哥倫比亞大學政治學博士。近期出版品計有《中共大戰略：趨勢、路線及長期競爭》(蘭德 2020 年出版)、《美國與中共的海上指管競爭》(蘭德 2020 年出版)、《習近平再造共軍：評估中共軍事改革》(美國國防大學專書彙編 2019 年出版，第一篇第四章合著)。

### 譯者簡介

劉宗翰陸軍中校，國防大學管理學院 93 年班，政治大學外交系戰略所碩士；現服務於國防部政務辦公室史政編譯處，曾任《國防譯粹》月刊主編。