

烏克蘭及代理人戰爭：改善軍事決策中本質的缺陷 (UKRAINE AND PROXY WAR: IMPROVING ONTOLOGICAL SHORTCOMINGS IN MILITARY THINKING)

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IN BRIEF

Though often overlooked or misinterpreted, proxy war is an important component of armed conflict. Policymakers and practitioners must understand the nuance of proxy war to avoid making missteps in policy and practice.

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簡言之

雖然常被忽視或誤解，代理人戰爭是武裝衝突的重要組成。政策制定者和執行者必須了解代理人戰爭的細微差別，以避免在政策制定及執行過程中出現失誤。

A proxy war can take the form of the more-recognized traditional model or of the technology diffusion model. In the traditional model, a principal actor uses a proxy for the day-to-day rigors of combat against an enemy. But in the technology diffusion model, a principal actor provides its agent with financing, weapons, training and equipment

代理人戰爭，可分為較常見的傳統模式或科技擴散模式等兩種形態。在傳統模式中，主導者使用代理人來與敵人進行日常的血腥戰鬥。但在科技擴散模式中，主導者提供其代理人資金、武器、訓練和裝備。

Recognizing proxy war's subcategories, and not misidentifying them as either a coalition or an alliance, is crucial to crafting policy, strategy, plans and doctrine.

瞭解代理人戰爭的類別，而非將它們誤認為軍事合併或同盟，對於後續制定政策、戰略、計畫和準則都至關重要。



INTRODUCTION

Proxy war is an underappreciated component of warfare. In many cases, proxy war is omitted from discussions of international armed conflict, relegated to non-international armed conflict and the realm of non-state actors. This taxonomy is incorrect because it overlooks the ways in which state actors use other state actors, in addition to non-state actors, to engage in proxy war.

簡介

代理人戰爭是戰爭中被低估的重要組成。在許多以往案例中，代理人戰爭常在國際軍事衝突的討論中被忽略，而被錯誤的歸類為非國際等級和非國家行為者間的衝突行為。以上的歸類法是不正確的，因為它忽略了一個國家利用非國家行為者參與代理人戰爭。

Further, Western militaries and pundits alike tend to place proxy war in a category outside the bounds of acceptable practice. Instead, they often label proxy war a nefarious activity conducted by cynical strategic actors. To be sure, a quick scan of U.S. Army doctrine, for instance, yields scant mention of proxy war, and when proxy war is mentioned, it is applied to non-state actors and to how an adversary operates. This is also an incorrect categorization of proxy war.

此外，西方軍隊和權威人士都傾向於將代理人戰爭，歸類為常規作戰選項範圍外。相反的，他們經常將代理人戰爭歸類為由惡劣的戰略行為者所執行的邪惡活動。可以肯定的是，快速瀏覽美國陸軍準則，很少會提到代理人戰爭，而當有提到代理人戰爭時，它通常是在講述非國家行為者以及敵人如何作戰。這也是對代理人戰爭的錯誤分類。

These two ontological misconceptions are the primary factors derailing a clear understanding of how proxy war fits both within warfare and within war as a whole. The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War provides the defense and security studies communities a ripe opportunity to review their understanding of proxy war and to rectify ontological incongruencies.

這兩項本體論的誤解，使得我們無法正確理解代理人戰爭為何可同時歸類為各式戰爭的主要因素。仍在如火如荼進行中的俄烏戰爭，為正在研究國防安全之學術界提供了一個成熟的機會來檢視他們對代理人戰爭的理解，並糾正與本體論的不一致。

The Russo-Ukrainian War demonstrates that proxy wars are not solely the action of cynical, revanchist actors operating through non-state actors. Rather, it is a striking example of how state actors fight proxy wars through other state actors. To that end, multiple Western nations are engaged in a proxy war against Russia to support and defend democratic ideals, the rule of law and the international system. However, to see beyond proxy war's ontological misgivings, and square the circle, a solid theoretical foundation is required. This paper, building on existing proxy war literature, seeks to provide that foundation by introducing two forms of proxy war: the traditional model and the technology diffusion model. This paper builds on those two forms of proxy war and asserts that each form contains two subcategories: state actor and non-state actor. In short, this paper adds to the existing literature on proxy war by injecting four new named and categorized subjects into the field's taxonomy to overcome the ontological shortcomings of proxy war.

俄烏戰爭中完整展示了代理人戰爭，不僅僅是惡劣的復仇主義，其透過非國家行為者所運作的行為。反之，這展示了一個國家如何透過他國進行代理人戰爭的完美示範。也因此，多個西方國家正透過對俄羅斯發動代理人戰爭，來支持與捍衛民主制度、法治和國際體系。然而，要跳脫代理人戰爭的本體論疑慮，並修正錯誤理論，需要一個扎實的理論基礎。本文建立在現有代理人戰爭的基礎上，來介紹兩種形式的代理人戰爭：傳統模式和科技擴散的代理人戰爭模式。而在上述這兩種代理人戰爭的基礎上都包含兩項子類別：國家和非國家行為者。簡言之，本文藉由在該領域的分類中注入四個新的命名和分類主題來克服代理人戰爭的本體論缺陷。

PROXY WARS—A TAXONOMY

A proxy war is armed conflict, whether international armed conflict or non-international armed conflict, in which one side (or more) uses an intermediary as its primary combat force to achieve its strategic aims. Within proxy wars, five basic strategic relationships exist: coercive, exploitative, transactional, cultural or contractual. Those relationships guide the interaction between principal and proxy (see Figure 1). Further, the unique structure of each strategic relationship governs what a principal can expect from, and accomplish with, its proxy. These five relationships come to life in proxy war's two basic forms—the traditional model and the technology diffusion model (see Figure 2).

代理人戰爭-剖析說明

代理人戰爭是武裝衝突，不論是國際性還是非國際性的武裝衝突，一方（或多方）利用中間人作為其主要作戰力量來實現其戰略目標。在代理人戰爭中，存在五種基本戰略關係：強制型、開發型、特定事務型、文化背景型或條約關係型。這些關係引導了主導國和代理人之間的互動。（如圖一）另外，每項戰略關係的獨特結構決定了主導國可以從其代理人那裡獲取、並藉由它完成什麼樣的目標。上述這五種關係，都以代理人戰爭的兩種基本形式表現出來-傳統模式和科技擴散模式。（如圖二）

Relationship	Regulatory Tie	Regulatory Form of Power	Solidity of Bond	Proxy's Agency Costs	Proxy's Embrace of Risk	Example	Analysis
Coerced	Event-Type (Transactional)	Coerced Power	Weak	High	Low	U.S. and Afghan Security Forces	Use for simple, low-risk, short-term work.
Exploitative	Event-Type (Transactional)	Coerced Power	Weak	Medium	Medium	Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic with Russian armed forces	Use for simple, medium-risk, short-term work.
Cultural	State-Type (Kinship)	Legitimate Power	Strong	Low	High	Iraq-based Shia militia groups and Iran	Use for complicated, high-risk, long-term work.
Transactional	Event-Type (Transactional)	Expert Power	Strong	Medium	High	U.S. and Iraq security forces during counter-ISIS fight	Use for high-risk, task-oriented missions; short-term.
Contractual	Event-Type (Transactional)	Reward Power	Strong	Low	High	Russia and Wagner Group	Use for high-risk, task-oriented missions; short-term.
Deductions	Most ties are transaction based	Multiple forms of power animate proxies	The use of coercive power is a cause and effect of weakly bonded proxies	Strongly bonded proxies result in low agency costs	Strongly bonded proxies share high levels of risk		

Figure 1: Five Models of Proxy War (圖一 – 代理人戰爭的五種基本戰略關係，翻譯內容請參閱下表)

關係	約束關係	約束的權力種類	緊密程度	代理人所付出代價	代理國承擔風險	範例	分析
強制型	任務導向 (特定事務型)	強制約束力	弱	高度	低	美國&阿富汗安全部隊	執行較單純、低風險、短期任務
開發型	任務導向 (特定事務型)	強制約束力	弱	中度	中	頓涅茨克& 盧甘斯克共和國與俄羅斯軍隊的關係	執行較單純、中等風險、短期任務
文化背景型	扶持國家導向 (共同文化背景)	國對國的約束力量	強	低度	高	伊朗的什葉派民兵與伊朗的關係	執行高風險、長期任務
特定事務型	任務導向 (特定事務型)	技術指導約束力	強	中度	高	美國& 伊拉克安全部隊-打擊伊斯蘭國行動	執行較複雜、任務導向的任務、短期任務
條約型	任務導向 (特定事務型)	獎勵型約束力	強	低度	高	俄羅斯 & 瓦格納傭兵集團	執行較複雜、任務導向的任務、短期任務
上述代理人與主導國關係推論	以任務事務導向往來為主	以多種手段活躍頻繁的互動	兩者關係鬆散時，所付出代價較低	兩者關係緊密時，所付出代價較低	兩者緊密關係時，共同分擔高風險		





Figure 2: Two Forms of Proxy War (圖二 – 代理人戰爭的兩種基本形式，翻譯內容請參閱下圖)



TRADITIONAL MODEL

Proxy war's traditional model results from a principal actor using a proxy for the day-to-day rigors of combat against an enemy. This is the most common form of proxy war and what most people envision when "proxy war" is mentioned. The use of combat advisors, especially at the tactical level, is one of the primary indicators of this form of proxy war. Iran's use of Iraq-based Shia militia groups to combat the U.S. military during both *Operation Iraqi Freedom* and *Operation Inherent Resolve* are recent examples of this form of proxy war, something to which the U.S. military can easily relate.

傳統模式

代理人戰爭的傳統模式源於主要參與者使用代理人來應對與敵人的日常嚴酷戰鬥。這是代理人戰爭最常見的形式，也是大多數人在提到「代理人戰爭」時所設想的。投入軍事顧問團，特別是在戰術層面，是這種代理人戰爭形式的主要指標之一。在伊拉克的「自由行動」和「堅定決心行動」時，伊朗利用伊拉克什葉派民兵組織與美軍作戰，這是此種代理人戰爭形式的最新例子，美軍可以很容易地將其聯繫起來。

Two subcategories exist within the traditional model. The first subcategory occurs when a state actor uses a non-state actor as its proxy. This category aligns with the Iranian model described in the previous paragraph and is the most recognizable form of proxy war.

傳統模式中存在兩個子類別。第一個子類別發生在國家參與者使用非國家行為者作為其代理時。該類別與上一段中描述的伊朗模式一致，是最知名的代理人戰爭形式。

The second subcategory is less common than the previous, but still pervasive. The second subcategory results from a state actor enlisting another state actor as its proxy, whether explicitly or implicitly, to fight against a common foe. Although it is easy to confuse this subcategory as a coalition or an alliance, it differs in that the principal does not fight alongside the proxy; instead, it provides the proxy with combat support. Combat support often comes in the form of planning, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), targeting, strike and logistics. This category is also characterized by the use of combat advisors, although many of those combat advisors are far closer to the front or fulfill a dual role, both advising and carrying out combat support.

第二項子類別不如前一項子類別普遍，但仍常態性的存在。第二項子類別源於一個國家招募另一個國家作為其代理人，不論是明說的還是暗示的，來對抗共同的敵人。儘管這個子類別很容易被混淆為軍事合併或聯盟，其最大不同之處在於委託國並不與代理人並肩作戰；相反，它為其代理人提供戰鬥支援。戰鬥支援通常以計畫、情報、監視和偵察手段 (ISR)、目標、打擊和後勤的形式呈現。這一類別的另一個特點是使用軍事顧問團，儘管這些軍事顧問團中的許多人，離前線更接近或履行雙重角色，既提供專業建議又提供戰鬥支援。

As David Lake notes in a contemporary work on proxy war, the United States' support to the post-Saddam government of Iraq typifies this subcategory. In post-Saddam Iraq, the United States developed, financed, equipped and trained the Iraqi security forces. The United States then used the Iraqi security forces to combat Iranian interference in Iraq and to lead the U.S. effort to snuff out the growing post-Saddam insurgency. The Iraqi security forces fought alongside and, later, in front of U.S. forces during this war. That is not to say that the U.S. military did not conduct unilateral operations, because it did. However, as the war progressed, the U.S. military relied more on the Iraqis for combat operations and took a back seat, offering advice, training and logistical support.

正如大衛·萊克在其代理人戰爭的著作中所指出，美國對後海珊時期伊拉克政府的支持就是這項子類別的典型代表。後海珊時期的伊拉克政府，美國發展、資助、裝備和訓練伊拉克安全部隊。然後美國運用伊拉克安全部隊來打擊伊朗對伊拉克的干涉，並持續打擊伊拉克內部動亂。伊拉克安全部隊在這場戰爭中與美軍並肩作戰。這並不是說美軍沒有進行單邊行動，因為它確實這樣做了。然而，隨著戰爭的進行，美軍在作戰行動中更加依賴伊拉克，並逐漸轉為退居二線，提供建議、訓練和後勤支援。

Operation Inherent Resolve, on the other hand, also provides an example of the traditional model's state actor/state actor subcategory. Despite being outfitted with friendly terms and phrases such as "partner" and "advise and assist," the United States' operational and tactical level reliance on the Iraqi security forces to combat the Islamic State meets the definitional requirements of a proxy war. U.S. forces provided combat advisors and planning and logistics advisors, and they covered discrete capability gaps for the Iraqis, to include ISR, targeting and precision strike. All of these factors combine to meet the standard for a traditional principal-proxy relationship.

另一方面，「堅定決心行動」也提供了傳統模式的狀態參與者 / 狀態參與者子類別的案例。儘管配備了諸如「合作夥伴」和「建議及協助」等友好內容，但美國在作戰和戰術層面上對伊拉克安全部隊打擊伊斯蘭國的依賴，是符合代理人戰爭定義的要求。美軍提供作戰顧問、規劃和後勤顧問，他們為伊拉克人提供各種縮短能力差距的戰鬥支援，包括情監偵手段、目標定位和精確打擊。以上這些因素結合起來就可以滿足傳統委託代理關係的標準。

To reiterate, the traditional model is the most common form of proxy war. Within this model, two subcategories exist—one in which a state actor fights through a non-state actor, and the other in which a state actor fights through a state actor. It is important to remember that the state actor/non-

state actor subcategory can be mistaken as a coalition or an alliance, but proxy relationships are discernible by the degree to which participants share tactical and existential risk. In situations in which the risk is offloaded to one actor, and the other actor (or actors) remain(s) relatively clear of harm's way, the situation is likely a proxy war and not a coalition or an alliance.

再次重申，傳統模式是代理人戰爭最常見的形式。在這個模式中，存在兩項子類別-其一是國家通過非國家行為者進行戰鬥，另一個是國家通過國家進行戰鬥。重要的是，國家/非國家行為者子類別可能被誤認為是軍事合併或聯盟，但代理關係可以通過參與者分擔戰術和生存風險的程度來辨別。在風險轉移給一個參與者，而另一個參與者（或多個參與者）相對不受傷害的情況下，這種情況很可能是一場代理人戰爭，而不是軍事合併或聯盟。

TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION MODEL

The technology diffusion model is proxy war's second form. This model results from the principal providing its agent with financing, weapons, training and equipment instead of indirectly fighting through the proxy. This model is often a third-party actor's pragmatic response to the actions of an aggressor state against a weaker actor. Further, this form of proxy war is useful for opportunistic principals interested in seeing an adversarial state actor fail in a third-party conflict. The technology diffusion model is often indicated by operational and strategic combat advising, but also by the use of technical advisors. Technical advisors often operate in third-party countries and train and educate the proxy on the use of foreign-supplied equipment and weapons. The technology diffusion model also has two subcategories.

科技擴散模式

科技擴散模式是代理人戰爭的第二種形式。這種模式源於委託國向其代理人提供資金、武器、培訓和設備，而不是通過代理人間接對抗。這種模型通常是第三方參與者對攻擊者國家針對較弱參與者的行動的務實反應。此外，這種形式的代理人戰爭對於有興趣看到敵對國家在第三方衝突中失敗的機會主義主導國很有用。科技擴散模式通常通過作戰、戰略和戰鬥建議來指示，但也通過使用技術顧問來指示。技術顧問通常在第三方國家開展業務，並就使用外國提供的設備和武器對代理人進行培訓和教育。科技擴散模式也有兩項子類別。

The first subcategory is the result of a principal providing a non-state actor with financing, weapons, training and other equipment to combat an enemy, but not taking an active role in the fighting itself. This subcategory is fairly common. The United States' support for the mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979 – 1989) is perhaps one of the best-known examples of this model. The U.S. Stinger missile came to be seen as a meme of U.S. involvement in that war, as the Stinger missile decidedly assisted the mujahideen defeat of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Russia's support to the Taliban and its affiliates during the U.S. war in Afghanistan (2001 – 2021) is another example of this proxy arrangement.

第一個子類別是委託國向非國家行為者提供資金、武器、訓練和其他裝備以對抗敵人，但並未在戰鬥本身中發揮積極作用的結果。這個子類別相當普遍。美國在蘇阿戰爭（1979-1989）期間對聖戰士的支持可能是這種模式最著名的例子之一。在蘇阿戰爭期間美國所提供的刺針飛彈被視為美國參與該場戰爭的象徵，因為刺針飛彈強而有力地協助聖戰士擊敗了蘇聯。另外，俄羅斯在美國阿富汗戰爭（2001-2021 年）期間對塔利班及其附屬機構的支持是這種代理支持的另一個案例。

On the other hand, the second subcategory results from the principal providing another state actor with financing, weapons, training and other equipment to combat an enemy, but not taking an active role in fighting. From a historical standpoint, the United States' support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War (1980 – 1988) is an example of this situation. However, the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War is a more tangible illustration of this subcategory.

另一方面，第二項子類別是由於委託國向另一個國家提供資金、武器、訓練和其他設備來對抗敵人，但沒有在戰鬥中發揮積極作用。從歷史的角度來看，美國在兩伊戰爭（1980-1988）期間對伊拉克的支持就是這種情況的一個案例。然而，正在進行的俄羅斯-烏克蘭戰爭是這項子類別的一個更具體的例證。

From a technology diffusion standpoint, the United States has provided Ukraine with military aid exceeding \$4.6 billion since February 2022.¹⁹ As recently as 31 May 2022, President Biden reiterated the United States' commitment to Ukraine's survival and, conversely, the thwarting of Moscow's policy aims in Ukraine. The most recent aid package, valued at \$700 million, includes High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), towed 155 millimeter artillery, a panoply of unmanned aerial systems and a wide variety of other weapons and related equipment. Furthermore, American combat advisors trained Ukrainian soldiers in Germany on the use and upkeep of the U.S.-provided combat equipment, to include its towed artillery.

從科技擴散的角度來看，自 2022 年 2 月以來，美國向烏克蘭提供了超過 46 億美元的軍事援助。就在 2022 年 5 月 31 日，拜登總統重申了美國對烏克蘭生存的承諾，並挫敗了莫斯科對烏克蘭的針對性政策。最近的專案援助計畫價值 7 億美元，包括高機動多管火箭系統 (HIMARS)、牽引式 155 公厘火炮、無人機系統以及各種其他武器和相關設備。此外，美國作戰顧問還對駐德國的烏克蘭士兵進行了有關使用和維護美國提供的作戰裝備的培訓，包括其牽引火炮。

It is important to note that the donation of money, equipment and weapons does not necessarily equate to an actor engaging in proxy war. Stated or unstated, an actor's involvement meets proxy war criteria mainly based on the intent behind its contributions and the degree of its support. It is also important to remember that press releases, open-source documents and doctrines often obfuscate intent and methods and instead focus on communicating a narrative. To that end, because a state actor is *not* using the phrase “proxy war” does not mean that they are not engaged in that activity. In both cases, resource commitment and intent—not words—are the surest way to discern if an actor

has committed to a proxy war or if it is just providing a needy international actor with support.

需要注意的是捐贈經費、設備和武器並不一定等同於參與代理人戰爭的行為者。不論是否明示，參與者的參與是否符合代理人戰爭標準，主要基於其支援背後的意圖和支持程度。同樣重要的是要切記，新聞稿、公開資訊和論述通常會混淆實際上的意圖和方法，使大眾無法瞭解實況。為此，國家沒有使用「代理人戰爭」一詞並不意味著他們沒有參與該活動。在這兩種情況下，資源承諾和意圖—而不是語言—是辨別一個行為體是否致力於代理人戰爭，或者它是否只是為有需要的國際行為體提供支持的最可靠方法。

CONCLUSION

Proxy wars must always be at the fore of warfare studies because they dominate both international and non-international armed conflict. Further, proxy war's nuance is important to understand because misunderstandings can cue missteps, from the policy level all the way to the tactical level of war. Providing a clear taxonomy for proxy war, as this paper does, helps overcome ontological shortcomings that also contribute to poor showings in proxy war.

結論

代理人戰爭必須始終處於戰爭研究的最前線，因為它們主導著國際和非國際武裝衝突。另外，代理人戰爭的細微差別很重要，因為誤解可能會導致失誤，從政策層面直到戰爭的戰術層面。正如本文所論述，為代理人戰爭提供清晰的分類有助於克服本體論缺陷，這些缺陷也導致代理人戰爭表現不佳。

Looking to the future, as the international system continues to rely on a rules-based international order, the student of warfare should expect to see a few trends in future war. First, in cases in which maligned state actors attempt territorial conquest vis-à-vis another state, one should anticipate a pragmatic response from third-party actors. If the third party elects a proxy war strategy, one should expect it to employ the traditional model against adversaries that it expects to defeat relatively soon. However, if the third party assesses a longer, more costly war, but goes with a proxy strategy, one should anticipate the technology diffusion model (see Figure 3).

展望未來，隨著國際體系繼續依賴以現有規則為基礎的國際秩序，研究戰爭者應該會看到未來戰爭的一些趨勢。首先，在受到誹謗的國家試圖對另一個國家進行領土征服的情況下，人們應該期待第三方行為者的務實回應。如果第三方選擇代理人戰爭戰略，人們應該期望它使用傳統模式來對抗預計會很快擊敗的對手。但是，如果第三方評估了一場耗時更長、成本更高的戰爭，但卻採用了代理策略，則應該預測科技擴散模式。（如圖三）





Figure 3: Anticipated Applications (圖三 – 不同的預期心理下所套用的不同形式，翻譯內容請參閱下圖)



Second, the method of identifying a proxy is less a selection process than it is assessing the available actors and evaluating one's capacity to create a proxy from the groups of fighters, partisans or like-minded people, then being able to transition it into a coherent force that can be put in the field to combat an adversary. In most cases, proxy selection is pragmatic and dynamic—it is based on how available resources allow for the quickest solution.

其次，識別代理人的方法與其解釋為一個選擇過程，評估可用的參與者並評估一個人從戰士、游擊隊或志同道合的群體中創建代理人的能力，然後能夠將其轉變為可以在戰場上與對手周旋到底的力量。在大多數情況下，代理選擇是務實和動態的——它基於可用資源如何允許最快的解決方案。

Finally, the student of warfare must expect proxy wars to continue at a regular clip in the cycle of violence that permeates the modern world. Proxy war provides policymakers, strategists and practitioners with quick, relatively cheap and low-risk (to oneself) options for the continuation of policy aims. The flexibility of proxy war strategies means that they will remain at the fore of international and non-international armed conflict for the foreseeable future.

最後，戰爭研究學者應預期代理人戰爭會常態性地以粗暴的循環方式瀰漫於現代世界中。代理人戰爭為政策制定者、戰略家和軍事人員提供了快速、相對便宜和低風險（對自己而言）的選擇，以實現政策目標的延續。代理人戰爭戰略的靈活性意味著它們在可預見的未來，仍將處於國際和非國際武裝衝突的最前端。

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