

ADP 5-0 THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

Chapter 2 Planning

作戰規劃程序 第二章 計畫(上)

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To be practical, any plan must take account of the enemy's power to frustrate it; the best chance of overcoming such obstruction is to have a plan that can be easily varied to fit the circumstances met; to keep such adaptability, while still keeping the initiative, the best way is to operate along a line which offers alternative objectives. Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart

實際上，任何要挫敗敵人的計畫，都要考量到敵人的能力；掃除這些障礙的最佳機會，就是制定一套易於修正以面對各種狀況的計畫。想擁有這種能力，並保持主動創新，最佳作法就是把握這個原則，並尋求替代方案。李德哈特爵士

This chapter defines planning and describes the functions of planning and plans. It discusses planning at the levels of warfare, operational art, integrated planning, and key components of a plan. The chapter concludes with guides for effective planning and planning pitfalls to avoid.

本章對計畫加以定義，並敘述規劃與計畫的各項功能。這牽涉到交戰階層、作戰藝術、協同計畫，以及計畫的關鍵構成要素。本章內容還包括有效計畫的指導，以及有哪些必須規避的計畫陷阱。



FUNDAMENTALS OF PLANNING

計畫的基本原則

2-1. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and determining effective ways to bring that future about. Planning helps leaders understand situations; develop solutions to problems; direct, coordinate, and synchronize actions; prioritize efforts; and anticipate events. In its simplest form, planning helps leaders determine how to move from the current state of affairs to a more desirable future state while identifying potential opportunities and threats along the way.

2-1. **計畫是瞭解狀況、展望未來，並決定未來適當走向的藝術與科學。**計畫可以幫助指揮者瞭解狀況，想出問題解決方案，對行動進行指導、協調及同步，確認優先事項，並預判事件。以其最簡單的型態，計畫可以幫助指揮者，透過認清潛在機會與威脅，決定如何從現行狀態，推移到所望的未來狀態。

2-2. Planning is a continuous learning activity. While planning may start an iteration of the operations process, planning does not stop with the production of an order. During preparation and execution, the commander and staff continuously refine the order to account for changes in the situation. Subordinates and others provide assessments about what works, what does not work, and how the force can do things better. In some circumstances, commanders may determine that the current order (to include associated branches and sequels) no longer applies. In these instances, instead of modifying the current order, commanders reframe the problem and develop a new plan.

2-2. 計畫是一種持續學習的行動，將會啟動作戰程序之間的交互影響，故不會因命令產出後而終止。在準備與執行期間，指揮官與幕僚持續修正命令以因應狀況變化。下級單位及其他人對哪些有用、哪些沒用，以及部隊該怎麼精進任務執行提出評估。某些狀況下，指揮官會決定當前命令(包括相關應變計畫與後續計畫)已不再適用。這些情形下，指揮官就不再修正當前命令，而是重新評估問題，擬定新的計畫。

2-3. Planning may be highly structured, involving the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and others who develop a fully synchronized plan or order. Planning may also be less structured, involving a commander and selected staff who quickly determine a scheme of maneuver for a hasty attack. Sometimes the planned activity is quite specific with very clear goals. At other times, planning must first determine the activity and the goals. Planning is conducted along various planning horizons, depending on the echelon and circumstances. Some units may plan out to years and months, others out to days and hours.

2-3. 計畫可能具備高度結構化，包含指揮官、幕僚、下級指揮官以及其他相關人員，都被要求制定同步計畫與命令。計畫也可能很不結構性，牽涉相關指揮官和某些幕僚須很快就制定兵力運用計畫，以應付一次急迫的攻擊行動。有時，計畫好的行動會特別用來針對明確的目標；也有的時候，計畫必須先期決定採取何種行動與選定目標。計畫會根據階層與即時狀況，在不同範圍進行規劃。有些單位的計畫耗時數月或數年，有些則幾天或幾小

時就做出來。

2-4. Planning techniques and methods vary based on circumstances. Planners may plan forward, starting with the present conditions and laying out potential decisions and actions forward in time. Planners also plan in reverse, starting with the envisioned end state and working backward in time to the present. Planning methods may be analytical, as in the MDMP, or more systemic, as in the Army design methodology (ADM).

2-4. 規劃技術與方法，會依據狀況而有所不同。計畫人員可能會先期規劃，依據當前狀況，將可能的決定與行動事先做準備。他們也可能採逆序方式，以預想的最終戰果為基礎，在時間上反推回來決定現在要怎麼做。規劃方法是分析型的工具，就如同軍事決策程序(MDMP)，或是更具系統性的，像是軍隊設計方法論(Army design methodology, ADM)。

2-5. A product of planning is a plan or order—a directive for future action. Commanders issue plans and orders to subordinates to communicate their visualization of the operations and to direct action. Plans and orders synchronize the action of forces in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish the mission. They inform others outside the organization on how to cooperate and provide support.

2-5. 規劃的成果，就是計畫或命令——未來行動的指引。指揮官發布計畫與命令給下級，向他們傳達作戰構想與行動指導。計畫與命令使部隊行動在時間、空間、目標要協同一致，以達成任務。計畫與命令也應知會產生非建置內其他單位，如何配合或提供支援。

2-6. Plans and orders describe a situation, establish a task organization, lay out a concept of operations, assign tasks to subordinate units, and provide essential coordinating instructions. The plan serves as a foundation for which the force can rapidly adjust from based on changing circumstance. The measure of a good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned, but whether the plan facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events.

2-6. 計畫與命令旨在描述一種任務狀況、建立任務編組、制定作戰構想、分配任務給下級單位，並提供重要的協調指示事項。計畫也是部隊在瞬息萬變的環境下，能迅速調整作為的重要依據。衡量一個計畫好壞，不在於能規範相關作為，而在於當面對非預期事件時，所能採取的有效行動。

2-7. Plans and orders come in many forms and vary in the scope, complexity, and length of time they address. Generally, commanders and staffs develop an operation plan (OPLAN) well in advance of execution; it is not executed until directed. An OPLAN becomes an OPORD when directed for execution based on a specific time or event. A FRAGORD is an abbreviated form of an OPORD issued as needed to change or modify an OPORD during the conduct of operations. (See FM 6-0 for Army formats for plans and orders.)

2-7. 計畫與命令在不同範圍、不同複雜程度，以及所處的不同時間，會有不同表現方式。通常來說，指揮官和幕僚是在執行前，策劃一個作戰計畫(OPLAN)，而不是在上級指揮行動時才展開計畫。當接獲指示在特定時間或特定狀況下執行任務時，作戰計畫就變成



作戰命令。要旨命令(FRAGORD)是作戰命令的縮小型式，當戰況發展到需要改變或修正作戰命令時，視需要予以發布(請見FM 6-0，陸軍範本之計畫與命令)。

THE SCIENCE AND ART OF PLANNING 計畫之科學與藝術

Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point.

Antoine Henri de Jomini

後勤包含達成戰略及戰術計畫的諸般方法與準備工作。戰略決定在何處行動，後勤將部隊帶到這個地點。

安托萬-亨利·若米尼男爵

2-8. Planning is both a science and an art. Many aspects of military operations, such as movement rates, fuel consumption, and weapons effects, are quantifiable. They are part of the science of planning. The combination of forces, choice of tactics, and arrangement of activities belong to the art of planning. Soldiers often gain knowledge of the science of planning through institutional training and study. They gain understanding of the art of planning primarily through operational training and experience. Effective planners are grounded in both the science and the art of planning.

2-8.計畫不僅是科學，也是一種藝術。軍事作戰的許多方面，諸如移動速率、油料耗損，和武器效能，都是可以計量的。這些是計畫的科學部分。部隊任務編組、戰術行動選擇，以及各項準備工作則屬於計畫的藝術。軍事幹部學習計畫科學那部分的知識，經常是透過制度性的訓練與學習。他們要瞭解計畫的藝術，主要透過作戰訓練與經驗累積，一個卓越的計畫人員，在這兩方面都必須具備堅實的基礎。

2-9. The science of planning encompasses aspects of operations that can be measured and analyzed. These aspects include the physical capabilities of friendly and enemy organizations. The science of planning includes a realistic appreciation for time-distance factors; an understanding of how long it takes to initiate certain actions; the techniques and procedures used to accomplish planning tasks; and the terms and graphics that compose the language of military operations. While not easy, the science of planning is fairly straightforward.

2-9.計畫的科學特質，讓作戰的各方面都能加以計算和分析，包括我軍和敵軍的兵、火力和勤務支援能力。計畫的科學，包括時空因素的實際衡量、瞭解發起某些行動需要花多長時間、完成計畫任務所需的方法和程序，以及與軍事作戰語言相關的術語及表格。這些說不上是簡單的，但在計畫的科學部分，通常可以非常明確的表達。

2-10. Mastery of the science of planning is necessary for military professionals to understand the physical and procedural constraints under which units operate. These constraints include the effects of terrain, weather, and time on friendly and enemy forces. However-because combat is an intensely human activity-the solution to problems cannot be reduced to a formula. This realization

necessitates the study of the art of planning.

2-10.為了掌握計畫的科學精髓，軍事專業人員必須瞭解單位於作戰中，實體與程序的限制因素。這些限制因素包含所面對的地形、氣候與時間對敵我之影響。然而——因為戰鬥是一種激烈的人類本能行動——問題的解決方案不能夠簡化成一個方程式。這種研究領會，就需要對計畫的藝術有所鑽研。

2-11. The art of planning requires understanding the dynamic relationships among friendly forces, the threat, and other aspects of an OE during operations. It includes making decisions based on skilled judgment acquired from experience, training, study, imagination, and critical and creative thinking. Commanders apply judgment based on their knowledge and experience to select the right time and place to act, assign tasks, prioritize actions, and allocate resources. The art of planning involves the commander's willingness to accept risk.

2-11.計畫的藝術，需要瞭解我軍之間威脅因素，以及作戰過程中與作戰環境的各個面向的重要關係。這包括了需要以經驗、訓練、學習、想像力，以及批判性創新思維做基礎的精準判斷與決策。指揮官根據他們的知識與經驗，對於行動時間、地點、任務分配、優先行動，以及資源調派做出最適當判斷。計畫的藝術，還包括與指揮官願意承受的風險程度有關。

2-12. Planning requires creative application of doctrine, units, and resources. It requires a thorough knowledge and application of the fundamentals of unified land operations and the fundamentals of tactics. The art of planning involves developing plans within the commander's intent and planning guidance by choosing from interrelated options, including-

- Arrangement of activities in time, space, and purpose.
- Assignment of tactical mission tasks and tactical enabling tasks.
- Task organization of available forces and resource allocation.
- Choice and arrangement of control measures.
- Tempo.
- The risk the commander is willing to take.

2-12.計畫需要對準則、單位與資源，實施創造性的運用。它需要對整體地面作戰與戰術的基本原則徹底瞭解與運用。計畫的藝術，需要在指揮官意圖與計畫指引下，在相互關連的方案中做出抉擇，諸如：

- 行動時間、空間與目標的妥善安排。
- 戰術任務與陣中要務及先期行動的適當調配。
- 任務編組可用兵力與資源的妥善分配。
- 管控措施的選擇與安排。
- 行動節奏。
- 指揮官願意承受的風險。

2-13. These interrelated options define a starting point from which planners create distinct solutions to particular problems. Each solution involves a range of options. Each balances



competing demands and requires judgment. The variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (known as METT-TC) always combine to form a different set of circumstances. There are no checklists that adequately apply to every situation.

2-13. 這些相互關連的選項，對於計畫人員來說，代表的是對特定問題找出相對解決方案的起點。每一個方案都與一些範圍的選項有關，而每一個方案都要在需求與判斷之間取得平衡。任務、敵軍、地形、天候、可用部隊與支援、時間、民事考量等等(就是一般熟知的METT-TC)這些變動因素經常相互糾結，形成各種不同場景。沒有任何一張檢查表，可以適用於每一個不同狀況。

THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANNING

計畫的功能

I tell this story to illustrate the truth of the statement I heard long ago in the Army: Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

我把這些很久以前在部隊中聽到的故事說出來，就是要陳述一件事實：計畫沒什麼用，但規劃卻和每件事都有關連。

艾森豪總統

2-14. Imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the future are inherent in all planning. Planning cannot predict with precision how enemies will react or how civilians will respond during operations. Nonetheless, the understanding and learning that occurs during planning have great value. Even if units do not execute the plan exactly as envisioned-and few ever do-planning results in an improved understanding of the situation that facilitates future decision making. Planning and plans help leaders-

- Understand situations and develop solutions to problems.
- Task-organize the force and prioritize efforts.
- Direct, coordinate, and synchronize action.
- Anticipate events and adapt to changing circumstances.

2-14. 對未來不夠理解，以及妄加臆測，是所有計畫都會碰到的問題。計畫不能準確預判敵人會如何行動，或是作戰中民眾會有哪些反應。但是，在計畫過程中瞭解和學到的卻彌足珍貴。即使單位無法依照計畫確實執行——也很少單位可以完全做得到——計畫還是可以增進對狀況的理解，對未來決策大有幫助。計畫可以幫助指揮官：

- 瞭解狀況，擬定對策。
- 確定任務編組及優先事項。
- 針對行動進行指導、協調及同步行動。
- 預判事件發展、肆應環境變化。

UNDERSTAND SITUATIONS AND DEVELOP SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS

瞭解狀況，擬定對策

2-15. Planning helps commanders and staffs understand situations to include discerning the relationship of the operational and mission variable. Effective planning not only helps leaders understand the land domain, but it helps leaders understand how capabilities in the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains and the information environment impact operations on land and vice versa.

2-15.計畫可以協助指揮官及幕僚瞭解狀況，包含洞察作戰相關因素與任務變數。有效計畫不僅可以幫助領導人掌握地面狀況，還能知道空中、海上、太空、網路各不同領域的能力，以及資訊環境對地面作戰之衝擊，反之亦然。

2-16. Understanding the situation requires both analysis and synthesis. Analysis is the process of studying a situation by successively dividing it into parts and addressing each part in turn. For example, the initial stages of mission and IPB rely heavily on analysis. Understanding the parts of a situation is necessary; however, understanding the parts alone does not provide an appreciation of the relationships among the parts. That appreciation requires synthesis. Synthesis is thinking about how the parts of a situation work together as a whole rather than in isolation. As part of planning, the commander and staff synthesize results of mission analysis to make sense of the situation before developing COAs.

2-16.瞭解狀況必須同時進行分析與歸納。分析是將狀況分成各部分，並依次予以解讀。舉例來說，在任務發起和戰場情報準備(IPB)階段，就非常依賴分析工作。瞭解整體狀況的各個組成部分，是有必要的；然而，只瞭解各部分，並不能正確評估各部分之間的關係，這就需要歸納了。歸納是思考狀況，針對各部分要如何運作完整成為計畫的一部分，指揮官與幕僚經過分析與歸納，有利於在策劃行動方案(COAs)前，能夠理解整體狀況。

2-17. Planning also helps leaders identify problems and develop solutions to solve or manage those problems. Not all problems require the same level of planning. Leaders often identify simple problems immediately and quickly decide on a solution-sometimes on the spot. Planning is critical, however, when a problem is actually a set of interrelated issues, and the solution to each affects the others. For unfamiliar situations, planning offers ways to solve the complete set of problems as a whole. In general, the more complex a situation is, the more important and involved the planning effort becomes.

2-17.計畫也可以協助領導者確認問題及研擬方案，以利解決或管理問題。並非所有問題都需要同樣層級的計畫。指揮官經常在確認簡單的問題後，很快就能決定出因應方案——有時就當場下決心。計畫很重要，然而當某個問題糾結了一大堆相關小問題時，針對其中一個解決了，可能會影響到其他。若處於不甚熟悉的狀況下，完整計畫對解決整體狀況的困局，它可以提供方法處理。整體而言，情況越複雜，相關的計畫就變得越重要。

TASK-ORGANIZE THE FORCE AND PRIORITIZE EFFORTS

任務編組及確定優先事項

2-18. When developing their concept of operations, commanders first visualize the decisive



operation that directly accomplishes the mission. They then visualize how shaping and sustaining operations support the decisive operation. The decisive operation prioritizes effort and is the focal point around which the plan is developed. When developing associated tasks to subordinate units, commanders ensure subordinates have the capabilities and resources to accomplish their assigned tasks. They do this by task-organizing the force and establishing priorities of support. Commanders consider the following principles of war when task organizing the force and prioritizing efforts:

- Mass: concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time.
- Economy of force: allocate minimum-essential combat power to secondary efforts.
- Unity of command: for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.

2-18.當規劃作戰概念時，指揮官設想的第一件事，就是直接能完成任務的主要作戰方式。然後他會想到如何組織和維持主要作戰所需各種支援。當籌謀計畫時，主要作戰總是優先考量的焦點。至於對下級各部隊分派任務時，指揮官要確保所屬有足夠能力和資源完成所賦予之任務。指揮官藉著任務編組建立支援優先順序。當進行任務編組及確定優先次序時，指揮官會遵循以下的戰爭原則指導：

- 集中：將戰鬥部隊的效能集中於決戰地點及時間。
- 兵力節約：在次要作戰方面分配最小需求兵力。
- 統一指揮：對每一任務目標，確保歸於一個責任系統之下指揮。

2-19. Task-organizing is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADP 3-0). It includes providing assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. Some assets are retained under the commander's immediate control to retain flexibility to exploit opportunities or counter threats.

2-19.任務編組是構思編組的兵力、支援幕僚、特定規模的支援組合，以及其相關組成，以利特殊行動或任務之執行 (ADP 3-0)。這工作包括提供資源給下級指揮官，建立其指揮支援關係。部分資源還是在指揮官直接管制之下，以保持運用彈性，使隨時能掌握戰機因應威脅。

2-20. Task-organizing results in a **task organization—a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish particular mission**. The unit's task organization is stipulated in the base plan or order or addressed in Annex A (Task Organization) to the base plan or order. The OPLAN or OPORD also stipulates changes in the task organization by phase or event. During execution, commanders modify the task organization as required based on the situation through FRAGORDs. (See FM 6-0 for task organization formats in Army plans and orders.)

2-20.任務指派決定部隊任務編組——為執行特殊任務而臨時編成的部隊。單位任務編組是在計畫或命令中律定，或記錄於附件一(任務編組)中的計畫或命令。作戰計畫或作戰命令也明訂在不同階段或事件下，律定任務編組的調整方式。在執行期間，指揮官依據狀況透過要旨命令調整相關任務編組(請見FM 6-0 陸軍計畫命令下之任務編組格式)。

2-21. Commanders avoid exceeding the span of control of a subordinate headquarters when task-organizing. Span of control refers to the number of subordinate units under a single commander. This number is situation dependent and may vary. Allocating more units to subordinate commanders gives subordinates greater flexibility and increases options and combinations. However, increasing the number of subordinate units increases the number of decisions the commander must make, and that may decrease agility. Running estimates and COA analysis provide the information that helps commanders determine the best task organization to-

- Facilitate the commander's intent and concept of operations.
- Weight the decisive operation or main effort.
- Create effective combined arms teams.
- Retain flexibility to meet unforeseen events and support future operations.
- Allocate resources with minimum restrictions on their employment.

2-21.任務指派時，應該避免超過下級指揮部的管制幅度。管制幅度是指在單一指揮官之下，可以遂行指管的下屬單位數量。至於可以管制的單位數量有多少，視情況會有所不同。分派越多單位給下級指揮官，可以讓他有更大彈性、更多執行方案以及執行方式組合。然而，增加下級單位的數量，意謂指揮官就必須做更多決策，機動性可能因而降低。持續判斷與行動方案(COA)分析能提供資訊，協助指揮官決定最佳任務編組方式：

- 達成指揮官意圖及作戰構想。
- 權衡主要作戰方式及主戰場投入兵力。
- 建立有效能的聯合兵種部隊。
- 維持運用彈性，以應付突發狀況及支援未來作戰。
- 確保資源調配在運用上受到最小限制。

Army Command and Support Relationships

陸軍指揮與支援關係

2-22. Command and support relationships provide the basis for unity of command and are essential to the exercise of mission command. Army command relationships define command responsibility and authority. Army support relationships define the purpose, scope, and effect desired when one capability supports another. Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental to organizing for any operation.

2-22.指揮與支援關係為統一指揮之基礎，對執行任務指揮而言甚為重要。陸軍指揮關係對指揮責任與職權有所律定。陸軍支援關係則對支援的目的、範圍與所望效能有所規範。對任何軍事行動而言，建立明確的指揮與支援管制關係都至關重要。

2-23. Army command relationships define superior and subordinate relationships between unit commanders. By specifying a chain of command, command relationships unify effort and enable commanders to use subordinate forces with maximum flexibility. Army command relationships include-

- Organic.



- Assigned.
- Attached.
- Operational control.
- Tactical control.

2-23.陸軍指揮關係規定了各單位指揮官上級與下級的關係。指揮鏈的構成，讓指揮官可以實踐統一指揮，並擁有最大彈性去運用下級部隊。陸軍指揮關係包含：

- 建制。
- 編配。
- 配屬。
- 作戰管制。
- 戰術管制。

2-24. Army command relationships identify the authorities and degree of control of the gaining Army commander. For example, operational control gives gaining commanders the authority to assign missions and further task-organize forces placed under their operational control. Tactical control on the other hand, gives gaining commanders the authority to assign missions, but not further task-organize forces placed under their tactical control. The type of command relationship often relates to the expected longevity of the relationship between the headquarters involved and quickly identifies the administrative and logistic support that the gaining and losing Army commanders provide.

2-24.陸軍指揮關係對於陸軍指揮官所擁有的職權及管制程度有明確規定。舉例來說，作戰管制讓取得管制權的指揮官有分派任務的職權，並可將該任務編組單位置於其作戰管制之下。另一方面，戰術管制模式時，指揮官可以分派任務，但不能進一步將指派任務單位置於戰術管制之下。這種型態的指揮關係通常可以維持得比較久，也可以很快釐清該單位的行政與後勤支援，到底該由原單位，還是戰術管制單位來負責。

2-25. A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force on a temporary basis. Designating support relationships is an important aspect of mission command in that it provides a flexible means of establishing and changing priorities with minimal additional instruction. Army support relationships are-

- Direct support.
- General support.
- Reinforcing.
- General support-reinforcing.

2-25.所謂支援關係，是指在臨時需要的基礎上，相關單位可以提供協助、保護、補充或維持。指定支援關係在任務指揮方面是很重要的一種方式，它可以用比較彈性的作法，在最少補充指引的狀況下，建立或改變支援的優先順序。陸軍支援關係分別是：

- 直接支援。
- 一般支援。

- 增援。
- 一般支援並增援。

2-26. Each Army support relationship identifies specific authorities and their responsibilities between the supported and supporting units to include who has the authority to sustain, establish communication with, position, and set priorities for the supporting force. For example, an artillery unit in direct support of a maneuver unit is positioned and has priorities established by the maneuver unit. A sustainment unit in general support of multiple units is positioned and has priorities of support established by its parent unit.

2-26.陸軍支援關係將支援與被支援單位之間特殊職權與責任清楚規定，包括誰有維持、建立溝通管道、部署等職權，以及其支援優先次序。舉例來說，砲兵單位對機動部隊實施直接支援，其部署和其他優先事項，就必須以受支援的機動單位為主。若在一般支援情況下，支援單位如果同時對多個單位實施一般支援，其部署和優先事項則要聽令於其母體單位。

2-27. Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental to organizing for any operation. These relationships are doctrinally defined and establish clear responsibilities and authorities between subordinate and supporting units. Knowing the inherent responsibilities of each command and support relationship allows commanders to effectively organize their forces and helps supporting commanders understand their unit's role in the organizational structure. (See ADP 3-0 for a detailed discussion of Army command and support relationships.)

2-27.建立明確的指揮與支援關係，對任何作戰編組都很重要。這些關係在準則中都已針對所屬及支援單位的職權與責任清楚說明。瞭解每一種指揮與支援關係間的責任歸屬，可以讓指揮官更有效率地掌握其部隊，也讓支援單位指揮官更加確認其單位在整體組織架構中的角色（請見ADP 3-0陸軍指揮與支援關係細節討論）。

Prioritizing Effort 區分優先事項

2-28. In addition to task-organizing, commanders establish priorities of support during planning and shift priorities during execution as the situation requires. A priority of support is a priority set by the commander to ensure a subordinate unit has support in accordance with its relative importance to accomplish the mission. Priorities of movement, fires, sustainment, and protection all illustrate priorities of support that commanders use to weight the decisive operation or the main effort if the operation is phased. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success (ADP 3-0). The main effort is weighted with the preponderance of combat power-the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADP 3-0). Designating a main effort temporarily gives that unit priority of support. Commanders shift resources and priorities to the main effort as circumstances require. Commanders may shift the main effort several times during an operation. When executed, the unit conducting



the decisive operation-the operation that directly accomplishes the mission-is always the main effort.

2-28.除了任務編組，指揮官還必須在計畫中建立支援的優先次序，並在任務執行中視情況需要予以調整。支援的優先由指揮官設定，以確保下級單位在任務完成過程中獲得所需支援。不論是移動、火力或防護，都是指揮官用來衡量各階段主要作戰或主要兵力配置時，支援項目的優先事項。主要兵力配置是指定下屬單位，在所望地點、時間完成部署，這在整體任務中是最為重要的(ADP 3-0)。重點兵力指的是在戰鬥力量上超越敵軍——整體來說就是軍事單位或部隊能夠在指定時間展現出來的破壞、建設和資訊能力(ADP 3-0)。暫時性的指定一支重點兵力，必須讓這個單位擁有優先支援；指揮官也應視情況需要，轉移資源優先次序給重點兵力部隊。在一次作戰中，指揮官可能會這樣數次轉移重點。該單位即為執行主要作戰——藉由作戰直接完成任務——這就是重點兵力部隊，通常主戰方面即為直接達成任務的作戰行動。

DIRECT, COORDINATE, AND SYNCHRONIZE ACTIONS

指導、協調及同步行動

2-29. Plans and orders are the principle means commanders use to direct, coordinate, and synchronize actions. Plans and orders also inform those outside the unit how to cooperate and provide support. Good plans direct subordinates by stating what is required (the task) and why (the purpose); they leave how (the method) up to subordinates. They contain the minimum number of control measures needed to coordinate actions and synchronize the war-fighting functions to mass the effects of combat power at the decisive point and time.

2-29.計畫和命令是指揮官用來進行指揮、協調及同步行動的主要手段。計畫與命令也可以讓單位之外的相關人員知道如何進行協同與支援。好的計畫可以讓下級明白要求是什麼(行動)，以及為什麼要這麼做(目的)，只留下如何做(方法)讓下級部隊去發揮。計畫包含了最少數量的管制作為，用以協調行動、將兵種作戰功能同步化，力求在決定性地點、時間發揮最大戰鬥力量。

2-30. Commanders use control measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate fire and maneuver, and control operations. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or war-fighting functions (ADP 6-0). Control measures assign responsibilities, coordinate actions between forces, impose restrictions, or establish guidelines to regulate freedom of action. Control measures are essential to coordinating subordinates' actions and are located throughout the plan. Control measures unburden subordinate commanders to conduct operations within their assigned AO without additional coordination.

2-30.指揮官運用管制措施劃分責任、協調火力與機動，藉以管制作戰。管制措施是用以規範兵力及各兵種功能運用的方法(ADP 6-0)，並藉以劃分責任、協調部隊間的行動、限制手段，對行動自由建立規範。管制作為對下級部隊行動之協調非常重要，貫穿計畫全文處處可見。管制措施讓指揮官在指定作戰地區(AO)中進行作戰時，因為不必進行額外的協調行動，使其得以在該方面的負荷減輕。

2-31. Control measures can be permissive (which allows something to happen) or restrictive (which limits how something is done). For example, a coordinated fire line—a line beyond which conventional surface to-surface direct fire and indirect fire support means may fire at any time within the boundaries of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination but does not eliminate the responsibility to coordinate the airspace required to conduct the mission (JP 3-09)—illustrates a permissive control measure. A route—the prescribed course to be traveled from a specific point of origin to a specific destination (FM 3-90-1)—illustrates a restrictive control measure. (ADP 1-02 contains definitions and symbols of control measures.)

2-31. 管制措施可以是開放性的(容許一些事情發生)或限制性的(怎麼完成有其限制)。例如，火力協調線——不同於傳統面對面直接火力與間接火力的支援方式，只要在指揮部設定範圍之內，不需額外協調，可在任何時間射擊，但並不排除任務所需空域協調的責任(JP 3-09)——顯現了管制措施的開放性。行軍路線——從特定出發點到特定目的地的規定路徑(FM 3-90-1)——則顯示了管制措施的限制性(ADP 1-02包含了管制措施的定義與符號)。

2-32. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose. Plans and orders synchronize the war-fighting functions to mass the effects of combat power at the chosen place and time. Synchronization is a means of control, not an end. Commanders balance necessary synchronization against desired agility and initiative.

2-32. 同步是對軍事行動有關時間、地點和目標的安排。計畫與命令將作戰功能同步，以求在所望地點時間將戰鬥力量最大化。同步是一種管制方法而不是目標。指揮官必須在必要的同步與靈活主動之間取得平衡。

2-33. Overemphasizing the direction, coordination, and synchronization functions of planning may result in detailed and rigid plans that stifle initiative. Mission command encourages the use of mission orders to avoid creating overly restrictive instructions to subordinates. Mission orders direct, coordinate, and synchronize actions while allowing subordinates the maximum freedom of action to accomplish missions within the commander's intent. (See paragraphs 2-119 through 2-126 for a discussion on mission orders.)

2-33. 過分強調計畫的指導、協調與同步功能，可能導致計畫過於僵固和細碎，限制了主動。任務指揮鼓勵使用任務命令，避免下達過多的限制性指示給下級。在指揮官意圖的原則之下，任務命令在指導、協調和同步的同時，也允許下級部隊有最大行動自由以完成任務。

ANTICIPATE EVENTS AND ADAPT TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES

對瞬息萬變的狀況先行預判與肆應

In general, campaign projects have to be adjusted to conditions (time, weather), the number of the enemy. ...The more one foresees obstacles to his plans, the less one will find of them later in the execution. In a word, everything must be foreseen; find the problems and resolve them.

Frederick the Great



整體而言，作戰計畫必須因應狀況(時間、天候等)、敵情進行調整。……對其計畫的障礙考量得越多，執行時碰到的障礙就越少。簡言之，每件事都要先行預想；發現問題，加以解決。

腓特烈大帝

2-34. A fundamental tension exists between the desire to plan far into the future to facilitate preparation and coordination and the fact that the farther into the future the commander plans, the less certain the plan will remain relevant. Given the fundamentally uncertain nature of operations, the object of planning is not to eliminate uncertainty but to develop a framework for action in the midst of such uncertainty. Planning provides an informed forecast of how future events may unfold. It entails identifying and evaluating potential decisions and actions in advance to include thinking through consequences of certain actions. Planning involves thinking about ways to influence the future as well as ways to respond to potential events.

2-34.完成未來計畫準備與協調事項，與指揮官實際規劃之間，存在嚴重的落差；但是如果計畫本身夠周延，落差就會降低。如果這種落差或不確定性是作戰的本質，計畫的功用並不是消除這種不確定性，而是從中發展出一個行動架構。計畫對於未來事件會如何發展，為大家提供了一種預測。計畫用以事先確認可能的決定與行動，也必須思考某些行動產生的後果。對於思考影響未來的方法，和面對可能狀況的應對方式，都要在計畫中提及。

2-35. Planning keeps the force oriented on future objectives despite the requirements of current operations. Anticipatory planning is essential for seizing and retaining the initiative by allowing commanders and staffs to consider potential decisions and actions in advance. Anticipatory planning reduces the time between decisions and actions during execution, especially at higher echelons. While some actions are implemented immediately, others require forethought and preparation. For example, changing the direction of attack may be a relatively simple and immediate matter for a battalion; however, changing the scheme of maneuver for a division, including all its support, is complicated and time consuming. Changing priority of fires at division level may take considerable time if artillery units must reposition. If leaders wait until an event occurs to begin planning and preparing for it, units may not be able to react quickly enough—ceding the initiative to the enemy.

2-35.儘管現行作戰中有諸多要求，計畫讓部隊向著未來目標前進。為了奪取和保有主動權，讓指揮官和幕僚可以預先思考可能的決定與行動，事前計畫是很重要的。事前計畫可以在執行時，縮短決定與行動之間的時間，尤其在高階層更明顯。當某些行動執行的當下，其他人需要預先考慮與準備。舉一個營級部隊為例，改變攻擊方向相對是很容易立刻執行的；然而對一個師來講，改變機動計畫，會牽涉到所有相關支援部隊，不但複雜還很耗時間。在師級階層改變火力優先，如果砲兵單位必須重新部署，耗費時間就很可觀。如果指揮官直到事情發生才開始計畫與準備，單位可能無法迅速應對——主動權就會因此被敵人拿走。

2-36. During execution planners continue to develop or refine options for potential enemy

action and friendly opportunities. By anticipating potential events beforehand, planning promotes flexibility and rapid decision making during execution. As a result, the force anticipates events and acts purposefully and effectively before the enemy can act or before situations deteriorate. Several tools are available to the commander and planners to assist in adapting to changing circumstance to include-

- Decision points.
- Branches.
- Sequels.

2-36.執行期間，計畫人員依據潛在之敵軍可能動向和我軍戰機掌握與運用，持續發展或更新選項。靠著事先預測可能狀況，計畫可以在執行期間提升運用彈性和快速制定決策。因此，部隊可以對戰況先做預判，並在敵人行動或情況惡化之前，執行特定目的的有效行動。許多工具都可讓指揮官或幕僚用於協助肆應多變狀況，包括：

- 決心點。
- 應變計畫。
- 後續計畫。

2-37. A decision point is a point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action (JP 5-0). A decision point is associated to actions by the enemy, the friendly force, or the population and tied to a CCIR. Identifying decision points associated to the execution of a branch or sequel is key to effective planning.

2-37.決心點是指揮官或幕僚針對時間或空間及特定行動方案，預先做出關鍵決策的點(JP 5-0)。決心點的制定，需要考量敵軍、友軍行動、當地居民，與指揮官特別情報需求(CCIR)等諸般因素。以決心點做基礎，加上執行過程中的應變、後續計畫，是擬定出卓越計畫的重要關鍵。

2-38. Planners record decision points on a decision support template and associated matrix. A decision support template is a combined intelligence and operations graphic based on the results of war-gaming that depicts decision points, timelines associated with movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific friendly course of action (JP 2-01.3). The decision support matrix provides text to recap expected events, decision points, and planned friendly actions. It describes where and when a decision must be made if a specific action is to take place. It ties decision points to named areas of interest (known as NAIs), targeted areas of interest (known as TAIs), CCIRs, collection assets, and potential friendly response options. The staff refines the decision support template and matrix as planning progresses and during execution.

2-38.規劃人員將決心點記錄在決心支援圖解上面，包含情報與作戰圖，以及其他矩陣上下相關資訊。所謂決心支援圖解，是根據電腦兵棋得出結果，描繪出於執行特定行動方案時，部隊移動及作戰流程有關的決心點、時間線等其他關鍵資訊項目，結合了情報與作戰需求的圖表(JP 2-01.3)。決心支援協同計畫管制表提供更新潛在事件、決心點，以及我



軍計畫行動。如果特定行動開始啟動，協同計畫管制表上就會顯示應在何處、何時做出決策。這種矩陣結合了命名為利害區(一般熟知的NAIs)、有利目標區(TAIs)、指揮官優先情報需求(CCIRs)、相關資材，和友軍可能回應選項等，都羅列其中。在計畫過程和執行中，幕僚必須時時更新決心支援圖解和協同計畫管制表內容，因應最新狀況。

2-39. Plans and orders often require adjustment beyond the initial stages of the operations. A branch is the contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions (JP 5-0). Branches anticipate situations that require changes to the basic plan. Such situations could result from enemy action, friendly action, or weather. Commanders build flexibility into their plans and orders by developing branches to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions.

2-39.計畫與命令經常需要在作戰開始之後適時調整。應變計畫是根據預期事件、機會、敵軍行動與回應造成的混亂狀況等，另行擬定出來的偶發選項，目的是要補充基礎計畫對於任務、部隊定位或移動方向等發生改變時的不足之處(JP 5-0)。當基礎計畫規範事項發生改變，預備計畫就要預判其狀況演變。狀況改變有可能肇因於敵人行動、友軍行動，或天候的變化。在快速變化的狀況下，指揮官必須藉著擬定應變計畫或預備計畫，讓計畫與命令能更具彈性，以保持行動自由。

2-40. A sequel is the subsequent operation or phase based on the possible outcomes of the current operation or phase (JP 5-0). Sequels are based on outcomes of current operations to include success, stalemate, or defeat. A counter offensive, for example, is a logical sequel to a defense; an exploitation and pursuit follow successful attacks. Executing a sequel normally begins another phase of an operation, if not a new operation. Commanders consider and develop sequels during planning and revisit them throughout an operation.

2-40.後續計畫是根據當前作戰或階段任務為基礎，對其可能結果推演出的後續作戰或階段任務(JP 5-0)。後續計畫中所謂當前作戰的可能結果包括任務成功、陷入僵持，或是被擊敗。舉例來說，反擊行動，就是防禦之後合理的後續發展；成功的攻擊行動之後，必然就是擴大戰果與追擊。執行後續計畫，通常表示即使不是展開新的作戰，至少也是開啟另一階段的戰鬥行動。指揮官在計畫擬定期間，就必須根據作戰全程，反覆思考如何籌備作戰次一階段(進程)的後續計畫。

PLANNING AND THE LEVELS OF WARFARE

計畫與交戰階層

2-41. It is important to understand how Army planning nests with joint planning and how planning differs at the levels of warfare. The levels of warfare are a framework for defining and clarifying the relationship among national objectives, the operational approach, and tactical tasks (ADP 1-01). The three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. There is no hard boundary between levels of warfare, nor fixed echelon responsible for a particular level.

2-41.瞭解陸軍計畫與聯合計畫如何交互運作，與計畫在各交戰階層有何不同，是很重要的。交戰階層是定義並區分國家目標、作戰型態，與戰術任務之間的關係(ADP 1-01)。有三個階層，分別是戰略、作戰與戰術。三個交戰階層之間並沒有嚴格的界線，也沒有哪個層級的部隊一定要負責哪個交戰階層的任務。

2-42. The levels of warfare focus a headquarters on one of three broad roles-creating strategy; conducting campaigns and major operations; or sequencing battles, engagements, and actions. The levels of warfare correspond to specific levels of responsibility and planning with decisions at one level affecting other levels. They help commanders visualize a logical arrangement and synchronization of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. Among the levels of warfare, planning horizons differ greatly.

2-42.各交戰階層的運作，是由指揮部統一負責範圍廣闊的三個階層其中之一——制定戰略、執行戰役及主要作戰，或是依序進行小型戰役、戰鬥及行動。交戰階層與某些特定層級的部隊任務相符合，某層級部隊計畫好的決策，也會對其他層級造成影響。交戰階層的劃分，幫助指揮官設想作戰行動的合理安排與同步性、資源分配，並指定工作讓合適的下級部隊去執行。在各不同交戰階層中，計畫範圍的差別很明顯。

STRATEGIC LEVEL 戰略階層

War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his sense ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective.

Carl von Clausewitz

戰爭計畫包括了戰爭的每一個層面，計畫將每一個單一作戰行動，相互交織起來，形成一個最終目標；在此大目標之下，所有個別的小目標都要以此為主。沒人想要開啟戰爭——或者說，沒人在心理上覺得應該這麼做——除非他一開始就清楚認定要靠戰爭達成意圖，而且很清楚要怎麼做。前者是政治目的，後者是作戰目標。

克勞賽維茨

2-43. The strategic level of warfare is the level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives (JP 3-0). The focus at this level is the development of strategy-a foundational idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve national and multinational objectives. The strategic level of war is primarily the province of national leadership in coordination with combatant commanders.

2-43.戰略階層是一個國家，經常是多國中的成員國，用以決定一個國家或多國(聯盟或同盟)戰略安全目標與指引，並動用國家資源達成這些目標(JP 3-0)。這個階層的重點是發展策略——一個或一組基本想法，啟動國家力量的諸般工具，以同步、整合的方式，達成國



家或多國目標。戰略階層的戰爭主要是國家領導階層的負責範圍，與其他戰鬥指揮官協力完成。

2-44. The National Security Council develops and recommends national security policy options for Presidential approval. The President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide their orders, intent, strategy, direction, and guidance via strategic direction to the military (Services and combatant commands) to pursue national interest. They communicate strategic direction to the military through written documents referred to as strategic guidance. Key strategic guidance documents include-

- National Security Strategy of the United States.
- National Defense Strategy of the United States.
- National Military Strategy of the United States.
- Joint Strategic Campaign Plan.
- Unified Command Plan.
- Guidance for Employment of the Force.
- Global Force Management Implementation Guidance.

(See JP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of strategic direction and guidance.)

2-44.國家安全委員會擬定並建議國家安全政策選項，給總統簽署認可。總統、國防部長和參謀首長聯席會議主席將他們的命令、意圖、策略、方向和指引傳達給軍方(各軍種和戰鬥指揮官)，以此追求國家利益。他們將戰略方向透過書寫文件下達軍方，作為戰略指導。關鍵戰略指導文件包含：

- 美國國家安全戰略。
- 美國國家防衛戰略。
- 美國國家軍事戰略。
- 聯合戰略作戰計畫。
- 統一指揮計畫。
- 武力運用指導。
- 全球武力管理運用指導。

(請見JP 5-0 戰略方向與指導細節討論)

2-45. Based on strategic guidance, GCCs and staffs-with input from subordinate commands (to include the theater army) and supporting commands and agencies-update their strategic estimates and develop theater strategies. A theater strategy is a broad statement of a GCC's long-term vision that bridges national strategic guidance and the joint planning required to achieve national and theater objectives. The theater strategy prioritizes the ends, ways, and means within the limitations established by the budget, global force management processes, and strategic guidance.

Note. Functional combatant commanders also follow this process within their functional areas.

2-45.根據戰略指導，地區作戰指揮官(GCCs)和幕僚——透過下級指揮官(包括戰區部

隊)、支援指揮部及各專業幕僚單位回報——以更新他們的戰略判斷，並擬定戰區戰略。戰區戰略是地區作戰指揮官長期以來的觀察所得，可做為國家戰略指導和聯合計畫之間的橋樑，以利國家與戰區目標之達成。在預算、全球武力管理程序和戰略指導的限制之下，戰區戰略在目的、方法和手段各方面都擁有優先權。

註釋：功能型作戰指揮官在其負責區域，仍須遵從這套程序。

OPERATIONAL LEVEL 作戰階層

2-46. The operational level of warfare is the level of warfare at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas (JP 3-0). Operational-level planning focuses on developing plans for campaigns and other joint operations. A campaign plan is a joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). Joint force commanders (combatant commanders and their subordinate joint task force commanders) and their component commanders (Service and functional) conduct operational-level planning. Planning at the operational level requires operational art to integrate ends, ways, and means while balancing risk. Operational-level planners use operational design and the joint planning process to develop campaign plans, OPLANs, OPORDs, and supporting plans. (JP 5-0 discusses joint planning. JP 3-31 discusses operational-level planning from a land component perspective.)

2-46. 作戰階層是在戰區或其他作戰區域，主要作戰與戰役計畫、執行與維持，以達成戰略目標的層級(JP 3-0)。作戰階層的計畫，將重點置於為戰役和其他聯合作戰制定。戰役計畫也是一種聯合作戰計畫，為一系列主要相關作戰進行規範，以利於在有限時間、空間限制下，達成戰略或作戰目的(JP 5-0)。聯合部隊指揮官(戰鬥指揮官與其下級聯合特遣部隊指揮官)以及他們的勤務與功能性指揮人員所執行的，都屬於作戰階層計畫。作戰階層計畫需要考慮作戰藝術，以整合目的、方式和手段來管控風險。作戰階層計畫人員運用作戰設計與聯合作戰規劃程序，來發展戰役計畫、作戰計畫、作戰命令與支援計畫(JP 5-0 討論聯合計畫；JP 3-31則從地面部隊觀點，討論作戰階層計畫)。

2-47. The combatant command campaign plan (CCP) operationalizes the GCC's strategy by organizing and aligning operations and activities with resources to achieve objectives in an area of responsibility. The CCP provides a framework within which the GCC conducts security cooperation activities and military engagement with regional partners. The CCP contains contingency plans that are viewed as branches within the campaign. Contingency plans identify how the command might respond in the event of a crisis. Contingency plans are often phased and have specified end states that seek to re-establish conditions favorable to the United States. Contingency plans have an identified military objective and termination criteria. They may address limited contingency operations or large-scale combat operations.

2-47. 戰區司令部戰役計畫(CCP)的執行，是藉著地區作戰指揮官(GCC)擬定的戰略，在



所屬責任區域運用資源及實施作戰行動，確保任務達成。CCP提供架構，讓地區作戰指揮官與區域夥伴一起執行安全合作與作戰行動。CCP包含了應變計畫，被視為戰役行動的分支。應變計畫讓指揮部在面對風險及突發狀況時，知道如何回應。應變計畫通常區分各階段，明確顯示如何尋求對美國最有利的最終狀態。應變計畫確認軍事目標及最終標準，同時對應急作戰或大規模戰鬥畫定限制範圍。

2-48. The theater army develops a support plan to the CCP. This support plan includes methods to achieve security cooperation, training and exercise programs, band ongoing Army activities within the theater including intelligence, air and missile defense, sustainment, and communications. The theater army also develops supporting plans for contingencies identified by the GCC. These include OPLANs for large-scale ground combat, noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and other crises response activities. Theater army planners routinely develop, review, and update supporting plans to numbered OPLANs to ensure they remain feasible. This includes a review of Army force structure as well as time-phased force and deployment data.

2-48.戰區陸軍擬定支援計畫，針對戰區司令部戰役計畫(CCP)擬定支援計畫。該支援計畫包括達成安全合作、訓練與演習計畫，並與戰區內現行的陸軍行動，包含情報、空權與飛彈防禦、後勤維持與通訊等結合在一起。戰區陸軍也研擬應變支援計畫，呈報地區戰鬥指揮官簽署。這些支援計畫包含大規模地面作戰的作戰計畫、非戰鬥撤離計畫、人道協助與災難救助，和其他危機應變行動。戰區陸軍計畫人員定期研擬、探討、更新支援計畫納入作戰計畫中，以確保持續可行。這也包括了對陸軍部隊結構、各階段兵力及部署資料的檢討。

2-49. Corps and below Army units normally conduct Army tactical planning. However, corps and divisions serving as the base headquarters for a joint task force or land component headquarters employ joint planning and develop joint formatted plans and orders. Corps or divisions receive joint formatted plans and orders when directly subordinate to a joint task force or joint land component command. It is important for these headquarters to be familiar with joint Adaptive Planning and Execution. (See CJCSM 3130.03A for joint formats for plans and orders.) Figure 2-1 illustrates the links among the levels of warfare using military actions in the Gulf War of 1991.

2-49.軍團(含)以下陸軍單位通常執行的是陸軍戰術計畫。然而，軍團與師作為聯合特遣部隊或地面部隊的總部，執行聯合計畫，並研擬聯合編成計畫與命令。軍團與師收到聯合編成計畫與命令，直接納入聯合特遣部隊或聯合地面部隊指揮掌握。對這些指揮機構來說，熟悉聯合計畫與執行是很重要的。圖2-1描繪出1991年波灣戰爭時，各階層作戰，與運用的軍事行動之間的關連。

TACTICAL LEVEL 戰術階層

2-50. The tactical level of warfare is the level of warfare at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces

(JP 3-0). Tactical-level planning revolves around how best to achieve objectives and accomplish tasks assigned by higher headquarters. Planning horizons for tactical-level planning are relatively shorter than planning horizons for operational-level planning. Tactical-level planning works within the framework of an operational-level plan and is addressed in Service doctrine or, in the case of multinational operations, the lead nation's doctrine. Army tactical planning is guided by the MDMP for units with a staff and TLP for small-units without a staff.

2-50.交戰的戰術階層，是指計畫和執行的戰鬥，達成的是戰術單位和特遣部隊的軍事目標(JP 3-0)。戰術階層計畫內容，圍繞著如何能順利完成上級指定的目標與工作。比起作戰階層的計畫，戰術階層的規劃範圍相對較小。戰術階層計畫的運作，列在作戰階層計畫的框架之下，在軍種準則裡面有所敘述；如果執行的是多國作戰，主導國家的準則中也會有所規範。如果是有幕僚的單位，陸軍戰術計畫執行時，以軍事決策程序(MDMP)為依歸；如果是沒有幕僚的小單位，就參考部隊指揮程序(TLP)。

戰略階層	國家政策	以軍事武力恢復科威特政府
	戰區戰略	擊潰幼發拉底河南岸的伊拉克部隊
作戰階層	戰役	沙漠風暴行動
	主要作戰	第3軍團消滅共和衛隊
戰術階層	戰鬥	第7軍攻擊伊拉克第12軍及共和衛隊
	接戰	裝甲騎兵第2團與塔瓦卡納師進行東距73之役
	小單位與人員行動	M1A1戰車遭遇並摧毀6輛T-72坦克

圖2-1 交戰階層區分

2-51. Operational- and tactical-level planning complement each other but have different aims. Operational level planning involves broader dimensions of time, space, and purpose than tactical-level planning involves. Operational-level planners need to define an operational area, estimate required forces, and evaluate requirements. In contrast, tactical-level planning proceeds from an existing operational design. Normally, AOs are prescribed, objectives and available forces are identified, and a general sequence of activities is specified for tactical-level commanders.

2-51.作戰與戰術階層的計畫，彼此相輔相成互補不足，但各有其不同目標。作戰階層計畫比戰術階層計畫涉及的時間、空間與目標範圍較為廣闊。作戰階層規劃人員需要釐清作戰區域、預判所需兵力、評估相關需求，而戰術階層計畫則依循現有作戰框架去執行。通常，作戰區域、目標和可用兵力都會在計畫中律定；後續行動則依循戰術階層指揮官指示。

OPERATIONAL ART 作戰藝術

Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well prepared plan.

Napoleon Bonaparte



如果沒有準備完善的計畫，戰爭中所有事情都不會成功。

拿破崙

2-52. Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs-supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment-to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). Operational art applies to all types and aspects of operations. It integrates ends, ways, and means while accounting for risk. Applying operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions:

- What conditions, when established, constitute the desired end state (ends)?
- How will the force achieve these desired conditions (ways)?
- What sequence of actions helps attain these conditions (ways)?
- What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)?
- What risks are associated with that sequence of actions and how can they be mitigated (risks)?

2-52. 作戰藝術是指揮官和幕僚——基於他們的技能、知識、經驗、創意與判斷的感知方式——以整合的目標、方法與手段並運用軍力來執行戰略、戰役與大型作戰 (JP 3-0)。作戰藝術適用於所有型態的作戰，及作戰的各個不同層面。整合目標、方法與手段以面對所遭遇風險。運用作戰藝術，指揮官需要回答下列問題：

- 在什麼條件下，什麼時候確立，以制定所望戰果(目標)？
- 部隊如何獲致所望條件(方法)？
- 哪些後續行動可以協助達成這些條件(方法)？
- 完成後續行動需要哪些資源(手段)？
- 後續行動會有哪些風險？如何將這些風險因素降低(風險)？

Operational art encompasses all levels of warfare. It requires creative vision, broad experience, and a knowledge of capabilities, tactics, and techniques across multiple domains. Commanders and staffs employ operational art during ADM and the MDMP.

作戰藝術含括了所有交戰層級。它需要創新視野、豐富經驗、知識、戰術能力，和多領域的技能。在陸軍設計方法論(ADM)和軍事決策程序(MDMP)過程中，指揮官和幕僚都需要用到作戰藝術。

OPERATIONAL APPROACH 作戰手段

2-53. It is through operational art that commanders develop and translate their operational approach-a description of the broad actions required to achieve the end state-into a concept of operations. An operational approach is the result of the commander's visualization of what needs to be done in broad terms to solve identified problems. It is the main idea that informs detailed planning. When developing an operational approach, commanders consider ways to employ a combination of defeat mechanisms and stability mechanisms. Defeat mechanisms relate to offensive and defensive operations; stability mechanisms relate to stability operations.

2-53. 透過作戰藝術，指揮官確立並傳達他們的作戰手段——描述對達成目標所需各種

行動——進而形成作戰構想。作戰手段源於指揮官洞見為了要完成哪些事項，以解決各種已辨識出的問題。它是詳盡規劃之後，孕育出來的主要構想。當構思作戰手段時，指揮官會綜合考量選擇擊敗敵人作戰機制和維穩作戰機制時該採何方法。擊敗敵人作戰機制會關係到攻擊和防禦行動；維穩作戰機制則須採取維穩作戰行動。

2-54. Army forces use combinations of four defeat mechanisms: destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate. Destroy means to physically render an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Dislocate means to employ forces to obtain a significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy's disposition less valuable or irrelevant. Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy's command and control system, degrading their ability to conduct operations while leading to the enemy's rapid collapse or will to fight. Isolate means to seal off-both physically and psychologically-an enemy from sources of support.

2-54.執行擊敗敵人作戰機制時，陸軍部隊依序有四種作法：「摧毀、攻占要點、瓦解和孤立」。「摧毀」是指在實體戰力方面，讓敵人無法作戰；「攻占要點」是奪取有利地形要點，讓敵軍無法立足；「瓦解」就是分裂敵人的指管體系，降低其作戰能力，並導致敵人快速崩潰，無法作戰；「孤立」就是加以封鎖——在實體和心理方面雙管齊下——讓敵人無法獲取支援。

2-55. Applying more than one defeat mechanism simultaneously produces complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. Used individually, a defeat mechanism achieves results relative to the amount of effort expended. Using defeat mechanisms in combination creates enemy dilemmas that magnify their effects significantly. Operational art formulates the most effective, efficient way to apply defeat mechanisms. Physically defeating the enemy deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve those aims. Temporally defeating the enemy anticipates enemy reactions and nullifies them before they can become effective. Cognitively defeating the enemy disrupts decision making and erodes the enemy's will to fight.

2-55.同時運用超過一個擊敗敵人的作戰機制，會產生互補和強化的效果，比執行單一作戰機制更有效率。個別執行時，打擊行動僅會導致敵人消耗相對數量的有形戰力；混合運用的話，可讓敵人進退失據，打擊效果更加明顯。作戰藝術將執行擊敗敵人作戰機制最有效果的方法羅列出來，在實體方面摧毀敵人，奪去敵軍有形戰力以達成任務。暫時擊敗敵人可以預判敵人的反應，藉此在他們重整軍力前讓敵人無力再起。在心理上擊敗敵人，則可以擾亂破壞其決策，消磨其戰鬥意志。

2-56. As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support. Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. Control involves imposing civil order. Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes,



and ultimately the behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy audiences through messages, presence, and actions.

2-56.相同原理，進行維穩作戰機制時，互補和強化的效果使彼此有效達成任務，也會比執行單一機制更有效率。執行維穩作戰機制的四個要點是「強制、控制、影響與支援」。「強制」是指使用或威脅使用致命武力，藉此獲取控制和優勢、改變敵方行動、迫使敵人順從我之命令和協議，並交出行政權；「控制」就是掌握該地的社會秩序；「影響」是指透過訊息傳達、武力展示等活動，改變當地意見和態度；最終，包括外國友邦、中立國、敵對方、敵方群眾等，都會「支持」我方。

ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL ART

作戰藝術理論之重要元素

2-57. In applying operational art, commanders and their staffs use a set of intellectual tools known as the elements of operational art. These tools help commanders understand, visualize, and describe operations and help to formulate their commander's intent and planning guidance to include the operational approach. Commanders may use these tools in any operation; however, their application is broadest in the context of long-term operations.

2-57.運用作戰藝術時，指揮官和其幕僚使用一整套知性工具，亦即我們所知的大軍作戰理論。這些工具幫助指揮官瞭解、洞察、描述作戰，以形成指揮官意圖與計畫指導，包括作戰手段都能更清楚地闡述。指揮官可能在任何作戰中用到這套工具；然而，以長期作戰角度而言，這種運用方式是無處不在的。

作戰藝術理論之重要元素包括：

- 最終戰果與條件
- 重心
- 決勝點
- 作戰線與補給線
- 節奏
- 階段區分與轉換
- 作戰範圍
- 戰力極限
- 基地
- 風險

2-58. Not all elements of operational art apply at all levels of warfare. A battalion commander may be concerned about the tempo of an upcoming operation but is probably not concerned with an enemy's center of gravity. A corps commander may consider all elements of operational art in developing a plan. The application of specific elements of operational art depends on the situation and echelon.

2-58.並非所有作戰藝術的要點，都適用於所有作戰層級。營長可能很關心即將來臨戰事的作戰節奏，但是對敵之重心就不甚在意。軍團指揮官在研擬計畫時，就會考慮到所有作戰藝術的要點。作戰藝術有哪些要點會運用到，取決於當時狀況及部隊層級。

End State and Conditions 最終戰果與條件

2-59. A central aspect of planning is determining the operation's end state. The end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives (JP 3-0). A condition is a reflection of the existing state of an OE. Thus, a desired condition is a sought-after change to an OE. Since every operation should focus on a clearly defined and attainable end state, accurately describing conditions that represent success is important.

2-59.計畫的中心觀點，就是決定作戰的所望戰果。所望戰果就是對指揮官所完成任務目標之全般狀況所做的定義(JP 3-0)。狀況條件則是對作戰環境現有狀態的反映與呈現。因此，所望條件就是對作戰環境來講，很受歡迎的改變。因為每一次作戰都必須聚焦於清楚定義和能達成的所望戰果，所以準確地描述達成任務的狀況條件，是很重要的。

2-60. Commanders explicitly describe end state conditions in their planning guidance to shape the development of an operational approach and COAs. Commanders summarize the operation's end state in their commander's intent. A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates integration and synchronization of the force, and guides subordinate initiative during execution.

2-60.指揮官在計畫指引中，清楚的描述所望戰果，就可以形塑作戰手段和行動方案。指揮官在其意圖中，對設想中的所望戰果概括描述。所望戰果的清楚定義，可以提高凝聚力、促進整合、將部隊行動同步化，並在任務執行中引導下屬發揮進取心。

2-61. Commanders ensure their end state is nested with their higher headquarters' end state and the overall end state for the joint operation. Subordinate operations within the larger plan often have an end state for that particular operation. In these instances commanders often address conditions for transition beyond the current operation to facilitate follow-on operations or an exploitation.

2-61.指揮官必須確保其設想的所望戰果與上級，還有整個聯合作戰的最終狀態是一致的。在大計畫框架之下，下級部隊針對其特殊任務，會有所望戰果。這種情況下，指揮官經常提出現行作戰轉換狀況條件，以促進接下來的作戰或擴張戰果。

Centers of Gravity 作戰重心

For Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII, and Frederick the Great, the center of gravity was their army. If the army had been destroyed, they would all have gone down in history as failures.

Carl von Clausewitz

對亞歷山大大帝、古斯塔夫·阿道夫、查理十二世和腓特烈大帝這些軍事家來說，



軍事重心就是他們的軍隊。如果軍隊被擊敗，他們都會像個失敗者一樣，被歷史遺忘。
克勞賽維茨

2-62. A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). The loss of a center of gravity can ultimately result in defeat. Centers of gravity are not limited to military forces and can be either physical or moral. Physical centers of gravity, such as a capital city or military force, are tangible and typically easier to identify, assess, and target than moral centers of gravity. Forces can often influence physical centers of gravity solely by military means. In contrast, moral centers of gravity are intangible and more difficult to influence; they exist in the cognitive dimension of an information environment. They can include a charismatic leader, powerful ruling elite, or the will of a population.

2-62.重心是戰力的來源，是精神或實體力量、行動自由，或戰鬥意志的根源(JP 5-0)。失去重心最終必導致失敗。重心並不只限於軍事力量，它也可以是實體或心理上的。實體上的重心，例如主要城市或軍事部隊，是有實際形體的，比起心理上的重心基本上較容易辨認、評估與標定。部隊單單以軍事手段，就能夠影響實體重心。比較起來，心理重心沒有實際形體，也比較難以影響；它們存在於資訊環境中的認知層面。它們包括有魅力的領導人、能力強的統治菁英，或是群眾的意志。

2-63. As an element of operational art, a center of gravity analysis helps commanders and staffs understand friendly and enemy sources of strength and weakness. This understanding helps to determine ways to undermine enemy strengths by exploiting enemy vulnerabilities while protecting friendly vulnerabilities from enemies attempting to do the same. Understanding friendly and enemy centers of gravity helps the commander and staffs identify decisive points and determine an operational approach to achieve the end state. (See JP 5-0 for more detailed discussions of center of gravity analysis.)

2-63.作為作戰藝術的要點，作戰重心分析可以協助指揮官與幕僚瞭解敵我雙方優勢與弱點。這種瞭解可以協助決定以何方法打擊敵之弱點，同時防護我軍弱點，避免敵人以相同方法對我進行打擊。瞭解敵我雙方的作戰重心，可以協助指揮官與幕僚確認決勝點及作戰手段，以達成所望之戰果(請見JP 5-0，有更多重心分析之細節討論)。

Decisive Points 決勝點

2-64. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). Identifying decisive points helps commanders to select clear, conclusive, attainable objectives that directly contribute to achieving the end state. Geographic decisive points can include port facilities, distribution networks and nodes, and bases of operation. Specific events and elements of an enemy force may also be decisive points. Examples of such events include commitment of an enemy operational reserve and reopening a major oil refinery.

2-64. 決勝點是一個地理位置、特定關鍵事件、重要因素或功能，指揮官只要好好掌握，就可以對敵人獲得可觀優勢，或是對實體上達成任務有重大貢獻(JP 5-0)。確認決勝點可以協助指揮官選出明確、決定性的可完成目標，對獲致最終戰果有直接助益。地理上的決勝點包括機場、海港、網絡系統與節點，以及作戰基地。敵軍的特定事件和重要戰力要素也可視為決勝點，例如敵軍戰區預備隊，以及重啟主要煉油廠。

2-65. A common characteristic of decisive points is their importance to a center of gravity. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are key to attacking or protecting centers of gravity. A decisive point's importance may cause the enemy to commit significant resources to defend it. The loss of a decisive point weakens a center of gravity and may expose more decisive points, eventually leading to an attack on the center of gravity itself.

2-65. 決勝點最典型特徵，就是對作戰重心的重要性。決勝點本身並非重心；他們是攻擊或防護重心的關鍵。決勝點的重要性，讓敵人可能犧牲重要資源來加以保護。失去決勝點，會削弱敵作戰重心，並暴露出更多決勝點，最終導致其重心遭受攻擊而失去平衡。

2-66. Generally, more decisive points exist in a given operational area than available forces and capabilities can attack, seize, retain, control, or protect. Accordingly, planners study and analyze decisive points and determine which offer the best opportunity to attack the enemy's center of gravity, extend friendly operational reach, or enable the application of friendly forces and capabilities. The art of planning includes selecting decisive points that best lead to establishing end state conditions in a sequence that most quickly and efficiently leads to mission success.

2-66. 通常，在一個固定作戰地區，會有比所在部隊兵力所能攻擊、奪取、保留、控制和防護，數量多很多的決勝點。根據這種情形，計畫人員加以研究、分析，並決定哪些是對打擊敵人重心、延伸我軍作戰範圍，或發揮我軍作戰能力最有幫助的決勝點。計畫的要點包括選出能形成所望戰果，並且能最快、最有效完成任務的決勝點。

2-67. Decisive points identified for action become objectives. An objective can be physical (an enemy force or a terrain feature) or conceptual as a goal (established rule of law). In the physical sense, an objective is a location on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide for unity of effort. In the conceptual sense, an objective is the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which an operation is directed (JP 5-0). Objectives provide the basis for determining tasks to subordinate units. The most important objective forms the basis for developing the decisive operation. Combined with end state conditions, objectives form the building blocks for developing lines of operations and lines of effort.

2-67. 決勝點經行動確認後成為目標。目標可以是實體的(敵人部隊或特定地形)或是概念性的(法律規則)。從實體上說，目標是地面上一個導引作戰、區分作戰階段、指引方向改變，並結合作戰力量的位置。從概念上來說，目標是清楚定義、具決定性、可獲致作戰指導的目標(JP 5-0)。最重要的目的是形成主要作戰的基礎，與所望戰果狀況條件結合之後，目標就成為了作戰線和補給線的基礎。



Lines of Operations and Lines of Effort

作戰線與補給線

If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the choice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attaining this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of a campaign.

Antoine Henri de Jomini

如果戰爭藝術包含將最大可用戰力運用在戰區的決勝點上，那麼作戰線的選擇，將是達成目標的首要方法，也是一個好戰役計畫的基本考量因素。

安托萬-亨利·約米尼男爵

2-68. Lines of operations and lines of effort link objectives in time, space, and purpose to achieve end state conditions as shown in figure 2-2. A line of operations links a base of operations to physical objectives which links to end state conditions. Lines of effort link tasks with goal-oriented objectives that focus toward establishing end state conditions. Commanders describe an operation along lines of operations, lines of effort, or a combination of both in their operational approach. Commanders may designate one line as decisive and others as shaping.

2-68. 作戰線和補給線把時間、空間和意圖結合起來形成目標及所望戰果，如圖2-2所示。補給線結合作戰基地形成實體目標，也與所望戰果相吻合。補給線結合意圖導向的目標任務，並將重點置於建立所望戰果。指揮官循著作戰線及補給線描述戰況，或者將兩者在其作戰手段方面相結合。指揮官可能指定其中一條線作為主作戰線，另一條作為次要作戰線。

2-69. A line of operations is a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives




圖 2-2 作戰線與補給線案例圖

(ADP 3-0). Lines of operations connect a series of intermediate objectives that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective. Operations designed using lines of operations generally consist of a series of actions executed according to a well-defined sequence.

2-69.作戰線是定義部隊與敵軍之間的時間、空間走向，並與其作戰基地和目標鏈結起來的一方向線(ADP 3-0)。作戰線將沿線各中間目標串聯起來，達到地理和兵力方向兩方面的控制權。作戰設計對作戰線的使用，通常包括一系列行動，而且有其明確的界定與次序；根據精心安排的次序，將一系列的行動包含在內。

2-70. Lines of operations can be categorized as interior and exterior. The choice of using interior or exterior lines supports a concept based on the length of movement and the supporting lines of sustainment. Staffs choose interior lines based on the fact that lines of movement and sustainment within an enclosed area are shorter than those lines outside the enclosed area. Interior lines are lines on which a force operates when its operations diverge from a central point. Interior lines allow commanders to move quickly against enemy forces along shorter lines of operations.

2-70.作戰線可區分為內線和外線兩種。內線或外線作戰線的使用，取決於移動距離的長短，與補給線的運作情形。當部隊移動和補給線都位於封閉區，作戰線會比在封閉區之外短時，幕僚就會建議使用內線作戰。內線作戰就是部隊作戰時，從中心點開始分岔出去的作戰動線。內線作戰可以讓指揮官沿著比較短的作戰線，讓我軍移動得比敵軍快。

2-71. Exterior lines are lines on which a force operates when its operations converge on the enemy. This requires the attacking force to be stronger or more mobile than the enemy. Exterior lines allow commanders to concentrate forces against multiple positions on the ground, thus presenting multiple dilemmas to the enemy. Exterior lines facilitate seizing opportunities to encircle and destroy the weaker or less mobile enemy. While commanders operating on interior lines have the opportunity to set the width of the battlefield, commanders operating on exterior lines have set the disposition of their force to deploy them outside their boundaries.

2-71.外線作戰就是部隊作戰時，靠向敵軍的作戰線。這需要攻擊部隊比敵方強大，機動力也比敵方快。外線作戰讓指揮官可以在多個點集中兵力，也就是在多方面讓敵人陷於困境。外線作戰可以抓住機會，包圍並殲滅較弱或機動力較差的敵軍。當指揮官啟用內線作戰，可以掌握機會設定戰場範圍；啟用外線作戰，就是要將部隊部署在其作戰邊界之外。

2-72. A line of effort is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing a desired end state (ADP 3-0). Lines of effort are essential to long-term planning when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort may be the only way to link tasks to the end state. Lines of effort often enable commanders to visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power.

2-72.補給線是以合理目的，而非地理因素作基礎，結合多個任務，並將行動聚焦於建



立所望戰果的一條線(ADP 3-0)。補給線的配置若能不受敵人或對手掣肘，對長期計畫而言是很重要的。當行動與許多非軍事因素相關，補給線可能就是一條將任務與最終戰果相結合的線。補給線能幫助指揮官預想到軍事能力，如何支援國家其他層面(非軍事)的安全防衛力量。

Tempo 節奏

2-73. Commanders and staff consider tempo both when planning and executing operations. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy (ADP 3-0). It reflects the rate of military action. Controlling tempo helps commanders keep the initiative during combat operations or rapidly establish a sense of normalcy during humanitarian crises. During large-scale ground combat, commanders seek to maintain a higher tempo than the enemy does; a rapid tempo can overwhelm an enemy's ability to counter friendly actions. During other operations dominated by stability operations tasks, commanders act quickly to control events and deny the enemy positions of advantage. By acting faster than the situation deteriorates, commanders can change the dynamics of a crisis and restore stability.

2-73.指揮官和幕僚在計畫和執行階段，都要考量節奏問題。節奏是軍事作戰中，在時間方面與敵人相關的相對速度與節律(ADP 3-0)。節奏反映了軍事行動的速度。節奏控制可以幫助指揮官在戰鬥行動中掌握主動，或在人道危機中快速形成運作常態。在大規模地面戰鬥中，指揮官通常尋求比敵人更快的節奏，這樣可以壓制敵人打擊我軍的能力。以維穩作戰為主的行動中，指揮官加快行動速度以求控制局勢，並設法抵銷敵人所占陣地的優勢。行動速度比情勢變化速度快，指揮官才得以改變局勢，轉危為安。

2-74. Several factors affect tempo including the friendly force's status, composition, and mobility. Terrain and weather are other factors. Planning also can accelerate tempo by anticipating decisions and actions in advance. This emphasis on increased tempo, while a guiding principle, is not an unbending rule. Commanders weigh the advantages of acting more quickly against the advantages of preparing more thoroughly.

2-74.許多因素都會影響到節奏，包括我軍情況、兵力組成與機動力。地形與天候也會有影響。計畫可以藉著預判決策與先採取行動，來加快節奏。這裡所強調的加快節奏，只是執行原則，並非顛撲不破的真理。指揮官應該衡量到底是快速行動，還是深思熟慮充分準備，較有利於戰局。

Phasing and Transitions 階段與轉換

2-75. Planning determines the sequence of actions-including the phases and transitions-that best accomplishes the mission. Ideally, commanders plan to accomplish a mission with simultaneous actions throughout the AO. However, operational reach, resource constraints, and the size of the friendly force limits what units can do at one time. In these cases, commanders phase operations. Phasing provides a way to view and conduct operations in manageable parts.

2-75.計畫決定了行動的次序——包括各階段與過渡期——目的是能順利完成任務。最理想狀況是指揮官依照計畫，在整個作戰區同步行動，完成任務。然而，因戰力所及、資源分配和友軍兵力規模等限制，同一時間所能執行事項受到限制時，指揮官就必須區分各個執行階段，使每個階段易於觀察、執行與管理。

2-76. A phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity (ADP 3-0). Within a phase, a large portion of the force executes similar or mutually supporting activities. Achieving a specified condition or set of conditions typically marks the end of a phase. No standard phasing model exists for Army operations. Commanders phase operations as required by the specific circumstances of the problem they are trying to solve.

2-76.階段劃分是計畫作為與執行的工具，用以將作戰的期程與行動做適當的切割 (ADP 3-0)。在個別階段中，大部分部隊執行的，是類似或相互支援的行動。達成典型特定狀況，表示達成最後階段。陸軍作戰不存在標準階段區分模式，指揮官視環境的需要解決特定問題，將作戰區分各階段。

2-77. A change in phase usually involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement. Phasing helps in planning and controlling operations during execution. Phasing may be indicated by time, distance, terrain, or an event. Well-designed phases-

- Focus effort.
- Concentrate combat power in time and space at a decisive point.

2-77.階段的改變通常牽涉到任務變更、任務編組，或接戰規則。區分階段可以在執行中協助計畫與管制作戰。階段區分會以時間、距離、地形或事件為依據。妥善的階段區分能：

- 集中力量。
- 在所望時間、空間將戰鬥力量聚焦於決勝點。

2-78. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting priorities among the offense, defense, and stability also involves transitions. Transitions require planning and preparation so the force can maintain the initiative and tempo of operations. Forces are vulnerable during transitions, so commanders establish clear conditions for their execution. Planning identifies potential transitions and accounts for them throughout execution. Effective commanders consider the time required to plan for and execute transitions. Assessment helps commanders measure progress toward such transitions and take appropriate actions to execute them.

2-78.轉換是各階段之間焦點改變，或是行動執行期間要進到後續或應變階段的空檔。攻擊、防禦或是維穩行動都要變換行動優先事項，也會產生轉換的問題。轉換依然需要計畫與準備，以利部隊仍能掌握主動與節奏。轉換期間部隊會相對較為脆弱，因此指揮官要將執行細節律定清楚。計畫必須將執行全程可能的轉換說明清楚。稱職的指揮官會撥出時間，考慮轉換的相關計畫。評估則可以幫助指揮官衡量轉換期間的任務進度，並採取適切行動接續執行。



Operational Reach 作戰範圍

2-79. While planning operations, it is critical to consider operational reach—the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). The concept of operational reach is inextricably tied to the concept of basing and lines of operations. Although geography may constrain or limit reach, units may extend reach by forward positioning capabilities and resources (such as long-range fires) and leveraging host-nation support. Commanders and staffs consider ways to increase their operational reach in each war-fighting function to include leveraging joint and multinational capabilities across all domains. For example, requesting and integrating joint intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance in combination with joint fires can significantly increase the unit's operational reach. This requires commanders and staffs to understand and interface with joint planning and processes such as the joint targeting cycle. Commanders and staffs also consider phasing operations based on operational reach.

2-79.當擬定計畫時，考慮作戰範圍事關重大——部隊能成功運用軍事能力的距離和持續時間(JP 3-0)。作戰範圍的概念不可避免的，會讓人將基地與作戰線的概念聯想到一起。雖然地理上有其限制，但是單位可以藉著將兵力和資源前進部署(例如長程火力)，並藉由在地國的支援達成目標。指揮官與幕僚考量各種方式，在每一種功能上增加部隊的作戰範圍，包括善用在各種環境下的聯合或多國能力。例如，要求提供並整合聯合情報、監視與偵察，讓聯合火力能大幅增加單位之作戰範圍。這需要指揮官與幕僚深入瞭解，並將聯合計畫與程序有效結合，形成目標分配循環。指揮官及幕僚也要思考以作戰範圍做基礎，區分各個作戰階段。

Culmination 戰力極限

2-80. The limit of a unit's operational reach is its culminating point. The culminating point is the point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense (JP 5-0). Culmination represents a crucial shift in relative combat power. It is relevant to both attackers and defenders at each level of warfare. While conducting offensive tasks, the culminating point occurs when the force cannot continue the attack and must assume a defensive posture or execute an operational pause. While conducting defensive tasks, it occurs when the force can no longer defend itself and must withdraw or risk destruction. The culminating point is more difficult to identify when Army forces conduct stability tasks. Two conditions can result in culmination: units being too dispersed to achieve security and units lacking required resources to achieve the end state.

2-80.一個單位作戰範圍的限制，就是它的戰力極限。「戰力極限」是一支部隊不再有能力繼續執行原來的行動，包含攻擊或防禦(JP 5-0)。就戰鬥力量而言，戰力極限代表一個決定性的轉變；它在每一個階層的戰役來說，都與攻擊者和防禦者息息相關。進行攻擊任務時，當部隊無法持續進行攻擊，必須採行防禦或暫停行動，就是已經到達戰力極限。若執行防禦時，戰力極限就是部隊不再能自我防衛，必須進行撤退或遭受摧毀。陸軍部隊進

行維穩任務時，是否進入戰力極限階段比較難以判定；兩種狀況可以決定：單位因為過度展開無法保證安全，以及因為欠缺所需資源無法獲致最終戰果。

Basing 基地

2-81. Basing is an indispensable part of operational art and linked to lines of operations and operational reach. Determining the location and sequence of establishing bases and base camps is essential for projecting power and sustaining the force. Basing may be joint or single Service and will routinely support both U.S. and multinational forces as well as interagency partners. Commanders designate a specific area as a base or base camp and assign responsibility to a single commander for protection, terrain management, and day-to-day operations. (See JP 3-34 and ATP 3-37.10 for more information on basing, bases, and base camps.)

2-81.基地是大軍作戰理論不可或缺的部分，並且與作戰線、作戰範圍相連結。決定其位置及後續基地營配置，對投射武力與保全部隊戰力非常重要。基地可能是聯合的或獨立的各軍種，定期提供美國、多國部隊，以及其跨國機構各項援助。指揮官指定特定地點作為基地或基地營，並分派防衛、戰場管理及每日行動任務給基地營指揮官（請見JP 3-34及ATP 3-37.10有更多基地及基地營資訊）。

Risk 風險

It is my experience that bold decisions give the best promise of success. But one must differentiate between strategical or tactical boldness and a military gamble. A bold operation is one in which success is not a certainty but which in case of failure leaves one with sufficient forces in hand to cope with whatever situation may arise. A gamble, on the other hand, is an operation which can lead either to victory or to the complete destruction of one's force.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

根據我的經驗，大膽的決策可以帶來最大的成功。但是要能區分出這種大膽是戰略、戰術，還是一場軍事豪賭。大膽行動即使失敗，仍有足夠兵力在手上，可以克服任何突發狀況。另一方面，如果是一場賭注，有可能贏得勝利，也有可能導致部隊完全被摧毀。

隆美爾將軍

2-82. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. Success during operations depends on a willingness to identify, mitigate, and accept risk to create opportunities. When considering how much risk to accept with a COA, commanders consider risk to the force and risk to the mission. Commanders need to balance the tension between protecting the force, and accepting risks that must be taken to accomplish their mission. They apply judgment with regard to the importance of an objective, time available, and anticipated cost.

2-82.風險、不確定性和機率，在軍事作戰中是與生俱來的。作戰成功，靠的是主動辨識，降低、接受風險，並創造機會。當想到依據行動方案要承受多少危害，指揮官就會考慮到部隊及任務的風險。完成任務過程中，指揮官要在保護部隊、接受必要風險這兩件事



之間，取得一個平衡。他們會依據目標重要性、可用時間和預期成本來進行判斷。

2-83. Mission command requires that commanders and subordinates accept risk, exercise initiative, and act decisively, even when the outcome is uncertain. Commanders focus on creating opportunities rather than simply preventing defeat—even when preventing defeat appears safer. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is not gambling. Gambling is making a decision in which the commander risks the force without a reasonable level of information about the outcome. Therefore, commanders avoid gambles. Commanders carefully determine risks, analyze and minimize as many hazards as possible, and then accept risk to accomplish the mission.

2-83.任務指揮需要指揮官及其部屬接受風險；主動演練、決定性行動，甚至連結果都充滿不確定性。指揮官通常比較傾向創造機會，而不純粹是預防被擊敗——即使不被擊敗似乎還安全一點。合理評估和有意識的接受風險，並不算賭注。賭注是指揮官在決策時，沒有相對應的合理資訊，而將部隊置於危險的結果中。因此，指揮官要避免賭博式的決策，要謹慎地決定風險、分析並將危險儘可能降低，然後才能在承受必要風險之下完成任務。

2-84. Inadequate planning and preparation puts forces at risk, as does delaying action while waiting for perfect intelligence and synchronization. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is fundamental to successful operations. Experienced commanders balance audacity and imagination against risk and uncertainty to strike in a manner, place, and time unexpected by enemy forces. This is the essence of surprise. Planning should identify risks to mission accomplishment. Part of developing an operational approach includes answering the question, "What is the chance of failure or unacceptable consequences in employing the operational approach?" Risks range from resource shortfalls to an approach that alienates a population. Identified risks are communicated to higher headquarters, and risk mitigation guidance is provided in the commander's planning guidance.

2-84.不適切的計畫和準備會將部隊置於風險之中，就像一直在空等完美的情報和同步性，卻延後行動一樣的道理。對於成功的行動來說，合理評估和有意識的接受風險是很重要的。有經驗的指揮官會在大膽無畏和深思熟慮之間做出平衡，以降低風險和不確定性，並在敵人預期不到的時間、地點，以迅雷之勢進行打擊。這就是出奇不意的精髓。計畫內要納入風險評估才能完成任務。在擬定作戰範圍時，別忘了問個問題：在劃定作戰範圍時，失敗機率和不可接受結果的機會有多高？風險的範圍，從資源短缺到當地群眾不支持都包括在內。風險的確認要跟上級指揮單位溝通，而降低風險指導也應該列入指揮官計畫之中。

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