

理解任務式指揮

Understanding Mission Command

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You get the best effort from others not by lighting a fire beneath them, but by building a fire within.

– Bob Nelson

2015, the Army published the “Mission Command Assessment Program” to measure progress toward achieving the objectives of the Army Mission Command Strategy.¹ The first strategic objective in the Army Mission Command Strategy is that “all Army leaders understand the mission command philosophy.”² As the Mission Command Assessment Program concluded in 2019, a series of articles published in *Military Review* made a persuasive case that the institution fell short of this objective.³ While there is undoubtedly progress since 2019 on generating greater understanding of the mission command philosophy, instilling an understanding of mission command is a continuous process rather than a milestone fixed in time.

「在表面點火還不如從裡面點火，這才是我們所尋找的最佳辦法。」

– 鮑伯·尼爾森

前言

2015 年，美陸軍頒布「任務式指揮評估計畫」來衡量達成「美陸軍任務式指揮戰略」目標之進程，¹該戰略首項目標是做到「所有陸軍領導幹部都理解任務式指揮哲學。」²到了 2019 年時，美國《軍事評論》期刊中一系列關於任務

¹ “U.S. Army Mission Command Strategy, FY 13-19” (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 2013), accessed 22 December 2021, <https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/312724.pdf>; “U.S. Army Mission Command Assessment Plan FY 15-19” (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 19 June 2015), accessed 17 October 2021, <https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/mccoe/AMCAP%2022%20Jun%2015.pdf>.

² “U.S. Army Mission Command Strategy, FY 13-19,” 1.

式指揮的專文，卻凸顯「美陸軍任務式指揮戰略」未能達成預期目標，³即便如此，2019 年的各篇專文確實促成對任務式指揮哲學有更多理解，吾人須有所認知任務式指揮之灌輸是一個持續性進程，而非只是設定固定時間的里程碑而已。

In this article, I share some perspectives on the difficulties of educating and training Army leaders on the mission command philosophy, and I recommend a method to address shortcomings in our current approach. I describe a tool grounded in the relationship between trust and competence as an intuitive approach to coach subordinates and inform our practice of mission command.

本文分享一些關於美陸軍領導幹部在從事任務式指揮教育訓練時所遭遇的困難，並對當前執行作法的缺陷提出一項解決方案，即提出信任與專業能力關係的象限圖，該工具提供一個較直觀方法來教育所屬，從而精進任務式指揮之實踐。

Mission Command Confusion

任務式指揮之混亂

Gen. Stephen Townsend (then the commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) and several coauthors discussed the Army's struggles with generating a shared understanding of mission command in three articles published in *Military Review* in 2019. They focused on two culprits. First, the Army's rhetoric and actions were not consistent with mission command, evidenced by centralized training processes that constrained opportunities for subordinates to exercise initiative.⁴ Second, instead of clarifying mission command, the 2012 version of Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, *Mission Command*, served as a source of confusion. Removing the term "command and control" and replacing it with mission command resulted in misunderstanding between mission command as a philosophy and mission command as a warfighting function.

時任美陸軍準則與訓練司令部司令史蒂芬·湯森上將與多位作者在 2019

³ Stephen J. Townsend, Douglas Crissman, and Kelly McCoy, "Reinvigorating the Army's Approach to Mission Command: It's Okay to Run with Scissors (Part 1)," *Military Review* 99, no. 3 (May-June 2019): 4-9; Stephen J. Townsend et al., "Reinvigorating the Army's Approach to Mission Command: Leading by Mission Command (Part 2)," *Military Review* 99, no. 4 (July-August 2019): 6-12; Stephen J. Townsend et al., "Reinvigorating the Army's Approach to Mission Command: Training for Mission Command (Part 3)," *Military Review* 99, no. 5 (September-October 2019): 6-15.

年《軍事評論》各期中撰文，大家共同探討所理解的任務式指揮，最後在兩方面發現癥結點：一、陸軍的言行無法契合任務式指揮，像是統一集中的訓練流程讓部屬喪失執行主動作為的機會；⁴二、2012 年版第 6-0 號美陸軍準則出版品《任務式指揮》，不但無法釐清任務式指揮，反而成為混亂之根源，因為內容移除「指揮與管制」之詞彙並用任務式指揮來代替，讓人搞不清楚任務式指揮到底是一種哲學還是一項作戰功能。

As I attended pre-command courses in preparation for battalion command in the summer of 2019, Army senior leaders explained our institutional struggles to understand and practice mission command routinely. They implored our cohort of future battalion and brigade commanders to do better. Updated doctrine published in the summer of 2019 provided us some tools to coach subordinates on mission command.

在 2019 年夏季時，我在接任營長之前參加職前指揮課程，陸軍高階領導人表示，我們都流於形式在理解與實踐任務式指揮，並一味期望未來的營、旅長能夠做得更好，所幸在那個時間點《任務式指揮》準則剛好更新出版，適時成為我們教育部屬任務式指揮的工具。

The revised Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, remedied the shortcomings of the 2012 version of Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0. As stated in the introduction to this manual, “Labeling multiple things mission command unintentionally eroded the importance of mission command, which is critical to the command and control of Army forces across the range of military operations.”⁵ This update restored command and control as a warfighting function. It also clarified that mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control with the goal of empowering subordinate decision making and decentralized execution of operations that is appropriate to the situation.

經修訂的(2019 年版)第 6-0 號美陸軍準則出版品名為《任務式指揮：陸軍部隊的指揮與管制》，其修正 2012 年版的缺點，誠如在該準則例言所述，「給多種事物貼上任務式指揮的標籤，無意間破壞了任務式指揮的重要性，而任務式指揮在整個軍事作戰過程中對陸軍部隊的指揮與管制至關重要。」⁵這次準則的

⁴ Donald E. Vandegriff, *Adopting Mission Command: Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019).

⁵ Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2019), vii.

更新，重新改變並將指管視為作戰功能(譯註：2012 年版認為任務式指揮兼具哲學與作戰功能，誠如本文前述所言為造成混亂之根源)，同時也釐清任務式指揮為陸軍指管的一種方法，旨在賦予下屬決策權並視情況分權執行作戰行動（如圖 1 及圖 2）。




Figure 1: ADP 6-0, Mission Command, 2012




圖 1 2012 年版第 6-0 號美陸軍準則出版品

Nature of War

Military operations are inherently human endeavors representing a contest of wills, characterized by violence and continuous adaption by all participants, conducted in dynamic and uncertain operational environments to achieve a political purpose.

Operations must account for the nature of war. As such the Army's operational concept is...

Unified Land Operations

The simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action.

The Army's operational concept is enabled by....

Mission Command

The Army's approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.

Enabled by the principles of...

Competence | Mutual trust | Shared understanding | Commander's intent
Mission orders | Disciplined initiative | Risk acceptance

Command and control is fundamental to all operations...

Command and Control

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission.

Elements of Command

- Authority
- Responsibility
- Decision making
- Leadership

Elements of Control

- Direction
- Feedback
- Information
- Communication


Executed through...

Command and Control Warfighting Function

The related tasks and a system that enables commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power.

Tasks

- Command forces
- Control operations
- Drive the operations process
- Establish the command and control system



Command and Control System

- People
- Processes
- Networks
- Command posts

Figure 2: ADP 6-0, Mission Command, 2019

戰爭本質

軍事作戰是人的行為，構成人意志之間的競爭，各參與方在暴力上相互調適的過程，並在動態與不確定環境下達成政治目的。

在戰爭本質下所呈現的是作戰行動，至於美陸軍的作戰構想為

統一地面作戰

在同步化下執行攻勢、守勢及安定作戰，並在各領域民間組織的國防支援下形塑作戰環境、避免衝突、在大規模地面作戰中克敵致勝，進而鞏固統一作戰行動下之利得。

美陸軍作戰構想的輔助工具為

任務式指揮

美陸軍指管方法為賦予所屬決策權並視情況分權執行。

下列各原則為推動要素：

專業能力/互信/共同理解/指揮官意圖/任務式命令/有紀律的主動作為/風險承擔

指管為所有作戰行動之基礎

指揮與管制

由一位適任指揮官依上級交付任務而對所屬與配屬部隊進行相關的職權行使與命令下達。

指揮要素

- 職權
- 責任
- 決策
- 領導統御

管制要素

- 命令
- 回饋
- 資訊
- 溝通

執行方式為經由

指揮與管制作戰功能

相關的任務與體系使指揮官能統合所有戰力要素




圖 2 2019 年版第 6-0 號美陸軍準則出版品

With a firmer doctrinal foundation for mission command, I prioritized coaching subordinate leaders on the practice of mission command. Company grade leaders expressed skepticism on mission command in practice despite the revisions to ADP 6-0 during my first leader development session on this topic. I found that I needed a better leader development tool to coach subordinates on mission command than what I found in doctrine. This session began a two-year journey to increase the understanding and practice of mission command in the formation. As Townsend noted, “At its heart, the Army’s approach to mission command is about applying the appropriate level of control so that, given the circumstances and information available, leaders make the best possible decision at the right level and at the right time.”⁶

在任務式指揮既有穩固的理論基礎下，筆者將教育所屬領導幹部實踐任務式指揮列為優先事項。儘管我在第一次幹部培育會上提出已有 2019 年版第 6-0 號美陸軍準則出版品供參考，但仍無法排除連級領導幹部對任務式指揮實踐之質疑，因此我發現需要一個比準則內容更好的領導幹部發展工具，以利教育所屬實行任務式指揮。該會議擬定兩年時間來增進各組別對任務式指揮之理解與實踐。誠如準訓部湯森將軍所言，「美陸軍執行任務式指揮方法的主要核心意涵，為根據當時環境與所獲情資來適當運用控制，如此一來，領導人才能在對的層級和對的時機做出最佳決策。」⁶

In our initial discussions on mission command, company grade leaders expressed a perspective that close control of subordinate leaders was antithetical to the spirit of mission command. From these conversations, I felt that grasping the nuance of the *appropriate* level of control was the key to unlocking the essence of mission command. A confluence of factors, among them the reduction of mandatory training under Army Secretary Mark Esper’s tenure, removal of the term “command and control” from doctrine, and discussions in professional journals about the effects on the institution of myriad reporting requirements, created the conditions under which control was seen as a dirty word and inconsistent with mission command.⁷

我們在任務式指揮的初期討論中，連級領導幹部表示「密切」控制所屬幹部與任務式指揮精神背道而馳，而且從這些對話中，我發現一個細微差別，即

⁶ Townsend, Crissman, and McCoy, “Reinvigorating the Army’s Approach to Mission Command (Part 1),” 7.

「適當」控制為掌握任務式指揮的關鍵要素。另在多種因素的影響之下，如在陸軍部部長馬克·埃斯柏任內減少強制性訓練、從準則中移除「指揮與管制」乙詞，以及在專業期刊上許多專文討論制度良窳等，都凸顯營造一個控制制度並不適切、也不符合任務式指揮之精神。⁷

The revised ADP 6-0 provides a path away from the perspective that control is antithetical to mission command, stressing that the appropriate level of control is part of the art of command.⁸ However, educating the force on mission command by imparting the knowledge from ADP 6-0 is insufficient. It must be accompanied by training in which the knowledge in ADP 6-0 is put into practice. If you have ever picked up a musical instrument or a paintbrush, you are familiar with the rough state of your early practice as a musician or painting artist. Similarly, early practice of the art of command can be rough. Some artists learn to employ their skills more quickly than others, but familiarization and training on the basic tools of the practice provide a foundation for experimentation and learning.

反觀 2019 年版第 6-0 號美陸軍準則出版品則提出一個不同觀點，認為控制並未與任務式指揮背道而馳，強調適當控制是指揮藝術之一部分；⁸然而，教育所屬部隊任務式指揮只靠灌輸準則知識是不夠的，還要輔以如何將準則知識付諸實現的訓練。如果你曾經學過樂器或畫畫，你就會了解初期在練習成為一位音樂家或畫家的那種粗糙狀態；同樣地，在初期練習任務式指揮之藝術也是如此。一些藝術家之所以比其他藝術家更快運用其技能，是因為其較為熟悉關於實踐的基本訓練工具，而這是他們在試驗與學習上的基礎。

If determining the appropriate level of control is part of the art of command, perhaps the Army's struggles with practicing mission command stem in part from the tools provided to establish the foundations for the practice of mission command. I sought a tool to help subordinates understand that control measures or risk mitigation practices were not automatically signals of distrust, but rather application of the appropriate level of control in a given situation. ADP 6-0 discusses the use of mission variables and eight other considerations to guide leaders in the exercise of control over subordinate elements, but I found success with a more intuitive approach to

⁷ Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, *Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2015).

⁸ ADP 6-0, Mission Command, 1-5.

enable the exercise of mission command.⁹

如果我們找出適當控制是指揮藝術之一部分，或許美陸軍在實踐任務式指揮方面應思考為其建立基礎的工具，因此我找出一項工具來協助部屬了解控制措施或減少風險作為，這並非是不信任的自動信號，反而是在特定狀況下所運用的適當控制程度。2019 年版第 6-0 號美陸軍準則出版品雖然提出使用任務變數與八種思維（如表 1 及表 2），以引導領導幹部對所屬單位運用控制，但我也從中找到一個較直觀方法來實踐任務式指揮。⁹

Table 1: Mission Variables

Variable	Description
Mission	Commanders and staffs view all of the mission variables in terms of their impact on mission accomplishment. The mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. It is always the first variable commanders consider during decision making. A mission statement contains the "who, what, when, where, and why" of the operation.
Enemy	The second variable to consider is the enemy's dispositions (including organization, strength, location, and tactical mobility), doctrine, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.
Terrain and weather	Terrain and weather analysis are inseparable and directly influence each other's impact on military operations. Terrain includes natural features (such as rivers and mountains) and manmade features (such as cities, airfields, and bridges). Commanders analyze terrain using the five military aspects of terrain expressed in the memory aid OAKOC: observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key and decisive terrain, obstacles, cover and concealment. The military aspects of weather include visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, and humidity.
Troops and support available	This variable includes the number, type, capabilities, and condition of available friendly troops and support. These include supplies, services, and support available from joint, host nation, and unified action partners. They also include support from civilians and contractors employed by military organizations, such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the Army Materiel Command.
Time available	Commanders assess the time available for planning, preparing, and executing tasks and operations. This includes the time required to assemble, deploy, and maneuver units in relationship to the enemy and conditions.
Civil considerations	Civil considerations are the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. Civil considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

Source: Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2019), 3-6.

⁹ Ibid., 1-6. 譯者註：Mission Variables (Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available, Time available and Civil considerations—known as METT-TC 任務變數(METT-TC)共計八項：任務、敵情、地形與天候、部隊與可用資源、可用時間、民事考量。

表 1 任務變數

變數	說明
任務	指揮官與參謀依據變數對任務完成的影響程度來檢視所有任務變數。任務為具目的性之工作，明確指出應採取的行動及其理由，也是指揮官在決策時的首要考慮變數。任務應說明人/時/地/事/為何。
敵情	第二項考量變數為敵部署(包含組織、兵力、地點及戰術機動)、準則、裝備、各項能力、弱點及可能行動方案。
地形與天候	地形與天候分析密不可分，兩者對軍事行動有直接影響。地形包含天然與人造地貌，前者如河流與山岳，後者如城市、機場、橋樑。指揮官分析地形使用下列五個軍事面向(OAKOC)：觀測與射界、接近路線、地形要點、障礙物、隱蔽與掩蔽。至於天候的軍事面向包含能見度、風、降雨、雲覆蓋量、溫度和濕度。
部隊與可用資源	此變數是指可用友軍及支援的數量、類型、能力、條件，這些包括聯盟國、地主國和聯軍行動夥伴所提供的物資、服務和支援，另還有來自國防後勤局、陸軍軍品司令部委請民間與承包商所提供的支援。
可用時間	指揮官評估可用於規劃、準備，以及執行任務和作戰的時間，這包含與敵人和各種條件相關的集結、部署和調動部隊所需的時間。
民事考量	此變數是指人造基礎設施、民間機構，以及作戰區內平民領導人、居民和組織等活動對軍事作戰的影響。民事考量變數有六個特徵(ASCOPE)：領域、結構、能力、組織、人員、事件。

Source: Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2019), 3-6.

Table 2: Levels of Control

← More control Less control →		
	Considerations	
- Predictable - Known	Situation	- Unpredictable - Unknown
- Inexperienced - New team	Unit Cohesion	- Experienced - Mature team
Untrained or needs practice	Level of Training	Trained in tasks to be performed
Being developed	Level of Trust	Established
- Top down - Explicit communications - Vertical communications	Shared Understanding	- Reciprocal information - Implicit communications - Vertical and horizontal communications
Restrictive	Rules of Engagement	Permissive
Optimal decisions later	Required Decision	Acceptable decisions sooner
- Science of war - Synchronization	Appropriate To	- Art of war - Orchestration

Source: Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2019), 1-6.

表 2 控制程度

← 較多控制 → 較少控制		
	思維	
• 可預測 • 已知	情況	• 不可預測 • 未知
• 經驗不足 • 新團體	單位向心力	• 有經驗 • 老團體
• 未受訓練或需要練習 • 在發展中	訓練程度 信任程度	• 受過執行任務的訓練 • 已建立
• 由上而下 • 直截了當的溝通 • 縱向溝通	共同理解	• 互惠的資訊 • 不直接言明的溝通 • 縱向與橫向溝通
• 限制 • 晚點下決策最理想	交戰規則 決策需求	• 許可 • 可接受快速決策
• 戰爭科學 • 同步	適切	• 戰爭藝術 • 精心策劃

Source: Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2019), 1-6.

Relationship of Competence and Trust

專業能力與信任關係之象限圖

My recommendation for a more intuitive guide for the practice of mission command is rooted in the relationship between trust and competence. ADP 6-0 states, “Mission command requires *competent* forces and an environment of mutual *trust* and shared understanding among commanders, staffs, and subordinates” (emphasis added).¹⁰ While not downplaying the importance of the other variables a leader should consider in determining the appropriate level of control for a given situation, conceptualizing mission command in terms of the relationship between trust and competence provides a more instinctive method to teach our warfighting philosophy.

我所建議一個較直觀方法引導任務式指揮之實踐，為根據專業能力與信任之關係。2019 年版第 6-0 號美陸軍準則出版品指出，「任務式指揮需要具『專業能力』的部隊及一個在指揮官、參謀和部屬之間互相『信任』與共同理解的環境。」¹⁰在不淡化其他變數重要性的同時，領導人應在特定情況下思考採取適當控制，而欲使任務式指揮概念化可參照專業能力與信任關係之象限圖，以獲得較直觀方法來教導作戰哲學。

¹⁰ Ibid.

What do we mean by trust and competence? ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession*, states that the foundation of competence is military-technical expertise. Trust is the “shared confidence between commanders, subordinates, and partners that they can be relied on and are competent in performing their assigned tasks.”¹¹ Competent leaders perform duties with discipline and to standards while striving for excellence; display the appropriate knowledge of equipment, procedures, and methods; and recognize and generate innovative solutions.¹² Competence is therefore rooted in a subordinate’s ability to perform tasks, while trust centers on the perception between leaders and subordinates of their ability to accomplish a task. Of note, trust depends on a “shared confidence,” meaning that if a leader trusts a subordinate but the subordinate does not perceive that the leader trusts him or her, trust is suboptimal.


至於美軍所指的「專業能力」與「信任」的意義為何？第 6-22 號美陸軍準則出版品《陸軍領導統御與專業》指出，「專業能力」的基礎就是各項軍事專業技能，「信任」是「指揮官、部屬及夥伴間有共同信心，彼此可以相互依賴並自信有能力執行所肩負之任務」。¹¹領導幹部專業能力是指其在追求完美達成任務的同時，遵守各項紀律與標準；展現關於裝備、程序及方法的適當知識；接受或研擬創新解決方案。¹²部屬專業能力是指其有能力執行任務。至於領導幹部與部屬之間的信任則是展現於彼此有能力共同完成任務，誠如前述所言信任靠的是「共同信心」，但如果領導幹部信任部屬但部屬並無法理解領導人(他或她)的信任，則這種單向信任並不理想。

Characterizing mission command as the relationship between trust and competence allows us to put these two concepts on a dichotomy (see figure). On the x-axis, competence of subordinates ranges from low on the left side of the dichotomy to high on the right side. The y-axis represents the perceived trust between leaders and subordinates, ranging from an environment of low trust on the bottom of the dichotomy to high trust on the top.


本文將任務式指揮濃縮成「專業能力」與「信任」關係的象限圖，好處能讓我們將這兩個概念以二分法方式探討(如圖 3)，X 軸代表部屬專業能力高低，由左至右為低至高，Y 軸代表領導幹部與部屬之間信任，由下至上為低至高。

¹¹ Ibid., 1-7.

¹² ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2019), 5-14.



Source: by Lee Robinson



Source: by Lee Robinson

This diagram provides a visual representation of the relationship between trust and competence to aid leaders in understanding the appropriate level of control for a given situation. As an illustration, consider the case of a company

tasked to conduct convoy protection platform gunnery. A leader faces many decisions on risk management and control measures to ensure a successful outcome and maximize this training opportunity. The appropriate level of control for this training exercise rests on the relationship of trust and competence as illustrated by each quadrant of the diagram.

這個象限圖提供視覺性說明「專業能力」與「信任」關係，以利協助領導幹部理解在特定情況下的適當控制程度。舉例而言，試想在演訓中一個連被賦予任務去保護槍砲射擊平台，領導的指揮官將面臨眾多的風險管控決策與管控措施，並在確保戰果的同時也獲致最佳的訓練機會。對該場演習而言，適度的控制程度應參考象限圖所示「專業能力」與「信任」關係。

Macromanagement (upper left quadrant). When the competence of subordinates is low but trust between leaders and subordinates is high, it is likely that leaders will fail to exercise the appropriate amount of control for the task. In our platform gunnery example, the inappropriate amount of control for the level of subordinate competence may manifest in inadequate leader presence at rehearsals or during execution. The risk in this situation is that leaders do not apply the appropriate level of control given the low competence of subordinates, leading to suboptimal outcomes due to an inappropriate level of supervision. A little league baseball coach could schedule practices run by his or her players, but of course the team will improve much more with deliberate, supervised practice rather than relinquishing total control to the players. Macromanagement is a quadrant to avoid; a hands-off approach for a low level of subordinate competence will likely lead to suboptimal outcomes as the leader is absent when subordinates need a coach to help them through the fundamentals of a given task.

宏觀管理（第二象限）：當部屬專業能力低，即便存在領導幹部與部屬之間信任高，領導幹部會發生無法對任務做出適當管控的問題。以上述所列舉的保護槍砲射擊平台為例，在部屬專業能力上的控制不當(形成專業能力低)，可能會凸顯領導幹部在演練或執行期間有無法勝任任務的問題。這種情況的風險是在部屬專業能力低的時候，領導幹部將無法運用適當的控制，而且在不當的監督下自然產生較不理想的結果。一位小聯盟的棒球教練會為球員們安排練習，而且更仔細、監督式的練習將更能提升球隊戰力，反倒不會將控制主導權留給球員們決定。宏觀管理是一個應避免的象限。不插手干涉的方法對於部屬專業能力低而言，將導致較不理想的結果，因為當部屬需要教練協助建立特定任務的

基礎時，領導層級的人卻缺席。

Micromanagement (lower right quadrant). Suboptimal outcomes of a different sort are likely to result when subordinate competence is high but trust is low. Whereas subordinate competence and insufficient control limit performance in macromanagement, too much control limits performance in micromanagement. Performance limitations in this quadrant stem from the harmful effects on motivation when leaders apply too much control in an environment of high subordinate competence. Drawing on situational leadership theory from the field of organizational behavior, delegation should increase with subordinate maturity.¹³ In this quadrant of high subordinate competence, subordinates are likely to view a leader's influence tactics as inappropriate since they are not consistent with their needs. Suboptimal outcomes result from the decrease in subordinate satisfaction and creativity due to the mismatch of leader actions to the situation. Returning to our platform gunnery example, micromanagement will lead to an environment in which competence is not rewarded with increased latitude to apply creativity. The potential for the training event will be therefore limited by the leader's actions rather than the collaborative power of the group.

微觀管理(第四象限):當部屬專業能力高但領導幹部與部屬之間信任低時，就會出現第四象限這種不理想的結果。第二象限的宏觀管理受部屬專業能力與控制不足所影響，至於第四象限的微觀管理則是因為有太多控制，而當領導幹部在部屬專業能力高的環境下運用太多控制，這個象限就會產生在動機上的有害影響。從組織行為領域中借鑒情境領導理論可以得知，授權應隨著部屬專業能力的成熟度而增加。¹³由於部屬專業能力高位於這個象限中，部屬有可能會認為領導幹部的管東管西作法是不適當的，因為這不符合他們所需。由於領導幹部作法不符當前情況所需，將導致部屬滿意度與創造力下降這種不理想結果。再回到先前所列舉的保護槍砲射擊平台案例，微觀管理將導致部屬在逐漸施展創造力的同時，感受到專業能力無法受到上級肯定，而該場演訓的潛力發揮將受到領導幹部作為而不是團隊合作力所限制。

Compliance focused (lower left quadrant). This quadrant demonstrates how a high level of leader engagement can lead to best case

¹³ Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, *Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources*, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Claude L. Graeff, "Evolution of Situational Leadership Theory: A Critical Review," *The Leadership Quarterly* 8, no. 2 (1997): 153–70.

outcomes when subordinate competence and trust are low. The exercise of compliance-focused leadership is appropriate when subordinate competence is low and the perception of trust between leaders and subordinates is also low. In sharp contrast to the expectations under micromanagement, the coaching and influence tactics of a leader in this quadrant are likely to be well received by subordinates because they are consistent with the subordinates' needs, especially if the leader explains that the control measures are in place to build trust and competence. In our platform gunnery example, detailed planning and the use of backbriefs and rehearsals will lead to positive outcomes rather than relying on intent-based mission orders.

聽命行事(第三象限):當部屬專業能力跟領導幹部與部屬之間信任都低時，第三象限說明領導幹部的高程度參與，將導致最理想的結果。當發現部屬專業能力低、領導幹部與部屬之間信任也低時，最適合運用這種聽命行事式的領導統御關係。與微觀管理產生鮮明對比的是，在此象限中領導幹部的訓練與介入作法，部屬將會欣然接受，因為這些符合部屬本身需求，尤其是當領導幹部說明為了建立部屬專業能力跟領導幹部與部屬之間信任，須設立一些控制措施。如再以保護槍砲射擊平台為例，詳細的規劃作為、使用反向簡報以及預演將產生正向結果，反而不是依賴意圖取向的任務式命令。

Mission command (upper right quadrant). This quadrant represents mission command in its ideal state with high trust and high competence. In this environment, mission orders focused on a clear commander's intent with latitude for subordinate creativity will maximize the potential outcome. Returning to our platform gunnery example, this quadrant is the most likely scenario for subordinates to draw upon their experience and creativity and maximize the outcome of the training event within the commander's intent.

任務式指揮(第一象限):這個象限說明任務式指揮處於部屬專業能力高、領導幹部與部屬之間信任高的理想狀態。在這種情況下，任務式命令的重點在於清楚傳達指揮官之意圖，並讓部屬自由發揮創造力，進而最大化可能的成果。同樣以保護槍砲射擊平台為例，這個象限的情況能讓部屬累積他們的經驗與發揮創造力，同時在指揮官意圖下讓演訓的成果最大化。

As the shading in the figure indicates, leaders should strive to operate within the quadrant of the ideal state of mission command but should understand that compliance-based leadership is appropriate in some situations. In these quadrants, the leader applies the appropriate control for the given level

of trust and competence among subordinates. The figure provides an intuitive approach for leaders to decide on the appropriate level of control for a given situation and communicates that compliance focused leadership is desirable in some cases.

一如象限圖中的箭頭指向，領導幹部應致力於往任務式指揮的象限邁進，但也應理解聽命行事式的領導統御適合用於某一些情況下。領導幹部在專業能力與信任所構成一至四象限中運用適當控制，此象限分析圖提供領導幹部一個較直觀方法，以決定在某些特定情況下運用適當控制，也說明聽命行事式的領導統御可以適用於某些案例。

Moving from Compliance-Focused to the Ideal State of Mission Command **從聽命行事到理想的任務式指揮**

An appropriate analogy to think about the movement between these quadrants is the relationship between a rider and a horse. When trust between the rider and horse is low and the situation is unfamiliar, the rider holds the reins tightly. As trust increases and competence grows through repetition, the rider holds the reins more loosely. A well-trained horse may complete a familiar ride without prompts from the rider. The rider seldom leaves the reins in place; however, circumstances may change that cause the rider to tighten or loosen the reins.

思考這些象限之間移動的合適類比為騎士與馬之間的關係。當騎士與馬之間信任低並在不熟悉情況下，騎士將緊握韁繩。在反覆練習下，信任與專業能力也會隨之提升，騎士將放鬆手上韁繩。一匹訓練有素的馬或許可以在無需騎士的鞭策下獨自完成一場熟悉的旅程。雖然騎士很少將韁繩棄之不用，但情況變化可能會影響騎士手上韁繩的鬆緊。

Leadership is a constant process of adjustment of the reins with the goal of applying the right level of control for the circumstances at hand. Variables such as new leaders or unfamiliar circumstances may impact the perception of trust and competence. In such cases, akin to a rider feeling nervous when the horse may not be, a leader may tighten the reins out of caution, bumping the level of control into an undesirable quadrant.

領導統御是不斷調整手上韁繩的過程，旨在對當前情況做出適當控制，而像是新領導幹部或不熟悉情況等變數，可能會影響專業能力與信任的認知。在一些情況下，當馬不聽使喚時，騎士可能會緊張，而一位領導幹部出於謹慎可

能會拉緊韁繩，將控制程度帶往不符當前情況的象限。

As the figure indicates, the method to move to the ideal state of mission command is leader development. Incorporating leader development in our training management and risk management practices are two methods to move from a compliance-focused form of mission command to the ideal state.

如象限圖中的箭頭指出，領導人培育是一種從聽命行事式領導統御轉變為理想的任務式指揮之方法，而關鍵的兩項作法就是將領導人培育整合至我們的訓練管理與風險管理作為。

Training management is the process by which leaders prioritize, plan, resource, and execute training events. Mission command depends on competence, so leaders must ensure that subordinates have sufficient repetitions to build competence on mission essential tasks. As subordinates demonstrate mastery of tasks, leaders introduce ambiguity and complexity to allow subordinates to make decisions and learn from them. Incorporating command-and-control systems is a critical aspect of training management to train subordinates and leaders to operate from shared understanding. As competence and trust increase, training management is the process that commanders use to provide leader development opportunities to move from detail-based to intent-based mission orders.

訓練管理是一個領導幹部在演訓上安排優先事項、計畫、資源及執行的過程。任務式指揮需要部屬專業能力，所以領導幹部須讓部屬有反覆練習的時間，以建立達成任務所需的專業能力。當部屬展現對任務的掌握度時，這時領導幹部要帶入模糊性與複雜性，讓部屬在這種情況下做決策並從中學習。指管體系的整合為訓練管理的重要面向之一，旨在形塑領導幹部與部屬之間的理解。隨著專業能力與信任提升，指揮官可以在訓練管理過程中從事領導幹部培育，進而將細節取向的任務式命令轉型為意圖取向。

ADP 6-0 provides a perspective on how risk management practices aid an organization to move from compliance-focused leadership to the ideal state of mission command. It explains that two ways of managing risk are “managing the number of tasks assigned to subordinates and by providing the appropriate resources to accomplish those tasks.”¹⁴ As subordinate competence increases, commanders have more opportunities to add complexity to an operation to further leader development while appropriately managing risk. This complexity may involve varying resources such as

information, forces, materiel, and time as described in ADP 6-0.

2019 年版第 6-0 號美陸軍準則出版品提出，風險管理作法如何協助單位從聽命行事式領導統御轉變為理想的任務式指揮，並說明管理風險的兩個方法：一是管理指派給部屬的任務數量，二是提供達成任務所需的適切資源。¹⁴隨著部屬專業能力增加，指揮官就有更多機會在過程中增加複雜性，以利精進領導幹部培育並適切管理風險，而這種複雜性可能涉及如準則所述的資訊、兵力、軍品及時間等不同事物。

The Mission Command Journey

任務式指揮之旅程

The road to understanding mission command has been a bumpy one through the way mission command was taught and practiced. Our ability to practice mission command will increase with our efforts to communicate this philosophy in a way that our subordinates easily grasp. Understanding the relationship of trust and competence provides a useful pathway to a firmer grasp of mission command among Army leaders. I found the tool described in this article helpful to coach subordinate leaders on mission command. It generated a constructive dialogue in our training management and risk management practices. It also helped subordinates feel less guilty about using compliance-focused leadership when it was appropriate.

在教導、實踐、最終獲得理解任務式指揮之路向來是顛簸的。隨著我們用部屬能輕易理解方式來傳達任務式指揮哲學，將進一步提升任務式指揮的實踐力。理解專業能力與信任之間關係是一項有用途徑，讓美陸軍領導幹部更能掌握任務式指揮之精髓。本文所提出的象限圖分析工具，將有助於教育所屬領導幹部關於任務式指揮的課題，並將在訓練管理與風險管理作為方面產生建設性對話；此外，象限圖還說明在合適情況下應採用聽命行事式領導統御，有利於減少所屬幹部在實踐任務式指揮時採用此方法所產生的罪惡感。

譯後語

繼本刊第 198 期譯介「論任務式指揮」(Preventing a Short Jump across a Wide Ditch: Fully Embracing Mission Command to Avoid a Multi-Domain Disaster)乙文後，我們已對任務式指揮的定義、起源及實踐作法有所理解。至於在本文「理解任務式指揮」中，作者認為準則所述的任務式指揮之實踐，不夠簡明易懂，這對於教育基層領導幹部理解任務式指揮之原理原則構成阻礙；

¹⁴ ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 1-5.

鑒此，作者擷取準則中最精華部分，並將之轉化成一項有用的分析工具，也就是專業能力與信任關係的象限圖，當中區分為四個象限：第一象限為最理想狀態的任務式指揮，第二象限為宏觀管理，第三象限為聽命行事，第四象限為微觀管理。

有了這個象限分析圖，領導幹部可以藉此迅速檢視當前情況落在哪一個象限，從而研擬適切方法與作法。任務式指揮為領導人培育最終所望達成之目標，並非立竿就能見影，這是一個逐步轉型與轉變過程，我們在實踐任務式指揮時須有耐心，因為要建立高度信任與專業能力並不容易，而對的指揮幹部配上對的部屬畢竟是少數，往往要透過不斷調整與改進，才能慢慢朝往任務式指揮的目標邁進。

任務式指揮強調主動並在指揮官意圖下分權執行。近期國軍在外離島的指揮幹部往往遭遇中共民用無人機的騷擾問題，所幸我方已派遣部分官兵攜帶無人機干擾槍進駐支援反制作為，而國防部方面也優先籌補干擾槍供外離島官兵使用。然而，由於無人機出沒時間短暫，可能在反制命令傳達前就已經完成拍攝離去，這時候任務式指揮所強調在上級意圖下的主動作為就是最佳的解決之道，適時授權予前線領導幹部，才能及時並有效採取反制措施，或許中共民用無人機襲擾危機，正是國軍實踐任務式指揮的最佳時機。

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Lt. Col. Lee Robinson, U.S. Army, is an Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program Goodpaster Scholar assigned to the Army Talent Management Task Force. His degrees include a BA from the U.S. Military Academy, an MPA from Cornell University, and a PhD in public administration from the University of Georgia. He also served as an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy from 2010 to 2012. As an Army aviator, he served in Operation Iraqi Freedom with tours in northern Iraq and Baghdad, Operation Enduring Freedom in southern Afghanistan, and most recently in Atlantic Resolve as the commander of the 603rd Aviation Support Battalion.

美陸軍中校李·羅賓森為隸屬美陸軍人才管理特遣隊高階戰略規劃與政策計畫的古帕德斯特學者之一，畢業於美國西點軍校、康乃爾大學公共行政碩士、喬治亞大學公共行政博士，並於 2010 至 2012 年間在西點軍校社會科學系擔任助理教授。他為陸軍航空飛行員，在伊拉克自由作戰行動期間派駐伊拉克北部與巴格達等地，在持久自由作戰行動期間派駐阿富汗南部，近期在大西洋決心演習時擔任 603 航空支援營營長。

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