

烏克蘭以及戰爭的真理

(UKRAINE AND THE TRUTHS OF WAR)

●作者/ Lt. Gen. James Dubik 詹姆斯·杜比克中將



譯者/楊書豪上尉

陸軍官校 106 年班，步訓部正規班 365 期畢業，曾任排長、連長、人事官，現任陸軍步兵訓練指揮部兵器組反裝甲小組教官。

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It's too early to talk about lessons learned from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but it's not too early to observe how some of war's perennial truths are illustrated in this, the most current of wars. This essay addresses five of them:

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現在就開始談論烏俄戰爭中獲取的經驗教訓還言之過早，但要評述這場最新的戰爭如何彰顯歷久不衰的戰爭真理，仍是綽綽有餘。本篇文章提出了其中五個要點：

1. The future of war. Some writers have argued that war has changed so fundamentally that, if we have wars at all in the future, they will look nothing like in the past. Artificial intelligence, cyber, drones, robots, hypersonic weapons, space—pick a favorite technology—and you can find someone who predicts it is the future of war. Others have predicted that future wars will be gray zone operations—hybrid war below the threshold of conventional combat—in which mercenaries or paramilitaries fight a murky war in the shadows.

1.未來的戰爭型態: 一些評論家認為戰爭已經發生了本質上的改變，未來若有任何戰爭，將與過去的型態截然不同。AI 人工智慧、網路、無人機、機器人、極音速武器、太空戰—任選一個偏好的科技，將會發現有人預測這就是未來戰爭的趨勢。而另一派則預測，未來的戰爭將是灰色地帶作戰行動-低於傳統戰鬥門檻的複合式戰爭-亦即由雇傭兵團或民兵等武裝團體在暗中進行的一場隱晦式的征戰。

British Army Gen. Sir Rupert Smith has written: “War as a battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.” Looking at world events, not only in Ukraine but beyond, civil and military professionals can see these arguments are forms of reductionism that don’t match the reality of what is happening on the ground.

英國陸軍上將羅伯特·史密斯曾寫道：“戰爭是人和機器之間在戰場上的戰鬥，更是仲裁國際爭端的重大事件”，但此種戰爭已不復存在。民間學者與軍事專家們，看到不只在烏克蘭，甚至其它各地的全球重大事件，亦是如此。此種簡化戰爭形式的論述，因無法符合現今各地正在發生的事件現況而造成爭議。

Future war will take the shape necessary to achieve the political aims of those engaged in it. Combat will feature use of the means at hand: high tech and low, primitive and advanced, in the gray zone with hybrid means and with conventional tools. War is a practical affair, not a theoretical one. Preparing for war in all its potential forms is hard. It always was, and it always will be.

未來戰爭的形式，將為達成參戰者的政治目的，而量身定製。戰鬥時將會使用手頭上有的所有手段：不論是高端或低階的科技、原始或先進武器，在灰色地帶使用複合式手段和傳統作戰工具。戰爭是實際的搏鬥殺戮，而非紙上談兵。因此為任何潛在可能發生的戰爭作完善的準備是非常困難的。它一直是如此，未來也將持續。

The key is that the future is unpredictable. Reductionism is seductive but represents a dangerous mindset for security professionals. Those who advance such views obscure real war and, in the process, place obstacles in the path of war preparation. Betting, so to speak, on one possible future is gambling with America’s security.

其關鍵在未來是不可預測的。簡化戰爭形式的論述是非常誘人的，但對國安人員來說，是一種危險的心態。抱持此種心態者，隱匿了戰爭的真實面目，更是在戰備進程上劃地自限，係將美國國家安全與不確定的未來，放在賭盤上對賭上。

2. Levels of war. The tactical, operational and strategic levels of war are interwoven, and all involve both military and nonmilitary actions. Some in the 1990s believed, falsely, that the levels of war had collapsed. But each level, as well as how they interact, is clearly at work in Ukraine.

2. 戰爭層級-在戰爭中的戰術、作戰行動及戰略層級均相互牽動，都涉及軍事和非軍事行動。1990年代時，有些人誤認為戰爭層次的理論已不復存在，但各層次之間很明顯的，仍在烏克蘭戰爭中發揮作用。

Some individual actions (the tactical level) involve fighting discrete battles. Other individual actions, however, may be diplomatic, informational, financial or industrial. A keen observer of the Russia-Ukraine war can see both military and nonmilitary tactical actions playing out daily. But if a state's political aims are to be achieved (the strategic level), civil and military leaders must string together these discrete actions discrete into coherent campaigns (the operational level).

戰場上有些單獨自主的行動(在執行戰術層級方面)，包括了個別獨立自主的戰役。但也可以是其他各別獨立自主的行動，可能與外交、資訊、金融或工業有關的行動。但若要實現一個國家的政治目標（政治戰略層級方面），文職和軍事領導者必須將上述個別獨立不同的行動整合成一連串的戰役¹（軍事作戰行動層級方面²）。

For example, the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, has been waging diplomatic and informational campaigns to create and sustain support for his country's defense. His individual actions—whether in the media or in capitals around the world—are part of a larger campaign

¹ (註，campaign, group of military operations with a set purpose, use in one area. 戰役是指在某一個地區所作的一連串的軍事行動)。

² Operation 作戰行動-(美國國防部) 1.是指具有共同目標或聯合作戰目的的一系列戰術行為 A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying. M 1-02: Operational Terms & Graphics, Headquarters, Department of the Army Publication, p1-112, Published 2004-09(SEP 04)

Campaign 戰役- 一系列的主要作戰任務，其目的是在特定時間和空間內達成戰略和作戰目標。(DOD) A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.

FM1-02: Operational Terms & Graphics, Headquarters, Department of the Army Publication, p1-112, Published 2004-09(SEP 04)

designed to achieve Ukraine's strategic, political aims. The U.S. and NATO are conducting at least three simultaneous campaigns: one to defend NATO territory and prevent the war from widening or escalating; a second to supply Ukraine with the means necessary for its defense; and a third to sanction Russian individuals and corporate entities. Also going on are informational, diplomatic, industrial and monetary campaigns.

例如，烏克蘭佛拉迪米爾·澤倫斯基總統持續發動的外交與資訊宣傳活動，都是在為其國家防衛創造有利機勢。他的個人行動-不論是在媒體上或世界各國的首府-都是烏克蘭在實現其戰略及政治目標的行動中其中的一部分。美國和北約至少正在同時進行三場戰役：一是守衛北約領土，防止戰事擴大或升級；二是向烏克蘭提供各式防衛所需的措施；第三則是制裁俄羅斯所屬的個人及企業機構。其他諸如：資訊、外交、工業及財務相關的行動也在進行中。

Like the tactical level, the operational is not just a military activity. Further, ensuring the military and nonmilitary campaigns are integrated, complement one another and adapt as the war unfolds is part of waging war at the operational and strategic levels. Finally, all campaigns must contribute to achieving the strategic, political aim set by the political communities involved. Otherwise, efforts could work against one another. This aspect of waging war is always difficult, more so when alliances are involved.

與戰術層級一樣，作戰行動不僅只是軍隊的行動，也是確保軍事及非軍事戰役上的整合與相互撐持。最終，所有的戰役行動，皆需能有助於各參戰國家共同制定之政治與戰略目標的達成，否則一切作為，可能是相互掣肘而落空；此種戰爭發動的方式總是充滿艱難，尤其當多國聯盟參與其中。

The key is to remember that excellence at the military tactical and operational levels is necessary but insufficient. Strategic excellence is also necessary, for wars are waged and won at the strategic level and always require military and nonmilitary action.

關鍵是要記住，卓越的戰術及軍事行動作為有其必要，但仍嫌不足，卓越的戰略作為亦屬必要。在戰略層級上，需要作到戰必勝，而且軍事及非軍事行動亦是缺一不可。

3. Combat power. Combat power is not merely a function of technology; it's a function of confidence—in yourself, your buddies, your leaders, your equipment, your training and, importantly but often overlooked, the systems that are supposed to support you and your unit.

3.戰鬥力-戰鬥力不是只有科技的功能；而是對自己、同伴、上級、裝備、訓練上的自信心，以及很重要但卻經常被忽視-足以支持你及所屬單位作戰的各式人事、情報、作戰及後勤系統。



The U.S. Army prepares for war in a variety of ways to keep pace with ever-changing global threats and battlefield demands. (Credit: U.S. Army and Indiana National Guard Images/ARMY magazine photo illustration)
美國陸軍為了跟上不斷變化的全球威脅與戰場需求，持續以各種方式為戰爭做準備。（來源：美國陸軍和印第安納州國民警衛隊圖片/陸軍雜誌照片插圖）

Thinking of a military force as a spear brings this point home. The tip of the spear, the fighting units, is sharp when confidence is high. Part of that confidence derives from the strength of the spear's shaft. If the echelons above those fighting cannot consistently provide proper intelligence, integrate maneuver and supporting fires, conduct supply and logistics operations, or provide adequate medical support, confidence and combat power decrease.

將軍事實力視為長矛，即可說明這一論點之基礎。戰鬥單位視同長矛的尖端，當訓練精良信心充足時，矛是鋒利的。感受此種信心，部分來自矛桿的強度(上級單位之指導

與作為)，如果上級指導單位無法持續提供正確的情報、整合兵力佈署及支援火力、執行後勤補給作業或提供足夠的醫療支援，自信及戰鬥力就會下降。

Confidence has three dimensions. Military confidence derives from the tip of the spear and its immediate shaft. Institutional confidence lies further up the shaft. Institutional confidence derives from the highest levels of military and civil organizations that are designed to provide the fighting force and command echelons above fighting with the people, training, materiel, leadership, organizations and fiscal means necessary to sustain combat. Poor institutional proficiency takes longer to erode combat power, but it will finally affect confidence at the tip of the spear.

信心包含三個部分。軍事信心來自矛尖及其桿身(比喻戰力)，制度性的信心則會攀升至桿身。制度性信心來自最高層級的軍事及文職單位，這些單位的目的在提供戰鬥部隊及各指揮層級，支持作戰所需的人員、訓練、裝備、領導、組織及財務手段等。制度專業度不足，會逐漸減損戰力，但最終會影響到矛尖上的信心(比喻士氣)。

Last, at the end of the shaft, lies political confidence. Spears don't throw themselves; senior political and military leaders throw them. When a military spear is thrown frivolously, in haste, at the wrong target, or is repetitively aimed poorly—that will ultimately affect confidence at the tip. And combat power at the tip of the spear decreases if there is a sense that those throwing the spear are “wasting” the lives and sacrifices of those fighting. The quality of both the Ukrainian and Russian “spear” is in full view for all to evaluate.

最後，在矛桿的尾端，是政治信心。長矛不會自己投擲，高階政治和軍事領導者才會。當一支長矛被輕率、匆忙地、投向錯誤的目標或反覆瞄準不佳時-終將影響到長矛尖端的信心。如果感覺那些投擲戰矛的人“浪費”了戰鬥人員的生命及無故被犧牲，那麼長矛尖端的戰鬥力就會降低。這場戰爭中，烏克蘭和俄羅斯“長矛”的戰力都呈現在世人的檢視下。

The key is proficiency-based confidence at each dimension of combat power: at the tip of the spear and in the spear's complete shaft. A sharp tip without a strong shaft is not a spear.

關鍵在於各種面向的戰鬥能力，其信心乃是基於純熟與專業，亦即對矛尖和長矛的完整桿身的信任。缺乏堅固桿身的鋒利矛尖，無法發揮長矛的戰力。

4. War's moral dimension. The moral dimension of war is often described in three parts: going to war for legitimate reasons, waging and fighting the war according to moral principles and the laws of armed conflict, and ending the war in ways that bring about a better peace than at the war's start. These are important, and each is apparent in the Russia-Ukraine war. Another way to understand war's moral dimension, however, is through four important wartime moral relationships.

4. 戰爭的道德面。戰爭的道德面通常被區分為三大部分：師出有名、代天行道的正義之師、速戰速決解救人民於戰火。上述論點很重要，也都在俄烏戰爭中彰顯出來。但是還有另外一種理解戰爭道德面向的方法，就是透過四種重要的戰時道德關係。

The first is between combatants and the innocent, the noncombatants who are always on the battlefield. The outrage over Russian disregard for the rights of the innocent is a daily reminder of the world's moral expectations of those who fight: first, protect the innocent to the extent demanded by international conventions and the law of armed conflict; and second, do not use the innocent as means to achieve military ends.

首先是藉於戰鬥人員和平民，非戰鬥人員始終都在戰場上。對俄羅斯無視平民權利的憤怒，每天都在提醒全世界對戰時道德規範的期望：第一，在國際公約和武裝衝突法要求的範圍內保護平民；第二，不要以平民作為達到軍事目的之手段。

The second morally relevant relationship is among soldiers themselves. Each combatant relies on the other for protection, sometimes to the point of sacrificing one's life for a fellow soldier. No unit can long fight if such trust is absent.

第二項與道德相關的關係，是參戰官兵之間的關係。每個戰鬥人員都依賴對方來保護自己，有時甚至會為了戰友而犧牲自己的生命。缺少這種信任，任何單位都無法長期戰鬥。

The third is between soldiers and their leaders—tactical, operational and strategic. Soldiers' very lives are in the hands of those who give commands, issue orders and promulgate directives. These leaders are often sergeants and officers. At the tip of the spear and the base of the shaft, the moral bond and the weight of responsibility are clearest. At the senior operational and strategic levels, the bond and responsibility are sometimes obscured, but both are always present. Those who direct large-scale operations literally use lives to achieve campaign goals. These military and political leaders have the weightiest of responsibilities even though they are farther from the battlefield.

第三項，是士兵與他們的上級之間的關係-戰術、作戰行動及戰略作為。士兵的性命掌握在那些指揮以及發號施令的人手中。這些上級通常是士官與軍官幹部。在矛的尖端和桿的底部，道德和責任是最清楚的。在高階作戰行動及戰略層級，道德和責任有時是模糊的，但兩者始終存在。古語說：一將功成萬骨枯；這些軍、政領導者即使遠離戰場，但仍肩負著沉重的道德責任。

Finally, there is an important and morally relevant relationship between soldiers and their government. Senior military and political leaders are those the government sanctions to send citizens-now-in-uniform to risk their lives; they are also the leaders whose decisions have a wide-ranging effect on families and communities. Governments have the right to use the lives of their citizens-turned-soldiers (or airmen, sailors or Marines), but in doing so they have the corresponding obligation to use those lives well. Responsible use is the flip side of the right of final decisions.

最後，士兵和他們的政府之間有著一層重要且和道德相關的關係。高階的軍、政領導人運用政府賦予他們的權力，以法令派遣穿著軍服的公民，冒生命危險去戰鬥；他們的決定，會對相關家庭和社區，產生廣泛程度的影響。政府有權運用其平民/軍人（或飛行員、水手或海軍陸戰隊）的生命，但在這樣做的同時，他們也有相對的義務去善待這些生命。因此，經過深思熟慮後的決策，才能免於生靈涂炭。

The key for civilian and military security professionals is this: Your decisions are matters of life and death. Citizens in uniform remain citizens. Some of their rights can be modified, abridged

and temporarily withheld, but none merely forfeited unconditionally.

對軍、文職的國安專業人員而言，最重要的是：他們的決定攸關生死。穿制服的公民仍然是公民。他們的一些權利可以被修改、忽視或暫時保留，但沒有一項是應該無條件喪失的。

5. War's enduring nature. Regardless of how technology affects the conduct of war, the geostrategic conditions surrounding war or the historical period of war, war remains the realm of fear, fog, friction and uncertainty. War remains, on the battlefield and in capitals, a dynamic phenomenon in which warring parties try to outfox as well as outfight their enemies. Each side tries to outwit the other, and each side tries to thwart the plans of the other. Force is the coin of war's realm.

5.戰爭的持久性。無論科技如何影響戰爭的進行、圍繞戰爭的地緣條件或戰爭的歷史因素，戰爭仍充滿恐懼、迷霧、摩擦與不確定性。戰爭仍然會發生在戰場上及政經城市，是一種動態的現象，交戰各方均試圖突破戰爭迷霧並戰勝敵人。每一方都試圖智取對方，每一方都試圖阻撓對方的作戰計劃。因此，武力就是戰爭中的本錢。

Sometimes diplomatic force or economic force may succeed, but physical force is more often the final arbiter. War's primary aim is to compel, not to convince or communicate. The Russia-Ukraine war displays war's enduring nature daily.

有時外交或經濟手段可能會成功，但實質的軍事力量往往是決定戰爭勝負的最終仲裁者。戰爭的主要目的是屈服對手，而非說服或交流，俄烏戰爭每天都在展示戰爭的曠日廢時，無法速戰速決的本性。

Finally, war is a constant interplay—at all levels—among its purpose, the emotion necessary to sustain fighting, and skill and chance associated with both fighting and waging war. This dynamic relationship changes constantly as war unfolds for each of the warring parties as well as between them. The dynamics are ever-changing, as opportunities and vulnerabilities emerge, and as populations and leaders respond to the realities of war unexpected at its start. Nothing is static in war, which adds to its fog and uncertainty.

最終，戰爭是一種在各個層面及各種目的中，在維持戰鬥所必需的衝勁及戰鬥技能，以及在和、戰與機會間，不停地相互傾軋。這種變動態關係隨著戰事的進展及交戰各方的利害盤算，而不斷變化。戰爭的本質亦恆久不變，隨著戰機的稍縱即逝，以及民眾與領導人對戰爭結果始料未及的反應。因此，在戰爭中一切都幻變無常，增添了撲朔迷離及不確定性。

Key for those who are trying already to derive lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine war is to be mindful not just of the specifics of this war, but also of the constants in war.

對於那些已經試圖從俄烏戰爭中汲取經驗教訓的人來說，不僅要注意這場戰爭的細節，還要注意戰爭中不變的本質。

When security professionals, military and civilian, hear claims that the Russia-Ukraine war shows that everything has changed, remember that this list of five is only the beginning of an understanding of war's perennial truths. Take care not to fall prey to a new fad of reductionist thinking.

當軍、文職國安專業人士，聽到關於烏俄戰爭證明一切都發生變化的說法時，請記住：本文中的五項要點只是了解戰爭永恆真理開始，請注意不要成為新的簡化論思想的犧牲品。

Lt. Gen. James Dubik, U.S. Army retired, a former commander of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, is a senior fellow of the Association of the U.S. Army. He holds a doctorate in philosophy from Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, and is the author of *Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory*.

詹姆斯·杜比克中將，美國陸軍退役，曾任伊拉克多國安全過渡司令部指揮官，美國陸軍協會高級研究員。他擁有巴爾的摩約翰霍普金斯大學哲學博士學位，著作有《正義戰爭重新考慮：戰略、倫理和理論》一書。