

論任務式指揮¹

Preventing a Short Jump across a Wide Ditch: Fully Embracing Mission Command to Avoid a Multi-Domain Disaster

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A short jump is certainly easier than a long one; but no one wanting to get across a wide ditch would begin by jumping half-way.

—Carl von Clausewitz

The American military risks a short jump across a wide ditch with the multi-domain operations (MDO) concept. The concept assumes an American advantage in rapid and agile decision-making due to mission command. Mission command provides the tempo and agility required to succeed in complex environments, pursue maneuver warfare, and succeed on the multi-domain battlefield. However, the Army has only partially embraced mission command. Unless the Army fully embraces mission command through organizational, doctrinal, and training changes, it could make a halfway jump into a military disaster.

「跳近一定比跳遠容易，但沒人想用只能跳一半距離的近跳來越過寬壕溝。」

— 克勞塞維茨

前言

美軍在多領域作戰構想上的處境，就如同冒著用近跳風險來跨越寬壕溝，原因在於該構想假設美軍具有任務式指揮快速與靈活的決策優勢。任務式指揮提供在複雜環境下克敵致勝、從事機動作戰，以及在多領域戰場殲敵所需的作戰節奏與靈活度。然而，美陸軍的任務式指揮只做對了一半，除非能在組織、準則及訓練層面跟著做改變，才能完全發揮任務式指揮之優勢，避免前述所說只能跳一半距離所導致的軍事災難。

In pursuing MDO, the Army assumes an advantage in mission command against peer threats. We need to challenge that assumption in Russia's case. The U.S. Army must recognize the strategic, cultural, and hierarchical pressures that inhibit such an advantage. To overcome those barriers to

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mission command and to enable maneuver warfare, the Army should (1) clarify the vision of mission command to allow soldiers to properly conceptualize the vision; (2) strengthen unit cohesion and flatten hierarchies to produce an entrepreneurial organizational culture; (3) adopt a decision-making model based on satisficing that supports rapid and flexible decisions; and (4) conduct regular large-scale, force-on-force exercises that simulate the complexity of warfare to develop the frames of references necessary for mission command. These changes will enable the decentralized, high tempo, agile decision-making required for MDO to succeed.

在多領域作戰層面上，美陸軍假設自己在對抗實力匹敵者（俄羅斯）時具有任務式指揮的優勢，本文旨在挑戰這種既定的假設。美軍須認知阻礙這種優勢的各種戰略、文化及等級制度等壓力。為了克服這些對任務式指揮的障礙及順利遂行機動作戰，美陸軍應該做到下列幾點：一、釐清任務式指揮願景，以使官兵能正確認知該願景的構想；二、強化單位向心力並扁平化等級，以形塑單位組織文化；三、採取基於滿意度的決策模式，以協助下達快速彈性的決策；四、定期進行大規模實兵對抗演習，以利模擬戰爭的複雜環境，進而發展任務式指揮所需的參考架構。這些作為將促成分權化、高節奏及彈性決策，為多領域作戰致勝不可或缺之要素。

MDO recognizes five domains (ground, air, maritime, space, and cyber/electromagnetic spectrum). Although the United States has dominated these domains in Afghanistan and Iraq, it must prepare to operate under conditions in which future adversaries have windows of dominance in select domains. According to MDO, competitors have invested in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems to provide layered standoff. This standoff could allow them to use force to create a *fait accompli*, which the joint force would struggle to penetrate at an acceptable cost and without risking escalating a limited conflict to a general war. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, states that “Army forces penetrate and dis-integrate A2/AD systems and exploit the resultant freedom of maneuver to achieve strategic objectives (win) and force a return to competition on favorable terms.”¹ In order to penetrate A2/AD systems, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, explains that the Army will exploit weak points and seize positions of relative advantage through maneuver warfare.²

任務式指揮與作戰之連結

多領域作戰界定美軍將面對五個作戰領域（陸、海、空、太空、網路）。¹¹雖然美國在阿富汗與伊拉克戰場主宰這些作戰領域，但須未雨綢繆未來敵人將在特定領域握有主導權的情況。在多領域作戰的想定下，競爭之敵致力於建立「反介入/區域拒止」體系，以形塑多層對峙態勢，這種態勢將使敵能運用兵力營造一個既定的控制區域，迫使美軍不敢輕舉妄動進行突圍，也不敢冒險將有限衝突升級為全面戰爭。美陸軍訓練與準則司令部頒布的編號 525-3-1：《2028 年美陸軍多領域作戰》手冊指出，陸軍部隊須突穿並瓦解敵「反介入/區域拒止」體系，同時利用從中開創的行動自由來達成戰略目標（致勝），進而讓自身重返有利的競爭條件。¹第 3-0 號：《作戰》野戰教則指出，為了突穿「反介入/區域拒止」體系，美陸軍須善用敵弱點並在機動作戰時奪取相對有利位置。²

Maneuver warfare seeks systemic disruption. In 1989, the Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, *Warfighting*, provided the most succinct definition of maneuver warfare: “A warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.”³ It repeatedly out-decides the enemy and exploits opportunities until they are in such chaos that they cease to provide effective resistance.

機動作戰旨在尋求系統性破壞。美陸戰隊準則出版品第 1 號：《戰鬥》，提供最簡明關於機動作戰的定義：戰鬥的哲學旨在破壞敵凝聚力，作法是透過一連串快速、暴力及不預期行動，開創一個敵無法處置的混亂且急速惡化情勢。」³其反覆向敵發動攻勢並利用可趁之機，直至敵陷入混亂且無法做出有效的反抗為止。

B. H. Liddell Hart described maneuver warfare as water overcoming an obstacle: the water does not approach the obstacle with a centralized plan. It tests it at countless points until it finds weaknesses then rushes in to create

¹¹ 美國國防部雖然尚未將電磁頻譜列為第六個作戰領域之一，但多數學者都將之列為第六個作戰領域做探討。
¹ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, February 2020), 17, accessed 2 Jul y 2021, <https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-3-1.pdf>.
² Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 6 December 2017), 1-80, accessed 2 July 2021, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN6687_FM%203-0%20C1%20Inc%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf.
³ U.S. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, *Warfighting* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1989), 59.

and exploit breakthroughs.⁴ Edward Luttwak explained that “the whole operation rests on the ceaseless maintenance of momentum,” which becomes supreme during the breakthrough phase.⁵ If momentum is lost, the enemy can plug his gaps and encircle vulnerable units that have broken through.

李德·哈特將機動作戰描述為如同水克服障礙物一樣：水不會以集中匯流方式接近障礙物，水會在障礙物的無數點上做測試直至發現弱點，然後闖入突破口並開創有利態勢。⁴至於愛德華·魯瓦克的見解為，「在作戰全程中須不斷保持一鼓作氣的氣勢，尤其是在突破階段時是最重要的。」⁵若一旦喪失氣勢，敵就可以防堵自身的缺口，接著包圍已遭突破的弱勢單位。

Achieving this tempo requires commanders to empower subordinates to act with disciplined initiative through mission command. Low-level leaders can more quickly understand the situation at their level and exploit opportunities than senior leaders. William Lind argued that “only a decentralized military can have a fast OODA [observe, orient, decide, act] Loop.”⁶ A force that more rapidly cycles through OODA loops than an enemy will cause its foe to lose cohesion and collapse. By making decisions more quickly than the enemy can react, this form of decision-making can exploit enemy vulnerabilities that arise from the natural friction of warfare faster than enemies can fix them.

若要達成這種作戰節奏，指揮官須將權力下放給部屬，並以任務式指揮要領執行有紀律的主動作為。基層部隊長因位處一線，將比高層指揮官更快速理解情勢且更容易掌握可趁之機。威廉·林德認為，「只有分權化軍事體制，才能有快速的『觀察、指導、決心、執行』（OODA）決策循環。」⁶一支有更快 OODA 決策循環的軍隊，將能打擊敵凝聚力並使之潰敗，若能比敵人更快下達決策不僅可以藉此發動反擊，還可以用這種方式來打擊敵來不及修復戰爭摩擦所產生的弱點。

The concepts of OODA loop cycling and maneuver warfare provide a solution against modern adversaries. Our adversaries are complex and adaptive, and they possess the resiliency to react to our actions in difficult-to-predict, asymmetric ways. Centralized solutions cannot overcome

⁴ B. H. Liddell Hart, “The ‘Man-in-the-Dark’ Theory of Infantry Tactics and the ‘Expanding Torrent System of Attack,’” *Royal United Services Institution Journal* 66, no. 461 (February 1921): 13, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071842109421930>.

⁵ Edward N. Luttwak, “The Operational Level of War,” *International Security* 5, no. 3 (Winter 1980-1981): 20, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538420>.

⁶ William S. Lind, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 4–6.

such adversaries except through overwhelming attrition. OODA loop cycling and maneuver warfare can achieve a level of systemic disruption to overcome our adversaries' resiliency at an acceptable cost. MDO attempts to pursue this theory of victory, but we must maintain a higher tempo of operations than our adversaries for this theory to succeed.

OODA 決策循環與機動作戰之構想是對付現代化敵人的解決方案之一。當前敵人的特性是複雜且具適應力，同時具有韌性並能以難以預測、不對稱方式來因應我方行動，因此集權化作戰方案須配合壓倒性消耗戰法，否則無法戰勝這種敵人，至於 OODA 決策循環與機動作戰則可以在合理成本下對敵造成一定程度的系統性破壞。多領域作戰試圖尋求這種勝利理論，所以我們要做的是維持比敵更快的作戰節奏，才能成功實現該理論。

MDO assumes the American military can decide at a more rapid tempo than its adversaries. Gen. David Perkins, the former commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, called maneuver warfare our “ace in the hole” against adversaries such as Russia that take an attritional approach to warfare.⁷ Perkins claimed that we should pursue maneuver warfare, because the “enemy does not have that agility, does not empower subordinates to do that.”⁸ TP 525-3-1 similarly assumes that Russia “organizes and operates forces through highly centralized command and control structures that have difficulty adapting to rapid tactical changes or complexity.”⁹

多領域作戰的有利假定是美軍能比敵更快下達決策。前美陸軍訓練暨準則司令部司令大衛·柏金斯上將表示：「機動作戰是美軍手上的『王牌』，尤其可以用來對付像俄羅斯這種採取消耗戰法的敵手。」⁷柏金斯將軍認為美軍應從事機動作戰，原因在於「敵人不具備彈性，而且在作戰時也不將權力下放給部屬。」⁸編號 525-3-1 多領域作戰手冊就假定俄羅斯是上述情況，其為經由高度集權的指管來調派軍隊，這種方式難以適應快速戰術變化與環境複雜性。⁹

These are dangerous assumptions. Robert Leonhard warned that overconfidence in maneuver warfare could prove disastrous if “the U.S. is engaged with a better rival [than Iraq] ... that is capable of showing initiative

⁷ GEN Perkins Explains #MultiDomainBattle, March 27, 2017, YouTube video, posted by “US Army TRADOC,” 27 March 2017, accessed 2 July 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sHAOpmg3mtg>.

⁸ LANPAC Symposium 2017: GEN Perkins Keynote Address on Multi-Domain Battle, YouTube video, posted by “US Army TRADOC,” 31 May 2017, accessed 2 July 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X1QghhZbqA8>.

⁹ TP 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, 14.

in every echelon of command.”¹⁰ If America was to attempt high-risk maneuver warfare against an enemy that operates at quicker tempo, it would risk disaster.

另外有一些對美軍不利的假定，如美國軍事理論家羅伯特·李奧納多警告道：「一旦美軍對上一個較厲害之敵（不像伊拉克），其若能在各個指揮梯隊遂行主動作戰，則將證明過度自信於機動作戰能力將是一場災難。」¹⁰若美國對敵人採取高風險的機動作戰，只要敵具備更快的作戰節奏，就無法排除面臨一場災難發生可能性。

Gen. Mark Milley voiced concerns over the Army's decision-making: “I think we're over-centralized, overly bureaucratic, and overly risk-averse—which is the opposite of what we're going to need.”¹¹ He observed a trend in America's way of war. The Army has tended toward centralization and attritional warfare rather than decentralization and maneuver warfare. It never fully embraced mission command.

時任美陸軍參謀長馬克·密利上將（現為參謀首長聯席會議主席）也對陸軍的決策表示擔憂：「我認為陸軍部隊過於集權化、過度官僚主義、過度講求規避風險，反而與我們所需要的背道而馳。」¹¹他提出自身觀察美國作戰方式的趨勢，陸軍部隊傾向集權化與消耗戰的戰法，而不是分權化與機動作戰的戰法，如此一來，將永遠不可能真正實踐任務式指揮。

The Army first codified mission command and maneuver warfare under Air-Land Battle doctrine. Gen. Donn Starry produced the Air-Land Battle concept in 1982. The concept owed much to Prussia's *Auftragstaktik* (mission type tactics), which was translated into “mission command.” Air-Land Battle introduced the operational level of war and revolved around four tenets: initiative, depth of operations, agility, and synchronization.

美陸軍率先在「空地作戰」準則架構下編纂任務式指揮與機動作戰，而「空地作戰」為唐恩·斯達里上將（1977-1981 年任陸軍訓練暨準則司令部司令）在 1982 年時所提出的作戰構想，該構想主要汲取普魯士的「任務式戰術」，後來將之轉譯成「任務式指揮」。「空地作戰」除了導入戰爭的作戰層級（戰略、作戰、戰術）外，也圍繞著四個要旨：主動作為、作戰縱深、靈活、同步性。

¹⁰ Robert Leonhard, *The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1991), 270.

¹¹ David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Three Things the Army Chief of Staff Wants You to Know,” *War on the Rocks*, 23 May 2017, accessed 2 July 2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/three-things-the-army-chief-of-staff-wants-you-to-know/>.

However, when Col. John Boyd, the father of the OODA loop, met the writers of the doctrine, he complained that *synchronization* was antithetical to maneuver warfare. He argued that *synchronization* means evening up the front line and waiting for slower units. “An army that relies on synchronization is not an army that practices maneuver warfare ... This idea of synchronization will ruin the Army.”¹²

然而，OODA 決策循環的提出者約翰·博伊德上校在遇見撰寫準則的人時抱怨道，同步性與機動作戰兩者是對立的，他認為「同步性好比是晚上時在前線起床等較慢的部隊，依靠同步性的軍隊實則無法實行機動作戰……這種同步性的理念會毀了陸軍。」¹²

MDO continues the chorus of synchronization. TP 525-3-1 tries to avoid using the word “synchronize” (only six occurrences) but delves deeply into the thesaurus to repeatedly use synonyms such as “integrate” (seventy-three occurrences), “converge” (ninety-four occurrences), “federate” (three occurrences), and “synergy” (twenty-three occurrences).¹³ The pamphlet begrudgingly accepts the trade-off between tempo and synchronization: “Commanders will invariably accept less-than-perfect multi-domain synchronization in order to maintain a higher tempo.”¹⁴ Leonhard’s criticism of AirLand Battle could apply to MDO: “The developers of AirLand Battle flirted with maneuver but have been unable to shake off American military traditions of the past ... the irresistible song of technology, fire, and mass destruction continue to lure American thought back to the battle calculus of attrition.”¹⁵ To understand America’s difficulty in adopting mission command and maneuver warfare, it is important to identify the mechanisms that gave rise to these concepts in the Prussian army.

多領域作戰雖然持續認同同步性理念，但編號 525-3-1 多領域作戰手冊卻試著避免使用「同步化」乙詞（僅出現 6 次），而且在深入研究內文後發現，一再使用同義詞諸如「整合」（出現 73 次）、「聚合」（出現 94 次）、結盟（出現 3 次）、協同（出現 23 次）。¹³這意味著該手冊勉強接受作戰節奏與同步性之間的替換：指揮官為了維持更高的作戰節奏，仍將接受不太完美的多領域同步性理

¹² Robert Coram, *Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War* (New York: Little, Brown, 2002), 371.

¹³ TP 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, C-7.

念。¹⁴羅伯特·李奧納多對「空地作戰」的批評可能適用於多領域作戰：「『空地作戰』的發展者曾思考機動作戰問題，但卻一直無法撼動美軍過去的傳統……但因為科技、火力及大規模毀滅等無法抗拒的因素，持續吸引著美軍思維又回到消耗戰鬥的算計上。」¹⁵為了理解美軍在運用任務式指揮與機動作戰上所遭遇的困難，重要的是須回源頭找出這些機制在普魯士軍隊所產生的構想。

Prussia's Adoption of Auftragstaktik

普魯士的任務式戰術

Prussia's geopolitical position provided the impetus for maneuver warfare. Prussia was economically weak and vulnerably located in the center of Europe. It needed to pursue wars that were *kurtz und vives* (short and lively).¹⁶ If its adversaries could concentrate their resources on Prussia, they could overwhelm it in a war of attrition. This threat provided the impetus for *Bewegungskrieg* (maneuver warfare), which was enabled by “an army with a high level of battlefield aggression, an officer corps that tended to launch attacks no matter what the odds, and a flexible system of command that left a great deal of initiative, sometimes too much, in the hands of lower-ranking commanders.”¹⁷

普魯士的地緣政治位置成為機動作戰的主要推力，其經濟衰弱並位處於中歐的不利位置，所以需要既短暫又活躍的作戰模式。¹⁶如果敵人能將其資源集中在普魯士，則對方就能在消耗戰中獲勝，這種威脅促成機動作戰的出現，也就是一支具高程度戰場侵略性的軍隊、一個軍官團無論成功機率多少都傾向發動攻擊，以及一個彈性的指揮系統讓基層部隊長有充分主動性可以放手去做（甚至有時不小心下放過多權力）。¹⁷

Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder codified the concepts that became Auftragstaktik. He had a Clausewitzian understanding of war as the interplay of chance, friction, and the fog of war. Since no plan survives first contact with the enemy, as Moltke reputedly said, he put a premium on flexibility. Strategy was a “system of expedients.”¹⁸ He emphasized decentralized and rapid decisions. Victory depended on the ability of subordinates to identify and exploit fleeting opportunities for the benefit of the strategic objective. He prepared the army to take advantage of these chances

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Leonhard, *The Art of Maneuver*, 186.

¹⁶ Robert Citino, *The German Way of War* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), xiii.

¹⁷ Ibid., xiv.

with minimal guidance. During the Franco-Prussian War he “had no firm plan for his operation against France. He never had one for any of his campaigns.”¹⁹ No one had the foresight to plan the events that led to the decisive Prussian victories over Austria at Königgrätz or the French at Sedan. Both battles came about through aggressive, independent action by subordinate commanders.

德國陸軍赫爾穆特·馮·毛奇元帥（俗稱老毛奇）將上述想法編纂成「任務式戰術」。他與克勞塞維茨一樣知悉戰爭，像是時機的相互影響、戰爭摩擦及戰爭迷霧等。由於作戰計畫與敵首次接觸後便會失去效用，老毛奇表示他會將彈性擺在第一位，至於戰略則視為一個「權宜的系統解決方案」，¹⁸應著重於分權與快速的決策。勝利取決於基層單位是否能掌握消縱即逝的機會，以達成所望之戰略目標，因此老毛奇對軍隊的作法是下達最少指導，讓各單位能自行掌握戰場契機。在普法戰爭期間，老毛奇在對付法國時並沒有一套固定的作戰計畫，而且在他從事的各場戰役中也不會只有一種計畫。¹⁹可惜的是，後人沒能理解該作法是兩場戰爭勝利的決定性因素，一場是普奧戰爭中的克尼雷格茨戰役，另一場是普法戰爭中的色當戰役，因為獲勝關鍵都是靠基層部隊長大膽、獨立的行動。

Prussia enabled Auftragstaktik through a flattened hierarchy amongst officers. The state was founded on a compact between the monarch and aristocrats who maintained near sovereignty over their fiefs and dominated the officer corps. Acknowledging their independence in battle was not only effective decision-making but part of the Prussian social contract. It would have been unseemly to micromanage an aristocrat even though he was serving as a subordinate.²⁰ Prussian officers celebrated stories of subordinates defying their commanders to act with their own initiative. As Prince Frederick Charles admonished an officer, “His majesty made you a major because he believed you would know when not to follow orders.”²¹

普魯士在「任務式戰術」的作法是扁平化軍官之間的層級制度，國家是建立在君主與貴族之間的緊密關係基礎之上，他們也幾乎掌握封地主權與軍官團主導權。君主與貴族由於在戰鬥中具獨立性，所以能造就有效的決策，況且這也是普國社會契約之一環。即使是貴族擔任下屬，也不會對其採微觀管理模式。

¹⁸ Eitan Shamir, *Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011), 37.

¹⁹ Citino, *The German Way of War*, 174.

²⁰普魯士軍官會讚許下屬為了搶佔主動先機而違抗其指揮官的事蹟。誠如菲特烈·卡爾告誡一名軍官：「陛下晉任你為少校，是因為他相信你知道何時該不服從命令。」²¹

The Difficulty of Translating Auftragstaktik into Mission Command

任務式戰術轉化為任務式指揮的難處

America has faced challenges adopting Prussia's model. The United States has a strategic culture that promotes risk aversion during wars. The oceans provide safety while America's industrial base ensures that time is in its favor. These advantages allow America to build up overwhelming combat power to win wars. With a few notable exceptions, often from periods of relative power equivalence such as Winfield Scott in Mexico, Ulysses S. Grant at Vicksburg, or Douglas MacArthur in Korea, America has followed an approach to war that emphasizes attrition over maneuver. As with Dwight Eisenhower's broad front strategy, the attritional approach relies on synchronizing combat power to efficiently and dependably grind down opponents rather than achieving the tempo necessary to exploit the opportunities that lead to an enemy's systemic disruption. This approach emphasizes risk mitigation and control over risk tolerance and subordinate initiative.

美軍已面臨在採用普魯式模式的挑戰，因為美國在戰爭期間往往採取規避風險的戰略文化。美國周邊海洋為其工業基地提供屏障，確保擁有作戰的時間優勢，這些優勢讓美國得以建立克敵致勝的壓倒性戰力。有一些明顯例外案例為美國強調消耗戰而非機動戰的戰法，這種情況往往來自敵我雙方勢均力敵的時期，諸如溫菲爾德·史考特將軍進攻墨西哥、尤利西斯·格蘭特將軍的維克斯堡攻城戰、道格拉斯·麥克阿瑟將軍的韓戰。至於德懷特·艾森豪將軍（後來成為美國總統）的「廣域前線戰略」^{III}也是採取消耗戰方式，主要是靠統合戰鬥兵力以有效擊敗敵人，而不是搶取先機以達成必要的作戰節奏並造成敵軍的整體破壞。這種作戰方式強調減少風險，以及須管控風險容忍程度和控制下屬的主動作為。

Recent operations have reinforced the Army's risk aversion. Ideally,

²⁰ Ibid., 32.

²¹ Trevor N. Dupuy, *A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice, 1977), 116.

^{III} 1944年9月，艾森豪將軍在向德軍心臟地帶發起最後一波攻勢之前，將部隊集結於從北海至瑞士的整個西部前線地帶，也就是為人所知的「廣域前線戰略」(Broad-front Strategy)。

mission command would flourish in counterinsurgency, which should be driven by small-unit operations. Mission command allows low-level leaders the initiative to adapt to the unique situations in each of their areas of operation. Britain controlled its empire through an extreme version of decentralized control that was more akin to “umpiring.”²² However, with success so difficult to measure in Afghanistan and Iraq, commanders veered toward risk aversion. Commanders feared casualties and the “strategic corporal” whose tactical mistakes could have strategic impacts. They emphasized restrictive rules of engagement, constant oversight, and Byzantine approval processes. These methods were the antithesis of mission command.

近期作戰行動已凸顯美陸軍的風險規避心態。理想上，任務式指揮適用於反叛亂行動，因為該任務的執行方式為小部隊作戰。任務式指揮讓基層部隊長有主導權來因應在其作戰區域所發生的特殊情況。至於英國則是透過類似於「自我判斷」的極端分權控制方式來控制其帝國。²²然而，由於在阿富汗與伊拉克戰場中難以界定任務成功與否，指揮官多偏向風險規避作法，因為他們害怕造成傷亡，以及「戰略下士」^{iv}若犯下戰術錯誤可能造成戰略影響；鑒此，指揮官強調限制性的交戰規則、持續性管控，以及拜占庭式的軍事授權程序，這些方式都與任務式指揮背道而馳。

American military culture further hinders mission command by a tendency toward technophilia. It assumes technology can pierce through the fog of war. Robert Bateman expected that our improved communications capabilities would signal the “Death of Auftragstaktik.”²³ In the 1990s, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) played into the “technological optimism that has historically animated U.S. defense planning.”²⁴ It engendered visions of a mystical silver bullet that would eliminate Clausewitz’s “fog of war” and allow for quick, decisive victory. Even with the obvious limitations of the RMA, technophilia has found a new lease with endless discussion of technological offsets and “decision dominance.”

美軍文化中因存在科技狂熱傾向進而阻礙了任務式指揮，原因在於認為科技可以解決戰爭迷霧的問題。羅伯特·貝特曼認為我們改良後的通信能力，將

²² Shamir, *Transforming Command*, 71.

^{iv} 「戰略下士」(Strategic Corporal)為基層初階軍、士官之統稱，這群人不僅具有武裝專業技術，還接受上級的作戰授權，而且其判斷、決策和行動將具有戰略和政治意涵，甚至會影響到特定任務和國家聲譽。

意味著「『任務式戰術』的滅亡」。²³在 1990 年代，由於軍事事務革新「引起了科技樂觀主義的心態，並在歷史上推動美國的國防規劃。」²⁴科技也使人產生神秘的「銀色子彈」^v願景，將可以用來消除克勞塞維茨的「戰爭迷霧」，可望成功達成速戰速決。即使是軍事事務革新有明顯的侷限性，但科技狂熱者也找出新途徑，無止盡地討論科技抵銷與「決策主導」議題。

“Decision dominance” provides utopian visions of perfectly connected sensors feeding into artificial intelligence (AI) to provide omnipotent understanding for commanders. It reinforces centralization and synchronization. This latest concept ignores the real world friction that prevents systems from talking even in highly regulated warfighter exercises in which simulations replace real sensors.

「決策主導」提供感測器能與人工智慧完美連結的烏托邦願景，藉此讓指揮官得以掌控全般狀況，同時也強化了集權化與同步化能力；然而，這個最新構想忽略了真實世界的摩擦，意即儘管在高空管的作戰演習中模擬真實感測器的運作情況，系統的發言權也會受到阻礙。

“Decision dominance” also puts unfound faith in AI. Current machine learning excels at developing algorithms to play games such as Go. Go provides perfect information, limited options, and millions of replays. When problems become less structured, AI fails. After high expectations and billions of miles analyzed, driverless cars have hit a roadblock and occasionally pedestrians. The founder of a failed self-driving vehicle company explained, “Supervised machine learning doesn’t live up to the hype. It isn’t actual artificial intelligence akin to C-3PO. It is a sophisticated pattern-matching tool.”²⁵ While useful for certain problem sets, modern machine learning is unsuited for decision-making in the fog and friction of war, which provides a data set of zero, novel situations, and an enemy who will actively deceive algorithms. If the Army’s investment in AI produces an operational system, opaque algorithms will freeze commanders, as their decision-making will be dominated by untrustworthy and untestable inputs.

²³ Robert Bateman, “Force XXI and the Death of Auftragstaktik,” *Armor* 105, no. 1 (January-February 1996): 16–20, accessed 2 July 2021, https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/1996/JAN_FEB/ArmorJanuaryFebruary1996web.pdf.

²⁴ Thomas G. Mahnken, *Technology and the American Way of War since 1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 6.

^v 「銀色子彈」(Silver Bullet) 比喻強而有力、一勞永逸地適應各種場合的解決方案。

「決策主導」也讓人對人工智慧抱持深度信心。當前機器學習的演算法較厲害方面是從事下棋遊戲，像是阿法狗人工智慧圍棋軟體就具備完整資訊、有限選項，以及數百萬次重覆比賽能力。不過，當問題變得不那麼結構化時，人工智慧就派不上用場了。即使在高期望值與數十億英哩分析的基礎下，自動駕駛汽車還是會撞上路障，甚至有可能是行人。一家倒閉的自駕車公司創辦人說道，監督式機器學習不可能像宣傳所說的那麼厲害，它並不是像電影《星際大戰》中 C-3PO 機器人的那種人工智慧，只是一種複雜的模式匹配工具。²⁵現代機器學習適用於特定的問題集，但並不適用在迷霧中的決策與戰爭摩擦（資料集內無相關參數、以前未遇過的全新情況），況且敵人還會積極欺騙演算法。如果美陸軍投資用於作戰系統的人工智慧，則不透明的演算法將使指揮官處處制肘，同時渠等決策將受不可信與未經驗證的輸入資訊所左右。

Decentralized Decision-Making in Russia

俄羅斯的分權化決策

While technology, recent operations, and culture have served to hinder America's adoption of mission command, the Russian military has trended toward a decentralized, rapid, and flexible system of decision-making. This system emerged through Russia's geopolitical vulnerability, strategic culture, and military reforms. From the time of Red Army Chief of Staff Mikhail Tukhachevskii's reflections on the Russian Civil War, Russian theorists have understood the importance of the operational level of war, the need for the disruption of continual, uninterrupted strikes, and the "operational shock" of maneuver warfare.²⁶ More recently, based on lessons from the 2008 Georgian War, the New Look Reforms have supported maneuver warfare by professionalizing Russia's force, training rapid decision-making, and decentralizing capabilities. Russia has tested these concepts in Ukraine and Syria.

科技、近期作戰行動及文化已經成為美軍採取任務式指揮的阻礙，反觀俄軍已轉向分權、快速及彈性的決策體系。該體系是透過俄國地緣政治脆弱性、戰略文化及軍事改革而產生。從紅軍時期的總參謀長米哈伊爾·圖哈切夫斯基反思蘇聯內戰開始，那時候的理論家就已經理解戰爭的作戰層級之重要性、需

²⁵ "Road Block: Driverless Cars Illustrate the Limits of Today's AI," *The Economist* (website), 11 June 2020, accessed 2 July 2021, <https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2020/06/11/driverless-cars-show-the-limits-of-todays-ai>.

要瓦解持續不間斷的攻勢，以及機動作戰所帶來的「作戰震撼」。²⁶近期，根據2008年喬治亞戰爭的經驗教訓，「新展望改革」藉由讓俄軍部隊專業化、訓練快速決策和分權化能力等來強化機動作戰，同時俄軍也在烏克蘭和敘利亞驗證這些新構想。

Russia shares Prussia's sense of strategic vulnerability. Russia cannot win an attritional war against NATO or China. It needs to pursue a form of warfare that exploits weakness and achieves rapid victories. The Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, calls this "21st Century Blitzkrieg."²⁷ To stand a chance against the West, Russia must act fast to achieve a *fait accompli*.

俄國也與普魯士的戰略脆弱性相同，其無法跟北約或中共打消耗戰，必須追求一種攻敵弱點並速戰速決的戰法，現任俄國總參謀長瓦列里·格拉西莫夫稱之為「21世紀閃擊戰」。²⁷為了有效應對西方國家，俄軍必須採取迅速行動，以營造既成事實的局面。

Instead of waiting for a synchronized strategy, Russian decision-makers pursue a strategy of tactics guided by a shared vision. Much as Moltke explained that strategy is a "system of expedients," Russian strategic culture emphasizes flexible tactics adapted toward the current situation. Michael Kofman explains that Russian leaders pursue a strategy common to successful business startups. "The hallmarks of this approach are fail fast, fail cheap, and adjust. It is principally Darwinian, prizing adaptation over a structured strategy."²⁸ Without a structured strategy, Russian decision-makers can rapidly adapt, exploit success, and abandon failures. "Moscow can fail and try again comfortably within a single U.S. decision-making cycle."²⁹

與其坐等統合式戰略出現，俄軍決策者追求一個以共同願景為戰術指導的戰術。正如老毛奇的解釋，戰略是「一套權宜之計的系統」，俄軍的戰略文化強調順應當前情勢而採取彈性戰術。麥克·科夫曼解釋說，俄軍領導人奉行成功創業企業的共同策略，「這種方法的特色是失敗快速、失敗代價不高及調整作法，其主要是達爾文式，強調適應而不是結構式戰略。」²⁸由於沒有結構式戰略，俄

²⁶ Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 10–11.

²⁷ Steve Covington, *The Culture of Strategic Thought behind Russia's Modern Approaches to Warfare* (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2016), 22, accessed 21 July 2021, <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Culture%20of%20Strategic%20Thought%203.pdf>.

²⁸ Michael Kofman, "The Moscow School of Hard Knocks: Key Pillars of Russian Security Strategy," *War on the Rocks*, 17 January 2017, accessed 2 July 2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/the-moscow-school-of-hard-knocks-key-pillars-of-russian-strategy/>.

軍決策者得以迅速行動、掌握先機，以及不畏失敗，即使俄軍失敗了，也會再度嘗試挑戰美軍的決策圈。²⁹

The Russian military desires a quicker decision-making process than potential adversaries. Since Soviet days, Russian commanders have used a form of doctrinal template to provide a rapid framework for quick decisions. Russia generously estimates NATO forces require eight hours to produce a brigade-level plan. The Russian military aims to out-decide NATO by reducing its planning process to under six hours.³⁰ It is reforming staff systems to increase decision speed. With this rapid decision-making process, Russia hopes to gain and maintain an advantage in the decisive “initial period of war.”³¹

俄軍想要的是比未來之敵有更快的決策過程。從蘇聯時代以來，俄軍指揮官就使用某種準則的範式，以提供快速下達決策所需的應急架構。俄軍寬估北約需要八小時來執行旅級兵力集結計畫，因此要面對北約的挑戰須將其計畫程序時間減少至六小時內，³⁰而且為了增加決策速度，就需要改革參謀作業體系。在快速決策過程的基礎下，俄軍可望在關鍵的「戰爭初期」獲得並維持優勢。³¹

Russia further improved the decision-making processes of its military with investments in leadership development and training. The New Look Reforms professionalized the army. By 2015, the number of contract soldiers exceeded the number of conscripts.³² Russia concentrated contract soldiers in a few formations to create a core of units with high levels of combat readiness. These professional soldiers provide initiative at the lowest levels.

俄軍也進一步在領導人培育與訓練的決策程序上做投資，「新展望改革」是為了建構一支專業化軍隊，在 2015 年時，簽約士兵（僱傭兵或職業軍人）在數量上已超過徵兵兵源。³²俄軍將簽約士兵集中於某些編隊中，以建立具有高戰備水準的核心單位，這些職業士兵在基層可望帶動主動作為的風氣。

Russia emphasizes that subordinate leaders must be comfortable planning without orders from higher as enemy cyberattacks and electronic

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Lester Grau and Charles Bartles, *The Russian War of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016), 57, accessed 21 July 2021, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot%20Spots/Documents/Russia/2017-07-The-Russian-Way-of-War-Grau-Bartles.pdf>.

³¹ Sergei G. Chekinov and Sergey A. Bogadnov, “Initial Periods of War and Their Impact on a Country's Preparation for Future War,” *Voennaya Mysl* [Military Thought], no. 11 (2012).

³² Grau and Bartles, *The Russian War of War*, 6.

warfare will disrupt communication. Russian military leadership has called for decentralized management of the battlefield: “Tactical commanders need the authority and initiative to conduct battles in order to meet rapidly developing and changing situations in an effective and timely manner.”³³ To provide tactical commanders with that authority, Russia decentralized cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. Russian ground forces have dedicated cyber and electronic warfare assets at the brigade, battalion, and sometimes company level. Russia leaders across echelons practice rapid decision-making in snap exercises that dwarf Western training events.

俄軍強調基層部隊長須不待命令從事規劃，以因應敵網攻或電子戰所造成的通信中斷。俄軍領導階層要求在戰場上從事分權管理：「為了及時和有效因應瞬息萬變的戰場情勢，戰術指揮官須獲得授權並得以從事戰鬥的主動作為。」³³ 為了授權予戰術指揮官，俄軍將網路與電子戰能力分權化，所以地面部隊在旅、營甚至有時在連級，都有各自專門的網路與電子戰裝備。俄軍各梯隊的部隊長在一系列無預警演習中實行快速決策模式，這讓西方國家的訓練科目相形見拙。

Crimea proved the value in rapid and decentralized decision-making. As the Ukrainian government fell into disarray, Russia had no concrete plan to seize Crimea. Vladimir Putin instructed Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to create a contingency plan. On the night of 26 February 2014, Russia's Crimean garrison and some paratroopers began seizing government buildings with minimal guidance.³⁴ Soon the rest of Russia's networked system of power began arriving in Ukraine. On 28 February, veterans of Afghanistan and Chechnya, athletes, motorcycle clubs, and patriotic groups flew into Crimea to agitate for independence.³⁵ Russia's rapid actions made it impossible for Kyiv to plan and implement any effective countermeasures.³⁶

克里米亞事件案例凸顯快速分權決策的價值。當烏克蘭政府陷入混亂之際，俄羅斯並沒有奪取烏克蘭的具體計畫，普丁指示國防部長謝爾蓋·紹伊古建立一項應急計畫。2014年2月26日晚間，俄國在克里米亞的駐軍和一些傘兵，以最少作戰指導方式奪取政府大樓。³⁴不久後，俄國的網狀組織力量開始介入烏克蘭，於是在2月28日，阿富汗和車臣的退伍軍人、運動員、摩托車俱樂部成

³³ Ibid., 51.

³⁴ Mikhail Zygar, *All the Kremlin's Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 276.

員和愛國團體搭機前往克里米亞，這些人主要目的是鼓吹獨立。³⁵俄國的快速行動讓基輔無法有效規劃並執行反制措施。³⁶

By early April, armed groups emerged in the Donbass and proclaimed the Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics. A key actor in these initial days was Igor Strelkov. Though a retired colonel, there is scant evidence that Putin ever directly ordered Strelkov and his compatriots to the Donbass. Using his own initiative, Strelkov identified Slavyansk as a city vulnerable to his fifty-two supporters and seized it.³⁷ His initial success led to the creation of the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics.

到了 4 月初，武裝團體出現在烏東的頓巴斯地區，並將區域內的盧甘斯克州與頓內茨克州冠上人民共和國的稱號。在行動初期，其中有一位關鍵人物退役上校伊戈爾·斯特列爾科夫，但當時並無證據表明普丁直接命令他與其同袍前往頓巴斯地區。斯特列爾科夫發揮主動作為精神，確認斯拉夫揚斯克（頓內茨克州內的城市）是一個容易受到 52 位支持者影響的弱點城市，並對其實施佔領。³⁷由於他初期的成功，建立了盧甘斯克與頓內茨克人民共和國的稱號。

By August 2014, Ukrainian forces threatened to cut the republics in half. Russia rapidly responded. It poured regular units into Ukraine. Ukrainian officials were dumbstruck. Prime Minister Victor Poroshenko took four days to publicly acknowledge the offensive. Before Ukrainian decision-makers could act, Russian forces surrounded several hundred Ukrainian soldiers in Ilovaisk. The Ukrainian commander understood that the Russians were cutting off his only escape route, but he could not obtain permission from his superiors in Kiev to withdraw.³⁸ Russia's rapid actions and Ukraine's slow response would leave hundreds of Ukrainian troops dead. America must recognize the progress Russia has made or risk one of its brigades suffering a similar fate.

到了 2014 年 8 月，烏克蘭軍隊威脅要拿下這兩個人民共和國，俄國聽聞後便迅速採取行動，將正規軍引進烏國境內，烏國官方震驚的無所適從，當時烏國首相維克多·波洛申科花了四天才向外坦承遭到入侵。在烏國決策系統啟動之前，俄軍早已在伊洛瓦伊斯克包圍數百名烏國士兵，雖然烏國指揮官知道俄軍將切斷其唯一撤退路線，但卻遲遲未能獲得基輔高層允許撤退的命令。³⁸俄軍

³⁵ Ibid., 276–79.

³⁶ Mikhail Barabanov, "Testing a 'New Look,'" *Russia in Global Affairs*, no. 4 (October-December 2014), accessed 2 July 2021, <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/testing-a-new-look/>.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Lucian Kim, "The Battle of Ilovaisk: Details of a Massacre Inside Rebel Held Ukraine," *Newsweek*

的果決行動對照於烏國的緩慢反應，已讓數百名士兵付出生命的代價。美國必須理解俄軍的行為模式，否則美軍部隊將遭遇類似的慘況。

To prevent such an outcome, the U.S. Army should adopt the following recommendations to embrace mission command.

為了避免類似慘況，美陸軍應採取下列建議以利真正實踐任務式指揮。

Clarify the Vision of Mission Command

闡明任務式指揮願景

The U.S. Army needs to articulate a clear vision of mission command and how it supports maneuver warfare and MDO. Mission command provides the tempo and agility necessary to pursue maneuver warfare and to be successful in future wars, which will be fast, lethal, and complex. Gen. Martin Dempsey provided a vision of mission command in a white paper. He explained that “decentralized approaches will provide us with competitive adaptability and tempo advantages.”³⁹

美陸軍須形塑一個任務式指揮的清楚願景，並說明其如何支持機動作戰與多領域作戰。任務式指揮提供機動作戰與未來戰爭克敵致勝所需的作戰節奏與彈性，而未來戰爭場景將是快速、致命且複雜的。馬丁·鄧普西上將在白皮書中闡述一個任務式指揮的願景，他解釋道，「分權方式將讓美軍具有調適的競爭力和作戰節奏優勢。」³⁹

Unfortunately, Dempsey also diluted mission command's meaning. He called for “all Army leaders [to] understand and apply the Mission Command philosophy habitually to everything they do—training, operations, routine military functions, and daily administrative activities.”⁴⁰ However, mission command is optimized for complex environments that require rapid decision-making. It is appropriate when chance, friction, and fog of war apply.

不幸的是，鄧普西將軍卻要求全面實行任務式指揮，像是「要陸軍所有領導人理解並應用任務式指揮的哲學，並將之用於平常的每件事：訓練、作戰行動、一般的軍事職能及日常的行政活動。」⁴⁰然而，任務式指揮須在快速決策的複雜環境下才能發揮最佳功效，而且在戰爭中的良機、困境及迷霧發生時，也適合運用任務式指揮。

(website), 4 November 2014, accessed 2 July 2021, <https://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/14/battle-iovaisk-details-massacre-inside-rebel-held-eastern-ukraine-282003.html>.

³⁹ Martin Dempsey, “Mission Command White Paper” (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 April 2012), 3.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 8.

When problems are not complex and are only complicated, when analysis can reduce ambiguity, when outputs can be predicted, and when tempo is not critical, then centralized decision-making can provide more efficient outcomes than decentralized systems. When a company is planning a training event, the Eight-Step Training Model provides the centralized control to ensure effective training. When a battalion conducts garrison maintenance, a detailed plan ensures vehicles follow their service schedule. Often, centralized decision-making has value.

當問題的複雜程度不高、分析可以減少模糊性、可以預測輸出結果及作戰節奏為非關鍵要素等情況下，那麼集權化決策就能比分權化體系產出更有效的結果。當一個連在規劃訓練科目時，「八步驟訓練模式」^{vi}旨在提供集權化控制，以利確保有效的訓練。當一個營在做駐地維保時，一個縝密的計畫確保車輛都能按保養期程進行。往往在這些情況下，集權化決策有其重要之處。

To fully explain the value of mission command, the Army needs to provide a clear understanding of maneuver warfare as a theory of victory. Instead of the complete destruction of an enemy force, maneuver warfare seeks systemic disruption. In 1989, MCDP 1 explained maneuver warfare's theory of victory: "Maneuver Warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope."⁴¹ Maneuver warfare requires decentralized decision-making to repeatedly out-decide the enemy and exploit opportunities until they are in such chaos that they cease to provide effective resistance. These insights recently resurfaced in TP 525- 3-6, *The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver: 2020-2040*. This pamphlet explained that maneuver "achieves surprise and gains a temporal advantage. The aim is to shatter the enemy's cohesion ... avoid enemy strengths and attack enemy weaknesses from multiple positions of advantage throughout the depth of the battlefield. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis for an enemy who has lost the ability to respond to friendly actions effectively."⁴²

為了全般說明任務式指揮的重要性，美陸軍提出一個清楚說法，讓人理解

^{vi} 美陸軍的「八步驟訓練模式」(Eight-Step Training Model)分別為規劃訓練事項、培養領導者訓練知識、勘查合適訓練地點、頒布訓練計畫、訓練預演、執行、從事訓練後檢討、再次投入訓練。

機動作戰將成為勝利理論。機動作戰意在達成系統性破壞，而非尋求全面殲敵。1989 年頒布的美陸戰隊準則出版品第 1 號：《戰鬥》就解釋機動作戰的勝利理論：「機動作戰為藉由一連串迅速、暴力及不預期行動來破壞敵向心力，開創一個讓敵無法應付的混亂且迅速惡化的局勢。」⁴¹機動作戰需要分權化決策，才能不斷擾亂敵人並搶佔先機，讓對方處於混亂狀態後無法做出有效抵抗。這種思維理則近期又重新出現於《美陸軍移動與機動作業構想：2020 至 2040 年》（編號 525-3-6 技術手冊），內文將機動解釋為「達成奇襲並奪取短暫優勢，旨在破壞敵向心力，在整個戰場的各方有利位置，避強擊弱，所望目標為癱瘓並瓦解敵能力，使之無法對我軍做出有效的行動。」⁴²

However, TP 525-3-1 does not clearly link mission command and maneuver warfare to a theory of victory. Part of the problem is the muddling of the term maneuver. The Army often defines it simply as the combination of fire and movement to achieve position of advantage rather than a definition based on the disruptive effect on the enemy. This definition leads to a weak conception of maneuver. Nearly every time the Army uses “maneuver,” the term “move” or “movement” would suffice. TP 525-3-1 regularly describes “maneuvering” to positions of advantage.⁴³ Moving to a position of advantage or presenting a dilemma to enemy is meaningless if the enemy can react in a manner and tempo that leads them undisrupted. TP 525-3-1 admits this by discussing the enemy’s A2/AD system: “If given time, the enemy will regenerate the system through tactical adaptation, reorganization, and limited reconstitution.”⁴⁴ Unless the Army is trying to grind down an enemy through attrition, positions of relative advantage and dilemmas only matter if they lead to the systemic disruption of an enemy. Systemic disruption occurs when the resiliency of his system is overcome by rapid and successive shocks that he cannot adapt to in time. It is the rapid and agile decision-making of mission command that allows the systemic disruption of the enemy through maneuver.

然而，編號 525-3-1 多領域作戰手冊並未清楚將任務式指揮與機動作戰連結至勝利理論，部分原因在於機動之詞混淆不明的定義。美陸軍通常僅將「機動」定義為結合火力與移動，以取得有利位置，而非根據對敵的破壞效果做定

⁴¹ MCDP 1, *Warfighting*, 59.

⁴² TP 525-3-6, *The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver: 2020-2040* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 24 February 2017), 15, accessed 2 July 2021, <https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-3-6.pdf>.

義，這種定義導致機動構想的解釋力不足，也讓美陸軍認為每次只要使用「機動」或「移動」等詞彙就夠了。多領域作戰手冊將「機動」正式描述為進入有利位置，⁴³然如果敵能以一種有效方式與節奏做出反應，那即使移動至有利位置或是對敵構成困境也毫無意義，手冊在論及敵「反介入/區域拒止」體系時認為：「如果給出時間，敵可以藉由戰術調適、重組及有限重組來從事兵力再生。」⁴⁴除非美軍試圖透過消耗戰來瓦解敵人，否則我方相對優勢位置與讓敵陷入困境，只有在敵兵力遭受系統性破壞時才能發揮功效。敵兵力體系破壞的時機是當敵體系韌性被快速連續衝擊所攻克，而且無法及時導正。任務式指揮快速靈活的決策方式配合著機動作戰，正是破壞敵兵力體系的用兵之道。

Increase Unit Cohesion

增加單位向心力

Mission command requires agile battlefield entrepreneurs that can make rapid decisions. Developing these entrepreneurs necessitates mutual trust, a shared frame of reference, and a flattened hierarchy as existed amongst the Prussian officer corps. Col. Brandon Teague, an observer coach/trainer from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), explained, If a subordinate has the trust of his superior, then he is commanded (defined as given intent, task and purpose, and freedom to execute with minimal oversight: engage and report type mentality). If trust is lacking, then control is needed of the subordinate (control defined as reporting early and often, strict graphical control measures, limited assets to control at a lower level, not the unit you would task organize to another BN, etc.).⁴⁵

任務式指揮需要能快速做決策的靈活戰場指揮官。要培養這些領導者需要互信、共同基準框架，以及存在普魯士軍官團中的扁平化等級制度。來自聯合戰備訓練中心的布萊登·提格上校（觀察、教練暨訓練員）解釋道，「如果一位部屬信任上級，則他就能為上級所用（執行特定意圖、接收任務與目的、最少監督下的行動自由：形成參與式報告的心態）。」若缺乏信任，就須對部屬進行控制（提早並時時報告、嚴格的圖表控制措施、在較低層級做有限的裝備管控，以及將部屬從原本單位改編至另一個營）。⁴⁵

Trust is built on a shared frame of reference. A shared frame of reference is a common approach for handling abstract problems. Gen. Stanley

⁴³ TP 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*, 23.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 42.

⁴⁵ Brandon Teague, interview by author, 30 January 2018.

McChrystal explained that Adm. Horatio Nelson developed a shared frame of reference. His “unique innovation lay in his managerial style and the culture he had cultivated among his force … his captains were to see themselves as entrepreneurs of battle.”⁴⁶ His real genius lay not in clever maneuvers but in the years of innovative talent management and leadership that preceded it. He developed a shared frame of reference in his subordinates so he trusted how they would react in the chaos of battle. An example of a frame of reference is a unit standard operating procedures (SOPs). Units at every echelon require SOPs for frame of references for how they fight, but in reality, few units at the battalion and higher-level have the time to develop, evaluate, and inculcate SOPs that provide the frame of references for how an entire battalion, brigade, or division fights.

信任是建立於共同基準框架，這是用來解決抽象問題的常用方法。史丹利·麥克克里斯托上將解釋霍雷肖·納爾遜上將所發展的共同基準框架，他的「獨特創新之處在於個人的管理風格，以及他在部隊中所培養的文化，他麾下的上尉們將自己視為作戰指揮官。」⁴⁶納爾遜將軍真正天才之處不在於巧妙的機動運兵，而是在於先前就奠下數年基礎的創新人才管理，他與部屬們發展共同基準框架，所以能夠信任他們在混亂戰鬥中的各項因應作為。一個參考架構的案例之一是單位標準操作程序，不管是在任何梯隊層級都需要用於參考架構的標準作業程序，以指導官兵如何作戰，不過事實上在營級及其以上的單位，很少有時間能發展、評估及適切教導標準作業程序，以提供營、旅、師級作戰所需的參考架構。

To facilitate frames of reference development, the U.S. Army needs to build cohesion through a regimental system. Under a regimental system, soldiers spend most of their careers within the same unit. The Duke of Wellington said the British Army's secret weapon was the regimental system. It provided intimacy and familiarity.⁴⁷ Through familiarity comes the flattened hierarchies that enable decentralized decision-making. Before 1945, the German army maintained a regimental system. Its system of “organization represented a conscious determination to maintain at all costs that which was believed to be decisive to the conduct of war: mutual trust, a willingness to assume responsibility, and the right and duty of subordinate commanders at

⁴⁶ Stanley McChrystal et al., *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World* (New York: Portfolio, 2015), 31.

all levels to make independent decisions and carry them out.”⁴⁸ The German system was decentralized and personal. It put a priority on unit cohesion over administrative efficiency.

為了促進參考架構之發展，美陸軍需要在團的層級建立向心力，因為士兵在其軍旅生涯中有大部分時間在此歷練。英國威靈頓公爵曾言，英國陸軍的秘密武器是團級體制，因為其能提供官兵一種像家人般的歸屬感，⁴⁷而透過這種歸屬感可以扁平化等級制度，促進分權化決策。德軍在 1945 年之前都不惜一切成本維持團級體制，因為其認為「該組織對戰爭有著關鍵性作用：互信、願意承擔責任，以及各層級部隊指揮官有權做出獨立自主的決策。」⁴⁸德軍軍事體制式的特色是分權化與個人化，並將單位向心力置於行政效率之上。

The American system of regular permanent changes of stations represents a misguided scientific management ideal of interchangeable parts. It made sense for an Army that had to rapidly grow for World War II. It had some logic for a large draftee Army during the Cold War. It is counterproductive for a small professional force. These moves cost over \$4.3 billion a year, disrupt soldiers' families, and exact a high price in cohesion and readiness.⁴⁹ Recently, the Army has even began forcing NCOs to move, whereas in the past some would spend years in a unit and serve as its backbone. Tom Odom gave the most damning indictment of the current system. He has over nineteen years as JRTC's Center for Army Lessons Learned senior analyst and has observed 190 training rotations; he had never seen any improvement in overall negative trends because units have “no collective experience longer than a year.”⁵⁰ He explains that “no CEO in his right mind would tell everyone to change jobs every year; we do just that in the Army ... we discard the collective experience of 10 x 25 million dollar training rotations every year only to start all over again, every year for every unit.”⁵¹ We need to reject this costly and counterproductive system.

美軍常規的永久性輪調制度，就像一種對於互換零件科學管理理念的誤解。雖然對於美陸軍當時在二戰時須快速壯大有其道理，並在冷戰期間須大量徵兵也有其邏輯可言，但這對於一支專業化的小部隊極為不利，而且這些輪調每年

⁴⁷ John Keegan, *Mask of Command* (New York: Penguin, 1988), 98.

⁴⁸ Martin van Creveld, *Fighting Power: German and U.S. Performance 1939-1945* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press), 165.

花費 43 億，擾亂士兵的家庭規劃，以及讓單位向心力與戰備付出高額代價。⁴⁹近期，美陸軍甚至開始強制士官調動，這些人過往數年來待在同一單位，用意是要來當作單位骨幹。湯姆·奧多姆對當前這種制度提出最嚴厲的控訴，他在聯合戰備訓練中心服務超過 19 年，擔任陸軍經驗學習的高階分析師並觀察 190 個單位訓練輪調情況，他從未看過整體負面趨勢有任何改善，原因在於單位「並沒有擁有超過一年的集體經驗。」⁵⁰他解釋道，「沒有任何一位公司 CEO 會違背常理告訴每個人應每年換工作；然我們美陸軍卻這麼做，我們放棄每年 2.5 億美元訓練輪調的集體經驗，只為了重新開始，每年每個單位都一再如此。」⁵¹我們必須揚棄這種所費不貲且無效的制度。

There are risks in changing to a regimental system. It could reduce the diversity of a soldier's experience and cause groupthink within a unit. Ironically, the Army often allows senior leaders to command in the same battalion, brigade, and division, while forcing junior leaders to move, allowing groupthink to fester at senior levels. Turn this paradigm on its head. Company grade officers should serve in a brigade system, and field grade officers should be assigned to a divisional system. The Army should force senior leaders to serve in different units to break nepotistic networks. For junior leaders, the Army's system of professional development schools and broadening assignments will ensure a crossover of ideas. A regimental system would spur innovation because leaders would have the time horizons to test and implement long-term concepts. To enable flexibility, soldiers should be free to request transfers, but permanent changes of stations should not be regularly mandated. Such a change would bring incalculable morale, psychological, and family benefits, and only through such reform will the Army properly prioritize cohesion to enable shared frames of reference and mission command.

團級制度也正在產生風險變化，這可能會讓士兵的多樣化經驗不足並導致單位內的集體迷思。諷刺的是，美陸軍往往讓資深領導人待在同一單位的營、旅及師級部隊，反而是讓資淺領導人做職務調動，這無疑讓團體迷思在領導高

⁴⁹ Wyatt Olson, "GAO Report Says PCS Costs Rising Even as Number of Moves Drops," Military.com, 10 September 2015, accessed 2 July 2021, <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/09/10/gao-report-says-pcs-costs-rising-even-as-number-of-moves-drops.html>.

⁵⁰ Tom Odom, "A Farewell to Trends," in *JRTC COG Issues and Trends 1st and 2nd Quarters FY 2019* (Fort Polk, LA: Joint Readiness Training Center, 2019).

⁵¹ Ibid.

層擴散，我們必須導正這種制度。尉級軍官應在旅級體制內歷練，校級軍官則應在師級體制內歷練，美陸軍還應讓高階領導人在不同單位歷練，以利解決裙帶關係的問題。對於資淺領導人而言，美陸軍的專業發展學校制度與不斷擴大的任務，將形成理論與實務的交織。團級制度將可以激發創新，因為領導人在此有較充足時間來測試並執行長期構想。雖然說為了實現靈活度，士兵應主動請求調動，但永久性輪調制度不應該定期強制執行。改變將帶來高昂士氣且有助於心理和眷屬利益，而且唯有透過此類改革，美陸軍才能提升向心力，進而實現共同基準框架與任務式指揮。

Adopt a Decision-Making Model Based on Satisficing

採用基於滿意度的決策模式

The Army requires a doctrinal decision-making process based on satisficing to enable mission command and maneuver warfare. Since the 1950's FM 101-5, *Staff Organizations and Procedures*, the Army has used a rational choice model of decision-making. Over time, the steps have expanded far beyond the initial five-step analytic procedure. However, for decades, studies have shown that units do not follow this model in combat conditions.⁵² Today, the closest units come to fighting a high-intensity conflict is at combat training centers (CTCs).

美陸軍需要一種基於滿意度的準則式決策程序，以利實現任務式指揮與機動作戰之結合。自從 1950 年代第 101-5 號野戰教範：《參謀組織與程序》頒布以來，美陸軍採用理性選項的決策模式，隨著時間過去，該決策模式的步驟已遠超出起初所使用的五步驟分析程序；然而，數十年後，研究顯示單位並未能在作戰情況下採用這種模式。⁵²今日，在作戰訓練中心的進訓單位才是最接近高強度衝突作戰的模擬。

The military decision-making process (MDMP) does not enable rapid decisions at CTCs. At the JRTC, Col. Brandon Teague observed, “I can only recall one time in the ten rotations that I conducted that a battalion gave a subordinate unit two-thirds and it was before they ‘deployed’ into country” (the Army calls for units to spend no more than one-third of time until an operation to plan for it and grant subordinate units the remaining two-thirds of the time).⁵³ Lt. Col. Brian Olson explained that “units will conduct deliberate

⁵² Karol Ross et al., “The Recognition-Primed Decision Model,” *Military Review* 84, no. 3 (July-August 2004): 6–10.

MDMP during RSOI [reception, staging, onward movement, and integration] period, but after the joint forcible entry period devolve into hasty decision-making.” (Hasty decision-making is no longer a doctrinal term, but they still do it.)⁵⁴ Lt. Col. William Adler highlighted the difficulty in conducting MDMP in a contested environment at the National Training Center: “This model becomes almost impossible to execute in actively contested environments against peer competitors who may exploit options to target mission command nodes throughout the depth of the battlefield.”⁵⁵

「軍事決策程序」(MDMP)並無法在作戰訓練中心實現快速決策。在聯合戰備訓練中心的布萊登·提格上校提出自身觀察：我在十次的進訓中只有看過一次，一個營級單位給下面連級單位三分之二的時間，讓其準備將部署至另一個國家的事務（美陸軍要求各單位在策定作戰行動計畫不能花超過三分之一時間，並將剩下的三分之二時間留給底下所屬單位）。⁵³布萊恩·奧爾森中校解釋說：在「人裝接收、暫留、前運及整合」的準備階段，單位將執行縝密的「軍事決策程序」，但在「聯合強制進入」時期之後卻轉變成倉促決策（儘管倉促決策不被準則所認可，但他們還是這樣做）。⁵⁴威廉·艾德勒中校強調即使是在國家訓練中心內，在敵情環境下從事「軍事決策程序」仍有其困難，該決策程序幾乎不可能在高敵情威脅下對抗實力匹敵者，因為對方可能會在整個戰場上找到擊敗任務式指揮節點的方法。⁵⁵

Gary Klein has found that leaders rarely use rational choice models of decision-making such as MDMP in practice. Decision-makers seldom have the time to follow such models. While they seem to offer efficiency by allowing staff sections to break a problem to its component parts and work on multiple courses of action (COA) in parallel, in reality, junior officers create plans for complex problems of which they only understand a segment. The commander is often isolated from the process. Staff officers are regularly broken into an “A” team and “B” team, with the “B” team producing a throwaway COA. Alternatively, they might produce COAs with similar values leading to a zone of indifference in which the staff dithers on choosing between two equally suitable COAs. Often, staff members that worked on a losing COA do not feel ownership of the chosen COA. Klein argues that even when properly executed,

⁵³ Teague, interview.

⁵⁴ Brian Olson, interview by author, 30 January 2018.

⁵⁵ William Adler, interview by author, 31 January 2018.

rational decision-making processes do not lead to better outcomes.⁵⁶ He found that satisficing was more effective than rational choice models. He proposed the recognition-primed decision model (RPM) as an alternative to MDMP.

格雷·克萊恩發現領導者鮮少使用諸如像「軍事決策程序」之類的理性決策模式，原因在於決策者根本沒時間去遵循這種模式的程序。他們為了提升效率而允許各參謀將問題拆解成各部分，並研擬多種的相似行動方案，然事實上，資淺軍官所提出的計畫中往往未能看見複雜問題的全貌，而且指揮官通常被排除在程序之外。參謀按常規區分為 A、B 兩組，而 B 組提出用後丟棄式（速成粗糙）的行動方案，又或者，他們可能會提出具有相似價值的行動方案，並形成一個無差異區域，而參謀會在兩個合適的行動方案之間猶豫不決。一般而言，參謀在提出較不佳的行動方案時就知道該方案不會被採納。格雷·克萊恩認為，即使適當地執行理性決策程序也不會有更佳的结果，⁵⁶他發現滿意度比理性決策模式更有效率，因此提出「認知導向模式」(RPM)^{vii}來作為「軍事決策程序」的替代方案。

RPM provides the agility and tempo necessary for maneuver warfare. By emphasizing rapid decisions and the iterative nature of planning, it allows subordinate units the time to make their own decisions and provide feedback. RPM is commander-driven. It makes maximum use of a commander's mental models developed over years of experience. After receiving a mission, a commander conceptualizes a draft COA based on his or her understanding of the situation. If a situation is unfamiliar, the system provides for a commander to use staff and subordinate commanders to help conceptualize a COA using an iterative process of mission analysis. In the second step, the staff tests and operationalizes the COA and begins producing products. In the third step, staff and subordinate commanders' wargame the COA. Finally, the staff publishes the order. RPM provides for feedback loops throughout the process and allows for adaptation to changing situations.

「認知導向模式」提供機動作戰所需的靈活度與彈性，並藉由強調迅速決策和反覆規劃的本質，讓所屬單位有時間做出自身決策並提供反饋，同時該模式是指揮官取向，最大化使用指揮官的心理模式（經數年所累積的經驗）。「認

⁵⁶ Gary A. Klein, *Streetlights and Shadows: Searching for the Keys to Adaptive Decision Making* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), 96.

^{vii} 格雷·克萊恩的「認知導向模式」(Recognition-Primed Model, RPM)就指出，決策者是根據先前的經驗進行模式匹配、然後進行心理模擬，以預測當前情況下的行動過程該如何進行。

知導向模式」是指揮官在接受一項任務後，基於自己對情況的理解後而將行動方案的草案進行概念化，如果是在不熟悉情況之下，指揮官就需要參謀與所屬部隊長來協助讓行動方案概念化，使用方法是任務分析的反覆程序；第二步驟是參謀做確認並執行行動方案及開始研擬作為；第三步驟是參謀與所屬部隊長對行動方案做兵棋推演；最後，參謀公布指揮官命令。「認知導向模式」在整個程序中提供回饋的循環，還能適應不斷變化的情勢。

Peter Thunholm tested RPM with the Swedish army. During the tests, a division staff produced more rapid, bolder, and more flexible plans.⁵⁷ Based on this evidence, the Swedish army adopted RPM. In 2003, a group of researchers tested RPM using an ad hoc American brigade staff. Even with minimal training in RPM, it produced orders in 30 percent less time than MDMP.⁵⁸ 4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery successfully employed RPM during Operation Iraqi Freedom and said it produced battalion-level plans in four to eight hours. Their version of RPM is presented here (see figure).⁵⁹ My battalion, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry, incorporated RPM into our planning SOP. At JRTC, RPM enabled us to rapidly plan an overwhelmingly successful defense and to condense the air assault planning process to under twenty-four hours.

彼得·杜恩荷母運用瑞典軍隊來測試「認知導向模式」，在測試期間，師級參謀研擬更快速、大膽及更為彈性的計畫，⁵⁷正因為有這個證據支撐，瑞典軍才採行「認知導向模式」。在 2003 年，一組研究人員運用臨時編組的美軍旅級參謀來測試「認知導向模式」，結果即使是該模式的訓練不多，但在命令產製上仍是比「軍事決策程序」減少三成時間。⁵⁸第 25 野戰砲兵第四營成功在伊拉克自由作戰行動期間運用「認知導向模式」，至於成果為營級計畫的產製只需四至八小時，該單位的「認知導向模式」程序如下圖所示：⁵⁹我任職單位第 502 步兵團第 2 營就將「認知導向模式」納入計畫作為的標準作業程序，在聯合戰備訓練中心時，該模式讓我們單位迅速研擬壓倒性的成功防禦作為，並縮減空襲的計畫程序於 24 小時內完成。

RPM's emphasis on satisficing reflects how effectively units approach


⁵⁷ Peter Thunholm, "Military Planning and Decision Making under Time-Pressure: A Scenario Based Experimental Comparison between Two Models," in *Försvärshögskolans ACTA-serie* (Stockholm: Swedish Defence University, 2003).

⁵⁸ David A. Bushey and Michael Forsyth, "Recognition Primed Decision Model—An Alternative to the MDMP for GWOT," *Field Artillery* 11, no. 1 (January-February 2006): 10–13.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

decision-making at CTCs. Adler reported that “successful units place emphasis on the continuous nature of mission analysis based on unit reporting and commander’s assessments to inform the formulation of adequate command directed COAs.”⁶⁰ When combined with the previous recommendation of increased unit cohesion, RPM allows a commander to choose a framework for an operation from a unit SOP that his staff and subordinates will largely already understand and on which they can initiate movement. The rest of the planning process is spent operationalizing and testing that initial plan.

「認知導向模式」所強調的滿意度，反應在單位在作戰訓練中心進訓時如何有效地從事決策。威廉·艾德勒指出，單位之所以成功是因為置重點於任務分析的持續性本質，該任務分析是根據單位報告與指揮官的評估事項，為制訂合適的上級行動方案而提供可用資訊。⁶⁰在結合前文所提的增加單位向心力的建議後，「認知導向模式」讓指揮官得以從單位的標準作業程序中選擇一套作戰架構，而該架構對於參謀與所屬部隊長而言，他們在很大程度上都已經知道要從哪裡下手了，所以能很快進行作戰計畫的其他部分，也就是對初步計畫進行實行與測試。



⁶⁰ Adler, interview.

輸入	步驟一：確認任務並形成行動方案概念*	步驟二：確認並執行行動方案	步驟三：兵棋推演行動方案*	步驟四：研擬命令*	輸出
	營長與參謀程序： - 參謀向連級傳遞警告（第 1 號預備命令） - 營長與參謀執行完整的任務分析** - 營長指導整個程序	參謀程序： - 修訂行動方案的細節 - 透過分析找出並修正缺點 - 確保行動方案符合「可行性、可接受性及適合的」標準*** - 報告指揮官關於修訂行動方案之意見	計畫人員與所有指揮官程序： - 決定行動方案是否符合指揮官願景 - 分析作戰計畫是否能阻攔敵行動	參謀程序： - 作戰命令寫作 - 向指揮官進行反向簡報	
	參謀工具： - 事實與假設 - 限制條件與因素 - 戰場情報準備 - 修正後混合障礙透明圖 - 其他	產物： - 要圖 - 支援矩陣 - 任務組織 - 所屬單位任務 - 作戰命令骨架 - 配合行動方案草案的第 3 號預備命令	產物： - 同步矩陣 - 執行清單 - 配合修訂行動方案的第 4 號預備命令	產物： - 五段式作戰命令 - 執行矩陣 - 經由無線電口頭通知連長	

*步驟一、三、四類似於任務分析的個別步驟，以及「軍事決策程序」中的兵棋推演與命令調製。
 **重要的是，指揮官與參謀須理解問題才能發展有效的方案。
 ***若行動方案未能符合可行性、可接受性及適合的標準，那就要再回到步驟一的程序，以研擬另一個行動方案。
 譯註：「反向簡報」（Backbrief）為指揮官核准參謀所建議之最佳行動方案後，應將該項具體之最佳行動方案，向上及實施反向簡報，以尋求上及指揮官之認可。

縮語詞
 Cdr：指揮官 MA：任務分析
 COA：行動方案 MCOO：修正後混合障礙透明圖
 HQ：總部 OPOD：作戰命令
 IPB：戰場情報準備 WARNO：預備命令

認知導向模式程序

資料來源：David A. Bushey and Michael Forsyth, "Recognition-Primed Decision Model: An Alternative to the MDMP for GWOT," *Field Artillery* 11, no. 1 [January-February 2006]: 10-13)

Train Mission Command through Force-on-Force Exercises

藉由實兵演習淬鍊任務式指揮

Army units must concentrate on large-scale, force-on-force exercises to develop the expertise and frames of reference required for effective mission command and maneuver warfare. Milley says, "We preach Mission Command ... if we're going to have to operate like that in warfare, we have to train as we're going to fight."⁶¹ TP 525-3-1 acknowledges that "the Army does

not always design our training programs and exercises that facilitate or require this type of decentralized decision making.”⁶² Since mission command’s purpose is to provide the tempo and flexibility to deal with the complex problems of future warfare, training exercises must replicate that complexity.

美陸軍單位須專注於大規模實兵演習，以利培養讓任務式指揮與機動作戰得以有效發揮的專業技能和參考架構。參謀首長聯席會議主席密利上將表示，「美軍提倡任務式指揮，就好像我們在戰爭中要那樣做，我們也必須那樣訓練從事未來的戰爭。」⁶¹編號 525-3-1 多領域作戰手冊坦承，「美陸軍訓練計畫與演習之設計，並非總是朝這種分權化決策做精進。」⁶²既然任務式指揮之目的為提供作戰節奏與彈性來處理未來戰爭的複雜問題，因此各項演訓科目也必須模擬這種複雜度。

Complexity occurs under circumstances simulating Clausewitz’s chance, friction, and fog of war. German Capt. Adolf von Schell introduced the concept of Auftragstaktik to the U.S. Army Infantry School during the interwar years. He explained the importance of training Auftragstaktik under conditions approximating war: “In peacetime problems, there is no uncertainty, nothing goes wrong, units are always complete ... In war, it is quite otherwise ... Teach your men that war brings such surprises and that often they will find themselves in apparently impossible situations ... Every soldier should know that war is a kaleidoscope, replete with constantly changing, unexpected, confusing situations. Its problems cannot be solved by mathematical formulae or set rules.”⁶³

複雜度模擬應在克勞塞維茨所述的戰爭時機、摩擦及迷霧的情境之下。阿道夫·馮·謝爾上尉於戰間期將「任務式戰術」構想引進美陸軍步兵學校，他說明在適當戰爭情境下從事「任務式戰術」訓練之重要性：承平時問題在於沒有不確定性、不會出任何狀況，單位一直在正常運作；然而，戰時情形卻並非如此，須教導士兵戰爭會帶來出奇不意的事，而且他們會發現自己處於前所未見的情境，每位士兵都應知道戰爭像萬花筒一樣，裡面充滿不斷變化、意料之外及令人眼花撩亂的圖像，而且戰爭問題是無法用數學公式或是設立規則來解決的。⁶³

⁶¹ Barno and Bensahel, “Three Things the Army Chief of Staff Wants You to Know.”

⁶² TP 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations* 2028, F-3.

⁶³ Adolf von Schell, *Battle Leadership* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association & Foundation, 1987), 63.

Soldiers require training that teaches them to deal with ambiguity, identify opportunities to exploit, accept risk, and make rapid decisions. Lind recommended introducing force-on-force exercises early in training. “Only by encountering an active enemy who is trying to confuse, surprise and defeat them in an environment of uncertainty and rapid change can they begin to understand the nature of the business to which they have committed themselves … Free-play exercises are critical to developing initiative, imagination, and new tactics.”⁶⁴

士兵在訓練的教導下，才能處理混沌不明的問題、有效掌握時機、承擔風險及迅速做出決策。威廉·林德建議在訓練初期引進實兵對抗演習，因為唯有在不確定性及迅速改變的環境下，遭遇一個會使用欺敵戰術、奇襲及採取攻擊的主動敵人，士兵才能理解他們訓練的本質為何，至於自由統裁的演習對於培養主動作為、想像力及新戰術等至關重要。⁶⁴

Observer coach/trainers recognize that the lack of repetitions hampers units conducting operations at CTCs. Adler states that “enemy vulnerabilities and tactical opportunities may be transitory and BCTs and BNs are often hampered in the exploitation of revealed opportunities because lower echelons lack the kind of agility gained through repetitive training.”⁶⁵ Units need to practice maneuver warfare if they are to succeed at it.

在作戰訓練中心的觀察、教練暨訓練員認為，缺少反覆操作訓練，將阻礙單位遂行作戰行動。威廉·艾德勒指出，敵弱點與戰術機會稍縱即逝，而且旅級戰鬥部隊與營往往在奪取先機時受到阻礙，因為較低層級梯隊缺乏從反覆訓練中獲致靈活度。⁶⁵作戰成功之道不外乎平時多練習機動作戰。

Germany realized that only large-scale maneuvers taught commanders to accept risk. These exercises became essential to officers' careers. During the 1920s, even with the constraints of the Treaty of Versailles, Chief of German Army Command Hans von Seeckt prioritized training for the chaos of large-scale meeting engagements. These exercises created the doctrine and mindset that led to the Wehrmacht's initial success during World War II. He stressed that the commander who would prevail was the one who could more rapidly recognize the situation and deploy his forces.⁶⁶

德國理解只有大規模機動才能教會指揮官接受風險，因此這些演習對軍官

⁶⁴ Lind, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*, 44.

⁶⁵ Adler, interview.

的軍旅生涯不可或缺。在 1920 年代期間，即使在《凡爾賽條約》限制下，德國陸軍司令部參謀長漢斯·馮·塞克特仍將大規模接敵的混亂情境列為優先訓練項目，這些演習從中建立準則與作戰心態，也讓德國國防軍能在二戰期間獲致初期的成功。他強調能克敵致勝的指揮官，一定能迅速看清局勢並即時調動部隊。⁶⁶

The German emphasis on unconstrained meeting engagements contrasts with the current scenarios at CTCs. CTC rotations follow predictable phases. BCTs culminate the training through a combined arms breach that emphasizes synchronization over tempo. A notional division provides timely orders to a BCT that provide clear intelligence and perfectly predict when the enemy's main body will attack. Units never have to develop the situation using their own internal assets through "reconnaissance pull." While CTCs overconstrain exercises, divisional Warfighter exercises are worse. Units spend months wargaming and rehearsing for a couple of weeks of operations involving simulated troops that lack any individual initiative. Warfighters center on a wet-gap crossing to demonstrate how a division can synchronize its assets from the comfort of a command post tent city that would put P. T. Barnum to shame. Divisions need to get in the field with their brigades to face the fog and friction of war.

德國這種強調不受限制的交戰方式，不同於作戰訓練中心所設定的訓練想定，作戰訓練中心的進訓則為遵循既定的計畫流路：旅級戰鬥部隊訓練的重點是透過強調同步而非作戰節奏的聯合兵種戰法；一個假想師提供即時命令給旅級戰鬥部隊，裡面有清楚情資與完整預測敵主力部隊何時會進攻；各單位永遠無須動用集各方資源而成的「偵察力」來開創局勢。作戰訓練中心對各演習定下過多限制，師級作戰演習的情況更是糟糕。單位花費數個月時間在兵棋推演，接著在部隊實兵作戰演練上耗費數週，其中卻缺少個人的主動作為。當作戰人員集中心力準備渡河時，這時候我們反而在舒適的指揮所帳棚內展示一個師如何統合所屬裝備運用，我想這種作戲居多的成分，將讓在天之靈的公關之父巴納姆蒙羞。師要跟底下的旅同在，一起面對戰爭迷霧與摩擦。

Only unconstrained force-on-force incentivizes soldiers to identify enemy vulnerabilities, use mission command, and exploit opportunities through maneuver warfare. The Army can provide time and resources for

⁶⁶ Citino, *The German Way of War*, 242–43.

force-on-force by deprioritizing formulaic live fires, which often resemble theatrical productions. Live fires reinforce detailed, centralized planning rather than developing the adaptive decision-making required for the chaos of war. Commanders also must reject traditional training progressions. Not all crews, platoons, and companies need to certify before a battalion, brigade, or division exercise. It will not matter if those small units are combat ready if their higher headquarters cannot make a timely decision in the face of an enemy.

只有不受限制的實兵對抗才能激發士兵找出敵弱點、運用任務式指揮，以及在機動作戰過程中奪取先機。美陸軍應取消像是作戲般的制式化實彈射擊科目，從而為實兵對抗演習爭取更多可用的時間與資源。實彈射擊強調仔細的集中規劃作為，而非培養在戰爭混亂中所需的調適型決策模式。指揮官也必須回絕傳統的訓練進度，我們並不需要在營、旅或師演習之前，對所有編組人員、各排、各連進行認證，這些小單位有沒有整備好並不是最重要的事，反而是上面總部高層在面對敵人時無法下達即時決策才是重點所在。

Conclusion

結論

If the Army does not make these changes, it risks entering into a peer fight with a high-risk concept of warfare that is not supported by its decision-making capabilities. The current concept calls for BCTs to advance independently to seize positions of relative advantage. They will be moving semi-independently with vulnerable flanks during windows of enemy domain dominance. Without the tempo and flexibility provided by mission command, these brigades will not operate at a tempo required to prevent an enemy from encircling and destroying them. Unless the Army fully embraces mission command, it risks falling into a multi-domain disaster.

美陸軍若不做出這些改變，就會冒著在高風險的作戰構想下和實力匹敵者從事作戰，而且現行作戰構想也無法有效支援決策能力。當前構想為要求旅級戰鬥部隊獨立前進去奪取相對優勢的位置，在這種構想下，他們只稱的上是半獨立移動並輔以脆弱的側翼部隊，還可能全程都在敵的掌握之下。如果沒有任務式指揮所提供的節奏與靈活度，這些旅級戰鬥部隊將無法獲致所需作戰節奏來防範敵人的包圍與攻擊。除非美陸軍能完全實踐任務式指揮，否則將有落入多領域災難的風險。

譯後語

任務式指揮起源於為因應克勞塞維茨的戰爭不確定性哲學，後來在 19 世紀

初，德軍的老毛奇將之制定較完善的理論體系，接著美軍在戰間期引進任務式指揮，但充其量只停留在概念與原則層面，直至越戰失利後，才重新審視任務式指揮，不過又在 1990 年代的裁軍與軍費緊縮使之一度進入停擺，直至 911 事件發生後才促成改革的動力。吾人認為美軍執行任務式指揮的成功案例是 2003 年伊拉克戰爭：名為迅雷（Thunder Run）的戰術行動讓美軍裝甲部隊直搗伊國首都巴格達。

任務式指揮為嚴守主動，強調在統一意圖下分權執行，意即在上級意圖下，下級可以在局部下達決心。惟美軍當前強調低風險文化、按表操課訓練及不健全的「軍事決策程序」(MDMP) 等，已扼殺了任務式指揮的發揮與實踐；鑒此，作者提出一些精進作為，希冀美軍能重拾任務式指揮光景，其中「認知導向模式」(RPM)，可供國軍在「軍事決策程序」教學上的另一個參考選項。

任務式指揮並不能全盤照套於軍中所有一切，而是要用在對的地方，意即在快速決策的複雜環境下才能發揮最大功效，另在戰爭時機、戰爭摩擦及戰爭迷霧發生時也同樣適用。若一個單位在規劃訓練科目時，集權化管控才能確保有效的訓練，這時候就不適用分權化管控。再者，任務式指揮的成功關鍵在於不斷的在實兵演習中實踐，這是美軍須強化的課題，才不會在未來戰爭陷入困境。國軍高層領導者也應將任務式指揮納入實兵演習的科目中，讓基層部隊長有機會演練任務式指揮，從中激發出更具創意的戰術戰法，才能有效因應未來多變的戰場環境。

作者簡介

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