

論戰爭層級的層次分析法*

The Levels of War as Levels of Analysis

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Many field grade officers and Command and General Staff Officers' Course (CGSOC) students have difficulty distinguishing between the levels of war. This article attempts to clarify the levels of war by proposing that they should be thought of as levels of analysis. Many disciplines have found utility in using levels of analysis to clarify thinking and as an approach to research and analysis. It seems reasonable to believe that approaching the levels of war as levels of analysis will do the same for CGSOC students. The advantages of this approach will be discerned by looking at the levels of war and common issues students have with them, the levels of analysis framework (to include the unit of analysis issue), and the benefits of using the levels of war as levels of analysis to clarify thinking.

前言

許多校級軍官與指參班課程的學員在區分戰爭層級上遇到困難。本文藉由提出層次分析的思考方法來試著釐清戰爭層級。誠如許多學科都獲益於使用層次分析法來釐清思考，並將之視為是一種研究分析的方法，因此我們合理相信在戰爭層級上運用層次分析法，同樣可以讓指參學員們獲致益處，預期所帶來的優點如下：一、檢視學員在戰爭層級區分上的共通問題；二、理解層次分析法的架構與「分析單位」**的問題；三、在戰爭層級運用層次分析法有助於釐清思維理則。

The concept of levels of war has a long history, starting with Carl von

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** 譯者註：「分析單位」(unit of analysis) 是社會科學中常見的研究方法之一，係指研究主題中所設定的分析單位，各個分析單位經統整後，可以歸納出對研究主題的概括性描述與解釋。

Clausewitz, who identified two levels: strategy and tactics.¹ Aleksandr A. Svechin, an officer in the 1920s Soviet Red Army, first proposed the concept of an operational level of war.² However, the U.S. Army did not adopt the operational level of war as doctrine until 1982 in Field Manual 100-5, Operations.³

戰爭層級的構想由來已久，克勞塞維茨開始將戰爭區分為戰略與戰術兩個層級，¹在 1920 年代時蘇聯紅軍軍官亞歷山大·史威琴首先提出在戰爭層級中多增一層作戰層級的構想，²至於美軍直到 1982 年才在「100-5 號野戰教範：作戰」的準則中納入戰爭的作戰層級。³

Current doctrine regarding the levels of war can be found in both Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations.⁴ The three levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—link tactical actions to achievement of national objectives. There are no finite limits or boundaries between these levels, but they help commanders design and synchronize operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. The strategic, operational, or tactical purpose of employment depends on the nature of the objective, mission, or task.⁵

準則論述

美軍當前關於戰爭層級的論述，揭櫫於「JP1 美國武裝部隊」與「JP3-0 聯合作戰」兩本準則，⁴JP1 準則指出，戰爭的三個層級（戰略、作戰、戰術）緊扣著戰術行動，目的是為達成國家目標，而在這三個層級中，沒有一定的限制或界線，主要是在協助上級指揮官設計並統合作戰行動、分配資源，以及將任務指派給合適的權責單位，至於是戰略目的、作戰目的或是戰術目的之運用方式，須視目標、任務或行動要項的本質而定。⁵

¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (China: Sweetwater Press, 2006); Clausewitz, *On War*, 178. The idea of the difference between strategy and tactics appears in chapter 3 of *The Art of War*, “Attack by Stratagem.”

² Jacob Kipp, “Soviet Military Doctrine and the Origins of Operational Art, 1917-1936,” in *Soviet Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991*, ed. William C. Frank Jr. and Philip S. Gillette (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1992), 88. 譯者註：史威琴歸結蘇聯內戰和一戰經驗，並根據當時戰場時空與軍力等條件，提出在戰略與戰術之間須加入「作戰」(Operation)，並界定三者關係為作戰是集合戰術的階段，依循戰略所指之路徑。

³ Huba Wass de Czege and L. D. Holder, “The New FM 100- 5,” *Military Review* 62, no. 7 (July 1982): 56.

⁴ Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 12 July 2017), I-7-I-8, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf; JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 22 October 2018), I-12-I-14, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf.

⁵ JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, I-7.

This description from JP 1 sets out the basics and also illustrates the epistemological issue inherent in the doctrinal concept. There are three levels of war (a classification construct), but “there are no finite limits or boundaries between these levels.”⁶ This is an issue for students when they try to identify which level of war particular mission or task or objective belongs in. For students, the issue is classifying which category applies, and although the levels of war are not really categories, categories are commonly how students approach the levels of war. Doctrine tries to clarify the issue with the caveat that “the strategic, operational, or tactical purpose of employment depends on the nature of the objective, mission, or task.”⁷ That is to say, the purpose of the action or objective is what determines the level of war. However, that does not completely rectify the epistemological classification problem. When there is no clear delineation of the limits or boundaries between the levels of war, it is still rather tricky to correctly classify the purpose. Doctrine in JP 1 creates a problem with how students can understand and use the levels of war in their thinking (see figure 1).

JP1 準則的敘述不僅說明基本原理，同時也指出準則概念中原本就存在的認識論問題，意即戰爭的架構雖然區分為三個層級，但三者之間並沒有一定的限制或界線。⁶學員的課題為試著界定一項特定的任務、行動要項或目標是屬於哪個戰爭層級，也就是說要做分門別類，但問題是戰爭層級並無法真正做分類，學員卻仍採這種分類方式來看待戰爭層級。JP1 準則已試著釐清這個問題並提醒說，「戰略目的、作戰目的或是戰術目的之運用方式，須視目標、任務或行動要項的本質而定。」⁷換言之，行動目的或是目標才是戰爭層級的決定者，但即便有此認知仍無法完全修正認識論的分類問題。當在戰爭各層級之間沒有明顯的限制或界線的輪廓時，要正確區分目的仍是一個棘手問題。JP1 準則反而製造出學員應如何在其思維上理解並使用戰爭層級的問題（參見圖 1）。

JP 3-0 does not help to clarify the issue and in fact reinforces the problem. A positive contribution, however, is the warning against the unit of analysis issue. The warning reiterates that there are three levels of war and that there are no fixed limits or boundaries between them. The student is warned against including the unit of analysis (e.g., echelon of command, size of units, types of

⁶ Ibid., x.

⁷ Ibid., 1-7.

equipment) in the levels of war classification. That is a useful warning because students often will make the unit of analysis mistake and conflate the echelon of command, size of units, or types of equipment with a particular level of war. On the other hand, the classification problem is still based on the nature of the task, mission, or objective. The place where JP 3-0 reinforces the epistemological problem is when it states, for example, intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally strategic assets, are also significant resources for tactical operations. Likewise, tactical actions can cause both intended and unintended strategic consequences, particularly in today's environment of pervasive and immediate global communications and networked threats.⁸

JP3-0 準則同樣對釐清問題沒有幫助，反而更實際強化問題所在，但仍有其正面貢獻的部分，也就是對「分析單位」的問題提出警告，準則一再強調戰爭有三個層級，但三者之間並沒有固定的限制或界線，還警告學員須在戰爭分類的層級中妥處如指揮層級、單位規模、裝備種類等「分析單位」。這是一個有用的警告，因為學員往往犯下「分析單位」的錯誤，並將指揮層級、單位規模、裝備種類跟特定某個戰爭層級混為一談。就另一個面向而言，如何做分類仍是根據行動要項、任務或目標。JP3-0 準則在以下的文字敘述部分強化了認識論的問題點，例如先前被視為重要戰略資產的情報與通信衛星，同時也是戰術行動的重要資源；同樣地，戰術行動可以產生預期與不預期的戰略效果，尤其是今日環境普遍存在對全球通信與網路的立即性威脅。⁸

Given that there are no fixed limits or boundaries between the levels of war, how does the student differentiate between them when strategic assets have tactical applications and when tactical actions have intended and unintended strategic consequences? A tactical action with an intended strategic consequence (purpose) would, from the explanation in JP 1 and JP 3-0, place that tactical action at the strategic level of war. Notice also that in this explanation from JP 3-0 that the operational level of war is not mentioned. It is no wonder that many CGSOC students in the Department of Distance Education have difficulty distinguishing between the levels of war; the doctrine has an inherent epistemological issue regarding the clarity of the delineation between the levels (see figure 2).

⁸ JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, I-12.

鑒於戰爭層級沒有固定的限制與界限，學員應如何辨別戰略資產是否具戰術用途，及戰術行動是否會產生預期與不預期的戰略效果呢？戰術行動會有預期的戰略效果（目的），可以從 JP1 與 JP3-0 準則將戰術行動置於戰爭中的戰略層級來做解釋，但我們也發現 JP3-0 準則並未提及戰術行動在戰爭中的作戰層級的解釋。難怪乎許多指參學員在上遠距教學部的課程時會對區分戰爭層級有困難，因為準則先天就存在釐清戰爭層級輪廓的認識論問題（參見圖 2）。




圖 1 戰爭的三個層級

This graphic shows the levels of war as a distinct hierarchy with marginally overlapping areas between the strategic and the operational and between the tactical and the operational. In this hierarchical structure, there is no overlap between the tactical and the strategic as suggested by the description in Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

該圖顯示戰爭的不同分類層級，在戰略與作戰、及作戰和戰術層級之間有部分重疊區域，至於在這個層級的分類架構中，一如 JP3-0 準則中的文字敘述，看不出戰略與戰術之間有重疊區域。




圖 2 戰爭的三個層級

This graphic of the levels of war from a lesson plan in the Command and General Staff Officers' Course (CGSOC) C200 course shows a version of the distinct hierarchy graphic from Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, on the left but presents the levels of war as nested or embedded on the right. This would indicate that the tactical and operational levels are contained within the strategic level and that the tactical level is contained within the operational level. That graphic would better fit the example from JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*. On the other hand, if the levels are nested and embedded rather than distinct with a marginal overlap, how does the student differentiate between them?

指參班 C200 課程計畫中的戰爭層級圖示不同於「JP1 美國武裝部隊」準則的分層圖示（參見圖 1），戰爭層級說明是以左圖分層交疊與右圖層層交疊的架構呈現，這意味著戰術與作戰層級納在戰略層級內，而戰術層級納在作戰層級內，這種重疊的圖示較能表達「JP3-0 聯合作戰」準則所欲傳達之意涵。附帶一提，若戰爭層級只是以層層交疊架構呈現，而不輔以邊緣重疊部分的方式共同呈現，則學員有辦法區別各層級之間的不同嗎？

There are two common issues students have with the levels of war. First, they will often combine the levels of war. That is, they do not make any distinction between strategic (national and theater), operational, and tactical; the most common mistake is they will combine the strategic and operational levels. Those levels are the ones they have the least experience with. The other common error is mistaking actions or objectives at one level for those done at another level, either higher or lower. The result of these errors is analysis that is confused and entangled. The errors prevent students from thinking clearly through problems dealing with operational art and are a hindrance to their ability to grasp key concepts. Most students think about, and make connections with, their professional military experiences to provide context to new information. The usual approach is to relate the new concepts in CGSOC to a tactical framework since the majority of students' military experiences are at that level. This is a natural response and a common heuristic, but it leads to hasty generalizations and biased interpretation of information. There is little recourse currently to assist students struggling to understand the levels of war except to point them back to doctrine. What is needed is a new way to clarify and present the levels of war in a way that assists students in absorbing the concept in a new framework without trying to make connections to their tactical experiences. A framework used in quite a few disciplines is called the level of analysis.

共通問題

學員在戰爭層級上有兩個共通問題。第一，他們往往將戰爭的不同層級併在一起，也就是說他們未清楚區分戰略（國家政策、戰區戰略）、作戰、戰術之層級，其中最常見的是錯誤是將戰略與作戰層級混在一起。這種層級的混淆至少是某些人曾遇過的情況。第二，他們往往將某一層級的行動或目標，誤認為

是另一個更高或是更低層級的。這些錯誤的結果將導致分析混亂不明，不僅讓學員無法清楚思考該如何運用「作戰藝術」，^{***}而且也阻礙他們無法掌握關鍵的概念。大多數學員對新資訊的解讀，其想法都是將這些新資訊與自身的軍事專業做聯想，常見的情況是把指參班課程上所學的新概念與戰術架構做聯想，這是因為大多數學員的經驗都只在戰術層級而已。這是一種自然反應且直觀的推斷法，但將導致武斷觀點並形成偏見看法。除了讓學員再次回歸準則面之外，當前似乎沒有較好方法能協助學員好好去理解戰爭層級，而這個新的作法就是釐清並清楚呈現戰爭層級，進而協助學員吸收新架構的概念，讓他們不必再將外來資訊與自身的戰術經驗做聯想。

That framework can assist CGSOC students to clarify their thinking and analysis. The level of analysis is a tool found in various social sciences (e.g., political science, sociology, psychology, anthropology) that helps the scholar define the scale and scope of his or her research. In any area of scholarly inquiry, there are always several ways in which the phenomena under study may be sorted and arranged for purposes of systemic analysis. Whether in the physical or social sciences, the observer may choose to focus upon the parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system.⁹

層次分析法

「層次分析法」有助於指參班課程的學員去釐清他們的思維與分析，這種架構會在一些學科上做使用，例如在許多社會科學的學科（如政治學、社會學、心理學、人類學）上被視為是一項工具，協助學者界定其研究的規模與範圍。在任何學術研究的領域，為了做出有系統的分析，總有一些方法可以對研究對象進行分類與歸納。無論是在物理學或社會學，觀察者可以選擇著重於部分或整體，也就是組成要素或體系。⁹

The example used here is from an international relations theory in political science, the field that this author is most familiar with. In political science, the level of analysis problem was described by J. David Singer in 1961, but he only described two levels: the international system and the state.¹⁰ Kenneth N.

^{***}譯者註：作戰藝術是指揮官及其參謀經由他們的技巧、知識及經驗所運用的創造性思維，在戰區或作戰區藉由設計、組織及使用武力等方式，進而執行戰役和主要作戰行動，以達成戰略目標。此外，作戰藝術是介於戰略與戰術層級之間的野戰用兵原理，作用是將戰略企圖轉為實際的戰術行動，旨在達成戰區所望之目標，其應用涵蓋整個作戰全程，涉及規劃、準備、執行等階段的理論與實踐，至於戰略、戰術及作戰藝術之間並沒有明確界線，彼此傾向融合在一起。

⁹ David J. Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (1961): 77, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009557>.

Waltz, in *Man, the State, and War* and in *Theory of International Politics*, proposes three levels of analysis that are now most commonly used: the individual, the state, and the international system.¹¹ These three levels allow a scholar to investigate phenomena from very different perspectives. For example, if the individual level of analysis is selected, then the research would focus on what the individual decision-maker does in terms of policy and why he or she made that decision. If the state level of analysis is chosen, then the focus would be on the internal workings of the state and how bureaucracies and groups make decisions (e.g., Graham Allison's work on the Cuban Missile Crisis).¹² If the international system is chosen, then the research would focus on the structure of the system and the interactions between actors in the system (e.g., looking at the structure of alliances and treaties prior to World War I).

本文所列舉的層次分析法是來自政治學的國際關係理論，該領域是筆者最為熟悉的。在政治學領域，層次分析的問題在 1961 年時由大衛·辛格提出，但他只提出兩個層次：國際體系與國家。¹⁰ 肯尼斯·沃爾茲在其兩本著作《人、國家和戰爭》與《國際政治理論》中提出三個層次的分析法：個人、國家、國際體系，這個分析法已為人廣泛使用。¹¹ 這個三層次分析法讓學者可以從不同觀點來研究對象，例如當選擇個人的分析法時，研究就著重於個人決策者如何做決策，及他或她為何做出這種決定；當選擇國家的分析法時，重點就放在國家內部的工作事項，及官僚體系和各團隊如何做決定（可參考格雷厄姆·艾利森所著《決策的本質：解釋古巴飛彈危機》乙書）¹²；當選擇國際體系的分析法時，研究重點就置於體系的結構及體系內各行為者（國家）的互動（可參考一戰前各國的結盟與締約關係）。

The utility then of selecting a level of analysis is methodological; it allows the scholar to structure his or her research in a way that is clear and rational. It prevents concepts and ideas from becoming confused and entangled by limiting what is under investigation to those things that fit within its scope. If a scholar uses the international system as a level of analysis, that choice prevents, for example, the personality of the German Kaiser (individual level of

¹⁰ Ibid., 80–84.

¹¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

¹² Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

analysis) to be considered as a factor in the international system of alliances and treaties prior to World War I. This does not mean that any one level of analysis is superior; on the contrary, all levels or perspectives regarding a subject are necessary to more fully understand it. However, using levels of analysis provides clarity and focus when examining complex subjects.

選擇層次分析法將獲得方法論上的好處，讓學者能清楚且合理建構其研究內容，因為這種方法藉由限制研究事物的範圍，避免讓人對各個概念與想法混淆不清。如果一位學者採用國際體系作為分析法時，則在一戰前各國的結盟與締約關係的國際體系中，就應避免將德皇威廉二世這種衝動人格特質（屬於個人分析法）的決策因素納入考量。這並不是說有某一個層次的分析是最好的，相反地，只要是關於主題的各個層次與觀點都必須進一步做到全般理解。不過，當在檢視複雜的主題時，使用層次分析法除了能釐清思維外，還能讓複雜的主題產生聚焦。

To further improve clarity in analysis, the military scholar must be aware of another concept known as the unit of analysis. The level of analysis is not the same as the unit of analysis. The unit of analysis is the object that is the focus of the analysis; it is the thing studied. What is important is that the unit of analysis “depends on the level of inquiry.”¹³ A unit of analysis could be individual(s), group(s), organization(s), state(s), or a system. The unit of analysis depends on the framework of the analysis, which is the level of analysis. If a soldier is looking at the strategic level of analysis, his or her unit of analysis might be the actions of a theater commander, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the secretary of defense. It could also be the actions of a corporal, sergeant, or junior officer when those actions are at the strategic level. This meshes with doctrine as noted above regarding the unit of analysis and the levels of war when JP 3-0 states, echelon of command, size of units, types of equipment, and types and location of forces or components may often be associated with a particular level, but the strategic, operational, or tactical purpose of their employment depends on the nature of their task, mission, or objective.¹⁴

分析單位

為了進一步在分析上釐清思維，軍事學者必須知道另一種為人熟知的概念：「分析單位」，其不同於層次分析法，分析單位是在進行分析時所設定的最小單

位，是一種對事物的研究方法。重要的是，「分析單位」也要選擇研究的層級，¹³範圍可以是個人、團體、組織、國家或體系，也就是「分析單位」須在分析的架構（分析的層次）下進行。如果某位學員正在檢視戰略層級的分析，則其「分析單位」主要是戰區指揮官、參謀首長聯席會議主席或國防部長等人所指示的各項行動，但當下士、士官長或低階軍官等人所下令的行動也會牽動戰略層級時，則須一併納入考量。「分析單位」與戰爭層級之間的關係跟 JP3-0 準則所提到的不謀而合，內容指出指揮層級、單位規模、裝備種類、主體或分組兵力位置往往特別與某個層級有所關連，但戰略目的、作戰目的或是戰術目的之運用方式，須視目標、任務或行動要項的本質而定。¹⁴

This is the doctrinal equivalent of stating that the unit of analysis depends on the level of analysis (level of war). Using the levels of war as levels of analysis fits doctrine and helps to clarify it. There are several benefits of using the levels of war as levels of analysis. First, it clarifies doctrine. It clears up the epistemological issue described previously. This is rather simple and yet not intuitive to most students. Most students try to fit the information they are given into a level of war as a category during their analysis.

準則內容等同於指出「分析單位」取決於分析的層次（戰爭層級），也就是在戰爭層級上運用層次分析法可以與準則相容，甚至還有助於釐清準則內容。至於在戰爭層級上運用層次分析法有數個好處，首當其衝的是有助於釐清準則內容，也就是釐清前文所說的認識論問題，雖然說起來好像很簡單，但對大多數學員而言並不是單憑認知直覺就可以解決，因為大多數學員在分析過程中會試著將其獲得的資訊歸類至某一個戰爭層級。

Treating the levels of war as levels of analysis would require students to first determine the scope and limitations of each level of war in a given scenario prior to conducting any analysis of the subject. It changes the student's focus from trying to sift information into loosely defined and overlapping categories during analysis to starting his or her analysis with a framework having predetermined parameters for what defines each level of analysis/level of war. As with the social sciences, use of levels of analysis clarifies the scope of research and analysis by clearly describing what is to be the subject of investigation prior to analysis. The example from JP 3-0

¹³ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 4th ed. (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2009), 31.

¹⁴ JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, I-12.

describing a tactical action at the strategic level of war would be clarified. The unit of analysis is not the determinant. If the student is using the strategic level of war as a level of analysis, then that action would simply be seen as a strategic action regardless of which echelon of command or unit conducted the action. In fact, the actions (unit of analysis) conducted by a tactical unit can be tactical, operational, or strategic. That is much clearer. This is simply a change in approach and not a change in definition or parameters (scope) of each level of war.

運用與釐清思維

至於要如何在戰爭層級上運用層次分析法呢？也就是學員在進行任何主題分析之前，需要在某個特定想定下的各個戰爭層級先設定範圍與限制條件。這改變了學員的研究重點，從在分析時試著將資訊過濾轉化成鬆散定義與重疊的類別，轉變成學員的分析架構開始有界定各分析層次/戰爭層級的預定參數。與社會科學一樣，分析的層次藉由在分析之前先清楚描述所要調查的對象，進而釐清研究分析的範圍。如此一來，JP3-0 準則在戰爭中的戰略層級描述戰術行動的問題，就獲得解決了。「分析單位」並不是行列式的運算法，若學員把戰爭的戰略層級當作「分析單位」，則行動就應將之單純視為戰術行動，不管是由指揮層級或單位所遂行的行動。事實上，由戰術單位遂行的行動（「分析單位」），類型可以是戰術的、作戰的或戰略的，也就是只有在方法上改變，至於在定義或在戰爭各層級的參數（範圍）則不變，這樣就清楚多了。

Doctrine in JP 1 already establishes the parameters (scope) of each level of war in such a way that each can be used as a level of analysis. The strategic level of war involves national (or multinational) guidance and resources to achieve national- or theater-level objectives. The strategic level of analysis would analyze any actions taken that involve national (or multinational) guidance, resources, or objectives and end state. The operational level of war involves planning and execution of campaigns and major operations using operational art to achieve military objectives. The operational level of analysis would analyze any actions taken that involve operational art and planning and execution of campaigns and major operations. The tactical level of war involves the planning and execution of battles and engagements by the “ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and the enemy to achieve combat

objectives.”¹⁵ The tactical level of analysis would analyze any actions taken that involve those activities.

JP1 準則已經建立戰爭各層級的參數（範圍），如此一來就可以在戰爭各層級上做分析。在戰爭的戰略層級上，為涉及國家（或多國）指導及達成國家級或戰區級目標所需資源，至於在戰略上的「分析單位」將需要分析任何涉及國家（或多國）指導、資源、目標和所望戰果的行動。在戰爭的作戰層級上，為涉及各戰役之規劃與執行、及在重大作戰行動上如何運用作戰藝術來達成軍事目標，至於在作戰上的「分析單位」為分析任何涉及作戰藝術、及各戰役和重大作戰行動之規劃與執行。在戰爭的戰術層級上，為涉及戰鬥與接戰之規劃與執行，也就是從事組織性部署並調遣兵力在敵陣營間穿梭，以利達成作戰目標，¹⁵至於在戰術上的「分析單位」為分析任何有關這些活動的行動。

A good example is Operation Desert Storm. When the levels of war are set as levels of analysis using the parameters in doctrine, it becomes clear that VII Corps was functioning at the tactical level of war (planning and executing battles and engagements using “the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and the enemy to achieve combat objectives”).¹⁶ It is instantly clear that the objectives or actions (battles and engagements) and not the echelon of command (Corps) determine the level of war when applying the levels of war as levels of analysis.

沙漠風暴作戰行動是一個作為解說的好例子，當對這場戰爭設定分析層次並使用準則中的參數時，就可以明顯看出第七軍是在戰爭的戰術層級中運作（也就是上述所說的從事組織性部署並調遣兵力在敵陣營間穿梭，以利達成作戰目標）。¹⁶當在戰爭層級運用層次分析法時，就可以立刻知道並不是看指揮層級（軍部）來決定戰爭層級，而是由目標與行動（戰鬥與接戰）來決定。

There is then a final question of whether to view the levels of war as a hierarchy or as nested and embedded. Another aspect of the utility of using the levels of war as levels of analysis is that both approaches can be used. As with levels of analysis in political science (individual, state, and international system), an individual is embedded or nested within the state, which is also embedded or nested within the international system, but there is a hierarchy in terms of scope that expands from the individual, to the state, to the

¹⁵ JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, I-8.

¹⁶ Ibid.

international system. Whether the levels of war can be considered as a hierarchy or as nested and embedded is a function of how the framework of the level of war as a level of analysis is used. Students can and should become comfortable with both ways of viewing the levels of war.

接著最後有一個問題是我們要將戰爭層級看成一層層分開的層級，還是看成一層層交疊在一起的架構。在戰爭層級運用層次分析法有另一個好處是都能適用這兩種的戰爭層級架構。這跟在政治學的分析層次（個人、國家、國際體系）一樣，個人層級交疊在國家層級內，而國家層級又交疊在國際體系內。無論戰爭層級是被看成一層層分開或是一層層交疊的層級，其都能導入戰爭層級的層次分析法做使用。學員可以也應該自在運用這兩種方式來看待戰爭的層級。

Students have repeatedly demonstrated difficulty understanding and applying the levels of war in their coursework. That is because there is an epistemological issue with current doctrine and the students' approach to the levels of war as categories to be used during the analysis process. They also often use their experiences at the tactical level as a heuristic, but that causes hasty generalizations and biased interpretation of information. These problems cause confused and entangled thinking, resulting in poor analysis. Using the levels of war as levels of analysis provides a method to clarify students' thinking. This is a departure from the current approach primarily in terms of process. The main difference is changing the student's view of the levels of war from that of several categories used in the analysis process, to levels of analysis considered as a framework to be applied to a scenario prior to the analysis. This will assist in eliminating the unit of analysis issue often made by students, as well as removing the epistemological issue of unclear boundaries between the levels of war.

結論

學員在其課程中一再出現對戰爭層級的運用與理解有困難，這是因為在當前準則中存在認識論的問題，學員在戰爭層級的分析過程中往往使用分類法，但卻將所獲資訊與自身的戰術層級經驗做連結，結果導致武斷觀點並形成偏見看法。這種問題讓思維混淆不明，更產生不良的分析結果。在戰爭層級運用層次分析法有助於釐清學員的思維，這種不同於當前作法都是在程序上進行改善，主要不同之處是改變學員看待戰爭層級的觀點，從在分析過程中將各資訊在戰

爭層級上做分類，轉變為在分析之前先於某一想定下運用「分析單位」的研究架構，這方法不僅有助於減少學員在做「分析單位」時所產生的問題，還能解決在戰爭層級上界線不明的認知論問題。

譯後語

戰爭層級區分戰略、作戰及戰術三個層級，本文指出戰爭架構雖然區分三個層級，但彼此之間並沒有一定的限制或界線，而戰爭層級之界定應以行動目的或目標來決定；然而，即使知道這個道理，指參班學員仍無法完全克服認識論的分類問題，因為他們在進行分析時會直觀將指揮層級、單位規模、裝備種類或兵力部署位置等因素跟某個戰爭層級做聯想，而忘記應以戰略、作戰或戰術目的作為考量，舉例而言，基層的作戰行動只要會產生戰略效應或影響，就要將之歸納在戰爭的戰略層級中看待，不能將之視為是戰術層級的行動。

鑒此，本文認為要改善這種問題，可以引進社會科學的兩種研究方法：「層次分析法」與「分析單位」。「層次分析法」的運用方法是對某個研究主題，採取個人、國家或國際體系的層次分析，例如我們若對某場戰爭的成因採個人與國家的層次分析，就應著重在國家領導人的個人因素與國家內的變動，至於國際體系的因素就先略而不談，這並不是說國際體系因素與戰爭的成因無任何關係，只不過是要將研究聚焦而得出最佳結果。

「分析單位」是在對某個研究主題做分析時所設定的最小單位，同時會選定一個層級（個人、團體、組織、國家或體系），選定範圍與設定條件同樣也是為了研究聚焦而得出最佳結果，例如我們將某國內戰的分析選定在組織層級，則「分析單位」就是找出各方派系產生不合的事件，不同眾多的事件（「分析單位」）經統整歸納後，就可以得出對該研究主題的結論。

本文所介紹的「層次分析法」與「分析單位」除了能在戰爭層級上做運用外，同樣也能運用於與軍事主題相關的研究，作法是排除比較不相關的層次後選定一個與事件主題最相關的層次，接著設定「分析單位」，經蒐整歸納各「分析單位」後而得出最具參考價值的結論，我國國軍中高階幹部的軍事教育課程若能採納本文所提的研究方法，並將之實踐運用於軍事主題的研究，一定能強化國軍幹部的本質學能。

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