

Well-Trained Partners Are More Likely to Fight

訓練有素的合作夥伴更有可能參與戰鬥

取材/2019 年 05 月 美國陸軍月刊(ARMY, May/2019)



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Tuesday, May 07, 2019

The first pickup laid down suppressive fire with its .50-caliber heavy machine gun; the other pickup—called a “technical” in the many places such makeshift combat vehicles are found—then advanced to the next fold in the sand, braked hard and took up the thundering cadence with its own weapon. The first technical used that suppression to resume its advance, and the two vehicles continued their alternating progress down a football field-length of Iraqi desert.

2019 年 5 月 7 日，星期二

當第一輛小貨卡以 50 重機槍對敵制壓射擊時，另一輛多功能亦稱為戰鬥車的貨卡，前進至沙丘中另一據點，緊急剎車停住後以車載武器，用迅雷不及掩耳之速度向敵人射擊。第一輛車制壓敵人後恢復前進，兩輛車保持有足球場距離之間隔，輪流向前穿越廣大的伊拉克沙漠。

The principles of fire and movement were developed by German stormtroopers in World War I, yet were new to these Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, recently trained by Western Special Forces. The multinational observers clapped after the demonstration, held near Mosul Dam during the war with the Islamic State group.

射擊與運動戰法，係第一次世界大戰德國衝鋒隊所發展出來，然對西方特種部隊訓練出來之庫德族武裝戰士而言，尚屬新奇。聯合國軍事觀察團成員在觀看這項，於對抗伊斯蘭國組織戰鬥期間，在摩蘇爾大壩舉行之戰鬥演練後，皆不吝給予掌聲。

Does this training help in combat, though? “Oh yes, we were surprised, but it really worked,” one Peshmerga told me after the demonstration, detailing a recent attack the Peshmerga made on Islamic State fighters. “We can launch attacks now that before cost lots of blood.”

His confidence was mirrored across the force: In a survey of 2,301 Peshmerga that I conducted during the summer of 2017, Western training increased their confidence and decreased the likelihood they would hide or run away when under fire from the Islamic State group.

此種訓練對作戰有幫助嗎?當然，我們非常驚訝，不過真的有幫助。一位庫德族戰士，於演練結束後跟我說明，近期和伊斯蘭國士兵作戰的狀況：現在，我們可以不畏流血喪命而向敵攻擊。戰力給了他足夠的自信力量。我在 2017 年夏天期間，對 2301 名庫德族戰士所作之調查報告中指出，西方的訓練增加了他們面對伊斯蘭國武裝部隊時的自信，亦減少在遭遇敵人炮火時，躲藏或逃跑的可能性。



In Iraq, Peshmerga soldiers, with direction from coalition forces, learn to clear buildings.

伊拉克庫德族武裝戰士在盟軍指導下，學習如何運用建築物執行掃蕩任務

(Credit: U.S. Army/1st Lt. Daniel Johnson)(圖片來源:美國陸軍/中尉丹尼爾約翰遜)

Not Second Nature

Small-unit tactics—fire and movement, cover and concealment, and suppression—are so ingrained into American warfighters they seem natural. They are not. Anyone who has spent time with partner forces knows how hard it is to teach weapons-handling skills; going beyond weapon proficiency to tactical proficiency is often “a bridge too far.” From the Vietnam War to Iraq, the U.S. military has struggled to professionalize our partners, often with catastrophic strategic effects. Think about the Islamic State group’s attack on Mosul in June 2014: 1,500 fighters caused 60,000 Iraqi soldiers and policemen we had trained to flee. The consequence was a grueling, multiyear campaign to liberate northern Iraq.

習慣成自然

小部隊戰術-射擊與運動、掩蔽與隱蔽以及制壓敵人-這對美軍士兵們來說就像根深蒂固的天性，非常自然。其實不然，只要有團隊作戰經驗的人都知道，光是教導武器操作技巧，就有許多難度，若再加上戰術結合武器運用到嫺熟程度，尚有諸多挑戰。從越戰到伊拉克戰爭，美國努力訓練其軍隊成為專業化的勁旅，不過往往換來災難性的效果。回想一下，2014 年 6 月在摩蘇爾，伊斯蘭國組織攻擊事件中，1,500 名攻擊者

造成約 60,000 名經我們訓練過的伊拉克士兵與警察逃跑的事件。此後，經過多年的苦心經營與勤訓精練，才得以將伊拉克北部解放出來。

Several obstacles prevent the U.S. from training effective militaries. American soldiers might suffer from the “curse of knowledge”: being so proficient at their small-unit tactics, they find it hard to understand why partners struggle. Only 31 percent of Afghan adults are literate. This creates an immediate barrier to learning. There are also cultural barriers. Military forces in developing states often focus on creating impressive visuals to serve as propaganda for the government; for example, soldiers are trained how to jump through hoops of fire or conduct kung fu moves in unison.

諸多障礙讓美國難以將軍隊訓練成鋼鐵勁旅。美國士兵間或許存在雞同鴨講的溝通問題，但他們對小部隊戰鬥，要達到純熟精練卻難以理解，為何同袍之間會相互掣肘。在阿富汗只有百分之三十一的成年人識字，不僅直接阻礙學習，不同文化之間亦存有歧見與阻礙。開發中國家的軍隊，往往專注在創造令人印象深刻的視覺表現，成為政府的宣傳手法。例如：將士兵訓練會穿越火圈或一些花拳繡腿的功夫表演。

Additionally, promotions are based not on competence, but instead on loyalty to the regime: In the eyes of a ruler of an unstable state, there’s no sense in having your best general leading the military if he’s going to launch a coup d’état against you. Advisers often have the experience of mentoring a great officer and not understanding why he is not in charge of a larger formation; it’s probably because he is in the wrong tribe or family, so promoting him would raise internal stability problems.

另外，升遷不是靠能力，而是取決於是否效忠政權當局。一位政權不穩定的統治者，如果他要發起政變攻擊對手，他並不會考慮是否有優秀的將領來領導軍隊。軍事指揮官者通常具有統領部屬的經驗，但他不見得知道為何始終無法更上層樓，總管大軍兵符。原因在於他的出身背景不同，若提攜他出任要職，可能引起內部人事衝突對立。



A U.S. Army captain, right, speaks with a member of the Iraqi Army at Camp Swift, Iraq, before a 2016 meeting to help synchronize efforts with Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in the area.

2016 年在伊拉克斯威夫特戰營的一次會議前夕，一名美國陸軍上尉(右者)與一名伊拉克軍官就如何指揮庫德族部隊，進行意見交換。

(圖片來源: DoD/Capt. A. Sean Taylor)

Coaching the Kurds

The counteroffensive against the Islamic State group, however, demonstrates how much our partners can accomplish if they want to learn and the U.S. provides proper training. Two of the principal forces have been composed of Kurds, an ethnic group with a different language than their Arabic and Turkish neighbors. In Syria, the YPG (People's Protection Units) have spearheaded the campaign; after a tenacious defense of the city of Kobane, they launched a brilliant counteroffensive that included the liberation of Raqqa, the Islamic State group's Syrian capital.

訓練庫德族戰士

關於打擊伊斯蘭國組織，只要我們的夥伴有意願且想要學習，美國都會提供適當的訓練。其中兩支對抗伊斯蘭國組織的主力，都是由庫德族戰士組成，但彼此操持不同語言，既不是阿拉伯語，也非土耳其語。在敘利亞的軍事行動由 YPG(人民防衛軍)領軍作戰，在經歷過柯巴內城(Kobane)的頑強抵抗後，他們成功攻下拉卡(Raqqa)城，該城係伊斯蘭國在敘利亞的首都。

On the other side of the Syria-Iraq border, the Peshmerga prevented the group from seizing the oil fields at Kirkuk, liberated Sinjar—site of the group's massacre of the Yezidi people—and supported the Iraqi Army's liberation of Mosul. In both cases, the Western countries of the anti-Islamic State group coalition enabled the victory of our Kurdish partners with equipment, fire support and, most importantly, training.

另一方面，敘利亞和伊拉克的邊界，係由庫德族戰士所防守，使基爾庫克(Kirkuk)油田免遭伊斯蘭國攻佔，並佔領了辛賈爾(Sinjar)，該城市曾支援伊拉克軍方收復摩蘇爾城(Mosul)的任務，亦是耶齊迪(Yezidi)人民大屠殺事件的所在地。在這兩件事例中，西方國家聯盟對抗伊斯蘭國組織的勝利，關鍵在提供庫德族夥伴們所需的裝備、火力以及最重要的訓練。

Coalition training of the Kurds focused on small-unit tactics, which they were eager to learn. In one of the training centers I visited in Iraq, individual Peshmerga learned how to conduct squad fire and movement while their squad leaders learned how to set up a suppression element. Coalition trainers guided Peshmerga through a specially designed village to ingrain urban tactics into them. Peshmerga gathered around sand tables to see coalition trainers demonstrate how to conduct fire and maneuver, until their own leaders could take the reins. The visuals were good—but did they actually help?

西方聯盟對庫德族戰士的訓練，主要在他們渴望學習到小部隊戰鬥技巧。在我參訪過的一處伊拉克訓練中心，庫德族戰士學習如何執行班的射擊與運動技巧，於此同時他們的班長則學習如何運用火力制壓敵軍部隊。聯盟訓練教官則藉由精心安排的村莊，指導庫德族士兵落實城鎮作戰技巧。庫德族戰士圍繞在沙盤周圍，觀看聯盟訓練教官示範如何進行火力運用與部隊調動的戰術，直到他們自己的領導者可以接手指揮為止。這看起來很棒，不過這真的有幫助嗎？

My survey of Peshmerga in the summer of 2017, while the war was ongoing, tested the effects of coalition training. The average participant was 34 years old, male (98 percent of the sample), Muslim (97 percent), literate (82 percent) and identified with a tribe (93 percent). He had served 14 years in the Peshmerga, and when he went home during his two-weeks-on, two-weeks-off rotation, his household had two people sleeping in each room (excluding kitchens and bathrooms). He had been in a small-arms-fire exchange (79 percent) as a rifleman (64 percent of combat veterans) and had served in territory once occupied by the Islamic State group (76 percent).

2017 年夏天，當時戰爭仍在進行，我針對庫德族戰士進行調查，驗證西方聯盟的訓練成效。參訓者平均年齡為 34 歲，男性比例 98%，穆斯林佔 97%，受過教育者比率為 82%，具有部落成員身份者佔 93%。其中有一位曾在庫德族部隊服役 14 年的老兵，當他在服勤兩星期後、休假兩星期的輪休方式返家時，家中每一房間都有兩人共用（不含廚房和浴室）。他的專長是步槍兵（佔有戰場經驗老兵的 64%），曾在伊斯蘭國組織佔據的領土（76% 曾被佔領）上，以輕兵器與敵交火（佔戰鬥的 79%）。

His highest educational attainment was primary school (30 percent; 23 percent had finished secondary school and 9 percent were college graduates, while the rest had never completed

primary school), and he had grown up in one of the three principal provinces of Kurdistan—Erbil, Sulaimaniya or Duhok (27 percent, 28 percent and 25 percent, respectively).

他的最高教育程度為小學(30%；23%完成中學；9%大學畢業；其餘則未完成小學教育)，他在庫爾德斯坦(Kurdistan)的埃比爾 (Erbil)、蘇拉曼尼耶(Sulaimaniya)及杜霍克(Duhok)等三個主要省份長大 (來自上述3省的部隊成員比例分別為27%，28%，25%)。

Mix of Ability

More than one-third of Peshmerga reported that they had received coalition training (36 percent), 31 percent had received formal training from other Peshmerga but not from the coalition, and 33 percent had not been formally trained by either the coalition or other Peshmerga. That's right: a third of the Peshmerga had just grabbed a rifle, walked to the front line and signed up without going through basic training, like the minutemen of the American Revolution. These Kurdish minutemen either were older Peshmerga who had fought in the guerrilla wars against Saddam Hussein or had joined with their tribe during the Islamic State group's initial attack in August 2014.

能力的混合

超過三分之一的庫德族戰士指稱，他們曾接受西方聯盟的訓練(佔部隊總數的36%)，31%則是接受其他庫德族部隊的正式訓練，但未接受西方聯盟的訓練；另33%則沒有接受過上述兩種訓練。沒錯，三分之一的庫德族士兵只是拿起步槍、上前線，連基礎訓練都未受過便從軍了，就像美國獨立戰爭期間應召的民兵。這些庫德族士兵都較年長，曾經參加對抗薩達姆·海珊(Saddam Hussein)的游擊隊，也曾加入他們的部族，參與2014年八月對抗伊斯蘭國組織的首次戰鬥。



Peshmerga soldiers practice coalition tactics for clearing urban areas in Iraq in 2016.

2016年在伊拉克庫德族戰士演練西方聯盟所教導的城鎮地區掃蕩戰術

(圖片來源：美國陸軍/參謀隊士兵 Peter J. Berardi)

While undoubtedly brave, does their lack of training harm their battlefield performance? Army combat historian S.L.A. Marshall sensationally estimated that 75 percent of American riflemen in

World War II did not fire back, but instead hid when under fire. Do the untrained Kurds have a similar problem, and does our training help them overcome it?

儘管他們夠勇敢，缺乏訓練會影響他們在戰場上的表現嗎？陸軍戰爭歷史學家馬歇爾(S.L.A. Marshall)曾驚人的估計，第二次世界大戰中，約有 75%的美國步兵在面臨敵火時並未還擊的經驗，而是害怕的躲藏起來。未曾受訓的庫德族戰士，是否也有相同的問題？另我們所施以的訓練，是否有助於他們克服此一問題？

My survey found that coalition training both raised the confidence of Peshmerga and made them less likely to hide when under fire. About 17 percent of Peshmerga without coalition training admitted to hiding under fire. Losing 17 percent of a force's riflemen is a devastating loss, many times more so than the loss of less than 1 percent of their force as casualties during their three-year war against the Islamic State group. In contrast, effectively no coalition-trained Peshmerga reported hiding in combat. Internal training from other Peshmerga—which often consisted of creating visuals, like of jumping through hoops of fire—did not provide the same benefits as coalition training.

我的調查報告顯示，西方聯盟的訓練不僅提升了庫德族戰士的信心，也讓他們不再會於面臨敵火時躲藏起來。約有 17%未受過訓練的庫德族戰士承認，他們在面臨敵火時會躲藏；而少了 17%的步槍兵，對部隊而言是致命性的損失，這比他們在對伊斯蘭國組織的三年戰爭期間不到 1%的傷亡人數，要高出許多倍。反而是，受過西方聯盟訓練的庫德族戰士，未有在戰火中躲藏之情事出現。其他由庫德族部隊自行訓練的戰士，經常會有包含穿越火圈等聲光效果十足，類似娛樂的訓練，卻無法達到與西方聯盟訓練的相同效益。

Both the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds were highly motivated by nationalism and faced existential threats. In the absence of one or both factors, will our partners lack the motivation to adopt the tactics that would make them successful on the battlefield? Are the Kurds unique? Or can we replicate their success in the future?

敘利亞及伊拉克的庫德族都深受民族主義的教化，且面對生存的威脅。上述兩項因素，如果缺少其中之一或兩項全部喪失，我們的夥伴是否因此缺乏動機接受，此項讓他們在戰場上攻無不克的戰術？這是單屬庫德族戰士的問題嗎？或者，我們可以複製他們的成功經驗於未來？

Promise of SFABs

Thankfully, we'll likely have an answer from the Army's new security force assistance brigades (SFABs). With special cross-cultural training and experience in advising, the SFABs will have a better chance of motivating and training our partners. The strategic shift away from

counterterrorism toward near-peer competitors makes this mission more urgent, rather than relegating it to history, for two reasons.

警戒部隊協防旅(SFABs)的承諾

我們很幸運的可能會從陸軍新成立的警戒部隊協防旅(SFABs)中，獲得所需的答案。透過特殊的跨文化訓練與經驗諮詢，警戒部隊協防旅將可以有更好的機會來激勵以及訓練我們的夥伴。從反恐作戰到抗衡勢均力敵競爭者所產生的戰略性轉變，讓這項任務更加急迫，而不是讓其走入歷史，原因有兩個：

First, we need to fully leverage our partner capacity if we're going to compete against increasingly capable Chinese and Russian forces; providing training and mentorship is the best way to do this. Second, we will need our partners to "hold the fort" in secondary theaters while we focus our conventional military against near-peers. The advising and training provided by the SFABs can ensure the U.S. doesn't suffer "death by a thousand paper cuts" while deterring against the most dangerous threats.

首先，如果我們要抗衡進步神速的中國大陸與俄國軍隊時，我們必需盡全力強化我們夥伴的能力；提供部隊訓練與督導他們確實執行，是實現此一目標的最好方式。其次，當我們專注於抗衡勢均力敵競爭者時，會需要夥伴守住我們位於另一戰場上的要塞。警戒部隊協防旅(SFABs)對夥伴們所提供的建議及訓練，可以確保美軍在大敵當前之際，不會遭人從背後下手襲擊。

An objective look at America's history of advising partner forces shows we have an inconsistent history. No mission is beyond the reach of our Army, though—our success in defeating the Islamic State group through the Kurds shows that. With the focus on advising provided by the SFABs, our track record can only improve.

客觀地檢視美軍協訓盟邦部隊的歷史顯示，儘管彼此的境遇不同，我們透過庫德族部隊，擊敗伊斯蘭國組織的成功經驗卻證實，我們軍隊的實力足以擔當大任。只要專注於警戒部隊協防旅(SFABs)提供的訓練建議，必能在彼此既有的基礎上再創高峰。Matthew Cancian is a nonresident fellow at the Modern War Institute at West Point. He served as an officer in the Marine Corps from 2009 to 2013, deploying as a forward observer in Operation Enduring Freedom. He is a doctoral candidate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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