

China's "Three Warfares" in Perspective Case Study on Hong Kong "Reverse Extradition Agreement" and Xi Jinping "One Country Two System"

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Abstract

When the “Three Warfares” first appeared, the PLA was in the middle of raising training standards and reducing the number of hours devoted to political education, one of the traditional roles of commissars. Information operations with its obvious political dimension led to the appearance of elements of what is now called “system of systems operations” — the PLA’s concept for joint operations. The PLA would introduce the concept of modular force groupings to conduct campaigns. One of the module forces identified in PLA writings in the 2010s was to conduct “Three Warfares” operations.

From the Gulf War onward, analysts in the PLA saw a trend they described as “peacetime-wartime integration.”

Victory in war, or at least achieving one's political objectives,

Information operations needed external and internal dimensions.

The party leads, the PLA follows. The purpose of influence operations is political power. Give full play to the combat function of political work: organize public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare; do a good job of disintegrating the enemy's activity; and prevent the enemy's efforts to incite discord.

China's political system is a core interest, as many documents ranging from the Constitution of the People's Republic of China to the white paper China's Peaceful Development make clear. Many of the threats to the CCP and its political system occur in the realm of ideas.

National security refers to the relative absence of international or domestic threats to the state's power to govern, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major national interests, and the ability to ensure a continued state of security. The PLA spends a lot of energy examining its capabilities against its objectives and competitors.

Keywords: Three Warfare, extradition agreement, one country two system

Introduction

I. What are the“Three warfares”means

What are the Three Wars? The Three Wars were adopted in 2003 by the Communist Party of China (hereinafter referred to as the Communist Party) Central Committee and Military Commission of the Central Committee of Party (hereinafter referred to as Central Military Commission), and were entered into the China Peoples' Liberation Army Political Ordinance¹, mentioning that the Three Wars are Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare and Legal Warfare, and that they include collapse operation², anti-psychological and anti-betrayal operation, and military judicial and legal duty operation (“collapse operation” means organization disintegrating activity,

¹ fundamental regulations of political maneuvering in the military, showing roles and duties of each class political department, each class political committee member, etc., strengthening political maneuver, Communist Party's absolute leadership against the military and so on.天児慧ほか編『現代中国辞典』 岩波書店、1999, p.582.

² Defeating opponents without using force is considered as the best thing in China from Sun-tzu's No Fight Winning to Mao Zedong's Collapse Warfare. Executing Collapse Warfare with Three Warfares is shown in China's People's Liberation Army Political Maneuvering Regulations.

“anti-psychological operation” means countermeasure against psychological attack, “anti-betrayal operation” means countermeasure against secret betrayal maneuvering activity of entering into the interior of opponents, “legal duty operation” means affairs concerning laws).

1. China introduced the concepts of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare when it revised the “Political Work Guidelines of the People’s Liberation Army” in 2003. Knowledge of these “Three Warfares” — as they became known in Chinese military writings, For many Western analysts, the “Three Warfares” concept has become a proxy for understanding Beijing’s influence operations. the Chinese military’s purpose is to create political power for the party. When analysts look at the PLA, they are looking at it as a military — at its warfighting capabilities and the resulting security implications. It is a purely military view that lacks a clear concept for appreciating political warfare.
2. Creating political power is precisely what the “Three Warfares” are intended to do. The first of the “Three Warfares,” media or public opinion warfare, attempts to shape public opinion both domestically and internationally. If the domestic element sounds odd, it is because the PLA believes energizing or mobilizing the Chinese public is useful for signaling resolve and deterring foreign incursions

on Chinese interests. The second warfare attempts to influence foreign decision-makers and how they approach China policy. The third seeks to shape the legal context for Chinese actions, including building the legal justification for Beijing's actions and using domestic laws to signal Chinese intentions. All of these fall under the broader umbrella of political warfare, which has been a part of the PLA's lexicon going back decades.

II. Why "Three warfares"

1. In 2003, the Central Military Commission (CMC) approved the guiding conceptual umbrella for information operations for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) – the “Three Warfares” (san zhong zhanfan 三種戰法). The concept is based on three mutually reinforcing strategies:

- (1). the coordinated use of strategic psychological operations;
- (2). overt and covert media manipulation;
- (3). legal warfare designed to manipulate strategies, defense policies, and perceptions of target audiences abroad.

At the operational level, the “Three Warfares” became the responsibility for the PLA's General Political Department's Liaison Department (GPD/LD), which conducts diverse political, financial, military, and intelligence operations. According to the Project2049 Institute, GPD/LD consists of four bureaus:

- (1) a liaison bureau responsible for clandestine Taiwan-focused operations;
- (2) an investigation and research bureau responsible for international security analysis and friendly contact;
- (3) an external propaganda bureau responsible for disintegration operations, including psychological operations, development of propaganda themes, and legal analysis;
- (4) a border defense bureau responsible for managing border negotiations and agreements. The Ministry of National Defense of the PRC provides more general terms, emphasizing “information weaponization and military social media strategy.”

III. How to make the "Three warfares" work

In recent years Beijing has more assertively demonstrated its global ambitions through a number of economic and military leverages, including its military expansion in the South China Sea and its multi-billion-dollar foreign media push.

Key points:

1. The "three warfare" framework refers to public opinion, psychological and legal warfare
2. China's definition of "national interest" provides justification for its actions overseas
3. China has had a longstanding position of non-interference in its foreign policy

But while many superpowers seek to export their influence overseas for self-interest, there lies a fundamental difference in the motivations behind China's assertiveness, as detailed in the country's laws and fine print.

China's National Security Law, revised in 2015, defines national security in terms which lie significantly beyond physical threats to the country and mainland itself.³ The People's Liberation Army's (PLA) mission is to protect China's national interest — its task has been described by Chairman Mao Zedong as "carrying the political task of the revolution".

"China now defines national interest to include two major parts: national security and national development interest," said Jian Zhang, director of China Engagement at the UNSW Canberra Australia Defense Force Academy.

According to Mr. Zhang, its presence is increasingly being felt overseas, in order "to protect China's economic presence"."any threat to China's national economic development is perceived as a threat to China's national interest."

By including national development as a key security issue, it broadens the scope of national-interest protection to include

³ Tasha Wibawa, "China's national security and the 'three warfares': How Beijing decides who or what to target", 26 Feb 2019, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-26/chinas-three-warfares-how-does-beijing-decide-who-or-what-to/10825448>.

anything that can undermine the country's development, including economic, resource and maritime security.

"Deterrence is the first priority," adding that these policies were increasingly being felt as China attempted to assert the narrative of a "peaceful rise".⁴ Beyond the fine print of China's National Security law lies the strategy of the PLA's strategy of "three warfares" — public opinion, psychological warfare and legal warfare — which involve influencing the international and domestic perception of the CCP while advancing its national interest and aiming to compromise its opponents' ability to respond.

For example, China's billion-dollar foreign media push attempts to shape and influence foreign views through the press as a form of public opinion warfare.

Meanwhile, psychological warfare aims to influence foreign decision makers and their approach towards Beijing's policies, often carried out simultaneously with public opinion warfare. China's efforts to redefine the UN Convention Law of the Sea — such as changing maritime boundaries within the South China Sea — is an example of its legal warfare, which seeks "to shape the legal context for Chinese actions", according to Mr Mattis.

The PLA has played an important role in trying to both influence and undermine Taiwan, however Mr Mattis said it

⁴ Ibid 3.

was not the main actor.

He told the ABC the "three warfares" is just PLA terminology describing how to influence "potentially threatening actors at the source to shape their thinking away from threatening actions".

IV. "Three warfares" strategic implication

Chinese military theory has long valued stratagems focused on undermining the morale of an opposing force. In his penultimate work, *The Art of War*, famed Zhou dynasty strategist Sun Tzu wrote, "Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."⁵ In continuing this tradition, the People's Republic of China's (PRC) Central Military Commission (CMC) officially introduced *san zhong zhanfa*, often translated as "the Three Warfares", in its Political Work Guidelines of the People's Liberation Army published in 2003.⁶ Much like with Sun Tzu over 2,500 years ago, the

⁵ Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles), *Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World*, (London: British Museum, 1910), 41.

⁶ Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, "The People's Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics," Project 2049 Institute, October 14, 2013, 15, https://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf.

Three Warfares of today seek to break adversary resistance and achieve Chinese national objectives with little or no actual fighting.

The Three Warfares conceptual framework organizes different information-related non-kinetic operations for influencing adversary behavior into three categories:

1. Strategic Psychological Operations: The pre-conflict posturing of military/paramilitary forces or application of other national capabilities (diplomatic, economic, cultural) with the intention of intimidating adversaries and encouraging acquiescence to PRC-desired outcomes.⁷
2. Overt and Covert Media Manipulations: The use of materials delivered to public audiences through established news services, informal internet sites, and other social media to influence domestic and international perspectives associated with ongoing disputes involving the PRC's interests.⁸
3. Exploitation of National and International Legal

⁷ T. Thomas, "New Developments in Chinese Strategic Psychological Warfare," *Special Warfare*, April 2003, 4,
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/fmso/chinesepsyop.pdf>.

⁸ Michael Raska, "Hybrid Warfare with Chinese Characteristics," S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
December 2, 2015,
<https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/CO15262.pdf>.

Systems: The leveraging of existing legal regimes and processes to constrain adversary behavior, contest disadvantageous circumstances, confuse legal precedent, and maximize advantage in situations related to the PRC's core interests.⁹

The concept of "information warfare" was a topic of widespread discussion within the ranks of the PLA as early as the mid-1990s. In June of 1995, the Liberation Army Daily published a series of articles by Senior Colonel Wang Baocun and Li Fei highlighting the importance of information dominance, both in terms of traditional battlefield "command and control" systems and asymmetric psychological operations designed to undermine the morale of enemy forces and targeted populations.¹⁰ While the earlier "information warfare" concept was not nearly as developed as the more contemporary Three Warfares, these early information warfare progenitors describe "the use of TV, radio, and leaflets" prior to and during active military operations to help influence the outcome of any engagement in the PRC's favor.

While many "China watchers" have expressed growing

⁹ Orde Kittrie, *Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2016), 162.

¹⁰ Wang Baocun and Li Fei, "Information Warfare," *Liberation Army Daily* by Federation of American Scientists, June 1995, https://fas.org/irp/world/china/docs/iw_wang.htm.

concern with the PRC's non-kinetic activities in the imprecise space between conventional warfare and peace (colloquially referred to as "the Gray Zone"), it is important to understand these concepts within a broader strategic context. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which controls the PRC as well as the People's Liberation Army (PLA), primarily wields the PLA to ensure the continuation of Party's control and minimization of external interference in the foreign and domestic affairs.¹¹ The PLA plays a part in a sophisticated national strategy that incorporates all levers of China's comprehensive national power that countries like the U.S. cannot begin to replicate without falling foul of national and international norms and standards. Current PRC military strategy emphasizes the importance of "information dominance", and *san zhong zhanfa* (三種戰法) is firmly nested within this larger strategic concept.¹² As non-kinetic tools, the Three Warfares provide useful options for the PRC to leverage in securing its national interests while also preventing escalation into more destructive conventional conflicts.

V. The Three warfares case study I

¹¹ Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, *China's Search for Security*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 27-31.

¹² "China's Military Strategy," China Military Online, May 26, 2015, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/2015-05/26/content_6507716.htm.

The Three Warfares are each very similar to each other, with such a close relationship that it is not possible to establish clear divisions between the three of them. For example, Public Opinion Warfare offers effective domestic and foreign public opinions to Psychological Warfare and Legal Warfare. Legal Warfare provides legal authority to Public Opinion Warfare and Psychological Warfare. The Three Wars aim to weaken the enemy by using propaganda, a special strength of China, and can be considered a part of their asymmetric warfare. The following are the three definitions for the three wars. (1) Public Opinion Warfare This refers to the buildup of morale inside of the country, inspiring the army and providing it with a fighting spirit, while aiming to decrease the morale of the enemy. The media and information resources, such as newspapers, books, radio, television, the Internet and electronic mail, are all considered operational tools. Some commonly used tactics are “emphatic blow” (which affects enemy leader’s decisions) and “information control” (spreading advantageous laid territorial claim to the Diaoyutai Islands other territories. In addition, in terms of Airpower, they have also established an Air Defense Identification Zone, an act which can be tied to the Three Wars strategy. information and limiting unfavorable information). (2) Psychological Warfare The goal of this warfare is to crush

the will of the enemy to resist. Propaganda is disseminated over the TV, Internet, print media etc. Regular tactics include intimidation through military exercises, strategic posturing, and displaying advanced weaponry. All of these tactics are intended to mislead the enemy, through deception, as to their true intent and to affect the enemies decision making. As the leaders and people are affected by this tactic, it will spread to the commanders and leaders of the military. Also included in this warfare is “psychological prevention.” This will protect the morale of their army through encouragement, counseling and other measures to reduce the psychological warfare activities of the enemy. (3) Legal Warfare The object of this warfare is to permit the friendly use of force and to secure the legitimacy of operation, while uncovering the enemy’s illegal use of force. Furthermore, this warfare aims to prevent the interference of third parties in a conflict, and to place the enemy into a passive posture. This warfare is considered an auxiliary strategy to military operations. Incidentally we presume, since the Three Wars was adopted by Central Committee which supervises politics and economics of the Communist Party, it was decided that not only the military but all the nation would execute the Three Wars. The following are the examples whose executors are other than the military.

Example #1: December 2013, the Foreign Ministry

exposed Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine to international criticism. (Public Opinion Warfare)

Example #2: September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat violated Japanese territorial waters. The fishing vessel hit a patrol vessel of the Japanese Coast Guard, who then arrested and detained the captain for violating territorial waters. This action was monitored by fishery vessels. Several hundred people were involved in large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations and China banned the export of rare earth minerals to Japan. (Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare)

Example #3: November 2013, the Hainan Fisheries Act was implemented as a modification to the "Fishing Regulations" placing the Hainan area under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Agriculture, legally banning Vietnamese fishing boats from the waters in the area. (Legal Warfare)

Example #4: March 2010, the People's Republic of China State Council enforced an maritime island protection law to protect China's maritime interests by creating Marine Administrative Departments.

VI. The Three warfares case study II

This section contains examples¹³ of how China uses the

¹³ Dean Cheng, "The U.S. Integrated Approach to Counter China's

Three Wars in relation to its A2/AD strategy.

(1) Public Opinion Warfare China has been using the state mass media to wage Public Opinion Warfare: 1) to confuse the issue of who has been disrupting regional stability and 2) to instill a sense of fear in the United States and its allies of Chinese retaliation. This is used in both offensively and defensively when discussing: 1) nuclear and military force modernization, particularly as related to new weapons, 2) its economic power, and 3) warning against any infringement on its core interests, China's historical "humiliation" over the last few hundred years.

(2) Psychological Warfare China wages Psychological Warfare against military personnel and civilians, from the lowest ranking soldier to the highest levels of decision-making, and seeks to influence their decision making. In the United States, its allies and aligned countries, they seek to build the perception that: 1) US victory cannot be expected, and 2) due to the strength of the Chinese military it is better if your country is not complicit in US activities. Public discussion of the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, especially as an effective measure against US aircraft carriers, during the

Anti-Access/ Area Denial Strategy," Backgrounder, No.2927, July 9, 2014.accessed on August 18, 2014,
<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/07/the-us-needs-an-integrated-approach-to-counter-chinas-anti-access-area-denial-strategy>.

military exercises "Mission Action – 2013" was intended to intimidate Taiwan.

(3) Legal Warfare An example of Legal Warfare is how China has used its own interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas for its own purposes. Though military activities are not specifically regulated in the law, China has been using its interpretation to bar other nation's military forces from the area. For example, in March 2009, the Chinese Navy used government and fishing vessels to interfere with a US Navy survey ship. In addition, China argues that since the United States has not signed the treaty, that: 1) the United States has forfeited any right to talk about the legal issues, and 2) the legal legitimacy of the US intervention in the issue. Furthermore, China will use Legal Warfare not only to determine what is legally legitimate, but will also use legal means to support the use of military force. Their goal is to delay US military operations by confusing US commanders about the legality of force.

VII. legal warfare case study

Legal warfare (or 'lawfare') involves the exploitation of legal systems, customs, and conventions, both international and domestic, in order to drive towards political and/or commercial gains. The fact that this exploitation of the law has been approved at the highest political echelons in China stems from a distinct difference between the conventional understanding of law in the West (that the law exists as a "distinct autonomous

entity” and applies to both the ruler and the ruled¹⁴) and in China (where the law is viewed as a means by which those in authority can enforce control over the population). As such, China has experienced rule by law, not rule of law, with the Communist Party viewing the law simply as one of the many tools at its disposal, to be harnessed, shaped, and moulded as it sees fit (or as far as international public opinion will allow) given the particular legal challenge China needs to overcome. For instance, China continuously takes aim at the law of the sea, as codified in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—manipulating it to its advantage in order to establish a greater footing in the South and East China Seas. China aims to both undermine its opponent’s legal cases, which are based upon existing treaty law as embodied in UNCLOS, and also to establish arguments in customary international law¹⁵ for China’s position on an issue by setting

¹⁴ Oiwan Lam, “Leaked Documents Reveal How the Chinese Communist Party Channels Public Opinion”, Global Voices Advocacy, August, 25, 2014. <https://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2014/08/25/leaked-document-several-how-the-Chinese-communist-party-channels-public-opinion>

¹⁵ Customary international law refers to international obligations arising from established state practice, as opposed to obligations arising from formal written international treaties. ‘Customary international law’ results from a general and consistent practice of states

precedents.¹⁶

VIII. Reverse extradition agreement

On April 3, 2019, the Hong Kong government formally introduced its extradition bill before Hong Kong's legislature, the Legislative Council (Leg Co).¹⁷ The bill proposes changes to the territory's extradition laws to allow ad hoc extraditions to countries and jurisdictions with which Hong Kong does not have such agreements, including mainland China, Macau, and

that they follow from a sense of legal obligation. Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law

¹⁶ Larry M. Wortzel "The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Information Warfare", Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, March 5, 2014: 30. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1191>

¹⁷ Elbert Lee, "How English Can Save Hong Kong from Becoming 'Just Another Chinese City'," South China Morning Post, February 1, 2018; Kent Ewing, "Xi Jinping's Vision of Hong Kong's Future? Just Another Chinese City," Hong Kong Free Press, October 27, 2017; Don Lee and Jessica Meyers, "Hong Kong Was Supposed to Be a World Financial Capital in a Communist System. Contradiction?" Los Angeles Times, June 30, 2017; T. Kumar, "After 20 Years—Hong Kong Is Becoming More Like China, Losing Human Rights Protections," Medium, June 29, 2017.

Taiwan.¹⁸ These changes would amend laws governing extradition agreements and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters in force since the 1997 handover of Hong Kong to China. At that time, the laws explicitly prohibited extradition arrangements with mainland China due to fears over its legal system and lack of human rights protections.¹⁹ The proposed extradition bill—which could reach a final vote by July 2019—is designed to close loopholes for the over 100

¹⁸ Phila Siu, Ng Kang-chung, and Owen Fung, “Booksellers Lam Wing-kee Reveals Explosive Details of His Mainland

China Detention, Claims Lee Po Told Him He Was ‘Taken Away from Hong Kong,’” South China Morning Post, June

16, 2016. <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/1976489/bookseller-lam-wing-kee-reveals-explosive-details-his>; Agency-France Presse, “‘Missing Hong Kong Bookseller Lee Bo Says He Will Give up British Citizenship,” February 29, 2016.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/29/missing-british-bookseller-appears-on-television>; BBC, “UK Challenges China over Missing Hong Kong Bookseller Lee Bo,” February 12, 2016.

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35557226>.

¹⁹ Chris Buckley, “Chinese Police Seize Publisher from Train in Front of Diplomats,” New York Times, January 22,

2018.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/22/world/asia/china-police-bookseller-train-gui-minhai.html>.

countries and territories without mutual extradition arrangements with Hong Kong. It makes individuals eligible for extradition for 37 offenses, punishable by a minimum three-year jail sentence under Hong Kong law, including some white-collar offenses such as bribery and fraud.²⁰ The bill would also transfer authority over extradition requests from Leg Co to the pro-Beijing chief executive of Hong Kong.²¹ The revised extradition process involves the following steps:

²⁰ Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Gazette, Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019, March 29, 2019.

<https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20192313/es3201923139.pdf>; Cap. 503 Fugitive Offenders Ordinance, April 25, 1997. <https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap503>.

²¹ Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Gazette, Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019, March 29, 2019.

<https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20192313/es3201923139.pdf>; Hong Kong Security Bureau, Legislative Council Panel on Security Cooperation between Hong Kong and Other Places on Juridical Assistance in Criminal Matters, February 15, 2019, 8. https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr18-19/english/panels/se/papers/se20190215c_b2-7673-e.pdf.

- Upon receiving an extradition request from any government or territory outside Hong Kong, the chief executive (who is elected by a committee of mostly pro-Beijing electors) issues a certificate to request a provisional arrest;
- The court of jurisdiction (determined by the type and severity of the case) conducts an open hearing, allowing the individual being called for extradition to offer a defense, and determines whether the extradition request complies with the law. The judge decides whether to issue an arrest warrant for the fugitive; and
- The chief executive makes a final decision on whether to proceed with the arrest and rendition.²²The Hong Kong

²² Hong Kong Security Bureau, Legislative Council Panel on Security Cooperation between Hong Kong and Other Places on Juridical Assistance in Criminal Matters, February 15, 2019, 3–6, 8–9. <https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr1819/english/panels/se/papers/se20190215cb2-767-3-e.pdf>; Alvin Lum, “Hong Kong Is Considering Changing the Law on Transferring Fugitives – So How are Extraditions Dealt with Now, and Why Are There No Deals with Mainland China, Taiwan, and Macau?” South China Morning Post, February 13, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2185902/hong-kong-considering-changing-law-transferring-fugitives-so>; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017 Annual Report to Congress, November 2017, 422–423.

government argues that such legislation is urgently needed to fill loopholes in its extraditions policy. In a February 2018 murder case, both Hong Kong and Taiwan authorities experienced difficulty in prosecuting a Hong Kong resident accused of murdering his girlfriend in Taiwan. After the suspect fled Taiwan to return to Hong Kong, Hong Kong authorities lacked a mutual extradition agreement and could not prosecute him for his alleged crimes.²³ Nevertheless, Hong Kong's High Court in April

²³ Alvin Lum and Jeffie Lam, "Lawmakers Threaten to Block Controversial Extradition Bill as Hong Kong Government Struggles to Win Business Support for Watered-Down Plan," South China Morning Post, March 27, 2019.

<https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/politics/article/3003557/lawmakers-threaten-block-controversial-extradition-bill>; Austin Ramzy, "Murder Case Poses Dilemma for Hong Kong on Sending Suspects to China," New York Times, March 4, 2019.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/world/asia/hongkong-china-extradition.html>; Hong Kong Security Bureau, Legislative Council Panel on Security Cooperation between Hong Kong and Other Places on Juridical Assistance in Criminal Matters, February 15, 2019, 2.

<https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr1819/english/panels/se/papers/se20190215cb2-767-3-e.pdf>; Hong Kong Information Office, Co-operation between Hong Kong and Other Places on Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters, February 13, 2019.

2019 sentenced the suspect to prison on related money laundering charges. Observers expect the suspect will be eligible for release from prison in October, extending the period the Hong Kong authorities have to arrange a special extradition arrangement.²⁴

IX. Xi Jinping One country two system

Chinese president pledges to uphold 'one country, two systems' as Hong Kong braces for protests

Chinese leader Xi Jinping stated that Beijing would continue to allow Hong Kong to handle its own affairs as anti-government protests threaten to tarnish a massive celebration honoring 70 years of Communist rule.

“We will continue to fully and faithfully implement the principles of ‘One country, two systems’ and ‘Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong,’” according to a printed copy of remarks given on the eve of China’s National Day holiday.

China’s approach is to ensure that Hong Kong and its fellow semi-autonomous region of Macau “prosper and

<https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201902/13/P2019021300334.htm>.

²⁴ Jasmine Siu, “Man Who Killed Girlfriend in Taiwan Could be Free by October, Setting Effective Deadline for Hong Kong Government’s Extradition Plan,” South China Morning Post, April 29, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-andcrime/article/3008099/sentence-man-who-killed-girlfriend-taiwan-sets>.

progress alongside the mainland and embrace an even brighter future,” he said.

Protests sweeping Hong Kong are now heading into their fifth month, posing the greatest popular challenge against Mr Xi since he took power in 2012.

Such uprisings are never tolerated and instead suppressed in mainland China, though Hong Kong has long enjoyed greater freedoms. But many in the former British colony say the Communist Party is chipping away at the autonomy promised when it was returned to Beijing rule.

Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks in advance of the anniversary

As the unrest has continued, unease has grown over whether Beijing will send in the military to restore order – a move that would be reminiscent of the bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 when soldiers fired on peaceful student demonstrators.

Despite Mr Xi’s remarks that Beijing would remain hands off in dealing with the protests, it emerged Monday that foreign envoys believed China had assembled its largest-ever active force of military troops and other anti-riot personnel in Hong Kong – estimated at as many as 12,000.

The addition had been explained away by Beijing in late August as a “routine” rotation of troops.

A build-up of military has also occurred in Shenzhen, a neighboring Chinese city, with state media releasing videos of

troops engaging in antiriot drills, an ominous warning that soldiers were ready to deploy.

More of that posturing is coming as Mr Xi will preside over a massive military parade on Tuesday for China's 70th anniversary celebrations, with plans to showcase 15,000 troops, 160 aircraft and 580 pieces of military equipment.

The parade is expected to include the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile. Billed as the world's most powerful, the nuclear-capable missile is thought to be able to reach the US in 30 minutes.

Flower baskets have been presented to deceased national heroes. Other equipment that will be seen for the first time include the DR-8 supersonic reconnaissance drones and the DF-17 hypersonic missile, and the H-6N strategic bomber, all of which are designed to project Chinese power deep into the Pacific.

"They will go all out to demonstrate military capability and promote Xi Jinping as president for life. He will want a parade par-excellence," said Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst in defense strategy and capability at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a think tank.

"The theme is anti-access and air denial capabilities, making more and more difficult for the US to project power into the Western Pacific," he said.

"These systems are designed to achieve that." The pageantry – and another speech expected from Mr Xi – is

meant to underscore China's global ambitions to become the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region.

It lays claim to the democratic island of Taiwan, long regarded by Beijing as a runaway province, and the South China Sea.

The Communist Party faces challenges to its authority from the unrest in Hong Kong and an economy weakened by the trade war

The big showing is also aimed at stirring nationalist sentiments at a time the country faces a waning economy, bogged down by a protracted trade war with the US. A large swathe of Beijing closed down, with the authorities cutting radio signals and sealing roads along the planned parade route and its surroundings. Dissidents have also been detained and placed under house arrest to ensure the festivities go off without a hitch. But China's big birthday is set to be marred by multiple rallies planned in Hong Kong.

X. Concluding remarks

Thinking about the Three Warfares, they are based on a way of waging asymmetric warfare, without military forces, to create favorable conditions and provide China freedom of action. It is also said that they are consistent with the spirit of Sun Tzu's teachings. The detailed content will be as follows: (1) Analyze the related documents, regarding the systematic (organization, point of dispatch) procedure of the Three Warfares in China and the change in roles of the Three

Warfares before and after the Central Commission's adoption (2003). (2) Analyze how the US military see the Three Warfares and how they are trying to cope with the warfares, focusing on the US military doctrine. (3) Analyze more the cases concerning soft power from the viewpoint of Psychological, Public Opinion and Legal Warfares, and organize them theoretically. (4) After that, The Three Warfares concept is a potential game-changer—a significant shift away from current understandings of war as defined primarily by the kinetic and tangible, and towards one focused more on thought processes, mental impressions, and the will to act. The doctrine will remain an essential component of China's information war strategy for decades to come and will continue to evolve. China is playing the long game and seeking to further refine each element in the trilogy, operating with increasing sophistication in the crucial testing ground of the South China Sea. The army and its propaganda departments are setting out arguments and establishing positions now that can be exploited in the future with the goal of redefining norms beyond East Asia, into the Arctic and even in space. China's military and legal thinkers deem the "control of portions of outer space to be a natural extension of other forms of territorial [i.e. sea or air] control". Over the next decade or so, we can expect Beijing's media outlets to broadcast the intentions behind China's rapidly maturing space programmed and to expound the legal justification for any planned operations as grounded in Chinese domestic space legislation, which is expected around 2020.