

Chinese Cyber-Enabled Information Operations Against Taiwan

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Abstract

One of the most pressing concerns facing Taiwan's national security establishment is how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) conduct political warfare through propagating disinformation in support of its objective to invade Taiwan. The CCP's public opinion, psychological and legal warfare operations, including a host of cyber-enabled techniques, are relentlessly deployed against the country.

To that end, Chinese influence operations in the form of United Front activities has long being an ongoing concern. However in recent years both the intensity and effectiveness of these campaigns has substantially increased. The increasing prevalence and penetration of social media to all walks of life in Taiwan has provided a new arena for conducting political warfare, while traditional United Front operations provide valuable information for conducting effective operation in this new domain. These operations are further aided by frequent

breach and loss of data originated from Chinese state actors.

This paper will propose a new method of investigating Chinese Cyber-enabled influence operations based on existing networks of United Front operations in Taiwan. Since the pre-established network on the ground not only engender additional trust to overcome the major issue in establishing a disinformation node in transmission, but such a method also ensures penetration of the more intimate and restricted private messaging apps.

Keywords: Information Operation, United Front,
Cyber-Enabled Influence Operation, Hybrid
Warfare, Political Warfare

Introduction

Information Operation as perceived by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) encompass four major realms from computer/cyberspace, electromagnetic realm, psychological/perception realm, as well as intelligence realm. The contiguous nature of these operations meant that their prosecution requires a diverse range of expertise, ranging from the military, such as the Central Military Commission (CMC) Political Works Department Liaison Department, the Network Systems Department (NSD) and 311 Base under the Strategic Support Force (SSF); authorized powers such as the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and of course the United Front Works Department (UFWD), its peak organizations, and various contractors and front companies in the civilian sector.

However for the practical purpose of developing a countermeasure toward ongoing and future information operations, it may be pertinent to put more emphasis on the nature of ongoing operations and nodes, in the hope of developing methods of disruption. Consequently, this paper will focus on several examples of both online clashes and grass-root United Front operations, before moving on to the linkages between these operations and finally the potential financial sources for such operations.

Difficulty in Attribution – A PTT Case Study

The difficulty of separating Chinese influence from

domestic political operations can be highlighted in a recent case involving online forces (網軍). These operators often represent various public relation firms behind Taiwan's political parties and candidates, promoting and evaluating the effectiveness of their respective narratives while keeping an eye on their opponents. On 3rd November 2019, it was reported that more than a thousand dummy accounts on the popular Taiwanese Billboard Bulletin System (BBS) site PTT belonging to online forces supporting the Pan-Green political camp has been deleted by the administrators of the site.¹ Initial reaction from the operator and some members of the administrators were of suspicion and alarm, since while all social media platforms routinely implement filtering mechanisms and investigate reports of dummy accounts, the scale and totality of the deletion, which included not only operational accounts, but legitimate accounts that were purchased years ago but were never activated. According to site administrators, since the site's policy is one of passive neutrality, which means they do not actively initiate investigations into suspicious accounts and IPs, but only investigate registered complaints complete with evidence.

¹ “震撼！PTT 大砍網軍帳號 上千挺英戰士陣亡 損失慘,” *China Times*, 3rd November 2019, at <https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20191103001875-260407?chdtv>.

Consequently, the only way for such a large scale compromise to take place, would require the PTT mainframe to be compromised, and that the original log files containing user IP history obtained.²

Suspicion of a Chinese-directed cyber-attack, perhaps spear-phishing or other credential compromising methods targeting either the online operators or the PTT administrators were immediately raised. Additional information indicating that the opposition, who registered complaints with the site, were operating with TTPs and software obtained from Chinese commercial PR firms specializing in creating the so called “water army”³ further reinforced the assumption.

However later investigations seem to point toward the possibility that the log file may have been obtained by political rivals through more prosaic methods from the administrators, and while Chinese involvement cannot be conclusively ruled out, all other avenues of investigation has also been exhausted.

The incident highlights the fundamental difficulty in countering certain forms of information operation – if we can’t even be sure it was a foreign operation, how can we hope to counter it? And while content analysis combined with known

² Information obtained from interview with all parties involved.

³ Yuan Yang, “China’s battle with the ‘internet water army’,” *Financial Times*, 1st August, 2018, at <https://www.ft.com/content/b4f27934-944a-11e8-b67b-b8205561c3fe>.

operation precedents may point to a chain reaching back to Chinese origin, the culpability and consequently appropriate measure necessary would still be far from clear.

Advantage of a Bottom-up Approach

Therefore, this paper will propose an alternative approach, through investigating and exploiting existing United Front networks and their development toward a more cyber-enabled influence model. The "bottom-up" developmental approach can resolve at least one of the major issues facing an Information Operation characterized by the disinformation Chain Model⁴ - lack of trust. since trust determines the effectiveness of a disinformation in spreading its message, most online social groups established for the purpose require constant participation and expenditure of manpower and attention to engender such trust. Yet in an established United Front network, such connections would not only exist through real-life events, organization and businesses, the second order effect of messages been spread to neighbors, family members would not be unsubstantial. Even when the message jumps onto social media and various messaging apps, due to the geographically local nature of these circles, the trust

⁴ Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Todd C. Helmus, Andrew Radin, Elina Treyger "Countering Russian Social Media Influence," *Rand Corporation*, 2018, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2740.html.

engendered would still decrease at a far slower rate than operation conducted purely in cyberspace.

The Intersection Between Cyber Warfare and Information Operations.

It is perhaps appropriate at this juncture to take a detour and talk a little bit about the utilities to military intelligence form an Information Operation with predominantly psychological and ideological aims. While major concerns regarding Chinese-manufactured software ⁵ and communication hardware transmitting unauthorized data back to unidentified servers located within China has gradually garnered international attention ⁶. And the Taiwanese government has also begun to perceive the potential security issue that consumer electronics produced by Chinese

⁵ Aantony Spadafora “Your iOS browser could be sending tracking data to China,” *Techradar*, 14th October, 2019, at <https://www.techradar.com/news/safari-on-ios-could-be-sending-tracking-data-to-china>.

⁶ Jerry Hildenbrand, “How does a phone maker ‘mistakenly’ collect user data and ship it off to a server in China?,” *Android Central*, 23rd March, 2019, at <https://www.androidcentral.com/how-does-company-nokia-or-oneplus-mistakenly-collect-user-data-and-ship-it-server-china>.

manufactures such as Huawei⁷. Less attention was paid to the consumer products, especially IoT devices present at sensitive locations throughout the Taiwanese military. With the prevalence and sophistication of established Chinese United Front network on the ground, the utilization, be it accidental or intentional of these vulnerable devices within sensitive military areas becomes a real concern. An example can be found in the set-top boxes (STBs) installed throughout various bases and barracks⁸. While most of these devices, regardless of Service providers and manufacturers, would be connected to the internet and thus at the very least possess the potential of transmitting IP addresses and user preferences from established locations, these devices were regulated under the Political Warfare section of their respective units, and thus ill-equipped to consider or examine the security implication such devices would pose for the unit.

United Front Operations: Taiwan Party for Public Good

⁷ 蔣曜宇, “工研院今起禁用華為, 這班抵制列車上還有哪些國家?”, *Business Next*, 15 January, 2019, at <https://www.bnext.com.tw/article/51950/huawei-ban-itri>.

⁸ For details regarding an ongoing investigation into Chinese-manufactured STBs potentially transmitting information back to Chinese government servers from Taiwanese military installation, please contact the author.

The very original Party for Public Good (PPG) can be traced all the way to the Chinese revolution era in the early 1910s, with a branch officially incorporated in 1925 in San Francisco, however this has very little resemblance with the later PPG established in Taiwan, as is common for United Front operations abroad, they often took over the legitimate representation of an organization before warping it into a form that suits its purpose.

In this section, we shall establish that not only did the PPG currently operating in Taiwan has extensive connections with the United Front network across both sides of the Strait, they have also, through intermediaries, became a major donor in Presidential Election, and founded a Media Company specializing in New Media and political messaging.

In the 1970s the branch in Hong Kong decided to comply with the CCP and was folded into the Political Consultative Committee under the UFWD system. The Taiwanese branch of the PPG was registered with the Taiwanese Ministry of interior on 2002 as political party. The Party is connected with the UFWD system through its Central Committee Chairman Gao Jin Yao (高錦樂)⁹, who was listed as a member of the 11th

⁹ “大陸：將研擬讓台灣民眾列席全國政協” *ET Today*, 26 January, 2013, at

<https://www.evernote.com/shard/s382/client/snv?noteGuid=729a2bfc-9d7a-49d4-b6d3-6ec35ed44451¬eKey=cdec5a303f8a479319e91d01a0b2f995&sn=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.evernote.com%2Fshard%2F382%2F>

Sichuan Province Political Consultative Committee. The Party Chairman Chen Bo Guang (陳柏光) also attended multiple events hosted by the CCP apparatus, including the 2017 Guizhou Cross-Strait Youth Innovation Forum, hosted by the Guizhou Taiwan Affairs Office, and the Guizhou Communist Youth Committee. The same address of PPG's Taipei registration also hosts another two companies, a management consulting firm and a travel agency ran by the same person Chen Li Feng (陳麗芳), who attended the Cross-Strait Youth Innovation alongside Chen as President of the China-Taiwan Economic and Cultural Exchange Foundation, some cursory search also revealed the foundation is linked with a host of other small pro-China political parties in Taiwan.¹⁰


Another heavy weight within the PPG harboring extensive

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¹⁰ For additional information on organizations, parties, companies forming PPG's operating network in Taiwan, please contact the author.

connections with the CCP is Ni Guo Wei (倪國緯), the current Secretary General of the PPG and also a reporter for the China Review News Agency's Taiwan branch (CRNTT), and possibly going as far back as the Party's founding in 1921. Before establishing the media technology company Just Fire (就是火) and joining the PPG, Ni served various positions in Taiwan and China, many of which have political implications; such as serving as the representative for Taiwan farmer's association in Beijing, and attending publicized CCP political events in 2006¹¹.

¹¹ “2005 年台商投资布局调整,” *Ministry of Commerce of the PRC*, 19 May, 2005, at <https://www.evernote.com/shard/s382/client/snv?noteGuid=de0bd94d-f196-4864-9517-cdc036e642aa¬eKey=77046cb5af6e7f2fdf7cdaea25266cd3&sn=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.evernote.com%2Fshard%2Fs382%2Fsh%2Fde0bd94d-f196-4864-9517-cdc036e642aa%2F77046cb5af6e7f2fdf7cdaea25266cd3&title=%25E4%25BA%25A4%25E6%25B5%2581%25E5%2590%2588%25E4%25BD%259C>.



Partial Map of the PPG Network

Just Fire (就是火) Media Technology Company

The Media technology company “Just Fire (就是火)”, originally founded in 2011, was in the business of advertising, promotion and messaging for political campaign. During an interview conducted on the visit of a Macau delegation with the then General Manager and board member Ni Guo Wei (倪國緯) on April 30th 2011, Ni characterize the service they provided as adding the “the fifth media,” namely video and audio clips into existing messaging to further reinforce campaign messaging in Taiwan¹². The company also

¹² “政治獻金會計報告書查閱制度電腦系統查詢結果列印清單,” 20 February, 2014, at

contributed to the reelection campaign of then incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou in 2014, as evidenced by their campaign contribution disclosure forum listing a 600 thousand-NT dollar donation from the company¹³.

In Feb. 2015, the company changed its name to Xin Chen-Fa (新澄發), Ni left his position with the company as well as the board, and KMT political operator Chang Han Yu (張玉漢) (at the time a legislative assistant for KMT Legislator Sun Da Chien (孫大千) joined the company's board as well as the management team. Chang subsequently left the company in April 2015.

This suggest that a major political party in Taiwan may have been employing the service of Just Fire for many of its campaigns at least in the period between 2014 – April 2015. Given its connection to PPG and consequently the United Front network operating in Taiwan, the intention and knowledge of

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¹³ According to experienced political operators, the real amount should be at least around 10 times of this figure, and would have been paid to Just Fire for services rendered without going through the campaign.

all parties involved warrants further investigation.

United Front Operations: Taiwan Guangcai Promotion Association

The Guangcai network is another prominent, if not more blatant examples of United Front operations in Taiwan. In this section we will establish its connection with the Chinese UFWD system, their attempts at influencing Taiwanese political events, and their extensive business interest and network that ultimately will take us to a potential avenue of investigation for future Chinese Information Operations directed against Taiwan.

The PRC China Society for the Promotion of Guangcai Program Guidance Center (光彩事业指导中心) is an organization under the direct auspices of the Central United Front Works Department¹⁴, and as all important peak organizations, is currently run by one of the deputy directors of Central UFWD. Its origin can be traced back to 1994, as part of the *Seven-Year Priority Poverty Alleviation Program* (《国家八七扶贫攻坚计划》).

Ostensibly established for poverty alleviation, the association wields enormous assets and influence both domestically and overseas. In July 1995, the budding program, along with 9 other Chinese companies registered and founded

¹⁴ UFWD Official Website, at <http://www.zyztb.gov.cn/html/index.html>.

the Guangcai Program Investment and Management Co. Ltd., with the China Oceanwide Group holding the controlling interest, the company was renamed Oceanwide Energy Holdings (泛海能源控股股份有限公司)¹⁵. The associated Oceanwide Holdings have several luxury development projects in the U.S., including the Oceanwide Center in San Francisco¹⁶, and the Oceanwide Plaza in LA¹⁷.

The Taiwan Guangcai Promotion Association (TGPA, 台灣光彩促進會) was established and registered in Taiwan in 2004, and shared the same logo with its PRC counterpart. The

¹⁵ "Oceanwide Real Estate Group Co., Ltd. 2009 Annual Report (泛海建设集团股份有限公司 2009 年年度报告)", "Disclosure - Shenzhen Stock Exchange Website, March 2009, archived on 2nd February, 2017, at <https://web.archive.org/web/20170202035711/http://disclosure.szse.cn/financialpage/2010-03-02/57640069.PDF>.

¹⁶ "Chinese developer behind one of San Francisco's largest projects stalls Los Angeles towers," *San Francisco Business Times*, 28th January 2019, archived on 12th May 2019, at <https://web.archive.org/web/20190512083608/https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2019/01/28/oceanwide-center-la-stalls-office-project-housing.html>.

¹⁷ "Los Angeles Oceanwide Plaza," *Oceanwide Group Official Website*, archived on 12th May 2019, at https://web.archive.org/web/20190512084007/http://www.fhkg.com/index.php/Ch/En/Industrial/infor_gk/id/51.

head of Taiwan's Guangcai program is a Taiwanese citizen Luo Hong Bin (駱宏賓), who has since transferred the registration to his son Luo Jun Hung (駱俊宏). Luo Jun Hung also dual-hatted as a member of the central executive committee, and head of the Taiwan delegation of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC, 全國工商聯), the ACFIC is a sector within the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CCPPC) and as such, a part of the United Front system. Both father and son also served as directors of Taiwanese Business Committee under the PRC Guangcai program, during a visit to the then Deputy Mayor of Kinmen County Yang Chung Chuan(楊忠全) lobbying for the construction of a Kinmen-Xiamen Bridge (金嶝大橋), which the TGPA offered to pay in full. The TGPA delegation led by Luo claimed that "Due to our association's leading position among Taiwanese businesses within China's Guangcai Promotion Program, we can mobilize millions of donations from Taiwanese businesses [in China], money is no object."¹⁸

TGPA is also closely associated with the Taiwan Association for the Promotion of the China Dream (TAPCD, 台湾中国梦促进会)¹⁹, which was also headed by Luo Hong


¹⁸ "籌建金嶝大橋台灣光彩促進會願無償提供興建工程," Kinmen Daily, 5 May 2006, at <https://www.kmdn.gov.tw/1117/1271/1272/132997/>.

¹⁹ "Introduction to the Taiwan Association Promoting the China Dream (台湾中国梦促进会简介)," *Cross-Strait Solidarity Network (TAPCD)*

Bin, with the goal promoting unification and closer ties with PRC. Both the TGPA and TAPCD are registered under the same address, along with four other entities under the Gunacai banner; the Gungcai Kimen-Xiamen Engineering Inc. (光彩金廈工程股份有限公司), Taiwan Guangcai Investment & Development Inc. (台灣光彩投資開發股份有限公司, also registered under Luo), Taiwan Guancai Kinmen-Xiamen Peace Bridge Inc.(台灣光彩金廈和平大橋股份有限公司), Taiwan Guangcai Agricultural Development Inc. (台灣光彩農業發展股份有限公司), three of which has since moved to a new location still within the same city.

TGPA also set up local branches all over Taiwan, occupying locations at least in Taoyuan, Tainan, Taichung (in Taiping and Southern Districts), Changhua, Kaohsiung, and Kinmen. And in the Leninist party tradition, also possess a Youth Group.

Official Website), archived on 28th January, 2019, at <https://web.archive.org/web/20190128212307/http://www.158958.top/nd.jsp?id=65>



Partial Map of the Taiwan Guangcai Network

Despite official claims of conducting poverty alleviation in Taiwan, the TGPA has a record of political activity. In 2008, the association bought a full-page advertisement in the paper, openly advocated against Taiwanese citizens voting in a referendum on joining the United Nations²⁰. In 2014, the association welcomed the then Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Zhang Zhijun (張志軍) during his Taiwan trip while handing out fliers promoting its event advocating a push for

²⁰ "Introduction to the Taiwan Association Promoting the China Dream (台灣中國夢促進會簡介)," *Cross-Strait Solidarity Network (TAPCD Official Website)*, archived on 28th January, 2019, at <https://web.archive.org/web/20190128212307/http://www.158958.top/nd.jsp?id=65>.

Cross-Strait Permanent Peace Accord from the civic sector (推動兩岸民間簽署永久和平協議論壇)²¹. TGPA has also attempted to lobby the Kinmen Government into holding a referendum establishing a Kinemen Free Trade Demonstration Zone (金門離島自由經濟示範區) at the same time during the 2016 Presidential Election.²²

The latest in the series of events brings us to the controversy surrounding the “Three-Mini-Links” in June 2019, where against regulation and without proper application, a maritime route ran by a long-dissolved company connecting Kaohsiung and Wenzhou was apparently launched with officials from Taiwan’s Kaohsiung City Government and City Council both attended the ceremony. As one of the principal parties behind the event was the Taiwan Association for the Promotion of the China Dream. This particular incident served to highlight the Guangcai network, and the Luo father and son duo’s interest in Wenzhou as their port of call for relevant operations.

Luo and his son also runs a series venture with the PRC Gunagcai program in the form of Wehnzhou Coastal Tourism

²¹ “疑中國統戰部分支統派團體高雄宣揚賣台？” Liberty Times, 28 June, 2014, at <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1041962>.

²² “金門設立自經區醞釀連署公投,” Kinmen Daily, 13 May 2015, at <https://www.kmdn.gov.tw/1117/1271/1272/253263/>.


Development Co., Ltd.(温州海岸旅游开发有限公司).

Cyber-Enabled Local Operations: Recruitment and Training

With the advent of social media and its obvious utility for information warfare, it is only natural that traditional network of United Front operations would endeavor to expand their efforts into the cyber realm. Efforts to expand operations into the realm started relatively early, as exemplified by the Just Fire (就是火) PR company case related with the PPG earlier. However one recent example following our examination of the Guangcai network in Taiwan is the Chinese Cross-Strait Harmonious Family Association (CCSHFA, 中華海峽兩岸和諧家庭協會) and its program to recruit and train Chinese spouse and their friends and family for just such a purpose.

The CCSHFA was founded ostensibly to assist Chinese spouses in Taiwan on all affairs ranging from legal assistance, job hunting to emergency relief. The current of the association is Ge Zhang Jie(葛正潔), who are friends and collaborators on multiple ventures with the husband and wife team Chiang Chuan Han (蔣權瀚) and Han Feng (韓芳), where Chiang and Luo Jun Hong (of Taiwan Guangcai) sits on the board of the same company in the Guangcai network, along with other connections within the Guangcai network. While Han Feng, a Chinese national who functions as the deputy director for the Chinese Cross-Strait Peace Promotion Association (中華海峽

兩岸和平發展促進會), and also the director of Taiwan Labour Committee (台灣工委主任) under the PRC Chinese Folklore and Art Association (中國民協), which is headed by a current committee member of the PRC Central CCPCC. Consequently it is not surprising that the CCSHFA would be part of events such as the Cross-Strait Peaceful Development Forum (兩岸和平發展論壇), and support specific pro-China initiatives.



Partial Map of Taiwan Guangcai and CCSHFA

This latest initiative in recruiting and training online influencers for Facebook was initiated in early 2019. While the training course was labeled as “skill training” for “e-commerce” on how to establish personal accounts with 3000-5000 followers. However the intent of the course was

evident in their categorization of prospective trainees including “retirees willing to serve as volunteers for online promotion,” “those who wish to become internet celebrities,” and “those who are willing to serve as volunteers for Chinese Cultural Curriculum Guidelines Referendum.” Course content includes instructions on the use of Facebook, WeChat, basic functions such as sharing, and enlistment in the association as volunteers and editors. Further enlistment of volunteers would then be subdivided into various teams responsible for local promotion, country-wide Chinese Culture promotion, Cross-Strait Exchange Cadre Training, and editorial teams for prospective political candidates.²³

The above case was but one of many such attempts at

²³ “中華海峽兩岸和諧家庭協會 - 首頁,” *CCSHFA Facebook Page*, archived on 11 November, 2019, at <https://www.evernote.com/shard/s670/client/snv?noteGuid=6a66657a-bcb1-482e-9677-3496802fa5e3¬eKey=8124d3b392bdcdbafe1ea22a865e2b63&sn=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.evernote.com%2Fshard%2F670%2Fsh%2F6a66657a-bcb1-482e-9677-3496802fa5e3%2F8124d3b392bdcdbafe1ea22a865e2b63&title=%25282%2529%2B%25E4%25B8%25AD%25E8%258F%25AF%25E6%25B5%25B7%25E5%25B3%25BD%25E5%2585%25A9%25E5%25B2%25B8%25E5%2592%258C%25E8%25AB%25A7%25E5%25AE%25B6%25E5%25BA%25AD%25E5%258D%2594%25E6%259C%2583%2B-%2B%25E9%25A6%2596%25E9%25A0%2581>.

recruiting local (perhaps unwitting) operators, establishing nodes of transmission that is local and therefore convey increased credibility.

While individual initiatives may seem harmless, the network of the entire operation involving both traditional and online messaging across multiple sectors from commercial business, political organizations to art and literary concerns reinforced the effectiveness of the message, and increases the difficulty in countering the network.

Conclusion: Joint-Force Approach Required

Just as in China, one of the principle goals of United Front operations, and CCP influence operations in general, is to establish legitimacy within their respective country. And as demonstrated by the continued existence from PPG, the Guangcai network, to more notorious examples such as Chinese Unification Promotion Party (CUPP). While they seem to occupy a relatively small portion of the public discourse, they did succeed in *becoming* a legitimate part of that discourse in many people's eyes.

And now with the advent of Cyber-enabled influence operations, the existing United Front network has found a new lease on life, leveraging what little local influence they once possess in creating a much more effective form of transmission than their purely cyber-based counterparts.

Such a combination also had the unexpected benefit, at least from the perspective of the Chinese actors, of entangling

themselves within multiple jurisdictional areas of Taiwan's various law enforcement and intelligence agencies, making effective countermeasure that much more difficult to achieve.

For example, the Political Warfare Bureau while has little jurisdiction over civilian matters, does possess the unique expertise in countering Chinese political warfare and recognizing their effects on a population. The Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau, while possessing both the authority and capability to monitor and apprehend PRC intelligence operatives under the competence of the National Security Bureau (NSB), is somewhat overstretched and lacking sufficient resources to focus on the more malleable field of United Front operations and Information Warfare. The newly established Cyber Command may possess the most capable offensive capability within the government, as evidenced by their recent exemplary record during the Cyber Offense and Defense Exercise (CODE)²⁴, but they lack the psychological and intelligence training required in dealing with a cyber-enabled information operation.

Consequently, the logical choice is the formation of a joint agency, an institution akin to the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), as

²⁴ 黃彥棻, “臺美首度聯手舉辦大規模網路攻防演練 臺銀行組藍隊聯隊對抗紅隊攻擊,” *iTHome*, 4th November, 2019, at <https://www.ithome.com.tw/news/134003>.

previously suggested by various scholars²⁵²⁶. Such a center would be capable of taking advantage of the resources and expertise available in both military, government and even civil spheres, to counter this unique hybrid threat, and safeguard Taiwan's democracy and our way of life.

²⁵ “沈伯洋、何澄輝、卜德凱：資訊戰的應對與體制的建立,” *Apple Daily*, 2nd May, 2019, at

<https://tw.appledaily.com/new/realtime/20190502/1559992/>.

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