

師目標審定會議

Fires solutions for the division targeting board

取材：美國陸軍《火力雜誌》2018年9 – 10月號
(Fires, September - October 2018)

作者：美國退役少將 Richard Longo、中校 Jeff Schmidt

譯者：胡元傑

Having served as both a Mission Command Training Program senior mentor and Fires warfighting function chief over the last three years with a focus on division-level targeting for over 17 Mission Command Training Center warfighter exercises, we often see units struggle to get their targeting processes up and running at the start of an exercise. The causes are many. The most common of which are that all members of the team are not grounded in the targeting methodology and, quite simply, have not worked together as a team.

過去三年，擔任任務指揮訓練案之資深導師及火力運用主管期間，參加過超過 17 次任務指揮訓練中心的演習，我的重點放在師階層的目標處理上。發現部隊為了目標處理往往跑上跑下，忙碌不堪，究其原因甚多，而最常見的是團隊沒有依目標處理程序各司其職，簡言之，就是團隊沒有合作觀念。

The purpose of this article is to provide the division “targeteers” with a starting point from which they can adjust for their own particular operating environments. These recommendations on how to conduct a targeting board at the division level can be modified to apply at different echelons of command.

本文旨在為「目標處理人員」提供一個思考開端，然後依照各自的特有作業環境作調整。本文所提建議，只要作若干調整，亦可適用於其他階層。

As one division commander told us, “The targeting board is the single most important hour of my day.”

有一位師長曾告訴我們：「目標審定會議是我一天中最重要的一小時。」

That is exactly as it should be. The board does several important things for the division. First, it ensures the division is fulfilling its responsibility to set the conditions for subordinate units’ success in future fights specifically by influencing “when, where and in what condition enemy forces commit to the close area” (Field Manual 6-0). We have seen divisions where both the main and tactical command posts become mired in the close fight. Second, it helps us gain access to resources outside of the division which are available to assist us in delivering effects. And finally, when executed well, it gives the commanding general a great snapshot of the integration of all warfighting functions over

the next 96 hours.


一點沒錯。該會議對師的作戰極為重要，首先，它確保師能執行其分配任務，經由「敵軍在何時、何地以及在何種條件下進抵近迫區」遂行戰鬥，以此作為起點實施的研討，為下屬部隊建立在未來戰鬥中的致勝條件（野戰準則 6-0）。我們曾經看到主指揮所及戰術指揮所都一團混亂的部隊。其次，經由會議有助於我們獲得師的外部的資源，幫助我們達到預期戰果。一次成功的會議會讓指揮官對掌握未來 96 小時內所有作戰功能整合的概況。

This article intentionally does not delve into the additional working groups and cells that support the targeting effort. Suffice it to say, the targeting board is the culmination of a myriad of different efforts captured in different working groups and cells. By describing what we consider a model targeting board, each of the feeder battle rhythm events that contribute to it should be optimized to make the targeting board the single point in which the commander can see the synchronization of intelligence, maneuver and Fires to shape the fight for the division. These battle rhythm events include, but are not limited to, the targeting working group, assessment working group, cyber-electromagnetic activity working group, collection working group, intelligence synch and operations synch.

本文刻意不對各組作業細節深究。基本上目標審定會議由各個作業團隊匯集作業成果。我們思考的目標處理模式，應該將所有掌理各項事件的作戰節奏部門的資料彙整至目標處理部門，讓指揮官能看到究竟情報、作戰、火力是如何同步結合的。事件的作戰節奏來自於目標處理組、評估作業組、電子電磁作業組、情蒐作業組等，彼此的情報與戰鬥之同步結合。

The fundamental organizing principle of a good targeting board is to use the framework of the Army's targeting methodology of decide, detect, deliver and assess. We have not found a single operating environment in which this tool failed to provide the necessary structure to see ourselves, the environment and the enemy very well. When units stray from this organizational construct, it usually leads to a confusing flow and omission of key elements required to synchronize the division's shaping efforts.

目標處理的基本原則，就是運用陸軍目標處理方法論架構：決心、偵蒐、打擊、評估。目前為止，還沒有發現過任何作戰環境，超出上述工具所能涵蓋。經由上述工具的處理，足以看清楚我軍、環境與敵人。若悖離此一組織性結構，就會使整個流程混亂，喪失部隊可以同步整合行動的若干要素。



圖一 目標處理程序

Targeting decision board

As a short preface, it might be useful to briefly describe the timing of the targeting board – where it best fits in the battle rhythm. There are two primary considerations with respect to the timing. The outputs of the division board serve as the inputs to the higher headquarters’ targeting board. Therefore, the principle consideration of timing is to ensure the nesting of battle rhythms. Secondly, since the first decision the commanding general must make during a board is whether to re-attack based on our assessment, the board must be held early enough in the day (or the air tasking order cycle) so a re-attack decision can have an immediate effect.

目標審定會議

首先簡要描述目標審定會議的時序 – 如何最有效配合戰鬥節奏。關於時間安排有兩個主要考慮因素。師作戰會議的結論即為目標處理的上級指導。因此，時機的掌握主要考慮如何確保戰鬥節奏。其次，由於師長在會議期間必須做出的第一個決定是根據評估是否應實施再興攻擊，因此會議必須在當天（或在空中作戰任務命令週期）儘早實施，再興攻擊方能立即奏效。

To begin the targeting decision board, it is helpful to lay out decisions we will be asking the commanding general over the course of the meeting. These range from re-attack decisions that must be made immediately, to adjusting and refining previously made decisions in the H+24, 48 and 72 hour timeframes; and finally, the focus of collection and Fires for submission into higher headquarters processes that ultimately result in air tasking order, airspace control orders and the joint integrated priority target

list.

在目標審定會議之前，宜臚列須師長裁決的事項。內容包括是否立即發起再興攻擊、在 H+24、48、72 小時期間對已經下達的決心是否必須加以修訂、是否須要向上級申請額外之偵蒐及火力資源，這些內容最終會影響到空中作戰任務命令、空域管制命令及聯合整體優先目標序列。

Assessment

Although we call the targeting process decide, detect, deliver, assess (D3A), we think it might be more accurate to call it A-D3-A because the cycle must start with a good assessment. We must start by asking the question, “What effect did we intend to have on the enemy by this time and did we have that effect?”

評估

雖然我們常將目標處理程序區分為決定、偵蒐、打擊、評估 (D3A)，但我們認為將其改為 A-D3-A 或許更貼切，因為整個循環必須以正確的評估做開始。我們首先要問的問題是：「當前我們打算對敵人製造什麼效果？我們是否具備這種能力？」

A common struggle with many training units is defining what they are trying to achieve with their shaping efforts. Too often, we hear “Sir, we intend to ‘shape’ the long-range artillery.” The problem with this lack of specificity is that it is near impossible to assess our effectiveness at accomplishing that task. How do we know whether we really set the conditions for the future success of our subordinate units once the close fight is joined? We must provide much more detail in terms of enemy capabilities or combat strengths. We must have something we can measure so we can turn with confidence to the commander and say, “We have had the necessary effects and have set the conditions.”

許多輪訓部隊的共同問題，無非確認他們致力達成的目標究竟為何。我們經常聽到他們說「長官，我們打算『型塑』遠程火力。」這種欠缺精準的說法，我們就很難評估達成此一任務的效果。我們如何確知下屬部隊是否在進入近迫戰鬥前就建立了充分條件？我們必須針對敵方能力，或所謂戰力方面，提供更多細節。我們必須掌握若干可以量測的東西，方能自信地向師長報告：「我們已經製造出必須要的效果，建立了未來致勝條件。」

An example of a better articulated targeting objective is, “We intend to reduce the capability of the enemy long-range artillery to mass on our forces at the wet gap crossing. We define that as destruction of 70 percent of his 9A52 Multiple Rocket Launchers (16 systems) that are within range and the disruption of command and control at the battalion

and brigade level.”

目標處理作業比較具體的目標如：「我們打算削弱敵位於濕地通行間隙，對我軍實施集火的之遠程砲兵火力。我們將其定義為：消滅敵 70%位於射程內之 9A52 多管火箭系統（16 套系統），同時破壞敵營、旅級部隊之指管。」

With that degree of specificity, we can measure the effects of our lethal and non-lethal efforts and make an informed recommendation to the commanding general. When we “assess” that we did not have the effects we intended, the commander must make one of three decisions: devote some of today’s resources to meet the targeting objectives (re-attack), adjust the plan (e.g. delay the maneuver of ground forces) or finally, accept risk, which probably mandates a call to the subordinate commander who was counting on the promised effects.

設定此一目標後，再據以衡量致命與非致命手段產生的效果，並向師長提出建議。設若經過「評估」後我們並沒有能達到預期效果時，師長有三項選擇：投入若干可用資源來實現目標（再興攻擊）、調整計劃（例如地面戰鬥步調放慢）、將現況告訴預期能獲得此一效果的下屬指揮官，準備接受可能風險。

Many units are not sure where they would get the specifics of the targeting objectives. For both deliberate and hasty planning, the best source is the discussions taking place during the wargame step of the military decision-making process. This is where we discuss details such as, “What do we need the correlation of forces to be at this point in the battle to ensure the success of our subordinate unit?”

很多部隊不知道如何確定其目標處理的具體目標。無論是周密或應急計畫作為，都是依照軍事決策程序（MDMP）的兵棋推演步驟進行討論。這部分將在「在此一戰鬥時間點上，我們需要那些相關部隊，以確保下屬部隊能成功達成任務？」的課題上詳細討論。

A targeteer should be an intimate player in the larger wargaming process and then bring those detailed targeting objectives to the rest of the targeting team as they conduct their concurrent planning.

目標處理人員應該是師級兵棋推演的要角，同時有責任將目標處理的詳確目標攜返，告知所有目標處理相關人員，俾進行爾後的計畫作為。

Intelligence/operations update

The next key part of the targeting board is intelligence. This should include weather and operations updates to ensure the longer-range targeting process is linked to the current situation. We do not want to get “bogged down” in this current situation, but it helps many leaders organize their minds to link the current with future operations. The

intelligence officer briefs the enemy's current disposition, composition and intent. The weather officer, usually from the United States Air Force, then briefs weather only as it impacts our operations during this time frame. The operations officer then briefs the current friendly situation much the same as the intelligence officer. This is sometimes augmented by a fire supporter detailing assets available to the division based on release of the air tasking order and strengths and locations of various delivery assets.

情報及作戰狀況更新

目標審定會議第二個重要部分是情報，其中包含天候及作戰狀況的更新，以確保未來目標處理作業能與現況相結合。我們不希望讓現況複雜化，但如此做有助於指揮官的思慮能將現況與未來做連結。情報官應簡報當前的敵軍部署、編裝、企圖。通常由空軍派出的氣象官，應簡報在某一時間區間天候對作戰的影響。作戰官則應比照情報官報告我軍狀況。簡報後，通常由火力支援軍官補充師可用之空中戰力，以及各項火力投射部隊之兵力與陣地位置。

This information and more importantly, analysis, sets the conditions for a discussion about the next 24 hours. This is generally a review of previously made decisions and refinements and an update on the acquisition of necessary enablers from outside the division. This discussion is usually very short and can go something like this, "Sir, three days ago you approved this approach and we are still on plan based on what the enemy and friendly forces have accomplished in the interim. We don't have the air tasking order yet, but in my discussions with our higher headquarters at their targeting meeting, I am confident we will get the collection and delivery resources we have asked for."

這些資訊以及更為重要的分析，為未來 24 小時的作戰討論奠定基礎，同時也是檢視先前做出的決心及如何加以修正，以及從上級獲取必要補強力量的最新情況。討論通常相當簡要，例如：「長官，三天前你核准這種方式，我們仍依據此一方式，考量敵我現況，依計畫完成中程目標。目前尚未獲得空中支援，但已與上級在目標審定會議中討論，相信我們很快會獲得我們需求的偵蒐與火力資源。」

What is more likely is that the enemy will NOT have done what we predicted 72 hours before and we will have to make adjustments based on emerging changes to mission, enemy, troops available and time. This is how the dynamic targeting process is embedded in the deliberate process. We refine and adjust as the battle evolves. This allows us to do what every single division commander has asked us to do: fight the enemy, not the plan. It also forces us to do what has become a lost art, and that is refining our targets over time.

敵人顯然不會跟著我們在 72 小時前所做的預判來行動，我們必須依據任務、敵軍、可用兵力及時間的最新變化來進行調整。這就是周密計畫作為過程中的動態目標處理。隨著戰況發展，進行改變與調整。這使我們能夠因應每位師長要求的：與敵人纏鬥，而不是與計劃糾纏。如此將迫使我們重拾此一失傳的藝術，不斷修改目標。

Assess

After we receive the intelligence, weather and operations update, we look at H+24 through the lens of A-D3-A. First, we look at assessing whether our activities over time have had the effect we set out to achieve. “We have reduced the enemy long-range artillery’s ability to impact the wet gap crossing by destroying 50 percent of his Multiple Rocket Launchers, but have not had any measurable effect on disrupting his C2 [command and control] capability. We are confident that with the air interdiction we have on station today and the electronic attack capability that we have requested for tomorrow, we will be able to meet our targeting objectives.” A common shortcoming across the Army is failing to include the results of our higher headquarters’ and adjacent units’ shaping activity into our assessment. Many times, they are going after many of the same targets and capabilities. The best way to capture their efforts is through active participation in their targeting processes.

評估

當我們接收到最新情報、天候與作戰狀況後，我們從 A-D3-A 角度觀察 H+24。首先，我們評估這一段時間，我們的作為是否達到預期效果。例如「我們摧毀敵 50% 多管火箭系統，制壓了敵遠程火炮攻擊濕地通行間隙的能力，但是對敵之指管能力尚未產生可見效果。我們相信，昨天提出申請，預定今天實施的空中阻絕及電子戰攻擊，我們將能達成預定目標。」全軍普遍存在的共同缺點，是未評估上級與鄰接部隊，並修正我軍行動，結果發現設定的目標與行動與上級及鄰接部隊相互重疊，而避免此一狀況最好辦法，就是積極投入目標處理過程。

Decide

During this portion of the H+24 discussion, we review the key decisions our commander has made such as determining the prioritization of effort through the use of the high payoff target list, attack guidance matrix, fire support coordination measures and recommending any changes based on the emerging operational environment. Just as a review, the high payoff target list is a prioritized list of targets whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. (Field Manual

3-09) The attack guidance matrix is a targeting product approved by the commander which addresses how and when targets are to be attacked and the desired effects. (Army Techniques Publication 3-09)

決定

在 H+24 時段的討論中，我們檢視師長作出所有的重大決定，例如依據高效益目標清單 (high payoff target list)、攻擊指導表 (attack guidance matrix)、火力支援協調措施及最新戰況所修正的工作優先順序。正如審查一樣，高效益目標清單是優先攻擊的目標，一旦予以消滅，將極有助於我任務之達成。(野戰準則 3-09) 攻擊指導表是指揮官核准的目標處理文件，說明目標攻擊方式、時間及預期效果。(陸軍技術出版物 3-09)

Detect

During this portion of the H+24 discussion, we review our intelligence collection plan and determine if any adjustments need to be made. Often, our collection managers are new to the job as the warfighter training begins and they need coaching. Invariably, they will have broad swaths and boxes all over the map linked to echelon-above-division collection assets with the thought process being “We will vacuum up everything and sort it out in the analysis control element.”

偵蒐

在 H+24 的討論中，我們檢討情報偵蒐計劃，並確定是否需要進行任何調整。通常我們的偵蒐管理人多為新手，必須給予輔導。通常他們的地圖上畫了一堆上級偵搜部隊的各種符號，認為：「分析管制部門會加以清理並分類」。

The much better approach is to focus specifically on the high payoff target list and describe in detail how they are going to find and track a specific target through detection, delivery and assessment. One division commander describes this as “putting a hook in him and never letting go.”

更好的方法是專注於高效益目標列清單，並詳細說明如何經由偵蒐、打擊、評估以搜尋並追蹤該特定目標。正如一位師長將此描述為「在目標掛上一個鉤子，然後絕不鬆手。」

Another common shortcoming in the intelligence collection process is failing to adjust the plan when it is not working. There are two fundamental assumptions we must make. First, the enemy is there somewhere executing a plan. Second, with the totality of systems we have at our disposal, we can find the enemy if we are looking in the right place with the right asset. Too often we see no adjustment in the collection plan for several days even though we are not finding the things we have identified as most important, the

high payoff target list. Einstein' s definition of insanity may be too harsh, but we have to show some agility in adjusting our plans until we start to see some benefit.

情蒐過程中另一項常見缺點是，當計劃不能正常運作時，卻無法作任何調整。我們必須作出兩項基本假設。第一、敵人正在某處，進行某項計畫。其次，若我們選擇的時間、地點正確，我們投入全般力量足可找到敵人。我們經常發現即使已經多日找不到我們認為最重要的高效益目標，偵蒐計畫仍然一成不變。若以愛因斯坦對「瘋狂」的定義來形容修正的速度或許過於苛刻，但絕對應盡量快速地加以修正，直到我們找到利基。

One last common shortcoming in our collection plan is when we task one line of division full motion video (FMV) in the form of a Grey Eagle to both try to answer the commander' s priority intelligence requirements AND be used by targeting for detection and assessment. We have not seen this work successfully a single time and strongly recommend some division collection capability be devoted to the targeting effort.

偵蒐計畫最後一項通病，是要求灰鷹無人機錄製一段影片，以滿足指揮官優先的情報蒐集要項，並運用於目標處理程序中的偵蒐與評估作業。但我們從來沒有看到此一任務成功達成過，因此強力建議情蒐能力應以目標處理為優先。

Deliver

Again, at H+24, we are reviewing the delivery decisions we made three days ago and comparing them to the anticipated enemy and friendly situation during this timeframe to see what refinements need to be made. A couple of examples of things that could impact these adjustment decisions could be interim assessment from our higher or adjacent units that tell us they have met our targeting objectives with activity of their own, or we may have lost a resource we were counting such as destruction of a friendly artillery unit.


打擊

同樣的，在 H+24 這時段中，我們要檢討三天內所有射擊任務，將射擊效果與預期的敵我狀況相比較，看是否需要加以調整。任何調整決心執行過程中，可以同時徵詢上級與鄰接部隊協助評估我之火力運用，是否達到原訂之目標處理目標，且要掌握是否有原來計畫可用於增援我之火力，是否因遭敵攻擊而已經消失。

Figure 2. An example agenda for a targeting board meeting. (Rick Paape, courtesy information)

Purpose	Approve targeting priorities, collection assets and planning efforts IOT anticipate emerging requirements, make recommendations to the commander and ensure continued execution of both lethal and non-lethal targets	Chair	Commanding general or designated representative
Frequency	Daily	OPR	FSCoord
Duration	One hour	Attendees	G2, SWO, G2 CM, CUOPS, G2 BDA, FUOPS, FUPLANS, G3 AVN, ENG, IO, CEMA, CMO, MISO, PAO, SJA, AMD, CBRN, ALO/ TACP, Targeting officer, G4, LNOs
Location	Briefing tent		
Inputs - Weather update (G2) - Operational timeline (G3) - G2 Assessment/BDA (G2) - Collection asset/delivery system status (CM) - Target nominations, 24-hour blocks (Fires) - Current HPTL/AGM, collection priorities (Fires) - Targeting Guidance Outputs - Updated HPTL/TSS/AGM - Targeting priorities - Target nominations - Synchronized IC plan - CG Guidance for future targeting		Agenda Assess previous ATO (last 24-48 hours) - Review operational timeline - SIGACT assessments - Tasks to effect review - Commander's guidance - OE updates - HPTL update Review next 24-48 hours and decisive operations - Weather impacts to operations - Enemy situation update - Lethal and non-lethal - Friendly situation update - Info collection emphasis Validate next ATO 48-72 hours - Weather impacts to operations - Enemy situation update - Lethal and non-lethal - Friendly situation update - Info collection emphasis - Initial consequence management Recommend/Approve ATO Cycle > 96 hours - Friendly situation - Enemy situation (Predictive analysis) - Recommended AI, EW, IO nominations - Recommended priorities for 48-72 HPTL	

目的：批准目標處理優先順序、預判所需之偵蒐資材及要求條件、向指揮官建議致命性及非致命性目標並確保對這些目標持續產生效果。 時間：每日 時長：一小時 地點：簡報帳篷	主持人：師長或指定代理人 負責人：火協官 參加人員：情報官、特戰官 SWO、反情報官 G2 CM、當前作戰 CUOPS、參二戰果評估 G2 BDA、未來作戰 FUOPS、未來計畫 FUPLANS、參三空業官 G3 AVN、工兵官 ENG、資訊官 IO、網路電磁代表 CEMA、網路電磁官 CMO、PAO、軍法官 SJA、防空及飛彈防禦官 AMD、核生化官 CBRN、戰術空軍聯絡官 ALO/TCAIR、後勤官 G4、海軍聯絡官 LNOs、目標處理官
先期備妥資訊： - 最新氣象（參二 G2） - 作戰時序（參三 G3） - 參二評估/戰果評估（參二） - 偵蒐資材現況（CM） 24 小時期間目標建議（火力） - 目前之 HPTL/AGM，優先偵搜行動 - 目標處理指導 成果： - 更新後之 HPTL/TSS/AGM - 選定之目標 - 同步之 IC 計畫 - 針對未來作戰之目標處理指導	討論項目： 已發布 ATO（最後 24-48 小時）之評估： - 檢討作戰時序・師長指導・重大行動 SIGACT 評估・最新 OE・任務分工之效果檢討・最新之 HPTL 爾後 24-48 小時即決定性作戰： - 天候對作戰之影響・友軍最新狀況・最新敵情情蒐重點・致命及非致命性效果 確認 48-72 小時之 ATO： - 天候對作戰之影響・友軍最新狀況・最新敵情・情蒐重點・致命及非致命性效果・初期效果管理 建議/批准 96 小時以後之 ATO： - 友軍狀況・建議 AI・EW・IO・敵軍狀況・建議 48 小時區間之 HPTL 優先



圖二 目標審定會議議程範例

Assessment

During this final phase of the H+24 discussion, we need to describe our plan for assessing our effectiveness. Divisions infrequently dedicate collection resources to assessment efforts and we therefore lose the ability to understand the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of our efforts. This leads us to redundant Fires with scarce resources, or worse, to not fully appreciate an enemy capability that still exists. We cannot have FMV everywhere. We need to broaden our scope of collection capability to include use of our subordinate units, other division “ints,” special operations forces in the area, allied militaries, national assets, local resources such as civilians on the battlefield and non-governmental organizations, and when necessary, predictive analysis based on acceptable models. A common problem in our “plan to assess” is that the responsibility is not fixed on any single entity, though we acknowledge the collaborative nature of the requirement. Some units use their Organizational Research and System Analyst to do this. Others place it in the G2 and still others put it in a subordinate unit, most often the division artillery. Wherever this responsibility is placed, the “Chief of Assessments” needs to be a part of the targeting process so he, or she understands what needs to be assessed, when and in what level of detail.

評估

在 H+24 時段討論的最後階段，必須說明如何射擊效果評估計畫。師甚少會將偵蒐資源放在效果評估上，因此這方面甚感欠缺，從而導致砲兵必須消耗過多火力，更糟糕的是無從得知究竟敵人還剩餘多少戰力。我們不能都依賴無人機的即時視訊，我們必須擴充我們的偵蒐思維，舉凡下級部隊、鄰接師的情報、特戰部隊、盟軍、國家級偵蒐資源、留在戰場的平民與非政府組織等，必要時根據可接受的模型加以分析判斷。「評估計畫」的通病，是即便我們都知道必須另有管道，卻將評估責任押注在某單一個體上。有些部隊以「組織研究與系統分析」來處理，有些部隊則全由參二處理，另有一些甚至交由下級部隊處理，但基本上由師砲兵負責者居多。不論責任置於何處，擔任評估的組長必須是目標處理的一環，因為他最知道評估的時機與需求。

H+48, H+72

This same format carries through in the discussion of H+48 and H+72, the plan for tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. Start with an intelligence assessment of likely enemy disposition, location, strengths and intentions. Follow with anticipated weather as it applies to our operations. Then have the G3 planner give a best guess of friendly disposition, strengths and missions. With that information as a starting point, as flawed as it might be in a dynamic environment, then go through the same A-D3-A format. In many cases, there will be no change at this time. That is OK. Go through that part quickly. But again, remember that we should be making refinements to the requests for resources that we made previously.

H+48, H+72

H+48 與 H+72 時段，亦即明、後天的計劃，可套用同樣模式進行討論。先對敵人的可能部署、位置、優點和意圖依據情報進行評估。其次預判作戰期間的天候，然後由參三說明我軍部署、優點與任務。根據上述資訊做為起點，說明在動態環境中可能存在的缺陷，然後經由同樣的 A-D3-A 模式進行討論。通常不會有太大變化。那麼就很快達成結論。但請記住，我們應該對我們之前所要求的資源做檢討與修正。

H+96

Finally, we get to the portion of the board where we need to extract the commanding general's guidance for our submission of requests to external organizations such as those described in the air tasking order (including detection and delivery assets), the full range of non-lethal capabilities, permission to use airspace and permission to shoot the Army

Tactical Missile System. In most theaters, these requests must be submitted between 72 and 96 hour before execution. Some theaters may have more lengthy requirements and that is usually based on the number of intervening headquarters between the division and the joint force commander.

H+96

最後，我們達到會議的部分目的，根據師長的指導，衍生出若干必須向外部申請的需求，如空中作戰任務命令（包括偵蒐與打擊）、各種非致命性戰力、使用空域的許可，以及發射陸軍戰術飛彈系統的許可。大多數戰區，這些需求必須在執行前 72 到 96 小時之間提出申請。某些戰區可能要求更長時間，而且通常是根據師與聯合部隊指揮官之間干預層級多寡而定。

Most units find it useful to follow the structure we have described in chronological order detailing the 24, 48 and 72 hour efforts prior to asking for the necessary decisions in the 96 hour timeframe. The targeting team needs to protect against unnecessarily “re-wargaming” every time period

大多數部隊認為以前述 24、48、72 小時時段區分，有助於思考 96 小時時段必須下達的決心。而目標處理組必須避免各時段實施不必要的「重行兵推」。

Once again, the intelligence and operations officer must lead us off with a best guess of what the enemy and friendly dispositions, compositions and intentions are at this stage of the fight. Many are hesitant to make this prediction because of the very small likelihood of it actually playing out as predicted. There is some merit to this because, in effect, we are trying to predict what the enemy is going to do even before he decides using his very effective decision point tactics. However, we must use our best professional military judgement and make the prediction. Doctrinally, an event template, or EVENTEMP, (Army Techniques Publication 2-19.3) is the best tool for the intelligence officer to use. Without doing so, we will not be able to submit justifiable requests for external resources from which we can adjust as the picture becomes clearer.

重申情報官及作戰官應該以現階段最可能之敵我部署、編裝、企圖預判引導我們，但由於判斷與實際永遠都有差距，以致很多人不敢妄加推測。

We also must articulate to the commanding general what our higher headquarters and adjacent units are trying to accomplish during this timeframe. This information gives him a better overall context for operations.

我們必須讓師長清楚的瞭解，在各時段中上級與鄰接部隊級級欲達成的任務，讓師長更瞭解全般戰況。

Decide

Next, we will walk the commanding general through the A-D3-A process and make recommendations on the necessary focus, guidance and decisions. During the decide phase of the briefing, we must provide a recommended and updated high payoff target list and attack guidance matrix based on the anticipated evolving operational environment. This is informed by all of our assessments to date as well as our understanding of emerging plans and operations. This must be tied to the intelligence and operations officers' discussion of what the future fight will look like.

決定

其次應帶著師長走過整個 A-D3-A 過程，同時針對必要的重點、指導、決心提供建議。在這一階段的簡報的決心部分，應該就預期戰況提供高效益目標及攻擊指導表相關建議。這是依照最新評估及對戰況理解所製作，更需與情報官及作戰官就未來作戰進行密切討論。

Detect

Then we must describe with some specificity how we are going to find (detect) those high payoff targets, put a "hook" in them and track them through detection to assessment. We must talk specific targets, sensors, cuing of secondary sensors, likely named and targeted areas of interest and what specifically we are looking for. The commander must approve the focus of key collection assets and have an understanding of the echelon-above-division capabilities available.

偵蒐

然後說明我們將如何搜尋高效益目標，以及如何經由偵蒐與評估加以勾連、追蹤。此時必須就某一特定目標、偵感器、備用偵感器、可能之優先目標區及有影響目標區，及急需知道的狀況。師長必須批准重要偵蒐系統之使用，同時瞭解師以上階層可用之偵蒐能力。

Deliver

At this point, we need the commander to approve the general focus of lethal and non-lethal Fires. We don't need him approving specific targets or even the method of engagement. We just need a general approval of the focus given the assets expected to be available. Our recommendation should sound something like "Sir, we intend to focus air interdiction on the enemy reserve tank brigade. We will focus Army Tactical Missile System on SA-20s and long-range shooters. We will use our Army attack aviation capability to destroy the remaining multiple rocket launcher systems associated with the

committed division tactical group and we will suppress all remaining indirect Fires capability with our rocket systems.”

打擊

此時我們需要師長批准致命及非致命性戰力使用的指導，但不需要師長批准特定目標或攻擊方式。我們只需要師長一次批准資源運用重點，而建議內容應類似「報告師長，我方擬集中空中阻絕火力攻擊敵預備戰車旅，運用陸軍戰術飛彈打擊敵 SA-20 及其他長程火力，陸航空中攻擊能力運用於攻擊師戰術群之多管火箭系統，另以火箭系統制壓敵曲射火力」。

As we have discussed earlier, we will add specifics of our targeting objectives as we continue to conduct our analysis. We know that we will need to refine those targets from submission through execution. One common mistake we see is that the non-lethal subset of the team will be working a completely different set of priorities off a completely different high payoff target list. Emphatically, we want to say there is one priority list and it is the combination of all these capabilities that gives us the best effects.

如前述，當我們繼續進行分析時，會增加特定的目標處理目的。我們瞭解在執行過程中必須不斷修正。此一階段的通病，是非致命性部門會製作出優先順序完全不同的高效益目標表。我們必須強調，只能有一份優先順序表，而該表融合了全般戰力，務求獲得最佳戰果。

Assessment

As stated earlier, there must be a plan to assess and some of the assessments require a long lead time. The most common long lead time is when we need a special forces team to reposition in order to be where they can provide an assessment and that is not something that can be done without significant planning and time to execute. Another division commander said, “If it is important enough to do, it is important enough to assess.”

評估

如前所述，評估也需要有所計畫，而且有些評估需要有前置時間，尤其當需要預置特戰小組擔任評估作業時，若非有詳細計畫勢難執行。另有一位師長說：「若任務重要性高，則任務執行效果的評估重要性相形更高。」

Our recent history has told us that lethal assessment, though not easy, is usually easier and timelier than non-lethal assessment. That must be accounted for in the targeting plan. Finally, we must acknowledge that the assessment plan must be continually refined through execution just like the detection and delivery plan.

最近的歷史顯示，非致命性效果評估在難易度與耗費時間上，均遠大於致命性武器，因此應在目標處理的計畫中詳加思考。最後我們應該了解，評估計

畫必須跟偵蒐與打擊計畫一樣，在執行中不斷加以修正。

Once the commanding general approves the focus of Fires and the refinement decisions presented throughout the meeting, the decision board is concluded, but the work is not done. It is critical that the results of the targeting board be promulgated to the division staff, the subordinate units and the higher and adjacent units. The intra-divisional communication is usually a specific targeting fragmentary order (FRAGO), or the inclusion of the results into a division daily FRAGO. At the minimum, the FRAGO must include refinement decisions, the high payoff target list, the attack guidance matrix and a target synchronization matrix. The redundant yet very necessary back-up method of sharing this information is the work of the brigade liaison officers who participate in all phases of the targeting process and keep their units informed on a regular basis.

當師長依據會議結果修改其決心，並批准火力計畫後，目標處理的決心部分結束但實際工作並未完成，最重要的是將會議結果通知全師幕僚、上、下、鄰接部隊。就師內各部隊通信而言，通常是以各別命令，或放在每日命令中發布。內容至少包含修改過之決心、高效益目標說明表、攻擊指導表、目標同步表。同時應適切運用旅派遣至師部之連絡官，他們全程參與目標審定會議，並有責任按規定將最新狀況回報其母體單位。

Targeting

A good targeting process is essential to keeping the division focused at the proper depth in time, space and purpose. It also enables the aligning of resources with priorities in a constrained environment. The targeting board is fundamental to making the appropriate decisions and the organizing principle is D3A, or as we have suggested, A-D3-A. There are many common shortfalls that we have described throughout, however each of these is surmountable if addressed and understood by the key contributors to the targeting process. By using the recommendations included in this article, we are confident that divisions can overcome these easily fixed shortfalls and truly set the conditions for their subordinate units' future fights.

目標處理

好的目標處理過程有助於全師上下能將重點放在適切的時間、空間縱深及目的上。同時也可以將有限資源設定優先順序運用。目標審定會議是下達適切決心的基礎，其原則放在 D3A，或我們所建議的 A-D3-A 上。本文描述了許多常見的缺失，但如果目標處理過程的主要參與人員都能清楚地認識並予以解決問題，則每項缺失都可以克服。根據本文的建議去做，相信足可克服諸般問題，並實際為下屬部隊奠定爾後作戰之勝利基礎。

作者簡介

Maj. Gen. (retired) Richard Longo serves as a Mission Command Training Program senior mentor since his retirement while serving as U.S. Army Europe deputy commanding general. He conducted targeting at the battalion, brigade, division, corps, Army and Combined Joint Inter-agency task force level.

Richard Longo 退役少將自駐歐部隊副司令官退役後，一直擔任「任務訓練計畫」之資深導師。渠曾於營、旅、師、軍、軍團、跨部會聯合特遣隊等階層擔任過目標處理相關工作。

Lt. Col. Jeff Schmidt is the current Mission Command Training Program, Fires Warfighting Function chief for Ops Group Delta. He provides observation, coaching, and training to division, corps, and Army Service Component Command-level staffs. He has served in key field artillery billets from battalion through division, to include time as a target acquisition battery commander, deputy fire support coordinator, and field artillery brigade deputy commander. Schmidt has also served as a division chief of operations, a division chief of future operations, and an instructor at the Command and General Staff College, where he taught Joint Operations and Joint Fires.

Jeff Schmidt 中校現任「任務指揮訓練計畫」D 作戰隊之火力作戰主管，負責師、軍、陸軍部隊指揮階層之裁判、訓練及導師工作。曾歷練營至師級各砲兵職務、師參三，並曾於指參學院擔任聯合作戰及聯合火力運用教官。

譯者簡介

胡元傑退役少將，陸軍官校 41 期、陸院 74 年班、南非陸院 1986 年班、戰院 84 年班、中山大學大陸研究所 100 年班，歷任連長、營長、師砲兵及軍團砲兵指揮官、聯參執行官、駐馬來西亞小組長、陸軍砲兵訓練指揮部副指揮官、國立中興大學總教官。