

# 「灰色地帶」作戰的跨文化領導

卡蜜拉·特羅邱斯卡 (Kamila Trochowska)

波蘭戰爭研究大學國家安全研究所副教授

## 摘 要

本文探討當今複雜而模糊的安全環境中有效領導的挑戰，在這種環境中，戰爭與和平成為難以捉摸的概念，因而被稱為「灰色地帶」或複合式戰爭概念。本文主要論點是：由於這些挑戰在資訊與認知領域，對於現在和未來的領導者，都應該發展這類軟技能(soft skills)。戰略創造力、靈活性，獲取信任能力以及跨文化和社會競爭能力，有效強化管理當代安全議題的績效，而賽蒙斯(Simons)的跨文化、靈活領導能力概念亦有效的包含這些技能。本文根據筆者自2016年來實地考察烏克蘭「混合戰爭」(hybrid war)的案例中，提出了支持此類發展的方法和理論。

本文中表達的觀點和意見均為作者所有，並不一定反映波蘭戰爭研究大學、波蘭國防部、北約HFM 286小組或與作者有關聯的任何組織官方政策或立場。

## 戰略的社會文化動能

能夠親見並運用文化（價值觀、意識形態、政治制度、宗教和其他管理社會的文化模式）對國家與國際關係有關事務之間動能的影響（即跨文化能力），是戰略思維的基本特質。<sup>1</sup> 然而，當代國際安全環境的每個領域都可以看到文化的影響。對於它的需求使得「文化能力」(cultural competence)成為影響戰略和政治目的關鍵，這不僅因為需要與其他多元文化國家及舊盟友進行有效合作，更需要面對新夥伴的合作以及對長期盟約的新挑戰。在極端主義部分，雖然這類主張有政治影響，且具有宗教、意識形態或種族根源的文化現象，此概念對適切回應極端主義具有重要意涵。在日益多元化的現代衝突環境中，文化將大大提高軍事行動的效力。文化能力也是在國際環境中創造自己的文化正面形象和加強「軟實力」(soft power)不可欠缺的技能，「軟實力」在今天與軍事「硬實力」(hard power)同等重要。此外，我們可以觀察到反對跨國威脅和挑戰的必要性，以及建立多元文化聯盟的必要性，如果沒有正確理解文化多樣性，就無法發揮作用。

1 Jeffrey Lantis, "Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism," in Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, Contract No: DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction (Washington: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 2006), p. 3.

此外，文化因素在塑造當代國際安全環境中可以發揮以下的功能：

- 文化影響領導者的決策，並通過社會壓力為政府行動提供框架。
- 文化是塑造外交政策的重要因素。我們甚至可以斷言，國際關係本質上是不同文化相互作用的產物，是一種主要為知識和文化本質的現象，具有動態變化的戰爭與和平概念。
- 宗教是影響政治決策的一個越來越重要的因素，在許多方面，它取代過去由國家透過操縱民族主義來形成與操作化(operationalization)認同(identity)的功能。
- 文化成為「政治化」，因此衝突具有意識形態面向。
- 重要概念的深層文化模式形塑國際關係，如宗教的包容或人權，然而不幸的是，常常被用作為某些特定活動辯護的工具，甚至在特定情況下並非合法，如多數西方國家在本世紀之初進行的軍事干預。
- 文化通常是民族團結和獨立的表現，也是多元文化社會中的表達，在多元文化社會中，你可以提出管理整體的具體方案。通過這種方式，文化、外交和各種組織文化明顯的成為國家安全戰略。
- 民族文化與國際主義的對比可能使外交關係更為複雜，特別當我們與保守國家打交道時，這些國家亦同時尋求保存其民族文化界限，並擴展到其他民族或國家。
- 文化基本教義主義(Cultural essentialism)可能產生負面發展，如極端民族主義、仇外心理、自我優越感以及對外國文化影響的恐懼和認同感喪失。在這種情況下，文化可以作為宣傳和思想鬥爭的工具。<sup>2</sup>

我們應該區分文化因素對不同安全管理層面的影響；在個人層面，文化因素很大程度影響領導作為、特定實體（國家或非國家行為者）的管理和組織，以及不同個體之間的溝通。在戰術層面，關於戰術概念、訓練系統、武器類型和部署使用成為戰爭的一部分，很大程度由文化所決定。在作戰層面，為了規劃有效的作戰行動，應該考慮在外國環境中，多國聯盟中參與任務行動時各國組織文化和文化特徵之間的協調，以及敵人和作戰地區的文化狀況。在這種情況下特別要強調的，就是軍民關係以及在特定情況下「作戰區」(AO)的政治和社會控制的來源、對作戰行動的社會支持、教則規範（以及不成文的規則和傳統對他們的束縛）、所有參與組成的軍事文化因素（包括指揮系統和訓練原則和理念）。在戰略和政治層面，文化因素是塑造決策過程、管理和實現政策和戰略安全目標的主要力量。就「安全」一詞本身的理解，不應受到國際社會形塑所共享單一核心概念的影響，而應於對不同文化有廣泛理解。

雖然社會文化因素在戰略層面安全管理的重要性已經獲得充分認知，但目前專業培訓和發展系統面臨的最大挑戰之一，就是當前和未來領導者對軟技能(soft skills)發展的

---

2 James Ferguson, *The Role of Culture in International Relations. Advanced International Relations and Advanced Global Politics 2* (Queensland, Australia: The Department of International Relations, SHSS, Bond University, 2017) <<http://www.international-relations.com/wbadvir/wbadvir4.htm>>（檢索日期：2019年1月17日）

關注度仍然不足。對於身處當前複雜安全環境所需的跨文化領導者來說，社會能力、合作、溝通、同理心、信任建立能力、思想開明、跨文化能力或性別意識等等，這些能力是不可或缺的。可惜的是它們通常不是這些領導者在專業發展的主要關注重點。

為了解決這個問題，筆者參與由Yvonne Masakowski教授領導的北約HFM 286小組「北約多國行動領導者發展計畫」，<sup>3</sup>除檢閱現有的理論、教材、關於該議題的民事文獻，另外將納列筆者為「歐盟和平專案兵推」(EU's Gaming for Peace Project) 2016-2019進行的研究內容，<sup>4</sup>及筆者自2016年以來在烏克蘭進行實地研究的個案分析內容。

## 戰爭與和平之間：「灰色地帶」的挑戰

與過去必須有效管理的議題相較，當代威脅和衝突更為模糊與不同。兩極世界秩序崩潰以及隨之而來的一系列全球社會政治進程，徹底改變當代的安全環境。此外，近期不對稱和混合戰爭的再度興起，或者更確切地說是再進化，為安全研究社群帶來更加艱鉅的挑戰。2014年俄羅斯對烏克蘭的侵略後，「灰色地帶」作戰成為一個亟待解決的問題。因為此作戰形式是國家和非國家行為者之間的競爭性互動和爭論，雖然已經具備戰爭的特徵，卻不具備武裝資格衝突，因此不在國際戰爭管轄範圍之內。<sup>5</sup>在科學和軍事領域早已有許多的學說、理論、術語來描述和應處國家之間戰爭、和平和危機狀態。但「灰色地帶」的挑戰並沒有被列入考量範疇。這種新型態衝突的共同特徵，是起源不明確、難以確定參與方、流動性和政治不確定性。灰色地帶的挑戰具有各類衝突的特徵，但是這些特徵的累積並未提供關於如何因應的提示，因為每種特徵的結構類型都是獨特的。這種情況不僅是衝突解決工具有限的問題，亦非屬於傳統國家安全政策的應用，以及內在、隱密以及在很大程度「心理」特性出現威脅。在這樣一個充滿挑戰的環境中，產生一系列不可或缺的不同技能。

如今，安全和國防組織、社群和決策者必須在「前現代性」(pre-modernity)和「後現代性」之間發揮作用。我們的軍隊逐漸受到人類進步、「超人類主義者思想」(transhumanist ideas)的影響，意指以思考未來的方式，使用科學技術增強精神、體力、能力和資質，以克服人類狀態不需要或不必要的因素和「奇異性」(singularity)的影響。同時必須在根本不遵循既有科技與文明模式的全然異質社會中，履行職責。此領域所有行動目標是以「人性因素」(human factor)為根本的狀況下，極大化人類系統效率、作戰人員的機動能力、自主性，體能狀態和認知技能必須大幅提升，以因應現代戰場複雜的需求。<sup>6</sup>對於複雜適應性威脅，需要完善的方法以及聯合跨國行動，其中由於涉及政治

---

3 The working group's profile: <https://www.sto.nato.int/Lists/test1/activitydetails.aspx?ID=16010> (檢索日期：2019年3月24日)

4 該計畫的主要目的是分析歐洲在參與維和任務的專業人員培訓軟技能方面的經驗和差距，並創建一個培訓這些技能的線上遊戲。該計畫的詳細內容請參見[www.gap.project.eu](http://www.gap.project.eu) (檢索日期：2019年3月24日)

5 US Special Operations Command, "The Gray Zone", 2017/09/15, White Paper. USSOCOM, pp. 3-4.

與經濟實體之間的文化和組織差異，在訓練、領導和作戰行動的管理上非常複雜。軍隊內部「人文領域」(human domain)和敵人文化多樣性日益增強，使得跨文化能力和其他軟技能的作用越來越大。以文化能力作為拯救生命的技能也是重要部分。建立文化能力安全教育理念與決策過程的形式，不僅能確保任務成功，而且是廣泛的安全和防禦行動。

此外，當談到已經在各國之間實現的「互操作性」(interoperability)--意指不同國家間的聯合作戰能力，主要側重於技術方面，而不是人為因素本身。即使日常平凡無奇的休假和晉升規則，或者任務類型和權限歸屬的限制，都不會考慮服務對象特異性。因此，有效率領導者必須通過融洽和睦關係和耐心，尊重不同的價值觀、文化、習俗，透過對每個成員國家目標、目的、能力和侷限的認識來實現團結一致（而不是統一指揮），並依據每個國家的使命進行公平的任務分配。<sup>7</sup>這樣的理念原理上非常簡單，但在戰區指揮結構之外的和平時期，其具體實踐非常困難，更不用說在戰爭或和平時期運作的多國演習，和多國結構所驗證的突發危機狀況結果。這情況在本研究曾參與的「歐盟和平專案兵推(2016~2019), GAP」訪談中，<sup>8</sup>也發現這問題。此外，正如「美國國防部跨文化能力報告(the Cross-Cultural Competence in the Department of Defense report)」所述，迄今多數跨文化能力研究都集中在跨越地理邊界的有效性方面，較少質疑這些技能和能力能否適用於各種任務、其他政府機構以及多國特遣部隊。<sup>9</sup>此外，依據地點模擬(Gaming for Place)研究，對歐盟和北約國家的培訓課程進行分析，<sup>10</sup>文化意識(cultural awareness)並非一般跨文化能力和其他軟技能所關注，通常也是人員發展訓練(Personal Development Training)的一部分，文化（或跨文化）領導雖然是必須被重視，但卻經常被忽略。

## 領導者的跨文化能力基礎發展架構

6 John Parmentola, *Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies* (Carlisle: US Army War College SSI, 2010).

7 Angela Febraro, "Leadership and Command," 2008, *Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors* (RTO-TR-HFM-120). Ed. Angela R. Febraro, Brian McKee and Sharon L. Riedel. RTO/NATO, p. 3.

8 該計畫的主要內容之一，是2016-2018年期間進行的168次國際訪談（芬蘭、保加利亞、愛爾蘭、英國、波蘭、烏克蘭、葡萄牙等國）的分析，其中涉及軟技能開發的跨國公司的軍事、民事和警察參與者，以及它們在當代CPPB任務環境中的特別意義與應用探討，詳細內容請參見<https://gap-project.eu>（檢索日期：2019年2月1日）

9 Jessica Gallus, et. al., *Cross-Cultural Competence in the Department of Defense: An Annotated Bibliography* (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences: Ft Belvoir, 2014), p. xii.

10 Smith, Roisin, Anne Holohan and Kamila Trochowska, "Final Report on Knowledge, Current Practice, Gender and Cultural Competency," 2017, *SOTA*, Gap Analysis and Roadmap of Key Actions to Advance SOTA, II. <[https://gap-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/D2.2\\_Knowledge\\_Current\\_practice\\_Gender\\_and\\_Cultural\\_Competency.pdf](https://gap-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/D2.2_Knowledge_Current_practice_Gender_and_Cultural_Competency.pdf)>（檢索日期：2019年2月5日）

在整個專業軍事教育和訓練過程中，培訓普遍的跨文化能力、技能和理想的態度是文化運作系統的基本要素。個體或領導者若是能具備這種文化通用能力，無論他們是否在任務區域中接受適當訓練，或者因時間急迫以致無法充分準備，這些人在文化多樣性環境將有較佳能力進行自我適應和操作。此外，這類培訓還提供理論架構和基礎，可以接續填補具體行動的知識和區域能力的不足。因此，在戰略層面，我們以執行一般任務使用的武力手段、措施、方法，來處理相關政治和戰略行動目標。這個層面上對政治和軍事組成要素的文化敏感性要求很高，並形成一項行動或任務的基本目標。此階段若將不恰當某些因素和變量納入，可能造成從戰略制定者到基層官兵發生由上至下一連串的錯誤。領導者應該具備基本技能為「文化自我覺知」(cultural self-awareness)，戰略和跨文化交流技能和文化能力—豐富並拓展地緣戰略想像力。為了實現此一目標，學者瓜拉恩(Graen)和胡伊(Hui)提出以下領導者培訓架構：<sup>11</sup>

1. 跨文化能力發展。
2. 第三文化製作技能。
3. 跨文化創造性問題解決技能。
4. 道德技巧。

其次，特定作戰準備工作取決於許多不同因素。在戰略層面，政治和軍事部門需要涉獵廣泛的地緣戰略知識，不僅要了解全球環境動態、當代威脅的性質，並且要對預劃執行任務的特定區域具體狀況要掌握清楚。將未來作戰區中威脅的性質列入考量是重要課題，因為這是正確評估部署軍事力量種類與規模的先決條件，此一層面需要對涉及政治、戰略、安全及社會文化動態進行深入分析。人們還必須能夠預測其行動在該地區政治、經濟和社會領域，以及整個全球安全環境中的第二、第三階效應(third order effect)。重要的是，更需要預測和管理新潛在社會運動和現象的能力，以協助決策及制定替代行動方案。

一旦受制度約束的具體培訓和發展框架被採用，上述內容應能建立跨國軍事行動領導人在社會文化領域中應該具備能力。

培訓方法和工具應豐富多樣，跨媒體學習取向（不僅包括虛擬培訓解決方案和沉浸式互動環境，還涉及社群媒體和應用軟體的使用）應該與面對面培訓計畫相結合，這些培訓計畫與區域焦點等議題有關，但不限於此。此外，應鼓勵在既定的培訓環境之外主動的、非機構性的社會學習，培訓師作用是激發學員潛能，並鼓勵他們參與，過程中應不斷對其有效性和道德面向進行嚴格評估，並定期對培訓進行檢討和精進。

首先，有一系列測量方法和工具可以強化下列兩者影響：第一，衡量「軟技能對整體安全和防衛領域活動的有效性」；其次，培訓和教育活動的效率（在個人和群體認知、情感和行為領域）。再其次，文化能力培養評估有各種各樣的選擇：來自商業自我

---

11 G. B. Graen, and Ch Hui. "Transcultural Global Leadership in the 21st Century: Challenges and Implications for Development." *Advances in Global Leadership*, 1999, pp. 3-19.

表1 戰略階層的通用能力

|      | 戰略階層                                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                                                                  |                                                                                 |
|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 能力   | - 跨文化能力<br>- 跨文化創造力、對複雜文化背景的理解，以及其形塑安全格局所扮演角色。<br>- 能夠創建一個能夠在複雜環境有效行動的概念。<br>- 預見行動和既定目標長期效果的能力。<br>- 運用特定符號、內容、信念等，創造群體共同認同感的能力。<br>- 將上述內容傳達給各類對象或受眾的能力。                         |                                                                                                                  |                                                                                 |
| 知識   | - 全面地緣戰略背景知識<br>- 了解全球安全環境的一般狀態及動態，以及對國際安全威脅本質的掌握。<br>- 了解上述面向的文化觀點，以及政治、戰略和安全文化面向的依存關係。                                                                                           |                                                                                                                  |                                                                                 |
| 訓練方法 | 專業軍事教育                                                                                                                                                                             | 指揮參謀訓練                                                                                                           | 週期性訓練                                                                           |
|      | 至少60個小時的專業培訓，其中包含將級指揮軍官的課程。建議的培訓方法包括講座，研討會和關於文化功能的一般機制的討論（以視聽教學與真實案例進行補充）、文獻自學、文化能力相關書籍、戰略文化等等，以及各種跨媒體的作業指定。理論部分準備則應輔以一般實驗方法，或採取決策遊戲或模擬等有助於塑造文化自我覺察和創造性、前瞻的取徑。此課程進行中，建議應有專業人員進行引導。 | 在理論準備期間，採用與專業軍事教育相應階段相同的方法。演習期間不論是否採取實兵，一般文化能力訓練的實驗方法（模擬與決策練習皆透過電腦程式與參與學員互動進行），觀察重點為行動規劃和理解第三、四階段效果時，不同部門間的協同作用。 | 培養一般文化能力的實驗方法，如網路和沉浸式互動環境中進行模擬和決策練習，以及直接互動過程中關注環境和決策過程文化面向。此過程進行中，雙方的互動與反饋是必要的。 |

本研究自行製表

資料來源：Kamila Trochowska, *Soft Skills for Security and Defense: Cross-Cultural Competence and Beyond* (Warsaw: War Studies University, 2018), pp. 94-95.

評估工具，例如文化能力自我覺察評估清單，已經用於測量個人傾向的安全和防衛組織的心理測試—例如360度評估（美國軍方目前所採用）；Raven的漸進矩陣，Eysenck的人格量表(EPQ)或情緒智力量表；各種評估方法，如自我報告測量、情境判斷測試(SJTs)、行為評級、模擬或生物數據以及更廣泛的神經影像學。<sup>12</sup> 當然，涉及到方法、道德、評估甚至有效性時，研究本身和培訓都存在許多局限和風險，但若能謹慎處理，將減輕危害。

## 邁向跨文化領導

就領導風格而言，包容性領導(inclusive leadership)是指基於人際關係應處技巧和對

12 Kamila Trochowska, *Soft Skills for Security and Defense: Cross-Cultural Competence and Beyond* (Warsaw: War Studies University, 2018).

每種文化、知識、經驗獨特視角的理解，<sup>13</sup> 此能力似乎是多國環境中最理想和有效的。然而，有效領導的相關特徵—即使是包容性、變革性的領導，文化上也可以交流協商。例如，迄今最全面的62國家領導力研究—「全球領導力與組織行為效用」計畫顯示，共同性且普遍正向的領導特質，內容包括果斷，積極、公正和智慧等。一般共同性負面的其他領導特質，如無情和自我中心；此外，亦有一些領導特質則僅出現在某些國家文化中，<sup>14</sup> 例如真誠、推諉、狡猾、敏感和熱情。領導概念本身也受文化制約，從歸屬權力的差異開始—在某些文化中，這種概念是世代相傳，並且與性別密切相關。關於領導者與特定群體形成什麼樣的關係（專制或共同合作，取決於權力距離）；或者根本沒有普遍性的領導效能指標。

在進一步的研究過程中，「全球領導力與組織行為效用」計畫研究人員分析來自62個國家的數據，界定以下與各種文化集群相對應的全球領導風格。<sup>15</sup>

- 具有超凡魅力／以價值為本的領導力：反映出基於堅定核心價值觀，以激勵、鼓舞和期望他人高績效成果的能力。包括以下六個主要領導層面：(a)有遠見的；(b)鼓舞人心的；(c)自我犧牲；(d)誠信；(e)決定性；以及(f)績效導向。
- 團隊導向型領導：強調團隊成員之間有效團隊建立和共同意圖與目標的實踐。它包括以下五個主要領導層面：(a)團隊協作取向；(b)團隊整合；(c)外交的；(d)惡意（反向評分）；以及(e)行政勝任。
- 參與式領導：反映管理者參與制定與實施決策的程度。包括兩個主要領導層面，標記為(a)非參與性和(b)專制（均為反向評分）。
- 以人為本的領導力：體現支持性和體貼領導力，包括同情和寬宏大量。這一領導層面包括兩個主要層面，即(a)謙虛和(b)人道取向。
- 自治領導力：指獨立和個人主義領導力屬性。由一個標記為自主領導的主要領導面向來衡量，包括個人主義，獨立性，自主性和獨特屬性。
- 自我保護領導力：透過提高身份地位和體面的做法，確保個人和團體安全。包括五個主要領導層面，標記為(a)以自我為中心；(b)地位狀態意識；(c)衝突誘導；(d)保全面子；(e)程序。<sup>16</sup>

此外，有效的領導者了解在特定背景中選擇正確領導風格，可以提高成功的可能

13 Yvonne R. Masakowski., *Inclusive Leadership and the Dynamics of Multinational Military Operations In Global and Culturally Diverse Leaders and Leadership: New Dimensions and Challenges for Business, Education and Society* (Emerald Publishing Limited, 2017), pp. 233-249.

14 Angela Febraro, pp. 3-6.

15 More details can be found on the project website, basic visualizations available at: <https://globeproject.com/results>. Full results of the 2014 study devoted specifically to strategic leadership can be found in: Robert House, et. al, *Strategic Leadership Across Cultures. GLOBE Study of CEO Leadership Behavior and Effectiveness in 24 Countries* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2014).

16 Ibidem.

性。正常情況下，大多數領導者在他們方法使用主要風格——不僅有組織和個人，還有強烈的文化影響。如果就適應性與深具影響的領導模式進一步探究，可以發現包容性領導方法，似乎是成功應對跨國任務高度複雜和多樣化的人員、組織領域的重要關鍵。這裡所期望的最終狀態，是為多元組織與國家文化提供真正的資產，使其成為成功的協同任務推動者之一。跨國軍事行動不僅僅是幾個國家元素的總和，而是創了一個多元文化實體，使得跨文化領導力的協同作用變成可能。<sup>17</sup>

學者安柏金斯(Anne Perkins)在「全球領導力研究：一個理論框架」(Global leadership study: A Theoretical Framework)一文中，<sup>18</sup> 提供關於跨文化領導非常重要的見解。她提出一定範圍的術語與運用技巧，揭示三種由全球化與跨文化領導的操作性模式。首先，由影響領導力最為關鍵的全球化議題開始，例如社會受到影響的程度（在大多數情況下，資訊科技驅動外在環境快速變化，國家尋求穩定的自我保護現象(the phenomenon of national entrenchment)沒有想像中容易，就是一個極端的例子。她還認為，儘管表面上調適全球趨勢與壓力，個人不僅要識別和容忍文化差異，還要認識到成功領導的文化價值觀和期望，社會規則和核心文化規範仍然相對不受影響。<sup>19</sup>

該框架的第二個層面取決於受文化影響的具體領域，包括擔任領導職位的社會要求；領導權力、影響力和特權；社會地位對提升領導者角色的影響程度；領導者行為或風格的預期與偏好模式；並追隨各種領導者行為的反應。<sup>20</sup> 有許多理論提供的面向使領導風格更容易調適，除了進一步討論著名學者霍夫斯泰德的觀點外，學者雷恩(Wren-Swaetz)的模型具有真正的潛力，可以為跨文化領導者形成具體文化期望的過程中，提供深刻洞察。因為說明了橫跨過去歷史的、當代的、中觀的與微觀的組織背景形成過程。

## 混合戰爭中的戰略領導——烏克蘭戰爭個案研究

許多研究發現，灰色地帶的挑戰和混合戰將在可預見和不可預見的未來造成問題，<sup>21</sup> 此問題也是不分地域的。以下列舉幾例：<sup>22</sup> 2014年俄羅斯對烏克蘭的侵略中使用

17 Gareis and Vom Hagen, "The Difficult Practice of Military Multinationality....." qtd in Angela Febraro. "Leadership and Command". Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors (RTO-TR-HFM-120). Ed. Angela R. Febraro, Brian McKee and Sharon L. Riedel. RTO/NATO, 2008, pp. 3-7.

18 Anne Perkins, "Global Leadership Study: A Theoretical Framework," *Journal of Leadership Education*, Vol.8, No. 2, 2009, pp. 72-87.

19 Ibidem, pp. 72-76.

20 P. W. Dorfman., Hanges, P. J., & Brodbeck, F. C. "Leadership and Cultural Variation: Identification of Culturally Endorsed Leadership Profiles". In R. J. House, P. J. Hanges, M. Javidan, P. W. Dorfman & V. Gupta (Eds.), *Culture, leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004), pp. 669-719., qtd. in Anne Perkins. "Global Leadership Study..." Op. cit., p. 75.

21 Patrick Cullen, and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud. "Understanding Hybrid Warfare", 2017, MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare Project, Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs.

22 Ibidem.

天然氣和借貸工具；伊朗在敘利亞的活動運用混合戰；伊斯蘭國(ISIL)在敘利亞和伊拉克的活動等等。

此外，關於混合戰的一般性討論主要集中在戰術層次，在較小程度上集中在作戰，而非此類型戰爭須處理的戰略層面。文化能力是理解混合戰的關鍵，因為它立基於衝突的資訊性（敘述）、社會性（影響）和心理性（獲得支持）等層面。在2014年俄羅斯對烏克蘭的侵略之前，從國外消息來源中觀察到了這一點，這是迄今挑起混合戰的最成功的例證。混合戰提出的最大挑戰之一是對認知和道德領域的利用，這是傳統安全分析關注的具體領域。使用專注於身份和意義方法可能有助於理解複合競爭對手，並建構勝利的理論。<sup>23</sup>

俄羅斯對於混合戰的運用已經不是頭一遭。在舊蘇聯時代，莫斯科經常利用顛覆性的「積極措施」來獲得影響力，並塑造歐洲政治格局。例如，蘇聯資助「歐盟共產主義」政黨，鼓勵反核抗議運動，試圖操縱歐洲媒體。克里姆林宮通過竊取外國國家機密以及傳統間諜形式來購買影響力，前蘇聯特種部隊也開展類似於俄羅斯特種部隊當前在混合戰中的訓練活動。正如關注該問題的一位研究人員所強調的，如果我們要使用混合戰的概念，它的獨特之處在於交戰國操縱或利用某些目標國家成員之間的當地民族和民族主義的不滿。民族主義和民族認同是現代的現象。在這種情況下，混合戰是現代性的產物。<sup>24</sup> 因此，文化分析和戰略跨文化能力將大大增強在這種衝突中，遇到此類衝突或變成代理人的反制能力。學者丹尼爾拉西卡(Daniel Lasica)也強調這一點。他認為資訊—心理因素是混合戰的不同基礎，因為他將混合戰士描述為：試圖刻意運用認知和道德領域，迅速將戰術成功和敵人錯誤轉化為戰略效果的人。<sup>25</sup> 這種「刻意地利用認知和道德領域」，不在乎對方內心真正想要什麼，而是為了獲得對人們思想的影響和控制，所採取的措施。這對擁有蘇聯血統的人來說相當容易。正如諾貝爾獎得主蘇維埃亞歷克西耶維奇(Svetlana Alexievich)描述的「蘇聯心態」。人們幾十年來一直不斷的接受到宣傳和恐懼訊息，教導他們不要去思考任何他們被告知的事情，因為許多人害怕有人可能會聽到他們個人觀點，而舉報他們有問題。<sup>26</sup>

然而，俄羅斯今天使用的混合戰與冷戰期間舊蘇聯使用的戰術並不完全相同，即使俄羅斯當時使用資訊作戰，當前俄羅斯資訊作戰的質量與野心，因為網際網路、有線新聞以及社交媒體的運用，而更加廣泛與便捷。網絡作戰運用也是新的形式，由於俄羅斯與世界的關係比冷戰時期更緊密，俄羅斯廣泛地透過經濟槓桿來影響外國政府，更容易

23 Daniel Lasica, *Strategic Implications of Hybrid War: A Theory of Victory* (Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth, 2009).

24 Octavian Manea, "The Strategy of Hybrid Warfare," *Small Wars Journal*, 2016. <<https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-strategy-of-hybrid-warfare>> (檢索日期：2019年1月17日)

25 Daniel Lasica, p. 3.

26 Svetlana Alexievich, *Secondhand Time: The Last of the Soviets* (Original title: *Время сэконд хэнд: конец красного человека*) (Random House Trade, 2017).

滲透西方社會。與冷戰時期相比，當時克里姆林宮擁有頑固的馬克思主義世界觀。當前俄羅斯對混合戰的運用，不具強烈的意識形態，亦不受其束縛，因此莫斯科採用的混合戰可能會因此更加精明。<sup>27</sup>

俄羅斯混合戰的主要特徵是對武力的經濟運用，堅持及否定傳統戰爭／和平二元觀點，以及強烈的以群眾為導向（因為影響力就是一切）。他們的工具選項包括但不僅限於：資訊作戰、各種形式和規模的網絡戰、僱用各種代理人、經濟影響和傳統的秘密措施—遍佈世界各地的間諜和特種部隊的運用。

俄羅斯方面還有一些來自於戰略行動和領導素質、具有諷刺意味的「寶貴」經驗教訓：<sup>28</sup>

- 進行兵棋推演訓練—從戰略角度思考，不僅要預見未來的發展，更要如親臨現場一樣（要像馬格努斯卡爾森 *Magnus Carlsen* 而非卡魯阿納 *Caruana*。）。
- 掌握地域內所有狀況，確認國際規則，了解你可以在怎樣範圍內恣意而為，卻不受懲罰。例如在北約和歐盟邊境地區佔領領土，並只接受一些經濟制裁就可以脫罪。因為任何軍事反應都可以被視為公開侵略行為，應該沒有人想要與俄羅斯開戰？如果他們這樣做，我們會以核武器對付他們的叫囂。
- 利用現有脆弱性，同步政治措施與經濟措施（如天然氣交易勒索），削弱社會影響（如克里米亞和頓巴斯，必要時造成社會文化動亂／分裂主義）和削弱目標國家的軍力（確保軍隊都像烏克蘭人一樣處於無望狀態，使對方軍事能力減弱）。
- 始終板著臉、不露笑容以及和廣泛吸引人的形象，讓奧斯卡得主著名導演奧利佛·史東(Oliver Stone)對俄羅斯總統普丁做一些真正明智的採訪。<sup>29</sup>
- 看看你的支持基礎是什麼—國民？你的少數民族？還是有共同心態的人？分析你應該參考哪些共同的部分。一旦你成為一個帝國，光榮的時代將會很美好，誰不想重溫帝國舊夢？無論是恐怖分子還是納粹，重新審視的歷史威脅的伎倆總是有效。<sup>30</sup>
- 不要忘記主流群眾：為他們準備一些純淨不斷和應用的宣傳活動，針對年紀較大的群眾，使用電視和報紙媒體宣傳，透過社交媒體和電影來吸引年輕世代注意。

27 Christopher Chivis., “Understanding Russian Hybrid Warfare and What Can Be Done About It,” 2017/5/11, Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee. <<https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT468.html>>（檢索日期：2018年11月23日）

28 The list provides an ironic, satirical take on Russian strategies and methods of operation in the conflict, own elaboration.

29 “The Putin Interviews,” *A series of interviews Oliver Stone did with Vladimir Putin in the years 2015-2017, later turned into a four-series documentary.* Showtime, 2017. <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QvIKSbYkTXI>>（檢索日期：2018年11月23日）

30 A DPR fighter in and interview for Al Jazeera English Youtube Channel. “Ukraine: Pro-Russian separatists ‘fighting to defend culture’”, 2017/2/13. <[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxUWInux\\_AQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxUWInux_AQ)>（檢索日期：2018年11月28日）

- 明智地採取行動，通過強大的軍事力量隨時準備進行經濟／軍事／法律的勒索，避免國際組織的可能報復。自古至今，巧扮和隱蔽的軍事行動（如特洛伊木馬屠城的戰爭）一直在發揮作用，現在當然也可以使用。為什麼不試圖拿掉士兵身上的徽章並將他們送去戰鬥呢？也許人道主義援助行動可以夾帶運送槍枝？在國家邊界附近進行軍事訓練——你總能告訴年輕士兵們因為技術不夠純熟，所以不小心誤擊某個區域的崗哨。
- 運用各種方式獲得民眾支持，包括重型火炮和資訊作戰。擺脫任何反對的電視台和記者。根據運作70年來仍然有效的蘇聯規則來動員媒體，沒有人可以否認它們是成功的。在後真相和資訊過載的世界中，必須有一個明確，統一的聲音。
- 一旦群眾心向於你，要抓住時機。在軍事上訓練任何可以訓練的東西，提供很好的觀點，並沒有任何支持來獲得其餘的。那些必須為生存而奮鬥的人，甚至是一條麵包，更容易操縱。歸咎區域恐怖安全局勢和人道主義危機，都是因為烏克蘭軍方希望清除那些反對他們的人所在地帶。他們是開槍和挑起衝突的人，俄羅斯只是為了自衛而不得已反擊，對吧？
- 過了一段時間，放開一點管制。你的領土不穩定，足以拒絕任何明智的國際組織進入。透過最小軍事力量運用、努力和資源來保持這樣的狀態（「凍結衝突狀態」的方式似乎是一個好主意），盡可能的持續下去吧。
- 由於在低強度衝突持續的情況下持續放任不管，俄羅斯因此可以走向全球，任意搞亂選舉。在敘利亞「打擊恐怖主義」（如果我們也打擊恐怖主義，其他人怎麼能批評俄羅斯？），儘可能影響世界從衣索匹亞偏僻的小村莊，到美國首府華盛頓的任何人。
- 不時升級，拘禁一些外國船隻，並稱這樣的行為是自衛。在對手國家即將舉行的總統選舉中，將克里米亞跨海大橋爭議之外交醜聞和國家處於戰爭邊緣，歸咎於對手。<sup>31</sup>

關於抵制這種威脅的建議，不會直接針對其中一個成員國——而且根據定義，將不會有針對性的作為，包括：

- 盟友之間強有力的協調與合作，這需要機構間良好合作的內部技能（宏大的戰略溝通從功能性的國內機構間合作開始，安全架構各個部門之間的一致性）。
- 支持受到威脅的國家的安全部門改革，使其足夠強大到能夠自行應對威脅。措施包括交流、培訓、共同演習等。這裡技能是能夠根據特定的安全文化和情況調整給定的措施。有些人可以獲得金錢、有些獲取軍事支持、有的為了避免資金流入腐敗系統、某些應該接受培訓。
- 反制影響行動，與歐盟戰略指部特別工作組和民間組織等機構的良好合作，如通報拿帕爾計畫(InformNapalm)、<sup>32</sup> 加拿大資助的Prometheus計畫<sup>33</sup> 或停止假新聞組織

---

<sup>31</sup> Own elaboration.

(StopFake.org)。<sup>34</sup> 新的媒體素養可能有助於理解在某個安全領域誰有發言權、誰被傾聽。確認及創造該領域的影響者。

- 關於分析技能，混合戰爭旨在利用橫跨政治、軍事、經濟、社會、資訊和基礎設施領域的國家脆弱性。因此，對所有部門的關鍵職能、脆弱性進行自我評估及定期維護至關重要。
- 然而，使用協調合作的軍事、政治、經濟、民用和資訊權力工具一樣重要，這些權力工具遠遠超出軍事領域。國家應努力加強傳統威脅評估，以包括非傳統政治、經濟、民用、國際工具和能力，考慮如何將這些攻擊手段，形成為針對目標量身定製的特定脆弱性同步攻擊統合方案。
- 應對措施應依循威脅的本質，保持同步和系統化。各國政府（指揮部）應建立並納入程序，以領導和協調全面和跨機構的自我評估、威脅分析的方法。同樣應該在國際指揮層級進行，制定多國框架，利用現有機構和程序以促進跨境合作與協同。<sup>35</sup>

## 戰略創造力的重要性

戰略領導者的技能在烏克蘭危機和後續戰爭之後，變得更加明確，可以稱之為戰略想像力和創造力。在這種情況下，幾乎必須在某種社會文化背景下發展自主類型創造力。2014年爆發的戰爭令烏克蘭軍隊感到意外，甚至在烏克蘭首都基輔的獨立廣場反政府示威前的幾個月，沒有人會懷疑俄羅斯人對該國抱持敵對意圖。<sup>36</sup> 此外，後蘇聯軍事文化和普遍心態被俄羅斯人刻意推動，承擔軍事衝突或行動責任由個別士兵和軍隊指揮官而非國家，某種程度將責任分散，不是沒有針對「缺席」的重要威脅，而是軍隊沒有士氣。

在尊嚴革命之後興起的新勢力，留下了一支完全解編的軍隊。當2014年，烏克蘭國防部副部長聲稱：「我去了其中一個射擊場，但沒有任何一枚砲彈擊中目標。他們告訴我，這是士兵們第一次使用真正砲彈……徵兵為幫助高級將領建造避暑別墅，他們沒有時間進行訓練」。<sup>37</sup> 此外，由於經濟支持不足及烏克蘭未來缺乏明確的戰略視野（拉攏北約？依賴俄羅斯？或發展自己方向？）導致該國幾乎沒有顯著的軍事實力可以阻卻俄羅斯攻擊，這也是該國軍事和組織文化的墮落。（譯者注：2013年底烏克蘭民眾「尊嚴

32 InformNapalm official website, 2018/11/23, <<https://informnapalm.org/en/>>（檢索日期：2018年11月28日）

33 Prometheus official website, 2018/11/23, <<https://prometheus.ngo/>>（檢索日期：2018年11月28日）

34 Stop Fake official website, 2018/11/23, <<https://www.stopfake.org/en/news/>>（檢索日期：2018年11月28日）

35 Patrick Cullen and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, pp. 23-26.

36 Informal interviews performed by the Author for the upcoming project on war zone narratives.

37 Piotr Pogorzelski, *Ukraine. Unusual People, Unusual Times. (Ukraina: niezwykli ludzie w niezwykłych czasach)* (Gliwice: Helion, 2015), p. 207.

革命」，大批民眾佔領獨立廣場，聚集不散，自發的大型聚會。佔領後期，警方僱用流氓攻擊及製造混亂，政府乘機通過嚴苛的反集會示威法，試圖阻止佔領蔓延。最後甚至狙擊手射殺警察和民眾，企圖製造更大的動盪。此事觸發大批官員退出執政黨，軍警更聲明只效忠人民。前總統亞努科維奇見大勢已去，下臺並出走俄羅斯）。然而，在烏克蘭首都獨立廣場反政府示威之後，可以獲得的是參與高度戰鬥的士氣、受到廣泛民眾支持以及以網絡為中心的“志願者大軍”。當然，它不是一個完全自發的武裝快閃族，其組成核心是2014年3月成立的內政部志願者和前武裝組織國民警衛隊，這個「志願者大軍」缺乏的醫療器材到防彈背心，都是由志願者、家人和一般政府文職人員供應支持。其中著名的Donbass、Ajdard或Dnipro營等自願單位，後來被整合到官方安全結構內，展現極高行動效率，普受群眾好評。多數群眾努力包括建立物質支持志願者團體，將食物送往反政府示威廣場。這些行為受到媒體和烏克蘭普羅大眾的讚揚與推崇，<sup>38</sup>與政府的感覺剛好相反。這些備受推崇的志願行為，是出於烏克蘭社會契約文化仍然存在。無論是渴望和相信的志願者在1941年加入前線作戰，還是那些會將僅有的錢財捐獻給軍隊支援戰爭的家庭，由各種社會實體組織的社會契約。從幼兒園團體到希望前往車諾比事件地區幫助解決。

在這種情況下，戰略創造力來自戰爭的積極階段，這些組織納入國防系統是具體呈現。截至2019年，烏克蘭有數十個志願者組織與軍方協調合作獨立工作，他們接管部門需要支持的任務。他們職能範圍從提供精神（音樂會，表演）和物質支援（食品、手冊、衣服、軍事裝備）直接到戰區，在學校舉辦研討會，由學生製作完成的防毒面具零件，或由志工醫生提供醫療援助。<sup>39</sup>在共同防禦作為中，識別、支持和整合此類舉措和團體的能力，是必須具備的關鍵技能之一。這種支持必須維持下去。因此文化調整的影響力和新的媒體素養是必須的。

特別是這也是混合戰的資訊領域，受益於志願者行動主義和駭客行動主義。首先，創建許多社會抵抗組織和業餘調查記者組織，以提高資訊領域的社會意識，例如：

- 通報拿帕爾(InformNapalm)，一個國際志工情報社群，專注於作為對2014年俄羅斯侵略烏克蘭的回應而創建的社會情報者（但並非唯一），持續提供關於戰爭的分析和新聞。它由Roman Burko（烏克蘭）和軍事專家Irakli Komaxidze（喬治亞共和國）所創辦。截至2019年，它匯集來自10多個國家的30多名志工的努力，提供20多種語言的調查分析。<sup>40</sup>
- 資訊抵抗計畫，對抗烏克蘭在軍事、經濟和能源等主要領域，以及資訊安全領域的

38 Movies such as “Cyborgs” the documentary, Breaking point: the war for democracy in Ukraine, <http://www.breakingpointfilm.com/>, or music Yarmak, “Get up,” 2015/4/17, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gPiTlhFQp3U>>（檢索日期：2018年11月26日）

39 Informal interview with col. Serhii Sviderok of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for the upcoming project on war zone narratives（檢索日期：2018年11月26日）

40 InformNapalm official website, 2019/1/17, <<https://informnapalm.org/en/>>（檢索日期：2019年1月17日）

外部威脅，由基輔的非政府組織「軍事和政治研究中心」提供。此計畫於2014年3月2日首次對外發行。<sup>41</sup>

— 停止假新聞事實核查網站創立於2014年3月2日（烏克蘭克里米亞被俄羅斯併吞的日子，由Kyiv Mohyla新聞學校講師、畢業生和在學生以及KMA未來新聞數位創立。

）最初該網站目標，是檢證和駁斥關於烏克蘭事件媒體假新聞和宣傳。該項目成為用來審查俄羅斯克里姆林宮國際方面宣傳的訊息中心，共有11種語言版本。<sup>42</sup>

它們是該領域國際活動備受讚譽和社會信任的資訊增補站，其中著名的歐盟東部戰略指揮部特別工作組(EU's East Stratcom Task Force)，旨在解決2015年俄羅斯進行的假訊息宣傳作戰。<sup>43</sup> 由於國家網絡安全系統仍在籌建中，關於資訊作戰的準則付之闕如，志工再次構築該結構最重要的頂石。近年來，烏克蘭機構直接回應來自俄羅斯網路威脅，建立特殊的網路安全部門。例如烏克蘭安全局有一個內部團隊；內政部和國家警察創建網路警察部隊；國家特殊通信和信息保護局內設有一個網絡保護中心等等。

烏克蘭的所有網路安全計畫都是由國家安全和國防委員會成立，在俄羅斯入侵克里米亞四年後的2018年中期，開設新型網路為關注焦點的中心。根據烏克蘭總統辦公室副主任希米可夫(Dmytro Shymkiv)的說法，<sup>44</sup> 國防部的反應速度較慢，截至2019年還沒有軍事網路防衛系統，但目前正在討論為軍事用途和網路防禦而建立的網絡單位。因此，烏克蘭志願者網路行動不僅針對俄羅斯聯邦軍，還包括模擬假想敵的紅軍。例如，駭客行為主義烏克蘭網路聯盟，不僅協助在政府網路基礎設施發現了大約200個漏洞，在諸如國家核電廠運營商等關鍵系統中，發現了駭客可能進入其能源系統的脆弱點。<sup>45</sup>

俄羅斯網路戰的劇本確實很豐富，從網路酸民、網路傭兵到干涉2016年美國大選，以及網絡Berkut（КиберБеркут）等等。<sup>46</sup> 親俄羅斯駭客行動主義者團體在特別警察部隊Berkut（該單位因為在2013年「烏克蘭反政府示威」期間使用暴力鎮壓民眾而惡名昭彰）解散後合併。該小組使用各種手段來實現其目標，從阻斷服務攻擊到傳播假新聞、洩漏和分析。俄羅斯國家安全局過去數十年說服和論證所使用敘述，也有一些戰略的連續性。這例子可能是俄羅斯總統普丁對干涉美國選舉指控的回應：你相信千里之外的俄

41 The Information Resistance official website, 2019/1/17, <<http://sprotyv.info/en>>（檢索日期：2019年1月17日）

42 The Stop Fake official website, 2019/1/17, <<https://www.stopfake.org/en/about-us/>>（檢索日期：2019年1月17日）

43 The European External Action Service's East Stratcom Task Force official website, 2019/1/17, <<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/>>（檢索日期：2019年1月17日）

44 Christopher Miller, "What's Ukraine Doing To Combat Russian Cyberwarfare? Not Enough", Radio Free Europe, 2018/3/7, <<https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-struggles-cyberdefense-russia-expands-testing-ground/29085277.html>>（檢索日期：2019年1月18日）

45 Ibidem.

46 Cyber Berkut official website, 2019/1/22, <<https://cyber-berkut.org/en/>>（檢索日期：2019年1月22日）

羅斯會在兩三個人的幫助下干涉美國選舉嗎？當然會。<sup>47</sup>

然而，烏克蘭仍然是目前最大的網路戰試驗場，或者正如「連線」網站(wired.com)所描述：「它是一個新形式全球線上戰鬥的絕佳實驗室」。<sup>48</sup>

此外，在混合戰的背景下，有必要研究「戰略士兵」<sup>49</sup>的概念，因為在這種情況下，通常不只軍事人員才能產生戰略效果。實際上，任何一方的人都具備產生戰略效果的能力。由於社交網路媒體提供的全球連通性，參與者不再是衝突的直接參與者，而是平民或激進主義者的族群。正如尼森進一步聲稱的那樣，這也是「遙控戰爭」(remote warfare)和「社會戰爭」(social warfare)等術語在當代衝突中作用越來越大的原因。社會網路媒體被用於軍事活動，如情報收集、針對性目標、心理戰、進攻性和防禦性的網路作戰和跨文化能力行動等。<sup>50</sup>（譯者注—美軍「戰略士兵」指這些初級軍士官繁重且常見的領導責任，明顯的案例是阿富汗、伊拉克戰爭，戰場的戰術責任下放給中尉、下士等基層軍士官）。它透過無處不在、萬無一失且可輕鬆觸及全球受眾的社交媒體來實施。任何配備電腦連接設備的人，都可以成為全球或安全領域的影響者，與資訊軍事事務革命時代和經典網絡戰資訊作戰操作形成對比，這些人不需要具備高超的資訊科技技能。

這對我們思考與顧慮非常重要，因為社交媒體戰略性使用，不僅賦予眾多參與者權力，而且對國際權力關係產生重新分配的影響，重塑當代衝突的特點。承認他們在當代衝突改變遊戲規則特性，至關重要；並理解由於他們具有戰略效果的能力，他們不僅成為非國家行為者手中的權力工具，而且也成為國家的權力工具。<sup>51</sup>

## 後續研究與結論

關於未來精進研究方向而言，柏金斯對霍福斯德(Hofstede)的觀點和全球研究(The GLOBE Study)的結果，突顯出西方領導理論與非西方領導實踐之間的差異。並指出西方——特別是美國人對當代理論的偏見，而這種偏見不適合大多數跨文化互動。<sup>52</sup>此外，文章假定西方領導力理論可能是使其在混合的非西方環境中，效果有限的一個因素。

47 Megyn Kelly's interview with Vladimir Putin, 2019/1/22, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0feDvVEz3Qc>>, more on the election investigation in <<http://time.com/5340060/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-summit-russia-meddling/>>（檢索日期：2019年1月22日）

48 Andy Greenberg, "How an Entire Nation Became Russia's Test Lab for Cyberwar," *Wired*, 2017/11/6, <<https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/>>（檢索日期：2019年1月22日）

49 Rye Barcott, "The Strategic Corporal," *Harvard Business Review*, October 2010. <<https://hbr.org/2010/10/the-strategic-corporal.html>>（檢索日期：2019年1月23日）

50 Thomas Nissen., #*The weaponization of social media. @Characteristics of contemporary conflicts* (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2015), p. 9.

51 Ibidem.

52 Anne Perkins, pp. 73-74.

表2 西方領導理論的有限性

| 前提    | 理由                    | 限制                               |
|-------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
| 領導者中心 | 領導者是理論的中心             | 在權力距離較低的國家無法有效發揮作用               |
| 男性主宰  | 僅限於男性領導者的性別觀點         | 在女性（權）指數較高的國家，男性觀念和領導力特徵普遍程度效果有限 |
| 普遍特徵  | 一些特徵被認為是普遍的，如誠信、品格、道德 | 這些想法具有強烈文化約束力                    |
| 平衡關係  | 行為和權變理論為西方思想提供最有效的領導力 | 在評估領導者表現時，權威、方向、任務和結果不一定是優先事項    |
| 量化呈現  | 專注於可量化績效和結果           | 並非最好指標，有時它是忠誠度展現而非追隨者表現          |
| 個別主義  | 個別可見的主要地位             | 在集體國家無法發揮作用                      |

本研究自行製表

資料來源：Anne Perkins, "Global Leadership Study: A Theoretical Framework," *Journal of Leadership Education*, Vol.8, No. 2, 2009, pp. 73-74.

就上述方針和後續研究方向的認知，提高領導者應用包容性的自我適應和靈活方法的能力，能夠適切滿足我們現在和未來複雜安全環境的操作需求。

總而言之，眾多分析已經同意「灰色地帶」所形成挑戰和混合戰，在未來構成重大安全問題。由於對資訊和認知領域的利用，現在和未來的領導者需要應對日益複雜的安全格局，具備因應非動態方面衝突的軟技能。這些軟技能包括社交能力、合作、溝通、同理心、信任建立能力、開放思想、跨文化能力或性別意識等等，可以有效促進組織、性別和文化多樣性環境中的協調、績效和關係建設，這也是當前安全和防衛組織的典型代表。這些技巧通常是即興的，不是透過全面整合系統精心訓練、發展和驗證相結合，產生專業級領導技能。這裡所希望的最終狀態，為組織和民族文化的多樣性創造真正資產。這是可能的，「文化總和」可以應對「灰色地帶」的挑戰，創造一個實體。這種實體，不僅僅是幾個獨立的國家元素的總和，同時也是跨文化領導的協同作用。只有透過這種方式，我們才能將這種多樣性視為一種挑戰，這種真正資產才能為我們發揮長期作用。

## 參考文獻

- Alexijevich, Svetlana, 2017. *Secondhand Tme: The Last of the Soviets* (Original title: *Время сэконд хэнд: конец красного человека*). Random House Trade.
- Ferguson, James, 2001. *The Role of Culture in International Relations. Advanced International Relations and Advanced Global Politics 2*. Queensland, Australia: The Department of International Relations, SHSS, Bond University, <<http://www.international-relations.com/wbadvir/wbadvir4.htm>>
- Gallus, Jessica et. al., 2014. *Cross-Cultural competence in the Department of Defense: An Annotated Bibliography*. Ft Belvoir: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
- House, Robert et. al., 2014. *Strategic Leadership Across Cultures. GLOBE Study of CEO Leadership Behavior and Effectiveness in 24 Countries*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Lantis, Jeffrey, 2006. "Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism," in *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, Contract No: DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction*. Washington: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office.
- Lasica, Daniel, 2009. *Strategic Implications of Hybrid War: A Theory of Victory*. Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth.
- Masakowski, Yvonne R., 2017. *Inclusive Leadership and the Dynamics of Multinational Military Operations*. In *Global and Culturally Diverse Leaders and Leadership: New Dimensions and Challenges for Business, Education and Society*. Emerald Publishing Limited.
- Nissen, Thomas, 2015. *#The weaponization of social media. @Characteristics of contemporary conflicts*. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College.
- Parmentola, John, 2010. *Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies*. Carlisle: US Army War College SSI.
- Pogorzelski, Piotr, 2015. *Ukraine. Unusual people, unusual times. (Ukraina: niezwykle ludzie w niezwykle czasach)*. Gliwice: Helion.
- Trochowska, Kamila., 2018. *Soft Skills for Security and Defense. Cross-Cultural Competence and Beyond*. Warsaw: War Studies University.
- Graen, G. B., and Ch Hui, 1999. "Transcultural Global Leadership in the 21st Century: Challenges and Implications for Development." *Advances in global leadership*.
- Greenberg, Andy, 2017/11/06. "How An Entire Nation Became Russia's Test Lab for Cyberwar" . *Wired*. <<https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/>>.
- Manea, Octavian, 2016/02/06. "The Strategy of Hybrid Warfare," *Small Wars Journal*. <<https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-strategy-of-hybrid-warfare>>.
- Perkins, Anne, 2009. "Global Leadership Study: A Theoretical Framework," *Journal of*

*Leadership Education*, Vol.8, No.2, pp. 72-87.

Cullen, Patrick and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2017. *Understanding Hybrid Warfare*. MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare Project, Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs.

Febraro, Angela, 2008. "Leadership and Command," *Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors* (RTO-TR-HFM-120). Ed. Angela R. Febraro, Brian McKee and Sharon L. Riedel. RTO/NATO, p. 3.

Smith, Roisin, Anne Holohan and Kamila Trochowska, 2017. *Final Report on Knowledge, Current Practice, Gender and Cultural Competency, SOTA*, Gap Analysis and Roadmap of Key Actions to Advance SOTA, II. <[https://gap-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/D2.2\\_Knowledge\\_Current\\_practice\\_Gender\\_and\\_Cultural\\_Competency.pdf](https://gap-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/D2.2_Knowledge_Current_practice_Gender_and_Cultural_Competency.pdf)>.

US Special Operations Command, 2017/09/15. *The Gray Zone*. White Paper, pp. 3-4.

Barcott, Rye, 2010/10/21. "The Strategic Corporal," *Harvard Business Review*, October 2010. <<https://hbr.org/2010/10/the-strategic-corporal.html>>.

Chivis, Christopher, 2017/5/11. *Understanding Russian hybrid warfare and what can be done about it*. Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee on March 22, 2017. <<https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT468.html>>.

Miller, Christopher, 2018/3/7. "What's Ukraine Doing To Combat Russian Cyberwarfare? 'Not Enough' " Radio Free Europe. <<https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-struggles-cyberdefense-russia-expands-testing-ground/29085277.html>>.

2017/2/13, A DPR fighter in and interview for Al Jazeera English Youtube Channel. "Ukraine: Pro-Russian separatists fighting to defend culture" <[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxUWInux\\_AQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxUWInux_AQ)>.

2018/03/10, Megyn Kelly's Interview with Vladimir Putin <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0feDvVEz3Qc>>.

2018/5/10, "The Putin Interviews". A Series of Interviews Oliver Stone did with Vladimir Putin in the Years 2015-2017, later turned into a four-series documentary. Showtime, 2017. <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QvIKSbYkTXI>>

2018/11/23, InformNapalm official website, <<https://informnapalm.org/en/>>.

2018/11/23, Prometheus official website, <<https://prometheus.ngo/>>.

2018/11/23, Stop Fake official website, <<https://www.stopfake.org/en/news/>>.

2019/01/17, The European External Action Service's East Stratcom Task Force official website <<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/>>.

2019/01/17, The Information Resistance official website <<http://sprotyv.info/en>>.

2019/01/17, The Stop Fake official website <<https://www.stopfake.org/en/about-us/>>.

## 作者／卡蜜拉·特羅邱斯卡

卡蜜拉·特羅邱斯卡博士為現任華沙戰爭研究大學國家安全研究所副教授。她是歐盟「地平線2020和平專案兵推(2016~2019)」的波蘭地區主任，歐洲安全和防務學院任務和行動課程跨文化能力的創建者／主任，以及波蘭武裝部隊人員情報課程。她為國防部和國家科學中心執行七項關於軍事、安全文化和網路安全人類學文化運作的研究計畫，目前正致力於安全和防衛的認知科學應用。

自2011年以來，她一直是波蘭國家安全局國際研究團隊成員、個人培訓和教育發展北約培訓小組、北約創新中心、北約DEEP、北約STO、歐洲安全和國防學院、應用人類因素的國家和國際研究團隊的成員，曾與波蘭、德國、烏克蘭軍隊、京都大學、中華民國國防大學、美國賓夕法尼亞州立大學對話中心世界、瑞典國防大學和波蘭ADL實驗室等研究及論文發表。

由於作者的科學背景植根於文化人類學和安全研究（當代軍事行動中的文化作戰博士），她在美國南達科他州的拉科達岩石保留區(Lakota Standing Rock Reservation)進行跨學科的實地研究（2008年）、敘利亞大馬士革的巴勒斯坦耶爾穆克難民營研究（2010年）、土耳其警察和軍事機構研究（2011年）、美國軍事機構—陸軍戰爭學院和美國中央司令部研究（2012年）、聯合特種行動大學、USAWC、西點軍校、NATO ACT和美國海軍戰爭學院（2015年），以及和烏克蘭（自2016年起）關於安全和防衛的文化方面研究。

她發表的著作包括當代安全環境文化以及軍事和民防組織的跨文化能力培訓等數本。她的研究興趣包括國家和國際安全的文化層面、安全和防衛的跨文化能力、安全文化、網路安全人類學、軍事訓練和文化神經科學的軟技能等等。

★★★★

**翻譯／**杜長青，國防大學政治學博士；現任職國防大學戰爭學院戰略及國際事務研究所中校助理教授。

**審查／**趙公卓，美國維吉尼亞軍校、美國紐約羅徹斯特大學商學院、美國海軍戰爭學院；現任職遠東集團。

# Transcultural Leadership in Gray Zone

Kamila Trochowska

## Abstract

The article discusses the challenges for effective leadership in today's complex and ambiguous security environment in which war and peace became elusive concepts and have been replaced by the notions of “gray zones” and hybrid warfare. The main argument is that since those challenges base on informational and cognitive domains, it is rather the soft skills that should be developed in present and future leaders. Strategic creativity, flexibility, trust gaining abilities and cross-cultural and social competence strongly enhance performance in managing contemporary security issues, and Simons's idea of transcultural, flexible leadership that embraces those skills is the most effective one. The article proposes methods and theories that support such development, and provide a hybrid war in Ukraine case study based on field work performed by the Author since 2016.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the Author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the War Studies University, Polish MoD, the NATO HFM 286 group or any organization the Author is associated with.

## Socio-cultural dynamics of strategy

The ability to see and utilize the influence of culture (values, ideologies, political systems, religion and other cultural patterns that govern the society) on the dynamics of the relationship between states and other subjects of international relations, namely intercultural competence, is one of the basic characteristics of strategic thinking.<sup>1</sup> However, the impact of culture is visible in every field of contemporary international security environment. Its requirements render cultural competence essential for the strategic and political purposes not only because of the need for effective cooperation with the increasingly culturally diverse countries and old allies that change, but also for the cooperation with new partners and new challenges to long-term covenants. It is also crucial in responding adequately to extremism, which, despite political implications, is above all a cultural phenomenon with a religious, ideological or ethnic root. Culture will also

---

1 Jeffrey Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” in *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, Contract No: DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction* (Washington: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 2006), p. 3.

greatly enhance the effectiveness of military campaigns in the increasingly diverse environment of modern conflicts. Cultural competence is also a skill indispensable to create a positive image of one's own culture in the international environment and the strengthening of “soft power”, which is today as important as the military “hard power”. Moreover, we can observe the imperative of going against transnational threats and challenges, and the need to build multicultural coalitions, which without proper understanding of cultural diversity, will simply not work.

In addition, the following functions that cultural factors play in shaping the contemporary international security environment can be pointed out:

- Culture influences the decisions of leaders and provides a framework for government action through social pressure.
- It is also an important factor in shaping foreign policy. We can even assert that international relations are essentially a product of the interaction of different cultures, a phenomenon of primarily intellectual and cultural nature, with ever changing concepts of war and peace.
- Religion is an increasingly important factor influencing political decisions, and in many respects, it takes over the function of nationalism that used to be controlled by the state in the formation and operationalization of identity.
- Culture has also become “politicized”, hence the conflicts can take an ideological dimension.
- Deep cultural patterns of the key concepts shaping international relations, like religious tolerance or human rights, were, unfortunately, often used as a tool to justify certain activities preferred, yet not always legitimate in a given situation, as in the case of most military interventions carried out by western countries at the turn of the century.
- Culture is usually an expression of national unity and independence, also in multicultural societies in which you can extract specific schemes governing the whole as such. In this way, culture, cultural diplomacy and the various organizational cultures shape national security strategy significantly.
- The contrast between the national culture and internationalism can complicate foreign relations, especially when we deal with conservative countries that are seeking to preserve and extend the boundaries of national culture to other ethnic or national entities.
- Cultural essentialism can also develop negative phenomena, such as extreme nationalism, xenophobia, concepts of superiority, fear of foreign cultural influences and loss of identity. In this case, culture can be still used as a tool of propaganda and ideological struggle.<sup>2</sup>

---

2 James Ferguson, *The Role of Culture in International Relations. Advanced International Relations and Advanced Global Politics 2* (Queensland, Australia: The Department of International Relations, SHSS, Bond University, 2017) <<http://www.international-relations.com/wbadvir/wbadvir4.htm>>.

We should also distinguish the impact of cultural factors on the different levels of security management. At the individual level, cultural factors largely shape the leadership, management and organization of a particular entity (state or non-state actor) and communication between various individuals that govern it. At the tactical level, the tactical concepts, training systems, type and employment of weapons are aspects of the battlefield in vast part culturally-determined. At the operational level, in order to design an effective campaign one should take into account the harmonization of organizational cultures and cultural characteristics of allied nations that are forming a multinational coalition in a foreign environment, as well as the culture of the enemy and the area of operations. Aspects particularly emphasized in this case, will be the civil-military relations and the sources of political and social control in given AO, social support for the operation, doctrines (and unwritten rules and traditions conditioning them), military culture of all engaged components, including the command system and the principles and philosophy of training. At the strategic and political level, cultural factors are the main forces shaping the decision-making process and the management and realization of security objectives of policy and strategy. And the very understanding of “security” as such, in intersubjective, not bound to one core, universal concept shared by the international community, but understood diversely in different cultures.

And although the significance of socio-cultural factors in strategic-level security management is well understood, one of the biggest challenges that the professional training and development system faces nowadays, is the insufficient focus on soft skills development among present and future leaders. Social competencies, cooperation, communication, empathy, trust-building abilities, open-mindedness, cross-cultural competence or gender awareness are indispensable for transcultural leaders that are needed in today's complex security environment, yet they are still usually not the primary cause for concern in professional career development. To address this issue, the article builds upon the work performed by the Author for the NATO HFM 286 group *Leaders Development for NATO Multinational Operations* led by Prof. Yvonne Masakowski,<sup>3</sup> a review of existing doctrinal and training documents and civilian theory on the issue, and the research performed by the Author for the EU's Gaming for Peace Project (2016-2019),<sup>4</sup> and a case study created during field work in the Ukraine that the Author runs since 2016.

---

3 The working group's profile: <https://www.sto.nato.int/Lists/test1/activitydetails.aspx?ID=16010>.

4 The main aim of the project was to analyze European experience and gaps in training soft skills in professionals that take part in peacekeeping missions and to create an online game to train those skills. More about the project and its developments at [www.gap.project.eu](http://www.gap.project.eu) (24.03.2019).

## Between war and peace: the “gray zones” challenge

Contemporary threats and conflicts differ vaguely from those that had to be managed even not so long ago. The collapse of the bi-polar world order and a whole array of global socio-political processes that followed, thoroughly changed the contemporary security environment. Moreover, the recent renaissance-or rather re-invention-of the asymmetric and hybrid warfare brings about even more strenuous challenges to security communities. The phenomenon of “gray zones” became a burning issue after the 2014 Russian aggression on Ukraine, since they are regions in which competing interactions and contentions of state and non-state actors have already the features of war, without being yet qualified as an armed conflict, thus being out of international war jurisdiction.<sup>5</sup> In the scientific and military world, there is an abundance of doctrines, theories, nomenclature that describe and handle the states of war, peace and crisis-but the gray zone challenges fail to fall into any of those categories. Their common features are unclear origin and difficulty in determining parties engaged, liquidity and political uncertainty. They definitely embrace features of various types conflicts, however the sum of those features does not provide any hints on how to handle them, since each such configuration is unique. And it is not only the problem with limited conflict-resolution tools that can be applied in such circumstances, it is also not the implications for classical state security policy, but the very clandestine, intestinal and to a vast extent “psychological” nature of those threats that renders the emergence of a range of different skills indispensable to function in such a challenging setting.

Security and defense organizations, communities and decision-makers nowadays have to function in a space between pre-modernity and postmodernity. Our armies already are and increasingly will be affected by the resulting human advancements, transhumanist ideas and singularity, at the same time having to perform their duties in societies that evolve in a completely different manner, that simply do not follow our pattern of technological and civilizational developments. The goal of any activities in the field is to maximize human-system effectiveness where human factor is the key. The contemporary battlefield also brings on extraordinary demands on the soldiers as to their mobility, autonomy, physical performance and cognitive skills.<sup>6</sup> Complex-adaptive threats demand a comprehensive approach and joint and multinational operations, in which the management of training, leadership and conduct of the

---

5 US Special Operations Command, “*The Gray Zone*”, 2017/09/15, White Paper. USSOCOM, pp. 3-4.

6 John Parmentola, 2010, *Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies* (Carlisle: US Army War College SSI).

operations is very complex due to cultural and organizational differences between the entities engaged. The increased cultural diversity both within the armies, the “human domain” and the enemy, renders the growing role of cross-cultural competence and other soft skills, with cultural competence being first of all a life-saving skill, and an important component of not only mission success, but a wide array of security and defense activities, from establishing security education philosophy to the shape and rationale of the decision-making process.

Moreover, when it comes to interoperability that is said to be already achieved among nations, it focuses rather on technical aspects, not human factors as such-not to mention cross-cultural interoperability that takes into account differences in specificity of service, even in such banal aspects of it as leave and promotion rules, restrictions of types of assignments and authority attribution. It is then crucial for an efficient leader to achieve unity of effort (rather than unity of command) through rapport and patience, respect for different values, cultures, customs, understanding and knowledge of each members national goals, objectives, capabilities and limitations and identifying proper mission for a nation together with assignment of equitable tasks.<sup>7</sup> Easier said than done, even in peace time in out of war-zone command structures, not to mention crisis situations which was proven by multinational exercises and multinational structures functioning in war and peace time, what also became evident in the interviews performed for the Gaming for Peace Project (GAP).<sup>8</sup> Moreover, as the Cross-Cultural Competence in the Department of Defense report states, the majority of 3C research to date has focused on the need to be effective across geographic boundaries, and it was less questioned whether these skills and abilities would work across services, other governmental agencies and within multinational contingents.<sup>9</sup> Also, the analysis of training curricula from the EU and NATO nations performed for the purpose of GAP<sup>10</sup> envisioned that although cultural awareness is usually a part of PDT,

---

7 Angela Febraro, “Leadership and Command,” 2008, Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors (RTO-TR-HFM-120). Ed. Angela R. Febraro, Brian McKee and Sharon L. Riedel. RTO/NATO, p. 3.

8 One of the project's main activities was the analysis of 168 international interviews set (Finland, Bulgaria, Ireland, UK, Poland, Ukraine, Portugal) performed in years 2016-2018 with military, civilian and police participants of multinational ops on soft skills development and their significance and application in contemporary CPPB mission environment. More at <https://gap-project.eu> (01.02.2019).

9 Jessica Gallus, et. al., *Cross-Cultural Competence in the Department of Defense: An Annotated Bibliography* (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences: Ft Belvoir, 2014), p. xii.

10 Smith, Roisin, Anne Holohan and Kamila Trochowska, “Final Report on Knowledge, Current Practice, Gender and Cultural Competency,” 2017, *SOTA*, Gap Analysis and Roadmap of Key Actions to Advance SOTA, II. <[https://gap-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/D2.2\\_Knowledge\\_Current\\_practice\\_Gender\\_and\\_Cultural\\_Competency.pdf](https://gap-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/D2.2_Knowledge_Current_practice_Gender_and_Cultural_Competency.pdf)>.

not only are general cross-cultural competence and other soft skills paid attention to, but cross-cultural (or rather transcultural) leadership is usually not a matter of concern-but it should be.

### **A basic leaders' development framework**

Training of universal intercultural competences, skills and desirable attitudes during overall professional military education and training path is the fundamental component of the system of operationalization of culture. This is because individuals equipped in this culture-generic competence, will have a greater ability to quickly adapt and operate in culturally diverse environments, regardless of whether they had been provided with proper regional training, or simply had just a very brief preparation and not enough time for self-improvement, which is often the case. Such training also provides the theoretical framework and basis that can be later “filled” with knowledge and regional competences for the specific operation. And so, at the strategic level, we are dealing with, among others, decisions regarding the establishment of political and strategic goals of operations-means, measures and methods of the use of force in the form of very general guidelines for conducting an operation. The requirements for cultural sensitivity of political and military components at this level are high, since the basic objectives of an activity or operation will be formed here, and improper inclusion of certain factors and variables at this stage can revenge with a spiral of mistakes passed from top to down, from the strategic decision-maker to those with boots on the ground. Essential skills a leader should embrace here would be cultural self-awareness, strategic and cross-cultural communication skills and cultural competence-enriched with wide geostrategic imagination. Graen and Hui for instance, propose the following comprehensive leaders' training framework to achieve that:<sup>11</sup>

1. Transcultural skills development.
2. Third culture making skills.
3. Cross-cultural creative problem-solving skills.
4. Ethical skills.

Then, preparation for a specific operation will depend on a number of factors. At the strategic level, the political and military components need a wide range of geostrategic knowledge. Not only the global environments dynamics should be understood, along with the nature of contemporary threats, but also the specific regional situation of the area in which the operation will be conducted. It is also crucial to take into account the nature of threats in the future AOO,

---

<sup>11</sup> G. B. Graen, and Ch Hui. “Transcultural Global Leadership in the 21st Century: Challenges and Implications for Development.” *Advances in Global Leadership*, 1999, pp. 3-19.

Chart 1: Universal competences at the strategic level

|                            | Strategic level                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Competences</b>         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- cross-cultural competence</li> <li>- intercultural creativity and understanding of the complexity of cultural contexts and their role in shaping security landscape</li> <li>- the ability to create a common perspective enabling effective operation in a complex environment,</li> <li>- the ability of foreseeing long-term consequences of actions and established goals</li> <li>- the ability to use specific symbols, contexts, beliefs and more to create a sense of common group identity</li> <li>- the ability of communicating the above to a variety of audiences</li> </ul>                                                                         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| <b>Knowledge</b>           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- a comprehensive range of geostrategic knowledge</li> <li>- understanding of the general configuration of the global security environment and its dynamics and the nature of threats to international security</li> <li>- understanding the cultural aspects of the above phenomena and dependencies between political, strategic and security cultures</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| <b>Methods of training</b> | <b>Professional military education</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | <b>Staffs' and commands' training</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | <b>Cyclical training exercises</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|                            | At least 60 hours of specialized training during, for instance, courses preparing to the rank of a general. The advised training methods include lectures, seminars and discussions concerning general mechanisms of functioning of cultures (complimented with audiovisual materials and genuine sources), self-study of literature and books on cultural competence, strategic culture et. Al., including a variety of trans-media tasks. The theoretical preparation should be supplemented with general experimental methods, in particular those shaping cultural self-awareness and creative, visionary approach - in form of for instance decision-games or simulations. Mentoring highly advisable. | During the theoretical preparation, the same methods as in the corresponding stage of professional military education. During exercises without troops (CAS) and with troops, experimental methods of general cultural competence training, (simulations and decision games conducted both by means of computer programs and during direct learners' interactions). Focus on interagency synergy in planning of activities and understanding third-and fourth-order effects. | Experimental methods of training general cultural competence, such as simulations and decision games carried out both online and in immersive environments, and during direct interactions with the focus on cultural aspects of the environment and decision-making process. Strong feedback. |

Source: Trochowska, Kamila. *Soft Skills for Security and Defense: Cross-Cultural Competence and Beyond*. War Studies University: Warsaw, 2018, p. 94-95.

as it is the prerequisite to proper assessment of the kind and size of military force to be deployed. Profound analysis of political, strategic and security cultures at stake, along with socio-cultural dynamics is demanded at this level. One must also be able to predict second- and third-order effects of their actions in political, economic and social spheres for the region-and the whole global security environment. Moreover, the ability to predict and manage new potential social movements and phenomena that will result from those decisions is also demanded, as alternative lines of action can be prepared.

The above should enable the development of the following capabilities that an effective multinational ops leader should embrace in the socio-cultural domain once the institution-bound, specific training and development framework is applied.

The training methods and tools should be abundant and varied, and transmedia learning approach (that engages not only virtual training solutions and immersive environments but also the use of for instance social media and apps) should be integrated with face-to face training initiatives that include strong regional focus but are not limited to it. Also the active, out-of institution, social learning that happens outside the established training context is highly welcomed, and the role of the trainer will be to instill enough motivation for the trainees to engage in it. Rigorous assessment of their effectiveness and ethical dimension should be applied constantly, and the training should be refined and updated regularly.

Concerning the issue of measuring the effectiveness of first the influence of soft skills on overall effectiveness of activities in the security and defense realm, and secondly the efficiency of training and educational activities (in the cognitive, affective and behavioral domains of individuals and groups), there is an array of measuring methods and tools that facilitate both. There is a wide range of selection: from commercial self-assessment tools such as the Cultural Competence Self-assessment Awareness Checklist, psychometric tests already used in security and defense organizations that measure individual predispositions-such as 360-DegreeAssesment (used in the U S military), Raven's Progressive Matrixes, Eyseneck's Personality scale (EPQ), or Emotional Intelligence Scale, or a variety of assessment methods such as self-report measures, Situational Judgement Tests (SJTs), behavioral ratings, simulations or biodata-and in wider perspective neuroimaging.<sup>12</sup> Of course, there is a number of limitations and risks, both of the research itself and of the training-when it comes to methods, ethics, assessment and even effectiveness, but when meticulously handled, they can be properly mitigated.

## **Towards transcultural leadership**

Concerning leadership style as such, inclusive leadership that bases on interpersonal skills and understanding of the unique perspectives of each individual culture, knowledge and experience,<sup>13</sup> seems to be the most desired and effective one in a multinational setting. However,

---

12 Trochowska, Kamila, *Soft Skills for Security and Defense. Cross-Cultural Competence and Beyond* (Warsaw: War Studies University, 2018).

13 Yvonne R. Masakowski., *Inclusive Leadership and the Dynamics of Multinational Military Operations In Global and Culturally Diverse Leaders and Leadership: New Dimensions and Challenges for Business, Education and Society* (Emerald Publishing Limited, 2017), pp. 233-249.

the traits associated with an effective leadership-and even an inclusive, transformational one-are culturally negotiable as well. For instance, the most comprehensive to date study of leadership in 62 nations, the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) project found that while some leadership traits considered as desired (like decisive, positive, just and intelligent) were seen as universally positive, and other leadership traits (e.g., ruthless and egocentric) were seen as universally negative, a number of leadership traits (e.g., sincerity, evasiveness, cunningness, sensitivity, and enthusiasm) were indicative of effective leadership in some cultures but not others.<sup>14</sup> It is also the leadership concept itself that is culture-bound, beginning with the difference in attributing authority-that in some cultures is passed by birth and strongly gender-related; the question of what kind of relationship does the leader is expected to form with a given group (authoritarian or collaborative one, depending on the power distance); or the leadership effectiveness indicators that are also not universal at all.

During the course of further work, the GLOBE researchers analysed the data sets from 62 countries and defined the following global leadership styles that correspond to various cultural clusters.<sup>15</sup>

- Charismatic/Value-Based Leadership: Reflects the ability to inspire, motivate, and expect high performance outcomes from others based on firmly held core values. It includes the following six primary leadership dimensions: (a)visionary, (b)inspirational, (c)self-sacrifice, (d)integrity, (e)decisive and (f)performance oriented.
- Team-Oriented Leadership: Emphasizes effective team building and implementation of a common purpose or goal among team members. It includes the following five primary leadership dimensions: (a)collaborative team orientation, (b)team integrator, (c)diplomatic, (d)malevolent (reverse scored), and (e)administratively competent.
- Participative Leadership: Reflects the degree to which managers involve others in making and implementing decisions. It includes two primary leadership dimensions labeled (a) nonparticipative and (b)autocratic (both reverse scored).
- Humane-Oriented Leadership: Reflects supportive and considerate leadership and includes compassion and generosity. This leadership dimension includes two primary leadership dimensions labeled (a)modesty and (b)humane orientation.

---

14 Angela Febraro, pp. 3-6.

15 More details can be found on the project website, basic visualizations available at: <https://globeproject.com/results>. Full results of the 2014 study devoted specifically to strategic leadership can be found in: Robert House, et. al, *Strategic Leadership Across Cultures. GLOBE Study of CEO Leadership Behavior and Effectiveness in 24 Countries* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2014).

- Autonomous Leadership: Refers to independent and individualistic leadership attributes. It is measured by a single primary leadership dimension labeled autonomous leadership, consisting of individualistic, independence, autonomous, and unique attributes.
- Self-Protective Leadership: Focuses on ensuring the safety and security of the individual and group through status enhancement and face saving. It includes five primary leadership dimensions labeled (a)self-centered, (b)status conscious, (c)conflict inducer, (d)face saver, and (e)procedural.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, effective leaders recognize that choosing the right leadership style for a specific context, improves the likelihood of success. Typically though, most leaders use a primary style in their approach-with not only organizational and personal, but also strong cultural influences. The decoding of those influences and developing an adaptive, inclusive leadership approach seems to be the key to success in coping with the challenges posed by the highly complex and diverse human and organizational domain of multinational operations. The desired end-state here is to make a true asset of the diversity of organizational and national cultures engaged, so that it can become one of the enablers of collaborative mission success. This is possible since the sum of cultures engaged in a military operation creates an entity that is much more than merely a sum of several national elements-a synergy that demands a transcultural leadership.<sup>17</sup>

A very important insight into the issues of transcultural leadership, has been provided by Anne Perkins in “Global leadership study: A Theoretical Framework”.<sup>18</sup> Her model indicates three levels of global leadership study that rises from the issues of globalization and operationalizes cross-cultural leadership in more narrow terms and skills. She begins with the issues of globalization that most critically affect leadership, such as the extent to which a society was affected (and in most of the cases it is less than imagined due to the phenomenon of national entrenchment which is the consequence of seeking stability in the fast-changing environment powered by IT-and fundamentalisms would be one such extreme example). She also argues that social rules and core cultural codes remain relatively untouched despite the “cosmetic” adaptation to global trends and stresses the extent of how an individual can adapt and be culturally sensitive in order to not only identify and tolerate cultural differences,

---

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>17</sup> Gareis and Vom Hagen, “The Difficult Practice of Military Multinationality.....” qtd in Angela Febraro. “Leadership and Command” . Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors (RTO-TR-HFM-120). Ed. Angela R. Febraro, Brian McKee and Sharon L. Riedel. RTO/NATO, 2008, pp. 3-7.

<sup>18</sup> Anne Perkins, “Global Leadership Study: A Theoretical Framework,” *Journal of Leadership Education*, Vol.8, No. 2, 2009, pp. 72-87.

but to recognize cultural values and expectations of successful leadership.<sup>19</sup>

The second level of the framework rests upon concrete domains of culture that are culturally-influenced, among others: societal requirements for holding a leadership position; leader power, influence, and privileges; extent to which social position influences elevation to a leader role; expected and preferred patterns of leader behaviors or styles; and response of followers to various leader behaviors.<sup>20</sup> There are numerous theories that provide dimensions that make the adaptation of a leadership style easier. Apart from the classic-Hofstede that will be discussed further on, the Wren-Swaetz Model has a genuine potential to provide transcultural leader with a deep insight into the processes that shaped concrete cultural expectations since it illustrates how the process is shaped across the historical, contemporary and immediate, micro-organizational context.

### Strategic leadership in hybrid warfare-Ukraine case study

It has been agreed in numerous analyses that gray zone challenges and hybrid warfare will pose a problem in the foreseeable and unforeseeable future,<sup>21</sup> and the 2014 Russian aggression on Ukraine was a confirmation enough. But it is not only a regional perspective-the employment of hybrid warfare has been observed during Iran's activity in Syria; Russia's use of gas and lending instruments in the Ukrainian conflict; ISIL's activities in Syria and Iraq-to mention a few.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, general discussions about hybrid war have been primarily focused at the tactical and to a lesser degree at the operational level, not at the strategic level where hybrid war should also be considered. And cultural competence is the key to understanding hybrid warfare since it strongly bases on informational (narrative), social (influence) and psychological (gaining support) aspects of conflicts. It was observed in foreign sources before the Russian aggression on Ukraine in 2014-which is as of now the most studious example of waging “successful” hybrid war. One of the biggest challenges hybrid war presents is exploitation of the cognitive and moral domains, vice the physical domain that the security analyses traditionally concentrate on. Using an approach that concentrates on identity and meaning may also be beneficial in understanding

---

19 Ibidem, pp. 72-76.

20 P. W. Dorfman., Hanges, P. J., & Brodbeck, F. C. “Leadership and Cultural Variation: Identification of Culturally Endorsed Leadership Profiles”. In R. J. House, P. J. Hanges, M. Javidan, P. W. Dorfman & V. Gupta (Eds.), *Culture, leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004), pp. 669-719., qtd. in Anne Perkins. “Global Leadership Study...” Op. cit., p. 75.

21 Patrick Cullen, and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud. “Understanding Hybrid Warfare”, 2017, MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare Project, Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs.

22 Ibidem.

the hybrid rival and framing a theory of victory.<sup>23</sup>

Russia's use of hybrid strategies is not new. During the Soviet era, Moscow frequently made use of subversive “active measures” to gain influence and shape the political landscape in Europe. For example, Soviets funded “euro-communist” political parties, encouraged antinuclear protest movements, and sought to manipulate the European media. The Kremlin conducted these activities in conjunction with efforts to steal state secrets and buy influence through traditional forms of espionage. Soviet special forces also trained for activities similar to those of Russian special forces in hybrid warfare today.

As one of the researchers on the subject stressed, “if we are to use the concept of hybrid warfare, what is distinct about it, in my view, is that the belligerent manipulates or exploits local ethnic and nationalist grievances among members of some target state. Nationalism and ethnic identities are more modern phenomenon. In this vein, hybrid warfare is a product of modernity”.<sup>24</sup> Thus, cultural analysis and strategic cross-cultural competence will greatly enhance the countermeasures in case of encountering or being a proxy in such conflict, which was also underlined by Daniel Lasica, who considers the information-psychological element as the very basis of hybrid warfare, as he characterizes the hybrid warrior as someone who seeks to quickly convert their tactical success and their enemy's mistakes into strategic effects through deliberate exploitation of the cognitive and moral domains.<sup>25</sup> This “Deliberate exploitation of the cognitive and moral domain” is nothing else as the measures taken to gain influence and control over people's minds-regardless of what their hearts really desire. It is fairly easy with people with post-soviet ancestry who, as Svetlana Alexievich, a Nobel-winning researcher on the soviet mindset claims, for decades have been subjected to constant propaganda and terror that taught them not to even think anything else they are told, since they are too afraid someone might hear their independent thought and report it.<sup>26</sup>

Hybrid war tactics that Russia uses today, however, are not identical to those used during the Cold War. Even if Russia used information operations back then, the volume and ambition

---

23 Daniel Lasica, *Strategic Implications of Hybrid War: A Theory of Victory* (Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 2009).

24 Octavian Manea, “The Strategy of Hybrid Warfare,” *Small Wars Journal*, 2016. <<https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-strategy-of-hybrid-warfare>>.

25 Daniel Lasica, p. 3.

26 Svetlana Alexijevich, *Secondhand Time: The Last of the Soviets* (Original title: *Время сэконд хэнд: конец красного человека*) (Random House Trade, 2017).

of Russian information campaigns today are far greater and facilitated by the existence of the Internet, cable news, and especially social media. The use of cyber operations is also new, as is Russia's more extensive use of economic levers to influence foreign governments. Because Russia and the world are much more closely interlinked than during the Cold War, it is easier for Russia to penetrate Western societies. Russia's use of these tactics also appears to be less ideological than during the Cold War, when the Kremlin held a hidebound Marxist worldview. Russia's outlook today is less bound to any ideology, and Moscow may be shrewder as a result.<sup>27</sup>

The main characteristics of Russian hybrid warfare are the economic use of force, persistence and denial of the traditional war/peace binary and being strongly population-centric (influence is everything). Their toolkit includes, but is not limited to: information operations, cyber warfare in all shapes and sizes, employing all kinds of proxies from the civilian groups, economic influence and traditional clandestine measures-espionage and SOF employment in various regions of the world.

Russia's use of hybrid strategies is not new. During the Soviet era, Moscow frequently made use of subversive “active measures” to gain influence and shape the political landscape in Europe. For example, Soviets funded “euro-communist” political parties, encouraged antinuclear protest movements, and sought to manipulate the European media. The Kremlin conducted these activities in conjunction with efforts to steal state secrets and buy influence through traditional forms of espionage. Soviet special forces also trained for activities similar to those of Russian special forces in hybrid warfare today.

There are also several ironically “precious” lessons from the Russian side as to strategic moves and leadership:<sup>28</sup>

- *Get some chess training-think strategically, be not only few moves ahead but already there (and be more like Magnus Carlsen rather than Caruana. You can always do some clothing marketing if you lose).*
- *Prepare the ground well, check with international regulations how far you can go without being punished. It is possible to occupy territories just at the NATO and EU borders, and get away only with some economic sanctions. Any military response can be then considered*

---

27 Christopher Chivis., “Understanding Russian Hybrid Warfare and What Can Be Done About It,” 2017/5/11, Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee. <<https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT468.html>>.

28 The list provides an ironic, satirical take on Russian strategies and methods of operation in the conflict, own elaboration.

*an act of open aggression. And nobody wants a war with Russia, do they? If they do, wave the nuclear weapons against their nose.*

- *Exploit existing vulnerabilities, synchronize political measures with economic ones (like gas deal blackmail), weakening social influences (see Crimea and Donbass, create socio-cultural unrest/separatism if necessary) and military degeneration of the target country (be sure the army is in hopeless condition like the Ukrainian one was upon the end of, contribute to the deterioration of military potentials just in case).*
- *Keep a straight face and widely appealing image at all times. Give some really sensible interviews to Oliver Stone.*<sup>29</sup>
- *See what your support basis is-nationals, your ethnic minorities, people with common mindset-analyze which parts of common past you should refer to. The glorious times once You were an empire will be just about fine, who would not like to be one again? Revisited historical threats always do the trick, either say they are terrorists or Nazis, it always works.*<sup>30</sup>
- *Don't forget the mainstream population-have some neat information campaigns ready for them. Apply liberally and constantly. Use television and newspapers for the older generation, social media and movies for the youth.*
- *Act sensibly to keep away the possible retaliation from international organizations through being militarily strong enough and always ready for economic/military/legal blackmail. The power of dressing up and covert ops has been working since the Trojan War, and will work now as well. Why not trying to strip your soldiers from insignia and send them over to fight? Maybe a humanitarian aid convoy with guns in? How about some military training right around the boarder-you can always tell the boys do not know their craft yet so they accidentally hit that block post.*
- *Get the popular support by all means, including heavy artillery and information operations. Get rid of any unfavorable TV stations and journalists. Mobilize the remaining media according to the soviet rules that did work for 70 years and nobody can deny they were successful. In the post-truth and the information overload world, there must be one clear, unified voice. Yours.*
- *Once the population is leaning towards you, seize the moment. Train militarily whatever can be trained, offer great perspectives and no support in gaining them to the rest. People*

---

29 "The Putin Interviews," *A series of interviews Oliver Stone did with Vladimir Putin in the years 2015-2017, later turned into a four-series documentary. Showtime, 2017.* <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QvIKSbYkTXI>>.

30 A DPR fighter in and interview for Al Jazeera English Youtube Channel. "Ukraine: Pro-Russian separatists 'fighting to defend culture' ", 2017/2/13. <[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxUWInux\\_AQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxUWInux_AQ)>.

*who have to strive for survival, for a loaf of bread even, are easier to manipulate. Blame the horrific security situation and humanitarian crisis on the Ukrainian military that wants to clear the terrain of the people who don't like them. They are the ones that shoot. We are simply defending, right? Right.*

- After some time, let go a little bit. You have the territories destabilized enough for the denial of access from any sensible international organization. Keep it that way by minimal application of force, effort and resources (“frozen” conflict is an always fresh idea). Keep it long that way.*
- Since You are hands-free with the low-intensity conflict continuing, go global. Feel free to mess up elections, “combat terrorism” in Syria (how can they speak bad about you if you are fighting terrorism?!), influence whoever possible, wherever possible, from some little village in Ethiopia to Washington.*
- Escalate from time to time, capture some ships, and say it is in self-defense. Blame the illegal bridge and the whole diplomatic scandal on the brink of war on the upcoming presidential election in your opponents' country.<sup>31</sup>*

Recommendations on countering such threat, even if it will be not waged directly against one of the member-states - and by definition, it will never be, include:

- Strong coordination and cooperation between allies that demands good internal skills of good interagency cooperation (great strategic communication, synchronization between various components of the security architecture one functions in, beginning with functional domestic interagency cooperation).
- Support for security sector reform in countries that are threatened so they are strong enough to counter it themselves, including exchanges, DEEP, trainings, common exercises and so on. The skill here is to be able to adjust given measures to the specific security culture and situation, some can receive money, some military support, and some should be trained since the money will flow in the corruption drain.
- Counter-influence operations, good cooperation with structures such as EU Stratcom Task Force and civilian organizations, such as InformNapalm,<sup>32</sup> Canadian-funded Prometheus project<sup>33</sup> or StopFake.org.<sup>34</sup> New media literacy might help here in understanding who, in given security landscape has a voice in this area, who is listened to. Identify and create

---

<sup>31</sup> Own elaboration.

<sup>32</sup> InformNapalm official website, 2018/11/23, <<https://informnapalm.org/en/>>.

<sup>33</sup> Prometheus official website, 2018/11/23, <<https://prometheus.ngo/>>.

<sup>34</sup> Stop Fake official website, 2018/11/23, <<https://www.stopfake.org/en/news/>>.

influencers in this area.

- Concerning analytical skills, hybrid warfare is designed to exploit national vulnerabilities across the political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructure (PMESII) spectrum therefore, it is vital to conduct a self-assessment of critical functions and vulnerabilities across all sectors, and maintain it regularly.
- However, of no less importance is the use of coordinated military, political, economic, civilian and informational (MPECI) instruments of power that extend far beyond the military realm. National efforts should enhance traditional threat assessment activity to include non-conventional political, economic, civil, international (PECI) tools and capabilities, and consider how these means of attack may be formed into a synchronized attack package tailored to the specific vulnerabilities of its target.
- The response should adhere to the nature of threat and be synchronized and systematic. National governments (commands) should establish and embed a process to lead and coordinate a national approach of self-assessment and threat analysis that is comprehensive and interagency. The same should be done at the international command level. Multinational frameworks-preferably using existing institutions and processes-should be developed to facilitate cooperation and collaboration across borders.<sup>35</sup>

### **The importance of strategic creativity**

A skill of strategic leaders that became evident during the Ukrainian Crisis and following War, was what we might call strategic imagination and creativity. In this case it was almost DIY type of creativity that has to be developed in a certain socio-cultural context. The war of 2014 caught the Ukrainian Army by surprise-even a couple months before Maidan nobody would suspect Russians of hostile intentions towards the country.<sup>36</sup> Plus, the post-soviet military culture and prevailing mindset that was promoted by the Russians deliberately to take all the responsibility from individual soldiers and commanders, somewhat dispersing it without aim in the “absence” of a more significant threat, did not improve the morale. The new power that has risen after the Revolution of Dignity, was left with a completely demobilized army. As gen. Turczynow, Deputy Minister of Defense claimed in 2014: “I went to one of the firing grounds and there was not a single artillery shot that would hit the target. They told me that it was the first time the soldiers would use real shells…… Conscript was to help generals build summer houses, there was no time for training”.<sup>37</sup> It was also the degeneration of military and organizational culture that resulted from insufficient economic support and lack of clear

---

<sup>35</sup> Patrick Cullen and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, pp. 23-26.

<sup>36</sup> Informal interviews performed by the Author for the upcoming project on war zone narratives.

strategic vision of Ukraine's future (NATO? Russia? Own direction?) that left the country with almost no significant military potential that would deter the attack.

However, what was available after Maidan, was engagement, high combat morale, popular support and an “army of volunteers” that formed itself network-centric like. Of course, it was not an entirely spontaneous armed flash mob, the core of it was the National Guard formed in March 2014 of volunteers and former armed formations of the Ministry of Interior. Of course, it was also the missing equipment-from sanitary materials to bulletproof vests that was gathered by the volunteers, their families and general civilian support. And it was not only voluntary units like the famous Donbass, Ajdar or Dnipro Battalions that were later integrated into official security structures that proved high operational effectiveness and popular acclaim. It was the effort of majority of the population that included formation of material support volunteer groups that passed home-made preserves to the frontlines. All that was glorified in media and Ukrainian popular culture,<sup>38</sup> and contrary to mixed feelings about the government, the battalions and popular movement were highly esteemed. Also because the culture of social deed remained-be it the eager and believing volunteers that went to frontlines in 1941 or families that would give their last money to war effort, the social deeds that were organized by various social entities-from kindergarten groups to student volunteers that wanted to go to the Chernobyl zone to help with the 1986 catastrophe……

The strategic creativity in this case came after the active phase of war, and it manifested itself in integrating those organizations in the defense system. As of 2019, there are tens of volunteer organizations working independently but with coordination with the military. They take over tasks that the ministry needs support with, and their functions span from providing moral (concerts, shows) and material support directly to the war zones (food, manuals, clothes, military equipment), through organizing workshops in schools at which for instance masking elements are done by pupils, to providing medical aid by volunteer doctors.<sup>39</sup> The ability to identify, support and integrate such initiatives and groups in common defense effort is one of the key skills one must have, in particular in VUCA environment. This renders the one's population

---

37 Piotr Pogorzelski, *Ukraine. Unusual People, Unusual Times. (Ukraina: niezwykli ludzie w niezwykłych czasach)* (Gliwice: Helion, 2015), p. 207.

38 Movies such as “Cyborgs” the documentary, Breaking point: the war for democracy in Ukraine, <http://www.breakingpointfilm.com/>, or music Yarmak, “Get up,” 2015/4/17, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gPiTihFQp3U>>.

39 Informal interview with col. Serhii Sviderok of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for the upcoming project on war zone narratives.

and asset-and not yet another problem, as it sometimes happen. This support must be maintained, therefore culturally adjusted influence and new media literacy are a must.

In particular that it is also the information domain of the hybrid war that benefited from volunteer activism and hacktivism. First of all, many social informational resistance groups and amateur investigative journalist ones were created to raise social awareness in the information domain, such as:

- InformNapalm, an international volunteer intelligence community that focuses on SOCMINT (but not exclusively) that was created as the response to the 2014 aggression, and continues providing analyses and news on the war. It was started by journalist Roman Burko (Ukraine) and military expert Irakli Komaxidze (Georgia), and as of 2019 it unites the efforts of more than 30 volunteers from over 10 countries, providing investigations in more than 20 languages.<sup>40</sup>
- The “Information Resistance” project that “aims to counteract external threats to the informational space of Ukraine in the main areas of military, economic, and energy, as well as the sphere of informational security” by the Center for Military and Political Studies NGO located in Kyiv. IR was launched on March 2, 2014.<sup>41</sup>
- Stopfake fact checking site created also on March 2, 2014 (Day of the annexation of the Crimea by the Kyiv Mohyla Journalism School lecturers, graduates and students along with the KMA Digital Future of Journalism). Initially the goal of the project was to verify and refute disinformation and propaganda about events in Ukraine being circulated in the media, but the project grew into an information hub where we examine international aspects of Kremlin propaganda. It is available in 11 languages.<sup>42</sup>

They are an acclaimed and socially trusted supplement to international activities in the field, one of which will definitely be the EU's East Stratcom Task Force set up to address Russia's ongoing disinformation campaigns in 2015.<sup>43</sup>

And, since state cyber security system is still under construction, and no INFO OPS doctrine has been completed, the volunteers again constitute a capstone part of the structure. In direct

---

40 InformNapalm official website, 2019/1/17, <<https://informnapalm.org/en/>>.

41 The Information Resistance official website, 2019/1/17, <<http://sprotyv.info/en/>>.

42 The Stop Fake official website, 2019/1/17, <<https://www.stopfake.org/en/about-us/>>.

43 The European External Action Service's East Stratcom Task Force official website, 2019/1/17, <<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/>>.

response to the Russian cyberthreat in recent years, Ukrainian institutions have developed special cybersecurity units. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) has an in-house team; the Interior Ministry and National Police created the Cyberpolice force; there is a Center for Cyberprotection within the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection. All of Ukraine's cybersecurity initiatives is the National Security and Defense Council (RNBO), which opened a new cyber-focused center for doing so only in mid-2018, four years after the invasion. The Defense Ministry has been slower to react and as of 2019 there is not yet a military cyber defense system, but they are currently discussing the creation of cyberunits for military purposes and cyberdefense, according to Dmytro Shymkiv, the deputy head of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, Ukrainian volunteer cyber operations are not only directed against RF, but also include some red teaming. For instance, the hacktivist Ukrainian Cyber Alliance (Український кіберальянс) found around 200 vulnerabilities not only in the governmental cyber infrastructure, but also in critical objects such as Energoatom, the state nuclear-power-plant operator, where they found vulnerabilities that would easily allow hackers to enter the energy system of one of its facilities.<sup>45</sup>

The repertoire of Russia's cyber warfare is rich indeed, from trolls through cyber mercenaries to meddling in the 2016 US elections and Cyber Berkut (КиберБеркут),<sup>46</sup> pro-Russian hacktivist group merged after the dissolution of special police force “Berkut” which had become notorious for its violent repression used during the EuroMaidan demonstrations, is the tip of the iceberg. The group uses a variety of techniques to reach its goals, from DoS attacks to spreading fake news, leaks and analyses. There is also some strategic continuity in the narrative used-kind of KGB school of persuasion and argumentation that used to work for decades. An example of that might be Vladimir Putin's response to accusations of interference in the US elections “Do You believe that Russia, thousands miles away, with help of two or three people, would interfere in the election? Nonsense!”.<sup>47</sup> However, it is the Ukraine that remains currently the biggest cyberwar testing ground, or as Wired described it “a laboratory for perfecting new forms of global online combat”.<sup>48</sup>

---

44 Christopher Miller., “What's Ukraine Doing To Combat Russian Cyberwarfare? Not Enough” , Radio Free Europe, 2018/3/7, <<https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-struggles-cyberdefense-russia-expands-testing-ground/29085277.html>>.

45 Ibidem.

46 Cyber Berkut official website, 2019/1/22, < <https://cyber-berkut.org/en/>>.

47 Megyn Kelly's interview with Vladimir Putin, 2019/1/22, <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0feDvVEz3Qc>>, more on the election investigation in <<http://time.com/5340060/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-summit-russia-meddling/>>.

Also, in the context of hybrid warfare, it is worth to investigate the strategic corporal idea,<sup>49</sup> since in this case it is not the military person only that can have strategic effect but practically anybody from either side. Because of the global connectivity that social network media provide, the actors are no longer only direct participants to the conflict, but they can be whoever, civilians and activists alike. As Thomas Nissen further claims, this is also why terms like “remote warfare” and “social warfare” play an increasing role in contemporary conflicts, where social network media is now used for military activities, such as intelligence collection, targeting, psychological warfare, offensive and defensive cyber ops and 3C activities.<sup>50</sup> It is enforced by the omnipresence, foolproofness and the ease to reach global audiences through social media—anybody equipped with a computer connected device can become the global influencer, also in the security realm, and in contrast to the information operations of the INO RMA era and classic cyber warfare, they do not demand any IT skills whatsoever.

It is important for our considerations since the strategic use of social media not only empower a multitude of actors, but also have a re-distributive effect on international power relations, and re-shapes the character of contemporary conflicts. It is crucial to acknowledge their game-changing properties in contemporary conflicts and understand that due to their ability to render strategic effects, they become an instrument of power not only in the hands of non-state actors, but states as well.<sup>51</sup>

## Reservations and conclusions

Concerning basic reservations, the findings of Hofstede and The GLOBE Study discussed by Perkins also demonstrated the discrepancies between Western leadership theories and non-Western leadership practices. And supported the presence of a Western, especially American, bias in contemporary theories that is ill-suited to most cross-cultural interaction.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, the article postulates that the basic premises of Western leadership theories might be a factor that renders them of limited effectiveness in mixed, non-western settings.

---

48 Andy Greenberg, “How an Entire Nation Became Russia's Test Lab for Cyberwar,” *Wired*, 2017/11/6, <<https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/>>.

49 Rye Barcott, “The Strategic Corporal,” *Harvard Business Review*, October 2010. <<https://hbr.org/2010/10/the-strategic-corporal.html>>.

50 Thomas Nissen., #*The weaponization of social media. @Characteristics of contemporary conflicts* (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2015), p. 9.

51 Ibidem.

52 Anne Perkins, pp. 73-74. [www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/](https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/).

Chart 2: Limitations of western leadership theories

| Premise                  | Justification                                                                                 | Limitation                                                                                                            |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Leader-centered          | The leader is central to the theory                                                           | Does not work well in countries with lower power distance                                                             |
| Male-dominated           | Gender perspective is rather limited to the male leader                                       | The prevalence of masculine ideas and traits on leadership with limited efficacy in higher femininity index countries |
| Universal traits         | Some traits are believed to be universal, like integrity, character, ethics                   | Those ideas are strongly culturally-bound                                                                             |
| Relationship balance     | Behavioural and contingency theories inform Western thoughts on the most effective leadership | Authority, direction, task and results are not necessarily of priority when assessing leaders' performance            |
| Quantifiable performance | Focus on quantifiable performance and outcomes                                                | Not always the best indicator, sometimes it is loyalty over follower performance                                      |
| Individualistic          | Visible primacy of an individual                                                              | Useless in collective countries                                                                                       |

Source: Anne Perkins, "Global Leadership Study: A Theoretical Framework," *Journal of Leadership Education*, Vol.8, No. 2, 2009, pp. 73-74.

Application of the above guidelines and reservations will strongly improve the leader's ability to apply the adaptive and flexible approach characteristic of inclusive, transcultural leadership that addresses best the demands of the complex security environment we are and will be functioning in the future.

To conclude, it has been agreed in numerous analyses that gray zone challenges and hybrid warfare will pose a major security problem in the foreseeable and unforeseeable future. Since they base on the exploitation of the informational and cognitive domains, it is the non-kinetic aspect of conflicts and corresponding soft skills that present and future leaders will need to cope with the growing complexity of the security landscape. Soft skills such as social competencies, cooperation, communication, empathy, trust-building abilities, open-mindedness, cross-cultural competence or gender awareness-strongly facilitate coordination, performance and relationship building in an environment of organizational, gender and cultural diversity that is typical of today's security and defense organizations. But those skills are very often improvised rather than meticulously trained, developed and attested within an integrated, holistic system together with the classically understood professional operational and leadership skills. The desired end-state here, is to make a true asset of the diversity of organizational and national cultures engaged. This is possible since the sum of cultures engaged in managing a gray zone challenge, creates an entity that is much more than merely a sum of several separate national elements - a synergy that demands a transcultural leadership. Only in this way we can make this diversity that is now seen as a challenge, a true asset that will work on our behalf in a long-time perspective.

## Bibliography

- Alexijevich, Svetlana, 2017. *Secondhand Tme: The Last of the Soviets* (Original title: *Время сэконд хэнд: конец красного человека*). Random House Trade.
- Ferguson, James, 2001. *The Role of Culture in International Relations. Advanced International Relations and Advanced Global Politics 2*. Queensland, Australia: The Department of International Relations, SHSS, Bond University, <<http://www.international-relations.com/wbadvir/wbadvir4.htm>>
- Gallus, Jessica et. al., 2014. *Cross-Cultural competence in the Department of Defense: An Annotated Bibliography*. Ft Belvoir: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
- House, Robert et. al., 2014. *Strategic Leadership Across Cultures. GLOBE Study of CEO Leadership Behavior and Effectiveness in 24 Countries*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Lantis, Jeffrey, 2006. "Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism," in Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, *Contract No: DTRA01-03-D-0017, Technical Instruction*. Washington: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office.
- Lasica, Daniel, 2009. *Strategic Implications of Hybrid War: A Theory of Victory*. Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth.
- Masakowski, Yvonne R., 2017. *Inclusive Leadership and the Dynamics of Multinational Military Operations*. In *Global and Culturally Diverse Leaders and Leadership: New Dimensions and Challenges for Business, Education and Society*. Emerald Publishing Limited.
- Nissen, Thomas, 2015. *#The weaponization of social media. @Characteristics of contemporary conflicts*. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College.
- Parmentola, John, 2010. *Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies*. Carlisle: US Army War College SSI.
- Pogorzelski, Piotr, 2015. *Ukraine. Unusual people, unusual times. (Ukraina: niezwykle ludzie w niezwykle czasach)*. Gliwice: Helion.
- Trochowska, Kamila., 2018. *Soft Skills for Security and Defense. Cross-Cultural Competence and Beyond*. Warsaw: War Studies University.
- Graen, G. B., and Ch Hui, 1999. "Transcultural Global Leadership in the 21st Century: Challenges and Implications for Development." *Advances in global leadership*.
- Greenberg, Andy, 2017/11/06. "How An Entire Nation Became Russia's Test Lab for Cyberwar" . *Wired*. <<https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/>>.
- Manea, Octavian, 2016/02/06. "The Strategy of Hybrid Warfare," *Small Wars Journal*. <<https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-strategy-of-hybrid-warfare>>.
- Perkins, Anne, 2009. "Global Leadership Study: A Theoretical Framework," *Journal of*

*Leadership Education*, Vol.8, No.2, pp. 72-87.

Cullen, Patrick and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2017. *Understanding Hybrid Warfare*. MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare Project, Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs.

Febraro, Angela, 2008. “Leadership and Command,” *Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors* (RTO-TR-HFM-120). Ed. Angela R. Febraro, Brian McKee and Sharon L. Riedel. RTO/NATO, p. 3.

Smith, Roisin, Anne Holohan and Kamila Trochowska, 2017. *Final Report on Knowledge, Current Practice, Gender and Cultural Competency, SOTA*, Gap Analysis and Roadmap of Key Actions to Advance SOTA, II. <[https://gap-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/D2.2\\_Knowledge\\_Current\\_practice\\_Gender\\_and\\_Cultural\\_Competency.pdf](https://gap-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/D2.2_Knowledge_Current_practice_Gender_and_Cultural_Competency.pdf)>.

US Special Operations Command, 2017/09/15. *The Gray Zone*. White Paper, pp. 3-4.

Barcott, Rye, 2010/10/21. “The Strategic Corporal,” *Harvard Business Review*, October 2010. <<https://hbr.org/2010/10/the-strategic-corporal.html>>.

Chivis, Christopher, 2017/5/11. *Understanding Russian hybrid warfare and what can be done about it*. Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee on March 22, 2017. <<https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT468.html>>.

Miller, Christopher, 2018/3/7. “What's Ukraine Doing To Combat Russian Cyberwarfare? ‘Not Enough’ ” Radio Free Europe. <<https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-struggles-cyberdefense-russia-expands-testing-ground/29085277.html>>.

2017/2/13, A DPR fighter in and interview for Al Jazeera English Youtube Channel. “Ukraine: Pro-Russian separatists 'fighting to defend culture” <[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxUWInux\\_AQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxUWInux_AQ)>.

2018/03/10, Megyn Kelly's Interview with Vladimir Putin <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0feDvVEz3Qc>>.

2018/5/10, “The Putin Interviews”. A Series of Interviews Oliver Stone did with Vladimir Putin in the Years 2015-2017, later turned into a four-series documentary. Showtime, 2017. <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QvIKSbYkTXI>>

2018/11/23, InformNapalm official website, <<https://informnapalm.org/en/>>.

2018/11/23, Prometheus official website, <<https://prometheus.ngo/>>.

2018/11/23, Stop Fake official website, <<https://www.stopfake.org/en/news/>>.

2019/01/17, The European External Action Service's East Stratcom Task Force official website <<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/>>.

2019/01/17, The Information Resistance official website <<http://sprotyv.info/en>>.

2019/01/17, The Stop Fake official website <<https://www.stopfake.org/en/about-us/>>.

## About the Author

Dr. Kamila Trochowska is an Associate Professor at the State Security Institute of the War Studies University in Warsaw. She is currently the director of the Polish share of the EU's Horizon 2020 Gaming for Peace Project, the creator and director of the Cross-Cultural Competence for CSDP Missions and Operations course for the European Security and Defense College and the Operationalization of Culture for HUMINT course for the Polish Armed Forces. Dr. Trochowska realized seven research projects on operationalization of culture for the military, security culture and anthropology of cybersecurity for the Ministry of Defense and National Science Center, and currently works on one on cognitive science applications for security and defense.

Since 2011 she has been a member of national and international research teams at the Polish National Security Bureau, Individual Training and Education Developments NATO Training Group, NATO ACT Innovation Hub, NATO DEEP, NATO STO, the European Security and Defence College, Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Polish Armed Forces, German Armed Forces, Armed Forces of Ukraine, Kyoto University, National Defense University of Taiwan, World in Conversation Center of the Penn State University, Swedish National Defense University and Polish ADL Labs, among others. As her scientific background is rooted in both cultural anthropology (M.A.) and security studies (Ph.D. on Operationalization of culture in contemporary military operations), Dr. Trochowska performed interdisciplinary field research at the Lakota Standing Rock Reservation in South Dakota, United States (2008), Palestinian Yarmouk Refugee Camp in Damascus, Syria (2010), Turkish police and military institutions (2011), American military institutions - US Army War College and US Central Command (2012) and Joint Special Operations University, USAWC, West Point, NATO ACT and US Naval War College (2015), and Ukraine (since 2016) on cultural aspects of security and defense.

She is the author of numerous scientific publications in the field of cultural aspects of contemporary security environment and cross-cultural competence training for the military and civilian defense organizations. Her research interests include cultural dimensions of national and international security, cross-cultural competence for security and defense, security culture, anthropology of cybersecurity, soft skills in military training and cultural neuroscience.

After hours she is a proud mom of three, a backpacker and a huge fan of professor Robert Sapolsky.

★★★★

