

強化美日軍事合作支持印太戰略

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摘 要

日、美兩國順利實現印度—亞洲太平洋戰略願景之關鍵繫於美日安全同盟 (Japan-America Security Alliance, JASA) 實力之強弱。本文探究美日同盟強項所在與重大挑戰，提出下列三項建議以強化美日安全同盟軍事力量：美日安全同盟與日本自衛隊 (JSDF) 之間指揮管制 (C²)、建立同盟海上特遣兵力 (combined maritime task forces)、藉美國退出美俄中程核武條約 (Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty) 之機會，擴大推動飛彈防禦；繼而針對反制中共政治作戰詆毀日本自衛隊改革與提高大眾支持提出建議。

一個「自由而開放的印度—太平洋」區域

「自由而開放」的印度—亞洲太平洋區域願景嚴格來說由日本首相安倍晉三 (Shinzo Abe) 首次提出，渠於2007年第一任期間，曾明確地闡明該項理念。¹ 惟囿於多項政治因素，該理念在安倍的首任期間未獲全面發展。一直到2017年11月，當美國總統川普 (D. J. Trump) 在亞太經濟合作會議企業領袖高峰會上，針對劇變的區域安全環境暢談美國版本下的宏觀作為時，² 此項說法再次出現，且顯得更具急迫性。當時川普總統強調任內區域政策的優先項目，包括公平而互惠的貿易、尊重法治原則、維護個人基本權利、保持海空航行自由權，特別是開放式公設航道等。

本文主張，我們現在所稱「自由開放的印度—太平洋」(FOIP) 的安全觀及其成敗關鍵繫於一個健全、果斷、軍力強大的美日安全同盟。而在印度—亞洲太平洋區域內，一些重視個人自由、共識治理、依法而治的民主政體，例如中華民國以及其他國家，特別依賴美日安全同盟，以遏阻鄰近專制政權。這些政權在治理和人權議題上造成顯著的負面威脅。

1 Russell Hsiao, "Backgrounder: A 'Free' and 'Open' Indo-Pacific and Taiwan," *Global Taiwan Brief* Vol. 3, Issue 18 (September 19, 2018), http://globaltaiwan.org/2018/09/vol-3-issue-18/?utm_source=Global+Taiwan+Updates&utm_campaign=813cab5c70-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_09_18_07_59&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d5a87749a5-813cab5c70-436750393&mc_cid=813cab5c70&mc_eid=22a4cf919a#WallaceGregson09192018. 基於「印度—太平洋區域」係日本、美國、中華民國及其他若干國家官方用語，而作者傾向於使用「印度—亞洲—太平洋區域」，用以指涉挑戰太平洋和印度洋地區的許多嚴肅的安全議題實則是以「亞洲」為舞台，故本文決定將「印度—太平洋區域」和「印度—亞洲—太平洋區域」兩組名詞於文內相互輪替使用，不另區分。

2 Russell Hsiao, "Backgrounder: A 'Free' and 'Open' Indo-Pacific and Taiwan," *Global Taiwan Brief*.

川普揭櫫其區域理念後，美國的盟邦、夥伴、競爭對手和對手最初並不清楚川普概念下的具體作為是什麼。這種疑慮難免，特別在歐巴馬團隊執政8年後，其所吹捧的「轉向亞洲」(Pivot to Asia)，後來更名為「再平衡」(Rebalance)，到頭來卻是一場空話。在過去數年間，川普政府已經承繼這個原本茫然無序的口號，且在若干戰略搭配下逐漸落實。2017年底，白宮公布川普政府就任後第一份「國家安全戰略」(NSS)文件，除了勾勒出未來的艱鉅任務，並針對如何落實「自由而開放」的印度—太平洋願景，揭櫫行動原則。³

「國家安全戰略」之後，五角大廈隨即頒布了「國防戰略」文件，接著是在2019會計年度的國防授權法案內，美軍最大規模的指揮部「美國太平洋司令部」更名為「美國印太司令部」。這項更名的意義溢於言表：亡羊補牢般地反映出美國強化區域作為的重要性。美國缺此作為則難以影響和確保從非洲東岸到美國西岸、從日本經過第一、第二島鏈直達澳洲的海洋佈局。⁴

我們必須要注意到此處「自由而開放」的概念，並非純然以防衛為導向的。針對上述概念，美國國務卿麥克·龐畢歐(M. Pompeo)於2018年7月在「印度—太平洋商業論壇」(Indo-Pacific Business Forum)上，給了最完整的說法，堪稱是「自由開放的印度—太平洋」戰略的依據。龐畢歐明確地指出：⁵

當我們說「自由」印度—太平洋時，它意味著我們全體都希望所有國家，也就是每一個國家，能捍衛他的主權不受來自其他國家的恫嚇。至於在國內層次上，「自由」意味著各國為其公民應享有基本權利和自由，提供完善治理及安全保證。

當我們說「開放」的印度—太平洋時，它意味著我們希望所有國家能享有海、空航道的使用權，也希望各國和平解決領土和海上紛爭，此乃國際和平以及各國達成人民賦予目標的關鍵所在。經濟上而言，「開放」就是指公平和互惠的貿易、開放的投資環境、國與國之間透明的協議簽署、及由更好的連結性所形成的區域關係—因為這些才是確保區域永續發展的途徑。

美國前國防部長馬提斯(J. Mattis)則是於2018年6月參加亞洲各國國防部官員會聚的

3 Wallace C. Gregson, "An American Perspective on Taiwan in the INDOPACOM Region," *Global Taiwan Brief*, Vol 3, Issue 18 (September 19, 2018), http://globaltaiwan.org/2018/09/vol-3-issue-18/?utm_source=Global+Taiwan+Updates&utm_campaign=813cab5c70-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_09_18_07_59&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d5a87749a5-813cab5c70-436750393&mc_cid=813cab5c70&mc_eid=22a4cf919a#WallaceGregson09192018.

4 Wallace C. Gregson, "An American Perspective on Taiwan in the INDOPACOM Region," *Global Taiwan Brief*.

5 Michael R. Pompeo, "Secretary of State Michael Pompeo's Remarks on 'America's Indo-Pacific Economic Vision'," (July 30, 2018), <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/284722.htm>.

年度香格里拉對話(Shangri-La Dialogue)時，進一步強化龐畢歐原來已甚周延的戰略觀。馬提斯力陳跨越傳統軍事和國防議題之必要性，主張在戰略發展應納入經濟議題、法治、治理透明度和公民社會等觀點。為落實以上芻議，馬提斯勾勒出需動用國家權力元素的多項努力方案。針對海域部分，馬提斯呼籲要提升關注，並強化行動，因為「海洋是全球資產，海上交通線是所有人類的經濟生命動脈」。⁶馬提斯同時還宣稱美國有意協助夥伴國家建構海上執法能力和能量，以改善海上疆界監督和海上利益保護，繼而提升各國之間作業的「相容性」（「相容性」概指整合軍事、法律、經濟活動之能力），以期更完善地支援人類的共同目標。

馬提斯另外還強調依法而治、公民社會、透明治理之概念，認為三者針對「威脅永續經濟發展的惡質因素」所投下一道曙光。⁷尤其值得注意的是，馬提斯呼籲改善財政機制以協助民間投資，主張美國政府所屬單位更加緊密地與區域經濟夥伴進行合作。以上所列的政府經營論述和接續行動，相較於過去8年所謂的空言「轉向」(Pivot)之說，明顯地反映出川普團隊更為嚴肅的意圖和動向。

美國不是在單邊主義條件或在權力真空狀態下推動印度—太平洋戰略，包括中華民國在內的若干美國盟邦和夥伴，也同樣地按此戰略而行，而且相關倡議路線行動更早於美國。該戰略在印度稱作「東向行動」(Act East)政策，南韓是「新南方政策」(New Southern Policy)，日本名之為「自由而開放」的印度—太平洋戰略，臺灣則有「新南向政策」。澳洲外交政策白皮書也揭櫫了類似目標與目的；⁸印尼也已試圖發展其印、太概念超過十年，並以「印度—太平洋條約」(Indo-Pacific Treaty)、「印度—太平洋區域架構」(Indo-Pacific regional architecture)、「印度—太平洋和平傘」(Indo-Pacific cooperation umbrella)等說詞出現。以上所有政策均嘗試在印度—太平洋區域內擴展國家關係，特別是與東南亞國協和其所屬國家建立管道，若再就其重疊處可以看出，各國政策皆聚焦於區域互動，期待以健全、自由、開放的體質整合成區域一體，確保主權完整，促進繁榮生機。

相對於以上廣泛、單邊的印度—太平洋戰略，日本約在十年前即已提出了四邊聯合的概念，主張聯合四個國家——日本、澳洲、印度和美國——共同致力於維繫海洋民主政體大國的重大共同利益。⁹日本這項四邊聯合的概念固然有意支持穩定和繁榮的願景，但是更確切而言，也是針對越來越具有威脅性、走上擴張路線、軍、經實力節節上升、兼具壓迫、法西斯、極權政治體質的中共而發。簡言之，憂慮中華人民共和國意圖

6 James Mattis, "Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue" (June 2, 2018), <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1538599/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-plenary-session-of-the-2018-shangri-la-dialogue/>.

7 James Mattis, "Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue,".

8 Allan Gyngell, "To Each Their Own 'Indo-Pacific,'" *East Asia Forum*, May 22, 2018, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/05/23/to-each-their-own-indo-pacific/#more-127635>.

9 Wallace Gregson, "An American Perspective on Taiwan in the INDOPACOM Region,".

和軍事能力，是以上所有提出印度—太平洋戰略的國家的內心動機。

美日安全同盟的優勢和挑戰

東北亞：難以搞定的鄰邦

檢視日本自衛隊的實力和因應任務之前，我們有必要先行檢視日本特殊的安全險境。此處借用美國芝加哥黑道的話術，日本是住在「很難搞定的社區」裡，其安全挑戰來自周遭近鄰。

日本最直接而立即的挑戰是中共，從任何客觀評量標準觀之，中共都屬於走擴張路線、恐嚇、極端民族主義、血腥鎮壓的極權國家。¹⁰ 中共飽和攻擊式的文宣更是時時提醒著日本，中共已是軍事和經濟的強權，隨時準備要針對日本1930～40年代的血腥帝國行徑採取報復行動。中共官方文宣喉舌也已公開宣稱有意取回日本所謂的「尖閣群島」（中華民國稱之「釣魚臺列嶼」，中共稱為「釣魚島」）和琉球（沖繩）群島。¹¹

日本的鄰邦還包括同屬極權政體的朝鮮人民民主共和國，或稱北韓。這是一個奴役型的國家，領導人違反人性的罪行經常出現於聯合國文件，¹² 北韓和日本的歷史宿怨尤深。此外還有兩個鄰邦「佔據」了日本宣稱擁有的土地和周邊水域：目前南韓握有竹島（Takashima）（南韓稱之「獨島」，北韓亦宣稱擁有該島主權）；俄國則是掌握千島群島（Kurile），後者原屬日本北方領土，二次大戰結束後由蘇軍進佔。

此外，俄羅斯、北韓和中共一樣，都是擁有核武的國家，能在數分鐘之內摧毀日本文明，反觀日本，本身既無核武反制力量，也無可靠的反飛彈防禦系統，以嚇阻當前的威脅。

中華民國的相對地位更是形成日本嚴重的挑戰，因為一旦中共佔據臺灣，將可能嚴重地削弱日本南側，日本整個領土的威脅倍增。臺灣出現「傾中」路線同樣也會導致日本經濟、心理和其他方面的嚴重損失。眾所皆知中共對臺構成威脅，中共以所謂的「中國夢」為名，全方位地推動政策，亟思於將臺灣納入口袋。中共在這場毫不手軟的對臺鬥爭中，無日不動用著經濟、資訊、政治、軍事作戰等顛覆和瓦解手段。此中尤以軍事工具最令人隱憂。中共領導人習近平已經要求解放軍要練就2020年前入侵暨攻佔臺灣之實力（本文付梓時距離已不到一年）。¹³ 最近一次的警告發自中共國防部長魏鳳和

10 Stein Ringen, "A Letter to Fellow China Analysts: Totalitarianism," September 19, 2018.

11 James E. Fanell and Kerry K. Gershaneck, "White Warships and Little Blue Men: The Looming 'Short, Sharp War' in the East China Sea over the Senkakus," *Project 2049 Institute Policy Paper* (Washington D.C.: Project 2049 Institute, April 2018), <https://project2049.net/2018/03/30/white-warships-and-little-blue-men-the-looming-short-sharp-war-in-the-east-china-sea-over-the-senkakus/>.

12 UNHRC, "Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," *United Nations Human Rights Council*, February 2014, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/coidprk/pages/commissioninquiryonhrindprk.aspx>.

13 "PRC 'Taiwan Invasion' Propaganda Backfires," *SinoInsider*, September 7, 2018, <https://sinoinsider.com/2018/09/geopolitics-watch-prc-taiwan-invasion-propaganda-backfires/>.

於2018年10月的發言，根據媒體轉述，渠強調任何涉及臺灣主權的挑戰可能引起中共動武，而這項說法向來是中共如影隨形的心理戰術，堪稱是實際動武的前奏。¹⁴

上述日本和美日同盟所承受的威脅，加上近期經濟重重的壓力，引起美國智庫戰略與國際研究中心（以下簡稱CSIS）的注意，並於2018年10月針對日本自衛隊提出報告，結論部分曾指出：¹⁵

鑒於中共、北韓和俄羅斯軍事能力逐步上升，且隨時展現著威懾行動，強化美日同盟的嚇阻能力和戰鬥效能實屬第一優先。進一步而言，這兩個分屬太平洋兩岸的國家若是國內政治支持度不高，美日同盟恐難以確保。因此，政治持續力必須是投注的焦點。再者，華府和東京的預算有限，同盟雙方都必須最有效地運用拮据的資源。

日本自衛隊強項

2018年CSIS的這份研究報告，首先勾勒日本自衛隊因應上述鄰邦挑戰的若干優勢所在。根據CSIS的報告，

近年來，美日同盟完成了新防衛大綱簽訂，建立同盟協作機制，合作開發出SM-3「第二階段A」型彈道飛彈攔截系統。日本重修國內安全法，已可動用集體自衛權，修繕保密條款，採取了更主動的全球交往戰略，同時在印度—太平洋區域更常扮演領導的角色，倡導「跨太平洋夥伴協定」（CPTPP）是其一例。相對於美國致力於再創亞洲均勢，爭取自由、開放的印度—太平洋區域，日美兩國領袖私誼甚篤是穩定兩國關係的助力。¹⁶

上述美日同盟力量之建構與維繫，居功者應為日本近數十年來最強勢的首相安倍晉三。安倍不同於過去的日本首相之處，在於安倍看清威脅所在，然後在其有限的政治運轉空間內，以具體的行動填補國家安全之罅隙。安倍任內兩度修訂「防衛計畫大綱」

14 “China Says Army Will Act ‘at Any Cost’ to Prevent Taiwan Split,” *Channel News Asia*, October 25, 2018, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiNk-qmg6TfAhUHvbwKHelBqgQFjADegQIBxAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.channelnewsasia.com%2Fnews%2Fasia%2Fchina-says-army-will-act--at-any-cost--to-prevent-taiwan-split-10862236&usg=AOvVaw3mHvflzW85hO-ffnIU4OD>.

15 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., “More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>.

16 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., “More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, pp. 1-2.

(National Defense Program Guidelines)，調整「美日合作防衛指針」(US-Japan Guidelines for Cooperative Defense)，通過「安全保障立法」(Legislation for Peace and Security)，¹⁷宣稱修改日本憲法第九條以確認日本自衛隊的身分定位。此外，安倍還著手於制定一紙全新的「中期防衛計畫」，期為高端戰場必要的防衛專案和武獲項目提供指導。¹⁸

話雖如此，美日同盟仍舊充滿著下列的挑戰。

美日同盟不足之處

儘管美日關係一片看好，在安全同盟以及日方防衛架構上，仍有若干揮之不去的缺陷，若處理不善，恐引發極具破壞性的後果。在介紹美日同盟缺失的論述架構之前，本文有必要特別指出2018年CSIS報告內陳述了一項立即威脅：軍力競爭者正逐漸縮小和美日同盟的相對差距。「尤其是中共」，該份CSIS報告指出，「已經進入迅速的軍事現代化軌道，開始從事於『灰色地帶』作戰，以致美、中軍事落差出現降低，迫使美日同盟必須重估嚇阻和擊潰犯敵之能力」。¹⁹

中共的挑戰堪稱是來勢洶洶，但是冀求有效的美日同盟之外，仍有內部結構問題仍待克服。首先，條理一致的日本國防戰略迄今未曾到位，自衛隊在資金、人力、通聯、準則、訓練、武器、裝備等方面也仍有重大缺陷。

百廢待舉的重大項目中，還包括日本本身意識到的憲法對國防武力的限制、仍未定案之日本自衛隊聯合作戰司令部、欠缺因應危機階段所亟需的美日聯合指揮架構（同盟的協調機制）以及在美軍和日本自衛隊之間，尚未發展出可靠的系統兼容性。²⁰

此外，美日同盟之下有必要擁有一支具有彈性、可供部署的聯合兵力部署於印度—亞洲太平洋區域。有必要強化「反介入／區域拒止」的作戰能力，否則恐難以降低本區域內極權政體隨時冒進之行為。

日本自衛隊的指揮管制(C²)存在議題

2018年CSIS的報告還提到一點，就是為了使美軍和日本自衛隊能夠圓滿在主要應變

17 Jiro Hanyu and Richard et al Armitage, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance to 2030: Power and Principle,” *Sasakawa Peace Foundation & Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 2016, 4, <https://www.csis.org/programs/japan-chair/us-japan-commission-future-alliance>.

18 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., “More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, pp. 3-4.

19 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., “More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, pp. 2-3.

20 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., “More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, pp. 7-8.

任務裡執行聯合作戰，美日現階段的指揮架構必須更新。²¹ 從美軍觀之，印太司令部的職掌項目勢必繁瑣，不僅要指揮日本境內和週邊戰鬥，還要維持和華府之間的關係，兼及兵力維繫，後勤補保支援，並與盟軍協調。

駐防於橫田空軍基地指揮部的駐日美軍固然設置一位司令官，且下轄司令部幕僚，但並非呈備戰狀態，無法和駐韓美軍相比。事實上，駐日美軍既未按戰鬥指揮部的標準訓練，編制員額也不足。進一步而言，駐日美軍按規定不能在日本周邊水域作戰，即使賦予任務，上述規定也限制美軍的作戰效能。CSIS報告有鑑於此，建議針對西太平洋區域的作戰任務需求，由日本和美國建置一支獨立的、屬於聯軍型態的美日聯合特遣隊，而非額外增加駐夏威夷的印太司令部的遠距責任。²²

以下簡稱CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force)的這支聯軍型式美日聯合特遣兵力，若成立後，應聚焦於區域內緊急應變任務，尤其是中共在臺灣、南海和東海的軍事冒進，兵力組成內容則必要和美國其他盟邦和夥伴國家協調。日本是聯合特遣部隊當然組成代表，但是其他國家武裝部隊，或聯絡官應成為聯合特遣部隊的基幹。由於到危機爆發期間再臨時成立聯合特遣部隊司令部往往捉襟見肘，必須是常設型的聯合特遣部隊司令部，並賦予定期訓練、演習的責任和預算，使其具備執行多元作戰的能力。無可否認的，駐日美軍的另一規劃選項是從「防衛日本本土」任務擴充為承擔更多的區域角色。儘管這一規劃選項可能引起日本和美國境內重大的政治動盪。

至於應變作戰執行成敗的關鍵，繫於計畫良窳和能否付諸迅速行動。如果美國和日本有意迅速回應敵人進犯，這支構想中的聯合特遣部隊（或是其他形式的新戰鬥協同機制）所依據的同盟防衛計畫，必須大規模地系統化和深度地演練。儘管我們目前已有若干同盟計畫在手，卻都是將就而成，性質上過度短線。根據CSIS的觀察，中共總是採用先造成「既定事實」(fait accompli)的戰術，看準那些決策較為緩慢的對手而佔盡便宜。²³ 換句話說，強化日本自衛隊決策速度乃是關鍵，重要性等同於前面所提到的研擬危機反應計畫和行動選項。各級指揮官必須具備迅速反應的能力，迅速反應與否，又繫於政治領導人針對某些作戰形式是否事先達成協同。特別要指出的是，其實這些都不是什麼新概念，在日本自衛隊的上下指揮關係之間，令人費解地未見著墨。聯合作戰計畫在美國的其他歐洲或亞洲盟軍間，恰是如臂使指般地自然。例如，美國和南韓軍隊為嚇阻和回應北韓升高危機的行為，聯手擬定作戰和反制挑釁的各種計畫。

21 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., "More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century," *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, pp. 7-8.

22 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., "More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century," *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, p. 7.

23 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., "More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century," *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, p. 8.

根據CSIS的這份報告，先期計畫和協同機制有助於制約中共冒進，特別是如果美軍捲入發生於「灰色地帶」的事故，包括還不致構成大型衝突層次的挑釁行為。²⁴ 只要計畫在手，無論是否跨越美日安保條約第五條所謂武裝攻擊底線，都能清楚地對任何侵犯行徑加以回應，此舉勢將刺激美日同盟的進一步合作。

與上述聯合指揮管制與計畫不足處直接相關聯的另一個組織罅隙，則是出現於日本政府組織內部，尤其是日本自衛隊，由於後者指揮管制組織力不足，導致計畫與執行欠缺彈性。直言之，日本現階段的指揮體系賦予日本自衛隊統合幕僚長的責任。

目前統合幕僚長身兼戰鬥指揮官和防衛首長，有必要將接受支援的戰鬥員角色，和屬於國家層次的防衛首長和武力供應（或支援）司令官角色加以切割，因為前者參與作戰，後二者則是建軍、訓練、裝備兵力、建構設施的指導人，統合幕僚長還需於危機期間為政治領導人提供建言。換句話說，日本國防部應該將日本自衛隊統合幕僚長部分作戰責任向下授與聯合軍種部隊指揮官。此舉有利於作戰指揮官全力投注於作戰事務，特別是出現大規模的危機應變事件時，可以強化日本軍力的作戰效能。²⁵

日本自衛隊的典範應是澳洲的「聯合作戰司令部」(Joint Operations Command)，聯合作戰由編階中將的司令官統轄。聯合作戰司令官負所有軍事作戰之責，兼顧兵力訓練暨戰備整備。若引進經過調適後的澳洲兵力組織模式，應可彌補日本特有的組織、立法、歷史、文化特殊性，有助於日軍各級指揮官和部隊，在未來作戰條件下，因應日復一日、快速節奏的戰備整備要求及壓力。我們寄望這套與駐韓聯合兵力結構類似的澳洲兵力模式，能夠經過整合，導入美日同盟。

由於中共正值對外大力推動政治戰，在日本境內激進分子的相應下，美日同盟有意改良上述缺陷時，任務誠屬艱鉅。本文下節將討論在改善美日同盟議題上，如何在日本境內爭取支持，並和中共與若干激進分子的政治戰相抗衡。

日本激進分子與中共的政治戰

根據CSIS的報告先前所述，「這兩個分屬太平洋兩岸的國家，若是國內政治支持度不高，美日同盟將難以確保。因此，政治持續力必須是關注焦點」，²⁶ 這也說明瓦解政治支持度的主要源頭是中共及其同路人，作法則是透過所謂的「政治戰」。

安倍首相全力推動的日本自衛隊地位正常化時就面臨一場大型政治戰。在日本，有

24 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., "More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century," *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, p. 2.

25 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., "More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century," *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, p. 8.

26 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., "More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century," *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, p. 6.

一批人數極少卻極具影響力的激進分子，總是樂見一個羸弱而中立的日本，而支持這批分子且從中受益的周邊國家，則又非中共、北韓和俄羅斯等具有敵意的鄰國獨裁政權莫屬。²⁷ 至於中共的政治戰在其「三戰」的準則指導下，達成分化對手目標的效果，更可說是獨樹一幟。

就質疑國防改革必要性的日本人當中，的確是有純粹抱持和平主義者，但是製造一些歇斯底里場面的，總是那批政治偏激分子。²⁸ 在後者的世界觀裡，安倍當前作為撕毀了日本「和平主義」的傳統，朝法西斯路線傾斜和區域掠奪與征服。問題是：日本政府 and 這批激進分子都不算和平主義者。

因為日本已成為一個愛好和平的民族。在那段狂暴屠殺行徑的邪惡歲月之後，日本於美軍佔領期間推動民主改革，迄今73年來未嘗對外捲入戰爭，該國於國際援助、對外直接投資暨人道行動方面搖身一變成為楷模。更確切而言，1945年之後日本和平主義，是日本政府道德立場下的稀有組合物，其和平主義受惠於雄厚的國防機制，該機制又依賴美軍來抵銷任何可能威脅日本的外力。

但是儘管有一紙「和平憲法」，日本仍在1950年北韓入侵南韓時，迅速建立起自己的軍力，並在聯合國要求下，派出掃雷部隊支援作戰。換句話說，日本自衛隊從建軍初期起，就已經是世界各國眼中所瞭解的日本軍隊，即使「自衛隊」一詞意涵受制於多個版本的詮釋（有時是極度狹義的）。韓戰期間，日本共產黨和其他政治激進分子對於日本支持聯合國出兵，遏阻北韓—中共—蘇聯聯手南侵表達抗議，當渠等抗議日本政府支持南韓，遏止世界史上最具壓迫、屠殺紀錄的國家入侵時，其抗議行為在整個冷戰和後冷戰期間已難逃歷史的定位。正是這批激進份子攻訐且削弱了自由民主政體，竟也支持共產主義暴政集團。²⁹ 他們總是控訴民主政治正走向軍國主義與法西斯侵略，卻忽略（或辯護）來自共產獨裁者們的超級民族主義與法西斯侵略。

任何民主政體都需要理性的辯論，但是偽和平主義者的攻訐直接指向日本遲遲未行的國防改革，是一場不折不扣的政治戰，目的是支持中共更大的區域圖謀，甚至可以說是全球霸權。誠如克勞塞維茲所言，如果「戰爭是政治透過其他手段之延續」，則中共的政治戰是「武裝鬥爭透過其他手段之延續」也並不過分。茲將政治戰的定義補述如下：「凡在有利於中共國家目標下，試圖影響國外政府、組織、集團與個人的情緒、動機、目標、推理和行為之各項行動」。

中共版本的政治戰是全方位的，也超越傳統外事聯絡工作（透過「統一戰線」形式建立聯盟，以支持中共進而瓦解對手）或所謂「三戰」（屬於戰略層次的心理戰、明暗

27 Kerry K. Gershaneck, "‘Faux Pacifists’ Imperil Japan While Empowering China," *Asia Times*, June 10, 2018, <http://www.atimes.com/article/faux-pacifists-imperil-japan-while-empowering-china/>.

28 Kerry K. Gershaneck, "‘Faux Pacifists’ Imperil Japan While Empowering China," *Asia Times*.

29 Kerry K. Gershaneck, "Taiwan's Future Depends on the Japan-America Security Alliance," *The National Interest*, June 7, 2018, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/taiwans-future-depends-the-japan-america-security-alliance-26167?page=show>.

兼具的輿論戰、「法律戰」)的一種總體戰(Total War),內容包括暴力手段以及其他形式的攻擊和破壞。中共已經成功地在日本利用反國防事務、反軍方的各種組織以阻撓軍事改革,甚至一度癱瘓沖繩島上陸戰隊基地的設施遷移工作。³⁰

中共政治戰模式根基穩固,具可測性,且是一種毫無掩飾的虛偽行徑。循激進路線的新聞媒體和反軍方團體,總是挑剔日本政府強化國防武力的任何舉措,但對於中共大規模建軍,非法佔據仍有爭議的島嶼,以及摧毀南海,建立大型海空基地,威脅亞洲和大洋洲生態恐怖主義行為等,反倒是隻字不提。另一個例子則是針對日本政府近期成立一支自衛隊小型兩棲旅議題,激進分子預謀地爆發了一齣情緒狂亂的戲碼。事實上,為奪回敵軍佔據的某座小島,這支兩棲旅約僅能投入600員兵力:600員兵力這個數字,較東京山手線尖峰時間一列地鐵的總人數還少。相對而言,中共刻正籌設規模10萬員額的陸戰隊。但是,這批偽和平主義者對於一股儼然成形的區域威脅,卻是三緘其口。

反而是下列暴力行為證實了偽和平主義者的稱呼,甚至已將純屬偽善的行徑推向另一層次,等同恐怖攻擊行動的身體侵略和劇烈的軍事破壞。激進分子為強化其反軍方訴求,曾粗暴地攻擊軍營設施附近的女性、校童和聘僱人員;曾以迫擊砲襲擊成田機場的自衛隊和美軍基地;製造墜機事件;於軍事設施安裝詭雷以及暗中破壞軍事設施和其他設備,也曾封鎖軍事設施進出口,阻礙應變基地發揮必要功能。³¹

偽和平主義者所作所為在在地支持中共政治戰,轉而打擊了美日同盟力量。中共見獵心喜,也以大筆資金投入日本,贊助那些立場傾向於北京卻反對軍方的政治文宣。中共在日本境內使用的政治戰戰術層次的作為,和在臺灣、澳洲、美國及其他國家境內如出一轍,³²包括成立統戰組織;以投機政客、新聞媒體、研究機構為對象,提供娛樂和資助資金;邀約雄心勃勃的學者、日本政府官員和其他輿論界名人造訪中國大陸。針對琉球乙地,中共的另一套戰術是「教育」琉球當地人,說他們和中國人「同根同源」,說服琉球人應認同中國,疏離日本。至於中共在日本境內使用的政治戰的戰略層次作為,則包括在中國共產黨指揮下經營對口單位,直接在琉球與其他日本新聞媒體組織、大學之間建立溝通管道;擴大對北海道及琉球兩地之投資,期在所謂的日本本土「南北痛點」上建立中共的政治、經濟槓桿。

從以上描述顯示,舉凡從公共資訊互通、資金及與中共/日本激進分子的關係來看,日本和美國早該更加公開地抗衡中共與日本境內激進分子的合縱關係。美日至少當下應立即建立類似政治作戰「戰情室」(war room)的協同機制,始能識別中共逐步壯大的政治戰威脅,同時應針對美日共有威脅,研發出戰略層次的溝通機制與其他回應手段。美日兩國更應著手政治戰的反制措施,而近期澳洲選擇公開揭露中共統一戰線之作法,尤其值得仿效。

30 Kerry K. Gershaneck, "Taiwan's Future Depends on the Japan-America Security Alliance," *The National Interest*.

31 Kerry K. Gershaneck, "‘Faux Pacifists’ Imperil Japan While Empowering China,".

32 Kerry K. Gershaneck, "‘Faux Pacifists’ Imperil Japan While Empowering China,".

強化同盟力量的可能途徑

承辦美日同盟兵力業務的日本自衛隊單位除了必須解決指揮管制問題之外，還需考量如何增強同盟兵力，以確保日本自衛隊能有效地支援印度—太平洋戰略，形塑安全環境。本文認為應該亟待落實的兩項建議，分別是建立一支常設型的同盟海上特遣兵力，以及藉美國近期宣稱有意退出美俄中程核武(INF)條約之便，推動飛彈防禦。

建立太平洋同盟海上特遣兵力

同前所述，美國國防部長馬提斯於2018年6月香格里拉對話時，基於「海洋是全球資產，海上交通線是所有人類的經濟生命的動脈」的理由，³³ 公開呼籲在海洋空間內放寬眼界與行動。馬提斯同時宣稱美國有意協助夥伴國家建構海上執法能力和能量，以改善海上監偵和利益防護，繼而提升各國之間作業的「相容性」（「相容性」概指整合軍事、法律、經濟活動之能力），期能更完善地支援人類的共同目標。

針對馬提斯的期許，在建構海上執法能力、能量暨友軍系統相容性方面，日本自衛隊可能邁出的重要一步，是建立常設型同盟海上特遣兵力。這項概念最初是由區域安全專家艾瑞克·塞耶斯(Eric Sayers)於CSIS提出，主要是仿效1960年代晚期催生的北約常設型大西洋海軍(Standing Naval Forces Atlantic, SNFA)概念，後來於1970～80年代證明，該常設兵力舉凡在嚇阻或甚至於面對舊蘇聯和華沙集團時運作效果良好。

根據塞耶斯的看法，目前政策是「適用於美國海軍和抱持同一心態的其他海上武力單位，他們希望在區域內外獨立作業，只有偶爾在間歇的基礎上，共同進行海上操演」。³⁴ 塞耶斯強調，隨著中共海洋軍力成長，觸角漸遠，「本地區既然仍要求美軍以脫胎創新的方式繼續保持接觸」，就須建立一支太平洋同盟海上特遣兵力，才可能促進「美國與區域合作，強化海軍活動，致力於確保自由開放的印度—太平洋海洋環境」。³⁵

塞耶斯所提及的常設型大西洋海軍（以下簡稱SNFA，成立於1967年），是承平時期的第一支永久編制的多國海軍部隊。常設海軍下轄6～10艘水面艦（驅逐艦、巡洋艦、巡防艦和支援艦等），一次最長以6個月期程配屬於北約戰隊之下。長期以來，這支水面艦隊是由加拿大、德國、荷蘭、英國、美國籍兵力組成，艦隊司令官直接向大西洋盟軍統帥負責，總部設於美國維吉尼亞州的諾福克基地，艦隊司令部則機動設立於上述兵力所屬國。

塞耶斯指出，SNFA戰隊除展示北約能力，還「能在其選定的地點和時間上，投入相當數量的多元海上武力」。但是，塞耶斯點出後者的實際效益，也就是「長期反覆的

33 James N. Mattis, "Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue,".

34 Eric Sayers, "Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific," *War on the Rocks*, June 1, 2108, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/time-to-launch-a-combined-maritime-task-force-for-the-pacific/>.

35 Eric Sayers, "Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific," *War on the Rocks*.

巡弋活動得使以上各國海軍在承平時期的『相容』性。常設海軍除執行年度屬於間歇性質之演訓外，其實是北約對外的重要利器，隨時對外彰顯著以上各國海軍的同盟走向和合作意願」。³⁶

每次提到效法北約經驗時，如同膝蓋的直覺反應是「冷戰時期的歐洲怎可和今日的亞洲同日而語，拿北約同盟合作指標來組織時下鬆散的印度—亞洲太平洋區域國家意義不大」。然而，若基於以上的理由從而否決是極為膚淺的，更反映出極其狹隘、毫無想像力的思維——因應印度—亞太區域內迅速衍生的各項威脅和挑戰，我們必須要有宏觀而富想像力的思維程序。從印度—亞洲太平洋區域視角觀之，如何鼓勵志同道合、共同承擔挑戰的夥伴國家，促其對區域安全多增一份心力，常設海軍戰隊其實給出一份歷史的路徑圖。塞耶斯的亞洲版本常設海軍，如果順利運作於一支健全的日本自衛隊，有助於擴充區域海軍合作，可以從間歇性的海上演習，發展出長期捍衛「自由而開放」的印度—亞洲太平洋區域的機制作為。

塞耶斯構想中的特遣艦隊活動內容包括：

跨南亞、大洋洲、東北亞區域的艦隊互訪；推動演訓活動，參加目前進行中的多國演習；因應天災與警急應變事件；同時定期執行聯合巡弋任務，建立合作、互信與系統共容基礎。例如，特遣隊這個月進入南太平洋進行艦隊訪問，下個月就可能進入印度洋參加高階海上演訓；然後這支艦隊可能轉向，趕往因應東南亞地區的某個暴風雨，接著可能航向馬尼拉進行訪問，在各國海軍準備航向夏威夷參加2020年環太平洋軍事演習(RIMPAC)之前，這支特遣艦隊邀請東南亞國協官員登艦晚宴。³⁷

日本自衛隊採用塞耶斯的概念，這種我們暫稱為「常設型太平洋海軍」（以下簡稱CMTFA）的作法，相對而言是容易的。假設安倍順利地擴充了日本憲法辯論內有關「集體自衛權」的概念，同時基於過去日本自衛隊和其他友邦演訓作戰的經驗，常設太平洋海軍在政治運作上其實對日、美兩國皆非陌生的產物。另外還有一層同屬政治層面的考慮，那就是日本一旦正式提出常設太平洋海軍的概念時，對區域和美國的重要性不可小覷；何況日本政府內部已有支持的聲音傳出。

在常設太平洋海軍概念下，美國和日本應該是海上武力的主要提供者（4~6艘水面艦、艦載美國陸戰隊、日本的兩棲作戰旅和航空單位）和定期部署的基幹。鑒於日本海上自衛隊和美國海軍長期緊密的合作關係，建立指揮管制和相容性核心能力若從這兩個海軍單位做起，應是效益最為快速。一旦作戰能力初步到位，其他志同道合的國家會伺機加入常設太平洋海軍，組成兵力可能包括亞洲、歐洲夥伴國家、澳洲、紐西蘭甚至南

36 Eric Sayers, "Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific," *War on the Rocks*.

37 Eric Sayers, "Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific," *War on the Rocks*.

美國家的海軍和海岸防衛隊。

我們可以想見中共必然抱怨上述海上同盟特遣部隊是「圍堵中國」的另一陰謀，繼而動用所有的外交和政治戰手法，來破壞常設太平洋海軍這種屬於新型海上合作性質之提議。諷刺的是，正是中共威脅行徑甚囂塵上，才導致上述這種合作方式較十年前提出時，更具實現的可能性。換句話說，中共急於透過「灰色地帶」和「切香腸（漸進）戰術」擴充其威脅，恰是常設太平洋海軍成立的因素之一。

儘管如此，塞耶斯評論道「當中共試圖施壓和破壞上述的聯合海上特遣組織提議時，有意參加這支特遣隊的國家可能仍會猶豫不前」，³⁸ 因此，我們需要計畫周延、表達明確的戰略溝通。在所有計畫推動步驟裡，塞耶斯建議常設太平洋海軍要避免予人是一種「反中」聯軍的觀感。日本自衛隊的常設太平洋海軍任務，一開始就應聚焦於一個特定的問題，再求向上發展，最後成為一個較為成熟的區域概念。換言之，初期焦點可置於國防部長馬提斯所提有關落實「自由而開放」的印度—亞洲太平洋區域願景的若干切入點，然後常設太平洋海軍按下列原則而成立，包括支持海、空航道的自由使用權、海洋生態環境保護、各國和平解決所有紛爭等。

當日本自衛隊常設太平洋海軍按以上原則行動時，可能在穩定印度—亞洲太平洋區域安全以及人類安全議題上，成為舉足輕重的一支軍事武力，特別是人類安全在印度—亞洲—太平洋區域的優先性可說是不證自明的。因為天然災害之後（例如2004年耶誕節隔日的地震和大海嘯，席捲30萬條人命）的現代海事合作自此展開，且一直延續迄今。本節將塞耶斯的見解簡述如下：常設太平洋海軍成立後，必然迫使美日安全同盟以及其他潛在的夥伴國家走出「舒適圈」區。但是，常設太平洋海軍之成軍在迎接現階段與未來挑戰，是值得信任的、也可以達成的，更是歷史上已經證明的一種途徑。

強化島嶼防衛戰略

每一國家對建構「自由而開放」的印度—亞洲太平洋區域所面臨的挑戰看法各有不同，但是前文已提及，一個越來越具有威脅性，軍、經實力節節上升，又具獨裁政體體質的中共，其意圖和能力正是所有國家規劃印度—太平洋戰略的基準點。解放軍在印度—亞洲太平洋區域內外，越來越頻繁地投射其核武和傳統兵力，直接衍生出日本自衛隊能否協助確保該區域「自由而開放」之衝擊。本文認為，川普總統2018年10月20日宣稱美國有意退出和俄國於1987年簽訂的中程核武條約，是強化日本自衛隊在印度—亞洲太平洋區域反制中共進犯的一個契機。

與上述推理直接相關的是「島嶼防衛」的概念，該名詞係由奎賓涅維奇(Andrew Krepinevich)首次於2015年《外交事務》雜誌(Foreign Affairs)提出，戰略內容是一旦開戰後，美軍使用本身的「反介入／區域拒止」(A2/AD)系統封鎖第一島鏈內的水域，迫使中共近海成為麥可·史文(Michael Swaine)和部分學者所謂的「無人地帶」(no man's land)

38 Eric Sayers, "Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific," *War on the Rocks*.

。³⁹ 根據包括英格蘭的亞當·泰勒(Adam Taylor)等專業人士之分析，「反介入／區域拒止」戰略有可能足以使美軍水面艦和航母，在不必要承受高度風險下，仍能嚇阻和圍堵中共軍事進犯，而這項結果不僅不至於破壞穩定，反而可能獲致更高的戰略穩定性，究其原因有二。⁴⁰ 首先，「以『反介入／區域拒止』戰略遂行制海，若和極端昂貴航母戰鬥群相比，前者具有成本（在金錢與生命方面）低廉的重大意義」。泰勒表示，「對美國而言，損失戰艦勢必是一場驚天動地的災難（例如，失去一艘航母等同犧牲高達6,000員官兵生命），若在此情形下，任何一位美國領導人勢必承受巨大壓力，必須迅速而激烈地提升衝突層次。相對而言，成本低廉、無人駕駛的長程攻擊機是有可能取代前述大型載臺，進而降低危機門檻升高的機會」。

其次，泰勒也斷言，「當進入中共領海的美軍水面艦數量越少，美軍指揮官戰術上需要針對中共境內飛彈系統，遂行防衛性的攻擊機會也就越低」。這項推論是值得注意的。根據塔爾瑪姬(Caitlin Talmadge)在近期《外交事務》雜誌之詮釋，「中共核武是與傳統飛彈部隊混搭配置，因此不可能美軍攻擊中共傳統彈道飛彈系統時，還能避開中共原本供戰略嚇阻使用的核彈」，塔爾瑪姬因此推論道，「中共領導人在美軍壓力之下，有可能在仍能使用手中核彈時，就決定動用之」。如是，則美、中核戰機會大增。因此，本文認為美國重啟開發和部署中程核子武器的戰力將是島嶼戰略的厚實砥柱。⁴¹

2018年2月，時任太平洋司令部指揮官的哈里斯(Harry Harris)上將於美國國會的證詞顯示，「歷史上前所未有的經濟發展，使中共建軍備戰引人側目，且迅速地在每一軍武領域幾乎構成對美國的挑戰，其中關鍵成長項目還包括飛彈系統技術的明顯躍進」。這些飛彈系統受到的關注點，在於他們能否威懾印度—亞洲太平洋區域國家，或是能否拒止日本自衛隊與其他受其影響國家，使其無法適時地回應中共對日本、中華民國或其他國家的軍事挑釁和進犯，在在都已構成了區域內值得注意的隱憂。⁴² 根據哈里斯上將的證詞：

中共解放軍技術進展最亮眼的部分是彈道飛彈。相對於解放軍正值迅速擴充的所有飛彈系統的數量、形式與水準，中程彈道飛彈的技術進展最為顯著，目前解放軍95%的飛彈部隊配署中程彈道飛彈。

39 Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., "How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, April 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-02-16/how-deter-china>.

40 Nathan Levine, "Why America Leaving the INF Treaty Is China's New Nightmare," *The National Interest*, October 22, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-america-leaving-inf-treaty-chinas-new-nightmare-34087>.

41 Nathan Levine, "Why America Leaving the INF Treaty Is China's New Nightmare," *The National Interest*.

42 Harry B. Harris, "Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command," *House Armed Services Committee*, 2018, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HarrisJrH-20180214.pdf>.

中共媒體定期吹捧飛彈技術發展現況，又全面宣稱中共飛彈未瞄準任何特定國家。但是，只要簡單拿地圖比對飛彈射程即可推知中共飛彈最有可能的瞄準目標在哪裡——短程彈道飛彈是指向臺灣以及海上美國航母戰鬥群；中程彈道飛彈是瞄準駐日美軍基地和關島；洲際彈道飛彈則是朝往美國本土。而中共研發的先進極音速(hypersonic)飛彈技術，未來數年之內勢必構成更大挑戰。

哈里斯上將同時指出，整體上「解放軍已經朝向任務遠征型和實力整合型」發展，解放軍海軍則是目前「正值大規模推動造艦計畫階段。如果持續其造艦計畫，則以潛艦和巡防艦以及更大型艦艇計算，中共會在2020年前，超越俄羅斯而成為全球第二大海軍」。以上說明，正培訓10萬員陸戰隊的中共解放軍海軍，此際儼然是以全球海軍之姿呈現，一方面利用公海遂行戰鬥訓練，「一方面也爭取多地點、多時段操演，熟練程度已見大幅提升」。此處所謂「多地點」包括臺灣海峽、東海、南海等。若結合中共解放軍空軍長程、具核彈頭攜行能力的H-6K轟炸機，加上自南海人工島嶼起飛所延伸的本土作戰半徑，中共等於已經具備同時從中國大陸和南海人工島基地迅速投射武力的能力。為因應中共武力投射後威懾、恐嚇或擊敗日本自衛隊的可能，進而殃及印度—太平洋區域內其他夥伴國家，日本自衛隊有必要提升戰力以制衡中共的兵力投射。

對於美國重啟開發和部署中程核子武器之意圖，中共國家安全部譴責美國退出中程核武條約，認為與其說美國正瞄準俄羅斯，毋寧說是瞄準了中共。中國國家安全部所屬智庫中國現代國際關係研究院某位發言人在近期《南華早報》抱怨，⁴³ 川普決定撕毀中程核武條約，是釋放出美國正準備和中共長期戰略對決的訊息。⁴⁴ 當然，這種抱怨不過是中共現代國際關係研究院談到「西方刻意圍堵中國」時不斷上演的另一段戲碼。但是，中共國家安全部這一輪的情勢評估也不是毫無道理的。

根據泰勒的看法，川普的決定事實上為美國（也間接的是為日本自衛隊）殺出了空間，最終得以突破條約的限制，和中共在建立中程飛彈系統上相抗衡。⁴⁵

美國正逐步掙脫中程核武條約束縛，因為該條約禁止美國發展和部署射程500～5,500公里的陸基彈道飛彈與巡弋飛彈。但是莫斯科當局又屢屢違反條約，最早可溯自2008年，當時即有報導指出莫斯科著手研發一款禁止的巡弋飛彈。換句話說，美國實際上片面卸除了有利於己的嚇阻武器，讓俄國在重啟中程核武的技術方面領先美國10年。其中，俄軍一款北約代號為SSC-8的陸基巡弋飛彈特別讓美國感到憂慮。

由於中共從來就不是中程核武條約的簽署國，使其得以囤積大批遂行「反介入／區

43 Bill Gertz, "Chinese Think Tank Also Serves as Spy Arm," *Washington Times*, September 28, 2011, <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/sep/28/chinese-think-tank-also-serves-as-spy-arm/>.

44 Kristin Huang, "Donald Trump 'Targets' China by Pulling out of Missile Deal with Russia," October 21, 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2169551/donald-trump-targets-china-pulling-out-missile-deal-russia>.

45 Nathan Levine, "Why America Leaving the INF Treaty Is China's New Nightmare," *The National Interest*.

域拒止」(A2/AD)戰術的傳統彈頭，例如號稱「航母殺手」的東風—21攻艦彈道飛彈，據稱射程1,500公里。根據2017年時哈里斯上將在國會證詞，中共解放軍擁有「全世界最龐大且分類最全的飛彈部隊，彈道與巡弋飛彈存量超過2,000枚」。如果中共是中程核武條約簽署國的話，則95%的彈頭違反該條約。

在川普公開宣稱退出條約之前，美國依法禁止部署相同級別的反制彈頭，一如在冷戰期間雷根總統的反制作為，迫使當時的蘇聯坐上談判桌。我們不是很確定中共是否願意針對削減大規模的中程核武彈頭而談判。但是，美國於日本自衛隊裡部署中程核武部隊後，勢必導致北京當局意圖武力進犯印度—太平洋區域之前，心生疑懼。

在引進中程核武計畫方面，美國顯得比外界期待更加篤定。美國國會年度國防授權法案已經同意撥款研發該型武器，通過的理由則是強調上述武器若在中程核武條約作廢後，可用以制衡中共。⁴⁶ 日本境內若部署地面機動中程核武飛彈部隊勢必要通過複雜的談判，但是這件事和雷根當年一馬當先，最後成功的主張在西歐境內部署中程核武，最終迫使蘇聯退讓的案例相比，都是可成的。隨著越來越多的人瞭解到，中共對日本和印度—亞洲太平洋友善國家的主權，與日俱增的實質威脅；更多的力量抵制中共和激進份子在日本境內聯手反對美日同盟，進而大眾支持中程核武進駐日本的可能性大增。

結 論

美日安全同盟強弱，是順利達成兩國印度—亞洲—太平洋戰略之關鍵，更是落實「自由而開放」的印度—亞洲—太平洋區域目標重中之重。長期的美日同盟關係已具備不可小覷的實力，足以因應21世紀的挑戰。但是，要成為印度—太平洋有效能、可依恃的安全基石，美日同盟仍須解決嚴重的（也許是致命的）缺陷。

本文提出三個值得注意的領域並建議改善，包括強化美日安全同盟和日本自衛隊指揮管制(C²)系統，建立一支聯合海上特遣隊，以及利用近期宣布退出美俄中程核武條約的機會，推動島嶼飛彈防衛戰略之延伸。同樣重要的是，美日安全同盟應累積能量，更有效地反制中共以美日軍隊為目標的政治作戰，因後者削弱日本自衛隊改革和強軍所需的公眾支持。

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46 Nathan Levine, "Why America Leaving the INF Treaty Is China's New Nightmare," *The National Interest*.

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Enhancing Japan-U.S. Military Cooperation To Support the Indo-Pacific Strategy

Kerry K. Gershaneck

Abstract

The strength of the Japan-America Security Alliance (JASA) is central to successfully achieving both countries' visions for an Indo-Asia-Pacific Strategy. This paper addresses strengths and key challenges associated with the alliance. It also provides three recommendations that will strengthen the alliance's military capacity: enhancing JASA and JSDF Command & Control (C²), establishment of combined maritime task forces, and implementation of an expanded archipelagic missile defense strategy based the opportunity provided by America's recent announced withdrawal from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia. It also provides recommendations for countering political warfare operations that undermine public support for necessary JASA reform and enhancements.

A “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region”

The vision of a “free and open” Indo-Asia-Pacific Region can properly be attributed to Japan's Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who articulated the concept during his first term as premier in 2007.¹ For a number of political reasons, Abe was unable to fully develop the concept during his first premiership. The term re-emerged and took on greater urgency in a dramatically changed regional security environment in November 2017, when U.S. President Donald J. Trump described his general concept for it at the APEC CEO Summit.² President Trump emphasized his administration's priorities for the region as fair and reciprocal trade, and respect for the principles of rule of law, individual rights, and freedom of navigation and overflight, including open shipping lanes.

Central to the security and success of what is now called a “Free and Open Indo-

1 Russell Hsiao, “Backgrounder: A ‘Free’ and ‘Open’ Indo-Pacific and Taiwan,” *Global Taiwan Brief* Vol. 3, Issue 18 (September 19, 2018), http://globaltaiwan.org/2018/09/vol-3-issue-18/?utm_source=Global+Taiwan+Updates&utm_campaign=813cab5c70-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_09_18_07_59&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d5a87749a5-813cab5c70-436750393&mc_cid=813cab5c70&mc_eid=22a4cf919a#WallaceGregson09192018.

2 Russell Hsiao, “Backgrounder: A ‘Free’ and ‘Open’ Indo-Pacific and Taiwan,” *Global Taiwan Brief*.

Pacific” (FOIP) is a strong, assertive, and militarily capable *Japan-America Security Alliance* (JASA). Democracies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region such as the Republic of China (ROC), and other nations that value individual liberty, consensual government, and rule of law, are especially reliant on this alliance as a bulwark against nearby totalitarian and authoritarian regimes—regimes that threaten with dramatically darker visions regarding governance and human rights.

Initially following Trump's pronouncement, it was unclear to America's allies, friends, competitors, and adversaries what substantive form this American vision will take. There was reason for skepticism, particularly following eight years of Obama Administration touting the *Pivot to Asia* (later renamed *The Rebalance*), which proved ultimately to be largely empty rhetoric. Over the course of the past year, however, the Trump Administration has taken this initially amorphous slogan and evolved it into something more tangible, with supporting strategies. In late 2017, the White House released its first *National Security Strategy* (NSS), which defined the challenges and highlighted the principles of how it will actualize a “free” and “open” Indo-Pacific region.³

The NSS was quickly followed by the Department of Defense's *National Defense Strategy*, and subsequent FY2019 Defense Authorization legislation established a new name for America's largest military “unified” command: the *U.S. Pacific Command* was renamed the *U.S. Indo-Pacific Command*. This name change was significant: it belatedly reflected the importance of a more focused U.S. effort to influence and secure the maritime theater from the east coast of Africa to the west coast of the United States, and from Japan through the first and second island chains to Australia.⁴

It is important to note that the “free and open” concept is not strictly defense oriented. In July of this year at the *Indo-Pacific Business Forum*, U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo provided the most comprehensive speech to that point of the underpinnings of the “free and open” Indo-Pacific strategy. Specifically, he said:⁵

3 Wallace C. Gregson, “An American Perspective on Taiwan in the INDOPACOM Region,” *Global Taiwan Brief*, Vol 3, Issue 18 (September 19, 2018), http://globaltaiwan.org/2018/09/vol-3-issue-18/?utm_source=Global+Taiwan+Updates&utm_campaign=813cab5c70-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_09_18_07_59&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d5a87749a5-813cab5c70-436750393&mc_cid=813cab5c70&mc_eid=22a4cf919a#WallaceGregson09192018.

4 Wallace C. Gregson, “An American Perspective on Taiwan in the INDOPACOM Region,” *Global Taiwan Brief*.

5 Michael R. Pompeo, “Secretary of State Michael Pompeo's Remarks on ‘America's Indo-Pacific Economic Vision’,” (July 30, 2018), <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/284722.htm>.

When we say “free” Indo-Pacific, it means we all want all nations, every nation, to be able to protect their sovereignty from coercion by other countries. At the national level, “free” means good governance and the assurance that citizens can enjoy their fundamental rights and liberties.

When we say “open” in the Indo-Pacific, it means we want all nations to enjoy open access to seas and airways. We want the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes. This is key for international peace and for each country's attainment of its own national aims. Economically, “open” means fair and reciprocal trade, open investment environments, transparent agreements between nations, and improved connectivity to drive regional ties—because these are the paths for sustainable growth in the region.

In June, at the annual *Shangri-La Dialogue* with Asian defense officials, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis reinforced Pompeo's comprehensive strategy overview by emphasizing the need to look beyond traditional military and defense issues to such elements as economic issues, rule of law, transparency, and civil society in the development of this strategy. Mattis defined several lines of effort involving all elements of national power to give substance to this initiative. He called for expanding attention and action in the maritime space because “(t)he maritime commons is a global good, and the sea lanes of communication are the arteries of economic vitality for all.”⁶ He also stated that the U.S. will help its partners to build up naval and law enforcement capabilities and capacities to improve monitoring and protection of maritime borders and interests and improve “interoperability” (defined as the ability to integrate the efforts of militaries, law enforcement, and economies) to better support common goals.

Mattis also highlighted that rule of law, civil society, and transparent governance will “be the sunlight that exposes the malign influence that threatens sustainable economic development.”⁷ Notably, Mattis called for improved financial institutions to assist private sector investment, and for U.S. agencies across the “whole of government” to work more closely with regional economic partners. These statements and subsequent actions by the Trump Administration reflect significantly more seriousness of intention and effort than was ever evidenced by the lost years of the so-called “Pivot”.

6 James Mattis, “Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue” (June 2, 2018), <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1538599/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-plenary-session-of-the-2018-shangri-la-dialogue/>.

7 James Mattis, “Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue,” .

The United States is not pursuing its Indo-Pacific strategy unilaterally or in a vacuum. A number of its allies and partners, including the ROC, are pursuing similar strategies. Several of these initiatives pre-date the U.S. strategy. India's is called the “Act East” policy, South Korea's is called the “New Southern Policy”, Japan's is the “Free & Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”, and Taiwan's is the “New Southbound Policy.” Australia has also published a Foreign Policy Whitepaper with similar goals and objectives,⁸ and Indonesia has attempted to develop an Indo-Pacific concept for more than a decade, dubbing it variously as an *Indo-Pacific Treaty*, an *Indo-Pacific regional architecture* and an *Indo-Pacific cooperation umbrella*. All the policies seek to expand ties throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and in particular with the nations of Southeast Asia and the *Association of Southeast Asian Nations* (ASEAN). In the sense that these strategies overlap, they overlap in focus on regional engagement that results in a strong, free, and open fabric that knits the region together, preserves sovereignty, and promotes prosperity.

Related to these wide-ranging unilateral Indo-Pacific strategies, Japan developed *The Quad* concept roughly a decade ago. The Quad concept encompasses four countries-- Japan, Australia, India, and U.S.--working together to achieve vital common interests of these major maritime democracies.⁹ This concept supports a vision of stability and prosperity. As important, however, the Quad is a vision of how to cope with an increasingly threatening, expansionist, militarily and economically powerful, repressive, fascist and totalitarian Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Deep concerns about the PRC's intentions and capabilities underlie all countries' versions of their Indo-Pacific Strategies as well.

The Japan-America Security Alliance: Strengths and Challenges

Northeast Asia: A Very Tough Neighborhood

Before examining the JASA strengths and challenges, it is useful to examine Japan's uniquely precarious security situation. Japan, to use Chicago gangland terminology, resides in “a very tough neighborhood”. It faces security challenges from all of its immediate neighbors.

The most imminent challenge is the PRC--by any objective assessment an expansionist, coercive, hyper-nationalistic, brutally repressive, totalitarian¹⁰ state. Japan is reminded daily

8 Allan Gyngell, “To Each Their Own ‘Indo-Pacific,’ ” *East Asia Forum*, May 22, 2018, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/05/23/to-each-their-own-indo-pacific/#more-127635>.

9 Wallace Gregson, “An American Perspective on Taiwan in the INDOPACOM Region,” .

10 Stein Ringen, “A Letter to Fellow China Analysts: Totalitarianism,” September 19, 2018.

through the PRC's bombastic propaganda organs that the PRC is now militarily and economically powerful and eager to avenge Japan's brutal past imperialism of the 1930s and 1940s. Official PRC propaganda organs openly voice intention to take Japan's territory such as the Senkakus (also known as *Tiaoyutai Islands* in the ROC and as *Diaoyu Islands* in the PRC)¹¹ and the Ryukyus (Okinawa).

Also in the neighborhood is the totalitarian Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, a slave state whose crimes against humanity are well documented by the United Nations¹² and which also has intense historical grievances against Japan. Two other neighbors occupy lands and adjacent waters claimed by Japan: the Republic of Korea (ROK) occupies *Takashima Island* (which the ROK calls *Dokdo Island*, and which is also claimed by North Korea); and Russia occupies Japan's *Kurile Islands*, Japan's northern territories occupied by Soviet forces in the closing days of World War II.

As nuclear powers, Russia and North Korea, like the PRC, are each capable of destroying Japan as a civilization within a matter of minutes. Japan has no nuclear counterforce deterrent of its own, nor a fully reliable anti-missile defense system to deter this existential threat.

The status of the ROC also poses a serious challenge for Japan, in that PRC occupation of Taiwan would severely compromise Japan's southern flank and lead to increased pressure on its territorial integrity. Economic, psychological, and other damage from Taiwan “going Red” would also be severe. The PRC threat to the ROC is well known, of course. In the name of a so-called “China Dream”, the PRC is engaged in an all-encompassing campaign to bring the ROC into its tender embrace. In its relentless war against the ROC, the PRC employs economic, informational, political, and military warfare on a daily basis.

All these means are destabilizing and demoralizing, but it is the military tool that is of most concern: PRC ruler Xi Jinping has ordered the Peoples Liberation Army to be able to invade and secure Taiwan by the year 2020—just 14 months from now.¹³ As part of the PRC's ongoing

11 James E. Fanell and Kerry K. Gershaneck, “White Warships and Little Blue Men: The Looming ‘Short, Sharp War’ in the East China Sea over the Senkakus,” *Project 2049 Institute Policy Paper* (Washington D.C.: Project 2049 Institute, April 2018), <https://project2049.net/2018/03/30/white-warships-and-little-blue-men-the-looming-short-sharp-war-in-the-east-china-sea-over-the-senkakus//>.

12 UNHRC, “Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,” *United Nations Human Rights Council*, February 2014, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/coidprk/pages/commissioninquiryonhrindprk.aspx>.

psychological warfare, as a likely prelude to a real military operation, as recently as late October PRC Minister of Defense Wei Fenghe warned that “challenges” to its sovereignty over Taiwan could lead China to use military force, according to the press reports.¹⁴

These threats to Japan and its alliance with America, combined with recent economic stresses, led to the development of an October 2018 report on JASA by the U.S. think tank *Center for Strategic & International Studies* (CSIS). The CSIS report concluded:¹⁵

Reinforcing allied deterrence and warfighting effectiveness is paramount given the growing array of military capabilities and coercive actions being developed and practiced by China, North Korea, and Russia. Moreover, without domestic political support from both sides of the Pacific, neither the United States nor Japan will remain a reliable ally. Therefore, political sustainability must remain an imperative. Finally, budgets are limited in Washington and Tokyo, so the allies must also make the most efficient use of scarce resources.

JASA Strengths

The CSIS report highlights some of the JASA's strengths available to meet these challenges. In recent years, the report notes, “the allies have concluded new defense guidelines, established the alliance coordination mechanism, and jointly developed the SM-3 Block IIA ballistic missile interceptor. Japan has renovated its domestic security legislation, enabled the exercise of collective self-defense, improved its secrecy provisions, embraced a more proactive global engagement strategy, and taken on a more visible leadership role within the Indo-Pacific region, including by championing the *Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership* (CPTPP). Meanwhile, the United States has committed to rebalance to Asia

13 “PRC ‘Taiwan Invasion’ Propaganda Backfires,” *SinoInsider*, September 7, 2018, <https://sinoinsider.com/2018/09/geopolitics-watch-prc-taiwan-invasion-propaganda-backfires/>.

14 “China Says Army Will Act ‘at Any Cost’ to Prevent Taiwan Split,” *Channel News Asia*, October 25, 2018, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiNk-qmg6TfAhUHvbwKHeIIBqgQFjADegQIBxAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.channelnewsasia.com%2Fnews%2Fasia%2Fchina-says-army-will-act--at-any-cost--to-prevent-taiwan-split-10862236&usg=AOvVaw3mHvflzW85hO-ffnIU4OD>.

15 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., “More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>.

and pursue a free and open Indo-Pacific. American and Japanese national leaders enjoy close personal ties, which serve as ballast for the relationship.”¹⁶

Shinzo Abe, Japan's strongest prime minister in decades, deserves substantial credit for building and sustaining these strengths. Unlike some previous Japanese premiers, he recognizes the threats facing Japan, and has taken substantial steps to address shortfalls within his limited political maneuvering space. He has ordered two revised *National Defense Program Guidelines*, revised the *US-Japan Guidelines for Cooperative Defense*, spearheaded the *2015 Legislation for Peace and Security*¹⁷, and pledged to amend Article IX of the Constitution to codify the Self-Defense Force's existence. In addition, Abe has begun preparing a significant new *Midterm Defense Plan* that will guide defense projects and acquisitions essential to high-end warfare.¹⁸

But, in reality, many challenges still face the alliance.

General Alliance Shortfalls

While the relationship looks good on paper, there are vexing shortcomings in the security alliance and with Japan's defense structure that could have devastating consequences. To set the context before addressing specific alliance shortfalls, it's important to highlight a pressing threat identified in the CSIS report: military competitors are narrowing the alliance's military edge. “China in particular,” says the report, “has engaged in rapid military modernization and embraced ‘gray zone’ operations, which have reduced the gap between it and the United States, forcing the alliance to reassess its ability to deter and defeat aggression.”¹⁹

This challenge is daunting enough, but there are also internal, structural problems the alliance

16 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., “More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, pp. 1-2.

17 Jiro Hanyu and Richard et al Armitage, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance to 2030: Power and Principle,” *Sasakawa Peace Foundation & Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 2016, 4, <https://www.csis.org/programs/japan-chair/us-japan-commission-future-alliance>.

18 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., “More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, pp. 3-4.

19 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., “More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, pp. 2-3.

must overcome to be truly effective. Japan still has not yet implemented a coherent national defense strategy and its forces face major shortfalls in funding, manpower, communications, doctrine, training, and weapons and equipment.

Of great importance also are Japan's perceived Constitutional restrictions on defense, and failure to develop a Joint JSDF warfighting command, as well as the yet unfulfilled requirement for a combined Japan-U.S. command structure (an alliance coordination mechanism) that will be useful in a crisis situation and to develop true interoperability of U.S. military and Japan Self Defense forces.²⁰

Further, there is a need for a flexible deployable combined force that can help shape the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region, and the need to enhance Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities to reduce the prospects of totalitarian state adventurism in the region. These topics will be the focus of subsequent discussion.

JASA Command & Control (C²) Challenges

As the CSIS report notes, in order for U.S. and JSDF forces to successfully execute combined operations in a major contingency, the alliance's existing command structures will need to be updated.²¹ Currently, on the U.S. side, the commander of the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) would serve a variety of functions, including not only directing the warfighting in and around Japan, but also managing relations with Washington, sustaining manpower and logistics support, and coordinating with allied forces.

While there is a *Commander, U.S. Forces Japan* (COMUSFJ) staff headquarters in Yokota Air Base, USFJ is not configured, staffed, nor trained as a warfighting command as is, say, Headquarters, U.S. Forces Korea. Further, USFJ does not have the authority to carry the fight beyond the territorial waters of Japan, limiting its combat effectiveness even if given this new mission. Rather than burden the commander of INDOPACOM, headquartered in Hawaii, with this warfighting mission, CSIS recommends that Japan and the U.S. create a stand-alone

20 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., "More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century," *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, pp. 7-8.

21 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., "More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century," *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, pp. 7-8.

combined Japan-U.S. joint task force for the western Pacific.²²

This combined joint task force, or CJTF, would focus on possible contingencies in the region, particularly with the PRC over Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. Such a CJTF would need to be established in coordination with U.S. allies and partners: Japan, of course, would be part of the CJTF, but other forces or at least Liaison Officers should be embedded in the organization. Standing up such a command in a crisis would be difficult, so this must be a “standing CJTF” with responsibility and funding for routine training and exercises that allows it to conduct multi-domain operations. Another option, of course, would be to change the mission of USFJ from “defense of Japan” to a more regional role, but that change would likely cause significant political fallout in both Japan and the U.S.

The keys to conducting successful contingency operations are good planning and the ability to act quickly. Accordingly, within this new CJTF (or other new warfighting coordination mechanism), combined planning must be dramatically systematized and practiced if the U.S. and Japan are to respond quickly to acts of aggression. Although some combined planning already occurs, it is too ad hoc. The PRC often relies on *fait accompli tactics*, which take advantage of slow decision-making cycles, says the CSIS report.²³ Improving the speed of JASA decision-making is critical, as is the need to have pre-existing response plans and options. Commanders must be able to act rapidly, and rapid response requires advanced coordination by political leaders for some types of operations. This is not a new concept, but it is inexplicably missing from the JASA command relationships: combined planning has long been inherent other U.S. alliances, both in Europe and Asia. For example, U.S. and ROK forces have together developed both warfighting and counter-provocation plans to deter and respond to North Korean escalations.

CSIS suggests that such prior planning and coordination will help limit PRC adventurism, especially if U.S. forces are involved earlier in so-called “gray zone” incidents, which include aggression that occurs below the level of major conflict.²⁴ This step would make clear that any

22 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., “More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, p. 7.

23 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., “More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, p. 8.

24 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., “More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, p. 2.

acts of aggression would trigger deeper alliance cooperation, regardless of whether they cross the threshold of an armed attack under Article V of the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America*.

Directly related to the combined C² and planning shortfall is a similar organizational shortfall within Japan's governmental organization. Japan's Self Defense Forces, in particular, suffer from inadequate C² organization and lack of flexibility in planning and operations. **Japan's existing command structures place too great a burden on the chief of staff of the Japan Self-Defense Forces.**

Currently, the chief of staff effectively serves as both a *combatant commander* and *chief of defense*. It is vital to disaggregate the duties of the “supported” warfighter and the *national-level chief of defense* and “force provider” (or supporting) commanders. The former *fights the force*, while the latter two *develop, train, and equip the force* and its supporting facilities and (for the Chief of Defense) provides advice to the political leadership during the crisis. In practice, this means that Japan's Ministry of Defense should devolve some of the JSDF chief of staff's operational responsibilities to a subordinate joint force commander. This will allow the combatant commander to focus fully on the fight and therefore increase the operational effectiveness of Japanese forces, particularly during a major contingency. ²⁵

A good model for the JSDF is Australia's *Joint Operations Command* (JOC), led by a three-star commander who serves as chief of joint operations. The JOC commander has responsibility for all military operations, as well as training and readiness of the force. Such a model, adapted to account for Japan's unique organizational, legal, historical, and cultural characteristics, would help prepare Japanese commanders and forces for the stress of high tempo day-to-day operational requirements readiness to conduct future operations. Ultimately this structure would be integrated into the combined force structure, which would be similar in structure to Combined Forces Korea.

The obstacles to overcoming the challenges are increased by a sophisticated PRC Political Warfare campaign, abetted by Japanese radical activists. The struggle to build the domestic

²⁵ Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., “More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, p. 8.

support for reform of the alliance against both PRC and radical activists political warfare operations will be examined next.

Radical Activists & PRC Political Warfare

As noted in the CSIS report, “without domestic political support from both sides of the Pacific, neither the United States nor Japan will remain a reliable ally. Therefore, political sustainability must remain an imperative.”²⁶ Accordingly, the PRC and others attack and undermine that political support, primarily through what is called “political warfare”.

Prime Minister Abe faces a major political warfare campaign as he labors to normalize the status of Japan's armed forces. There is a very small but powerful radical minority in Japan that desires a weak, neutralized Japan. Nearby hostile totalitarian regimes such as the PRC, the DPRK, and Russia benefit from, and support, these radicals.²⁷ The PRC's Political Warfare operations are particularly effective in their goal to “disintegrate” this PRC “enemy” in accordance with the *Three Warfares* doctrine.

While there are some genuine pacifists in Japan who sincerely question the need for defense reform, it is Japan's radical activists (*kagekiteki katsudoka*) that generate the most hysteria.²⁸ In their worldview, Abe's efforts will upend Japan's “pacifist” tradition and lead it to fascism and rapacious regional conquest. But Japan is not pacifist, nor is Japan's *kagekiteki katsudoka*.

Japan is now a *peaceful* nation. After a particularly vicious era of near-genocidal rampage followed by U.S. military occupation and democratic reform, Japan has not fought in a foreign war in 73 years. It has been a role model in international aid, foreign direct investment, and humanitarian actions. Japan's pacifism post-1945 is a curious mix of moral posturing buttressed by a large defense establishment and reliance on the U.S. military force to obliterate any country that threatened Japan.

Despite its “peace constitution”, Japan quickly built a real military after North Korea (NK)

26 Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., “More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, October 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>, p. 6.

27 Kerry K. Gershaneck, “‘Faux Pacifists’ Imperil Japan While Empowering China,” *Asia Times*, June 10, 2018, <http://www.atimes.com/article/faux-pacifists-imperil-japan-while-empowering-china/>.

28 Kerry K. Gershaneck, “‘Faux Pacifists’ Imperil Japan While Empowering China,” *Asia Times*.

invaded South Korea in 1950. At the request of UN forces, Japan dispatched minesweepers to support the fight. From early on, then, the JSDF was an *armed force* in the sense most nations understand the term, even if it has been subject to various (and sometime highly restrictive) interpretations since. During the Korean War, Japanese communists and other radical activists protested support for the UN forces fighting NK-PRC-USSR aggression. As they protested Japan supporting the defense of South Koreans from one of the more oppressive, murderous states in world history, the *kagekiteki katsudoka* set their pattern for the rest of the Cold War and its aftermath: attack and undermine liberal democracies and provide support for communist dictatorships.²⁹ They always accuse the democracies of militarism and fascist aggression, while ignoring (or defending) hyper-nationalistic, fascist aggression from communist dictatorships.

Reasoned debate is desirable in any democracy, but *faux pacifist* attacks directed against Japan's overdue defense efforts amounts to simple *Political Warfare* that supports the PRC's larger drive for regional and, arguably, global hegemony. If, as Clausewitz wrote, “war is the extension of politics by other means”, then it's fair to say that the PRC's political warfare is “an extension of armed conflict by other means”. A useful definition of Political Warfare is “those operations that seek to influence emotions, motives, objectives, reasoning, and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the PRC's objectives”.

The PRC's version of PW is all encompassing. It is *Total War* that goes beyond traditional Liaison Work (building coalitions in a “United Front” to support the PRC and to “disintegrate” enemies) and the “Three Warfares” (strategic psychological warfare, overt and covert media manipulation, and use of “Lawfare”) to include use of violence and other forms of destructive attacks. In Japan, it has successfully exploited anti-defense, anti-bases organizations in Japan to obstruct military reform and paralyze relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' *Futenma Replacement Facility* on Okinawa.³⁰

The pattern is well established, predictable, and blatantly hypocritical. Radical activist news media and anti-defense groups always find fault with any efforts by Japan to strengthen its defensive posture—yet they will never utter a word of criticism about the PRC's massive military

29 Kerry K. Gershaneck, “Taiwan's Future Depends on the Japan-America Security Alliance,” *The National Interest*, June 7, 2018, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/taiwans-future-depends-the-japan-america-security-alliance-26167?page=show>.

30 Kerry K. Gershaneck, “Taiwan's Future Depends on the Japan-America Security Alliance,” *The National Interest*.

buildup, illegal occupation of disputed islands, and ecological terrorism in destroying the South China Sea to build massive naval and air bases to threaten Asia and Oceania. Another PW example is the contrived hysteria regarding Japan's recent activation of a small JSDF amphibious brigade. This unit can, in reality, land only perhaps 600 JGSDF soldiers to re-capture a Japanese island occupied by a hostile force: 600 people is less than the number of passengers inside a single Tokyo *Yamanote Line* subway train at rush hour. However, the PRC is building a 100,000-man Marine Corps, yet there is not a mention of this looming regional threat from the *faux pacifists*.

It is their violence, however, that earns them the title *faux pacifists* and takes simple hypocrisy to a different level--to physical assault and active military sabotage that amounts to terrorism. In pursuit of their anti-defense agenda, radical activists have violently attacked women, schoolchildren, and employees at military installations; fired mortars against JSDF and US bases and at Narita Airport; attempted to cause aircraft to crash, booby-trapped military facilities, sabotaged military and other equipment, and blocked off gates to installations to interfere with essential emergency base functions.³¹

The *faux pacifists'* actions actively support PRC PW against both Japan and the alliance. Accordingly, the PRC invests heavily in Japan to support a pro-Beijing, anti-defense PW campaign. Tactics used in Japan are common to those the PRC uses in the ROC, Australia, the U.S., and other countries.³² The include establishment of *United Front* organizations, entertaining and funding pliable politicians, news media, and academic institutions; and hosting trips visits by eager academics, GOJ officials, and other opinion leaders to the PRC. In Okinawa, another tactic has been to "educate" Okinawans that they are "from the same womb" as the Chinese; that is, persuade them their allegiance is to China and not Japan. Strategies include establishing direct linkages between Okinawan and other Japanese news media organizations and universities to CCP-directed PRC counterparts, and heavy PRC investment in Hokkaido and Okinawa to develop political and economic leverage in what has been termed "a North-South Pinch".

It is long past time for Japan and the US to more openly confront the PRC-aligned radicals in terms of public information, and in terms of their financial and other relations with the PRC. An immediate action would be to establish a Japan-US coordination mechanism that would act like a political campaign "war room" to identify the ever-evolving PRC PW threat and develop

31 Kerry K. Gershaneck, " 'Faux Pacifists' Imperil Japan While Empowering China,".

32 Kerry K. Gershaneck, " 'Faux Pacifists' Imperil Japan While Empowering China,".

Strategic Communications and other responses to confront the common threat. Then each country should begin PW counter-offensives, to include emulating Australia's recent successful public exposure of PRC United Front influence operations.

Alliance Enhancement Possibilities

In addition to the JASA alliance managers' requirement to address the C² issues addressed previously, those managers should consider the following alliance enhancements to ensure JASA helps effectively shape the security environment in support of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Two initiatives that should be implemented include establishment of a standing Combined Maritime Task Force and enhancement of “Archipelagic Defense” through the opportunity offered by America's recent decision to withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia.

Establish Combined Maritime Task Forces Pacific

As stated previously, U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis, at the June Shangri-La Dialogue, called for expanding attention and action in the maritime space because “(t)he maritime commons is a global good, and the sea lanes of communication are the arteries of economic vitality for all.”³³ He also stated that the U.S. will help its partners to build up naval and law enforcement capabilities and capacities to improve monitoring and protection of maritime borders and interests and improve “interoperability” (defined as the ability to integrate the efforts of militaries, law enforcement, and economies) to better support common goals.

A significant step that JASA could take in building up naval and law enforcement capabilities and capacities, as well as interoperability, is to establish a standing Combined Maritime Task Force. This concept, first proposed by noted regional security expert Eric Sayers at CSIS, is modeled on NATO's *Standing Naval Forces Atlantic* construct that was proposed in the late 1960's and successfully operated during the 1970s and 1980s, to deter and if need be, fight, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.

According to Sayers, current policy is “for the United States and like-minded navies to operate independently across the region and only come together on an intermittent basis to exercise.”³⁴ However, he argues that as the PRC's maritime power and reach grow, “the region continues to demand that the U.S. remain engaged in new and innovative ways”. Establishing

³³ James N. Mattis, “Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue,”.

a *Combined Maritime Task Force Pacific* would further “U.S. and regional cooperation to contribute consistently to naval activities across the region and remain committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific maritime environment.”³⁵

The Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFA) was established in 1967 as the first permanent multinational naval unit that operated during peacetime. The SNFA was comprised of 6—to-10 surface ships (destroyers, cruisers, frigates, and support ships) that attached to the squadron for up to six months at a time. Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States were the five permanent contributors to the standing force, and other European nations contributing ships periodically. The SNFA commander reported directly to the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, and command of the squadron rotated among contributing nations.

The squadron demonstrated NATO's ability “to bring significant multilateral naval power to bear at a time and place of its choosing,” notes Sayers. But the real utility, he argues, was that “its permanent and consistent nature allowed contributing navies to work together to build interoperability during peacetime. Instead of conducting intermittent exercises throughout the year, Standing Naval Forces Atlantic gave the alliance a tool to ensure it was always signaling contributing navies' growing alignment and desire to work together.”³⁶

The all-too-quick “knee jerk” response to proposal modeled on NATO experience has often been “Europe of the Cold War era is not the Asia of today, and the NATO alliance is not a useful guide for organizing cooperation in the less cohesive Indo-Asia-Pacific Region of today”. But such facile dismissal of this proposal on those grounds represents extremely narrow and unimaginative thinking--at a time when broad and highly imaginative thought processes are required to meet the rapidly evolving threats and challenges in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region.

From the Indo-Asia-Pacific perspective, the SNFA concept presents a historical roadmap for how to encourage like-minded partners facing shared challenges to contribute more to regional security. Sayers' Asia version, if applied within the well-established JASA, would help expand regional naval cooperation from intermittent exercises into a more permanent effort to

34 Eric Sayers, “Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific,” *War on the Rocks*, June 1, 2108, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/time-to-launch-a-combined-maritime-task-force-for-the-pacific/>.

35 Eric Sayers, “Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific,” *War on the Rocks*.

36 Eric Sayers, “Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific,” *War on the Rocks*.

protect the “free and open Indo-Pacific” maritime environment.

Sayers' vision for the task force's duties includes *conducting port calls across South Asia, Oceania, and into Northeast Asia; conducting exercises, joining existing multilateral exercises, and responding to natural disasters and other emergencies, all while sailing together on a regular basis and building cooperation, trust, and interoperability. One month, the task force might be doing port calls throughout the South Pacific; the next it might join a high-end maritime exercise in the Indian Ocean. The force could then be diverted to help respond to a cyclone in Southeast Asia, after that it might head off to visit Manila Harbor and host ASEAN officials aboard for a dinner before the various members sail together to Hawaii to join RIMPAC 2020.*³⁷

Adapting Sayers' general *Combined Maritime Task Forces Pacific* (CMTFA) concept for JASA implementation would be relatively easy. Assuming Abe's success in broadening the concept of “collective self defense” in Japan's Constitutional debate, and based on past successful JMSDF operations and exercises with other nations abroad, the concept would be politically acceptable with both the U.S. and Japan. Also politically, it would be important regionally and within the U.S. for Japan to formally propose the concept; there is already support within some circles in GOJ for the concept.

The U.S. and Japan would then provide the core naval assets (4-to-6 surface ships, to include embarked U.S. Marines and JGSDF Amphibious Brigade forces and aviation assets), to be routinely deployed. As Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and the U.S. Navy have a long-standing closer working relationship, it would not take long to build the core capacity for C² and interoperability between these two core naval components. Once initial operating capability is established, the MCTFA would be augmented by like-minded countries when possible, to include navies and coast guards from Asian and European partners, as well as from Australia and New Zealand and possibly South America.

It is a given that the PRC will also complain that this maritime combined task force is yet another conspiracy designed to “contain China”. It will use all diplomatic and political warfare means available to it to subvert this new cooperative maritime initiative. Ironically, it is the PRC's increasingly threatening behavior that has set the conditions for such cooperation like this *more possible* than it would have been just a decade ago. So a threatening PRC eager to expand

37 Eric Sayers, “Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific,” *War on the Rocks*.

via “Gray Zone” and “salami slicing” operations is indeed a factor in the establishment of the MCTFA.

Nevertheless, observes Sayers, “potential members of the task force are likely to balk at the idea as Beijing seeks to apply pressure and torpedo the nascent initiative”³⁸ so careful planning and well-conceived strategic communications are required. Among other planning steps Sayers offers to avoid the perception that this will be an “anti-China coalition”, JASA's CMCTFA mission should focus on a specific problem at the outset, and eventually be allowed to grow into a more mature regional concept. The initial focus would be to support those tenets laid out by Secretary Mattis regarding a “free and open Indo-Pacific Region”. Accordingly, the CMCTFA would be established based on a statement of principles that include supporting freedom of overflight and navigation, protection of the maritime ecological environment, and agreement that all disputes should be resolved peacefully.

Operating under these principles, JASA's CMCTFA could become a very significant military tool in helping to ensure both Indo-Asia-Pacific “regional security” as well as “human security”. The latter is particularly important in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, where modern maritime cooperation emerged in the wake of a natural disaster (the 2004 Boxing Day earthquake and tsunami that killed nearly 300,000) and has continued to this day.

To paraphrase Sayers, a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific is sure to take the Japan-American Security Alliance and other prospective members out of their normal comfort zone, but it offers a credible, achievable, and historically proven range of ways to address current and future challenges that cannot be ignored.

Enhance the Archipelagic Defense Strategy

While each country views the challenges to a free and open Indo-Pacific somewhat differently, as addressed previously, the intentions and capabilities of an increasingly threatening, militarily and economically powerful, totalitarian PRC underlie all countries' versions of their Indo-Pacific strategies. The ability of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to increasingly project nuclear and conventional power throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region impacts directly on JASA's ability to help ensure the region remains “free and open”. President Trump's announcement on October 20 that the U.S. will withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

38 Eric Sayers, “Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific,” *War on the Rocks*.

Treaty with Russia offers and option for augmenting JASA's ability to counter PRC aggression in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region.

The reasoning behind this is tied directly to the concept of *archipelagic defense*. Andrew Krepinevich first used the term in a Foreign Affairs article in 2015: this strategy would use America's own anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems to lock down the waters within the “first island chain” and transform the PRC's near seas into what scholars like Michael Swaine and others have described as a “no man's land” in the event of war.³⁹ Such a strategy would be capable of deterring and containing Chinese military aggression without having to place U.S. surface vessels and aircraft at significant risk. The result could be more strategic stability rather than less, according to security analysts such as England's Adam Taylor, for two reasons.⁴⁰

“First, it has the potential to be significantly cheaper (in both money and lives) than relying on incredibly expensive carrier battle groups to maintain sea control,” says Taylor. “The loss of those assets would be such a traumatic disaster for America (with up to six thousand lives lost with a single aircraft carrier, for example) that any U.S. leader would feel immense pressure to immediately and dramatically escalate the scale of the conflict. Instead, cheap, unmanned long-range strike weapons could serve in their place, reducing the chance of crisis escalation.”

Second, asserts Taylor, “with fewer American surface ships required to operate close to China, the tactical necessity for U.S. commanders to strike Chinese missile systems within mainland China as a defensive measure would be reduced. This is significant because, as Caitlin Talmadge explains in the most recent issue of *Foreign Affairs*, China's nuclear weapons are intermingled with its conventional missile forces, and it would be nearly impossible for the United States to strike at China's conventional ballistic missiles without inadvertently destroying elements of China's strategic nuclear deterrent.” As Talmadge explains it: “faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to,” increasing the chances of a conflict going nuclear.

Security Analyst Nathan Levine argues persuasively that America's renewed ability to develop and deploy INF weapons—intermediate range missiles--would be the cornerstone of the

39 Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., “How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-02-16/how-deter-china>.

40 Nathan Levine, “Why America Leaving the INF Treaty Is China's New Nightmare,” *The National Interest*, October 22, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-america-leaving-inf-treaty-chinas-new-nightmare-34087>.

archipelagic strategy.⁴¹

As the then-Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, ADM Harry Harris testified before the U.S. Congress in February of this year, the PRC's "historically unprecedented economic development has enabled an impressive military buildup that could soon challenge the U.S. across almost all domains. Key Chinese advancements include significant improvements in missile systems". These missile systems are of particular concern for both their ability to intimidate nations within the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region and their potential to deny the JASA and other impacted nations the ability to properly respond to military provocations and aggression by the PLA against Japan, the ROC, and others. Harris testified:⁴²

Perhaps nowhere is the PLA making more dramatic progress than in ballistic missiles. While the PLA is rapidly expanding the number, type, and sophistication of all of its missiles, China has made the most progress in intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) technology, with IRBMs now constituting approximately 95 percent of the PLA's overall missile force.

Chinese media routinely trumpets missile developments, carefully noting their missiles do not target any specific country. However, a simple comparison of missile ranges with geography suggests where Chinese missiles would most likely be targeted—SRBMs against Taiwan and U.S. carrier strike groups operating at sea, IRBMs against U.S. bases in Japan and Guam, and ICBMs against the continental U.S. China's pursuit of advanced hypersonic missile technologies portends even greater challenges over the next few years.

Harris also noted that "PLA forces have become more expeditionary and more integrated" in general, and that the PLA Navy (PLAN) "is in the midst of a massive shipbuilding program. If this program continues, China will surpass Russia as the world's second largest Navy by 2020, when measured in terms of submarines and frigate-class ships or larger." The PLAN, which is building a 100,000-man Marine Corps, is emerging as a global naval force, training for combat in open ocean environments, and "operating in more locations, more often, leading to greater

41 Nathan Levine, "Why America Leaving the INF Treaty Is China's New Nightmare," *The National Interest*.

42 Harry B. Harris, "Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command," *House Armed Services Committee*, 2018, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HarrisJrH-20180214.pdf>.

degrees of proficiency”. Often those locations include the Taiwan Straits and the East and South China Seas. In combination with the extended range provided to its PLA Air Force long-range, nuclear strike-capable H-6K bombers from its militarized artificial islands in the South China Sea, the PRC has the ability to rapidly project power from its mainland and artificial island bases. In cases where the PRC's power projection is to coerce, intimidate, or defeat JASA or other partners in the Indo-Pacific Region, is important that JASA enhance its ability to check the PRC's power projection capabilities.

The PRC's *Ministry of State Security* (MSS) was quick to condemn the U.S. withdrawal from the INF treaty as being targeted not so much against Russia as against the PRC. A spokesperson for the *China Institute for Contemporary International Relations* (CICIR), a think tank “front” for the MSS spy agency,⁴³ complained that Trump's decision to “tear up” the INF treaty was really “as sign that Washington was gearing up for a long-term strategic battle with China,” according to a recent *South China Morning Post* article.⁴⁴ This complaint is, of course, merely another variation of CICIR's constant reprise of accusations regarding Western efforts to “contain China”. But this time, there may be some validity to the MSS assessment.

In fact, Trump's decision allows the U.S. (and implicitly JASA) to finally compete with Beijing in building intermediate range missiles previously banned under the treaty, according to Taylor.⁴⁵

The U.S. is pulling out of the INF treaty, which bans the development or deployment of both nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, because of Moscow's repeated violations of it. Moscow reportedly began test flights of a prohibited cruise missile as early as 2008. So the U.S. effectively unilaterally disarmed itself of this useful deterrent weapon, while allowing Russia a 10-year head start in re-developing its INF capabilities. The U.S. is now particularly concerned by a Russian ground-launched cruise missile known as the SSC-8.

The PRC, however, has never been a signatory of the INF Treaty. This has allowed China to

43 Bill Gertz, “Chinese Think Tank Also Serves as Spy Arm,” *Washington Times*, September 28, 2011, <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/sep/28/chinese-think-tank-also-serves-as-spy-arm/>.

44 Kristin Huang, “Donald Trump ‘Targets’ China by Pulling out of Missile Deal with Russia,” October 21, 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2169551/donald-trump-targets-china-pulling-out-missile-deal-russia>.

45 Nathan Levine, “Why America Leaving the INF Treaty Is China's New Nightmare,” *The National Interest*.

build up a vast arsenal of conventional A2/AD weapons, such as the DF-21 “carrier killer” anti-ship ballistic missile, with a reported range of 1,500 kilometers. In 2017, ADM Harris had testified before Congress that the PLA now had the “largest and most diverse missile force in the world, with an inventory of more than 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles.” He added that 95 percent of those missiles would violate the INF Treaty if China were a signatory.

Until Trump's announcement, the U.S. was legally prohibited from deploying this class of weapons as a counterweight, as U.S. President Ronald Reagan did in Europe during the Cold War, to force the Soviets to the negotiating table. While it is questionable whether the PRC would ever be willing to negotiate away its massive INF superiority, U.S. deployment of INF weapons as part of JASA would certainly cause Beijing to hesitate before considering any military aggression in the Indo-Pacific Region.

The U.S. is further along in planning for use of such INF weapons than might be expected, as Congress' annual defense authorization bill has funded research and development into these weapons, specifically making the argument that these weapons could be used to counter China if the agreement were scrapped.⁴⁶ Placing road-mobile INF missiles in Japan would require complicated negotiations, but would be no more difficult than was President Reagan's Herculean—and ultimately successful—campaign to deploy INF missiles within Western Europe to force Soviet concessions. With increased public understanding of the existential threat that the PRC poses to Japan's sovereignty and the sovereignty of friendly Indo-Asia-Pacific nations, and with better-focused efforts on countering PRC and radical anti-alliance activists in Japan, the popular support for such a deployment on Japanese soil is possible.

Conclusion

The strength of the Japan-America Security Alliance is central to successfully achieving both countries' visions for an Indo-Asia-Pacific Strategy, and in support of the broader regional objectives associated with a “free and open Indo-Pacific Region”. The long-standing alliance has built on significant strengths to meet the challenges of the 21st Century, but it must address serious (perhaps fatal) shortfalls to be effective and credible cornerstone for Indo-Pacific security.

Three significant areas for improvement include enhancing JASA and JSDF Command & Control (C²), establishment of a combined maritime task force, and implementation

46 Nathan Levine, “Why America Leaving the INF Treaty Is China's New Nightmare,” *The National Interest*.

of an expanded archipelagic missile defense strategy based the opportunity provided by America's recent announced withdrawal from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia. It is also important that JASA develop capabilities to more effective counter PRC and anti-alliance political warfare operations that undermine public support for necessary JASA reform and enhancements.

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