

支持下一個戰鬥

(SUPPORTING The NEXT FIGHT)

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From terrorism to cyberwarfare to fighting “by, with and through” coalition partners, the past 16-plus years of armed conflict have forced the Army to change. Much of this evolution has involved new hardware such as Predator drones, precision guided munitions and Stryker combat vehicles, but the Army has also grown increasingly reliant on contracted service and support to move, house and sustain its formations.

過去 16 年多的武裝衝突，自恐怖主義到網路戰，再到「由」聯軍、「與」聯軍及「藉由(透過)」聯軍作戰，陸軍已被迫轉型。多半的進步都與新的硬體息息相關：例如掠奪者無人偵察機、精準導引彈藥及史崔克裝步戰鬥車等，但陸軍也更趨依賴委商服務與支援來移動、安置和維持其編隊。

By way of illustration, the Pentagon reported in January that more than 46,000 contractors support the U.S. military in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, with most of them supporting Army operations. The Army's increasing dependency on commercial support stems from several root causes, including force-management limitations, the geopolitical benefits of contracting with host-nation vendors, and internal force structure decisions.

例如，美國國防部在1月的報告中指出，超過4萬6千多名承包商刻正支援在美國中央司令部地區內的美軍部隊；其中多為陸軍的作戰行動。陸軍對商業支援的日漸依賴，源自許多根本要因，即軍隊管理的限制、與駐地國廠商簽約之地緣政治利益及組織內部之決策。

However, senior Army leaders believe the next war may be different. Analysts can't know who, where or when we will fight our next major conflict, but the belligerence of near-peer competitors and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction suggest future clashes will feature more speed, complexity and lethality than recent campaigns.

然而，許多陸軍高階將領相信之後的戰爭可能會不同以往。分析者無從得知下一個主要衝突的對象、地域及時間，但與旗鼓相當的對手間的交戰與大規模殺傷性武器的擴散，顯示出未來的衝突在速度、複雜性及殺傷性將更勝以往。

The increased ability of potential enemies to locate and destroy large troop concentrations with long-range fires will compel formations to disperse and operate in small, highly mobile units with little or no logistical support. These spartan conditions will contrast starkly with the hot meals and creature comforts of forward operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. Comparing future conflict to the brutal conditions on Iwo Jima, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley observed, "We have to condition ourselves for the rigors and the violence of intense combat, if it comes to that."

隨著潛在敵人藉由遠程火力對大部隊集結的定位與摧毀能力的提升，將迫使軍隊在少量甚至無後勤支援的狀況下，採取分散與高機動性之小部隊作戰。這些嚴峻的條件將和位於伊拉克和阿富汗的前方作戰基地所提供的熱食及舒適性形成強烈對比。未來的衝突與硫磺島的慘烈狀況相比，陸軍參謀長馬克·米利

(Mark A. Milley)指出「如果真有這麼一天，我們必須讓自己具備面對激烈戰鬥的嚴酷與殘暴的條件。」

To prepare for that possibility, the Army is revisiting its ability to conduct large-scale combat operations. In October, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command published an important new document, Field Manual (FM) 3-0: Operations, which outlines “how we deter adversaries and fight a peer threat today, with today’s forces and today’s capabilities.” The new doctrine adds a consolidation area to the existing deep, close and support area framework, emphasizes training and preparation for large-scale combat operations, describes corps and divisions as formations rather than simply as headquarters, and focuses on exploiting positions of relative advantage.

為了準備這個可能，陸軍正在重新審視其進行大規模作戰行動的能力。去年十月，美國陸軍教準部發布了一份重要的新文件，即野戰教則（FM）3-0：軍事行動，其中概述了「如何以現有的部隊與能力嚇阻敵人並與匹敵威脅對抗。」新教則在現有縱深、近接及支援地區之架構下，增列固守地區，強調對大規模作戰行動的訓練與備戰，並說明軍團與師的編組不僅是指揮部，並且置重點在善用相對優勢的陣地，更是乘機造勢之所在。

This austere vision of future warfare implies a dangerous and lonely battlefield. The limited logistical support in forward areas would come from automated delivery systems and small groups of fast-moving, well-armed logisticians capable of providing their own force protection. This scenario leaves little room for the phalanx of contractors currently providing battlefield services and support to American combat forces around the globe.

未來戰爭的嚴峻意味著戰場係危險而孤立無援。在前線區域，有限的後勤支援將來自具自衛能力的自動配送系統和小群快速移動與裝備精良的後勤單位。這種景況使那群正在世界各地為美軍戰鬥部隊提供勤務支援的承包商，難以大展身手。

The absence of contractors from the front lines, however, does not reduce the critical importance of contracted capabilities in future conflicts. In fact, the scale and tempo of large-scale combat operations and the constraints of

existing Army force structure will require American commanders to depend even more heavily on contracted capabilities to fight and win the next war.

然而，前線承包商的不足並未降低委商能力在未來衝突中的重要性。事實上，大規模作戰行動的規模和節奏及當前陸軍部隊結構的限制，將迫使美軍指揮官們更加依賴委商的能力來打贏下一場戰爭。

The Army's current allocation of active component and reserve component forces, known as the AC/RC mix, drives its dependence on contracted capabilities. Approximately 80 percent of the Army's sustainment capability resides in Army Reserve and National Guard units, according to FM 3-0.

陸軍目前部署的現役(AC-Active Corps)部隊與後備(RC-Reserve Corps)部隊，稱為現役後備混編隊，助長其對委商能力的依賴性。根據野戰教則 (FM 3-0)，接近 80%的陸軍後勤補保能力，係依賴後備部隊與國民兵提供。

Despite some flaws, this allocation of forces has met mission requirements in the Central Command region, where existing force-management levels and heavy reliance on contractors limit the demand for sustainment forces in theater. Moreover, a predictable rotation schedule, executed under the president's partial-mobilization authority, has enabled reserve forces to mobilize, train and deploy in a deliberate manner while reducing operational demands on active-duty forces deploying from the U.S.

儘管存在一些缺陷，但這種軍隊的配置符合中央司令部防區的任務要求，戰區內現有的部隊管理程度與對於承包商的高度依賴，限制了對後勤補保部隊維持軍隊的需求。此外，根據代行總統授權動員機構的輪調時程，後備部隊能從容不迫地動員、訓練，同時減少從美國本土徵調正規部隊的作戰需求。

Those conditions may not exist in the next war. In a crisis, planners will not have time to alert, mobilize, train and deploy sufficient reserve formations to meet immediate mission requirements. As a 2014 study for the Army's Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command observed: "In general, a company or battalion-sized RC unit could be expected in theater within 60 to

90 days of alert notification. This could be optimistic considering the training time that may be required.”

在下一個戰爭中，那些條件可能不復存在。在危機的緊要關頭，計劃人將沒有時間預警、動員、訓練及調用足夠的預備隊來滿足當前任務之需求。正如 2014 年一份針對陸軍的地面軍事部署暨兵力分配指揮部的研究所述：「通常情況下，一個連級或營級應在緊急動員令頒佈 60 至 90 天內抵達戰區。考量必要的臨戰訓練時間，這可能過於樂觀。」

Reserve commanders have various tools available to abbreviate this timeline, but even best-case scenarios suggest a 30- to 45-day delay before the first units could deploy.

後備指揮官有諸多手段可縮短這個時間，但即使是最甚理想的情況下，首批部隊也要 30 到 45 天的延滯才能派上用場。

In the meantime, commanders must establish and secure lodgment areas and logistical nodes while simultaneously prioritizing flow of forces to build combat power within the designated theater of operations. Beyond setting the theater and rapidly deploying its own forces, the Army must also provide a myriad of common-user logistics to other members of the joint force, from potable water to intratheater trucking to mortuary services.

於此同時，指揮官必須建立並確保宿營地區和後勤節點的安全，並同步安排進駐部隊的優先次序，以便在作戰地區內建置戰力。除了設置戰區並迅速部署部隊外，陸軍還必須為其他的聯合部隊提供飲水、戰場運輸與軍墓勤務等分項後勤瑣事。

Contracted Capabilities

Operational Contract Support (OCS)—the process of acquiring and employing contracted capabilities for military operations—is not the only option for addressing these gaps. In several regions, the U.S. has negotiated agreements with allies to provide host-nation support. During the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, for example, the Kuwaiti government provided

bulk fuel for American forces. Similarly, coalition military partners may provide specific logistical capabilities to U.S. forces, and vice versa.

委商能力

作戰承包商支援（OCS-Operational Contract Support）為軍事行動獲得與雇用委商的過程，並非解決上述問題的唯一選項。在若干地區，美國及盟軍已協請地主國就地提供支援。例如在伊拉克自由行動的早期階段中，科威特政府曾提供美軍大量油料。同樣地，聯軍成員可能會為美軍提供特定的後勤支援能量，反之亦然。

Unfortunately, the scope of logistics necessary to support a large-scale combat operation dwarfs our own organic capabilities and those of our allies. The OCS process provides the most flexible and responsive solution to many of our needs, ranging from basic commodities and facilities to complex supply, maintenance and transportation requirements.

不幸的是，大規模作戰行動所需的後勤支援，使我們建制的能力及盟軍的能力看來相形見绌。作戰承包商支援流程對於日常補給與設施到複合性支援、維修及運輸需求，皆能提供最彈性與靈活的解決辦法。

Current OCS doctrine identifies three types of contracted support. Each plays an essential role in supporting large-scale combat operations. Systems support contracts provide field service representatives who maintain and repair critical weapon systems, such as Patriot missiles and Apache helicopters. Theater support contracts meet specific requirements within a given area of responsibility, often employing local and regional vendors to provide commodities, construction and a myriad of services, from janitors to interpreters to long-haul truck drivers. Finally, external support contracts provide commodities and services on a global scale, usually under preplanned contracts rapidly adjustable to meet short-fuse contingency requirements.

目前的作戰承包商支援教則確定了三種委商支援的型式。每一種都在支持大規模作戰行動中扮演重要角色。系統支援委商是愛國者飛彈與阿帕契直升機等重要武器系統維修的野戰服務對口。戰區支援委商通常藉僱用當地和區域內的供應商在所賦予之責任區域內來提供日常補給品、營建及其他勤務支援，如警

衛保全、傳譯及長途貨運司機。最後，外部支援委商是可快速調整以滿足種種不預期突發狀況的預劃型合約，可在全球範圍內提供日常補給及勤務支援。

Because of their scale and flexibility, external support contracts play a particularly vital role in supporting large-scale combat operations. The Defense Logistics Agency's fuel contract, for example, includes arrangements for transportation, storage and delivery of fuel to U.S. forces deployed around the world and provides commanders with a readily available surge capacity in a crisis.

由於其規模和彈性，外部支援委商對於在支援大規模作戰行動方面扮演著至關重要的角色。例如，國防部後勤署的油料承包，能為在全球各個的部屬的美軍部隊安排油料運輸、儲存及配送等作業，並為處於危機中的指揮官們提供隨時增援的能力。

Economies of Force

Given existing capability gaps and the potential support available from commercial sources, how does the OCS process function within a future large-scale combat operation?

兵力的節約

鑑於目前能力上的缺口與商業來源可能提供的支援，作戰承包商支援流程如何在未來的大規模作戰行動中發揮作用？

First, it provides economies of force, especially during early stages of a contingency when the employment of contracted capabilities helps set the theater. Because active-duty military transportation, supply and maintenance assets are limited, outsourcing deployment and theater-opening functions until reserve support arrives will enable commanders to mass their limited organic sustainment capabilities forward in the close area to support tactical maneuver requirements. In many regions, contractors already maintain pre-positioned fleets of Army equipment, accelerating the Army's ability to project combat power.

首先，它提供了兵力上的節約，特別是在緊急情況的早期階段，利用委商的能力幫助戰區建立。由於現役部隊的運輸、供應及維修資材受限，在預備支援到達前，運用外援完成戰場開設，將使指揮官們具有集中有限的建制後勤補保機能，在近接地區支援戰術行動的需求。在許多地區，承包商已經擁有預置陸軍裝備的能力，加速了陸軍戰力的投射能力。

Second, it provides commanders with flexible, scalable options once decisive combat operations commence. Advanced technology, for example, has not reduced our need for basic commodities such as gravel, lumber and T-walls, all of which can be procured locally. The OCS process also provides commanders with flexible options to house, feed and support units undergoing reconstitution. Furthermore, FM 3-0 identifies commercial support as a major source of support in executing minimum essential stability tasks such as rebuilding infrastructure, restoring government services and providing humanitarian relief.

其次，一旦決定性的作戰行動開始，它為指揮官們提供靈活具彈性的選項。例如，先進科技並沒有減少我們對砂礫碎石、木材及 T 形牆等基本物資的需求，所有這些物資都可以在當地採購。在宿營、食物供給及支援刻正重組的部隊方面，作戰承包商支援流程也提供指揮官們彈性的選項。此外，野戰教則 (FM 3-0) 指出商品物資的供給是執行基礎建設重建、恢復政府機能及提供人道救濟等最低限度的維穩工作要項。

Finally, the OCS process allows U.S. forces to provide coalition partners with unique capabilities in order to move them to the fight and sustain them once they arrive. Operation Valley Wolf, recently executed in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, provides a case study in using contracted capabilities to achieve battlefield effects. Between December 2015 and August 2016, coalition forces commanded by Lt. Gen. Sean B. MacFarland leveraged commercial sources to house, feed, train and equip Iraqi forces in preparation for their culminating attack on Mosul.

最後，作戰承包商流程讓美軍能在盟軍戰友抵達戰場之際，進行部隊運動及維持戰力的獨特能力。近期支援「內部決心作戰行動」的「谷狼作戰行動」，

提供運用委商能力來達到戰場效用的研究案例。於 2015 年 12 月至 2016 年 8 月期間，由尚恩·麥克法蘭(Sean B. MacFarland)中將所指揮的聯軍運用商用資源對伊拉克部隊進行宿營、食物供給、訓練及裝配，以準備在摩蘇爾進行最後攻擊。

During this period, MacFarland's staff coordinated with subordinate maneuver, sustainment and contracting headquarters to identify, synchronize and execute 328 commercial support requirements at a cost of \$878 million. In the final stage of preparation, commercial trucks moved 13 ribbon bridges from Kuwait to critical river-crossing sites in Iraq, then transported the 9th Iraqi Armored Division, including 110 heavy armored vehicles, to staging areas south of Mosul. There, other contractors repaired and refueled equipment while providing base life support to the Iraqis in preparation for the assault. "There's no way we could have done all that without commercial support," MacFarland said.

在此期間，麥克法蘭的幕僚與下級部隊的機動、維持及承包商密切協調配合，以確定、同步執行費用達 8.78 億美元的 328 項商業性支援。在準備工作的最後階段，商用貨車自科威特搬運了 13 條帶狀橋到伊拉克邊界渡河點，然後將伊拉克第 9 裝甲師及 110 輛重型裝甲車運送到摩蘇爾南部的集結地區。在那裡，其他承包商為裝備實施修復、加油，同時為伊拉克人爾後作戰提供日常補給品。麥克法蘭說到：「若無商業支援，我們無法完成這一切。」

Room for Improvement

The OCS process plays a vital role in how the Army will deploy, sustain and fight the next war, but it is no silver bullet. The current process is simply too slow and too complicated. Federal regulations governing obligation of funds and procurement of commercial support provide a constant source of confusion and frustration to commanders and staff officers trying to meet short-fuse battlefield requirements. Multiple layers of review and approval within this process create additional delay and frustration. Meanwhile, host-nation restrictions and agreements further complicate the process.

策進空間

作戰承包商支援流程在軍隊如何調用、維持及後續作戰方面扮演著至關重要的角色，但這不是一帖萬靈丹，當前委外的過程太慢且複雜。聯邦法規要求的經費籌措及商業資源採購程序，對應付突發性戰場需求的指揮官與幕僚們是接連不斷地混亂和挫折的來源。過程中，多層審查和核准程序造成多餘的延誤和挫折。同時，地主國的限制和協議內容亦使過程更加複雜。

In addition, most deployed headquarters struggle to meet the planning, execution and oversight responsibilities involved in employing commercial support. The absence of OCS planners at echelons above brigade severely degrades commanders' ability to anticipate and synchronize commercial requirements during the planning process, while a limited supply of deployable contracting officers hampers execution and oversight once those requirements are identified.

此外，多數被調用的指揮部費力地滿足雇用商業支援相關的計畫、執行及監督責任。在旅級以上的層級缺乏作戰承包商支援的計劃人員，嚴重降低了指揮官在擬定作戰計劃過程中，預估及調節商業需求的能力；即便確定了這些需求執行和監督工作，又因可供調用的委商官員數量不足而受限。

The Army cannot fix all of these problems, but until the current AC/RC mix changes dramatically, the following steps will streamline and simplify the OCS process:

陸軍不能解決所有問題，但當前現役與後備部隊混編大幅改變之前，以下步驟將可以簡化作戰承包商的支援過程：

- Improve requirements development. Units need more tools and better training to develop this skill set. Army Logistics University's two-week OCS course provides comprehensive training on this task, but deployed individuals and units need shorter, more accessible options that can provide automated tools and just-in-time training at remote locations.
- 改善需求。單位需要更多的工具和更好的培訓來發展這套技能。陸軍後勤大學為期兩週的作戰承包商支援課程，提供了此工作相關的綜合培訓但在調用個人和部隊上仍需要更省時、更易於使用的選項，以便在偏遠地區提供自動化工具和即時訓練。

- Maximize use of strategic sourcing. Greater reliance on preplanned, pre-approved strategic sources such as the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program will streamline the OCS process and expand contracting capacity. Strategic sources provide economies of scale to contracting professionals and to units that employ the contracted capabilities they provide.
- 善用戰略資源。依賴預先規劃與預先核准的戰略資源，如民用後勤擴充計劃將簡化作戰承包商支援的流程並擴大委商能量。戰略資源提供具規模的經濟給專業委商人員和雇用他們所提供的合約功能的單位。
- Enhance OCS planning capabilities within maneuver headquarters. The development and fielding of a permanent OCS planning capability at echelons above brigade would provide commanders with an organic capability to integrate, synchronize and manage contract support requirements during current and future operations. At the tactical level, commanders need to incorporate basic OCS information, such as visibility of contractors and equipment, within their common operating picture, so OCS challenges do not impede mission accomplishment.
- 強化機動指揮部對作戰承包商支援的計劃能力。在旅級以上的層級發展和部署一個永久的作戰承包商支援的計畫能力將提供指揮官們於當前和未來的作戰行動中，具備整合、調動及管理委商支援的建制機能。在戰術層面，指揮官們需要將基本的作戰承包商支援資訊（如承包商與裝備的透明化）納入其作戰場景中，避免作戰承包商支援的難題妨礙任務之完成
- Expand collective training at echelons above brigade. Current Army exercises focus on Phase 3 operations, minimizing many of the support functions necessary to set conditions. Establishing realistic limitations on troop lists and requiring routine updates on the number of contractors and equipment within a unit's footprint would add OCS to the staff's battle rhythm while increasing awareness of OCS capabilities and limitations. Separately, the Army should sharpen its ability to project combat power by sponsoring annual theater-opening exercises to synchronize commercial support and other capabilities across the joint logistical enterprise.
- 擴大旅級以上層級的集體訓練。目前的陸軍演習置重點在第三階段的

作戰行動，減少許多狀況設定的支援機能。部隊編組的實際限制因素和要求，對承包商與部隊作戰範圍內的裝備數量做常態性的更新，將有助於幕僚在緊迫作戰節奏中，提升對作戰承包商支援能量與限制之認知能力另外，陸軍應該透過協助年度戰區開放演習，來提高其戰力投射能力，以便在聯合後勤的精神中調節商業支援及其他能力。

- **Expand OCS content within professional military education.** Most Army professional military education courses ignore the topic, despite a specific mandate from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. While the topic is not appropriate for entry-level courses, senior NCOs, warrant officers and commissioned officers need a working knowledge of their responsibilities within the OCS process to prevent waste, fraud and abuse.
- 在專業軍事教育中擴大作戰承包商支援的篇幅。儘管有聯合參謀長主席特別授權，多數陸軍專業軍事教育課程仍忽略此課題。雖然此課題不適合入門課程，但高階士官、准尉及軍官應瞭解作戰承包商支援的流程，與他們相關的責任，以避免浪費、舞弊及濫用等情事。
- **Strengthen contracting force structure.** Recent force-structure decisions significantly reduced the Army's contracting capabilities. During the same time frame, DoD transferred responsibility for contingency contracting administrative support to each of the services, generating an enormous new mission requirement. The Army's contracting workforce is supporting these mission requirements in multiple locations, but it cannot continue to do more with less. Whether large-scale or not, future operations will require a robust, deployable contracting force to support field commanders while assisting the synchronization and execution of contracted support across the theater.
- 加強委商部隊之組織架構。近年來的兵力結構調整，大大降低了陸軍的委商能力。在此期間，美國國防部將緊急簽約的行政支援責任移轉給每個軍種，而產生龐大的新任務需求。陸軍的委商工作人員正在多個地點支援這些任務需求，但它不能只作業而不提供資源。不論規模大小，未來作戰行動都需要一支強大和可調用的委商組織來支援戰地指揮官們，同時協助整個戰區與承包商支援的調節及執行。

Finally, senior leaders should integrate contracted capabilities when and where appropriate to free military units for missions in forward areas. The Army's current AC/RC mix leaves dangerous gaps in our ability to conduct large-scale combat operations. The OCS process enables commanders to fill those gaps with contracted personnel, equipment and facilities, much of it readily available in theater. Moreover, commercial support remains a critical enabler for other types of operations, such as humanitarian assistance, stability and security force assistance.

最後，高階領導者應適時將委商的能力整合，以鬆綁前線部隊諸多任務束縛。陸軍當前的現役與後備部隊混編，在我們執行大規模作戰行動的能力產生諸多差距。作戰承包商支援的流程將使指揮官們能以委商人員、裝備及設施來填補這些差距。此外，商業支援仍然是許多如人道援助、維穩及安全部隊援助等其他類型的作戰行動之關鍵成功因素。

Because of its central importance to the Army, the OCS process deserves more emphasis and attention as we organize, train and equip soldiers to survive and win the next fight.

由於其對陸軍至關重要，為了打贏下一場戰爭，在吾等編組訓練及裝配部隊時，對作戰承包商支援流程應給予更多重視與關注。

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