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Global Anti-terrorism Effort against IS

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Abstract of President Tsai Ing-wen's Inaugural Address

On May 20, 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen sworn in as the 14th president of the Republic of China (ROC). In her inaugural address, President Tsai first of all expressed her gratitude to the people and highlighted the missions and responsibilities entrusted to the new cabinet. She also stressed that amid a difficult situation, the country requires the new cabinet's leadership and the people's support to make a series of reforms possible.

Under the theme of Building a Better Country for the Younger Generation, the inaugural address covers the following five key points:

1. Transforming Economic Structures
2. Strengthening the Social Safety Net
3. Social Fairness and Justice
4. Regional Peace and Stability and Cross-Strait Relations; and
5. Diplomatic and Global Issues

Before the inauguration, much attention had been given both from home and abroad to issues of cross-Strait relations, regional peace and stability, and foreign affairs. A summary of these issues is as follows:

According to President Tsai, the first step of transforming economic structures is to strengthen the vitality and autonomy of Taiwan's economy, reinforce Taiwan's global and regional connections, and actively participate in multilateral and bilateral economic cooperation as well as free trade negotiations such as Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The government will also promote a New Southbound Policy in order to elevate the scope and diversity of Taiwan's external economy and to bid farewell to overreliance on a single market. The government will prioritize its plans to promote five major innovative industries (green technology, the Silicon Valley of Asia, biochemistry technology, smart machinery, and national defense industry) with the goal of reshaping Taiwan's global competitiveness.

In terms of cross-Strait relations and regional peace and stability, President Tsai said that over the past 30 years, Asia and the world have undergone dramatic changes. Taiwan has always played an indispensable role in the region's development. However, in recent years, regional dynamics have been changing rapidly. If Taiwan does not effectively use its strengths and leverage to proactively participate in regional affairs, it will become insignificant and may even be marginalized and lose the ability to determine its own future. At present, Taiwan's economic development is highly connected and complementary with many countries in the region. Through cooperation, Taiwan will not just contribute to the region's innovation but will also contribute greatly to the region's structural adjustment and sustainable development, and expand in particular Taiwan's dynamic relationships with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India. Taiwan is also willing to engage in candid exchanges and pursue possibilities for cooperation and collaboration with the other side of the Strait on common participation in regional development.

For Taiwan to accomplish the goals of regional peace and stability, dialogue and communication are absolutely crucial. The government will establish mechanisms for intensive and routine communications with all parties involved, establish mutual trust, and effectively resolve disputes. The government will handle related disputes in adherence to the principles of maintaining peace and sharing interests. President Tsai said that as she was elected as the president in accordance with the *Constitution of the Republic of China*, it is her

responsibility to safeguard the sovereignty and territory of the ROC. With regard to problems arising in the East China Sea and South China Sea, the government proposes setting aside disputes so as to enable joint development.

Cross-Strait relations have become an integral part of building regional peace and collective security. Therefore, Taiwan will work to maintain peace and stability in cross-Strait relations. The government will make efforts to facilitate domestic reconciliation, strengthen the country's democratic institutions, consolidate consensus, and present a united position to the outside world.

The government will also work to maintain the existing mechanisms for dialogue and communication across the Taiwan Strait. In 1992, the two institutions representing each side across the Strait, through communication and negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings. It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences. President Tsai expressed her respect to this historical fact. Since 1992, over twenty years of interactions and negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated outcomes which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain; and it is based on such existing realities and political foundations that the stable and peaceful development of the cross-Strait relationship must be continuously promoted. The new government will conduct cross-Strait affairs in accordance with the *Constitution*, the *Act Governing Relations between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area*, and other relevant legislations.

By existing political foundations, President Tsai referred to a number of key elements. The first element is the fact of the 1992 talks between the two institutions representing each side across the Strait, when there was joint acknowledgement of setting aside differences to seek common ground. The second element is the existing ROC constitutional order. The third element pertains to the outcomes of over twenty years of negotiations and interactions across the Strait. And the fourth relates to the democratic principle and prevalent will of the people of Taiwan.

For foreign and global issues, Taiwan will proactively participate in international economic and trade cooperation and rule-making, steadfastly defend the global economic order, and integrate into important regional trade and commercial architecture. Taiwan will also not be absent on the prevention of global warming and climate change. President Tsai confirmed that together with friendly nations, Taiwan will safeguard a sustainable Earth.



President Tsai speaks about the new government's goal and vision for Taiwan. (Source: ROC Presidential Office)

The ROC Armed Forces Participates in the 2016 Minan 2 Exercise

In order to improve the country's disaster response capabilities, the Ministry of Defense (MND) and the government of Nantou County in central Taiwan jointly held the 2016 All-out Defense & Disaster Prevention and Relief Exercise (Minan 2 Exercise) at the training center of the National Fire Agency, Ministry of the Interior, on March 24. Representatives from relevant governmental agencies, the MND, city and county governments in central Taiwan, schools, civil disaster relief organizations, and non-governmental organizations took part in the exercise. Then President Ma Ying-jeou, senior officials, and over 100 representatives from 45 countries, including civil defense officials and foreign mission personnel of such countries as the United States, Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asian nations, also observed the exercise, which is part of international exchange programs in the field of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR).

As specified in the *Regulations Concerning Armed Forces Assistance in Disaster Prevention and Relief*, the Armed Forces of the Republic of China (ROC) is charged with providing necessary personnel, equipment, and facilities to support relief efforts in the event of disasters. Annual disaster prevention exercises such as Minan 2 are intended to verify the ROC Armed Forces' ability to work in cooperation with central and local governments in order to respond to disasters in a seamless manner. A total of 815 servicepersons from 14 units, including the Army Aviation and Special Operations Command, the Army's 58th Artillery Command, the Air Force's 455th Tactical Wing, Navy Marine Corps, Nantou Reserve Force Command (county level), chemical groups, engineer groups, communications and information groups, and military police, were mobilized by the 5th Operations Theater (central Taiwan) for the exercise. A total of 190 equipment and vehicles in 36 categories, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), M3 amphibious rigs, amphibious assault vehicles (AAV), life detection devices, and Hummers, were also deployed to support the exercise.

In response to a growing trend toward complex disasters, multiple scenarios, including typhoon, earthquake, debris flow, leakage of toxic chemicals, and outbreak of infectious diseases, were incorporated



M3 and AAV 7 are deployed to support the 2016 Minan 2 Exercise. (Source: Military News Agency)



“Search Ball” is a wireless remote-controlled camera that shoots 360-degree images to locate survivors buried under collapsed structures. (Source: Military News Agency)

An UH-60M helicopter transports the Special Operation Force to perform rescue missions in the exercise. (Source: Military News Agency)

in the three stages of the exercise, which consisted of emergency response, disaster relief, and post-disaster recovery. In his remarks, President Ma noted that since Typhoon Morakot in 2009, the ROC has done much to reinforce its disaster preparedness and response mechanisms, but several recent natural and manmade disasters, such as the Kaohsiung gas explosion in August 2014, the water park explosion in New Taipei City in June 2015, the debris flows triggered by Typhoon Soudelor in August 2015, and the earthquake that hit Tainan in February 2016, have put the response abilities of the ROC government and public to the test. Tragic as they were, the foregoing disasters allowed the ROC to learn more about disaster prevention, response, relief, and recovery, and the resulting experience can be shared with other countries to help them improve their own response capabilities.

President Ma also mentioned that the National Fire Agency Training Center in Nantou has 66 disaster training facilities, and is currently the largest disaster training center in Asia. In addition to training firefighters for the Ministry of the Interior, the center also helps train Armed Forces and other governmental agency personnel. To reach out to other countries, the center conducted an exchange involving firefighting and disaster relief techniques with the Hawaiian National Guard in 2013, and has helped train instructors from the Gyeonggi-do Fire Service Academy in Korea and volunteer firefighters from the Philippines.

President Ma stressed that the ROC has been striving to fulfill a role as a promoter of peace and HA/DR in recent years. Over the past eight years, both ROC governmental agencies, including the MND, and non-governmental organizations have provided timely aid to countries devastated by earthquakes, typhoons, and infectious disease outbreaks. Recent examples include relief missions to Haiti following the earthquake in 2010, to the Philippines and Palau after Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, and to West Africa after the Ebola outbreak. While recognizing the HA/DR efforts made by all levels of governmental agencies, President Ma also encouraged them to stay vigilant for possible future disasters and plan disaster prevention tasks in order to mitigate risks as much as possible.

“One Belt, One Road” Initiative and Its Implications for Taiwan *

Dino R. Tramontani & Hwang Ji-jen

The rise of China has been one of the favorite and most discussed issues in the field of international relations for the past three decades. China has undeniably become, both militarily and economically, a force to be reckoned with, and its intents of attaining a leading role within the Asia-Pacific region (and arguably even globally) have become quite evident by now. While some welcome China’s economic and political rise and see it as a great opportunity for regional and global socio-economic development,¹ others view it with suspicion and even as a threat to regional stability.² Nowhere is this more apparent than in the current territorial dispute in the South China Sea, where six countries, including China and Taiwan, have overlapping claims over the Spratly and Paracel Islands.³

Although China has tried to frame its economic and military rise as a peaceful one, its rise unavoidably represents a threat for the security of Taiwan, not the least because the Chinese Communist Party has vowed to retake Taiwan, by force if necessary, and still has about 1,500 missiles pointing in its direction.⁴ China’s growing international influence has also resulted in the blocking of Taiwan’s attempts to participate in major international organizations, with the United Nations (UN),⁵ the International Monetary Fund,⁶ and the World Bank (WB) being the most notable examples.

In the midst of the rising China debate and its geo-political disputes in East and South China Seas lies the figure of the United States’ military and economic global leadership and its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Many commentators view

China’s assertiveness in its claim of the South China Sea and its building of artificial islands (despite heavy international criticism) as a direct challenge to the US maritime presence in Asia-Pacific, and to further establish itself as a regional superpower.⁷ President Xi Jinping’s new “One Belt, One Road” initiative has equally been framed by some as a means to that end.

Background of the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative

Announced in September, 2013, during President Xi’s visit to Kazakhstan, the “One Belt, One Road” initiative is China’s proposal to revive the ancient Silk Road, which linked East China to the Roman Empire and was used by merchants many centuries ago for trading purposes.⁸ Although called “One-Belt, One-Road,” there is actually not just one particular road but many routes, both land and maritime, whose main objective is to connect the Eurasian continent. There are two interlinked components to this initiative. The Silk Road Economic Belt, which refers to the multiple land routes aiming to create a direct connection between East Asia and Europe, starts from Shaanxi Province in China and passes through Southeast and Central Asia and the Middle East. The road is, ironically, not a land road but the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. It aims to expand and create new shipping routes and develop major shipping ports to connect East and Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, East Africa, and again to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea,

* For clarity, this article uses “China” when referring to Mainland China and “Taiwan” when referring to the Republic of China.



57 founding members sign into the AIIB. (Source: AIIB Official Website)

connecting the maritime and land routes in Venice, Italy.⁹

Some analysts have claimed that the “One Belt, One Road” is China’s third round of opening up to the world economy as a global trading superpower (the first being Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 Open Door Policy, and the second being China’s inclusion into the World Trade Organization in 2001).¹⁰ The initiative has already garnered a lot of media coverage and scholarly debate. China is taking this initiative very proactively, with President Xi claiming that the development of this initiative will be of the highest priority regarding China’s domestic and foreign policy.¹¹

Two major institutions have been established for the purpose of funding the belt and road initiative. First, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), an international development bank (which has been described as the Chinese version of the IMF and WB), was established to fund infrastructure projects and boost trade and investment within Asia-Pacific. The AIIB has 57 founding members, and its capital amounts to US\$ 100 billion, with China being the largest stakeholder with the majority of voting rights. Although the AIIB will provide a major funding source for the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, it is first and foremost an international banking institution and will work as such, which means it can offer commercial loans to countries in

need of capital.¹² The second institution, the Silk Road Fund, is a US\$ 40 billion investment fund owned by the Chinese government, established with the major purpose of investing in countries and businesses along the “One Belt, One Road” initiative.¹³

Skeptics of the belt and road initiative have compared it to the United States’ post-World War II Marshall Plan,¹⁴ with some political commentators claiming that the development of the region is not China’s main interest, but rather it is a way to develop new markets for Chinese overflowing goods and services from state-owned enterprises, secure China’s access to energy sources in the region, gain political leverage in central Asia and the Middle East, and ultimately respond to US’ “rebalancing toward Asia” policy.¹⁵

China has refuted these claims, stating that the “One Belt, One Road” is an initiative that has growth, development, and inclusiveness at its core. The Chinese Communist Party has argued that the main purposes of the initiative are to foster transportation infrastructure, investment and trade facilitation, financial cooperation, and cultural exchanges. German political activist and founder of the Schiller Institute, Helga Zepp-LaRouche, has been a vocal advocate of the initiative and has called it “the most important political initiative on the planet right now.”¹⁶

This initiative is a long-term project (10-20 years) and a very ambitious one indeed. It requires the agreement and collaboration of over 60 countries, which means a wide array of legal environments and tax policies that need to reach consensus on a host of issues. Moreover, according to the IMF, only seven of these 60 countries are developed countries, so the vast majority are in fact developing economies. Many of those countries are dealing with major threats, such as socio-political instability, civil wars, and terrorist organizations. When and if concluded, the “One Belt, One Road” could affect about 60% of the world’s population and 46% of the world’s current GDP.¹⁷

Implications of the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative for Taiwan

In a news release issued by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce, Taiwan is mentioned as one of the entities that China seeks to “deepen the cooperation with,” as it is stated that “[we] should also make proper arrangements for the Taiwan region to be part of this effort.”¹⁸

The most obvious implication for Taiwan and Taiwanese companies is that the “One Belt, One Road” initiative can provide great investment opportunities, which would in turn benefit the Taiwanese economy. Taiwan is a developed, export-led economy, and it is included in the group of advanced economies by the IMF.¹⁹ Taiwan will no doubt have much to contribute to the development of this initiative, and it also stands to gain from it.

Therefore, although this initiative will present many opportunities for export of Taiwanese goods and services, Taiwan needs to step carefully, so that it does not find itself at a deeper disadvantageous position in its relationship with China.

The rapprochement between China and Taiwan promoted by then President Ma Ying-jeou has led to more economic and people-to-people exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. Many Taiwanese companies now have investments, trade, and other economic stakes tied closely to the Chinese economy and financial system, and vice-versa.

The main focus of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative at its initial stage will be on infrastructure development, mainly through the building of pipelines, roads, high-speed rails, and airport infrastructure, to help communicate the nations along the belt and road, thereby facilitating the movement of goods and people. Taiwanese main export goods, such as electronics, semiconductors, basic metals,

plastics and rubber, optical and photographic instruments and chemicals, could be essential at this initial stage.²⁰

However, Taiwan’s over-reliance on China’s economy has inevitably created an imbalance in their bilateral relationship, which so far tilts in China’s favor. Presently, China and Hong Kong are Taiwan’s biggest export destination, amounting to over 40% of Taiwan’s total exports,²¹ a dangerously high percentage considering Taiwan and China’s volatile relationship. Therefore, although this initiative will present many opportunities for export of Taiwanese goods and services, Taiwan needs to step carefully, so that it does not find itself at a deeper disadvantageous position in its relationship with China, which is an increasingly complicated task as China’s economic outreach continues to increase.

Taiwan’s strategic geographic location and its proximity to China can also play in its favor. The South China Sea is a vital maritime route for trade and energy supply from Southeast to East Asia. The volume trade that passes through these waters amounts to roughly US\$ 5.3 trillion, including US\$ 1.2 trillion in goods en route to the US.²² Moreover, about 80% of China’s crude oil imports come through the South China Sea;²³ its importance for the smooth development of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is therefore self-evident.

The initiative may also have a positive impact on Taiwan’s participation in the regional economic integration process. Taiwan has so far been unsuccessful in its attempts of attaining a more prominent role in the regional integration process, managing to secure free trade agreements with New Zealand, Singapore, and a handful of small Central American economies only. Thus, it trails behind South Korea, one of its major economic competitors. Taiwan has expressed interest in joining the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP),²⁴ both of which are rather substantial economic cooperation agreements in the Asia-Pacific region. Taiwan has also applied

to become a founding member of the Beijing-led AIIB.²⁵ However, Taiwan has not become a member of any of these institutions thus far. Taiwan's geopolitical dispute with China continues to be the major hindrance in its efforts of taking a more active role in the international community. The "One Belt, One Road" will most likely not be the catalyst force to change this situation, but it can provide a useful platform to increase cross-Strait interaction and cooperation, which can in turn have a positive spillover in Taiwan's participation in other international organizations and increase its economic collaboration with regional economies.


Perhaps a less obvious benefit of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative to Taiwan is freer movement of people that will inevitably result from it. According to the World Factbook of US Central Intelligence Agency, Taiwan is among the countries with the lowest birth rate in the world, ranking 216 out of 224 in 2015.²⁶ There have been concerns in the island over the long-term negative impacts it may have on Taiwan's economy.²⁷ Taiwan has come to rely on migrant workers for certain sectors of its economy and if the low birth rate trend continues, the island's reliance on foreign workforce will also continue to increase. Taiwan will need the migration of the young, skilled labor from Central and Southeast Asia that will result from the interconnection of countries to palliate this gap and remain a competitive economy.

Although the "One Belt, One Road" initiative represents an important economic development project in the region, China may attempt to use it and Taiwan's participation as a card to win ground in its attempts to reunify with the island. Therefore, as with every aspect of its interaction with China, Taiwan needs to analyze every possible implication thoroughly and move cautiously. The two major conspicuous absentees in the AIIB founding membership are the US and Japan, two critical players in the region and important allies of Taiwan. The US has

warned its allies, including countries like France and the United Kingdom, about joining the AIIB. If China is to accept Taiwan to join the AIIB in the future and to take a more active role in the belt and road initiative, it will require a major diplomatic maneuvering from Taiwan in order to balance its relations between Washington and Beijing.

Conclusion

The "One Belt, One Road" is indeed a major commercial, infrastructure, and socio-political initiative which stands to have important implications both regionally and globally. However, the initiative is still at a very early stage, and there are many problems, both from within and without China, that threaten the successful implementation of the initiative. Taiwan is not the only region that has geopolitical conflicts with China. Besides the territorial disputes in the East China Sea (with Japan) and South China Sea (with Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei), China also



TPP is a US-led free trade agreement Taiwan tries to participate. (Source: US Senate Committee on Finance)

has internal turmoil in the autonomous regions of Tibet and Xinjiang and increasingly in Hong Kong, after the Umbrella Revolution which called for more political autonomy to the region. China also has historical territorial dispute with India over the Arunachal Pradesh region located in Northeast India. Many of these countries and geographic locations are vital for the implementation of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, and these disputes are likely to slow down its process. Furthermore, the over 60 countries that must cooperate with China (and with each other) for the successful conclusion of the project are at very different levels of political and economic development, which means that the

possibility of failure is still quite high. Therefore, Taiwan will need to assess the economic and political implications of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative carefully before deciding whether the benefits outweigh the risks.

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When Islamic State Shifts Its Strategy to Target the Whole World

Chang Li-te & Yang Ya-chi

Since 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or IS), an extremist group derived from al-Qaeda, has been expanding its reach from the Middle East to the rest of the world after declaring its intent to build a global “caliphate” based on the fundamentalist doctrine of Sunni Islam. But while many Western intelligence agencies were previously convinced that IS had prioritized its mission of seizing a strong foothold in Iraq and Syria, a series of overseas terrorist attacks has indicated that IS is also seeking to realize its global goals. Between mid-2014 and early 2016, around 70 terrorist attacks were carried out by IS or its supporters and sympathizers

against 20 countries around the globe,¹ including the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Indonesia, and, most notably, France and Belgium. The multiple attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, killed over 100 people and injured more than 300 people, shocking the world with the magnitude attacks and inducing harsh condemnation of their brutality. Most recently, the bombings in Brussels on March 22, which were said to be retaliation for the arrest of the mastermind of the Paris attacks, again demonstrated IS’s relentless determination. Making a binary distinction between believers and non-believers, IS regards as enemies not only



Ministers of the 66 partner countries of the Global Coalition to Counter the ISIL attend a meeting in Brussels to discuss goals of eliminating the threat posed by ISIL. (Source: US Department of State)

those countries at direct war with it, but also those involved in humanitarian aid for people victimized by IS-related operations. IS's outrageous behavior has triggered not only anger but also widespread fear across the world, making almost every country feel that it cannot be exempted from the possibility of attacks. In response, major countries have been acting unilaterally and/or in coalition against IS in order to contain its spread and prevent its influence from going further. This article first reviews IS's terrorist activities and major countries' responses. It then analyzes several noteworthy trends connected with this growing global security crisis. Lastly, it looks at implications for Taiwan,* which has also been put on IS's list of terrorist attack targets.

IS Terrorist Actions

IS employs three major strategies to guide its actions: terrorize, polarize, and mobilize.² Here "terrorize" implies intimidation of civilians and governments of target countries by broadcasting images of the execution of captives and launching terrorist attacks in these countries. "Polarize"

signifies to play Muslim populations in regions other than the Middle East, particularly in the West, against their governments and seek to increase the appeal of IS among Muslims. "Mobilize" means to incite IS supporters to launch deadly attacks on enemy soil, such as the Paris attacks.

To terrorize its enemies, IS, like other terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, constantly broadcasts images of the extremely cruel execution of captives. Thanks to technological advances, terrorist organizations such as IS are acquiring more tools with which to spread fear and also publicize their ideologies and planned attacks, and attract sympathy and support. What makes IS different from other terrorist organizations in this regard is its emphasis on and sophistication of media use. For example, since 2006, IS has established several media agencies to produce and broadcast CDs, DVDs, posters, pamphlets, and online propaganda products and official statements. In particular, the Al-Hayat Media Center, an IS media agency established in mid-2014, targets Western audiences and produces materials in English, German, Russian, and French,³ showing that IS is serious about using



A Tomahawk missile is fired from the USS Philippine Sea and the USS Arleigh Burke at IS targets. (Source: US DoD)

* For clarity, this article uses "Taiwan" when referring to the Republic of China.

its “media arm” to support its greater cause.

Furthermore, apart from spreading terror with carefully made media materials, IS is also skillful at marketing itself by means of social media, and seeks to appeal to not only likely jihadists, but also loners in other countries. It has been said that IS’s use of media is “probably more sophisticated than that of most US companies.”⁴ With the help of social media, IS presents itself as “an emotionally attractive place where people ‘belong,’ and where everyone is a ‘brother’ or ‘sister.’”⁵ Such a slogan tends to be particularly attractive to marginalized Muslim immigrants in Europe, thus driving these immigrants, who are already dissatisfied with their marginalized social and economic status, further away from the government and mainstream society. Personal frustration, unfair treatment, longing for a sense of belonging, and a search for religious comfort make these immigrants vulnerable to the call of IS, which pursues greater political objectives in the name of Islam.

Apart from Muslim immigrants in Europe, IS is also reaching out to Southeast Asia, which is home to the world’s biggest Muslim population, in an effort to gain more support to its cause. The Australian government has warned of the possibility that IS will attempt to create a caliphate state in Indonesia, and the Indonesian government has confirmed that over 200 Indonesians who had joined IS had returned to Indonesia. The Indonesian authorities fear these militarily-trained sympathizers may launch terrorist attacks in Indonesia, and use social media to develop IS contacts and networks in the Southeast Asia for the purpose of recruiting more members.⁶ After the Brussels attacks, Nurson Wahid, head of the Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers, also warned that some radical migrant workers from Indonesia have started to infiltrate East Asian democracies, including Taiwan.⁷ It appears that IS is now applying the strategy of polarization not only in Europe but also in Southeast Asia.

IS also seems to be successful in mobilizing foreign supporters to come to Iraq and Syria for

IS training to become foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). According to the New York-based security consultancy Soufan Group,⁸ over the past year, the number of people traveling from around the world to Iraq and Syria to join IS has grown to between 27,000 and 33,000. Most of them are from the Middle East (over 8,200) and North Africa (around 8,000), followed by Western Europe (around 5,000). Among the trained personnel from Western countries, 20 to 30% will eventually return to their own countries. Take Germany for example. According to comments made by German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere last year, as many as 750 Germans had traveled to the Middle East to join IS, and about 200 of them had returned to Germany and become potential terrorists.⁹ These developments seem to suggest a new trend of homegrown terrorism, which means that more and more terrorist attacks may be planned in the Middle East before being exported to other parts of the world by FTFs. The Paris and Brussels attacks can be seen as proof of this trend.

International Responses to IS

The international community, coalition forces, major countries, and even non-state actors have been taking a variety of countermeasures against IS. At the international level, the United Nations (UN) Security Council has adopted Resolution 2249 (2015), which states that IS “constitutes a global and unprecedented threat to international peace and security” and calls upon “member states that have the capacity to do so to take all necessary measures, in compliance with international law...to redouble and coordinate their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed [specifically by IS].”¹⁰ This resolution therefore provides an international and legal framework for countries to take actions against IS.

At the coalition level, there is the Global Coalition to Counter the ISIL, which is an US-led group of nations and such multi-national organizations as the European Union (EU), the Arab

League, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC).¹¹ According to a joint statement issued by the Coalition, participants in the Coalition are tasked with supporting military operations, capacity building, and training; stopping the flow of FTFs; cutting of IS finances; addressing associated humanitarian crises; and delegitimizing IS's ideology.¹² In terms of military operations, the Coalition has intensified air strikes against IS strongholds and oil infrastructure, mostly in Syria. Since last fall, the Coalition has also started to conduct air attacks against moving targets, which are mainly IS militants driven out by Coalition-supported local armed forces from cities to the desert. IS oil tankers have also been targeted by the Coalition in an effort to disrupt IS's sources of funds.

Countries including the US, UK, France, and Russia have also taken unilateral actions against IS. Militarily, these countries have focused on air strikes targeting IS bases, leaders, infrastructure, and troops. In particular, the US dispatched an expeditionary targeting force consisting of hundreds of special operations personnel, intelligence agents, and pilots to Iraq and Syria. Members of this force are expected to work with local troops to implement such missions as hostage rescue, intelligence collection, and attacks on/capture of IS leaders.

In light of IS's use of the Internet and social media technologies, the US has been undertaking cyber countermeasures against the group. US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter confirmed that he has given Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) its first wartime assignment in the counter-IS fight. CYBERCOM is tasked with working with other units in the US Department of Defense (DoD) to disrupt IS's command and control of its forces, interfere with its ability to plot against the US and US friends and allies, and eliminate its sources of funding.¹³ It is hoped that American efforts will deprive IS of the effective use of advanced technologies, which have made it such a powerful force online.

As for the efforts made by the Muslim world

to counter IS, in the wake of increasingly frequent IS attacks, Muslim leaders and scholars around the world have spoken out against IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and IS's violent ideology, denying IS legitimacy as a representation of Islam. Shortly after al-Baghdadi declared himself the leader of the "Islamic State," renowned Muslims scholars published a 17-page letter to al-Baghdadi, challenging his claim to be "caliph" and accusing his group's distortion of the Koran to justify its outrageous actions.¹⁴ To counter IS's legitimacy and message, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a 57-member multi-national organization that sees itself as "the collective voice of the Muslim world," has launched a messaging center online to connect senior Muslim scholars through social media, hoping to communicate and resonate with those Muslims who need to hear the correct doctrine of Islam the most.¹⁵

In addition to a direct security threat, IS actions in Iraq and Syria have also triggered an overwhelming refugee crisis that has spilled over into the neighboring European region, and this crisis has called into question the openness and integration that has prevailed in Europe since the establishment of the EU. The Paris terrorist attacks, in which two of the perpetrators had entered Europe by claiming to be refugees, only compounded worries that the influx of refugees might promote further terrorist activities. To prevent IS members from infiltrating into Europe, the EU decided to make a major amendment to the Schengen Accord, which is the agreement that allows the free movement of persons and goods across Europe. A more extreme measure suggested by right-wingers and anti-migration advocates in some European countries is to stop the flow of refugees from the Middle East by reintroducing border controls, which several EU member states have in fact been implementing. However, considering the impact of border controls on the credibility of the Schengen system and the European economy,¹⁶ the European Commission has decided that "restoring the Schengen area, without controls at internal borders, is therefore of paramount



Countless Syrian refugees dislocated by IS seek asylums in neighboring countries and Europe. (Source: US White House)

importance for the European Union as a whole.”¹⁷ To that end, the commission has identified actions in three areas to bring the Schengen system back to normality, while also ensuring border security: addressing shortcomings in the management of the external border by and in Greece, which is the first stop for the influx of Middle Eastern asylum seekers; stopping the wave-through approach to either accepting or refusing access to asylum procedures for refugees; and replacing the current patchwork of unilateral reintroduction of border controls with a coordinated approach to temporary border controls.¹⁸ The effectiveness of the decision, in terms of bringing the Schengen system back to a fully functioning state and safeguarding the security of European borders, remains to be seen.

Non-state actions have also been taken against IS. After the Paris attacks, *Anonymous*, an online hacker organization, announced that it had declared war on IS (by targeting IS accounts on social media).¹⁹ Days after the announcement, *Anonymous* claimed that it had taken down more than 5,000 Twitter accounts of IS supporters. It also released a list of Twitter accounts, email addresses, and web servers of IS members.²⁰ However, the list provided by *Anonymous* has been found to be inaccurate,²¹

and the effectiveness of *Anonymous*’ actions against IS remains unclear.

Security Threats from IS

IS poses both direct and indirect security threats to the Middle East and beyond. In terms of direct security threats, before the Paris attacks, many in the West still believed that IS’s main focus was on capturing more territory and gaining greater power in the Middle East. However, the Paris attacks suggested that, unlike most previous overseas terrorist attacks, which had mostly been committed by IS sympathizers, the attacks in France seemed to have been carefully planned and well supplied, implying that the decision to carry them out might have come directly from IS decision-makers. This reveals the possibility that IS has shifted its strategy to targeting the West.²² Furthermore, IS has been training FTFs in the Middle East. After completing the training, these FTFs may very likely return to their countries of origin to launch terrorist attacks in response to IS’s calls for building a worldwide caliphate.

Apart from extending its reach to the West, IS is also taking aim at Asia, especially Southeast Asia. As mentioned above, IS may want to create a caliphate in Indonesia as one of its initial goals. As a result, better cooperation between Indonesia and other Southeast Asian nations may be necessary to prevent IS from establishing a growing foothold in Asia. However, as the Brussels attacks have shown, changes in the nature of terrorist threats and the lack of adequate legislation make it difficult to use and share anti-terrorist intelligence. While some believe that the Belgian authorities should be held responsible for failing to see signs of the impending attacks, there are also observers who argue that with IS inciting FTFs and lone wolves to launch homegrown terrorist attacks, the nature of terrorist threats has changed. Nevertheless, inadequate legislative empowerment has made it more difficult for intelligence agencies to use available information to track or detain suspected FTFs and lone wolves.

If it is still difficult for the well-integrated EU to determine thoroughgoing mechanisms for member and non-member states to coordinate their intelligence and actions against IS, it will be even more so for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is still a very young and not well-integrated multi-national bloc.

Apart from direct security threats, the unprecedented refugee crisis triggered by IS is also risking a partial retreat from freedom and human rights in Europe. As mentioned above, several European nations have imposed temporary border controls to ease pressure from a growing inflow of asylum seekers and to keep potential terrorists at bay. However, this practice has also undermined free movement across Europe, which is one of the original reasons for the EU's establishment. Although the European Commission has decided to bring the Schengen system back to normality, there are still calls in many European countries that their governments should keep border controls, stop taking in more refugees, send refugees within their borders back to where they came from, and even clamp down on the religious activities of Muslims in their territories. Despite the fact that these calls have not yet been accepted by mainstream political parties, they may have already caused greater divisions between Muslim and non-Muslim

populations, which is a trend that will hamper united actions against IS.

Suggestions for Taiwan

Comparatively speaking, the chance that Taiwan will be attacked by terrorists is relatively low. There may be radical individuals in Taiwan, but there are no radical religious organizations in Taiwanese society, let alone radical Muslim communities. Furthermore, Taiwan has only a very small number of Muslims, who are mostly migrant workers with benign backgrounds. This means that Taiwan does not have a favorable environment for homegrown terrorist attacks or infiltration of terrorist groups such as IS.

However, this does not mean that Taiwan is totally immune from all forms of terrorism. Although a variety of exercises have been carried out annually to gauge governmental agencies' ability to respond to large-scale attacks, the resulting experience and practices have not been publicized widely among the public. In light of this, it is critical to raise public awareness of the possibility of terrorist attacks. Many anti-terrorism experts have pointed out that during the preliminary phase of a terrorist attack, before special operations forces come to the rescue, the public can only rely on

themselves. Therefore, citizens must have relevant knowledge and ability to help themselves. To that end, the government must consult with security experts in producing guidelines to educate the public how to identify suspected objects or personnel, how to keep themselves safe in a terrorist attack, and how to report on-site information and/or images of a terrorist attack to the competent authorities if the situation allows it. These guidelines should be made available to the public and be taught and practiced through programs such as "all-out defense," a program combining the four channels



The ROC Armed Forces have a role to play in anti-terrorism efforts. This photo shows the Special Operation Force taking down terrorists in an exercise. (Source: Chang Li-te)



of school education, social education, on-the-job education, and military education.

The government should also draft an anti-terrorism law as soon as possible for the sake of establishing comprehensive anti-terrorism cooperation mechanisms. This law should specifically identify the authorities and responsibilities of chief units (such as the Office of the Homeland Security) and supportive units (such as the Ministry of National Defense [MND]), so that the chief units can take the lead in coordinating cross-agency anti-terrorism efforts among supporting units. For instance, the MND can play a supporting role by deploying special operations forces, chemical corps, and bomb squads in support of the chief unit's response efforts in the event of a terrorist attack. During peacetime, the MND can also work with

the chief units to study the latest developments in terrorist attacks and conduct joint training based on their findings. In short, it will require both increased public awareness and capabilities, and cross-agency coordination and cooperation, to better prepare Taiwan for possible terrorist attacks.

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China's Military Reforms: An Overview


Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who is also the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Communist Party of China, proclaimed a reduction of 300,000 military personnel at a parade celebrating the 70th anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II on September 3, 2015. Since that time, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has announced a series of important measures to strengthen defense and military reforms. As the 11th reorganization of the PLA since 1952, the current reforms focus on the four aspects of the leadership system, joint operational command system, military size and structure, and troop composition. In addition, these reforms have the overarching goal of ensuring that the CMC is responsible for general affairs, the theater commands are responsible for operations, and the services are responsible for their construction.

Based on the *Opinions of the Central Military Commission on Deepening the National Defense and Military Reforms*, which was issued publicly on January 1, 2016, and reports in the official media, it can be concluded that the current reforms focus on the following four lines of effort:

1. Cutting of 300,000 Military Personnel

Current downsizing plans aim to transform the PLA from “a quantity-oriented to a quality-oriented” organization. By cutting the number of non-combat institutions and personnel and the number of officers, this effort will gradually reduce the military from 2,300,000 to 2,000,000 personnel, while also reducing the dominance of the Army, which accounts for 55% of the PLA's total troops, and rebalancing the percentage of personnel in each service.

Despite the size of the reduction, observers believe that the measure will not weaken the PLA's strength. In fact, since the funds saved from the cut-back can be used to advance naval, air force,



PLA contingent in the Moscow Victory Day Parade in May, 2015. (Source: Presidential Executive Office of Russia, <http://www.kremlin.ru>)

rocket force, information and electronic, and space equipment, the PLA's real strength is likely to be improved. It is also believed that a considerable number of the downsized personnel will be transferred to serve in the armed police.

2. Adjustment of the CMC's Organization

Before the reorganization, the CMC consisted of the General Staff Department (GSD), the General Political Department (GPD), the General Logistics Department (GLD), and the General Armament Department (GAD). These four departments have now been divided into fifteen functional sections, which comprise seven departments, three commissions, and five directly affiliated offices. Although it may seem that the number of units under the CMC has increased, the functional sections have merged former units with overlapping functions, making the organization more streamlined, professional, and efficient. For example, in the case of the GSD, while it formerly had oversight of operational command, military training, military construction, and military management, the new Joint Staff Department is more focused and solely in charge of operational command, while military

training, construction, and management have been assigned to other functional sections or services.

3. Regrouping Seven Military Regions into Five Theater Commands

The PLA's seven military regions (MRs) have now been merged into five theater commands: the Northern, Eastern, Southern, Western, and Central Theater Commands. The Northern Theater Command deals with threats from the north; the Eastern is tasked to respond to situations in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the broader West Pacific Ocean; the Southern is responsible for the South China Sea; the Central guards the security of the capital and can support operations of the other theater commands; the Western, which covers nearly half of China, is to protect the western territory by countering terrorism and ensuring the stability of this part of China.

Unlike the MRs, the theater commands are no longer in charge of the management, construction, and logistics of troops. With the oversight of these missions being transferred to theater command-level service organs, the theater commands can focus on coordinating the joint training of their respective Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force components during peacetime, and joint operational command during wartime. This implies that the theater commands belong to a “theater-level joint operational command system” and are supervised by the “joint operational command authority under the CMC.”

4. Establishment of the Army Leading Organ, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force

In the past, the PLA Army was overseen by the four CMC departments and the seven MRs. Unlike the Navy and Air Force, there was no exclusive leading organ for the Army, and most of the leaders

in the CMC and MRs were from the Army as well. The establishment of the Army Leading Organ (national-level headquarters) will not only be favorable for the construction and modernization of the Army but also for the correction of the original “Army-dominated” system, thus realizing equal footing among all services. In the future, the five theater commands will also establish their respective theater command-level Army organs (as well as Navy and Air Force organs)* responsible for the management and construction of troops, so as to clarify the division of labor between the theater commands and the service organs.

The Rocket Force was formerly the Second Artillery, and is still tasked with the same missions involving core strategic deterrent power. However, some observers have suggested that it will be important to see whether or not the Rocket Force includes the nuclear strike forces consisting of the Air Force's bombers and the Navy's nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), which would make it a “three-in-one” nuclear force. As a response to concerns over the establishment of the Rocket Force, China's Ministry of National Defense has given assurances that China will continue to uphold the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons.

Despite its seemingly low-profile title, the Strategic Support Force will include former electronic warfare (including technical reconnaissance information), cyberwarfare, and aerospace units into its organization, making it essential to “winning local wars under the conditions of informatization.” In contrast with the other newly-established units, many experts are therefore following the development of the Strategic Support Force with particular attention.

China's military reforms are expected to run into numerous challenges, including push-back from individuals with vested interests within the PLA. However, if the reforms are implemented as planned, one can expect that the PLA's joint operational efficiency and capabilities will receive a major boost.

* The Navy organs are established based on the “relevant naval fleets,” and the Air Force organs are established based on relevant air force units.

China's Military Reforms: The Rocket Force

After China initiated its military reforms at the end of 2015, the Second Artillery was upgraded to a full service and renamed the Rocket Force. Unlike the strategic missile forces of other countries, the Rocket Force of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is required to be capable of “both nuclear and conventional strikes,” and have the ability to “deter and strike across the entire defense area.” The former implies that the Rocket Force is equipped with both nuclear and conventional missiles, while the latter indicates that in addition to being used for deterrence, these missiles will also be used in operations. In other words, the Rocket Force will play an important role in both strategic and tactical missions.

PLA missiles used for conventional strikes include the medium-range DF-16, DF-21, and DF-26 (between 1,000 and 4,000 kilometers) and short-range DF-11 and DF-15 (between 600 and 1,000 kilometers). These conventional missiles can threaten the military deployment of the United States and other neighboring countries, providing PLA aircraft

and warships with protection and ensuring their freedom of movement within the First Island Chain.

Despite the improvement in naval and air force weapons and equipment, PLA's reliance on protection provided by conventional missiles shows that the PLA still lacks full capacity for long-range operations. For example, in the case of the PLA Air Force, in the EP-3E incident in 2001, the PLA J-8 fighter scrambling to intercept the US reconnaissance aircraft flew only 110 kilometers from Hainan Island. In 2014, a J-11B fighter of the PLA Navy flew only 220 kilometers from Hainan Island to intercept an approaching US P-8 surveillance aircraft. In addition, the PLA Air Force still relies on aging H-6 bombers as its major long-range aircraft, making its overall air combat capabilities still no match for those of the US. The PLA Air Force will have to wait for the commissioning of J-15, J-16, J-11D, Su-35, and J-20 fighters to see a significant enhancement of its capabilities.

Given that the PLA Rocket Force will also play



DF-16 missiles in China's September 3 military parade. (Source: Asia-Pacific Defense Magazine)



Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System



The PLA Rocket Force is acquiring technologies to break US missile defense systems. This photo visualizes the concept of US missile defense network.
(Source: US DoD)

a role as a conventional strike force, it will have to acquire cross-service/cross-theater joint operation and coordination capabilities. In this context, it was believed that the Rocket Force's joint exercise with the PLA Navy this April was intended to validate the two services' joint operational processes and doctrines. Furthermore, to ensure increased accuracy for its next-generation missiles, the PLA Rocket Force must have the cross-service/cross-theater C4ISR capabilities needed to search for, acquire, target, and track targets. To that end, the C4ISR network must include satellite intelligence, satellite positioning, long-range ISR aircraft (such as aircraft developed based on Y-8 transport aircraft), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), etc. The network must also be able to assess battle damage to its targets and prevent the kill chain from being attacked by enemy. All of these requirements will pose major challenges to the PLA Rocket Force.

The PLA Rocket Force will nevertheless

enjoy several improvements. Given that next-generation missiles now use solid fuel, they are smaller, easier to conceal, more mobile, have better survivability, and allow the PLA Rocket Force to save fueling time. The next-generation missiles can be transported with 8x8 vehicles, which are capable of running on poor quality or unimproved roads, thus facilitating concealment and rapid deployment.

In addition, the PLA Rocket Force is also making progress in acquiring the technologies needed for its missiles to overcome US ballistic missile defense systems, including electronic countering technology, stealth technology, and MIRV (multiple independently reentry vehicle) and MaRV (maneuverable reentry vehicle) technologies. Once these technologies mature, China's neighbors will face major challenges if they wish to counter the PLA Rocket Forces' next-generation missiles, and will have to formulate new, integrated countermeasures.

ODS Seminar of the Month: Recent IS Terrorist Attacks and Their Implications

To better understand IS's terrorist attacks and their implications, the Office of Defense Studies held a seminar on this subject, and invited Dr. Chang Chung-young of Fo Guang University, Dr. Wang Yuh-woei of Central Police University, and Dr. Ou Si-fu of Tamkang University, to share their insights on this topic.

Recent IS Terrorist Attacks Trends

Recent IS terrorist attacks in the Middle East, Europe, Asia and the United States have highlighted several developments. The first of these is the rise of homegrown terrorism. Some observers have held that, since the US began waging the war on terror in the Middle East in 2001, several extremist groups have either been weakened or destroyed, and many foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) recruited from across the Middle East and other parts of the world such as North Africa, Europe, and Southeast Asia, have returned to their own countries. Incited by IS, FTFs and foreign terrorist supporters (FTSs) living in their home countries may launch local terrorist attacks in support of IS's ambition of building a worldwide caliphate, thus spurring the growth of homegrown terrorism.

Second, marginalized immigrants have become new targets for terrorist recruiting. In addition to IS's involvement, European terrorist attacks during the recent decade have seen the growing participation of first or second-generation Muslim immigrants. With limited social and economic resources available to them, many Muslim immigrants in Europe find it hard to blend into the mainstream society, which may lead them toward extremism or radicalism.

Third, changes in the nature of terrorist threats and the lack of appropriate laws in some countries make it more difficult to use and share anti-terrorist

intelligence. Some observers blame Belgium—due to political disagreement, lack of coordination among governmental agencies, and inadequate abilities and resources—for not able to utilize relevant intelligence internally and work with other countries such as Turkey and France externally. However, some believe that with IS inciting FTFs and lone wolves, whose connection with terrorist organizations is usually more difficult to determine, to launch homegrown terrorist attacks, the nature of terrorist threats has changed. Furthermore, inadequate legislation in Belgium has made it more difficult for relevant agencies to use available intelligence to track or jail suspected FTFs and lone wolves.

Implications for Taiwan

IS has put the icon of the ROC national flag on its propaganda video *No Respite*, showing that Taiwan is also one of the targets on its attack list. In addition, after the Brussels attacks, Nurson Wahid, head of the Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers, warned that some radical migrant workers from Indonesia have started to infiltrate East Asian democracies, including the ROC. These recent developments have set off panic among Taiwanese people. Nevertheless, in comparison with Europe, Taiwan has a much lower chance of been attacked by terrorists.

While there may be individual radicals in Taiwan, there are no radical communities—not to mention radical Muslim organizations—in Taiwanese society. An organized terrorist attack typically involves not only masterminds, but also target surveyors, transport coordinators, operational supporters, and technical weapons personnel. The lack of radical communities means it is highly unlikely that Taiwan will face homegrown terrorist

attacks or be infiltrated by FTFs.

Second, unlike in Europe, where a large Muslim population is mostly poorly integrated with the rest of society, Taiwan has only a very small number of Muslims, who are mostly migrant workers. Moreover, a relatively large percentage of the jihadists involved in previous terrorist attacks had engineering backgrounds, and this is different from the educational backgrounds of migrant Muslim workers in Taiwan. As a consequence, objectively speaking, the environment in Taiwan will not be conducive to the growth of terrorism.

However, this does not mean that the chance that Taiwan will be attacked by terrorist organizations is zero. Instead of asking “if” Taiwan will be attacked by terrorists, we should ask “what” precautions Taiwan can take and “how” Taiwan should respond if terrorist attacks do happen. The first step will be for Taiwan to quickly legislate an anti-terrorism law calling for the establishment of well-rounded anti-terrorism mechanisms involving national security agencies, intelligence agencies, border control agencies, the police, the military, etc.

It should be noted that an anti-terrorism law should specifically identify the authorities and responsibilities of chief units (such as the Office of Homeland Security) and supportive units (such as the Ministry of National Defense [MND]) based on the nature of terrorist attacks and anti-terrorism

missions. There should be a chief unit responsible for the planning and coordination of anti-terrorism efforts, and supportive units should work with the chief unit. Take the supporting role of the MND for example. While the MND may have a limited role to play in the prevention of terrorist infiltration, when a terrorist attack occurs, the MND can deploy special operations forces, chemical corps, and bomb squads to support the chief unit’s response efforts. During peacetime, the MND can work with the chief unit to study the latest developments of terrorist attacks and engage in joint training based on their findings.

A second, but equally important, step will be to raise public awareness of responses to terrorist attacks. The public should understand that the response to any security threat, be it natural or manmade, is not the sole responsibility of the government. After 911, US Department of Homeland Security has been educating Americans to notify the authorities of any suspicious or abnormal occurrences—“If you see something, say something.” The government of Taiwan should also educate people to be aware of and sensitive to suspicious situations. The government should therefore work with chief and supportive units to help the public acquire necessary knowledge and ability, so that they know how to react and protect themselves in the event of a terrorist attack.



ODS holds a seminar to discuss terrorist attacks launched by IS and their implications for Taiwan. (Source: ODS)



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