


多重領域戰鬥中陸軍應有之角色調整 (Realign the Army for Multi-Domain Battle)

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Following more than a decade of counterinsurgency focus, the U.S. Army has found itself increasingly challenged by adversaries in Eastern Europe and East Asia who are modernizing their area denial capabilities. As argued by Gen. Mark A. Milley, the 39th chief of staff of the Army, “Land-based forces now are going to have to penetrate denied areas for the rest of the joint force” while having the capacity to “operate in all domains simultaneously.”

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經過十多年對綏靖作戰的關注，美軍終於發現自己日漸遭到來自東歐及東亞，擁有現代化區域阻絕能力對手的挑戰。正如陸軍第三十九任參謀長馬克·亞歷山大·米利所言：當陸地部隊培訓同步執行全方位任務的同時，亦得為其他聯合作戰部隊滲透進入遭阻絕之區域。

Unfortunately for the land power institution, its embrace of brigade combat team (BCT) modularity has left ground forces organized for gradients of general-purpose operations rather than the expeditionary, forcible entry

required to deter and, if necessary, defeat peer competitors. The solution for these challenges lies, in part, in reconceptualizing the U.S. military's traditional advantages through the emerging Multi-Domain Battle concept.

不幸的是，對於地面作戰部隊而言，其擁有的旅戰鬥隊模式化作戰能力，使得他們只適用於一般作戰，而非境外作戰，或依任務需求強迫介入時，須嚇阻進而擊敗其對手。面對這些挑戰的因應之道，在於透過全方位戰鬥概念，重新認知美軍的傳統優勢。

Designed to maximize diverse elements of joint, interorganizational and multinational power to create temporary windows of advantage against complex enemy systems, the Army's incorporation of the idea should be accompanied by optimization of its order of battle to excel against integrated fire and maneuver networks. To that end, it should functionalize its tactical forces to fight as penetration, exploitation and stabilization divisions with corresponding expertise in enabling the vast panoply of American and allied coercive abilities.

陸軍為發揮優勢戰力擊敗來源複雜的敵軍，而組成的聯合兵種與多國部隊構想，應充分運用其戰鬥序列以超越敵軍之整合火力及指揮調度能力。為達此目的，美軍應將戰鬥部隊予以功能化調整，納編美國及盟國具各項威嚇能力之專業人才，成為執行滲透、清剿及綏靖任務之師級部隊。

This forcewide realignment would enable “flexible and resilient ground formations [to] project combat power from land into other domains to enable joint force freedom of action,” as required by Gen. David G. Perkins, commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. While tailored brigades and battalions would feature combined arms with the ability to maneuver in a dispersed manner, optimized divisions would allow functional expertise in rear, close, deep and non-linear contests while maintaining operational tempo throughout rapid deep attacks, decisive assaults, and consolidation of gains. The new order would also bridge tactical and operational divides to allow greater cross-domain integration across the full range of military operations.

這種全軍性的調整，將使作戰部隊享有充分行動自由，以靈活而富有彈性的編組方式，將戰鬥力從陸地投射到其他領域，完全符合美國陸軍訓練暨準則司令部指揮官大衛·傑拉德·柏金斯將軍(Gen. David G. Perkins)之訓令。雖然量身訂製的旅、營級部隊，具有分散機動之聯合兵種特色，但戰力優異之師級部隊，可以在後方、近接、深度及非線性的對抗中運用專業技能，同時透過快速深入之攻擊、致命突擊及鞏固戰果，維持作戰節奏。新的戰鬥序列亦彌補了戰術與決策作為上的分歧，以便在作戰全程獲得充分的跨領域整合。

Dynamic Forced Entry

Empowering joint dynamism begins with creating highly mobile and survivable divisions designed to penetrate complex defenses that increasingly challenge aerial access. These “recon-strike” elements would combine armored and Stryker BCTs; special operations forces; engineers; and multifaceted air defense, indirect, joint, cyber, electromagnetic and informational fires to dislocate and disintegrate adversary defenses across theater depth. As argued by Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, then-director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center, they could “fight their way through long-range weapons fire and gain physical contact with hard-to-find opponents” while striking “from unexpected directions with multiple forms of firepower.”

動態強勢介入

為使部隊具有聯合作戰動能，應創建具備高度機動力及生存能力的師級部隊，在空中航路日益遭受挑戰的狀況下，滲透進入敵方複雜的防禦體系。此種偵察打擊部隊應納編裝甲部隊和史崔克旅戰鬥隊、特戰部隊、工兵、多面向防空、曲射、聯合、網路、電磁及資訊等戰力，以癱瘓、瓦解敵軍縱橫戰場的能力。正如陸軍能力整合中心主任赫伯特·雷蒙德·麥瑪斯特中將(Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster)所說：作戰部隊透過遠程武器，遵循自己的意志，不用與捉摸不定的對手進行近戰接觸，即能藉由多重火力從對手意想不到的方向，予以痛擊。

Exploitation divisions would employ more balanced capabilities to destroy enemy concentrations, clear contested zones and seize key terrain.

Comprising a variety of light, airborne, motorized and mechanized infantry BCTs with modest armor and engineer support—all empowered by

destructive kinetic, electronic and virtual fires—these commands would attack through windows of opportunity created by deep strikes to overmatch paralyzed defenders. While penetrating formations would rapidly bridge air and land component efforts, their more versatile and flexible exploitation counterparts would allow joint commands to decisively shatter adversary warfighting capabilities through intensive fire and maneuver.

這些配備裝甲防護及工兵支援之輕裝、空降、摩托化及機械化步兵旅戰鬥隊所組成的遠征師，採用調配得宜的戰力來摧毀敵人的集結兵力、掃蕩戰場及奪取關鍵地形，並強化機動、電子及隱匿摧毀火力，藉由深度打擊所創造的契機來戰勝指揮系統已遭癱瘓之防守者。儘管面對成員較複雜及組織較靈活的投機型對手，但滲透式的打擊編組可迅速彌合空中及陸地部隊的戰鬥作為間隙，讓聯合作戰指令透過密集的火力與機動力，擊潰敵人的作戰能力。

The third type of division would be made up of elements trained to consolidate gains in order to set the conditions for a sustainable, stable environment, as required by Army doctrine. The command's multifaceted brigades could include tailored civil affairs, informational, combat advisory, military police, light infantry, aviation and special operations elements in partnership with joint, interdepartmental, non-governmental and coalition personnel. These stabilization divisions would be equipped to independently follow penetration and exploitation forces to secure expanding frontages, manage population and resource disruptions, negotiate political turbulence, and support the re-establishment of legitimate security forces and governance.

依照陸軍準則所要求，第三項改進案師須由訓練有素的部隊組成，為持續及穩定作戰環境創造有利條件，以確保既得戰果。其所轄的多面向功能旅，將納編為任務量身訂製的民事、資訊、作戰顧問、憲兵、輕裝步兵、航空兵及特戰部隊等單位，用以和聯合、跨部門、非政府及盟軍人員等協調合作。這些執行維穩任務的師，配備精良且擁有在遠征部隊後方孤軍跟進之能力，確保不斷擴大的戰線、居民管控、資源分配、政治協商及支持合法治安部隊之整建。

Optimizing the Army for offensive strikes, as opposed to a larger spectrum of more ubiquitous missions, would be especially important in strategic

multinational contexts. Since America remains the only power capable of expeditionary campaigns of mass and scale, it should prize and cultivate this singularly coercive capability as its premier contribution to existing and future coalitions. Modernizing divisions, BCTs and battalions for specific missions—as opposed to variations of general-purpose maneuver and security—would allow deeper, if narrower, tactical expertise while maintaining capability of fulfilling globally dispersed obligations for peacetime partnership and deterrence.

強化陸軍攻勢打擊戰力，而非全面參與任務的能力，這在執行多國聯盟的策略關係上尤為重要。由於美國係唯一能夠進行大規模遠距征戰的強國，因此應當鼓勵培養此種獨特的嚇阻能力，為現在及未來之聯盟作出貢獻。將師、旅戰鬥隊及營級部隊進行現代化，以適應特定之任務，而非一般性的戰鬥及維安任務。此舉將有助於和平時期在全球各地維持夥伴義務及威懾能力的同時，仍能保有可深入作戰，或執行一般任務所需之戰術專長。

Prioritize Army Contribution

This realignment would consequently allow the Army to prioritize its singular contribution to the joint force: large-scale, forced entry into contested domains. By restructuring tactical forces according to functionality and purpose, the Army would balance mobility, protection, firepower and operational reach across battlefield time and space to exemplify the operational tenets of simultaneity, depth, synchronization and flexibility. As outlined in Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0: Unified Land Operations, this focus on defeating peer nations with cascading penetration, exploitation and stabilization would ultimately enable joint forces commands to “seize, retain and exploit the initiative while synchronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible.”

優先強化陸軍作為

此次調整最終可讓陸軍，依情勢輕重緩急為聯合部隊作出無可取代之貢獻：大規模被動進入爭戰領域。陸軍將根據功能性與目的來重新整建戰鬥部隊，平衡考量作戰全程所需之機動力、防護力、火力與戰力，並驗證同步、深入、協同及靈活性等作戰原則。正如陸軍準則參考刊物 3-0 所指出：整合式陸戰行動，主

要在以壓倒性之滲透攻擊、追擊及鞏固整頓，擊敗敵對國，最終讓聯合部隊在協同所有作戰行動時，得以掌握、享有及乘勝追擊之主動權，而獲取最佳戰果。

Realignment of Army forces would provide additional value by mitigating some capability and readiness gaps that currently limit operational effectiveness. Beginning with the exercise of theater Army or corps-level Mission Command across increasingly complex environments, functionally designed divisions with control of all ground elements in delineated rear, close, deep or non-linear areas of responsibility would allow improved unity of effort and command throughout and across theater depth. This predictability would allow both Army and joint leadership to task-organize forces, structure Mission Command systems, and resource training programs according to essential penetration, exploitation or stabilization tasks.

陸軍部隊任務調整，將藉由減低影響現行作戰效能之演訓成效與戰備任務間之差距，提升陸軍之額外價值。在日趨複雜的作戰環境中，運用任務編組型之野戰軍團或軍級，以及依功能設計之師級單位，在所律定的戰場後方、近戰區、縱深區或非線性責任區，調動所有的地面部隊，以提升作戰全程統一指揮之功效。如此一來，將使陸軍和聯參領導層級可根據必要之滲透攻擊、追擊或維穩任務，來組建任務兵力、成立任務編組式指揮系統及規劃訓練方案。

The new force structure would likewise begin to address the emergent issue of tactical headquarters survivability due to adversary recon-strike lethality. By optimizing for specific offensive missions, as opposed to “plug and play” architecture, division and brigade commands could apply efficiencies to creating smaller and more mobile command posts. Likewise, commanders could experiment with economizing their perilously large physical, logistical and electromagnetic signatures by placing increased reliance on land component or corps headquarters systems, as they did during World War II under similarly dangerous conditions.

新的兵力結構同樣得考量，敵方偵察打擊殺傷力，對我軍戰術指揮機構之存活威脅。師及旅級指揮部，可依特定攻勢任務，成立小巧靈活之指揮所，而非既定式的編組結構，以提升指揮效率。各級指揮官也可模擬在第二次世界大戰期間之危險狀況，試驗增加對地面部隊或軍級指揮部的依賴性，來縮減隨著龐大部隊實體、後勤及電磁等特性所帶來之戰損風險。

Functionalized divisions and brigades would also mitigate, if not rectify, the Army's dearth of information-collection capacity at higher echelons. As argued by retired Lt. Gen. David Barno in a 2016 Atlantic Council report "The Future of the Army," because the institution lacks dedicated formations at division and corps level to meet demanding battlefield reconnaissance and security missions, entire divisions equipped and trained for recon-strike would fill the capabilities gap. This commitment to decisively win the "deep fight"—a critical requirement to offset the Army's historic lack of maneuver mass—would create cascading windows of advantage and desynchronize enemy networks at early stages of forced entry.

即使不予調整陸軍的角色，依功能性組建的師、旅級部隊亦可解決陸軍上層部隊缺乏情報收集能力的問題。正如退休中將大衛·巴爾諾在 2016 年大西洋理事會的報告“陸軍的未來”中指出：由於陸軍的師及軍級部隊缺乏在戰場執行偵察與警戒等嚴苛任務之專業編組，這些為偵察打擊任務而編訓的師級部隊，正可填補此等能力差距。這種贏得深度戰鬥的果斷作法，係解決陸軍長久以來缺乏調動大部隊能力的關鍵條件，使部隊在被動介入行動的初期階段，創造瓦解敵人組織之壓倒性契機。

A fourth improvement stemming from functional alignment would be prevention of skill atrophy among combat formations during asymmetrically assigned foreign military partnerships. Instead, highly trained recon-strike and assault units would regionally align with similar formations and thus maintain tactical acumen through combined gunneries and maneuver exercises even when deployed.

源自於組織調整的第四項改進案，可防止在與外國軍事夥伴共同戰鬥編組時，因能力參差不齊而彼此拖累之問題。此外，訓練有素的偵察打擊與突擊部隊，

將可在類似編組時與之匹配，並可在整個聯合實彈及實兵演習過程中，或即使實際部署時，仍能保有戰術優勢。

Conversely, stabilization formations would maintain their expertise by adopting stability efforts and peacekeeping missions. These functionally defined partnerships would ensure higher degrees of readiness across the Army while avoiding the cyclic degradation of tactical skills that repeatedly occurred over the previous decade.

相反地，藉由採用維穩及維和任務的作為方式，平穩編組得以保持其專業技能。而定義明確的功能性夥伴關係，亦可確保陸軍的高度戰備水準，同時避免掉過去十年中，重覆發生的戰術技能週期性退化問題。

Optimizing tactical commands by function would offer a final benefit: the elimination of artificial separations among special operations, conventional and enabling forces. By aligning divisions according to space, time and purpose with command over all elements in rear, close, deep or non-linear areas, the Army would meet its requirement, as described in its Operating Concept, to “synchronize the efforts of multiple partners across multiple domains to ensure unity of effort.” This integration, which adversary militaries are already employing, would allow placement of combined arms capabilities at the lowest possible echelons to better create task forces capable of cross-domain and dispersed fire and maneuver.

按照功能性來強化戰術指揮的最終好處，係消除特種作戰與傳統作戰部隊間的人為差距。依照時、空因素及目的來調整師級部隊，使其能夠指揮位於戰場後方、近戰區、縱深區或非線性責任區內的所有部隊，以符合陸軍要求，誠如“在多重領域中協調整合所有部隊，以確保統一作為”之作戰概念所述。此種整合模式(敵軍已經採用)，可組建足以跨領域、具分散配置與機動能力的特遣隊，讓低層級部隊的聯合兵種作戰能力達到所望水準。

Multidomain Dominance

As the Army increasingly shifts focus from stability operations to high-intensity peer confrontation, Milley has cautioned that “the level of uncertainty, the velocity of instability, and potential for significant interstate conflict is higher than it has been since the end of the Cold War in 1989–91.” This means that approaches to multidomain battle must go beyond innovative integration of joint, interdepartmental and multinational efforts to include enhancement of force structure. These changes should organize tactical units within an order of battle designed to simultaneously penetrate and dislocate complex defenses, exploit desynchronization to seize and destroy, and rapidly stabilize and transition war-torn regions.

多領域優勢

隨著陸軍逐漸將注意力從維穩作戰轉移到高強度敵對戰鬥，米利將軍提醒“不確定程度、不穩定的速度以及潛在的重大國際衝突等現象，都比 1989 至 1991 年間之冷戰時代要高出許多”。這意謂多重領域戰鬥的手段，包括兵力結構的提升，必須超越聯合兵種、跨部門與多國性作為等創新性整合。這些變革應該在過往所設計，執行同步滲透及瓦解敵複雜防禦體系之戰鬥序列中，組建戰術部隊，使其具備擴張戰果、攻佔及摧毀等戰力，甚至將遭戰火蹂躪地區迅速轉危回穩的能力。

This forcewide optimization would prove controversial with its orientation on forced entry against a minority of peer adversaries in Eastern Europe and East Asia. Opponents may argue that the Army, as the nation’s premier land power force, should remain structured for a wider array of missions, with broader capability for efforts such as security forces partnership and amphibious warfare. Others might criticize overreliance on resource-intensive armored units and underappreciation of airborne, airmobile and aviation viability against adversary air defense, ballistic and artillery defenses. Integration of Army special operations forces and other low-density elements within unified division commands would likewise find resistance.

這種全軍性的強化變革，將會與原本用來被迫介入對抗少數東歐及東亞敵對勢力之編組方式，格格不入。反對者可能會爭辯說：陸軍作為國家首要的陸上戰力，應繼續保持執行廣泛任務之結構，並具有擔任安全夥伴及執行兩棲作戰等能力。其他人亦可能批評：裝甲部隊過度依賴密集資源，並低估空降、空中機動及航空部隊，對抗敵方防空、導彈及砲兵防禦之能力。但是將陸軍特戰及其他小型部隊，整合建置於整編師指揮下，就會發現他們具備這些能耐。

However, these arguments avoid the reality that the United States faces the potential to be decisively stymied by an improving adversary recon-strike capacity. Only by amending forces to rapidly fight through complex area denial defenses with sustained maneuver tempo can the Army, as argued by Perkins, be capable of executing multidomain battle to deter enemy actions and challenge adversary subversion and “fait accompli territory grabs.”

然而這些論述，忽略美國面臨敵軍正精進偵察打擊能力之事實，致美軍可能陷入進退兩難之困境。因此只有藉由整編部隊，才能以持穩之作戰節奏，於複雜防禦區域進行戰鬥。正如柏金斯將軍所言：陸軍必須有能力於多重領域戰鬥，嚇阻敵人的行動，並挑戰敵手的顛覆及奪回其已到手之地盤。

Just as France in the 1810s and Germany in the 1930s each reconceptualized land warfare, America should empower emerging theory with new doctrine and structural changes to provide realistic expeditionary capability and, more importantly, credible assurance and deterrence.

正如 1810 年代的法國及 1930 年代的德國所作所為，重新界定陸地作戰概念。美國應該以全新的理論及組織結構的變革，提供部隊真實的遠征能力，更重要的是，以具體的安全承諾及威懾能力，來詮釋全新的作戰理論。

The Army’s approach to the Multi-Domain Battle concept should ultimately address current challenges while establishing doctrine, organizational culture and force structure to accommodate emergent tactical trends that demand dispersion, cross-domain expertise and mobile survivability. Aligning along penetration, exploitation and stabilization functions creates theoretical

foundations for incorporating new technologies such as proxy and autonomous robotics, swarming attacks, fleetier armored platforms, miniaturized heavy firepower, and cyber and informational means. Looking further into the 21st century, America's land power institution must embrace dynamism and innovation or risk being neutralized, or even defeated, in the unforgiving crucible of combat.

陸軍對多重領域戰鬥概念的解決手段，在修編準則、組織文化及部隊結構，以適應快速湧來的作戰浪潮之同時，還是得強調現今面臨的挑戰，這當中要求分散、跨領域專業知識及機動生存能力等。配合滲透打擊、追擊及維持穩定等任務功能，陸軍當局應為整合可替代人類之自主機器人、蜂群式攻擊、輕快裝甲載台、小巧化重型火力以及網路資訊等科技，創建理論基礎。

展望 21 世紀，美國陸軍必須具備活力與創新的精神，否則就得冒有在嚴酷戰鬥中，遭受無法抹滅的挫敗風險。

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