



任務式指揮2.0版： 從個人主義到集體主義模式

Mission Command 2.0: From an Individualist to a Collectivist Model

譯者簡介



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ABSTRACT: This article specifies the distinctive character of mission command in the twenty-first century by examining the generalships of Stanley McChrystal and James Mattis. These examples contrast the historical attention to immediate tactical tasks with today's application, which involves a deep and enduring interdependence between commanders across echelons so that decisions are closely aligned.

摘要：本文藉檢視麥克里斯特爾與馬提斯的將帥風範，闡述21世紀任務式指揮的特質，內文案例將歷史上眾所矚目的臨機戰術任務，對比於今日的應用，涵括了各層級指揮官之間的深厚與持久之互賴，因而上下之決心體緊密的契合。

Adopted in the 1980s, mission command is the dominant command philosophy in

American and, indeed, Western armed forces. US Army doctrine states "mission command is one of the foundations of unified land operations. This philosophy of command helps commanders capitalize on the human ability to take action to develop the situation and integrate military operations to achieve the commander's intent and desired end state. Mission command emphasizes centralized intent and dispersed execution through disciplined initiative. This precept guides leaders toward mission accomplishment."¹ By empowering subordinates to take local decisions in line with a superior's intent, mission command accelerates decision-making while simultaneously maintaining operational unity. It is therefore seen as an optimal solution on a complex, fast-moving battlefield.

任務式指揮於1980年代調整之後，儼然成為美國乃至於西方武裝部隊主流的指揮哲學。美國陸軍準則指出：「任務式指揮是統一地面作戰的基礎之一。這種指揮哲學可提升指揮官用人的能力，以創機造勢並統合戰力，達成指揮官之意圖與所望之目標。任務式指揮藉由嚴守主動，強調在統一的意圖下分權執行。引領著領導者圓滿達成任務。」¹藉由在上級之意圖下，下級可在局部下達決心，任務式指揮加速了決策流程，同時維持作戰的一致性。因此，在一個複雜多變的戰場上，此被視為一項最佳解決方案。

Originally developed by German General Helmuth von Moltke the elder based upon German military traditions, mission command reached fruition with Oskar von Hutier's stormtroop tactics in the First World War and the Wehrmacht's *Auftragstaktik* in the Second World War.² It is noticeable that studies of the Wehrmacht's operations, in particular, informed the formal introduction of mission command into Western military doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s.³ While accepting the importance of historical precedents, however, it is also widely recognized that mission command today is not a mere imitation of twentieth-

1 Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), *Mission Command*, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2012), 1-1.

2 Bruce Gudmundsson, *Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-18* (New York: Praeger, 1989); and Robert M. Citino, *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich* (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Press, 2005).

3 John T. Nelsen II, "Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle," *Parameters* 17, no. 3 (September 1987).



century practices. Operational, organizational, and technological transformations have ensured that-while continuities are certainly observable, especially at the level of principles-the actual practice of mission command is necessarily distinctive today. Mission command has evolved.

任務式之指揮，是德國老毛奇元帥根據德國軍事傳統衍生出來的，並在第一次世界大戰時胡蒂爾將軍的暴風突擊隊戰術與第二次世界大戰時德軍的「任務式戰術指揮」開花結果。²尤其值得注意的是，關於德軍作戰行動的研究指出，在1970年代與1980年代，任務式指揮的概念正式引進西方的準則中。³然而，在接受歷史的前車之鑑之同時，世人普遍地認為今日的任務式指揮，不能只是仿照20世紀的實踐方式。在作戰、組織及科技上的轉型—其連續性是顯而易見，尤其是在原則上一任務式指揮的實務必有今日的特點。任務式指揮已然進化了。

This article argues the doctrine of mission command in the twentieth century referred to a very limited devolution of authority relating to immediate tactical tasks. By contrast, mission command today does not involve mere local, individual initiative but rather a deep and enduring interdependence between commanders across levels. Decisions are not simply devolved, as they were in the past, but collectively aligned and coordinated across and within echelons to ensure the coherence of the entire network. Mission command in the twenty-first century involves a new level of organizational integration requiring intense, professionalized teamwork between commanders. This article examines the legend and reality of mission command in the twentieth century and tries to demonstrate the distinctiveness of contemporary practices through an examination of the generalships of Stanley McChrystal and James Mattis.

本文認為20世紀的任務式指揮準則，意味著在臨機的戰術任務中，授權極其有限。相形之下，今日的任務式指揮不僅包括地區性、個人主動，而且在各級指揮官之間還有一種深遠的互賴。在過去的實踐過程中，決心不單只是下放而已，還要在各層級內外齊一意志與協調一致，以確保全體的連貫性。21世紀的任務式指揮涉及了一種新層次的組織整合，而需要指揮官之間專業性團隊密切合作。本文檢視20世紀任務式指揮的實際狀況與傳承，並透過檢視麥克里斯特爾與馬提斯的將帥風範，試圖說明當代任務式指揮的實踐特點。

Mission Command in the Twentieth Century

In his work on mission command, Martin van Creveld contrasts the practices of the imperial German army with those of the British Expeditionary Force. He describes the latter as "the most extreme a form as can be found" where "carefully laid plans rigorously and undeviatingly carried out are regarded as the one way to overcome the inevitable confusion of the battlefield."⁴ The German army, by contrast, developed a highly decentralized system, which "sought to extend the spirit of free cooperation from the highest levels."⁵ Subordinate commanders were given minimum objectives and then encouraged to improvise. Significantly, van Creveld highlights the individualism at the heart of this system, citing 1906 regulations: "Combat demands thinking, independent leaders and troops, capable of independent action." Even more tellingly, van Creveld cites a key sentence from the 1908 regulations: "From the youngest soldiers upward, the total independent commitment of all physical and mental forces is to be demanded."⁶ For van Creveld, German mission command was a decentralized, individualistic system in which, in order to respond to the confusion of battle, subordinate commanders were given freedom to act as they personally saw fit in relation to their immediate circumstances.

20世紀的任務式指揮

在馮克瑞福德的著作中提及任務式指揮時，他將德意志帝國陸軍的實踐方式與英國遠征軍進行對比。他把後者任務式指揮的實踐方式形容成「前所未有的極端形式」，而「將鉅細靡遺計畫，嚴格不違地奉行，做為克服戰場上發生無可避免的混亂之方式。」⁴相對地，德軍發展出一個高度分權的體系，「從最高階層級將自由合作的精神發揚光大。」⁵下級指揮官被賦予最小的目標，然後鼓勵他們要能隨機應變。重要的是，馮克瑞福德強調個人主義是任務式指揮體系的核心。他在1906年的教則中指出：「作戰需要有能獨立思考的領導者與部隊，能夠獨立行動。」甚至還有一項更為明顯的例子，馮克瑞福德從1908年的教則中援引一段重要的句子：「從年輕士兵到以上各階層，在生理或

4 Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 166.

5 Ibid., 169.

6 Ibid., 170.



心理上都必須完全獨立投入。」⁶對馮克瑞福德而言，德軍的任務式指揮是一個分權、個人主義的體系，旨在因應作戰的混亂，下級指揮官被賦予行動上的自由，個人視當前相關之環境適時下達命令。

This argument has been very influential and, indeed, reproduced almost exactly in the most recent works on mission command from such authors as Eitan Shamir.⁷ He traces the evolution of mission command from the initial approach of Prussian Frederick the Great through the von Hutier "stormtroop" tactics in the First World War. Moreover, his discussion of Helmuth von Moltke the elder is important to understanding traditional concepts of mission command.⁸ Although von Moltke planned campaigns carefully with his general staff, he understood that once in battle, unexpected situations would arise.

此一論點影響深遠，確實也在最近大多數有關任務式指揮的著作中被重新提及，沙米爾即是。⁷他回顧過去任務式指揮的演進途徑，從普魯士的腓特烈大帝，乃至胡蒂爾將軍在第一次世界大戰時的「暴風突擊隊」戰術。甚至老毛奇的論點，都是瞭解任務式指揮傳統概念的重要泉源。⁸雖然老毛奇審慎與其幕僚規劃各場戰役，但他也瞭解一旦戰爭爆發，預料之外的狀況就會接踵而至。

Shamir notes "No discussion of Moltke's style of command would be complete without the extraordinary description of him lying on a sofa calmly reading book while the army mobilized to fight Austria." Indeed, J. F. C. Fuller claimed that von Moltke "abdicated his command."⁹ Yet, the scale of operations and the limitations of communications prevented von Moltke from exercising direct command over his forces; laissez-faire was required. Consequently, having designed the campaign, von Moltke was forced to give his subordinate army commanders almost total license to operate independently in any crisis; they would be out of communication at decisive moments. Decision-making was not so much aligned as consciously decentralized. Local commanders acted by reference to their intuition in the light of their

7 Eitan Shamir, *Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

8 Ibid., 36-41.

9 Ibid., 41.

immediate situation.

沙米爾指出，「如果探討老毛奇的指揮風格，不將他揮軍進攻奧地利時，正氣定神閒地在沙發上靜靜地看書一事點出，將是一件憾事。」誠如富勒所言，老毛奇「完全交出其指揮權。」⁹由於作戰規模與通信限制阻礙了老毛奇對其麾下部隊直接行使指揮；不干涉的作法有其必要。因此，由於戰役設計的緣故，老毛奇不得不賦予所屬的各軍團司令，在任何危機中都能獨立作戰的全權；在決定性時刻將不必層層回報。要補充說明的是，決策方式並不是一種刻意的分權行為。地區指揮官一旦遭逢臨機狀況，就可以依照自身的判斷逕自而為。

Communications had improved enormously by the Second World War, but with mechanization, so had the pace of battle.¹⁰ Consequently, the Wehrmacht adopted a similarly individualist, Moltkean model of mission command where local commanders were empowered to act independently in broad reference to their senior commanders: "It has always been a particular forte of German leadership to grant wide scope to the self-dependence of subordinate commanders……Generally, the German high commanders rarely or never reproached their subordinates unless they made a terrible blunder."¹¹ Shamir admits that in the course of the Second World War, Auftragstaktik (mission-tactics command) suffered a decline. But he explains the German method of mission command was, perhaps, the central factor in Germany's combat effectiveness in World War II: "Its de-centralised tradition facilitated organized and effective resistance even while the supreme command had all but collapsed."¹²

到了第二次世界大戰，通信設備雖有大幅改進，但作戰步調也隨著機械化作戰而改變。¹⁰因此，德軍採取一種類似老毛奇個人主義風格的任務式指揮，讓當地的指揮官可以獨立行動：「德軍的領導統御一直存在一項特色，下級指揮官有相當大的自主權……通常上級指揮官甚少、甚至從不責難其下級，除非有重大閃失。」¹¹沙米爾坦承在第二次世界大戰期間，任務式指揮有衰頹趨勢，但他認為任務式指揮或許仍是德軍在第二次世界大戰中戰力的核心：「這種分權化的傳統，使得德軍即便在統帥部已然瓦解的狀況

10 Ibid., 50.

11 Ibid., 50.

12 Ibid., 52.



下，仍能有組織地有效抵抗。」¹²

Karl-Heinz Frieser's work on the legend of blitzkrieg supports Shamir's argument.¹³ While blitzkrieg was invented more or less by accident in 1940, mission command allowed local commanders to act on their initiative in response to their immediate circumstances without consideration or knowledge of the wider situation—for instance, as commander of 7th Panzer Division during the invasion of France, Erwin Rommel "explored new paths in the command of a Panzer Division," which has been taken as the exemplar of mission command.¹⁴ Significantly, at the Meuse, Avesnes, and Arras, he acted all but independently of his corps and army commanders, Generals Hermann Hoth and Hans von Kluge, who often had little idea of his location. Indeed, Shimon Naveh has described Rommel's method as "sheer opportunism."¹⁵ In the German army, Rommel was certainly extreme, and other panzer commanders, such as Hermann Balck, were less cavalier in their application of classic mission command involving ad hoc improvisation in a highly decentralized system.

福萊瑟閃擊戰傳說的文章則支持了沙米爾的論點。¹³閃擊戰或多或少是來自1940年的意外，任務式指揮使地區指揮官能主動作為，以因應當前的狀況，而無須浪費心力在思考或瞭解大的情勢。例如，第7裝甲師師長隆美爾在進軍法國期間，「開發出裝甲師指揮的新方式」，這個案例被視為任務式指揮的典範。¹⁴值得注意的是，在繆斯、阿凡斯內及阿拉斯等地，全都獨斷專行，連軍長霍特跟軍團司令克魯格將軍也時常搞不清楚隆美爾的所在位置。的確，納維曾描述隆美爾的方式為「純然投機主義。」¹⁵在德軍中，隆美爾確實是屬於極端的人物，而諸如巴爾克等其他的裝甲部隊指揮官，在運

13 Karl-Heinz Frieser, *The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005).

14 Frieser, *Blitzkrieg Legend*; Kenneth Macksey, *Rommel: Battles and Campaigns* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1997); Claus Telp, "Rommel and 1940," in *Rommel Reconsidered*, ed. Ian Beckett (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2014); Desmond Young, *Rommel* (London: Collins, 1950); Ronald Lewin, *Rommel as Military Commander* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2003); and Dennis Showalter, *Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2005), 200.

15 Shamir, *Transforming Command*, 51.

16 於下頁。

用典型的任務式指揮時也都是較不墨守成規，尤其是在高度分權體制下的臨時交辦任務。

Jorg Muth makes a commensurate argument in his recent work on officer education in the American and German armies before the Second World War.¹⁶ He compares West Point unfavorably with equivalent German officer training. Right up to the 1940s, West Point instituted a crude pedagogy in which students learned only boorishness and conformity. Individualism was explicitly extirpated from the officer candidates as the US Army strove to impose discipline and a wooden respect for military hierarchy in its students. By contrast, the German army sought not simply to train its officers but genuinely to educate them. It sought to create knowledgeable and questioning individuals capable of creativity, flexibility, and adaptation. Against the Prussian stereotype, German officer training created thinking soldiers, encouraged to assert themselves and to improvise, not mere automatons. In the work of all these scholars, then, traditional twentieth-century mission command is understood to be an individualistic practice based on independence and intuition.

穆斯在近期的著作中，針對第二次世界大戰之前的美軍與德軍的軍官教育進行對比。¹⁶ 他拿位居劣勢的西點軍校跟德國軍官訓練來做同等比較。直至1940年代，西點軍校才有粗糙的教學法出現，但學生所學習到的只是粗淺與整齊劃一。當時陸軍致力於灌輸學生強制性的紀律與僵化的階級服從，個人主義幾已蕩然無存。相對地，德軍對軍官不僅施以訓練，而且還循循善誘他們。培養每一個人都聰明且勇於質疑，使其具備創造性、靈活性及適應性。有別於普魯士人的陳規，德國軍官的訓練在於創造具有思考力的官兵，並鼓勵他們應該要堅持自身立場，能隨機應變，不能永遠只是聽話照做。在這些學者所有的著作中得知，20世紀的任務式指揮可詮釋為基於獨立自主與直覺意識的一種個人主義實踐。

Mission Command in the 21st Century

16 Jorg Muth, *Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II* (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2013).



Scholars have identified the character of mission command in the twentieth century in detail. They have also recognized a revision of mission command today acknowledged in discussions of the Israel Defense Force and its recent operations. In conventional operations up until 1973, simple devolved mission command worked well for the IDF. Then, an individualistic doctrine proved effective. On the basis of it, the IDF developed a highly pragmatic officer class, oriented to practice and to experience, not to theory.¹⁷ The IDF operated on an ad hoc personal basis. In the twenty-first century in Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza, however, this system of mission command has become increasingly inadequate. As war has become more complex and Israel's enemies more sophisticated, "it has now become clear that the practical soldier is no longer enough."¹⁸

21世紀的任務式指揮

對20世紀的任務式指揮，學者們有詳細的定義。當討論以色列國防軍及其晚近戰史時，也認為以軍的任務式指揮與今日我們所認知的有所不同。在1973年以前的傳統戰爭中，以軍將指揮權下放的任務式指揮運作還算不錯，也證明個人主義是有用的。以軍培養出一批極度務實的軍官層級，主要根據實務與經驗，而不講理論，完全依照個人風格遂行作戰。¹⁷然而到了21世紀，無論在黎巴嫩、約旦河西岸、加薩走廊等地，這種方式的任務式指揮已不合時宜。戰爭型態更為複雜，敵人也更聰明，「現在擺在眼前的事實是，實踐型士兵已經不足以因應當前情勢了。」¹⁸

In a recent article coauthored with Uzi Ben-Shalom, Shamir draws a divide between classical twentieth-century mission command and contemporary practice. For these authors, contemporary mission command involves more than just Moltkean deregulation: "Mission command require[s] a certain quality of education and a common language."¹⁹ Yet, the Israeli officer corps never developed a genuinely professional ethos. The education of the IDF officer corps has always been markedly inferior especially to their Western peers. Consequently, "the result is something opposed to mission command, since commanders operating in this spirit

17 Avi Kober, "What Happened to Israeli Military Thought," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34, no. 5 (2011): 708, doi: 10.1080/01402390.2011.561109.

18 Ibid., 723.

19 Ibid., 111.

would act in accordance with their own understanding-not the mission."²⁰ As an individualist practice, the IDF has proved classical twentieth-century mission command is, in fact, increasingly unsuited to the special demands of contemporary operations. Indeed, in many cases, the IDF have descended into directive, centralized command of the most extreme type as they lose faith in their own mission command system.

沙米爾在近期與班夏隆合撰的文章中指出，典型20世紀的任務式指揮與當代實踐之間的區別。對於兩位作者而言，當代任務式指揮不只是涉及老毛奇式的放任：「任務式指揮還需有相當程度的教育與共同語言。」¹⁹不過，以色列軍官團從未開發出一套真正的專業精神。軍官團教育明顯不如西方同儕國家。於是，「在指揮官依其自身認知而行，而非任務，造成某種程度上與任務式指揮背道而馳。」²⁰就個人主義而言，以軍證實經典式的20世紀任務式指揮，愈來愈不適合現代作戰。事實上在諸多案例顯示，隨著以軍喪失在自身任務式指揮體系的信念，渠等也淪落成為指令式、集權式的極端指揮種類。

With his discussion of the IDF, Shamir implies the practice of mission command today has evolved considerably. While he is aware of these changes, however, he does not define the term with any precision, especially in relation to Western forces. Indeed, Shamir's monograph mainly focuses on the failure of British and American forces to implement mission command on operations in the last three decades, preferring long established dirigiste systems. Similarly, although Jorg Muth focuses on the prewar period, he adopts a compatible position. He simply assumes the American Army is still committed to a directive command system. Scholars have, therefore, recognized that mission command is in transition, but they do not examine their evidence insufficient depth to define the scale or the character of the change.

在沙米爾對以軍的探討中，認為今日任務式指揮的實踐已經大幅演進了。雖然他瞭解這些改變，他卻沒有對這個詞作出精確的定義，尤其是關於西方的軍隊。誠如在沙米爾的專題著作中，主要聚焦於英軍與美軍在過去30年來執行任務式指揮作戰行動的失敗經驗，並直指出長期既有的統制體系。同樣的，穆斯的著作雖然內容著重於戰前時期，但他採取的是兼容的立場。他直認為美國陸軍仍是執著於指令式的指揮體系。由此可見，學者們認為任務式指揮處於轉型過程，但他們並沒有深入檢視其立論依據，並對這種改變的特質或規模進行定義。



In fact, mission command no longer refers to mere devolution and individual license typical in the twentieth century but to the ever-closer integration and interdependence of commanders. Crucially, mission command today involves increasing interaction and synergy between commanders. For contemporary mission command, education and shared concepts are required so commanders at every level are oriented to the systemic effects of their local decisions. In contrast with the individualistic practice of the last century, mission command today involves collectivism with commanders united around common definitions and a shared consciousness.

事實上，任務式指揮在20世紀不再只是權力下授與個人授權的特有表徵，而且是更接近指揮官之間的整合與互賴。重要的是，今日任務式指揮涉及指揮官之間漸增的互動與協同。對當代任務式指揮而言，教育與共享概念是不可或缺，如此一來，各層級指揮官在他們局部的決心中都是以系統性的作用為導向。和上一世紀的個人主義實踐不同，今日任務式指揮涉及團體主義，指揮官們是圍繞著共同定義和見解分享上，團結合作。

Two Case Studies

Although a transformation is clearly recognized, there is a lack of detailed analysis about mission command today. This is somewhat anomalous since, with the long-running campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is extensive evidence on which to draw. In Iraq and Afghanistan, modern mission command was repeatedly demonstrated by a number of commanders. Indeed, the practice is thoroughly ingrained into the US Army and Marine Corps. There is an embarrassment of evidence. This article draws upon some of this material. In an article of this length, however, the empirical analysis must be limited. Consequently, it is impossible to prove a transformation of command definitively. The argument must, perforce, be indicative.

兩個案例研究

雖然在伊拉克與阿富汗經歷了長期戰役，多數指揮官也不斷展現出現代任務式指揮。在陸軍與陸戰隊實已深植人心，有太多例證可供引用，但迄今尚欠缺詳細分析。本文亦引用上述例證，但限於篇幅，實證分析亦屬有限，而難以明確印證其中的轉變。任何一項論證都應該有其必然性與指標性。

In this situation, rather than provide a generalized and descriptive narrative, two particularly well-documented case studies will illustrate this transformation of command: Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in Baghdad (2003-2008), and Major General James Mattis, commander of 1st Marine Division during the invasion of Iraq (2003). McChrystal and Mattis practiced mission command in Iraq, constructing novel systems of command for the challenges of contemporary operations. They commanded very different organizations. The 1st Marine Division conducted conventional maneuver warfare; JSOC, counterterrorism missions. Consequently, identifying a compatible practice of command in both headquarters would seem to be evidentially significant.

在這種情況下，由於無法提供通用而描述性敘事，筆者特別挑選出兩件文獻完整的案例研究：時任伊拉克巴格達聯合特戰司令部司令麥克里斯特爾中將(2003～2008年)，以及攻打伊拉克期間(2003年)時任第1陸戰師師長的馬提斯少將，以說明任務式指揮的轉型。麥克里斯特爾與馬提斯在伊拉克實施任務式指揮，建構了新型的指揮體系，以因應當代作戰的挑戰。他們兩人指揮的組織可說是大相逕庭。第1陸戰師遂行傳統的機動作戰，聯合特戰司令部則是執行反恐任務。因此，要在兩個指揮機構中釐清一個兼容的任務式實踐，這種重要性是不證自明的。

Moreover, both generals have another advantage: McChrystal has written extensively about his headquarters while the United States Marine Corps has documented Mattis's command. Consequently, it is possible to develop a sufficiently detailed understanding of their command methods. These cases not only constitute valid evidence of the revision of mission command but also exemplify its precise character. Of course like all samples, McChrystal and Mattis may be outliers, which cannot be refuted here. Since the two studies corroborate each other, however, they suggest the transition might be a much wider phenomenon-mission command has become an increasingly collective practice.

再者，在兩位將軍身上還有另一項優點：麥克里斯特爾曾對其司令部有全面的記述，而美國陸戰隊的文獻中則記錄了馬提斯的指揮。因此，才有可能充分瞭解兩人的指揮方式。這些案例不僅對任務式指揮的轉變提供有效證據，而且也以實際案例來說明任務式指揮確切的特質。誠如所有案例一般，麥克里斯特爾與馬提斯都是局外人，無法



反駁筆者在此所提出的見解。然而，他們都會接受任務式指揮的轉型可能是極普遍的現象，已經逐漸變成集體式的實務。

McChrystal's writings describe how, like other organizations, the armed forces have been radically challenged by new global threats. In particular, the hierarchies, developed in the twentieth century for industrial warfare and in which classical mission command emerged, have become increasingly obsolete. Twentieth-century warfare was complicated, involving the coordination of massive forces. This task was administratively demanding—a mistake could be catastrophic—but missions were relatively simple. In contrast, twenty-first century military problems have become heterogeneous and, above all, complex: "the number of interactions between components increases dramatically—the interdependencies that allow viruses and bank runs to spread; this is where things quickly become unpredictable."²¹

麥克里斯特爾寫到，如同其他組織一般，武裝部隊是如何受到新興全球威脅的嚴峻挑戰。尤其是在20世紀的發展是因工業戰爭而興起的層層節制所引起的，傳統任務式已經逐漸不合時宜。20世紀的戰爭是複雜多變，涉及了大軍的協同合作。這種任務在行政上有所要求—稍有不慎就釀成大禍—但是任務相對單純。相較之下，21世紀的軍事問題已經是由不同因素所組成，總之就是錯綜複雜：在各個組成要素中「互動」之數量大幅增加—互賴也讓病毒傳播與興起銀行擠兌現象；這些都是讓事物迅速變得無法預測的原因。」²¹

In Iraq, McChrystal discovered traditional methods of command were ill-adapted for complex operations and constructed a new network: "We had to unlearn a great deal of what we thought we knew about how war—and the world—worked. We had to tear down familiar organizational structures and rebuild them along completely different lines, swapping our sturdy architecture for organic fluidity, because it was the only way to confront a rising tide of

20 Uzi Ben-Shalom and Eitan Shamir, "Mission Command between Theory and Practice: The Case of the IDF," *Defense & Security Analysis* 27, no. 2 (2011): 112, doi:10.1080/14751798.2011.578715.

21 Stanley A. McChrystal with Tatum Collins, David Silverman and Chris Fussell, *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement* (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015), 57.

complex threats."²²

在伊拉克，麥克里斯特爾發現傳統指揮方法對複合式作戰而言已不合時宜，而建立了一套新網絡架構：「我們必須捨棄許多以往我們對戰爭及世界運作的看法。我們必須拆除熟悉的組織架構，以全然不同的路線重新建立組織架構，同時將僵化的架構轉換成充滿生氣的彈性架構，因為這是面對複合威脅崛起浪潮的唯一方法。」²²

The most important element in this network was McChrystal's command team itself. Here, traditional models of leadership had become obsolete and obstructive: "The heroic 'hands-on' leader whose personal competence and force of will dominated battlefields and boardrooms for generations had been overwhelmed by accelerating speed, swelling complexity, and interdependence."²³ Yet, the mission command McChrystal introduced was also quite novel. In order to realize this intent, McChrystal did not merely devolve decision-making authority to subordinates who acted on their own initiative. He had to create a "shared consciousness" which "helped us understand and react to the interdependence of the battlefield."²⁴

在這個網絡中最重要的因素是麥克里斯特爾本身的指揮團隊。在該團隊身上，傳統的領導統御模式已過時與窒礙難行：「以個人能力與意志力，在戰場上揮灑，在會議室裡一言九鼎的英雄世代，已經被不斷加速、錯綜複雜，而必須互賴的戰場環境所擊敗。」²³ 不過，麥克里斯特爾採用的任務式指揮相當新穎。為了實現這種意圖，麥克里斯特爾不僅下授決策權限予部屬，使他們能在自己的主動下作為。他還創立「共識」，以「協助部隊理解與因應戰場上的互賴關係。」²⁴

One of the central means by which McChrystal created shared consciousness was the daily Operations and Intelligence Brief, at which representatives from every involved agency would share their assessment of the campaign. This brief was "a relatively small video teleconference between our rear headquarters at Fort Bragg, a few DC officers and our biggest bases in Iraq

22 Ibid., 20.

23 Ibid., 231.

24 Ibid., 202.



and Afghanistan. Quickly, though, that audience grew"; "In time, people came to appreciate the value of systemic understanding. O&I attendance grew as the quality of information and interaction grew. Eventually we had seven thousand people attending almost daily for two hours."²⁵

麥克里斯特爾創立共識的核心手段之一，就是每日戰情簡報，在會議中來自各相關部門的代表，共享他們對戰役的評估。這種簡報是「原本供位於布拉格堡後方總部、華府若干官員及位於伊拉克及阿富汗大型基地之間的小型視訊會議」；「歷經領會其價值，且基於資訊的品質及互動，觀測員及情報人員列席者增多。最終多達七千人參加這項每日舉行、長達兩小時的簡報。」²⁵

McChrystal saw the briefing as the principal means of generating shared consciousness and therefore exercising a new form of mission command. Indeed, he actively adopted certain practices to encourage this sense of collective participation and shared cognition: "I adopted a practice I called 'thinking aloud' in which I would summarize what I'd heard." "Thinking out loud can be a frightening prospect for a senior leader" as it risks exposing ignorance and uncertainty. Yet, in the context of JSOC, it had a salutary command effect: "The overall message reinforced by the O&I was that we have a problem that only we can understand and solve."²⁶

麥克里斯特爾將簡報視為產生共識的主要手段，藉此行使一種新型態的任務式指揮。的確，他主動採取特定作為，以激勵集體參與感與共同認知：「我採取一種我稱之為『放聲思考』的作法，而我可以從中歸納出我所聽到的。」「對高階領導人而言，『放聲思考』可能是一個令人卻步的想法」，因為將冒著一無所知與不確定性的風險。不過，在聯合特戰司令部的環境中，則出現一個有益的指揮效應：「觀測員與情報員可強化整體訊息來源，一旦我們遇上問題，透過他們的幫助，我們就可以瞭解並解決麻煩。」²⁶

McChrystal recognized that even as a commander, he could not know everything:

25 Ibid., 164, 168.

26 Ibid., 229.

"Being woken to make life-or-death decisions confirmed my role as a leader, and made me feel important and needed-something most managers yearn for. But it was not long before I began to question my value to the process. Unless I had been tracking the target the previous night, I would usually know only what the officers told me that morning……My inclusion was a rubber stamp that slowed the process, and sometimes caused us to miss fleeting opportunities."²⁷

麥克里斯特爾坦承即使身為司令，他也不可能無所不知：「每當醒來要做出生死決策時，就更加確認我身為領導者的角色，這讓我覺得自己是重要且為人所需要——這是大部分管理者渴望追求的。但是過不了多久，我就會開始質疑我處理事情的價值。除非我一直都能掌握前一個晚上的目標，否則我通常只記得幕僚早上告訴我的事情……我的本質就像一個只會蓋准字的橡皮圖章，還會推延流程，有時候會使我們錯失稍縱即逝的機會。」²⁷

Accordingly, McChrystal implemented a heightened form of mission command in JSOC, empowering commanders at the local level to prosecute missions-but always in line with the collective consciousness of the organization. McChrystal specifically drew on the example of British Naval Commander Horatio Nelson who

據此，麥克里斯特爾在聯合特戰司令部執行一種增強型的任務式指揮，賦權給地區層級的各個指揮官，以執行各項任務——但是要遵循組織的集體共識。麥克里斯特爾特別列舉英國海軍指揮官納爾遜將軍的案例。

"had told his commanders 'No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy,' but that broad authority could have gone terribly wrong if he had not spent decades cultivating their individual qualities as decision makers, and if they had lacked an overall understanding of the force and the battle as a whole. This was Nelson's equivalent of shared consciousness, and it was only because of that his captains could thrive as empowered agents in a chaotic melee."²⁸

「他曾告訴麾下指揮官，『艦長只要能將戰艦與敵併列，就大致不會出錯，但若未

27 Ibid., 202.

28 Ibid., 215.



經數十載養成他們的決策本質，或對自己的部隊及戰場欠缺整體瞭解，則大方向就可能搞擰。這就是納爾遜的共識分享，也是何以戰況危殆之際，經授權的各艦長仍能目標一致奮勇向前的主因。」²⁸

Although McChrystal mentions the "individual qualities of decision-makers," it is important to note that he does not use Nelson as an exemplar of laissez-faire mission command. On the contrary, in Iraq, McChrystal created a federation of commanders, linked together in a closely integrated network, able to cue actions reflecting the collective goals. His subordinates exercised their individual qualities as decisionmakers precisely insofar as they were already members of an integrated team: "The term 'empowerment' gets thrown around a great deal in the management world, but the truth is simply taking off constraints is a dangerous move. It should be done only if the recipients of new found authority have the necessary sense of perspective to act on it wisely."

雖然麥克里斯特爾提及「決策者的個人特質」，但在此特別要指出的是，他並沒有用納爾遜這種放任式的任務式指揮來當成典範。相反地，麥克里斯特爾在伊拉克創造出一種指揮官聯盟模式，在一個密切整合的網絡中將彼此鏈結，使提示能反應共同目標的任務。他的部屬執行他們的決策者個人特質時，是完全在一個整合的團體之中：「賦予權力這個詞在一個管理領域的世界中雖然招致不少批評，但真正實情卻是單純只解除限制會更加危險。唯有獲得授權者能明智採取行動，才有可能劍及履及。」

To distribute command authority accordingly but to retain simultaneously unity of command, McChrystal developed a policy of "Eyes On, Hands Off." He monitored his subordinates, confirming they were acting in line with his intent without seeking to manage them. McChrystal both liberated his subordinates and drew them into an evercloser relationship with him and their colleagues. In this way, decisionmaking at every level was closely synchronized. Using a new lexicon of terms like "shared consciousness" and "empowerment," McChrystal adapted and advanced existing concepts of mission command. In place of individual license, he created a professional team whose members were mutually oriented to collective intentionality.

因此，為了要有條不紊地分配授權，卻同時能保留指揮的一致性，麥克里斯特爾研

擬出一種「眼到，不插手」的策略。他督導所屬，只確認他們的行動與上級意圖相同，而不去管他們的大小事。麥克里斯特爾對其所屬指揮官採取自由態度，同時將他們帶進他與他們同僚所形成的緊密關係中。依照這種方式，各個層級的決策都是密切同步的。麥克里斯特爾調整且精進任務式指揮的概念，使用了一個像是「共識」與「賦權」的新詞彙。為了代替個人授權，他創造一個專業的團隊，其中的成員相互引導對方，最後達成集體的共識。

It might be argued McChrystal was only able to adopt this distinctively collective system of command because of technological imperatives. He enjoyed the most advanced communications and information system of any US commander in history. In fact, while digital communications and surveillance were certainly not irrelevant to McChrystal, his command method cannot be reduced to mere technology. On the contrary, digital technology potentially allowed McChrystal to operate a highly centralized, directive system precisely because real-time, high-fidelity video feeds were available to him. By contrast, he actively constructed a confederated system. He employed technology not to oversee his subordinates but to unite their activities and to coordinate their decision-making, forming a tightly articulated but flexible network. The technology was not employed to eliminate individualism-as it could have been-but rather to develop an integrated command community.

吾人或許可以主張麥克里斯特爾能夠採取這種特殊的集體型任務式指揮是科技進步所致。他享有歷史上任何一位美軍指揮官前所未有的最先進通信與資訊系統。事實上，由於數位通信與監視跟麥克里斯特爾的指揮方式息息相關，所以科技將影響他的指揮方法。換言之，數位科技潛在地使麥克里斯特爾能準確地遂行高度集中化、直接式的體系，因為他能掌握即時、高擬真的影像。相較之下，他主動地建構一套聯盟式的指揮體系。他雖然善用科技，但卻不去監控所屬，而是去統合他們的行動與協調他們的決策，塑造出一個緊密明確且具彈性的網絡。科技並非用來削弱個人主義，它可以用來發展出一個整合式的指揮社群。

Although the operational conditions in which Mattis was working were quite different, he did something very similar with the 1st Marine Division. Instructively, while McChrystal's



command system exploited the most advanced digital technology available to US forces, Mattis's division notably lacked information technology. It was eventually supplied with Blue Force Tracker equipment, but the division constructed its own ad hoc communications system before the operation with procured commercial videophones, video teleconference suites, and Iridium phones.²⁹ The relative paucity of the 1st Marine Division's information and communication technology suggests that while digital communications have certainly assisted the revision of mission command, it cannot be reduced to them. Contemporary mission command represents a transformation in professional expertise and practice, not merely available technology.

雖然馬提斯所處的作戰條件大不相同，但是他在第1陸戰師所做的一切與麥克里斯特爾有異曲同工之妙。發人深省的是，麥克里斯特爾的指揮體系利用美軍現有最先進的數位科技，但是馬提斯的師相當缺乏資訊科技的資源。馬提斯的部隊雖然最後引進了「友軍追蹤者」系統，但師在作戰之前，還是會以購來的商規視訊電話、視訊會議套件，以及銓衛星電話建構專屬的通信系統。²⁹ 從第1陸戰師的資訊與通信科技相對缺乏的狀況中得知，雖然數位通信必定有助於任務式指揮的修正，但任務式指揮的效能不必然會受到數位通信的影響而減少。當代任務式指揮的意涵是在專業知識、作為上的轉型，而非僅視可用的科技為何。

Like McChrystal, Mattis consciously implemented the doctrine of mission command, laid out in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting.³⁰ "His style of command is a function of the mission concept from army and marine maneuver warfare laid out in Warfighting. He follows those tenets 'to a T.' It is all about intent and guidance. Everything that can possibly be done by direct communications with commanders should be done that way-through his intent and guidance. Opportunities are fleeting and you have to make sure that commanders are in a position not to have to second guess their decisions (i.e. to require direction from above)."³¹

29 Michael S. Groen, *With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003: No Greater Friend, No Worse Enemy* (Quantico, VA: History Division, Marine Corps University, 2006), 83-86.

30 Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC), *Warfighting*, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1997), 50.

31 Colonel Clarke Lethin, (assistant chief of staff, G-3, 1st Marine Division), interview with author, July 19, 2016.

Indeed, Mattis consciously understood himself to be implementing the precepts of mission command: "Commander's intent is straight out of Marine Corps doctrine, as written by Al Gray, 10 years ago. It demands a higher level of discipline."³²

和麥克里斯特爾一樣，馬提斯也瞭解到運用任務式指揮的準則，陸戰隊第1號準則出版品《戰鬥》³⁰也對任務式指揮進行解釋，「馬提斯的指揮風格是從《戰鬥》準則中，衍生自陸軍與陸戰隊機動作戰而來的一種指揮概念功能。他『適切地』遵循那些教則，其講求意圖與指導。經由他的意圖與指導，每件事應該如何做，都能藉由直接與指揮官們進行溝通。機會稍縱即逝，你必須確認各個指揮官能一次到位，而不用再去猜測他們的決定為何」(意即需要上級直接的指令)。³¹的確，馬提斯察覺到自己不斷在執行任務式指揮的規則：「如同10年前格雷所寫下的文字，指揮官意圖直接源自於陸戰隊準則。而且它需要較高層級的學養。」³²

The commander's intent was central to Mattis's method of command.³³ Crucially, Mattis established speed as the center of gravity for the 1st Marine Division in his intent and impressed its importance upon all his subordinates; indeed, one of his regimental team commanders was removed precisely because he failed to implement this principle. Unless the division could quickly react in Baghdad and depose Saddam. Hussein, the operation would deplete its supplies and potentially generate regional and international political opposition.

指揮官意圖就是馬提斯指揮方法的核心。³³重要的是，馬提斯意在為第1陸戰師建立以速度為主的重心，並對所屬強調其至關重要；誠然，有位馬提斯的團長，就是因為未能嚴格執行這項原則而斷然遭到解職。在當時情況下，除非陸戰師能夠在巴格達迅速作出反應，而且擊潰海珊政權，否則作戰行動將遭遇補給線中斷，可能還會引起區域與國際政治的反對聲浪。

Moreover, the commander's intent was only as effective as Mattis's subordinates understood, accepted, and implemented it. Following the precepts of Warfighting, it was here

32 General James Mattis, interview, January 23, 2004.

33 Michael L. Valenti, *The Mattis Way of War: An Examination of Operational Art in Task Force 58 and 1st Marine Division* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2014), 48.



that Mattis demonstrated his greatest skill.³⁴ Mattis invested great effort in creating a command fraternity able to enact his intent. Before deploying to Iraq, Mattis issued his "Commanding General's Staff Guidance" to his regimental and battalion commanders, his division principals, and special staff. The guidance was also communicated orally in a series of visits to his units; indeed, the guidance constituted his notes for his briefing. It is a deeply interesting document which provides a privileged insight into the way he built a command team in the 1st Marine Division.

再者，馬提斯所屬的部隊長也能有效地理解、接受及執行指揮官的意圖。遵照《戰鬥》準則，馬提斯將自己的技能發揮至最大。³⁴ 他也致力於營造指揮情誼，以利執行其意圖。在調至伊拉克之前，馬提斯頒布「師長的參謀指導」給所屬團長與營長、師部主管，以及特業參謀。該項指導透過一系列視導單位行程中，以口語方式進行傳達；的確，在馬提斯的簡報中，該項指導成為他的論述基調。這是一項非常令人矚目的文件，獨特之處為他在第1陸戰師中建立了一套團隊合作的方式。

One of the most important principles was the equality of all commanders in the division. Radically, Mattis stressed: "All of us are [Marine Air Ground Task Force] MAGTF leaders." Unusually, Mattis believed all commanders, at whatever level, were distinctive. They constituted a special status group within the division, unified by their decision-making responsibilities. He worked hard to create a special relationship with each of his subordinate commanders down to battalion and even company level. Later in the guidance, he elaborated upon the point: "Accused of making subordinate commanders my equal—that is good—I stand guilty. I don't need to call the plays so long as the plays will gain my endstate/intent. I don't want subordinates on a string like puppets, but I expect them to energetically carry out my intent."³⁵

最重要的原則之一就是在師裡面所有的指揮官都是平等的。馬提斯極為強調：「我們都是陸戰隊陸空特遣部隊的領導人。」不尋常的是，馬提斯相信不論在任何層級的所

34 HQMC, Warfighting, 51.

35 James Mattis, "Commanding General's Staff Guidance," 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, August 14, 2002, 4.

有指揮官，都是獨一無二的。在師裡面，他們各自構成一個地位特殊的團隊，並透過決策責任團結在一起。他致力於與所屬部隊長建立一種特別的關係，向下至營級，甚至還到連級。後來在「師長的參謀指導」中，他詳細說明此點：「有人指責我認為下級指揮官一律平等的觀點，能勇於表達不同意見的立場是一件好事，但我寧願承擔這個罪責。因為我不需要長時間要求所屬人員，就能按照我的意圖，獲致我所欲之終局。我不想要下級指揮官像一個穿著線的木偶，我期望他們積極地執行我的意圖。」³⁵

An officer who was a battalion commander with the 1st Marine Division in Iraq and subsequently worked on Mattis's staff noted the difference: "With the relationship commander to commander, you have responsibility. You are placed there for the commander. He gives you his will, personality, force-and trust. That was not his relationship with his staff. It is much more demanding to work for him as staff. It was a privilege to be both. But he had a different relationship with his staff."³⁶

一位在伊拉克第1陸戰師曾任營長的軍官，而且後來成為馬提斯的參謀，他指出了不同之處：「在指揮官對指揮官的關係之中，你負有責任，因為你在師裡面是一位指揮官。馬提斯給予你他的意志、品格與力量，還有信任。而這種關係是有別於他和參謀的關係。這比參謀所做的工作要求還要多更多。不管是成為指揮官或參謀，這都是一項殊榮。但是馬提斯與參謀之間卻是不同的關係。」³⁶

Specifically, Mattis sought to replace a traditional military hierarchy with a unified team. Indeed, Mattis employed sporting metaphors to communicate unity. Rather than directing operations from above, he saw himself as a coach or perhaps a quarterback calling plays from within the action, a first among equals rather than a superior. Naturally, commanders in this team were not equal; however, mission command was anything but a license for subordinates to do as they pleased: "Don't screw with higher commander's intent, missions, tasks."³⁷

特別之處在於馬提斯企圖用一個團結一致的團隊，來取代傳統的軍隊階級制度。的

36 Interview with a marine, March 15, 2016.

37 Ibid., 4.



確，馬提斯運用了運動譬喻來傳達團結一致，而不是從上下達作戰指令，他認為自己是位教練或是四分衛，在場中指揮比賽進行，在平等之中的首要就是不要成為上級督導官。指揮官在團隊中本質上不可能平等；然而，任務式指揮是授權所屬能做他們想做的任何事情：「不要搞砸高階指揮官的意圖、任務與交辦事項。」³⁷

In order to generate a common consciousness among his commanders, Mattis exploited standard planning methods such as the drill Rehearsal of Concept (ROC). Of course, Mattis was in no way unique in using sandtables, tactical models, or Rehearsal of Concept drills to prepare his troops for battle. Models of this type had been used at the division and corps level since the First World War and their use at higher levels can be traced back to the late-eighteenth century. But Mattis dramatically intensified their significance, consciously seeking to draw his commanders together as a decision-making community.

為了要在所屬指揮官之中建立共識，馬提斯採用諸如「構想預演」演練的標準規劃方法。當然，馬提斯絕非使用沙盤、戰術模式，或是「構想預演」演練，從事部隊的戰備整備的第一人。自從第一次世界大戰以來，在師與團的層級中就已經採用這種模式，在較高層級的運用更可以回溯至十八世紀末期。但是馬提斯特別強調其重要性，刻意將其所屬指揮官聚集在一起形成一個決策社群。

Before the operation began in Iraq, the 1st Marine Division conducted a series of Rehearsal of Concept drills.³⁸ In August 2002, when the division was first warned they were possibly deploying to Iraq, Mattis decided to conduct a rehearsal maneuver on a scale model of Iraq constructed in front of the "White House," the division's headquarters building, with over 6,000 Lego blocks representing every vehicle in the division. After arriving in Kuwait, the marines completed two additional drills in the desert on February 7 and 27, 2002, using two large Olympic swimming pool sized model sandpits made with bulldozers.³⁹ Commanders wore distinctively colored football jerseys with the unit's call sign to distinguish the units from each other.

38 Groen, With the 1st Marine Division, 109-12, 126-8.

39 Lethin interview.

在伊拉克的作戰行動開始之前，第1陸戰師實施了一系列的「構想預演」演練。³⁸ 在2002年8月，當陸戰師預先被告知有可能調至伊拉克時，馬提斯決定在師部的「白宮」前方設立一座伊拉克縮小模型，並用了6千餘塊樂高積木代表全師所有車輛，實施機動預演。另外，在抵達科威特後，陸戰隊員在沙漠中完成兩次額外演練，分別在2002年2月7日和27日，使用由推土機推出兩個大型奧林匹克泳池規模大小的沙坑。³⁹ 各個指揮官穿著不同顏色、有單位呼號的橄欖球衣，以區別彼此不同。

On the basis of these drills, Mattis and his staff were able to draw definite deductions about plausible and impractical schemes of maneuver—for instance, after formulating the invasion plan the division learned Task Force Tarawa would be assigned to their area of operations with a mission of securing its lines of communication around Nasiriyah. Mattis opposed the order on the basis of the Lego drill:

"Adding Tarawa, which was crossing in front of the divisional line of march and stopping in the middle of it; it was going to conflict with [Regimental Combat Team One] RCT-1. It was going to create friction. We knew that was going to occur but we didn't know how much. We had covered that one though. When we saw Task Force Tarawa briefing their move to the [Marine Expeditionary Force] MEF, I said: 'You won't be able to do that. We are on the main effort and you are now on the same road at the same time.'"⁴⁰

在這些演練的基礎之下，馬提斯及其參謀能明確推演出合理與不符實際的機動計畫。例如，在模擬進攻計畫之後，陸戰師瞭解到塔拉瓦特遣隊將被派遣至他們的作戰區，任務是要確保在納希里耶周邊的通信線暢通。在樂高積木演練的基礎上，馬提斯不同意這項命令。

塔拉瓦特遣隊加入之後，該部隊將會跨越陸戰師的前進路線，而且停留在中央；這樣將與第1團戰鬥群相牴觸，產生摩擦。我們知道這將會發生，但不知道會有多嚴重。即便我們有掩護團戰鬥群的想法。當我們看到塔拉瓦特遣隊提報進入陸戰隊遠征軍時，我表示：「你們不能那麼做。因為我們都是主力部隊，而你們這時卻用了我們的路線。」⁴⁰

40 General James Mattis (commanding general, 1st Marine Division), interview with author, June 4, 2016.



This was an important episode: it showed the drills also allowed leaders in the division to anticipate and practice decision-making. By anticipating alternative scenarios, the two jersey drills allowed the 1st Marine Division to predict when a decision might have to be taken and, therefore, accelerating or even eliminating decision-making during the actual operation. The identification of decision points was indispensable to the application of mission command because the points effectively presented subordinate commanders with anticipated decisions. Subordinate commanders were already cued to the kinds of situations they would face, the sorts of decisions which they might have to make, and the way that General Mattis and the division wanted the decisions to be made. The "commanders knew the second and third order effects of their possible decisions, based on the commander's intent and guidance."⁴¹

這是一個重要的情節：它凸顯演練也可讓陸戰師內的領導者一同參與且練習做決策。藉由參與非傳統的想定，兩隊橄欖球衣的演練方式，使第1陸戰師能預測做完決策之後的情勢走向，因此也能加速甚或減少在實際作戰行動時的決策時間。在任務式指揮的應用上，能有效地辨識出決策點的時機至關重要，因為這意味著所屬指揮官都共同參與決策。所屬指揮官都已經預想到他們所將面臨的狀況，或許也已經演練過各種類型的決策，而這就是馬提斯將軍與陸戰師所望之決策方式。「根據指揮官的意圖與指導，指揮官們瞭解第二、第三道命令對決策所產生的影響。」⁴¹

The ROC drills impressed Mattis's intent upon commanders collectively orienting them to a coherent pattern of action even when they were not copresent. In order to facilitate accurate and coherent decision-making in line with the commander's intent, the 1st Marine Division also deployed nominated staff officers to those decision points in Iraq: "We gamed out where the friction points were likely to be. Myself and Colonel Kennedy performed that function of the division. We would be at the friction point, for instance, when the Division was splitting on its line of march. I was free to roam to a friction point when they needed someone there to assist."⁴²

41 Ibid.

42 Lethin interview.

「構想預演」演練強調馬提斯的集體導向，意在使所屬指揮官能達成一致的行動模式，即便他們沒有同時在現場。為了要促成正確且一致的決策，同時符合指揮官意圖，第1陸戰師也派遣指定的參謀軍官至那些在伊拉克的決策點：「我們推演出可能會有摩擦點之處。我本身與甘迺迪上校共同維持陸戰師的運作。例如，當陸戰師部隊在分進線時，就會產生摩擦點。而當部隊需要某人來協助時，我就會在摩擦點附近晃蕩。」⁴²

Mattis's method of command was by no means original. Indeed, Mattis himself has denied he was doing anything novel at all. Most of the techniques he employed like his intent, building a command team, and using models were all well-established practices; however, Mattis intensified these methods to such a degree that the mission command he exercised in Iraq was of a different order to the ad hoc decentralization typical of the twentieth century. His subordinates did not act on their individual initiative or instinct. Their decision-making was facilitated insofar as they were all bound together in a highly developed team with a shared understanding of the operation. In many cases, the decisions subordinates "made" were in fact already anticipated and collectively agreed upon in the course of the ROC drills. As Mattis emphasized, this system of mission command demanded far more discipline and professionalism; it no longer involved mere individual freedom and independence. It stood in direct contrast to the Moltkean tradition.

馬提斯的指揮方式並非獨創一格。的確，馬提斯本身也認為他所從事的事情並不新穎。他所運用的大部分技巧，像是意圖、建立指揮團隊，以及使用模型，均行之有年；然而，馬提斯強化這些方法的程度，使他在伊拉克實行的任務式指揮，走出一條不同於20世紀特有分權模式的路徑。他的所屬指揮官並沒有根據個人主動或是直覺就採取行動。他們的決策精進方式是他們聚集在一個高度發展的團體，在團體內可以分享對作戰的見解。在許多案例中，所屬指揮官做出的決策，其實早已經預先準備過了，而且大家在「構想預演」演練的課目中，就已取得集體共識了。誠如馬提斯所強調的，任務式指揮體系相當要求紀律與專業素養；它不再只是涉及個人自由與獨立性。立場與德國元帥老毛奇的傳統有所不同。

In Iraq, McChrystal and Mattis explored new frontiers of command under different



operational conditions. Although they based their methods of command on existing doctrine, they were, in fact, developing novel practices of command. Specifically, both sought to create a dense federation of commanders who shared a common understanding and were closely united around the commander's intent. Decision-making was, therefore, collectively preconceived, aligned, and coordinated.

在伊拉克，麥克里斯特爾與馬提斯在不同作戰情況下，探索了新的指揮領域。雖然他們指揮的方法是基於既有準則，但事實上，他們正在發展新的指揮實踐方式。兩人的特別之處，在於他們都企圖創造一個緊密的聯盟式指揮體系，指揮官們能分享共同理解且能對上級指揮官意圖產生一股凝聚力。因此，決策是集體預先策劃，並經過統合而來的。

The McChrystal and Mattis methods of command were significant developments of traditional Western concepts of mission command. Although the principle of decentralized decision-making and improvisation remained important, the practices involved articulating different command levels and required a high level of professionalism-commanders at each level were committed to a common understanding of the operation. Consequently, McChrystal and Mattis did not enact mission command by reference to their own immediate situation but rather by reference to the shared intentions of the wider force reinforced by careful collective preparation, anticipation, and imaging reinforced by constant interaction, communication, and feedback. Ironically, mission command today requires intensifying the professional bonds between commanders at each level so they are acutely attuned to each other; it requires an accentuated shared consciousness. In this way, apparently instinctive individual decisions are actually increasingly informed by the collective, systemic expectations.

對於西方傳統任務式指揮概念而言，麥克里斯特爾與馬提斯的指揮方法實屬重大的進步。雖然分權的決策原則與修訂仍然至關重要，但實踐方式涉及要在不同指揮層級清楚傳達，同時也需要高程度的專業知識—在各層級的指揮官們都要致力於取得作戰共識。結果，麥克里斯特爾與馬提斯的任務式指揮方式，並不是評估當面情勢後依自身想法而行，而是採用廣泛部隊所形成的共同意圖，此一過程是經由審慎的集體準備、參與及共同圖像，這些都是經由不斷互動、溝通及回饋而來。諷刺的是，今日任務式指揮需

要強化各層級指揮官之間的專業連結，所以他們才能大幅度地調整彼此；它需要凸顯共識的重要性。依此方式而言，集體、體系的期望，顯然已逐漸進入直覺式的個人決策領域。

Although among the most gifted commanders of their generation, McChrystal and Mattis were not unusual in implementing this intensified system of mission command. Many other commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan engaged in similar practices—for instance, Mattis's superior Lieutenant General David Mckiernan, the Combined Forces Land Component commander, implemented a very similar system. As he prepared his forces for the invasion of Iraq, Mckiernan was careful to anticipate decisions through the use of ROC drills and other techniques. He was diligent in communicating his intent to his subordinate corps and division commanders, including Mattis, to ensure unified and coherent decision-making at every level. In particular, Mckiernan was careful to engage in a series of face-to-face meetings with Lieutenant General James T. Conway, I Marine Expeditionary Force, and Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, V Corps, to rehearse their passage of lines and to anticipate when a command intervention might and might not be necessary.⁴³ McChrystal and Mattis were not unusual.

麥克里斯特爾與馬提斯雖然是屬於該世代中最有天賦指揮官的成員，但兩人在執行這種強化式的任務式指揮體系中，絕非有別於他人。在伊拉克與阿富汗的許多其他指揮官，也從事類似的實踐方式。例如，馬提斯的長官，聯軍地面部隊指揮官麥基爾南中將，也採行相當類似的體系。當他整備部隊準備進軍伊拉克時，麥基爾南藉由使用「構想預演」演練與其他技巧，謹慎地參與決策。他致力於跟所屬師和團級指揮官進行意圖溝通，包含馬提斯在內，並確保在各個層級決策的統一與一致性。麥基爾南尤其重視與第1陸戰遠征軍的康為中將、第5軍的華勒斯中將等人進行的一系列面對面會議，以預演他們的超越接替路線，並預作考量有沒有必要進行指揮權介入。⁴³是以，克里斯特爾與馬提斯絕非特例。

Moreover, recent developments have only accentuated the methods McChrystal and

43 I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers who served on Mckiernan's staff for this example.



Mattis pursued. The US Army is currently implementing a division-level system of mission command whereby a networked main division headquarters remains in the continental United States, while tactical command posts deploy. Mission command has many advantages, reducing the vulnerability and logistical footprint of the division's headquarters; however, a dispersed command system of this type requires higher levels of discipline, professionalism, and teamwork from commanders and staff. Precisely because it is now radically distributed, local decision-making cannot be autonomous. Rather, local commanders must continually align their decision-making with the rest of the force to ensure coherence across tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Mission Command 2.0 does not involve merely decentralizing vertical hierarchy, but in fact, integrating a complex and heterogeneous network.

再者，近期發展趨勢也強調麥克里斯特爾與馬提斯所追求的方式。美國陸軍當前刻正執行師級的任務式指揮體系，一個網絡式的師主指揮所仍然位於美國本土，同時部署各個戰術指揮所。任務式指揮有許多優點，如減少單位弱點與師部的後勤需求；然而，這種分散式的指揮體系需要在指揮官與幕僚之間，建立較高度的紀律、專業知識及團隊合作。精確而言，即便它是極為分散式的，但地區性決策也不會是自主的。反而是，地區指揮官必須持續在決策上與其他部隊密切合作，以確保在戰術、作戰及戰略層級上取得一致性。任務式指揮2.0版不僅涉及分權式的垂直階層，而且實質上也整合成為一個複雜與多層次的網絡。

Conclusion

Mission command is indisputably a central precept in Western military doctrine today; it is the professed method of command. It is also true that when Western forces institutionalized mission command into doctrine, they drew heavily on historical examples, especially from the Wehrmacht in World War II. While recognizing continuity, this article argues the changing character of operations and the expansion of the span of control facilitated by new technologies deepens and intensifies mission command into a highly distinctive phenomenon.

結 論

今日任務式指揮無庸置疑是西方軍事準則的核心信條；它是一種專業的指揮方法。

實情是當西方部隊將任務式指揮制度化成為準則時，他們借重歷史上的案例，尤其是從當時在第二次世界大戰的德軍。然而在承認其延續性的同時，本文也主張新科技促成了作戰特徵的改變與控制幅度的擴展，凡此種種都深化並強化任務式指揮轉變成有別於以往的現象。

In particular, while traditional mission command might be characterized as an individualistic system, giving local commanders temporary independence to make immediate tactical decisions, Mission Command 2.0 relies on a dense federation of commanders. It is highly collective. It aligns and coordinates decisions across command echelons. It unites commanders into dense, professional communities, whose members are intimately and constantly attuned to each other's intentions and situations. Ironically, to increase the tempo and accuracy of decision-making, Mission Command 2.0 involves not the increased independence of subordinate commanders but radical interdependence.

值得注意的是，傳統任務式指揮具有個人主義體系的特徵，給予地區指揮官短暫獨立自主權去下達臨機戰術決策，任務式指揮2.0版憑藉的是密集的聯邦指揮官體系。它是高度集體性的，並在指揮層級中進行決策的統合。它將指揮官們凝聚成專業且彼此緊密在一起的社群，當中的成員以氣氛融洽與持續不斷的方式調和彼此的意圖與情況。不過諷刺的是，為了要增加決策的速度與準確性，任務式指揮2.0版並不是增加所屬指揮官的獨立性，反而是一種緊密的互賴。