



削足適履：美國陸軍任務式指揮之分析

Cutting Our Feet to Fit the Shoes : An Analysis of Mission Command in the U.S. Army

譯者簡介



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資料來源：Military Review, January-February 2017，美軍事評論2017年1～2月號。

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The U.S. Army has sought to integrate mission command over the past decade but has run into resistance in many arenas. Mission command has not taken hold in the Army because it lacks specificity in relation to the Army's conditions and culture. Nor does it align with the contemporary American way of war, which is highlighted by its information and data-obsessed pursuit of efficiency and precision. This article seeks to develop a method of command and control more in line with the praxis of Army methods and principles. It recommends rescinding the doctrinal definition of mission command, while retaining mission command's principles. Army doctrine for command and control should incorporate a continuum that includes both mission command and centralized control, rather than preaching mission command but all too often practicing excess control.

美軍在過去十年中一直試圖推廣任務式指揮，但在許多領域上受到阻礙。陸軍的環

境與文化欠缺與任務式指揮之間的特殊連結，也與當前美軍強調依賴數據，強調效果與精準的作戰方式格格不入。本文旨在結合作戰方法與原則，尋找最佳的指揮管制方式。最後建議取消準則上任務式指揮的定義，但是又不失任務式指揮的精神。陸軍指揮與管制準則應將任務式指揮與集中管制加以融合，而不是一方面宣揚任務式指揮，另一方面卻又行之過度管制。

The Army defines mission command as "the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations."¹ The Army assigns the following principles to guide mission command: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander's intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk.²

陸軍將任務式指揮定義為：「指揮官以任務式命令行使其指揮權責，依其意圖規範行動，使聯合地面作戰更敏捷，更能因地制宜」。¹陸軍設定下列原則指導任務式指揮：以相互信任建立團隊凝聚力創造共識、提供明確的指揮官意圖、行使有紀律的主動作為，運用任務式命令、接受審慎的風險。²

There are two primary theories on mission command, both of which reflect the German concept of Auftragstaktik. In mission command, a commander clearly communicates his or her intent in relation to friendly forces, the enemy, and the mission but leaves the decisions on how to complete the mission with the subordinate leaders. The higher echelon commander allows subordinate leaders to develop the "how" based on the situation, the conditions, the terrain, familiarity with their unit, and their equipment.³ This idea, providing latitude in execution, is at the heart of mission command, and its intellectual fountainhead, Auftragstaktik. While not explicitly referenced in any doctrinal publication, both concepts serve as the foundational

1 Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, Mission Command (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2015).

2 Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, Mission Command (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2012), 2-1.

3 Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle (New York: Presidio Books, 1991), p.113.



underpinning of the Army's command philosophy of the art of command and the science of control.

任務式指揮有兩項主要理論，都反映出德國Auftragstaktik[譯註：德文，由Auftrag(任務)及Taktik(戰術、政策)兩個字組成，即「任務式指揮」。]的精神。在任務式命令中，指揮官針對友軍、敵軍、任務，明確表達其意圖，但如何完成任務則由下屬指揮官自行決定。上級指揮官允許下屬根據狀況、條件、地形，及對自己部隊與裝備之瞭解，擬定如何達成該任務之作為。³這樣的想法貫穿任務的執行面，是任務式指揮的核心意義，也是Auftragstaktik的智慧內涵。雖然現行所有準則並沒有明確說明，但兩項觀念都是陸軍指揮藝術與管制技巧中，指揮哲學的基礎。

The other school of thought treats mission command and command and control as sides of the same coin. In this line of reasoning, the theory of command and control finds its genesis in the relationship between information flow and decision making. Mission command, or what military theorist Robert Leonhard calls directive control, is required when decision making can no longer keep pace with the flow of information.⁴ Command and control, what Leonhard calls detailed control, is required when decision making can maintain pace with the flow of information. In this school of thought, both forms of command and control-directive control and detailed control-are acceptable and viable in modern war. The key is to balance information flow with decision-making authority.⁵

另一學派認為任務式指揮與管制式指揮有如一枚硬幣之兩面。根據其一系列理論，指揮與管制的源頭在於資訊流與決心形成兩者的關係。任務式指揮，或軍事理論家羅伯·李奧哈德所稱之指導性管制，乃是基於決心形成跟不上資訊流的腳步所必須，而當決心形成速度能跟得上資訊流時，就可以採取細節性管制。⁴這一派理論認為管制式指揮的兩種形態：指導性管制與細節性管制，在現代戰爭都可以被接受且可行的，只要資訊流與決心形成兩者能平衡。⁵

However, a more granular examination suggests mission command-Leonhard's directive

4 Robert Leonhard, *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War* (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1994), pp.111-19.

5 Ibid.

control-is messy, inefficient, and ambiguous. Mission command is messy because it provides parameters within which one must operate instead of an instructive method of operation. Mission command is inefficient and ambiguous because it relies on imprecise, bottom-up understanding and information instead of perfect, or near-perfect, understanding. Because of this, mission command is slow in relation to higher echelons of command as lower echelons develop the situation, analyze the situation, execute courses of action, and report to higher echelons.

然而李奧哈德更深入的檢驗，認為任務式指揮，或李奧哈德所謂的指導式管制，表現出凌亂、效率低，而且含糊不清。任務式指揮之所以凌亂，是由於僅提供作戰所需的參數，而不是作戰方法的指示。任務式指揮之低效與含糊不清，是由於所依賴的資訊不精準，由下而上各自解讀，結果無法完美或接近完美。職是之故，當下級解讀狀況、分析情勢、執行行動方案、回報上級，拖慢了上、下級的任務式指揮。

Mission Command in the Army Today

The Army's adoption of mission command has been great for generating discussion about empowering junior leaders and developing mutual trust within formations. In 2016, the Army released several works on mission command, to include Mission Command in the 21st Century, Training for Decisive Action: Stories of Mission Command, and 16 Cases of Mission Command.⁶ Additionally, the Army's professional journals and Army-related blogs are continually filled with essays advocating for mission command and the principles it entails.

陸軍當前的任務式指揮

陸軍採用任務式指揮，已對如何精實新進軍官及增進單位內部互信上引發很多討論。2016年，美國陸軍公布了一些任務式指揮的相關作為，包括21世紀任務式指揮、決定性行動訓練：任務式指揮戰史及任務式指揮16項例證。⁶而且陸軍專業部落格，不斷

6 Nathan K. Finney and Jonathan P. Klug, eds., Mission Command in the 21st Century: Empowering to Win in a Complex World (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Press, 2016); Operations Group, U.S. Army National Training Center, Training for Decisive Action: Stories of Mission Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2014); Donald P. Wright, ed., 16 Cases of Mission Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013).



有相關論文發表，推廣任務式指揮及其重要的原則。

However, resistance to the ethos of mission command can be found everywhere. For all the success of mission command appears to be having across the Army, there are some critical shortcomings to full application across the force. Today's Army finds itself operating in an environment in which messy, inefficient, and slow methods of command are unwelcome and counterproductive. Regardless of the method of command and control stated in doctrine, commanders have always and will always evaluate their units and subordinates based on how much they trust them. Then commanders will allocate varying degrees of independent action based upon that trust.

然而，對任務式指揮的抗拒卻仍比比皆是。任務式指揮欲成功地施行全軍，則仍有若干重大缺失。陸軍並不歡迎當前凌亂、低效、緩慢的指揮方法。先不談準則上如何敘述管制式指揮，指揮官必須根據對其部隊及下屬的信任程度，不斷加以評估，然後據以賦予不同程度的獨立行動。

Mission Command in Doctrine

In his seminal work on maneuver warfare theory, *Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War*, Leonhard states that nothing in military doctrine is everlasting, regardless of how strong it is at a given time. Leonhard continues, "Therefore, doctrine has a life span, and its death is certain."⁷ In analyzing mission command, perhaps it too is approaching its timely demise.

準則上的任務式指揮

在李奧哈德開創性的機動作戰理論《戰鬥紀要：時間與戰爭藝術》一書中之陳述：不論軍事準則在某段時間多麼堅強，卻絕非亙古不變。「因此，準則有其壽命，而其消亡更屬必然。」⁷在我們分析的同時，或許任務式指揮已經邁向消亡。

Army mission command doctrine is, in effect, being applied in a prescriptive manner. The Army dictates the primacy of mission command instead of providing commanders

⁷ Leonhard, *Fighting by Minutes*, xxii.

and staffs with options for directing action within their commands. Leaders are forced into a dilemma: do they faithfully follow doctrine-potentially at the expense of what is the smart decision-or do they deviate from doctrine based upon their understanding of their organization and its leaders?

實際上陸軍任務式指揮應用上有其規定，要求指揮官及其幕僚必須採用，而且沒有選擇的空間。幹部被迫陷入了兩難情境：若忠實遵守準則，就可能放棄至佳的決心；若根據對組織及其幹部的瞭解下決心，就可能悖離準則？

This dynamic highlights the need for the Army to shelve the notion that mission command is a singular, unquestionable approach. Instead, the Army should encourage a more flexible approach that encourages leaders to consider options based on their understanding of their unit and their subordinate leaders in relation to the unit's operational environment.

這種狀況顯示必須放棄任務式指揮是獨一無二，且不容置疑的觀念，而應該鼓勵更有彈性的思維，讓幹部根據其對部隊與其下屬幹部及作戰環境的了解，思考更多的選項。

The Operating Environment's Influence on Command and Control

Today's operational environments often place Army units in situations in which their actions must be deliberate and restrained. In many cases, the U.S. government uses the Army as a tool to shape the strategic environment. Where national interests are at stake but limited objectives do not warrant large-scale combat operations, Army units must operate with finesse, in a manner not necessarily compatible with mission command. Concepts such as the "strategic corporal" highlight the limits of mission command-the independent actions of a single soldier on the battlefield can have strategic impact.⁸ If soldiers' actions are not carefully controlled, the consequences could affect national security. However, that notion stands in stark contrast to the principles of mission command, which allow soldiers to choose their actions in accordance with commander's intent and vision, disciplined

8 Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marines Corps Gazette* 83, no. 1 (January 1999).



initiative, shared understanding, and mutual trust. Command and control methods are influenced not only by strategic mission constraints but also are strongly influenced by technological developments.

作戰環境對指揮管制方式的影響

今天的作戰環境經常使得陸軍部隊的行動必須小心謹慎，而且有所克制。在許多情況下，陸軍是美國政府用來形塑戰略環境的工具。當國家利益受到威脅，而作戰目標卻受到限制，無法支持大規模用兵時，陸軍部隊就必須運用技巧，採取與任務式指揮不一定兼容的作戰方式。所謂「戰略下士」之類的概念，凸顯了任務式指揮的拘限性，因為戰場上任何一兵一卒的個別行動，都可能產生戰略性影響。⁸如果士兵的行動不能小心控制，後果可能影響到國家安全。這種觀念顯然與任務式指揮的原則有所衝突，本應讓戰士們可以在考量指揮官的意圖和願景、有紀律的採取主動作為、共同性狀況理解和相互信任等因素採取行動。指揮管制方法不僅受到戰略任務約制，而且更受到科技進步的影響。

The proliferation of communications technology, information collection systems, and precision weaponry led the Army to over-engineer battlefield solutions. The thinking was that near-perfect situational understanding could be achieved, enabled by using precision weapons to kill without closing with the enemy while greatly minimizing collateral damage. Though these ideas are virtuous, they erode the principles of mission command and are largely unachievable.

通信技術、資訊蒐集系統和精準導引武器的擴散，讓陸軍可以策定過於講求細節的方案。當敵情在近乎精準的掌控下，總想用精準武器遠距離消滅敵人，又不傷及無辜。雖然這種想法很好，但弱化了任務式指揮的原則，而且基本上並不容易做到。

In many cases, technological advancement has been geared toward providing commanders better situational awareness and improved ability to communicate, as with digital systems such as Blue Force Tracker, Command Post of the Future, and unmanned aircraft systems. In the past, commanders relied on reports from the field to populate friendly positions on maps. Today, Blue Force Tracker and Command Post of the Future allow commanders to see their formations down to the individual vehicle on high-resolution digital maps in near-real time.

The employment of unmanned aircraft systems in conjunction with battle-tracking systems allows commanders a relatively high degree of understanding. A high degree of understanding, coupled with ubiquitous communications systems, has led to an environment similar to that of Vietnam, where commanders at multiple echelons were directing the actions of platoons and squads on the ground.⁹

在許多情況下，科技已經進步到能提供指揮官更好狀況掌控，同時諸如「友軍追蹤系統」、「未來指揮所」等數位系統，加上無人載具的運用，使通信能力更暢通。在過去，指揮官依賴分散各地傳來的回報，在地圖上標示友軍位置，如今「友軍追蹤系統」及「未來指揮所」讓指揮官可以在高解析度數位地圖上，近乎即時地清楚看到所屬每一輛車。「友軍追蹤系統」加上無人載具讓指揮官狀況掌握能力相對提高，於是和當年在越南戰場一樣，不同階層的指揮官直接對排級，甚至班級行動作下達指導。⁹

Successful Innovation and Mission Command

Historian Williamson Murray defined four critical factors of successful military innovation: specificity; a reflective, honest military culture; proper use of history; and cognitive openness.¹⁰ Murray's thoughts on innovation are important to mission command because they suggest that philosophies and operational methods must be derived from the culture they are intended to support. In attempting to shoehorn mission command into Army doctrine, some could argue that the Army is improperly using history and ignoring specificity to justify the incorporation of the concept based solely on theoretical preference, or that the Army is cutting its feet to fit the shoes. Joint doctrine's retention of command and control instead of wholesale adoption of mission command could be seen as an acknowledgement of this idea. The Army's mission command doctrine lacks specificity of the environments in which the U.S. Army finds itself, the nature in which technology has influenced how the Army operates, and how the information age has shaped the Army's thinking about fighting. Based on Murray's factors of successful military innovation, it

9 Department of the Army, *Division-Level Communications, 1962-1973* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1982), pp.40-41.

10 Williamson Murray, "Innovation: Past and Future," in *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, eds. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 308-23.



is time for the Army's approach to mission command to evolve. Further exacerbating the command and control confusion is that mission command does not provide specificity to the Army in relation to the contemporary American way of war. The Germans' Auftragstaktik was an evolutionary innovation specific to the tactical, doctrinal, and cultural needs of the German army.¹¹ The conditions that allowed the concept of Auftragstaktik to develop organically over time and flourish in the German military are not found in today's U.S. Army operations.

成功的改革與任務式指揮

歷史學家威廉森·莫瑞定義成功的軍事革新的四個關鍵因素：特殊性、誠實反思的軍隊文化、適當的運用歷史、開放性認知。¹⁰莫瑞的思想對任務式指揮甚為重要，因為他們認為哲學與作戰方法必須從文化汲取。試圖將任務式指揮硬塞進陸軍的準則裏，有人認為陸軍扭曲了歷史，忽略了特殊性，只引用偏好的理論，也就是陸軍在削足適履。在聯合作戰準則內，僅保留部分任務式指揮觀念，並沒有全盤照收，或許也就是基於此種認知。陸軍任務指揮準則欠缺考量當前所處環境的特殊性，科技進步已經影響陸軍作戰，資訊時代來臨則影響陸軍遂行戰鬥的思維。根據莫瑞軍事革新能成功的因素，此刻正是任務式指揮演進的時機。對任務式指揮產生進一步的困惑，並不能增進陸軍與當代美國戰爭之路的關係。德國人的Auftragstaktik是根據德國人所需要的特殊戰術、文化而演變。¹¹在這種環境下，德軍Auftragstaktik的觀念隨著時間的推移作有機且蓬勃的發展，但美軍在今天的作戰並沒有發生這些過程。

The theoretical underpinnings of Auftragstaktik were products of vast battlefields in which large field armies were dispersed across great distances, generally operating against opponents similar in style and organization. However, in twenty-first century Army operations, conditions have changed.

Auftragstaktik理論源自於一個大型戰場上，眾多部隊彼此分散，距離遙遠，且通常敵人在型態與編組與我相似。但是21世紀陸軍作戰，這種環境已經改變。

11 Ibid., 308; Donald E. Vandergriff, "Misinterpretation and Confusion: What is Mission Command and Can the U.S. Army Make it Work?" The Land Warfare Papers, no. 94 (June 2013), pp.2-4.

The United States traditionally fought according to what many have called the "Western way of war." Historian Geoffrey Parker suggests that it is characterized by a focus on seeking a quick, decisive victory through annihilation. Furthermore, according to Parker, it is built on finance, technology, diversity, and overwhelming firepower.¹²

傳統上美國是採取所謂「西方式戰爭」的作戰觀念，史學家卓弗瑞·派克認為這種作戰觀念主在以殲滅戰，尋求快速且決定性勝利。此外，他認為這種方式乃植基於財力、科技、疏散，與壓倒性火力上。¹²

However, the conditions changed as informationage technological advancement occurred and the Soviet Union, with its large military force, disintegrated. These factors, coupled with the effects of globalism, have given rise to a relatively new theory on how the U.S. now fights.

然而，當資訊科技進步，蘇聯擁有龐大部隊卻分散配置，整個環境改變。加上全球主義影響，使得美軍作戰的新理論崛起。

Military theorist Antulio Enchevarria suggests that U.S. forces "shy away from thinking about the complicated process of turning military triumphs into strategic successes."¹³ He agrees with Russel Weigley and Max Boot that this lack of clear thinking stems from an emphasis on destroying the opponent, rather than taking into consideration the results of tactical victory.¹⁴ In this construct, "controlmania," or a method of command and control that seeks to supersede risk and battlefield error through detailed control, appears to be a major byproduct of the information-age-fueled American way of war. The fact that individual soldiers can cause strategic problems is at the heart of hypercontrol. To remove the risk of subordinate leaders making, or accidentally allowing, their subordinates to make strategic mistakes, constraints are emplaced, observation is ubiquitous, and heuristics such as the strategic corporal are developed to mitigate risk. The reduction of collateral damage and killing without closing with the enemy

12 Geoffrey Parker, "The Western Way of War," in *The Cambridge History of Warfare*, ed. Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.2.

13 Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Toward an American Way of War* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), vi.

14 Ibid., v-vi.



by employing precision munitions and precision forces, controlling narratives, and seeking perfect understanding all fly in the face of the less controlled mission command approach that focuses on individual initiative, trust, and accepting prudent risk. Mission command reinforces the American focus on warfare (operational and tactical victory in battle) rather than war (strategic and political victory) due to the concept being derived from a German operational concept for winning quick battles of annihilation.

軍事理論家艾切瓦里亞(Antulio Enchevarria)認為，「美軍對於如何將軍事勝利……轉變為戰略成功的複雜程序顯得興趣缺缺。」¹³他認同韋格利(Russel Weigley)及布特(Max Boot)的見解，認為此種思慮不周的情況源自於強調摧毀對手，而非深入考量戰術勝利背後的各種結果。¹⁴在此架構之下，「控制狂」或是想要藉由細節管制的方法，消弭風險與戰場疏失，顯然就是資訊時代推波助瀾下主要的附帶產物。事實上，個別士兵所能造成的戰略問題，正是超控制(hypercontrol)的核心所在。為了消弭所屬幹部造成這種風險，或在容許範圍內所發生的意外，亦即他們的所屬幹部犯下戰略性的錯誤，相關限制就有必要加諸在他們身上，隨時都要接受督察，同時也會發展諸如戰略士官的啟發式教育學程，期能降低風險。降低附帶傷亡、不用接近敵人便能透過精準彈藥及精準部隊進行擊殺任務、控制事件的發展，以及尋求完善的認知，已然不考慮聚焦於個人的創新、信任，以及接受審慎考量的風險，亦即控制手段較少的任務式指揮策略。任務式指揮強化了美國專注於作戰(戰場上的作戰行動或戰術性的勝利)，而非戰爭(戰略及政治的勝利)，而此等想法則是源自迅速於戰鬥中殲滅敵軍的德國作戰概念。

At this point, it is instructive to harken back to Leonhard's theory of command and control to understand how informationage technology encourages practices at odds with mission command. Leaders and staffs now command an amazing array of tools that allow them to visualize the battlefield and the operational environment, which in turn allows them to feel as though they are using information flow to guide decision making. Leaders, in their minds, are not micromanaging the mission; they are making decisions and directing action consistent with what they are capable of understanding.

從這一論點回溯李奧哈德指揮管制理論，可以了解資訊科技的進步如何強化任務式指揮的運用。指揮官與幕僚現在採用的指揮工具，可以讓他們透視戰場與作戰環境，同時也能有效將資訊流運用在決心擬定上。在指揮官內心，認為他們並不會大而化之，他

們的決心與行動都來自於對狀況持續不斷的深入瞭解。

Thus, technology's proliferation continues to dramatically influence how U.S. commanders exercise command and control. In World War I, trench warfare led to detailed command and control, but in the twenty-first century, technology has had a similar effect, leading to commanders falling too heavily into the detailed control side of the command and control spectrum.¹⁵ It has undercut mission command. The byproduct of technology is faith in the ability to obtain perfect, or nearperfect, information before launching precision weapons to destroy a specific target. Seeking perfect information in order to precisely kill a target in a way that minimizes the chances of collateral damage creates an environment of controlmania, the antithesis of mission command. Army commanders do not accept prudent risk but instead tend to minimize risk by setting stringently exacting conditions before servicing a target or committing forces.

因此，科技的擴散不斷對指揮官遂行其指揮管制產生引人注目的影響。一次大戰的壕溝戰需要指揮管制到細節，到了21世紀科技產生同樣影響，讓指揮官又加重了指揮光譜中細節管制這一端的份量。¹⁵這削弱了任務式命令功效。科技的副產品是相信發射出精準武器，摧毀某一特定目標前，必有完美，或近乎完美的資訊。為了精準摧毀目標，又儘量不產生間接損害，必須追尋完美資訊，正好形成與任務式指揮相反的控制狂熱感。陸軍指揮官們不接受審慎的風險，而是傾向於攻擊目標或投入部隊前，設定嚴格條件，以降低所有風險。

Recommendations

The principles of mission command should not be exclusive to mission command but should be principles adhered to in any modern, democratic army. Mutual trust, shared understanding, thinking subordinate leaders who exercise initiative, accepting prudent risk—these are not sacred rights bestowed upon junior leaders by an enlightened commander; rather, these are principles vital to success on the modern battlefield. The speed of the information age demands these principles be intrinsic qualities for any army that wants to succeed. The

15 這是一項內心思維過程，絕非幹部用來評估狀況的工具。



principles should serve as the foundation of the operations process, the art of command, and the science of control in all the Army does. However, the manner in which commanders lead their organizations and their subordinates cannot be standardized.

建 議

任務式指揮的原則，不應該只是單純的任務式指揮，而應該符合任何現代、民主化軍隊堅守的原則，就不同程度的相互信任、共識，以及鼓勵下級幹部發揮主動精神、接受審慎風險。這些都不只是開明的指揮官賦予年輕下級幹部的神聖權利，而是現代戰場成功所必須的原則。資訊時代的速度，使得渴望求勝的軍隊必須含蘊這些原則。這些原則必須成為全軍作戰過程、指揮藝術、管制技巧的基礎。但是指揮官領導其部隊及其下屬時，卻不能一成不變。

Instead, the Army must acknowledge that successful commanders adjust their approach to command methodology by continually assessing a variety of factors to determine how much to tighten or loosen their grip on the reins of control. Commanders must determine their approaches based upon understanding derived from individual assessment of each subordinate and organization. The Army should not dictate one approach (i.e., mission command or command and control) over another. Instead, doctrine should define the art of command and the science of control as occurring in proportional amounts along a continuum, with directive control and detailed control as the bookends (see figure 1, page 52).¹⁶ The decision on the method of control should then rest with the commander, based upon his or her understanding of any number of factors (see figure 2, page 53).

相反地，陸軍必須承認成功的指揮官，常根據持續不斷地評估各種因素，決定在何種程度上採緊韁式，抑或弛韁式管控其部隊。指揮官必須依據對每一下屬及組織的了解，決定採用何種方式。陸軍不應該將其定於一(任務式指揮或管制式指揮)。準則應該將指揮藝術與管制科學定義為從指導性管制到細節性管制的連續性(光譜)，不同比例的取捨(參閱圖1)。¹⁶採用何種管制方式，最終必須依據指揮官對各項因素的深入瞭解作決定(參閱圖2)。

16 Leonhard, *Fighting by Minutes*, 114.

Doctrine should list the types of factors that commanders should consider when determining the method of control they will employ. However, doctrine should articulate that these factors are only examples to stimulate thought, not a definitive list. Commanders should assess factors such as the following when determining their method of control:

- degree of mutual trust between leaders in the unit
- degree of situational understanding
- degree of complexity associated with the mission (i.e., is the problem simple, complicated, complex, or chaotic?)

- degree of protection inherent to the organization¹⁷

- degree of synchronization required for the mission or subordinate missions

- complexity and type of terrain

- selfconfidence of the commander

- proficiency of the organization and its subordinate units

- proficiency of subordinate leaders

- proficiency of the staff




圖1 任務式指揮之連續性




圖2 決定管制方式之因素

17 假設指揮官認為既有之安全程度高，就比較會選擇指導性管制，因為他不必為部隊自身的安全防護操心。



當指揮官決定採用某種方式前，必須考量各種因素。然而，準則所能列出的因素，只算是啟發進一步思考的範例，絕非僅止於此。指揮官決定管制的方法時，必須評估之因素如下：

- 領導者與部隊之間相互信任的程度。
- 對狀況理解的程度。
- 與任務相關的複雜程度。
- 部隊既有之安全程度。¹⁷
- 自身與下級部隊任務同步程度。
- 地形的種類與其複雜程度。
- 指揮官的自信程度。
- 本身組織與下級部隊的能力。
- 下級指揮官的能力。
- 幕僚的能力。

Commanders will likely gravitate toward detailed control in areas with low degrees of proficiency or high levels of complexity and complicated problems (see figure 3, page 54). Conversely, commanders will likely slide toward more directive control in areas with moderate to high degrees of proficiency and little complexity or complicated problems (see figure 4, page 55).

指揮官對作戰效能較差、複雜程度高、問題嚴重性大的狀況，基本上採細節管制(參閱圖3)。對作戰效能中、上，問題複雜程度及嚴重性較低的狀況下，指揮官可能採取指導性管制(參閱圖4)。

Furthermore, commanders must understand that the method of command and control is not static. Commanders must adjust their method of control based upon the continually evolving conditions. Another consideration is that organizations have multiple units. A commander may have a cavalry formation forward developing the situation on the ground, while the maneuver units are conducting a complicated, highly synchronized operation such as a wet-gap crossing. The commander would likely employ directive control with the cavalry formation, while retaining more detailed control for the part of the mission requiring highly synchronized

operations. Upon completion of the complicated mission, the commander could revert to directive control.

此外，指揮官必須體認，指揮管制的方法不是一成不變的，必須根據狀況變化加以調整。另一項思考，是在同一組織內，有不同單位存在，當部隊遂行如必須跨越之艱困間隙等複雜，卻需要高度同步配合的任務時，他可能需要編組一支前方騎兵部隊，摸清楚實際敵情。指揮官可能對這支騎兵部隊採取指導式管制，而對諸如必須高度同步配合的渡河行動，採取細節式管制。當任務的複雜部分完成後，指揮官就回復指導式管制。




圖3 宜採指導性管制之評估




圖4 宜採細節性管制之評估

The primary benefit of this approach is that it formally acknowledges the cognitive process a commander undergoes when thinking about how to command and control operations.



Commanders and leaders at all levels conduct inventory of their subordinates and their organization before deciding how to approach commanding each person and unit. Subordinates and units requiring more oversight get more oversight. Conversely, those that can be trusted to operate more independently are often provided more latitude.

這種方法的主要好處是，正式承認指揮官思考如何指揮管制的認知過程。指揮官和所屬各級幹部，決定對每一個人或部隊的指揮方法前，都會先清點其下屬幹部與組織。需要加以督導的，就多督導一些，而信任其具備獨立作戰能力者，就多給他一些自由。

Moreover, while addressing the contemporary American way of war, this approach provides flexibility to the commander by not dictating a specific approach for commanding and controlling operations. If the Army adjusts the manner in which doctrine is written and adopts the idea of the directive and detailed control continuum, it will better address the realities of war, pulling doctrine from the theoretical into the tangible.

尤有進者，為因應美國現代戰爭，這種方法並不侷限於某一特定指揮管制方式，而讓指揮官更有彈性。如果陸軍調整現行準則條文，而願意同時接受指導性與細節性觀念，將更貼近戰爭的真實性，將準則從理論拉回到現實。

Notwithstanding, it is useful to observe that either method of command or combination thereof is largely dependent on the quality of soldiers tasked to perform the missions. Gen. George S. Patton Jr. articulated this requirement over seventy years ago when he wrote, "To be a good soldier a man must have discipline, self-respect, pride in his unit and his country, a high sense of duty and obligation to his comrades and his superiors, and self-confidence born of demonstrated proficiency."¹⁸

儘管如此，可以觀察到不論採取何種指揮方式，或以兩者混合使用，都繫乎受領任務戰士的素質。巴頓將軍七十年前就寫下：「優秀的戰士，乃是一名有紀律，有自尊，以其部隊及國家為榮的人。他對其同胞及長官有強烈的責任感與義務，對自己則對展現其價值有強烈自信。」¹⁸

18 George S. Patton Jr., *War as I Knew It* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1947), p.335.

Conclusion

In summation, mission command needs to be overhauled. The concept fails to provide specificity and therefore is at conflict with the Army's culture and the new American way of war. The Army must harken back to its own history to define what it wants from each end of the continuum while not forgetting the praxis of the American way of war and the influence of the information age. Doctrine must not dictate one way or one end of the continuum over the other but must describe instead how commanders continually assess themselves, their units, their subordinates, their environment, and the threat or enemy when determining which approach to employ. The approach must be appropriate to each subordinate leader in their organization. By adopting a continuum of control, the Army will develop an approach that is at harmony with the Army's culture and the manner in which it has long preferred to fight.

結語

總而言之，任務式指揮的概念必須大加修改。這個概念不具獨特性，與軍隊文化及新的戰爭之路有所衝突。陸軍必須回到自己的歷史，根據戰史及資訊時代的影響，及其實際需求，從兩種指揮方式連續互為增減的兩端，選擇其所需。準則不應定於一，或評斷位於兩端的指揮方式孰優孰劣，而應該告訴指揮官如何不斷自我評估，評估其部隊、下屬、所處環境及敵情，再決定採取何種指揮方式。採取的方式，必須適合組織內每一位下級幹部。配合這種管制的連續性，陸軍必須結合陸軍文化及長期以來慣用戰法，研擬出更適合的方式。