

外籍軍官培訓打造中共軟實力

Foreign Military Education as PLA Soft Power

譯者簡介



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Abstract: This article argues Chinese foreign military education programs, modeled on similar US efforts, promote a positive international image of China while simultaneously advancing military-to-military relations. To ensure American soft power remains strong, US policymakers should prioritize international military education as a method of supporting long-term partnerships even in constrained fiscal environments.

摘要：本文認為，比照美國模式建立的中共外籍軍官培訓計畫，有助於提升其正面的國際形象，同時也改善和外國軍事對軍事之關係。為了確保美國的軟實力依然強勁，美國的決策者即使在財政環境不佳的狀況下，亦應優先考慮將國際軍事教育視為支持長期合作夥伴關係的一種方式。

On a midsummer evening at the People's Liberation Army National Defense University (PLA NDU) in Beijing, Chinese and foreign military officers in full dress uniform, accompanied by their spouses in traditional garb, assemble. Aided by crisply dressed PLA singers, everyone belts out a rendition of the Beijing 2008 Olympics anthem, "You and Me",



under a long red banner emblazoned with Chinese characters that translate as "Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of Victory in the Global Struggle against Fascism and College of Defense Studies 2015 Graduation." As the banner indicates, the event marks the graduation of 136 senior foreign military officers from 82 countries from the College of Defense Studies (CDS), while simultaneously commemorating the 70th anniversary of China and its allies' victory in the "War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression" in 1945.¹

某一仲夏之夜，北京解放軍國防大學的中、外軍官全都身著全配飾軍常服，眷屬也各自穿著他們的傳統服裝及飾件，齊聚一堂。在服裝整齊的解放軍歌手領唱下，齊聲高唱北京2008年奧運主題曲「你和我」，會場上高掛「紀念全世界反法西斯鬥爭70周年及防務學院2015年畢業典禮」字樣的紅布條。正如紅布條所示，這場盛會是來自82個國家，136位資深軍官在國防研究院的畢業典禮，也剛好是中國與同盟國1945年對日抗戰勝利70周年。¹

The 70th anniversary of the end of World War II was enthusiastically celebrated globally and in China. Nevertheless, the significance of linking China's struggle against Japanese imperialism with a graduation ceremony for officers primarily from African, Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American countries was undoubtedly not lost on the event's organizers who understood many College of Defense Studies graduates are from countries with histories of Western colonialism. Similarly, the period from 1839 to 1949 is embedded in Chinese historical memory as a "century of humiliation", when the European powers, Russia, and Japan imposed a series of unequal treaties, which coerced territorial, economic, and juridical concessions that reduced China to semicolonial status.² In domestic media, the ruling Communist Party portrays itself as executing a post-1949 revival of Chinese civilization from this nadir. Comparable

- 1 All references to the 2015 CDS graduation ceremony are from Russia-Dragon News, a Russian newspaper published in Chinese, which partners with Chinese state media outlets including China Central Television (CCTV). See "136 high-level foreign officers from 82 countries graduate from Chinese National Defense University," 「82國136名外國高級軍官從中國國防大學畢業」, Russia-Dragon News 「俄羅斯龍報」 (St. Petersburg), http://www.dragonnewsru.com/news/ch_news/20150722/17192.html, July 22, 2015.
- 2 Zheng Wang, "National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 4 (2008): 783, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00526.x.

historical grievances provide a basis for camaraderie between China and other countries with postcolonial legacies.

二戰勝利70周年，全世界及中國無不熱烈慶祝，但是將與日本帝國主義鬥爭跟防務學院畢業連接在一起卻意義不同。這批畢業生中多半來自非洲、亞洲、中東、拉丁美洲，當然承辦人員也沒有忘記，其中不乏來自西方曾經是殖民主義國家的學官。1839年到1949年間，正是中國人難以忘懷的「百年恥辱」，遭受歐洲列強、俄羅斯、日本迫簽的不平等條約，領土、經濟、法律管轄權都被割讓，使中國淪為次殖民地。²當政的中國共產黨運用媒體，自命為1949年以後讓中華文明谷底翻身的功臣，歷史的苦難成了後殖民時代中國與其他國家建立有志一同感覺的基礎。

The function of the CDS memorial-cum-graduation ceremony testifies to the multiple purposes of the PLA's foreign military education programs. As in other war colleges, students examine and analyze key issues in the contemporary security environment while learning about the host nation's domestic and international politics, military, culture, and history, as well as general aspects of strategic studies.³ The educational exchanges also strengthen military-to-military relations by building person-to-person relationships with foreign officers. Finally, the public diplomacy aspect seeks to improve international perceptions of China by winning the hearts and minds of foreign officers, a key segment of governing elites in many countries particularly in the developing world.⁴

防務學院將紀念日與畢業典禮結合，說明了解放軍外籍軍官教育計畫的多重目的。與其他戰爭學院一樣，學官不但研究當代安全環境下的關鍵性議題，同時也學習地主國國內與國際的政治、軍事、文化、歷史，當然也有一般戰略研究。³教育交流也經由與外籍學官人際關係，而增強彼此軍事對軍事之間的關係。最後，從公共外交的觀點看，能贏得外籍學官的心自然也改善國際對中國的看法，這些學官都是各國的菁英，尤其是來自發展中國家的學官。⁴

3 For a course of study outline see "Courses," College of Defense Studies, NDU, PLA, China, http://www.cdsndu.org/html_en/to_columnContent_orderNo=2402&superOrderNo=2400.html, April 19, 2016.

4 David Shambaugh, "China's Soft Power Push: The Search for Respect," *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 4 (July/August 2015): 104.



Educating foreign military officers at PLA military academies such as the CDS constitute just one line of effort in the Chinese party-state and PLA's conduct of public diplomacy and military-to-military relations. Nonetheless, an examination of the College of Defense Studies, the PLA's flagship academy for educating foreign officers, elucidates several key developments, particularly with regard to the role that military diplomacy plays in China's overall foreign policy efforts:

- The PLA is assuming a growing, although still secondary, role in the conduct of Chinese public diplomacy and foreign policy.
- China is using public diplomacy to compensate for its limited soft power and to cultivate international influence.
- China is safeguarding its expanding global interests through diversified foreign policy strategies that utilize all instruments of national power, not merely economic leverage.
- A growing number of African, Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American countries are starting to see China as a viable security partner.

防務學院等院校教育外籍軍官，只是中共及解放軍遂行公眾外交及軍事關係的一環。從檢驗外籍軍官教育旗艦(龍頭)的國防研究院，我們可以發現，軍事外交在整體外交政策上扮演若干角色的重要發展。

- 目前解放軍在公眾外交及外交政策方面，其重要性雖屬次要，但其地位應在提升中。
- 中共以公眾外交來補償軟實力的不足，同時也藉此培養其國際影響力。
- 中共以各種國家工具，採多樣外交政策，來維護其全球國家利益，而不僅止於經濟一途。
- 位於非洲、亞洲、中東、拉丁美洲的許多國家，愈來愈將中國視為一個現實的安全夥伴。

Military Diplomacy as an Instrument of Statecraft

The current trend of the PLA toward a more active military diplomacy occurs in the broader context of expanding Chinese involvement in nearly all facets of international affairs. History will remember the early twenty-first century as the moment China became a truly global actor. Since the 1990s, Beijing has become far more active in international

organizations, massively expanded its overseas economic footprint, and intensified bilateral relationships from South Korea to Brazil.⁵ To be clear, China is not yet a peer competitor to the United States; however, due to China's economic heft and latent power, many countries perceive it as an emerging pole that, along with Russia, can reduce or offset American preeminence.

國家工具之軍事外交

在中共參與幾乎所有國際事務的大脈絡下，解放軍軍事外交也愈來愈積極。未來史家會銘記，21世紀初是中共成為真正全球行為者的歷史，從1990年代起，中共在國際組織愈益活躍，海外經濟大幅擴張，與從南韓到巴西的國家發展雙邊關係。⁵至今中共仍無法與美國相匹敵，但由於中國經濟產生的潛在國力，很多國家將其視為崛起的一極，若加上俄羅斯就足以抵銷美國的獨霸局面。

As China's international influence and interests have increased, its foreign relations have become more extensive and complex. Correspondingly, the number of governmental actors involved in foreign policy has proliferated. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains the primary conduit for diplomatic relations, but other ministries, provincial governments, state-owned enterprises, intelligence agencies, and the People's Liberation Army all now also factor in foreign relations.⁶ The diffusion of foreign policy implementation has been overlaid by President Xi Jinping's recent centralization of foreign policy decision-making power. In a February 2016 Council on Foreign Relations report, Robert D. Blackwill and Kurt M. Campbell note Xi exercises greater control over foreign policy than any leader since Deng Xiaoping, and has demonstrated a "willingness to use every instrument of statecraft," including military resources, in pursuit of foreign policy objectives.⁷ While China's primary sources of foreign policy leverage remain

5 For an overview of China's post-Cold War foreign policy see Robert G. Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012).

6 David L. Shambaugh, *China Goes Global: The Partial Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 61-72.

7 Robert D. Blackwill and Kurt M. Campbell, *Xi Jinping on the Global Stage: Chinese Foreign Policy under a Powerful but Exposed Leader*, Council Special Report No. 74 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016), 3-7, 16.



economic, security factors have grown as a secondary lever of influence, particularly in Asia and Africa.⁸

隨著中共的國際影響力和利益的增加，其外交關係變得更加廣泛和複雜。相應地，參與外交政策的行為人數量也有所增加。外交部仍然是外交關係的主要管道，但其他部委、省級政府、國有企業、情報部門與解放軍現在也都是外交關係的影響因素。⁶習近平最近將外交決策權集中，蓋過外交政策實施的分散性。2016年2月，羅伯·布萊克維爾和克特·坎貝爾在「外交關係委員會」報告：自鄧小平以來，習近平對外交政策的控制比任何領導人都強大，而且「願意使用任何手段」，包括軍事資源，追求外交政策目標。⁷雖然中國的外交政策槓桿的主要來源依然在經濟，但安全因素已經緊追其後，特別是在亞洲和非洲地區。⁸

In January 2015, Xi called for China to "place a greater emphasis on military diplomacy as part of its overall foreign policy strategy."⁹ The May 2015 white paper on Chinese Military Strategy also sketched out an expansive role for military diplomacy, stating the People's Liberation Army will "develop all-round military-to-military relations" by broadening military exchanges with Russia, promoting a "new model of military relationship with the US armed forces," deepening military relations with Europe, and preserving "traditional friendly military ties with their African, Latin American, and Southern Pacific counterparts."¹⁰

2015年1月，習要求中共「應重視軍事外交，作為其整體外交戰略的一部分。」⁹ 2015年5月出版的《中國軍事戰略白皮書》還勾畫出軍事外交扮演的更大角色，解放軍將透過擴大軍事交流，與俄羅斯「發展全面軍事關係」；推動「與美國軍事關係的新模式」；深化與歐洲的軍事關係，同時維繫與非洲、拉丁美洲、南太平洋地區「傳統友好

8 See Mathieu Duchatel, Richard Gowan, and Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, *Into Africa: China's Global Security Shift*, Policy Brief 179 (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2016); and Niklas Swanstrom, "The Security Dimension of the China-Central Asia Relationship: China's Military Engagement with Central Asian Countries" (testimony, hearing on Looking West: China and Central Asia, Before the United States Congressional Commission on U.S.-China Economic and Security Review, March 18, 2015).

9 Shannon Tiezzi, "3 Goals of China's Military Diplomacy," *Diplomat*, January 30, 2015.

10 Chinese Ministry of National Defense, "China's Military Strategy," *US Naval Institute News*, May 26, 2015, <https://news.usni.org/2015/05/26/document-chinas-military-strategy#MSC>.

軍事關係」。¹⁰

Military diplomacy supports developing the Chinese military into an effective joint force by providing opportunities to improve operational readiness. Because the PLA has not conducted major combat operations since 1979, bilateral and multilateral exercises help compensate for a lack of experience and thus contribute to operational preparedness.¹¹ Joint exercises also provide opportunities to learn from more advanced forces such as the Russian and American militaries. Chinese forces have also gained useful operational experience staging new types of missions while participating in multinational humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities and military operations other than war.¹² Most notably, since late 2008, the PLA Navy has participated in antipiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden in coordination with North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Japanese, and other naval forces.¹³

軍事外交提供改進戰備整備的機會，從而支持中共軍隊邁向有效的聯合部隊型態。由於自1979年以來解放軍就沒有參加過重大的作戰行動，雙邊和多邊的演習有助於彌補經驗的缺乏，而有利其戰備整備。¹¹與俄羅斯及美國等更先進軍隊聯合演習，可以從中得到借鑒。中共軍隊在參與多國人道援助和救災行動，以及非戰爭軍事行動的同時，也獲得了新類型任務的寶貴經驗。¹²特別是2008年底以來，解放軍海軍與北約國家、日本等海軍合作，參加了亞丁灣海域的反盜巡邏。¹³

Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa exemplify China's increasing willingness to assume security roles where its interests are concerned. Since the Maoist period, China has supplied African countries with affordable Soviet-designed land equipment and small arms; however, Chinese arms manufacturers have only recently begun selling African buyers more advanced,

11 Eric Hagt, "The Rise of PLA Diplomacy," in *PLA Influence on China's National Security Policymaking*, ed. Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies of Stanford University Press, 2015), 227-28.

12 Roy Kamphausen, "China's Military Operations Other Than War: The Military Legacy of Hu Jintao," (paper presented at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute conference, Stockholm, April 18-19, 2013, 2).

13 Kenneth Allen, "The Top Trends in China's Military Diplomacy," Jamestown Foundation, May 1, 2015, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43866&no_cache=1#.VxECZPnR-Uk.



indigenously developed technologies. In 2015, for example, Nigeria purchased the CH-3 unmanned aerial vehicle for operations against Boko Haram.¹⁴ While China has long been a major African arms supplier, it just recently started making significant troop contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations, deploying combat troops in a peacekeeping capacity for the first time to South Sudan in 2012.¹⁵ In early 2016, China established its first overseas military facility in Djibouti to facilitate logistical support for peacekeeping missions in Africa and antipiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden.¹⁶

與非洲撒哈拉沙漠南國家的關係顯示只要有國家利益所在，中國愈來愈願意扮演安全上的角色。從毛澤東時代迄今，中共就將廉價的俄式裝備及輕兵器供應給非洲國家，不過直到最近中共軍火企業才將較先進之自製武器賣給非洲國家，如在2015年奈及利亞購買了CH-3無人機，對付博科聖地(譯註：為奈及利亞的伊斯蘭教基本教義派組織，主張在奈及利亞全國推行伊斯蘭教法，以及成為哈里發國的一部分，被稱之為「奈及利亞的塔利班」)。¹⁴中共長期以來一直是非洲的主要武器供應國，最近參與聯合國維和行動，2012年首次在南蘇丹部署戰鬥部隊執行維和任務。¹⁵ 2016年初，中國在吉布提建立了第一個海外軍事基地，為非洲維和及亞丁灣反海盜部隊提供後勤支援。¹⁶

Unsurprisingly, major peacekeeping contributions have occurred where China has significant economic interests. As of mid-2016, more than one thousand Chinese peacekeepers were in South Sudan, where the state-run China National Petroleum Corporation operates extensive energy projects.¹⁷ Increased security involvement in Africa has not come without risks; for example, two Chinese peacekeepers were killed in July when violence erupted in South Sudan.¹⁸ Nonetheless, China looks to continue security

14 "Sub-Saharan Africa," in *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics 2016* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016), 425

15 Before this, China had mostly deployed medics and engineers. See Duchatel, Gowan, and Rapnouil, *Into Africa*, 6.

16 Katrina Manson, "China Military to Set Up First Overseas Base in Horn of Africa," *Financial Times*, March 31, 2016.

17 Karen Allen, "What China Hopes to Achieve with First Peacekeeping Mission," *BBC News*, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34976580>, December 2, 2015.

18 Okech Francis and William Davidson, "China Peacekeepers Killed in South Sudan as Civil War Looms," *BloombergTechnology*, July 11, 2016.

involvement in Africa for the foreseeable future.

毫不意外，維和行動多與中共主要的經濟利益有關。2016年中，中共在其國營「中國國家石油公司」正在探採能源的南蘇丹，派駐上千名部隊。¹⁷參與非洲安全問題，並非沒有風險，例如南蘇丹七月暴動，死了兩名維和部隊人員。¹⁸不過在可見的未來，中共仍將參與非洲的安全問題。

PLA Public Diplomacy

China has historically been a source of "good enough" weapons and military assistance for many middle-and low-income countries, particularly in Asia and Africa. As a result, many of China's military-to-military relationships hitherto have been based primarily on transactional drivers such as security aid in the form of arms, materiel, and arms sales, as well as ensuring the security of Chinese investments and nationals overseas.¹⁹ Nevertheless, Beijing increasingly recognizes that robust military-to-military relationships rest on more than transactional considerations.

解放軍公眾外交

中國歷來都是許多中低收入國家，特別是亞洲和非洲國家，「還可以的」武器和軍事援助的來源。產生的結果是即便時至今日，許多軍事對軍事關係的交易主要是以武器、物資、軍售及國家海外投資與國民安全為驅動力。¹⁹然而，北京逐漸體會堅強的軍事對軍事關係須以交易以上的考量為基礎。

Consequently, the PLA is working to develop relationships with foreign military forces based on "personal and institutional affiliations."²⁰ As a part of this effort, China's international military education programs aim to cultivate influence among foreign military officers, many of whom will rise to leadership positions in their respective countries. This investment demonstrates recognition that international power is not based solely on economic and military strength but also on the ability to influence other nations through soft power assets such as cultural attraction and interpersonal relationships.

19 Duchatel, Gowan, and Rapnouil, *Into Africa*, 2; and Hagt, "The Rise of PLA Diplomacy," 233.

20 Hagt, "The Rise of PLA Diplomacy," 233.



於是解放軍從「人際與機構間的關係」來發展與外國軍隊的關係。²⁰其中一部分就是著眼於開拓外籍軍官影響力的國際軍事教育計畫，這些軍官中很多都會在其本國爬到高位。此一投資顯示中共已認知到國際間的權力並不單純依賴經濟或軍事實力，透過文化吸引力及人際關係等軟實力資源也同樣能影響其他國家。

The People's Liberation Army has recently attached greater importance to public diplomacy and seeks to promote a positive image of Chinese military power as a force for stability that contributes to international security.²¹ In doing so, PLA public diplomacy confronts many of the same challenges complicating China's overall public diplomacy efforts. Since the early 1990s, Beijing has assiduously sought to counteract what Chinese sources term the "China threat theory"-the widespread post-Cold War perception that the rise of China challenges the US-led international order and imperils the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.²² Beijing has responded by promulgating a "peaceful rise" counternarrative wherein a strong China is portrayed as a contributor to international peace and stability.²³

解放軍最近相當重視公眾外交，致力於提升其正面形象，希望被認為是一個國際安全穩定的貢獻者。²¹解放軍與整體公眾外交面臨相同挑戰，從1990年代初以來，北京一直在努力抵抗所謂「中國威脅論」—後冷戰時期廣為流傳的觀點，也就是中國的崛起挑戰美國領導的國際秩序，從而危及亞太地區的穩定。²²北京則以「和平崛起」作為回應，表達一個強大的中國乃是國際和平與穩定的貢獻者。²³

Another obstacle for Chinese public diplomacy is overcoming an inward-facing culture and authoritarian, Leninist political system to appeal to a global audience. Naturally, the need to control dissent and limit individual expression stifles some key sources of soft power,

21 Heidi Holz and Kenneth Allen, "Military Exchanges with Chinese Characteristics: The People's Liberation Army Experience with Military Relations" in *The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military* ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute [SSI], US Army War College [USAWC], 2010), 430-33; and Shannon Tiezzi, "3 Goals."

22 Shannon Tiezzi, "Beijing's 'China Threat' Theory," *Diplomat*, June 3, 2014; and Tiezzi, "3 Goals."

23 "Peaceful Rise," *Economist*, June 24, 2004.

namely individual innovation and cultural expression.²⁴ Leading China experts such as David Shambaugh observe that China's growing military and economic hard powers have not translated into international cultural and political influence, or soft power.²⁵ Thus, in order to compensate for China's limited organic soft power, Beijing places greater emphases on official public diplomacy efforts, including PLA-led public diplomacy.

中共公眾外交的另一障礙，就是克服內向的文化與極權的列寧式政治制度，轉向吸引全球的目光。當然，控制異議分子與限制個人言論扼殺了如個人創新與文化表現等重要的軟實力。²⁴著名的中國專家，如沈大偉等人認為，中國在軍事與經濟這些硬實力，尚未轉化為國際文化與政治影響力，或稱之為軟實力。²⁵因此，為了彌補中國的軟實力不足，北京更加加強官方公眾外交工作，包括由解放軍領導的公眾外交。

Foreign Military Education in China

The PLA operates nearly 70 military academies in China; approximately half offer training to foreign military personnel.²⁶ Although little interest has been demonstrated in emulating the normative aspects of US programs, China's military educators have been eager to appropriate best practices and other key elements of US programs—for example, Chinese international military education programs at the university-level were modeled on the US National Defense University International Fellows Program after several high-level PLA officers visited the US National Defense University during the early 1980s.²⁷ This application fits a larger pattern of selective borrowing from US military education programs. The People's Liberation Army's brief, but fruitful engagement (1999-2002) with the Asia Pacific Center for Strategic Studies (APCSS), a Department of Defense-funded regional center intended to build "capacities and communities of interest by educating, connecting, and empowering security practitioners to advance Asia-Pacific security" in support of US Pacific Command (USPACOM) education and

24 Shambaugh, "China's Soft Power Push," 99.

25 Ibid.

26 Shambaugh, *China Goes Global*, 301.

27 Paul H. B. Godwin, "The Cradle of Generals: Strategists, Commanders, and the PLA-National Defense University," in *The "People" in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China's Military*, ed. Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle, PA: SSI, USAWC, 2008), 322.



outreach efforts, offers another case in point.²⁸

中共之外籍軍事教育

解放軍現有將近70所軍事院校，約有半數提供外籍軍事人員培訓。²⁶雖然中共在價值規範上並不想模仿美國學程，但實務及其他關鍵部分上卻急欲比照美國—例如在大學階層的國際軍事教育在1980年代若干高階幹部訪問美國後，就以美國的國防大學國際學程作為模型做設計。²⁷應用上選擇性採取美國一般的軍事教育計畫模式。解放軍與亞太戰略研究中心(APCSS)簡短卻成果斐然的合作(1999~2002年)，該中心是美國防部資助的區域研究中心。其合作在美軍太平洋指揮部教育與外連工作支持下「透過教育、聯繫建立相關人員的安全研究水準與培養相關社群，以其增進亞太的區域安全」。此為其中一例。²⁸

As part of its mission, the Asia Pacific Center for Strategic Studies regularly hosts educational seminars and workshops for security practitioners from throughout the Asia-Pacific region. People's Liberation Army officers began attending ACPSS seminars in 1999 and PLA NDU faculty regularly participated in these programs through 2002, which roughly parallels the timeframe that the PLA NDU implemented, developed, and revised its own International Symposium Course.²⁹ This sustained effort to apply lessons from ACPSS fora to PLA courses for foreign officers exemplifies a proclivity to selectively borrow and adapt US models and practices to suit the Chinese military's purposes.

亞太戰略研究中心任務之一，為來自亞太地區的安全從業人員舉辦定期教育研討會並成立作業小組。解放軍官於1999年開始參加ACPSS研討會，2002年解放軍國防大學教師定期參加這些計畫，在制定、研發與修訂本身國際研討課程的時程相結合。²⁹如此經由ACPSS論壇學習到的成果，不斷應用到解放軍所安排的外籍人員課程上，呈現出選擇性借用與結合美國模式與實際作為，以達到中共軍事上的目的。

28 Frank Miller, "The People's Liberation Army Lessons Learned from Recent Pacific Command Operations and Contingencies," in *Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples' Wars*, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle, PA: SSI, USAWC, 2011), 217-18; and "Mission and Vision", Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, <http://apcss.org/about-2/mission/>, September 23, 2016.

29 Miller, "Lessons Learned," 217-18.

The efficacy of China's foreign military education programs matters because education is an important yet underexamined aspect of the PLA's international engagement strategy. According to Shambaugh, courses for "officials, diplomats and military officers from developing countries……do teach students tangible skills, but they also try to win hearts and minds along the way."³⁰ Such programs help China cultivate influence among foreign military elites and foster amicable military-to-military relations particularly with states in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Central Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East.

中共的軍事外交教育計畫發揮的功效值得重視，因為解放軍嘗試以教育方式參與國際戰略是很重要但卻很少被探討的方面。根據沈大偉的看法：「針對發展中國家派出的官員、外交官及軍官的課程……教導學生有形的技能，同時也試圖在過程中贏得他們的向心。」³⁰這樣的計畫有助於培養外國軍事菁英的影響力，特別是與北非和撒哈拉沙漠以南非洲國家、南亞、中亞、拉丁美洲、東歐和中東等地區的國家建立友好的軍事對軍事關係。

As a tool of diplomacy, military education is likely most effective with countries outside of East Asia, particularly with authoritarian states in the developing world, who share China's suspicion of what are often perceived as Western-imposed values, such as human rights and democratization, that infringe on national sovereignty.³¹ By contrast, sources of tension, such as unresolved territorial disputes with nearby East and Southeast Asian countries, negatively impact China's security relations with Asian neighbors and are not easily overcome.³² Finally, several countries that send officers to study in China, such as Venezuela, generally have poor relations with the United States and therefore either do not attend American professional military education institutions or are not invited to participate in US-funded courses.³³

作為一項中共的外交工具，軍事教育對一些位於東亞以外的國家，特別是一些處於

30 Shambaugh, "China's Soft Power Push," 104.

31 Cynthia Watson, "China's use of the Military Instrument in Latin America: Not Yet the Biggest Stick," *Journal of International Affairs* 66, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2013): 106-7.

32~33 於下頁。



獨裁的開發中國家，因為他們與中共一樣都懷疑如人權、民主等足以影響國家主權的西方價值觀。³¹相反地，中共與南亞及東南亞國家的領土爭議等衝突源頭，對中共安全有負面影響，就沒有那麼容易克服。³²某些派前軍官到中國受訓的國家，如委內瑞拉等，與美國關係本來就不好，因此不派軍官到美國專業班隊受訓，或受邀參加由美國資助的班對課程。³³

College of Defense Studies

The College of Defense Studies, the primary institution for graduate-level international military education in China, is a component of the PLA NDU offering short-term and extended courses for foreign officers. The CDS has trained foreign military personnel under different monikers since the early 1960s.³⁴ Estimates on the total number of students educated vary but universally number in the thousands. Composed primarily of commissioned foreign military officers ranging from lieutenant (O-2) to brigadier general (O-7), the student body also includes civilian defense officials. The year-long Defense and Strategic Studies course is taught in English and French to colonels (O-6) and brigadier generals (O-7).³⁵ In 2012, the PLA designated CDS as its pilot program for granting war college master's degrees to foreign military officers and had awarded 61 such degrees by September 2014.³⁶

32 For example, despite strong economic relations, China's defense relations with Malaysia have been circumscribed because of Kuala Lumpur's suspicion of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea region. See Ngeow Chow Bing, "Comprehensive Strategic Partners but Prosaic Military Ties: The Development of Malaysia-China Defence Relations 1991-2015," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 37, no. 2 (August 2015): 269-304. Nonetheless, recent indicators suggest China's influence in Southeast Asia is increasing relative to the United States. In November 2016, Malaysia signed its first significant defense agreement with China, which included the purchase of four littoral combat ships. See Sue-Lin Wong, "China and Malaysia Sign Deals on Navy Vessels," *Reuters*, November 1, 2016. Furthermore, under President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines, a longtime US ally, has bolstered economic ties with China and indicated greater willingness to compromise on maritime territorial disputes.

33 Watson, "China's Military Instrument," 106.

34 "Courses," College of Defense Studies.

35 Ibid.

36 "National Defense University of PLA Awards Master Degree to Foreign Senior Officers," *China Military Online*, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2014-09/09/content_6129447.htm, September 9, 2014.

防務學院

防務學院是中共提供國際軍事研究所層級的主要機構，屬於國防大學的一個部門，為外籍學官提供短期及進修課程。防務學院早在1960年代就以不同名目訓練外籍軍官，³⁴曾經接受訓練的外籍軍官統計數字各有不同，估計有數千人，受訓人員主要是軍官，階級從少尉(O-2譯註：美軍薪等)到准將(O-7)都有，其中尚包括一些文職國防部官員。為期一年的國防與戰略研究課程以上校與准將為對象，以英語或法語授課。³⁵2012年起，國防研究院開始啟動授予外籍軍官碩士學位的實驗計畫，至2014年9月已有61位獲得學位。³⁶

According to a 2010 Xinhua News Agency article, more than 4,000 foreign officers from 150 countries had received some form of training at the College of Defense Studies.³⁷ Due to this international orientation, the college is relatively transparent compared to other Chinese military academies. In contrast to other Chinese military academies and the PLA NDU, which largely do not have publicly-accessible websites, the College of Defense Studies has hosted a public website since 2012 that shares information in Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish.³⁸ The multilingual website demonstrates that international outreach is a core function of the college as stated in its mission to undertake "unswerving efforts to promote friendly relations and pragmatic cooperation between countries and armed forces."³⁹

根據2010年新華社報導，已經有4000名、來自150個國家的學官，在防務學院接受各種形式的訓練。³⁷由於其國際面向，防務學院比其他軍事學院來得透明。在其他軍事學院及解放軍國防大學基本上沒有公開網站，但防務學院從2012年就提供中、英、法、俄、西等語言網站。³⁸多語網站開放顯示該學院接觸國際的核心功能，正如其任務所揭

37 國防大學防務學院首次揭秘：已培訓4千多名外國軍官 [College of Defense Studies' top secret: 4,000 foreign military officers trained already], 新華網 [Xinhua Net], http://news.xinhuanet.com/school/2010-09/05/c_12519388.htm, September 5, 2010.

38 Zhao Shengnan, "College of Defense Studies Launches Website," China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-09/14/content_15759701.htm, September 14, 2012.

39 "Function and Mission," College of Defense Studies, NDU, PLA, China, http://www.cdsndu.org/html_en/to_xygk_orderNo=2251&superOrderNo=2250.html, April 21, 2016.



示：「堅定不移地推動不同國家與軍隊的友好合作關係和實務合作。」³⁹

On the one-year anniversary of the College of Defense Studies website launch, an article was published in the official newspaper of the People's Liberation Army, the PLA Daily, praising the "international influence of the College of Defense Studies' website."⁴⁰ This recognition is notable because the PLA Daily serves as a mouthpiece for top-level military and civilian Communist Party leaders, advancing policy prerogatives and promoting the official party line. The article describes the website as "an online bridge of Chinese-foreign military friendship" and quotes a Brazilian Air Force colonel and alumnus: "Congratulations to CDS on the opening of the website, this is great news, this is a great platform to keep up with my alma mater and to understand China's military buildup, hope the site does better and better!"⁴¹

防務學院網站開啟一周年時官方的《解放軍報》登出一篇文章，讚揚「防務學院的國際影響力」。⁴⁰這項認同很重要，因為《解放軍報》是中共軍、民領導人的喉舌，負責推動政策並強化黨的路線。該文將網站描述為：「中國與外軍友誼的橋樑」，同時引述一位巴西空軍上校校友所言：「恭喜防務學院設立網站，這是大好消息，這是一個與母校連結及瞭解中國軍事建設的大平台，期望這一個網站日新月異。」⁴¹

Like other Chinese colleges and universities in the business of educating foreigners, CDS leverages China's illustrious civilizational legacy by exposing students to Chinese history and culture—for example, CDS has organized trips for students and their families to the Great Wall and visits to a Beijing Shaolin kung fu school as well as held classes in calligraphy, dumpling making, and Chinese character paper-cutting for students' spouses and children.⁴²

與中國其他接受外籍學生的高等院校一樣，防務學院運用豐富的文化遺產，讓學生浸淫在中國的歷史文化中—例如辦理學官及其眷屬前往長城一遊、參觀北京少林功夫學

40 國防大學防務學院網站的國際影響力 [International influence of the College of Defense Studies website], 解放軍報 [PLA Daily], http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2013-09/20/c_125416490.htm, September 20, 2013.

41 Ibid.

42 於下頁。

校、為學官眷屬與子女舉辦書法班、包餃子班和漢字剪紙班。⁴²

Although CDS students are exposed to historical attractions and Chinese culture, they are not integrated with their Chinese counterparts at the PLA National Defense University. Foreign students are taught at a separate satellite campus in northern Beijing, which according to alumni from Southeast Asia limits opportunities to interface and build relationships with PLA colleagues.⁴³ These alumni also expressed disappointment that instructors limit opportunities for discussion and rarely depart from official positions.⁴⁴ Steep language barriers are likely responsible for segregation of Chinese and foreign officers at the PLA NDU. Most foreign officers lack the language skills necessary to undertake graduate-level coursework in Mandarin, but speak French, Spanish, Arabic, Russian, or other foreign languages. As a result, the College of Defense Studies offers courses in English, French, Russian, Spanish, and Chinese, which reflects this linguistic mix.⁴⁵ Conversely, many Chinese officers would also likely be unable to undertake graduate studies in English or another foreign language.⁴⁶ Putting aside the PLA's motives for holding separate courses, segregating foreign and Chinese officers at the university attenuates efforts to build stronger person-to-person relationships between PLA and foreign officers.

雖然防務學院學官接觸到歷史景點和中國文化，但並沒有融入解放軍國防大學的中國同行。外籍學官在北京北部一個獨立的衛星園區受教，根據東南亞校友說，甚少有機會與解放軍互動並建立關係。⁴³這些校友也對講員甚少脫離官方立場，課堂也極少討論表示失望。⁴⁴語言障礙或許是國防大學中外學官造成隔閡的原因。絕大多數外籍學官只

42 "Visit to Beijing Shaolin Kung Fu School," Cultural Life, College of Defense Studies, NDU, PLA, China, June 1, 2015, http://www.cdsndu.org/html_en/to_articleContent_article.id=40288a854cd222b5014dbda32f8103bd.html; and "Pictures," College of Defense Studies, NDU, PLA, China, http://www.cdsndu.org/html_en/to_picture_language=English&pageSize=9.html, June 23, 2016.

43 Bing, "Strategic Partners," 286; and Ian Storey, "China's Bilateral Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia," *Asian Security* 8, no. 3 (2012): 297, doi:10.1080/14799855.2012.723928.

44 Storey, "China's Bilateral Defense Diplomacy."

45 "Courses," College of Defense Studies.

46 Van Oudenaren developed this perception based upon his experience teaching adult English classes in China (2008-9).



能說法、西、阿拉伯、俄文，或其他語言，欠缺研讀研究所課程的中文能力。基此，國防研究院提供英、法、俄、西及中文課程。⁴⁵同樣的，很多中國軍官也無法參加英語或其他語言的研究所課程。⁴⁶拋開解放軍獨立課程的動機，將中、外籍學官隔離，極不利於解放軍與外籍軍官建立更強有力的人際關係。

"Understanding" China

Coursework at the College of Defense Studies includes general literature on international security studies. Nonetheless, the curriculum adopts a primarily Sinocentric perspective designed to instill understanding and respect for China. The college introduces students to classical Chinese philosophy and strategic culture through classics such as Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*.⁴⁷ A China Studies course provides a comprehensive introduction to the contemporary Chinese political system and China's economy, military, diplomacy, and culture.⁴⁸ The course comprises 18 seminar sessions taught by prominent guest lecturers including retired senior leaders such as former Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and former Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Vice Chairman Qi Xuchun. A 2014 PLA Daily article entitled "The China Dream through the Eyes of Foreign Officers at CDS" notes the China Studies course strives to promulgate the concept of China's peaceful development while explaining the China Dream to foreign officers. A Pakistani brigadier general explained China's peaceful development path is a strategic choice benefiting not only neighboring countries, but also the whole world. Realizing the "China Dream" will bring about a more "fortunate world."⁴⁹

瞭解中國

防務學院的課程包含一般國際安全研究文獻。儘管如此，課程仍以中國為中心的角度設計，旨在灌輸對中國的理解和尊重。學院以孫子兵法等經典介紹中國古典哲學與戰略文化。⁴⁷「中國研究」課程廣泛介紹當代中國政治制度及經濟、軍事外交與文化。⁴⁸課程有18次研討會，延聘客座講員包括前外交部長李肇星、前政協副主席齊學春等退休

47 "Academic Trends" College of Defense Studies, NDU, PLA, http://www.cdsndu.org/html_en/to_xshd_.html.

48 All information concerning CDS's China studies course is from 國防大學外國高級軍官學員眼中的「中國夢」 [The China dream through the eyes of senior foreign officers], 解放軍報 [PLA Daily], http://www.81.cn/jkhc/2014-11/20/content_6233316.htm, November 20, 2014.

49 Ibid.

高級領導人。2014年解放軍報一篇題為〈國防研究院外籍學官眼中的中國夢〉的文章指出，中國研究課程努力向外籍學官推銷和平崛起理念，同時說明何謂「中國夢」。一位巴基斯坦准將解釋說，中國的和平發展道路是一項戰略選擇，不僅鄰國受益，乃至全世界都受益。實現「中國夢」將帶來更「幸福的世界」。⁴⁹

Student scholarship highlighted on the CDS website also reflects efforts to instill greater sympathy and admiration for China. An early 2013 paper, "Is China a Threat to World?" [sic], written by a Bangladeshi officer claims, for example, "The 'China Threat' theory originated in the early 1990s in America and Japan" and stems from a "lingering Cold War mentality."⁵⁰ He further argues those espousing this theory fail to account for China's dependence on the international system, increasing global economic interdependence, internal development needs, and the Confucian tradition of emphasizing harmony.⁵¹

防務學院網站上貼出來的學官心得報告，反映出對中國同情與欽佩的灌輸。2013年初一篇孟加拉學官題為〈中國是否對世界構成威脅？〉的文章認為：「『中國威脅論』起源於1990年代初期的美、日」，乃是「冷戰思維的延續」。⁵⁰他進一步認為，支持此一理論的人無法解釋何以中國對國際體系有所依賴、全球經濟相互依存增加、內部發展需要，以及儒家傳統重視的和諧。⁵¹

Remarkably, a few student papers featured on the CDS website are less sanguine that China's rise will be frictionless. A 2013 paper by a Malaysian brigadier general notes American forward military deployments serve as a "strategic insurance policy" for smaller Southeast Asian countries against Chinese assertiveness.⁵² Nonetheless, the tone of the paper suggests Southeast Asian states should be wary of American efforts to regain regional primacy, which Beijing might perceive as attempts to encircle China and consequently heighten regional tensions. Student scholarship demonstrates different

50 Group Captain Fazlul Haque, "Is China a Threat to World," Defense Forum, Autumn 2013, 112.

51 Ibid, 113-16.

52 Brigadier General Hj Sanusi Bin Hj Samion, "China-Southeast Asia Relations: The Security Dimensions and the Way Forward," Defense Forum, Spring 2013, 41.



opinions are tolerated, albeit within the context of the curriculum, which steers scholarship toward viewpoints that are generally sympathetic toward China. This demonstrates a subtle approach to shaping the perspectives of a multinational student body with diverse ideological orientations.

值得注意的是，防務學院網站上有幾篇學官論文對中國的崛起不會不產生摩擦的論點，表示並不那麼樂觀。2013年馬來西亞准將的一篇心得指出，美國軍隊的前進部署是東南亞小國對抗中國獨斷專行的一項「戰略保險政策」。⁵²儘管如此，該文的調性仍認為東南亞各國應該小心美國致力恢復在此一地區的優勢，因為可能被北京視為對中國形成包圍，從而加劇區域緊張局勢。儘管在課程的設計背景下，獎學金引導了對中國的同情，但獎學金的授與展現出對不同意見的容忍。這也顯示出以一種微妙的方式來形塑不同國家，意識形態各異學官的看法。

Another means used to develop rapport with students from African, Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American countries is to emphasize postcolonial grievances, primarily with the West. A senior African officer who attended both a US professional military education program and CDS recalled the latter's curriculum promulgated a narrative of US neoimperialism in Africa.⁵³ According to this narrative, the West, and in particular the United States, continued to subjugate Africa following the colonial period by controlling means of production and exploiting African labor. This viewpoint dovetails with China's own postcolonial historical narrative that the West and Japan subjected China to a "century of humiliation," which finally ended when the Mao Zedong-led Communist Party threw off the shackles of foreign imperialism.⁵⁴

另一種與非洲、亞洲、中東、拉丁美洲國家學官拉近關係的手段，是強調以西方國家為主的後殖民時期的不滿。曾經參加美國軍事專業教育及防務學院某一非洲高級官員回憶說，後者的課程主在傳播美國在非洲的新帝國主義。⁵³描述西方(特別是美國)在殖民時期以後，仍透過控制生產方式與剝削勞工，繼續馴服非洲。這個觀點與中國本身後殖民歷史敘事相吻合，即西方和日本使中國「百年恥辱」，最後在毛澤東領導的共產黨手

53 Interview in spring 2016.

54 Wang, "National Humiliation," 790-91.

上，終於擺脫了帝國主義的枷鎖。⁵⁴

Made in the USA: China's Foreign Military Education

Although the narrative delivered to foreign students at PLA military academies differs greatly from American international military education programs, China has adopted and adapted some key elements of US models and practices. Most importantly, Chinese programs such as CDS attract high-level military personnel to build and develop mutually beneficial relationships with foreign partners similar to US Defense Security Cooperation Agency programs, such as the International Military Education and Training program and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, for elite military and government leaders.⁵⁵

美國製造的中國外籍軍事教育

雖然在解放軍的軍事院校提供給外籍學官的課程內容與美國的國際軍事教育計畫有很大的不同，但中國已經吸納若干美國模式及實務上的關鍵要素。最重要的是，防務學院主在吸收高階軍事人員，以期與外國夥伴建立並發展雙方互惠的關係，這一點與美國國防安全合作署各項計畫，如國際軍事教育及訓練計畫，及打擊恐怖主義夥伴等計畫相似，一樣是旨在吸收軍事及政府菁英。⁵⁵

Multinational programs, particularly those conducted at the US National Defense University, are often underappreciated outside the classroom as demonstrating the value of education, and connecting student learning directly to national security outcomes is difficult. According to scholarship on US national security budgeting, "The initial goals of International

55 Funding for International Military Education and Training is administered by the Department of State through traditional bilateral foreign assistance and implemented by the Department of Defense. Funding for Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program is administered by the Department of Defense and international student billets are allocated by the US Combatant Commands. See also Russell S. Thacker and Paul W. Lambert, "Low Cost High Returns: Getting More from International Partnerships," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 74, (4th Quarter): 70; and "History of the International Counterterrorism Fellows Program," National Defense University International Student Management Office, <http://ismo.ndu.edu/Incoming-Students/The-International-Fellows-Programs/International-Counterterrorism-Fellows-CISA/History-of-the-ICTFP/>, October 12, 2016.



Military Education Training were to further regional stability through military-to-military relationships, transfer critical skills to foreign militaries, and train militaries for combined operations with the United States."⁵⁶

跨國計畫特別是在美國國防大學課程的教育價值觀經常在離開教室以後就被忽視，直接將學官學習與國家安全的成果相連結相當困難。根據一篇與美國國家安全預算相關的論文，認為「國際軍事教育訓練的最初目的，是透過軍事對軍事關係、將關鍵技能轉移給外軍，及與美軍之聯合作戰訓練，進一步推動區域之穩定。」⁵⁶

After the end of the Cold War, International Military Education and Training evolved beyond training partners for combined operations with the United States to include coursework promoting US ideals such as government accountability, civilian oversight of the military, protection of minority and human rights, and democratic values.⁵⁷ This shift recognized the utility of military-to-military education in advancing American soft power in a post-Cold War era, thereby consolidating the gains of the Cold War based on the fundamental belief that security emanates from proliferation of democratic ideals and norms.

冷戰結束以後，國際軍事教育已經不僅止於訓練合作夥伴國家與美國的協同作戰，其中也包含推動美國理想的課程，如政府問責制、人民對軍隊的監督、保護少數民族與人權，以及民主價值觀。⁵⁷這一改變是體認軍事教育的運用，有助於後冷戰時代推動美國軟實力，從而在安全來自民主的理念與規範的擴散下，鞏固了冷戰時期的成果。

China does not share these goals or ideals. The ruling Communist Party is suspicious, if not hostile, toward organizations and states seeking greater respect for human rights, protection of minorities, or democratic reform. Thus, the PLA has replicated much of the academic framework of the US model of foreign military education graduate programs while jettisoning the values that American programs promote.

中國不接受這些目的或理想。執政的共產黨追求對人權、少數民族保護、民主改革

56 Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams, *Buying National Security: How America Plans and Pays for Its Global Role and Safety at Home* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 82.

57 Ibid.

等的國家及組織懷疑甚至敵視。因此，解放軍複製了美國外籍軍事教育研究所課程大部分學術架構，但拋棄美國推動的價值觀。

Implications for the United States

China's rise is invariably cited as the most significant geopolitical development of the early twenty-first century. Whether China is actually a near-peer competitor to the United States matters less than the widespread perception that it is. Many observers both inside and outside the PRC perceive China as a standard bearer for an alternative to a Western model of governance and economics. The Communist Party, particularly under Xi, has to some extent encouraged this perception. Due to the gradual discrediting of socialist ideology in Chinese society and increased domestic exposure to Western influences that Beijing views as both pervasive and subversive, the party has stepped up its external propaganda efforts to forge and promote a new Chinese ideology at home and abroad.⁵⁸

對美國的意涵

中國的崛起經常被認為是21世紀初最重要的地緣政治發展。無論中國是否真正成為美國的競爭對手，一般所認知都已接受中國就是美國對手。中國內、外的許多觀察家認為，中國是西方國家治理與經濟替代模式的標準載體。習近平領導下的共產黨，特別是在，一定程度鼓勵此一觀點。由於中國民間逐漸懷疑社會主義意識形態，受到西方影響越來越多，北京認為這會蔓延且具顛覆性，黨於是打造新的中國意識形態，大力在國內、外宣傳。⁵⁸

Influencing international discourse is a new approach for China, which has previously relied on blocking external influences that the party considers potential threats (e.g., through internet censorship). Public diplomacy, outsized economic investments abroad such as the One Belt, One Road project, and state media have taken on larger roles in Chinese efforts to acquire international influence and shape external discourse because China is not able to draw on the same reservoir of soft power as open societies such as South Korea or

58 Mareike Ohlberg, "Boosting the Party's Voice: China's Quest for Ideological Dominance," MERICS China Monitor 34 (July 21, 2016): 3.



the United States. The PLA's cultivation of relationships with foreign officers at programs such as the College of Defense Studies constitutes a targeted component of this larger endeavor.

影響國際話語是中共的一種新手法，中國以往都認為外界影響是一項威脅而加以封鎖(如網路網檢査)。公眾外交，大型海外投資如「一帶一路」、國家媒體等都是中國在爭取國際影響力及形塑國際話語權的作為中扮演重要角色，因為中共無法比照美、韓等國，可以從開放社會中汲取軟實力。解放軍以防務學院等機構耕耘與外籍軍官之間的關係，其實就是整體努力，有其針對性的一部分。

Outside East Asia, where Sino-US strategic competition is intensifying, China and the United States are not engaged in a bipolar contest for supremacy akin to the US-Soviet contest during the Cold War. By contrast, Chinese and US relations with developing nations beyond East Asia are best envisioned as running on separate tracks, neither complimentary nor adversarial, but rather generally ambivalent toward each other. In peripheral regions, Chinese foreign policy is driven mainly by economic interests and efforts to promote positive diplomatic ties with other nations. By maintaining cordial relations with as many countries as possible, China seeks an improved international image, additional support for positions on international norms and institutions, and diplomatic backing on key issues related to core national security interests such as Taiwan, Tibet, and territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas.⁵⁹

在中、美戰略競爭激烈的東亞地區以外，雙方並未發展到如冷戰時期的兩極競逐狀態，彼此有如在兩條獨立的軌道上各自發展，既不互補，也非對抗，彼此好惡交織；在外圍地區，中國的外交政策主要放在經濟利益及促進與他國的積極外交關係上，透過與盡可能多的國家保持親密關係，來改善國際形象，同時希望能在國際規範與制度上獲得支持，以及對中國國家利益的核心，如臺灣、西藏，及在南海與東海有領土爭議的外交力挺。⁵⁹

As noted above, Beijing's objectives in promoting alternatives to Western ideology abroad

59 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, *China's Search for Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 170-71.

are largely informed by its overriding priority to foster internal and external political contexts that perpetuate and strengthen the Communist Party's domestic grip on power. Nevertheless, the ramifications of China's endeavors in this arena extend far beyond its borders. A major concern is that China, especially if it continues cooperating closely with Russia, is capable of presenting an alternative to the US-led system that attracts and emboldens authoritarian states across the globe. As a result, Chinese involvement in the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America presents complex challenges for the United States.

如上所述，北京在對抗西方意識形態的目的下，主在優先營造加強共產黨永久掌握權力的內外政治環境。然而，中國在這個領域的努力，其影響遠遠超越國界，其中一項主要的關切是，若中國與俄羅斯繼續合作緊密，就有能力提出一種替代美國主導的制度，吸引並鼓勵全球的威權國家。因此，中國在中東、非洲、中亞和拉丁美洲的參與，為美國帶來了複雜的挑戰。

States that do not share US foreign policy prerogatives such as promoting good governance, democracy, free markets, and human rights can now turn to China's more active international diplomacy for support, and increasingly view-rightly or wrongly-China as an exemplar of an alternative model predicated on authoritarianism and state capitalism.⁶⁰ Over the long term, the perception that there is such an alternative model could erode US influence abroad and limit the ability of Washington to spread and sustain its preferred international institutions. The United States can counteract this outcome by striving to preserve its comparative advantages.

不接受美國外交政策，如政府治理、民主、自由市場、人權等價值觀的國家，現在可以轉向中國更積極的國際外交來獲得支持，無論正確與否，越來越多人認為，中國是集權主義和國家資本主義之另類模型的典範。⁶⁰從長遠來看，這一種另類模式觀念可能會削弱美國對外影響力，並壓縮華府傳播與保持其制度優勢的能力。美國可以透過努力保持其相對優勢，來抵消這一結果。

60 Joshua Kurlantzick, "Why the 'China Model' Isn't Going Away," Atlantic, March 21, 2013. For debates and discussion on the validity of the China Model, see Bell et. al., "Is there a China Model," ChinaFile, October 16, 2015, <http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/there-china-model>.



Comparative US Advantage

The United States retains a qualitative advantage over China in international military education based on the reputation of the US military and American educational institutions and extensive American experience in building partner capacity. Attending a US war college remains extremely prestigious for foreign military officers, even for those from allied and partner countries that have strained relationships with the United States. Nonetheless, assuming America's advantage in this area is immutable would be imprudent.

美國的相對優勢

基於美國在軍事與教育制度的聲望，加上建立夥伴能力的經驗，在國際軍事教育上擁有質的優勢。就讀美國戰爭學院對外國軍官來說，仍然非常有地位，甚至對於若干與美國關係緊張的盟國和夥伴國家的軍官來說也是如此。儘管如此，認定美國在此領域的優勢永遠不變，則就嫌輕率了。

As this article demonstrates, China's international military education efforts are substantial, both in terms of resources allocated and number of students educated. Clearly, China has borrowed key elements from US programs, while infusing its own values and messages. If the United States abandoned its efforts in international military education, China would not take long to fill the void. To avoid this eventuality, policymakers should support steps to sustain and enhance the quality of US foreign military education programs.

如本文所示，中國的國際軍事教育工作在資源配置及受教育的學生人數看都相當實在。顯然，中國很明顯地從美國借鑒一些主要成分，然後注入自己的價值觀和信息。如果美國放棄在國際軍事教育方面的努力，中國不會很久就填補這個空白。為了避免這種可能性，政策制定者應該支持維持並逐步提高美國外國軍事教育計畫的品質。

Due to China's tendency to appropriate and adapt US military institutions to its own purposes, the United States should be more circumspect in future military-to-military relations with China. By no means should the United States sever military-to-military relations with China entirely as cooperation on overlapping counterterrorism, counterpiracy, counterterrorism, and humanitarian and disaster relief objectives has proven mutually

beneficial.⁶¹ Nevertheless, US strategic leaders should look for opportunities to maximize these sorts of synergic opportunities in military-to-military relations while curtailing linkages the PLA is likely to exploit.

由於中國慣於接收美國的軍事制度，並依自己目的加以修改，美國在今後與中國的軍事對軍事關係中應該更加謹慎。美國絕對不應該完全斷絕與中國的軍事對軍事關係，因為在反恐、反海盜、人道及救災等方面的合作，被證明是互利的。⁶¹然而，美國的戰略領導人應該尋求這類軍事對軍事關係最大的合作機會，同時限縮可能被解放軍利用的聯繫。

Fiscally, Congress and other leaders should avoid the regular temptation to see foreign military education as an easy target during times of austerity and recognize that a relatively small investment provides access to global defense leaders and enables international partners to speak the same language of military strategy. Viewing such programs as expendable negates the long-term value of sustained relationships with key partners and leads to an overreliance on train and equip authorities, which often prioritize flashy new tactical gear and rifle ranges over enduring partnerships.⁶² The United States should counter the urge to reduce the number of international officers studying at its war colleges by increasing opportunities for key foreign leaders to build positive and enduring military-to-military relationships.

財政方面，在財政緊縮時期國會和其他領導人應避免不時將外國軍事教育視為一項可有可無的事情，要體認這種相對較小的投資可以接觸到全球國防領導人，並使得國際夥伴都能操相同的軍事戰略語言。若不重視這類計畫，忽視與合作夥伴持續關係的長期性價值，導致對訓練和裝備部門的過度依賴，而這些部門往往重視戰術裝備與步槍靶場遠勝於長遠的夥伴關係。⁶²美國應該抵抗減少戰爭學院學官人數的呼籲，甚至應該增加重要的外籍學官名額，以建立積極並長久的軍事對軍事關係。

61 Christopher P. Twomey, "The Military-Security Relationship," in *Tangled Titans: The United States and China*, ed. David Shambaugh (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 254.

62 Authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Security Forces, 10 U.S.C. § 2282, (2014).



Although the impact of educating allies and partners is often difficult to measure at the macrolevel due to the multifaceted nature of these programs, the aggregate impact of such programs should not be underestimated or sacrificed for short-term security needs. Graduating officers of the US National Defense University's College of International Security Affairs (CISA) and other similar US programs for international officers, for example, demonstrate how such endeavors shape longer-term strategic partnerships. Success comes in many forms ranging from US war college faculty directly supporting work on national-level strategy and legislation to improving foreign officers' views of the United States, shaping strategic thinking, and building the intellectual capacity of foreign leaders to navigate tough security challenges.⁶³

雖然對盟邦及伙伴提供教育的影響，由於各項計畫的多面向特質，很難從宏觀角度衡量，但整體效果絕不可低估，或因短期安全需要而予以犧牲。例如，美國國防大學國際安全事務學院(CISA)和其他類似的美國國際官員課程的畢業生，展現此種努力形塑了更長遠的戰略夥伴關係。成功有許多形式表現，從美國戰爭學院教師直接支援國家層級戰略與立法工作，以提升外國官員對美國的看法，到形塑戰略思想，建立外國領導人知識能量以解決嚴重安全挑戰。⁶³

Moreover, many foreign graduates return home to teach at their respective command and staff colleges thereby infusing US joint doctrine into their own national contexts.⁶⁴ In South Asia, CISA's Nepali graduates regularly teach and update their irregular warfare doctrine at the Nepal Army Staff College based on the latest curriculum at CISA and in collaboration with their former thesis advisors at the US National Defense University. Because Nepal's Army is

63 Specific examples include the chiefs of the Colombian Navy and Senegalese Army, three consecutive commanders of Jordanian special forces battalions in Afghanistan, vice chiefs of the Maldives National Defense Force and the Malian Army, presidential advisers in Tunisia and Senegal, and many other strategic leaders.

64 In a postgraduation interview, Admiral Hernando Wills Velez, who rose to become the Colombian Navy Commander, attributed his success as a military leader to seeing the interconnected nature of twenty-first-century warfare, which he learned while at CISA. He applied these lessons to his country's unique situation by expanding the Colombian Navy's leadership and participation in joint training exercises with other South American countries, as well as the United States.

a key troop contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions this has a cascading effect that influences strategic thinking in other militaries that also contribute troops to peacekeeping operations.

尤有進者，許多外籍畢業學官回到母國的指參學院教書，從而將美國的聯合作戰準則注入自己的國家景況中。⁶⁴來自南亞尼泊爾的國際安全事務學院畢業學官，根據最新課程內容，加上他們在國防大學時的老師指導，定期修改在本國陸軍參謀學院的授課，並修改其《非正規作戰準則》。由於尼泊爾是聯合國維和行動的重要部隊，這種做法對其他參與維和行動部隊的戰略思想也產生串聯式的影響。

When Major General Didier Dacko, a 2010 CISA graduate from Mali, was featured in an article in the Atlantic entitled "The New Terrorist Training Ground," he cited his CISA thesis as the basis for his country's strategic response to the crisis caused by the nexus of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other regional threats.⁶⁵ In conversations with military planners at US Africa Command, Dacko was singled out as an "indispensable partner" who could "speak the same language [in discussing strategy]."⁶⁶

來自馬利的迪迪爾·達科少將，是國際安全事務學院 2010年畢業校友，他在大西洋雜誌發表一篇名為〈新恐怖主義訓練場〉，稱他引用在CISA論文，延伸為該國處理伊斯蘭馬格里布基地組織與其他區域威脅的戰略。⁶⁵當他與美國非洲司令部的軍事規劃人員對話時，達科被認為是「不可或缺的合作夥伴」，因為他們在「討論戰略」時有共同語言。⁶⁶

The recent increase in coalition operations, such as American troops fighting alongside a Jordanian Special Forces battalion in Operation Enduring Freedom or with Bulgarian Army officers in Iraq, illustrates that US professional military education is critical to building international partnerships at the strategic level. At the present time, America's senior service college system, as well as its other war colleges, remain the benchmark for officers around the world, drawing many future leaders of US partner nations to

65 Yochi Dreazen, "The New Terrorist Training Ground," Atlantic, October 2013.

66 Discussion with USAFRICOM colonel at US National Defense University in 2014.



learn in classrooms alongside their US counterparts. This ideological interoperability in which officers and government officials build on the strategic frameworks, leadership competencies, and joint doctrine taught at US war colleges enhances the effectiveness of joint multinational warfighting by allowing commanders to share a common vocabulary as they cooperate to counteract threats in the twenty-first-century security environment. Abandoning this worthy goal just as competitive alternatives to US international military education are emerging in China that share neither America's values nor goals would be a mistake.

最近聯盟作戰次數增加，如美軍部隊與約旦特戰營在「持久自由行動」期間併肩作戰，與保加利亞軍官在伊拉克合作，顯示美國專業軍事教育對建立戰略層級的國際合作夥伴關係之重要。目前美軍各軍種高階學院及其他戰爭學院仍然是全世界軍官的標竿，吸引很多美國的夥伴國家未來領導人與美軍同業在教室同聚一堂。這些軍官與政府官員在美國戰爭學院接受的戰略架構、領導能力與聯合作戰準則教育所形成的意識形態互通，使指揮官能以共同語言共同對抗21世紀安全威脅，從而強化了多國聯合作戰效能。崛起的中國準備取而代之，他們國際軍事教育的價值觀與目的與美國南轅北轍，若美國放棄此一有價值的目的，就大錯特錯了。

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