

強權國家安全戰略及對東亞可能的影響

Superpower States National Security Strategies and the Possible Impacts on East Asia

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前 言

20世紀開始時各強權分據四方，由於同盟國在二次世界大戰時戰勝了軸心國，結束後，原盟國的美國與蘇聯兩強各自帶頭組織了北約及華沙公約組織在歐洲以集體安全的名義對抗，因此世界也走向了由美蘇主導的兩極發展，兩股勢力之間展開了所謂的冷戰。美國與前蘇聯之間雖未正式宣戰，但雙方在軍備及政治上持續衝突與對峙。先前兩國雖然共同對抗軸心國勢力，但在如何重建戰後世界方面，產生重大歧異。隨著這種情況經年累月的持續，冷戰也從歐洲擴散到世界各角落。美國動員西歐和中東的盟友力圖孤立及消滅共產政權勢力。同時，蘇聯則支持世界各地的共產主義運動，尤其是在東歐、拉丁美洲及東南亞。1991年柏林圍牆遭拆除、蘇聯崩解、冷戰結束，世界秩序便朝向單極化發展。

1990年8月美國老布希總統在準備揮軍波斯灣時發表演說，演說中提出「新世界秩序」的名詞使世界震驚。這個名詞總結闡述美國政府動向的法則和價值觀，將成為一簡化的國際關係，把世界視為同質性單位以化解歷史衝突。從1990年至2015年的25年間，世界見證了蘇聯的崩解、波灣戰爭（科威特解放和聯軍進攻伊拉克）、巴爾幹地區的戰爭、阿拉伯之春的革命以及對利比亞、敘利亞和葉門的軍事干預等許多改變，最後在許多地方產生恐怖主義，不僅在這些地區發生影響，其影響力也蔓延至全世界。

美國前國務卿季辛吉於2014年出版的最近著作《世界秩序》一書中曾說「我們的時代有時是持續不斷地追求世界秩序的一種共同理念。」。他的言語彷彿是在提醒所有人，這些在世界上正在發生中的事件只是布希所提「新世界秩序」價值觀的延續。幾十年過去了，全球的戰爭與衝突方興未艾，亟需某種程度的秩序。

作者認為世界可以從3個層面來敘述。首先，世界不同的國家可以約分為15個區域；其中每個區域都包括許多其他子區域。如果我們進一步探討並了解，除了幾個非會員國之外，世界是由193個聯合國會員國組成。然而，從第一個角度來看世界，只有一個國家有能力強加其意志於其他國家，那就是世界唯一的超級強國（美國），以及其他6個強權國家：英國、法國、俄羅斯和中共（除了德國和日本以外的安理會5個常任理事國）。我認為美國、英國、法國和德國儘管與中國的關係日益密切，但仍認為中共是

競爭對手，俄羅斯是敵對勢力。另一方面，英國的脫離歐盟，對歐盟是一項挑戰，而上海合作組織(SCO)將是北約和歐盟的競爭對手。就區域層面而言，在東亞地區，包括中國、俄羅斯、日本、南韓和北韓是這個地區主要的勢力。而南海和東海亦是爭端的地區。所以，本文的主要研究課題即著重於東亞。

壹、美國國家安全戰略

在歐巴馬兩任總統任期期間，分別於2010年頒布了美國國家安全戰略（後於2011年修訂），及於2015年頒布新戰略。而川普的國家安全戰略則迄今尚未頒布。

一、已宣布的對美國戰略威脅

- (一)恐怖主義和暴力極端主義對美國本土或重要基礎設施進行災難性攻擊。
- (二)針對美國公民海外僑民及美國盟邦的威脅或攻擊。
- (三)全球經濟危機或大規模經濟衰退。
- (四)大規模毀滅性武器之擴散及／或使用；以及傳染性疾病之散播。
- (五)氣候變遷。（巴黎氣候公約已遭川普總統暫時中止）
- (六)主要能源市場動盪。
- (七)高度脆弱或失敗國家所造成的日漸不穩定及危安的後果（包括大規模屠殺和跨國組織犯罪）。

二、未宣布的對美國戰略威脅（個人看法）

- (一)中國國力日增，成為世界上最大的經濟競爭對手。
- (二)俄羅斯的政治影響力及軍事力量（核子—心理戰—網路戰等…）。
- (三)某些國家在區域的主宰地位對美國全球霸權利益產生的衝突。

三、美國戰略願景

維持其單一全球強權地位，安全及繁榮，使美國能夠建構全球的政治和經濟版圖。

四、美國的戰略目標

- (一)保障利益及主宰地位。
- (二)維護其人民及盟邦之安全、穩定及繁榮。
- (三)尊重美國及全世界的價值觀。

五、透過4大主軸達成其目標

- (一)安全。
- (二)繁榮。
- (三)價值觀（平等、民主、自由、人權、法治、支持沒有暴力和極端主義的公民社會、年輕人成就感）。
- (四)世界秩序（與亞洲、歐洲、中東、非洲和美洲的關係和影響力之類型及程度）。

六、美國與其他國家的關係管道

- (一)美國政府機構具有固定目標（這些目標被認為是對國家的真正擁有），以及不斷變化的政策和戰略（認為對總統及其行政當局的真正擁有）。美國的決策

體系由總統、國務院、國防部（五角大廈）及國家安全顧問5個主要角色構成。它的設計是基於美國總統單方面決定的複雜性做為基礎。所有美國的國家安全戰略在保護其土地、人民及國家利益，價值觀和盟邦方面均無不同。因此毫無疑問，與美國的戰略關係，對於任何一個國家都是必要的。

(二)美國將與其往來的盟邦分成兩大類型：民主社會及非民主社會。

(三)美國透過單一的管道與民主國家往來，即政治管道；與非民主國家往來則透過兩個管道（政治和軍事管道），本人認為在很多情況下，那是美國較佳的選擇。美國認為，軍事實體應該永遠存在，以做為盟國的支柱，在政治管道失效或弱化時，軍事管道仍具有功能且強大，你可能會注意到，美國數十年來每年對埃及的援助只有在經濟援助方面受影響，甚至完全停止，但對埃及的軍事援助從未受到絲毫影響。

七、美國計畫透過下列方式維持世界秩序

(一)推動亞太地區再平衡

- 1.美國向來都是有意維持其亞太強權的地位。直到2020年，美國以外的成長將近一半都將來自亞洲。也就是說，該地區的安全情勢一包括有爭議的海上領土主張和北韓的挑釁一都有升級和衝突的風險。美國領導階層對於塑造此區域的長線佈局，以增進穩定與安全，透過公開透明的制度促進貿易和商業，確保尊重普及權利和自由，仍然至關重要。
- 2.為了實現這一願景，美國正多樣化其在亞洲的安全關係以及其防禦態勢及佈局。美國正與日本、韓國、澳洲和菲律賓建立現代化聯盟，加強彼此間的互動，確保這些國家有能力應付區域和全球的挑戰。美國認為本身應致力於強化東協、東亞高峰會和亞太經合會等區域機構，以加強共同的規則和規範，應對共同的挑戰，協助確保爭端的和平解決。美國正與其亞洲合作夥伴合作，促進更加開放和透明的經濟體，以及對國際經濟規範的區域支持，這些規範對於維持其作為全球經濟成長的發動機而言至關重要。而跨太平洋夥伴關係(TPP)實為此一作為重心。
- 3.美國打算繼續支持推進亞太地區安全、發展和民主。這對於深化美國與東南亞，包括越南，印尼和馬來西亞等國家正在建立的合作夥伴關係而言，是重點所在。美國打算維護對韓國、日本、菲律賓和泰國的條約義務，同時鼓勵泰國迅速恢復民主。
- 4.美國在其戰略中表明，歡迎一個穩定、和平、繁榮中國的崛起，並尋求一種建設性關係，為兩國人民帶來福利。美國在公共衛生、經濟成長和朝鮮半島無核化等共同的區域，和全球挑戰方面會尋求合作。雖然會有競爭，但美國否定對抗的必然性。同時，美國打算從實力的立場來管理競爭，同時堅持中國在海事安全、貿易和人權等問題上應遵守國際規則和規範。美國將密切監視中國的軍事現代化建設，以及在亞洲的勢力擴大，同時尋求減少誤解或

誤判的風險。在網路安全方面，美國將採取必要行動保護企業和捍衛網路安全，以防止民間人士或中國政府為商業利益在網路上盜取商業機密。

(二)美國、中國和臺灣

- 1.雖然美國與在臺北的中華民國（臺灣）沒有外交關係，但美國與臺灣之間保有一種獨特的安全夥伴關係，美國將此安全夥伴關係列為高度優先，做為針對中國及對臺政策的一種明確回應，特別是美國認為臺灣人民拒絕將他們的島嶼視為中國主權領土的一部分，這取決於國際法，而非武力。
- 2.根據「2017年3月，全球觀察調查研究中心」的民意調查，只有約20%的臺灣人可以接受與中華人民共和國統一，而超過40%的人口願意獨立。臺灣沒有靠自己的軍力與中國抗衡的本錢，美國必須隨時準備支持其盟友對抗其對手。
- 3.即使在美臺共同防禦條約終止後，「臺灣關係法」仍為臺灣提供信心。另一方面，美國歷任政府持續關切臺灣安全是由於臺灣享有美國的政治支持，且亞洲盟邦及合作夥伴將臺灣視為對美國決心的試金石。最後，由於美軍有能力干預臺灣的危機，使得北京長期以來一直不敢攻擊臺灣。然而；美國從未宣布其有意在中國對臺採取敵對行動的情況下進行軍事干預。反之，美國官員總是言語支持臺海的和平與穩定。
- 4.美國以往針對北京和臺北採取雙重嚇阻的政策，因為各方都有責任維持和平。美國對兩岸都提出警告和保證：針對北京，美國的基本路線是警告不得攻擊臺灣，但也保證不支持臺獨。針對臺灣，美國的訊息是警告不要採取不必要的政治挑釁以引發中國軍事反應，但也保證美國將繼續支持臺灣。
- 5.中華人民共和國了解無法阻止美國對臺海提供軍事支援所面臨的長距離障礙。中國組建短程和中程彈道導彈部隊（人民解放軍火箭軍）。截至2014年底，中國共有1200多枚精準度已獲提升的短程彈道飛彈，加上數量不明的巡弋飛彈。這支部隊使解放軍的飛彈可反覆襲擊臺灣的機場，癱瘓臺灣的空軍。此外，在俄羅斯的協助下，大陸防空部隊的改善也將使任何飛越海峽的臺灣空軍戰機都有遭到擊落的危險。中國軍隊尚不能對臺灣進行成功的兩棲作戰，也不能對此島嶼港口進行嚴密海上封鎖，但其能力正在有系統地提升，此將使中華民國長期以來的防衛戰略失靈。
- 6.一些美國的國防學者的結論是，對臺灣而言，唯一有意義的防禦戰略就是善用其關鍵性的戰略特質，即它是一個島嶼，也是解放軍最大的弱點—入侵的部隊在橫渡臺灣海峽及在臺灣登陸上岸時，容易受到攻擊。這個戰略也需要臺灣採取創新和「不對稱的作戰構想和戰術以將臺灣持久的戰力和優勢發揮到最大極致」。

(三)美國有意尋求中東和北非(MENA)的穩定及和平。

(四)資源挹注於非洲的未來。

(五)深化美洲地區的經濟及安全合作。

貳、俄羅斯的國家安全戰略

俄羅斯國家安全戰略(2009-2020年)由俄羅斯前總統梅德韋傑夫起草。到2015年底總統普丁對此作出重大修改，並頒布「俄羅斯國家安全戰略2016」；然而，普丁早在2013年已經啟動了他的戰略。

一、威脅

- (一)美國和北約的軍力，尤其是美國的飛彈防禦體系，全球打擊能力，戰略非核武器以及太空軍事化和資訊戰的強化。
- (二)位於波羅的海區域俄羅斯邊界附近的美國生物實驗室。
- (三)日美關係的日益強化。
- (四)由於俄羅斯戰略中所謂的「第四代戰爭」，中亞地區成為緊張局勢的溫床，其形態為透過收買的特工發起顏色革命，目的在破壞俄羅斯的穩定。
- (五)由世界幾個地區的恐怖主義、極端主義和內戰所造成之區域不穩定。
- (六)跨國犯罪所造成的腐敗、破壞行為和威脅。

二、長期戰略目標

- (一)加強國防，保障政權的合法性，國家的主權和獨立性，保障俄羅斯聯邦國家和憲法統一。
- (二)加強民族融和、政治和社會穩定，發展民主機制，改善國家與民間社會的合作機制。
- (三)提升生活品質、強化健康、確保穩定國家人口發展。
- (四)維護及發展俄羅斯文化、精神價值觀及傳承。
- (五)提升全國經濟的競爭力。
- (六)強化俄羅斯聯邦身為全球強權的地位，旨在維繫與其他國家互利的穩定與戰略夥伴關係。

總結2016年俄羅斯國家安全戰略：

三、願景

擴大全球影響力並確保俄羅斯繁榮，進而重返能並列美國的世界強權地位。

四、價值觀

平等的戰略夥伴關係，相互國際尊重和標準的等同性。

五、依據前述，本人可將2015年12月頒布之俄羅斯國家安全戰略特點歸納如下：

- (一)普丁總統將已將俄羅斯的戰略從防禦轉變為攻擊，其中包括對烏克蘭的戰爭，將克里米亞併入其領土，以及對敘利亞的軍事干預。
- (二)此一戰略旨在獲取「聲望與領導地位」，進而發揮俄羅斯在解決國際問題上所扮演的角色，並擴大參與國際組織和聯盟，以提高競爭力和國際地位。

- (三)以創新為發展基礎，將軍隊及情報機關現代化，提高教育水準。俄羅斯在解決重大全球性問題，確保與各國關係中的戰略穩定及國際法的法治方面的角色越來越重要，這些都面臨美國霸權的抵制，以及北約在俄羅斯邊界活動的威脅。
- (四)俄羅斯認為伊斯蘭國是在西方雙重標準政策下的產物。而視其本身是在捍衛國家利益，追求公開、理性和務實的政策，排除耗費資源的對抗，包括軍備競賽。
- (五)它正與金磚國家集團、上海合作組織和20國集團的合作夥伴展開合作。俄羅斯的戰略也表明有興趣促進與歐洲國家和歐盟的互利夥伴關係，並基於兩國的共同利益與美國建立共同夥伴關係。

六、俄羅斯的主要戰略目標

極力發展俄國政治、軍事、經濟和科技，使其回到國際政治舞台，能與強權美國平起坐之外，能夠嚇阻北約勢力擴張，弱化美國國際影響力，特別是在波羅的海、亞太、中東及北非地區勢力，並與該地區國家建立穩固的關係，控制歐洲的能源市場。

七、俄羅斯與東亞國家

- (一)俄羅斯對東亞國家的傳統外交政策，旨在促進與東京、首爾的合作，反制平壤的核武計畫。此政策因美俄關係的持續惡化而承受越來越大的壓力。
- (二)俄羅斯與日本的政治關係已經惡化，原因為日本仍然是美國的盟友，也是七大工業國成員國，並對俄羅斯在烏克蘭的行動實行制裁（儘管比歐盟或美國制裁的範圍要有限得多）。雙方關係中的傳統問題（領土爭端，美日聯盟等）的討論已經較以往變得更為嚴肅。
- (三)同時日本企業和東京的對外經濟政策規畫試圖盡量減少日本對俄制裁的深度，以維持日本在俄羅斯市場的占有率，以及日本在俄羅斯境內的經濟影響力。東京認為，烏克蘭危機是歐洲問題，認為其與莫斯科的關係對於其在該地區的利益而言，重要更多。
- (四)俄羅斯與南韓的關係所受影響，較其與日本的關係為少。首爾由於因應平壤方面需要莫斯科的支持，抗拒對俄制裁的壓力。因此，韓國企業可能會填補西方公司因汽車，造船和電子業的制裁而放棄的利基。
- (五)南韓一直透過雙邊的方式和六方會談（在六方會談停止前）的架構與俄羅斯保持對話。首爾已準備好與莫斯科進行討論，但直到最近尚未支持5國架構（不包括北韓），以及包括與北韓邊境接壤的俄羅斯、南韓和中國的三邊組合等新架構。然而，中國和美國仍然是韓國的主要合作夥伴。中國對於北韓的應戰戰略及影響力至關重要，美國則是韓國的安全擔保者。
- (六)和冷戰時期不同的是，莫斯科通常不會將美韓聯盟視為如美日聯盟般之針對俄羅斯安全的威脅。如果美俄關係的危機結束，美韓聯盟不會令其感到芒刺在背。從莫斯科的角度來看，加強與朝鮮半島的相互了解和維護安全是俄韓關係

的首要任務。關係中的主要政治問題—北韓、美韓聯盟和兩韓統一的前景—不是迫切的問題，也不影響其他方面的關係。關於首爾提出的「歐亞倡議」概念，莫斯科認為，這是企圖實行更多的多邊及平衡的外交政策，不僅考慮到美國的優先事項，也考慮到中國的區域利益。

(七)莫斯科的一些人存有與北韓改善關係的幻覺。北韓被認為是不支持西方對俄制裁的「東方」的一部分。但是，與平壤的關係改善，就中期而言，並無實質意義。北韓的核武計畫是俄羅斯完全不能接受的；它消除莫斯科在與平壤關係當中自由運作的空間。

(八)在經濟上，北韓的極權主義制度並未準備好進行公認的全球標準為基礎的合作。實際上，雙邊經濟舉措到頭來變成平壤要求更多的財力支援。對於俄羅斯來說，這是不可能的，因為它的經濟援助措施集中在補助克里米亞。

參、中國的國家安全戰略

似乎在去年年底時，中國覺得它已削弱了海牙常設仲裁法庭國際法庭對南海的裁決效果，並成功地讓菲律賓這個美國防禦條約的盟友向其求助，使美國另一個防禦條約盟國韓國所部署薩德(THAAD)系統的政治因素變得複雜，並威脅華盛頓—首爾—東京三邊聯盟。中國也瞭解，這可能會使目前臺灣政府獨立傾向的政策被邊緣化，消除美國在該地區的優勢，而不會破壞具有重要戰略地位的美中兩國雙邊關係；最重要的是中國將在2017年及往後國際事務中扮演更強大的全球角色創造有利戰略條件。

《中國亞太安全合作政策》的文件表明了中國的一般做法，目的在邀請所謂的「大國」來根據這些政策與中國往來及處理亞洲的區域問題。而在這個架構當中，容納不下任何小的元素；「一個中國的政策」是必須的。根據以上所述，本人將盡量解釋我對中國國家安全戰略的簡要陳述，因為在我的研究中，找不到任何一個這樣的陳述。

一、威脅

2017年2月17日，中國國家主席習近平在北京主持一場國家安全研討會。確定從中國的觀點界定2017年地緣政治的3個進程。「世界多極化、經濟全球化和國際關係民主化」。他說，「這些過程給中國帶來挑戰和機遇，但無論發生什麼事情，中國的反應是不變的。」他還說：「我們要保持戰略穩定、戰略自信和戰略耐心」。然而；根據本人自己的看法，我總結中國國家主要的安全挑戰和威脅。

(一)內部

1. 社會經濟挑戰：儘管中國經濟持續成長，但由於人口眾多，從鄉村、偏遠地區到城市和沿海城市的大規模遷移，導致失業率上升，內部人口結構及經濟上的失衡。
2. 若干社會矛盾。
3. 因改革衝擊所造成的直接挑戰。

(二)外部

- 1.美國的霸權主宰地位。
- 2.經濟全球化的挑戰，破壞中國經濟的全球擴展，包括施政面臨的巨大挑戰（一帶一路）。
- 3.能源威脅：中國全球影響力有限，面臨著諸多的挑戰，這與其強大的經濟實力不成正比。它已成為世界第二大石油進口國，也是世界上最大的天然氣進口國之一。這使北京在確保其能源及通行方面都有更多的安全考量及責任。
- 4.由於下列的鄰國領土糾紛造成的東亞海洋邊界（南海及東海）的不穩定。
- 5.與鄰國的區域性爭端，例如與馬來西亞、菲律賓、越南及汶萊的南沙群島爭端，與越南的西沙群島中某些島嶼的爭端，與日本的釣魚島爭端，與北韓的鴨綠江及圖門江上某些島嶼的爭端，以及與印度的喀什米爾爭端。
- 6.臺灣問題與中國的對外安全密切相關（海峽兩岸的軍事衝突可能會引發中美的軍事衝突）；也與內部穩定息息相關（臺灣問題的處理不當可能會引發中國的社會不穩和權力鬥爭）。

二、戰略願景

維持一個穩定、和平及安全的區域環境，確保中國能以一個安全、穩定、繁榮及已開發的世界強國及領先群倫的全球經濟大國的狀態生存，尋求對等的政治影響力。

三、價值觀

中國第一、同心協力、創新和競爭力。

四、戰略目標

- (一)防止威脅中國領土完整的危險，以實現「一個中國政策」，以保證其體制的安全及穩定。
- (二)維護內部秩序及其面對社會衝突挑戰之能力。
- (三)維護其身為地緣政治影響的關鍵支持者的經濟力量及影響力。
- (四)根據中國的區域政策解決與鄰國的海洋邊界糾紛。
- (五)確保中國能源及走廊的安全。
- (六)支持「一帶一路」的國際戰略方案。

五、根據四大主軸執行其戰略如下

- (一)針對國際社會方面：尋求國際對中國所扮演實力日增角色的支持。
- (二)針對世界秩序方面：在不造成損失情況下壯大自身實力。因此，中國參與全球經濟發展、貿易、技術轉移、武器管制、環境等方面的規模係根據個別情況而定。
- (三)針對武裝力量方面：使其能夠支持外交和政治影響力，逐步發展軍事力量，以確保持續專注於經濟發展。
- (四)針對區域衝突的解決及中國的團結：避免使用武力，並採取睦鄰及戰略夥伴的政策。

六、南海議題

- (一)南海面積350萬平方公里，每年可讓10萬艘以上貨輪通過。其戰略地位的提升是因為除了中國認為其具有豐富的漁業資源之外，也含有龐大的石油和天然氣儲量。這些因素使得沿海國家對分散的島嶼（超過205個島嶼）所有權進行爭奪，其中大多是無人居住的島嶼，由少數幾個礁岩組成。
- (二)菲律賓、馬來西亞、越南、臺灣和汶萊聲稱對南海部分地區的主權，中國認為其中大部分屬於其疆界範圍內，因而拒絕外部干預。在此方面，中國宣布拒絕國際仲裁法院在海牙的裁決（接受菲律賓的南海仲裁要求，否定中國對南海的主權聲明）。中國宣布此判決無效，對它沒有約束力。
- (三)另一方面，美國是國際安理會常任理事國和北約成員國，並與東亞、東南亞及太平洋的國家簽署多項雙邊防禦條約，其中包括日本、韓國、臺灣、菲律賓、泰國、澳洲。美國在未與中國政府協調且未經其許可情況下在南海部署了戰艦。根據美國與日本簽署的第3項防禦協定，美國在東亞海域將受到日本的保護。

肆、英國的國家安全戰略

目前的英國國家安全戰略由前總理卡麥隆於2015年11月頒布，其明確要點如下：

一、威脅

- (一)恐怖主義、極端主義和不穩定之威脅日益加劇。
- (二)影響國家結構的威脅，如俄羅斯挑釁，國際競爭擴大。
- (三)科技的影響，尤其是網絡威脅，以及科技手段重大發展。
- (四)現有國際體系法規受到侵蝕，使打擊全球威脅的共識難以達成。

二、戰略願景

一個安全繁榮的英國，具有全球延伸力和影響力。它將保護其人民及其價值觀，並確保英國的繁榮。

三、價值觀

自由、接納他人、包容、民主及法治。

四、戰略目標

- (一)保護英國境內及境外的英國人民。
- (二)投射英國對全球的影響力。
- (三)促進英國的繁榮。

五、透過下列主軸達成其目標

- (一)支持三軍和安全及情報機構。
- (二)支持聯盟，支持英國的體制。
- (三)對恐怖主義迎頭痛擊，並對抗極端主義的意識形態。
- (四)維持在資訊安全領域的優越地位。
- (五)協助強化以法規為基礎的國際秩序及其體制。

(六)採取聯合行動壓制衝突。

(七)發揚與妥善治理及人權一致的英國價值觀。

六、考慮事項

(一)在不與英國的價值觀相矛盾的情況下強化軍力，安全機構和情報機構做為確保安全和繁榮的必要支柱。

(二)有意識的軟實力是英國國力一個非常重要的戰略主軸，利用有效的外交力量發揚光大。

(三)建立新的安全和經濟國際聯盟，並維持現有聯盟，以確保安全和繁榮。

(四)資訊安全是英國國家安全戰略的主軸之一，對於消除恐怖主義，建立安全並強化繁榮途徑大有助益。

七、英國—亞洲及太平洋

(一)英國在亞太地區有重要的經濟機會，對未來以法規為基礎的國際秩序的健全及信譽有很大的影響。英國持續與日本、澳洲、紐西蘭等志同道合的夥伴進行合作，捍衛及保護全球的共同利益，維護以法規為基礎的國際秩序，並加強合作，以解決國際和區域爭端。

(二)英國正在與日本這個在亞洲最密切的安全夥伴加強在防衛、政治和外交上的合作，兩國也越來越從全球的觀點來看待安全問題。英國大力支持日本企圖成為擴大的聯合國安理會的常任理事國的企圖，支持日本在聯合國維和行動中發揮更大的作用。基於成功的行動合作，包括在亞丁灣和索馬利亞外海的反制海盜行動，英國將強化防衛的合作。英國將尋求更進一步合作，尤其是在區域和全球的救災行動和更廣泛的聯合部署方面。英國將繼續探索長期的機會，進一步加強防衛工作及國防工業合作。日本市場身為世界第三大經濟體，持續為英國提供重要的貿易和投資機會。

(三)英國還將加強與南韓的合作，包括海事和網路安全，對抗暴力極端主義和恐怖主義以及氣候變遷。

(四)英國與中國的關係正在迅速增長，但並不期待能與中國政府在所有事情上都有一致的看法。在雙方所有往來中，英國將大力保護其利益。其目的是與中國建立更深層次的伙伴關係，更密切地合作，以致力於全球挑戰，包括氣候變化、恐怖主義、非洲經濟發展、維和行動，以及反制北韓的核武計畫。

(五)隨著中國在全球中的角色及責任更為吃重，英國強力支持中國使其更能融入全球重要機構和組織中。英國的目的在與中國合作，建立高層的安全對話，就防止核武擴散、組織犯罪、網路犯罪及非法移民等安全問題加強交流與合作。2015年10月中國是訪問期間所宣布有關網路商業間諜活動的協議顯示了已取得了相當的進展。

(六)英國將與他國共同合作，依照「聯合國憲章」及國際法和平解決國際和地區爭端。

- (七)英國也正在加強與中國的經貿關係，如其國家安全戰略第6章所述。英國的目標是讓中國在未來十年內成為其第二大出口目的地國。

伍、北大西洋公約組織 (NATO)

北約組織是一個由29個會員國所組成的政治軍事聯盟，成立於二戰之後，目的在於保護會員國的國家安全及利益。

一、北約組織的目的在於藉由政治及軍事手段保衛其所有會員國之自由及安全。

- (一)政治上，北約組織倡導民主價值觀，使會員國能就防衛和安全相關議題進行磋商及合作，解決問題，建立信任，並就長期而言，防止衝突。
- (二)軍事上，北約組織致力於和平解決爭端。如果外交努力失敗，該組織擁有軍事力量進行危機管理行動。這些是根據北約創始條約「華盛頓條約」第5條或聯合國授權的集體防禦條款，單獨或與其他國家和國際組織合作執行。

二、北約價值觀

個人自由、民主、人權及法治。

三、北約使命

- (一)一般而言，保護世界各國家，特別是其會員國。
- (二)維護安全及穩定。
- (三)對抗新的安全威脅。
- (四)投入軍力處理國際危機。

四、北約的合作組織

北約與各種國際組織在不同的架構下合作，如以下所述：

(一)歐洲大西洋合作協會(EAPC)

包括所有北約組織會員國及下列21個夥伴國家：亞美尼亞、奧地利、亞塞拜然、白俄羅斯、波士尼亞和赫塞哥維納、芬蘭、喬治亞、愛爾蘭、哈薩克、吉爾吉斯共和國、馬爾他、摩爾多瓦共和國、俄羅斯、塞爾維亞、瑞典、瑞士、塔吉克、馬其頓共和國。前南斯拉夫土庫曼共和國、烏克蘭、烏茲別克。

(二)北約地中海對話國

目前有以下7個地中海區域國家參與：埃及、突尼斯、阿爾及利亞、摩洛哥、茅利塔尼亞、約旦和以色列。

(三)伊斯坦堡合作倡議(ICI)

迄今為止，海灣合作委員會的以下4個國家已加入：阿拉伯聯合大公國、卡達、巴林及科威特。

(四)全球各地的合作夥伴

北約除了正式的伙伴關係外，也與不屬於這些架構的一些國家合作。這些國家通常被稱為「全球合作夥伴」，它們與北約在互利領域，其中包括新興安全的挑戰展開合作，其中有些國家以軍事或其他方式為北約行動作出了積極的貢獻。包括

以下9個國家：阿富汗、澳洲、哥倫比亞、伊拉克、日本、大韓民國、蒙古、紐西蘭和巴基斯坦。

(五)與國際組織的合作關係

北約與聯合國(UN)、歐盟(EU)及歐洲安全與合作組織合作。

五、北約與東亞的關係

(一)北約認為，日本和北約藉由共同價值觀和對國際規則秩序的共同承諾而團結一致。日本是北約最資深的合作夥伴，在90年代初即開始進行政治磋商。北約在2013年簽署了「政治宣言」，日本首相安倍於2015年5月在對北大西洋理事會會議發表演說時，也提及此宣言。對北約而言，與日本的伙伴關係是一個密切的實際夥伴關係，透過共同努力，雙方之間保持密切的聯繫。日本是北約相互操作平臺的關鍵角色，此平臺旨在加強北約與合作夥伴共同應付安全挑戰的能力。多年以來，日本的歷屆政府均支持國際社會在東帝汶、戈蘭高地、印度洋、巴爾幹和阿富汗的作為。北約和日本都對一個穩定和安全，不再為威脅北約國家的恐怖份子提供安全避風港的阿富汗有明確的共同利益。自2001年以來，東京提供阿富汗超過50億美元款項，並承諾到2017年底將達到80億美元。日本和澳洲一樣，可能是北約為南部鄰國開發防衛能力建設方案的關鍵夥伴。因此，北約歡迎日本的「積極和平」政策，支持可維持北約軍力戰備的軍事合作。

(二)澳洲、南韓和蒙古身為國際安全援助部隊的一員，派兵到阿富汗；蒙古和澳洲繼續以北約「堅決支持派遣團」的一員繼續提供支援，而南韓像日本一樣，為阿富汗安全部隊提供必要的財政支持。從巴爾幹到阿富汗，澳洲近年來對北約行動作出重大貢獻。除了軍事行動外，澳洲還與北約進行了各種的演習；另澳洲和日本和北約同一陣線，譴責俄羅斯在烏克蘭的行動並實施制裁。

(三)中國雖非夥伴國，北約還是正在與其接觸。例如，中國海軍已參與北約的潛艦搜救的演訓。也參加北約年度大規模毀滅性武器(WMD)會議。北約還與中國海軍協調處理非洲之角外海的反制海盜行動。中國在維護開放和安全的海上航道方面獲得很大的利益，藉由共同合作，北約能夠更加有效地將其範圍涵蓋更廣泛的地區。然而；中國在東海及南海的態度和彈道飛彈是北約與中國的主要問題。

(四)北約與蒙古的合作也延伸到阿富汗以外的範圍，建立長期夥伴關係，並協助其軍隊現代化。北約在蒙古有幾項「和平與安全科學」專案計畫，正在與蒙古合作改善其軍事教育及訓練計畫。

(五)北約支持由韓國前總統朴槿惠所發起的「東南亞和平與合作倡議」(NAPCI)。北約可能認為，試圖讓韓國、中國、日本、蒙古、俄羅斯和美國參與一種夥伴關係，如同「赫爾辛基進程」，是一個好主意。這為合作夥伴之間的可預測及平行行為提供了基準。

陸、日本的國家安全戰略（簡述）

一、威脅

（一）區域

1. 區域安全合作框架並未能充分制度化。
2. 北韓繼續發展核武和彈道飛彈計畫，以及其挑釁行為。
3. 中國的軍力提升不透明，以及在海域和空域的進一步活動。

（二）全球

1. 全球權力平衡的轉變及科技創新的快速進展。
2. 大規模毀滅性武器的擴散，以及跨國界威脅的出現，包括在海洋，外太空和網路空間的國際恐怖主義和風險。
3. 與「人類安全」有關的議題，包括貧窮、發展上的挑戰，以及全球經濟日漸增加的風險。

二、日本國家利益及國家安全目標

（一）國家利益

1. 在憲法精神下維持其本身及區域和平及安全。
2. 達成日本及其人民之繁榮，進而鞏固其和平及安全。
3. 根據普世價值及法規維護國際秩序。

（二）戰略目標

1. 強化嚇阻力量，以嚇阻直接影響日本的威脅。
2. 改善此區域的安全環境，藉由強化日美聯盟，加強與合作夥伴的信任與合作關係，防止／減少對日本的直接威脅。
3. 改善全球安全環境，建立和平、穩定及繁榮的國際社會。

三、日本應為其國家安全採取之戰略作法。

四、強化及擴展日本能力及角色

（一）強化外交。

（二）建立全面的防禦架構。

（三）保障領土的完整性並確保海事安全。

（四）加強資訊網路安全、國際反恐、情報能力、外太空穩定利用和科技能力。

五、強化美日同盟

（一）加強日美安全協定的有效性，並實現更多面向的日美同盟。

（二）進一步加強日美在廣泛領域的安全防衛合作。

（三）確保美國軍力的穩定存在。

六、加強與日本夥伴國的外交與安全合作以促成國際和平與穩定

（一）大韓民國、澳洲、東協國家和印度：共享普世價值觀和戰略利益。

（二）中國：「根據共同的戰略利益建立互利的關係」。

(三)北韓：呼籲北韓針對尚未解決的關注議題，採取具體行動。

(四)積極利用多邊架構（七大工業國、亞太經合組織、東亞高峰會、東協區域論壇，東協國防部長級會議加強組織，日本—美國—韓國、日本—美國—澳洲、日本—美國—印度及日本—中國—韓國）。

七、對國際社會的和平及穩定作出主動貢獻

(一)強化在聯合國的外交。

(二)強化國際社會的法治，包括海上、外太空及網路空間。

(三)促進裁軍與武器不擴散方面的國際合作，聯合國維和行動和其他國際和平活動，政府發展援助(ODA)，產能建立援助及國際反恐怖主義。

八、依據普世價值加強合作，以解決全球問題

透過主動和戰略性地使用政府發展援助(ODA)支持民主化，因應發展挑戰和全球性議題，將人類的安全觀念納入主流，強化自由貿易框架，人與人進一步的交流等。

九、強化支持國家安全的國內基礎，促進國內和全球的了解

維護和加強國防生產及科技基礎，提升溝通能力，加強社會意識和知識基礎。

柒、主要全球及區域事件 (2015-2016)

一、除了中亞和東南亞外，恐怖主義和暴力極端主義主要在中東與北非的蔓延，且逐漸影響西歐和南歐地區。除了特定地區禁止的其他恐怖主義集團外，還有67個國際恐怖組織根據「2000年恐怖主義法」遭到禁止。伊斯蘭國是最常見的國際威脅，博科聖地造成最大的死亡威脅。31個恐怖組織位於中東和北非，且在東南亞設有分支機構。這些恐怖組織中有17個在2014年之後被消滅。幾個恐怖主義團體承諾效忠伊斯蘭國，宣布其所在地區為伊斯蘭國家。

二、國際聯合部隊於2014年在敘利亞和伊拉克對抗伊斯蘭國，以及2015年在葉門對抗「葉門青年運動組織」武裝團體。

三、2011/2016年的中國國際計畫（一帶一路）。

四、(P5+1)中國、法國、俄羅斯、英國、美國及德國加上歐盟(EU)及伊朗達成了聯合全面行動計畫(JCPOA)，以確保伊朗的核子計畫將完全作為和平用途。川普總統想針對其要點進行談判。

五、上海合作組織(SCO)擴大，增加兩個會員國（印度和巴基斯坦），成為8個會員國，占世界人口約一半。土耳其和其他4個國家成為上海合作組織對話國家。

六、2015年地中海國家希臘、塞普勒斯、以色列和埃及的天然氣協議以及土耳其與俄羅斯於2016年簽訂的土耳其—溪流天然氣協定。

七、歐洲的發展（英國脫歐—在中東的軍事基地），2016年6月及12月。

八、永久仲裁庭於2016年接受菲律賓對中國所提出有關南海的主張，遭到中國拒絕。

九、北韓舉行數次核試。

十、2017年5、6月伊斯蘭聯合勢力對抗恐怖主義及卡達外交危機。

捌、對東亞的國際及區域的可能影響

一、國際上

- (一)俄羅斯努力尋求多極世界功敗垂成。同時，中國持續以其超級大國競爭對手的姿態，擁有世界第二大的經濟規模，繼續進行其「一帶一路」的計畫。
- (二)美國與俄羅斯之間取得暫時的互信；讓美國正嚴肅的制定對策，以對付中國的全球經濟影響力。
- (三)上海合作組織(SCO)加上印度和巴基斯坦目前占全球土地面積的23%，人口的45%，GDP的25%；這將使上海合作組織成為北約的強大競爭對手。
- (四)另一方面；北約有可能試圖讓更多的東歐國家納入其聯盟，例如烏克蘭、喬治亞、波士尼亞及赫塞哥維納、馬其頓和其他國家，與亞洲、中東和北非國家建立的戰略夥伴關係。北約將試圖說服日本繼續以夥伴國身分提供援助。
- (五)「安全高於人權」意識形態更為盛行，可能導致更多的衝突和恐怖主義行動。
- (六)資訊戰，尤其是先進的「調控理論與心理戰」在往後對抗進化人員及科技的戰爭中扮演越來越吃重的角色；在需要情況下保有核子武器做為解決未決問題的威懾武器。
- (七)天然氣資源供應國之間的競爭加劇（俄羅斯、地中海及卡達）。
- (八)雖然臺灣是一個民主社會，但可能傾向於透過政治和軍事管道與美國往來，且有能力持續操控其所面對的區域威脅。
- (九)恐怖主義
 - 1. 伊斯蘭國及其效忠團體將在中東和北非地區遭到擊敗，但擊敗這些團體並不意味消除了恐怖主義。恐怖份子將使其自殺行動更具殺傷力，特別是在持續獲得資助的情況下。
 - 2. 他們將指示其成員在其活動領域中擴大宗派和族裔分裂。對伊斯蘭國和其他恐怖主義集團的更大壓力，將迫使其成員採取下列行動：
 - (1)在敘利亞和伊拉克遭擊敗的武裝團體持續加入葉門、埃及和利比亞的武裝團體。然而；中東和北非地區和國際上的壓力將持續。
 - (2)他們也被迫提前逃往中亞地區，尤其是逃往阿富汗、東南亞、菲律賓和印尼。他們將會如此行動，一方面加入基地組織，而這是艾曼·扎瓦希里所期待的，以便教訓在2013年進行叛變的伊斯蘭國領導人阿布·巴克爾·巴格達迪；另一方面與阿富汗的「基地組織」進行對抗，以試圖攻陷一些戰略城鎮，在更適合的環境中重整旗鼓，這被認為是最有可能的選擇。
 - (3)逃亡或讓某些恐怖份子以難民身分，使用已死亡敘利亞人的假護照滲透進入歐洲，尤其是地中海北部的國家。

二、區域

(一)中國及臺灣問題

1. 在經濟上，北京將利用跨太平洋夥伴關係終結的機會，推廣自己所設計的替代方案：區域綜合經濟夥伴關係和亞太自由貿易區。
2. 國內持續的經濟疲軟，加上政府抑制非法資金外流的努力，可能會緩和中國對外投資的動力，但不會中止其加強與中亞和東南亞的基礎設施，經濟和安全關係的努力。
3. 「一帶一路」倡議，這項將中國與亞洲其他地區、歐洲和東非地區更緊密聯繫的大規模發展和基礎建設策略，今年面臨的最大障礙是中亞、巴基斯坦和印尼等地的當地反對聲浪以及安全隱憂。
4. 根據川普的承諾，他將把中國列為貨幣操縱國，將對美國所進口的中國貨物課徵全面關稅。
5. 在政治上，川普政府不會從根本上重新評估臺灣地位，而是試圖利用臺灣問題來獲得中國的讓步，在與北京談判資訊網路安全、北韓核武計畫和貿易等問題時，打臺灣牌。與此同時，華盛頓了解北京將會為避免在臺灣問題上做出的任何讓步而作出努力。
6. 中國可以針對特定貨物以貿易壁壘方式進行報復，威脅限制與美國的網路及軍事合作，且在南海或其他地區採取更公開的對抗行動。在短期內，美國預期在這個問題上支持臺灣。
7. 臺灣巧妙地處理兩岸關係，避免與中國為增加對臺施壓所進行的外交孤立企圖、軍事恫嚇及針對性的經濟脅迫直接對抗。
8. 中國可能必須改變其南海政策，放慢擴張步伐。然而；美中兩國之間不會因為臺灣或南海發生任何戰爭，但爭端和博弈仍將持續。

(二)日本

1. 東京可能在南海和東海區域與美國更密切積極合作。因此，北京可能會試圖透過強加一個防空識別區來對抗美日合作，進而擴大中國對東海民航機的控制。但隨著情勢升級，中國可能對日本到臺灣的島鏈構成威脅。儘管中國可能更願意在情況允許下進行和解，亞太地區的權力競爭加劇也可能會迫使其採取其他態度。日本涉入越深，中國就越需要平衡其與東協組織(ASEAN)會員國的關係及利益，而中國在此方面獲得不同程度的成就。
2. 東京預計將繼續恢復日本在該地區的經濟活力和軍事力量。
3. 另一方面，日本將擴大與美國的雙邊外交和安全合作，力求確保美國在該地區的承諾和參與；莫斯科將採取類似的政策，這可能會在一定程度上影響北約—日本的合作。
4. 與此同時，日本可能利用美國地區戰略潛在變化開啟的機會，發揮更積極的領導作用來制約中國。

(三)北韓

1. 北韓可能為了技術目的進行更多的核彈試驗，並提醒國際社會，特別是美

國，其具有戰略重要性。這將迫使南韓加強防禦，採購更多武器。

2. 美國可能擴大對北韓的制裁，並請北京對平壤施壓。
3. 北韓認為統一兩韓的想法（一個韓國）會讓統一的韓國在民主陣營國家的支持下，成為一個具有經濟、科技、核武實力的國家，雖然可作為美國對抗中國和俄羅斯的盟友，但也因此可能嚴重影響美方對中國大陸的「一個中國政策」的戰略承諾而與中國大陸直接發生衝突，這就是為何美國不謀求徹底剷除北韓核武的原因。

Superpower States National Security Strategies and the Possible Impacts on East Asia

Introduction

The twentieth century began with powers scattered between East and West. By the end of World War II and the victory of NATO forces and the Warsaw Pact on the Axis forces; the world turned into a binary pole, namely the United States and the Soviet Union. Between the two forces, the so called cold war began.

In absence of declared war between the United States and the former Soviet Union, the two engaged in building military powers and political conflicts. Though both were on the same side against Axis forces, they disagreed on how to reconstruct the post-war world. Over the years that followed the way, the cold world spread outside Europe to every corner on Earth. The United States has sought to isolate and remove communist policies and to mobilize allies in Western Europe and the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union supported communist movements around the world, especially in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia. The cold war ended, the wall around Berlin was brought down, the Soviet Union collapsed, and the world order shifted to becoming one of a single pole in 1991.

In August 1990 George Bush gave a speech in preparation to send US troops to the Gulf. In that speech, Bush surprised the world with the term: New World Order. The term was to summarize the laws and values that explain the movements and direction of the US administration, being a simplification of international relations and overcoming historical conflicts through looking at the world as one homogeneous unit.

Twenty-five years, between 1990 and 2015, have witnessed the world change; the collapse of the Soviet Union; the Gulf wars (the liberation of Kuwait and the invasion of Iraq), the war in the Balkans; the Arab Spring revolutions and the military intervention in Libya, Syria, and Yemen; to end with more terrorism in many places, not only in those areas, but in many parts

around the world.

“Our age is insistent, at times always desperately, in pursuit of a common concept of world order” -Former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger in his recent book, issued in 2014, entitled World Order.

He said so as if he was reminding everyone that the ongoing events are only a sequel to Bush's, the father, project that must continue.

Decades have passed. And the world has seen wars and conflicts that left it in dire need to a point of order.

The world can be described on three levels. First, there is the world with all of its countries. The world can be then divided into fifteen regions; each of them includes a number of other sub-regions. If we go deeper, we can see that the world consists of 193 UN-member states in addition to a few non-member states.

However, when looking at the world from the first perspective, there is only one country that can impose its will, the global power state (the United States of America), and six other superpower states; Britain, France, Russia, and China (The five permanent member states in the security council; in addition to Germany and Japan. I believe that The U.S., UK, France and Germany consider China as a competitor despite its growing relations with them, and consider Russia as a hostile power. On the other hand, Brexit is a challenge to EU, meanwhile, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will be a competitor to NATO and EU.

At the regional level, East Asia including China, Russia, Japan, Republic of Korea and North Korea are the main actors in the region. South and East China seas are areas of disputes. However, East Asia will be my research topic.

1. US National Security Strategy

During both periods of Obama's presidency, the US National Security Strategy was issued in 2010, amended in 2011, and the new Obama's strategy was issued in 2015. Trump's National Security Strategy is not issued so far.

1.1. Declared US strategic threats

- 1.1.1. Catastrophic attacks on the territory of the homeland or vital infrastructure by terrorism and violent extremism.
- 1.1.2. Threats or attacks against citizens of the U.S. abroad or against their allies.
- 1.1.3. Global economic crises or economic recession on a large scale.
- 1.1.4. The proliferation and/or use of weapons of mass destruction; and the spread of infectious diseases globally.
- 1.1.5. Climate change. (suspended by President Donald trump).
- 1.1.6. Major energy market disturbances.

- 1.1.7. Increasing instability, the dangerous security consequences of the practices of highly vulnerable or failed States (including mass killings and transnational organized crime).
- 1.2. Undeclared US strategic threats (personal view)
 - 1.2.1. China's growing power as the world's largest economic competitor.
 - 1.2.2. Russian political influence and military power (nuclear-psychological operations-cyberwar-etc..).
 - 1.2.3. The regional dominance of some countries with interests that conflict with American global hegemony.
- 1.3. US Strategic Vision
 - 1.3.1. To maintain its single-pole Global power, secured and prosperous, enabling the USA to form the political and economic global map.
- 1.4. US Strategic Goals
 - 1.4.1. Guarantee profit and domination.
 - 1.4.2. Maintain its people and allies' security, stability and prosperity.
 - 1.4.3. Respect its values inside the US and all over the world.
- 1.5. Achieving its goals through four major axes;
 - 1.5.1. Security.
 - 1.5.2. Prosperity.
 - 1.5.3. Values (equality, democracy, freedoms, human rights, rule of law, supporting civil societies free of violence and extremism, with young people capable of accomplishment).
 - 1.5.4. World Order (types and levels of relations and influence with Asia, Europe, Middle East, Africa, and the Americas).
- 1.6. The U.S. Channels of relations with other states;
 - 1.6.1. The U.S. is a nation of institutions with fixed goals (which considered as genuine ownership of the country), and changing policies and strategies (which considered genuine ownership of the President and his administration). The U.S. decision-making system is composed of five main actors: The President, the State Department, the Defense Department (Pentagon), and the National Security Adviser. It's designed on the basis of the complexity of the unilateral decision of the U.S. President. All U.S. national security strategies did not differ once on protecting their lands, people, national interests, values and their allies' as well. Therefore, no doubt that strategic relations the United States is necessary for any country.
 - 1.6.2. The U.S. deals with its allied countries through two main categories: Democratic

societies and non-democratic societies.

1.6.3. Where the U.S. deals with democratic states through one channel, which is the political channel, it deals with non-democratic states through two channels (political and military channels), and I think it's better option for the U.S. in many cases. The U.S thinks that a military body should be always there as a backbone of the allied country, where the fall or weakness of the political channel, the military channel remains capable and strong. You may notice that the annual U.S. aid to Egypt decreased through decades in only economic aids until bit became (zero) amount, BUT military aids to Egypt was never touched.

1.7. USA planned to maintain the world order through the next:

1.7.1. Advance rebalance to Asia and the Pacific

1.7.1.1. The US has been and intends to remain an Asia and Pacific power. Till year 2020, nearly half of all growth outside the United States is expected to come from Asia. That said, the security dynamics of the region-including contested maritime territorial claims and a provocative North Korea-risk escalation and conflict. American leadership will remain essential to shaping the region's long-term trajectory to enhance stability and security, facilitate trade and commerce through an open and transparent system, and ensure respect for universal rights and freedoms.

1.7.1.2. To realize this vision, US is diversifying its security relationships in Asia as well as its defense posture and presence. US is modernizing its alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines and enhancing the interactions among them to ensure they are fully capable of responding to regional and global challenges. US considers itself committed to strengthening regional institutions such as ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation to reinforce shared rules and norms, forge collective responses to shared challenges, and help ensure peaceful resolution of disputes. US is working with its Asian partners to promote more open and transparent economies and regional support for international economic norms that are vital to maintaining it as an engine for global economic growth. Considering the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) central to this effort.

1.7.1.3. US intends to continue supporting the advance of security, development, and democracy in Asia and the Pacific. This is an important focus of the deepening partnerships it's building in Southeast Asia including with Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. It intends to uphold its treaty obligations to South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand, while encouraging the latter to return quickly to

democracy.

1.7.1.4. The U.S. declared in its strategy that it welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China, seeking a constructive relationship with it that delivers benefits for both states' peoples. The U.S. seeks cooperation on shared regional and global challenges such as public health, economic growth, and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. While there will be competition, the U.S. rejects the inevitability of confrontation. At the same time, US intends to manage competition from a position of strength while insisting that China uphold international rules and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human rights. The U.S. will closely monitor China's military modernization and expanding presence in Asia, while seeking ways to reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation. On cybersecurity, it will take necessary actions to protect its businesses and defend its networks against cyber-theft of trade secrets for commercial gain whether by private actors or the Chinese government.

1.7.2. USA, China and Taiwan

1.7.2.1. Although Washington does not have diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in Taipei, there's a unique security partnership between USA and Taiwan. USA is considerably giving priorities for this security partnership as a declared response to the Chinese policy toward Taiwan, specially that US sees people of Taiwan rejects that their island being held as a part of the sovereign territory of China, depending on international law not force.

1.7.2.2. According to the opinion poll, "March 2017, Global View Survey Research Center", only about 20% of the Taiwanese may accept the unification with PRC in the time that more than 40% of the population are willing to the independence. Taiwan does not have the resources to match China's capabilities with a military build-up of its own, and the US has to be ready to support its allies against its competitors.

1.7.2.3. The Taiwan Relations Act provided Taipei with confidence in the US even after the termination of the U.S.-Taiwan mutual defense treaty. On the other hand, concern for Taiwan's security has lasted through several administrations due to the political support Taiwan enjoys in the US and the knowledge that Asian allies and partners treat Taiwan as a larger litmus test of U.S. resolve. Finally, Beijing was long discouraged from attacking Taiwan because of the risk that capable US armed forces would intervene to protect Taiwan. However; Washington never declared its will to militarily intervene to support in case of any hostile action

against the island by China. Instead US officials always stated their support to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

1.7.2.4. The U.S. used to adopt a policy of dual deterrence directed at both Beijing and Taipei, since each had a responsibility to keep the peace. U.S. it's shown a mix of warnings and reassurances for both: Towards Beijing, the basic U.S. line was to warn against attacking Taiwan, but to reassure that Washington did not support Taiwan independence. Towards Taipei, the message was to warn against political steps that would unnecessarily provoke a Chinese military response, but to reassure that the U.S. would continue supporting Taiwan.

1.7.2.5. People's Republic of China (PRC) understands the obstacle of the long distance against the US military support to reach the Taiwan Strait, this obstacle was not enough to it. PRC formed a force of short-and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles (people's liberation Army Rocket force-PLA). As of late 2014, the PRC had over 1,200 short-range ballistic missiles with improving accuracy in its arsenal, plus an unknown number of cruise missiles. This force has created the possibility that PLA missiles could immobilize Taiwan's air force by repeated missile strikes on its airfields. Also, improvements in Mainland air defenses, with Russian help, would also render vulnerable any Taiwan's air force fighters that could take off and then fly over the Strait. The Chinese military cannot yet conduct a successful amphibious campaign against Taiwan or execute a tight naval blockade of the island's ports, but its capabilities are improving systematically, and in the process, are negating the ROC's long-standing defense strategy.

1.7.2.6. Some American defense scholars have concluded that the only defense strategy that makes sense for Taiwan is one that better exploits its key strategic feature—that it is an island—and the PLA's greatest weaknesses—the vulnerability of an invasion force to attack while it is transiting the Taiwan Strait and coming ashore on Taiwan. This strategy, in turn, requires that Taiwan adopt innovative and “asymmetric concepts and technologies to maximize Taiwan's enduring strengths and advantages.”

1.7.3. U.S. intends to seek stability and peace in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

1.7.4. Invest in Africa's Future.

1.7.5. Deepen Economic and Security Cooperation in the Americas.

2. Russia's National Security Strategy

The Russian National Security Strategy (2009-2020) had drafted by the former president

of Russia Dmitry Medvedev. By end of 2015 Russian President Vladimir Putin made major changes to it, issuing “Russian National Security Strategy 2016”; however, Putin already started his strategy in 2013.

2.1. Threats

- 2.1.1. US and NATO capabilities, especially US missile defense systems, global strike capabilities, strategic non-nuclear weapons, as well as militarization of space and the intensification of information warfare.
- 2.1.2. US biological laboratories near the Russian border in the Baltic region.
- 2.1.3. Increasing convergence in the US-Japanese Relations.
- 2.1.4. The hotbeds of tension in the Central Asia region, as a result of what the Russian strategy called “Fourth Generation of War” in form of the colored revolutions, initiated by paid agents, seeking to destabilize Russia.
- 2.1.5. Regional instability resulting from terrorism, extremism and civil wars in several regions in the world.
- 2.1.6. Corruption, vandalism and threats resulting from transnational crimes.

2.2. Long-term Strategic Goals

- 2.2.1. Strengthening the defense, guaranteeing the legitimacy of the regime, sovereignty and independence of the state, as well as guaranteeing national and constitutional unity of the Russian Federation.
- 2.2.2. Strengthening national reconciliation, political and social stability, developing democratic institutions, and improving cooperation mechanisms between the state and the civil society.
- 2.2.3. Raise the standard of living, improve health, and ensure stable population development in the country.
- 2.2.4. Maintain and develop the Russian culture, spiritual values and heritage.
- 2.2.5. Increasing the competitiveness of the national economy.
- 2.2.6. Strengthening the status of the Russian Federation as a global power, aimed at maintaining stability and strategic partnerships of mutual interest with other powers.

To summarize the Russian National Security Strategic 2016;

2.3. Vision

To return as a global power counterpartying to the US by expanding its global influence and ensuring prosperous Russia.

2.4. Values

Equal strategic partnerships, mutual international respect, and same standards to others.

2.5. Accordingly, I may summarize the features of the Russian national security strategy issued in December 2015 as next;

2.5.1. President Putin has converted the Russian strategy from defense to attack, as its war against Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea to its territories and its military intervention in Syria.

2.5.2. The strategy was aimed at “prestige and leadership”, thus achieving Russia's role in solving international problems and maximizing participation in international organizations and alliances, to increase its competitiveness and international standing.

2.5.3. Turning to the development scenario based on innovations, modernizing the army and intelligence, and raising the level of education. Growing role of Russia in solving the significant global issues and ensuring strategic stability and the rule of international law in relations among states, these all are in front of the resistance of American hegemony, and threats from NATO activities at the Russian borders.

2.5.4. Russia sees ISIS is made by the western double standard policies. it sees itself defending its national interests, pursuing an open, rational and pragmatic policy that excludes costly confrontation, including the arms race.

2.5.5. It's working to develop cooperation with its partners in the Brix Group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the G-20. Russia shows also in its strategy that it's interested in promoting a mutually beneficial partnership with European countries and the European Union, and building an integrated partnership with the U.S based on the mutual interests of the two countries.

2.6. Therefore, the main Russian strategic goal is;

Maximizing its political, economic, military, and technological powers, returning as a counterpart global power along with or against the U.S, able to deter NATO forces. Undermining the US global influence, especially in Baltic, Asia and Pacific, Middle East and North Africa regions, having strong relations with the countries of those regions, controlling the gas market in Europe.

2.7. Russia-East Asia states

2.7.1. Russia's traditional foreign policy toward East Asia states aimed at promoting cooperation with Tokyo and Seoul and countering Pyongyang's nuclear programme, is under growing pressure from the continuing deterioration of US-Russia relations.

2.7.2. Russia-Japan political relations have deteriorated, as Japan remains an ally of the US and a member of the G7 and has imposed sanctions on Russia for its actions in Ukraine (although of a much more limited scope than EU or US sanctions). Discussions about the traditional problems in the relationship (the territorial dispute, the US-Japan alliance, etc.) have become somewhat tenser.

2.7.3. Meanwhile, Japanese business and Tokyo's foreign economic policy continues to

manoeuvre trying to minimize Japan's participation in a sanctions regime against Russia while preserving Japan's share of the Russian market, together with Japan's economic influence within Russia. Moreover, Tokyo views the Ukraine crisis as a European issue, and sees its relationship with Moscow as central to protect its interests in the region.

- 2.7.4. Russia's relations with South Korea suffer less than those with Japan. Seoul has resisted pressure to impose sanctions against Russia, motivated by its need for Moscow's support vis-à-vis Pyongyang. As a result, South Korean firms might backfill the niches that western firms have abandoned because of sanctions in automobiles, shipbuilding and electronics sectors.
- 2.7.5. South Korea has maintained a permanent dialogue with Russia both bilaterally and within the Six-Party Talks format (until it was suspended). Seoul is ready for discussions with Moscow, but until recently did not support new formats such as a five-party format (without North Korea) or a trilateral grouping that includes Russia, South Korea and China, the three countries bordering North Korea. Nevertheless, China and the US remain South Korea's primary partners. China is important for the strategy of engaging with and exerting leverage over North Korea, while the US is South Korea's security guarantor.
- 2.7.6. Moscow does not generally perceive the US-South Korea alliance-unlike its Japanese counterpart-as a threat to Russia's security, as it did during the Cold War. If the crisis in US-Russia relations comes to an end, the alliance will not be a significant irritant. From Moscow's point of view, strengthening mutual understanding and maintaining security on the Korean Peninsula are the top priorities in Russia-South Korea relations. The main political problems in the relationship-North Korea, the US-South Korea alliance and prospects of Korean reunification-are not burning issues and do not affect other aspects of the relationship. Regarding Seoul's proposed concept of a 'Eurasia initiative', Moscow understands it as an attempt to conduct a more multilateral and balanced foreign policy that considers not only US priorities, but also China's regional interests.
- 2.7.7. Some in Moscow believe in the illusion of improved relations with North Korea. North Korea has been portrayed as part of the 'East' that does not support Western sanctions against Russia. However, the appearance of improved relations with Pyongyang will have no real substance in the medium term. The North Korean nuclear programme is completely unacceptable to Russia; it eliminates Moscow's freedom of manoeuvre in relations with Pyongyang.
- 2.7.8. Economically, North Korea's totalitarian system is not ready for cooperation based

on accepted global standards. In practice, bilateral economic initiatives boil down to Pyongyang's demands for greater financial support. For Russia, this is currently not possible, as its economic assistance measures are focused on subsidizing Crimea.

3.China's National Security Strategy

It seems that by end of last year, China felt that it had diminished the South China Sea ruling by the International Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague and successfully courting the Philippines to its side, the US defence treaty ally, complicating the US deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea, another US defence treaty ally, and threatening Washington-Seoul-Tokyo trilateral alliance. China also sees that it could marginalize the independence-leaning policy of the current Taiwanese Government; abating the US preeminence in the region without destabilizing the all-important strategic US-China bilateral relationship; and most importantly, set the strategic conditions for a more robust global Chinese role in international affairs in 2017 and beyond.

The document “China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation” gives indications of a Chinese general approach aimed at inviting what they called “major powers” to deal with China and Asia's regional issues accordingly. Where there is no place for any small elements in that equation; “One China Policy” is a must.

According to all above, I'll try to explain my view forming a brief respective of China's national security strategy, as during my research I could not find any.

3.1. Threats

On 17th of February 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping presided over a seminar on national security in Beijing. Mr Xi identified three processes that from China's perspective define geopolitics in 2017; “multi-polarization of the world, the globalization of the economy and the democratization of international relations.”

He said, “These processes present challenges and opportunities for China, but China's response is the same no matter what happens”. He also said, “We must maintain our strategic steadiness, strategic confidence and strategic patience”.

However; according to my view, I've summarized the main possible Chinese national security challenges and threats.

3.1.1. *Internally*

3.1.1.1. Socio-economic challenge: Despite the growing economic growth of China, it suffers from an increasing huge population and a large migration from country side and remote areas to urban and coastal cities, resulting increased unemployment and an internal demographic and economic imbalance.

3.1.1.2. Several social contradictions.

3.1.1.3. Direct challenges resulted from the reforms' impacts.

3.1.2. *Externally:*

3.1.2.1. The US authoritarian domination.

3.1.2.2. The economic globalization challenges, which undermine the spread of the global Chinese economy, including the huge challenges facing its project (One Belt One Road).

3.1.2.3. Energy threats: China's limited global influence facing its challenges, which is disproportionate to its huge economic power; it has become the second largest importer of oil, and one of the largest importers of natural gas in the world. This imposed additional security considerations and responsibilities on Beijing to secure its energy resources and passages.

3.1.2.4. The instability of the East Asian maritime borders (South and East China Seas) resulting from neighboring territorial threats as next:

3.1.2.5. Regional disputes against neighboring countries such as; the dispute on the Spratly Islands against Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei, dispute on some of the Paracel Islands against Vietnam, dispute on the Senkaku Islands against Japan, dispute on some islands in the Yalu and Tumen rivers against North Korea and dispute on Kashmir against India.

3.1.2.6. Taiwan issue is closely related to China's external security (a military clash across the Taiwan Strait may end up to a China-US military conflict); and to internal stability (the mishandling of the Taiwan issue could trigger off social instability and power struggle in China).

3.2. Strategic Vision

Maintain a stable, peaceful and secured regional environment that ensue China's survival as a secured, stable, prosperous and developed global power state, leading the global economic power, seeking parallel political influence.

3.3. Values

China first, unity of efforts, innovation and competitiveness.

3.4. Strategic Goals

3.4.1. Prevent the dangers that threaten the unity of the territory of China, that achieve “one-China policy” and guarantee the security and stability of its institutions.

3.4.2. Maintain the internal order and its capabilities facing the challenges of social conflict.

3.4.3. Preserve economic power and influence, as a key supporter of geopolitical influence.

3.4.4. Settle maritime borders' disputes with the neighboring countries in accordance with China's regional policies.

3.4.5. Ensuring the security of China's energy resources and corridors.

3.4.6. Support the international project “One Belt - One Road” .

3.5. Acting its strategy toward four major axes as next:

3.5.1. *Toward the international community*; seeking international support for the growing strength of China's role, insuring stability in Asia.

3.5.2. *Toward the world order*; securing greater strengths without incurring losses. Therefore, the size of the Chinese participation globally in economic development, trade, transfer of technology, weapons control, environment, etc., is determined on the basis of each individual case.

3.5.3. *Toward its armed forces*; making it able to support the diplomatic and political influence, developing its military forces slowly but surely, insuring a continuous focus on economic development.

3.5.4. *Towards the settlement of regional conflicts and the unity of China*; by avoiding usage of force, and adopting a policy of good neighborliness and strategic partnerships.

3.6. South China Sea Issue

3.6.1. South China Sea with the area of 3.5 million km square, allows the passage of more than a hundred thousand cargo ships annually. Its strategic significance was increased because of the belief that it contains huge reserves of oil and natural gas, in addition to rich fisheries. These made the littoral states compete on ownership of the scattered islands (more than 205 islands), mostly uninhabited islands populated, and formed of some of the few rocks.

3.6.2. The Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan and Brunei claim their sovereignty over parts of the South China Sea, while China considers most of it is inside its boundaries rejecting any external intervention. In this context, China declared its rejection of the International Court of Arbitration's ruling in The Hague accepting the request of the Philippines for arbitration in the South China Sea against the Chinese claims. China declared that it was null and void, and it had no binding effects on China.

3.6.3. On the other hand, USA the permanent member state in the International Security Council and the member state of NATO. It also signed several bilateral defense treaties with the countries in the East and South-East Asia and the Pacific “Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia” . USA deployed its warships in South China Sea without the coordination or permission of the Chinese Government. Any US existence in East Asia seas would be protected by Japan according to the third defence agreement signed by USA and Japan.

4.UK's National Security Strategy

The current UK national security strategy was issued by David Cameron in November 2015 in clear points as next;

4.1. Threats

- 4.1.1. The growing threats of terrorism, extremism and instability.
- 4.1.2. Threats affecting the structure of the state, such as Russian provocation, and the expansion of the international competition.
- 4.1.3. The impact of technology, especially cyber threats, and the tremendous development of technological means.
- 4.1.4. The erosion of the existing rules of the international system, making consensus difficult and countering global threats.

4.2. Strategic vision

A secure and prosperous United Kingdom, with global reach and influence. It'll to protect its people and its values, and ensure a prospers UK.

4.3. Values

Freedoms, acceptance of others, tolerance, democracy and rule of law.

4.4. Strategic Goals

- 4.4.1. To protect British people in and outside UK.
- 4.4.2. To project the UK global influence.
- 4.4.3. To promote the British prosperity.

4.5. Achieving its goals through major axis as next;

- 4.5.1. Support the Armed Forces and security and intelligence agencies.
- 4.5.2. Support alliances, support the British institutions.
- 4.5.3. Tackle terrorism head-on and counter extremism ideology.
- 4.5.4. Maintain excellence in the fields of information security.
- 4.5.5. Help strengthen the rules-based international order and its institutions.
- 4.5.6. Joint action to curb conflicts.
- 4.5.7. Promote UK's values in line with good governance and human rights.

4.6. Considerations;

- 4.6.1. Maximizing the armed forces, the security establishment and the intelligence agencies as necessary pillars to ensure security and prosperity without contradicting with the UK's values.
- 4.6.2. Conscious soft power is a very important strategic axis as one the British powers, exploiting its success by the effective diplomatic force.
- 4.6.3. Establishing new security and economic international alliances and maintaining the current ones to ensure security and prosperity.
- 4.6.4. Information security is one of the main axes of the British national security

strategy, which is strongly helping to eliminate terrorism, establishing security and strengthening means of prosperity.

4.7. UK-Asia & the Pacific

4.7.1. The Asia-Pacific region has significant economic opportunities for the UK, and considerable influence on the future integrity and credibility of the rules-based international order. UK continues to work with like-minded partners in the region, including Japan, Australia, New Zealand and others to defend and protect the global shared interests, uphold the rules-based international order and to strengthen cooperation on settling international and regional disputes.

4.7.2. UK is strengthening considerably its defence, political and diplomatic cooperation with Japan, its closest security partner in Asia, as they take an increasingly global outlook on security issues. UK strongly supports Japan's bid to become a permanent member of an expanded United Nations Security Council, and support Japan taking a greater role in UN peacekeeping. UK will build on its defence cooperation, based on successful operational cooperation including on counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia. It will collaborate further, particularly on disaster relief operations and broader joint deployments both regionally and worldwide. UK will continue to explore longer term opportunities for closer defence engagement and defence industrial collaboration. As the world's third largest economy, the Japanese market continues to provide important trade and investment opportunities for the UK.

4.7.3. UK will also deepen its cooperation with the Republic of Korea, including in maritime and cyber security, countering violent extremism and terrorism, and climate change.

4.7.4. UK's relationship with China is rapidly expanding. It does not expect to agree with the Chinese Government on everything. In all its dealings, UK will protect its interests vigorously. But its aim is to build a deeper partnership with China, working more closely together to address global challenges, including climate change, terrorism, economic development in Africa, peacekeeping, and to counter North Korea's nuclear programme.

4.7.5. UK strongly supports China's greater integration into more of the world's key institutions and organizations as its global role and responsibilities grow. The UK aims to cooperate with China to establish a high-level security dialogue to strengthen exchanges and cooperation on security issues such as non-proliferation, organized crime, cybercrime and illegal immigration. The agreement on cyber-enabled commercial espionage, announced during the Chinese State Visit in October 2015, shows the progress being made.

4.7.6. UK will work together to strengthen cooperation on settling international and regional

disputes peacefully in accordance with the UN Charter and international law.

- 4.7.7. UK is also strengthening its economic relationship with China, as set out in Chapter 6. UK's ambition is that China becomes its second biggest export destination within the next decade.

5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO is a political and military alliance composed of twenty-nine member states, it's formed after the WWII to protect its members' national security and interests.

- 5.1. NATO's purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means.

5.1.1. *Politically*, NATO promotes democratic values and enables members to consult and cooperate on defence and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict.

5.1.2. *Militarily*, NATO is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes. If diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military power to undertake crisis-management operations. These are carried out under the collective defence clause of NATO's founding treaty- Article 5 of the Washington Treaty or under a United Nations mandate, alone or in cooperation with other countries and international organizations.

- 5.2. NATO Values

Individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law

- 5.3. NATO Missions

5.3.1. Protect the world's nations in general, and its member states in particular.

5.3.2. Maintain security and stability.

5.3.3. Combat new security threats.

5.3.4. Engage its forces in dealing with international crises.

- 5.4. NATO Partnerships

NATO cooperates with a range of international organizations and countries in different structures as next:

- 5.4.1. *Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)*

It consists of all NATO member states and the following (21) partner states: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Malta, Republic of Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Republic of Macedonia. Former Yugoslav Republic of- Turkmenistan-Ukraine-Uzbekistan.

- 5.4.2. *NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue*

The following seven countries of the Mediterranean region are currently involved:

Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Jordan and Israel.

5.4.3. *Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)*

To date, the following four countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have joined: UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait.

5.4.4. *Partners Cross the Globe*

In addition to its formal partnerships, NATO cooperates with a range of countries which are not part of these structures. Often known as “Partners across the globe”, these countries develop cooperation with NATO in areas of mutual interest, including emerging security challenges, and some contribute actively to NATO operations either militarily or other way. It includes the following (9) states:

Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, and Pakistan).

5.4.5. *Partnerships with international organizations*

NATO cooperates with: United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

5.5. NATO Relations with East Asia

5.5.1. NATO sees that Japan and NATO are united by common values and a common commitment to the international rules-based order. Japan is NATO's most senior partner, having started political consultations in the early nineties. In 2013 NATO signed a Political Declaration, accordingly, Japanese Prime Minister Abe put it when he addressed the North Atlantic Council in May 2015.

NATO considers its partnership with Japan as an intensely practical partnership, that by working together, both are keeping the bonds between their nations' armed forces strong. Japan is a key player in NATO's Interoperability Platform, which is aimed at strengthening NATO's ability to tackle security challenges together with its partners. Over many years, Japan's successive governments supported the international efforts in East Timor, the Golan Heights, the Indian Ocean, the Balkans and Afghanistan. Both NATO and Japan have a clear, shared interest in a stable and secure Afghanistan that no longer offers a safe haven for terrorists threatening to NATO nations. Since 2001, Tokyo has contributed more than US\$5 billion to Afghanistan, and it's committed to be \$8 billion by end of 2017.

Along with Australia, Japan is potentially a key partner as NATO develops Defence Capacity Building packages for its southern neighbors. Therefore, NATO welcomes Japan's policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace”, it supports the military cooperation maintaining NATO forces readiness.

5.5.2. Australia, South Korea, and Mongolia all sent forces to Afghanistan as part of ISAF;

Mongolia and Australia continue their support as part of NATO current Resolute Support mission, while-just like Japan-South Korea provides essential financial support for the Afghan Security Forces.

Australia has made significant contributions to NATO operations in recent years, from the Balkans to Afghanistan. Beyond operations, Australia works with NATO on a wide range of exercises.

And both Australia and Japan stand with NATO in their condemnation of Russia's actions in Ukraine and on the imposition of sanctions.

- 5.5.3. Though not a partner, NATO is also reaching out to China. For example, the Chinese navy has taken part in NATO training exercises for submarine search and rescue. It attends NATO's annual Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) conference. NATO also coordinates with the Chinese navy in dealing with counter-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa. China has a huge interest in maintaining open and secure sea lanes, and by working together NATO has been able to cover a far wider area far more effectively. However; China's attitude in the East and South China Seas and the plastic missiles are the main issues between NATO and China.
- 5.5.4. NATO also extended its cooperation with Mongolia beyond Afghanistan, building a long-term partnership and helping it to modernize its armed forces. NATO has several 'Science for Peace and Security' projects with Mongolia and is working with them to improve their military education and training programmes.
- 5.5.5. NATO supports the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) that was launched by President Park Geun-hye of South Korea. NATO may see a good idea attempting to involve South Korea, China, Japan, Mongolia, Russia and the United States in Partnership could be like the Helsinki Process, which provides a baseline for predictable and peaceful behavior among the partners.

6. Japan's National Security Strategy (In brief)

6.1. Threats

6.1.1. Regionally

- 6.1.1.1. Regional cooperation frameworks on security are not sufficiently institutionalized.
- 6.1.1.2. North Korea's continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs as well as its provocative behavior.
- 6.1.1.3. China's advancement of its military capacity without transparency, and its further activities in the sea and air space.

6.1.2. Globally

- 6.1.2.1. Shift in the global power balance and rapid progress of technological innovation.

6.1.2.2. Proliferation of mass destruction weapons, and the emergence of threats that cross-national borders, including international terrorism and risks in the sea, outer space and cyberspace.

6.1.2.3. Issues related to “human security,” including poverty, development challenges, and growing risks to the global economy.

6.1.2.4. Japan's national interests and national security objectives

6.2. National interests

6.2.1. Maintain its own and regional peace and security under genius of the constitution.

6.2.2. Achieve the prosperity of Japan and its people, thereby consolidating its peace and security.

6.2.3. Maintain and protect the international order based on universal values and rules.

6.3. Strategic Objectives

6.3.1. Strengthen the deterrence, to deter threats from directly reaching Japan.

6.3.2. Improve the security environment of the region, and prevent/ reduce direct threats to Japan through strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance and enhancing trust and cooperative relations with its partners.

6.3.3. Improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable and prosperous international community.

6.4. Strategic approaches that Japan should take for its national security

6.5. Strengthening and expanding Japan's capabilities and roles

6.5.1. Strengthening diplomacy

6.5.2. Building a comprehensive defense architecture

6.5.3. Protecting territorial integrity and ensuring maritime security

6.5.4. Strengthening cyber security, international counterterrorism, intelligence capabilities, stable use of outer space, and technological capabilities

6.6. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

6.6.1. Enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and realize a more multifaceted Japan-U.S. Alliance

6.6.2. Further strengthen Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation in a wide range of areas

6.6.3. Ensure a stable presence of the U.S. forces

6.7. Strengthening diplomacy and security cooperation with Japan's partners for peace and stability in the international community

6.7.1. *The Republic of Korea, Australia, ASEAN states, and India:* Share universal values and strategic interests.

6.7.2. *China:* Build a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic

Interests”

- 6.7.3. *North Korea*: Urge North Korea to take concrete actions towards the comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern
- 6.7.4. Actively utilize multilateral frameworks (G7, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), Japan-U.S.-ROK, Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-India, and Japan-China-ROK).
- 6.8. *Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community*
 - 6.8.1. Strengthen diplomacy at the United Nations
 - 6.8.2. Strengthen the rule of law in the international community, including the seas, outer space, and cyberspace
 - 6.8.3. Promote international cooperation in disarmament and non-proliferation, UN PKO and other international peace activities, Official Development Assistance (ODA), capacity building assistance, and international counterterrorism.
- 6.9. *Strengthening cooperation based on universal values to resolve global issues*
 - 6.9.1. Support democratization through proactive and strategic use of ODA, respond to development challenges and global issues, mainstream the concept of human security, strengthen free trade frameworks, further people-to-people exchanges, etc.
- 6.10. *Strengthening domestic foundations that supports national security, and promote domestic and global understanding*
 - 6.10.1. Maintain and enhance defense production and technological bases, boost communications capabilities, strengthen the societal awareness and knowledge base.

7. Main Global & Regional Incidents (2015-2016)

- 7.1. Spread of Terrorism and violent extremism mainly in Middle East & North Africa, in addition to Central & Southeast Asia and gradually in West and South Europe. 67 international terrorist organizations are proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000, in addition to other terrorist groups proscribed by specific regions. ISIS is the most common international threat and Boko Haram is the largest threat as a cause of deaths. 31 Terrorist groups are located in MENA and branched in Southeast Asia. 17 of these Terrorist groups are proscribed after 2014. Several terrorist groups pledged allegiance to ISIS declaring their areas Islamic states.
- 7.2. International Coalitions Against ISIS in Syria and Iraq in 2014 and in Yemen against Houthis in 2015.
- 7.3. International Chinese project (Belt and Road) in 2011 / 2016.

- 7.4. The (P5+1), China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States Germany, in addition to the European Union (EU), and Iran reached a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to ensure that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. President Trump is willing to bargain on its points.
- 7.5. Enlarging Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) adding two member states (India and Pakistan) to become (8) members of about half of the world's population. Turkey besides (4) other states as SCO Dialogue States.
- 7.6. Gas agreements of the Mediterranean states Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt in 2015, and Turk-Stream gas agreement between Turkey and Russia in 2016.
- 7.7. European developments (UK Brexit-Military Bases in the ME), June & December 2016.
- 7.8. The Permanent Court of Arbitration accepted claim of Philippines concerning South China Sea against China, and was rejected by China in 2016.
- 7.9. Several North Korea nuclear tests.
- 7.10. Islamic coalition against terrorism and GCC Crisis in May/ June 2017.

8. Possible International Impacts and Possible Regional Impacts on East Asia

8.1. Internationally

- 8.1.1. Unsuccessful Russian efforts seeking a multi-poled world. Meanwhile, China continues as a competitor superpower, having the second biggest economy in the world, continuing its initiative “One Belt - One Road”.
- 8.1.2. A temporary understanding between U.S and Russia; while U.S. is keeping a serious counter strategy against the global Chinese economic influence.
- 8.1.3. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with the addition of India and Pakistan now accounts for about 23% of the planet's landmass, 45% of its population, and 25% of global GDP; this will make SCO a very strong competitor to NATO.
- 8.1.4. On the other hand; it is likely that NATO will try to bring more states from Eastern Europe into the alliance, e.g. Ukraine, Georgia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia, and other countries for its strategic partnerships from Asia, Middle East and North Africa. NATO also will try to convince Japan to keep its support as a partner.
- 8.1.5. Wider ideology of ‘security is before human rights’ which may lead to more conflicts and terrorism actions.
- 8.1.6. Growing role of Information Warfare specially advanced ‘cybernetic and psychological warfare’ in next wars against developed personnel and developed technologies; keeping the nuclear weapons as a deterrent weapon to unresolved results if necessary.

8.1.7. Escalating competition among gas resources' nations (Russia, the Mediterranean nations and Qatar).

8.1.8. Although Taiwan is a state of a democratic society, it may prefer to deal with the U.S. through both political and military channels parallelly, with capability to continuing and maneuvering facing its regional threats.

8.1.9. *Terrorism:*

8.1.9.1. ISIS and its loyalist groups will be defeated in MENA, but defeating these groups doesn't mean eliminating terrorism. Terrorists will increase their qualitative suicidal operations, especially in case of continuing funding.

8.1.9.2. They'll direct their elements to increase sectarian and ethnic division in their area of activities. More pressure on ISIS and other terrorist groups their elements will have to do the following:

- The defeated armed groups in Syria and Iraq continue joining the armed groups in Yemen, Egypt and Libya. However; regional and international pressure on them in MENA will continue.
- They're also forced to a prompt flee eastwards to the Central Asian region, specifically to Afghanistan and Southeast Asia to Philippines and Indonesia. They will do so to either join al-Qaeda as an option which is awaited by its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to discipline the ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi for his mutiny in 2013; or confronting al-Qaeda in Afghanistan trying to seize some strategic towns, rebuilding its own capabilities in a more suitable environment, which is considered the most likely option.
- Fleeing or could be infiltrating some terrorist elements to Europe, especially North Mediterranean states as refugees, using fake passports of dead Syrian persons, or by illegal immigration.

8.2. Regionally

8.2.1. *China and Taiwan issue*

8.2.1.1. Economically, Beijing will capitalize on the opportunity created by the Trans-Pacific Partnership's demise to promote alternatives of its own devising: The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific.

8.2.1.2. Continued economic weakness at home, combined with the government's efforts to curb illicit capital outflows, may slow the momentum of Chinese outbound investment somewhat. But it will not halt China's efforts to enhance infrastructural, economic and security ties to Central and Southeast Asia.

8.2.1.3. The biggest obstacles confronting "One Belt, One Road" initiative is the

massive development and infrastructure strategy to better connect China to the rest of Asia, Europe and East Africa this year are local opposition and security risks in places such as Central Asia, Pakistan and Indonesia.

8.2.1.4. As per Trump pledging, he'll label China as a currency manipulator, accordingly, he'll impose across-the-board tariffs on U.S. imports of Chinese goods.

8.2.1.5. *Politically*, instead of fundamentally re-evaluating Taiwan's status, Trump administration will try to use the Taiwan issue to get concessions from China, using the Taiwan's status in negotiations with Beijing on other issues such as; cybersecurity, North Korea's nuclear program and trade. Meanwhile, Beijing is expected to pay its efforts to avoid any concessions on Taiwan issue, and Washington knows this.

8.2.1.6. China can retaliate with trade barriers on selected goods and can threaten to limit cyber and military cooperation with the U.S., as well as more openly confrontational actions in the South China Sea or elsewhere. In the short term, U.S. is expected to support Taipei in this issue.

8.2.1.7. Taiwan has tactfully to manage cross-strait ties to avoid a direct confrontation against the Chinese diplomatic isolation attempts, military intimidation and targeted economic coercion to increase pressure on Taiwan.

8.2.1.8. China probably will have to change its policy toward South China sea, slowing down its pace of expansion. However; no war will occur between the U.S. and China because of Taiwan or the South China Sea, but disputes and maneuvers will continue.

8.2.2. Japan

8.2.2.1. Tokyo may work closer and more active with the US in both South China and East China Seas. Accordingly, Beijing may try to counter US-Japanese cooperation by imposing an air defense identification zone, which would extend Chinese control over civilian aircraft in the East China Sea. However, with escalation, China may threaten the chain of islands coming from Japan down to Taiwan. And though China would probably prefer to be as conciliatory as it can as the situation warrants, heightened great power competition in the Asia-Pacific may compel it otherwise.

The more Japan is involved, the more China will have to balance, with different degrees of success, its relationships and its interests with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

8.2.2.2. Tokyo is expected to continue reviving Japan's economic vitality and military power keeping its place in the region.

8.2.2.3. On the other hand, Japan will expand bilateral diplomatic and security cooperation with the US, seeking to ensure Washington's commitment and involvement in the region; similar policy would be taken with Mosco This may affect NATO-Japan cooperation for some extent.

8.2.2.4. Meanwhile, Japan may take advantage of opportunities opened by potential changes to the US' regional strategy to play a more active leadership role to constrain China.

8.2.3. *North Korea*

8.2.3.1. North Korea may carry out additional nuclear missile tests for technical purposes and to remind the international community, especially U.S, of the country's strategic importance. This will push Seoul to build up its defenses procuring more arms.

8.2.3.2. Washington may expand its sanctions against North Korea, and petition Beijing to pressure Pyongyang as well.

8.2.3.3. The idea of the unity of the two Koreas to be (One Korea) could be seriously considered to affect (One-China Policy); supported by all democratic camp states, seeking a unified economic technological nuclear Korea, as an ally against China and Russia. That's why the U.S. doesn't seek to radically eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons.

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