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Non-Traditional Security Challenges and Roles for the Military

Non-traditional security has posed more and more severe threats to the Asia-Pacific region, and the Republic of China is no exception under serious challenges. The R.O.C. Armed Forces bear responsibility for assisting in the resolution of non-traditional security issues in the R.O.C. During the yearly typhoon season, which generally runs from July to September, the R.O.C. Armed Forces are especially active in engaging in disaster relief and flood prevention work. Article 2 of the *National Defense Act* specifies the responsibilities of the Armed Forces as: “*The national defense of the Republic of China is aimed at utilization of comprehensive national power to establish a national defense military force, assist disaster prevention and rescue, safeguard national security and maintain world peace.*” Article 3 further prescribes: “*The national defense of the Republic of China consists of all-round national defense, and encompasses matters pertaining to military, civil defense, and prevention and rescue aspects, as well as the political, society, economic, psychological and technological domains, which may directly or indirectly contribute to the national defense.*” The *National Defense Act* thus illustrates that, in addition to their military responsibilities, the R.O.C. Armed Forces have incorporated disaster relief and rescue as an auxiliary mission.

At the time of President Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration for his second term, the Ma administration reiterated that disaster prevention is one of its top priorities, and stated that the R.O.C. Armed Forces must actively strengthen its relief capabilities, maintain the attitude that “disaster relief is akin to fighting a battle,” and stay prepared for disasters. The Armed Forces must deploy troops with an eye to disaster preparedness while not affecting defense readiness. The Army's future development trends will therefore include enhancement of disaster prevention and relief capabilities and improvement of disaster prevention mechanisms. During routine exercises and training, active duty and reserve units should have more sound and feasible disaster planning, equipment, and training. Non-traditional security threats require government responses that integrate national capabilities. The Ministry of National Defense will work closely with other agencies and effectively coordinate with local governments and related units to accomplish disaster prevention and relief missions.

Nowadays, some non-traditional security threats are so severe that a single country may not be able to overcome them alone, and require international cooperation. President Ma's concept of “Three Lines of Defense” is an important redefinition of the R.O.C.'s national defense. The first line consists of the institutionalization of the cross- Strait rapprochement, the second consists of enhancing the R.O.C.'s contributions to international development, and the third consists of aligning defense with diplomatic initiatives. International cooperation is important to the “Three Lines of Defense,” and one of the most effective ways of realizing this concept is to call on the international community to work together in response to non-traditional security threats. The R.O.C. has developed disaster relief and emergency response forces that, having demonstrated the ability to respond in robust and timely manner to domestic crises, can contribute to regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions and be a bridge to strengthened cooperation in the broader Asia-Pacific region.



In addition to military responsibilities, the R.O.C. Armed Forces have incorporated disaster relief and rescue as one of its top priorities. (Source: MND, R.O.C.)

Proposals for Peace and Cooperation in the East China Sea: A Need to Turn Words into Deeds

Yann-Huei Song

There are a number of proposals for peace and maritime cooperation in the East China Sea. The proposals are related to the call to manage potential conflicts that are caused by the complicated territorial and maritime disputes in this semi-enclosed sea and large marine ecosystem in Northeast Asia.

The main objective for these proposals is to maintain peace and stability in the East China Sea, and jointly develop the rich and enormous marine resources, both living and non-living, that lie under the sea and are important to the future development of national economy of the parties to the disputes, namely, Mainland China (hereinafter referred to as China), Japan, and the Republic of China on Taiwan (hereinafter referred to as Taiwan or R.O.C.).

These proposals are referred to the peace initiatives that were announced by the Chinese and Japanese leaders after they met in Beijing and Tokyo, respectively, during the period of time between 2006 and 2012, and the East China Sea Peace Initiative (hereinafter referred to as ECSPI) proposed by the R.O.C. President Ma Ying-jiou on August 5, 2012.

The Chinese-Japanese Peaceful Proposals

In November 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met in Hanoi, Vietnam when attending the APEC meeting. The two leaders agreed: (1) to speed up consultation on the East China Sea issue in line with the principle of mutual benefit and reciprocity; (2) to adhere to negotiation and dialogue; (3) to put aside disputes and pursue joint development; and (4) to make the East China Sea a "sea of peace, cooperation and friendship."

In April 2007, then-Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao paid an official visit to Japan. During the visit, Japan and China reached the following five common understandings on properly addressing the East China Sea issue: (1) both sides are committed to making the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation and friendship; (2) they agreed to carry out joint development based on the principle of mutual benefit as a temporary arrangement pending the final demarcation and without prejudice to the positions of either side on matters concerning the law of the sea; (3) they will conduct consultation at higher level when necessary; (4) they will

carry out joint development in larger waters acceptable to them; and (5) they will speed up consultations and hope to submit a detailed plan on joint development to the leaders of the two countries in autumn 2007.


In December 2007, the Chinese and Japanese leaders reached 4-point new consensus on the East China Sea issue: (1) to continue to adhere to the five-point consensus achieved by leaders of the two countries in April 2007; (2) the two sides have elevated the level of consultation, conducted earnest and substantive consultation on the concrete solution to the issue and made positive progress; (3) to conduct vice-ministerial-level consultation, if necessary, while maintaining the current consultation framework; (4) the solution to the East China Sea issue conformed with the interests of both China and Japan. The two sides agreed to strive for an early solution in the process of developing bilateral ties.

There have been peace initiatives announced by the Chinese and Japanese leaders during the period of time between 2006 and 2012. The two sides pledged to make the East China Sea a "sea of peace, cooperation and friendship."

In May 2008, China and Japan issued a joint statement on promoting strategic, mutually beneficial ties. The proposal of making the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation and friendship was then again reiterated in the June 2008 Principled Common Understanding on the East China Sea Issues.

In December 2011, at the China-Japan summit meeting held in Beijing, then-Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda expressed "Six Initiatives" to further deepen diplomatic relations between Japan and China. Among other things, they shared a basic recognition that it is becoming more important for them to tackle regional and global issues together as partners for cooperation in accordance with the

* To prevent confusion and for reading convenience, in this article, the "Republic of China" is indicated as "Taiwan," while "China" means "Mainland China."



In May 2008, then-Mainland Chinese leader Hu Jintao (Left) and then-Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda (Right) announce “the comprehensive promotion of a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.” (Source: kantei.go.jp)

four basic documents that govern the China-Japan relations. They also agreed to promote cooperation for making the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation and friendship. To achieve this goal, they agreed to establish High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs and made an agreement in principle on the text of “Japan-China Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) Cooperation.” In addition, the Prime Minister urged the early resumption of negotiations on the agreement China and Japan signed in June 2008 on resources development in the East China Sea. In response to this request, then-Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that the said agreement should be put into action and China is willing to further communicate and to work together with Japan. Japan and China also shared the view that as major countries in the world, they should strengthen dialogues and cooperation concerning regional and global issues.

In May 2012, when attending the Trilateral Summit of Japan, China and the Republic of Korea in Beijing, then-Japanese Prime Minister Noda reiterated again his “Six Initiatives” and welcomed the first plenary meeting of “Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs” that was held in Hangzhou on May 16, 2012. Prime Minister Noda and Premier Wen expressed expectations that the consultation would lead to enhancing trust between the maritime-related agencies of the two countries. During the meeting, the two prime ministers expressed their respective position on the status of Diaoyu Dao/Senkaku Islands.

Prime Minister Noda said, “it would be undesirable if this issue were to impact adversely on the overall bilateral relations.” He also indicated that the active maritime activities by the Chinese in the areas surrounding the disputed islands are giving undesirable influence to the sentiment of Japanese people and therefore he urged China to act with restraint. In addition, Noda stressed the importance of maintaining strategic stability among Japan, the U.S., and

China, and stated in this connection that it was essential for the three countries to promote dialogues among them.

In response, Chinese Premier Wen said that China was seriously considering the trilateral dialogue. In July 2012, then-Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba and then-Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on the sidelines of the ASEAN-related Ministers’ Meeting. Among other things, they talked about the disputed Diaoyutai Islands Group (DIG) by repeating their respective basic stance on the issue. They also agreed to promote more cooperation and dialogue.

Then-Japanese Foreign Minister Gemba strongly requested for the early resumption of negotiations for the China-Japan agreement regarding the development of natural resources in the East China Sea. He also stated that the Japanese side hoped for the early start of the Japan-U.S.-China dialogue. Then-Chinese Foreign Minister Yang responded by stating that China’s position on implementing a principle agreement concerning the East China Sea remained unchanged, and that he would like to continue working-level communications.

In November 2012, the government of Japan expressed its intention to strengthen cooperation with China and continue to make efforts to make the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation and friendship by promoting understanding and trust between the maritime authorities of the two countries through the Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs under the “Six Initiatives” that were agreed between the two countries.

The call for maritime cooperation continued in the development of Sino-Japanese relations from 2006. However, it seems that the efforts have been put on hold because of the rising tensions caused by the territorial disputes over the Diaoyutai Islands since April 2012.

As tensions continue to rise in the area near the disputed Diaoyutai Islands, it has become more important for China and Japan to make efforts to make the East China Sea a “sea of peace, cooperation and friendship” by proposing peaceful measures and establishing dialogue and conflict management mechanisms.

The East China Sea Peace Initiative

The East China Sea Peace Initiative (ECSPI) calls all parties concerned to: (1) refrain from taking any antagonistic actions; (2) shelve controversies and not abandon dialogue; (3) observe international law and resolve disputes through peaceful means; (4) seek consensus on a code of conduct in the East China Sea; and (5) establish a mechanism for cooperation on exploring and developing resources in the East China Sea.

This peace proposal, based on the principle of

“safeguarding sovereignty, shelving disputes, pursuing peace and reciprocity, and promoting joint exploration and development,” was followed by the implementation guidelines that were announced on September 7, 2012 on one of Taiwan’s offshore islands located in the East China Sea.

The ECSPI will be implemented in two stages: (1) peaceful dialogue and mutually reciprocal negotiation; and (2) sharing resources and cooperative development. The first stage involves (1) promoting the idea of resolving the East China Sea dispute through peaceful means; (2) establishing channels for Track I and Track II dialogue; and (3) encouraging all parties concerned to address key East China Sea issues via bilateral or multilateral negotiation mechanisms to bolster mutual trust and collective benefit. During the second stage, the main task is to institutionalize all forms of dialogue and negotiation, to encourage all parties concerned to implement substantive cooperative projects, and to establish mechanisms for joint exploration and development of resources that form a network of peace and cooperation in the East China Sea area.

Key issues for the implementation of the peace initiative include fishing industry, mining industry, marine science research and maritime environmental protection, maritime security and non-traditional security, and East China Sea Code of Conduct. This is to be done by moving from three parallel tracks of bilateral dialogue (between Taiwan and Japan, Taiwan and China, and Japan and China) to one track of trilateral negotiations (among China, Japan and Taiwan) to realize peace and cooperation in the East China Sea.

The ECSPI, proposed in August 2012, has gradually gained support from the international community for its contributions to reducing tensions and maintaining regional stability. In September 2012, for example, Eduard Kukan, a Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the European Parliament stated that

The East China Sea Peace Initiative was proposed to promote regional peace and security, and as such is in line with the EU's East Asia Guidelines and EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which encourage peaceful and cooperative solutions to disputes. All parties concerned should take this initiative into consideration with a view to bringing about peaceful and positive developments.

In March 2013, the European Parliament passed a report on EU-China Relations, in which it “takes note of Taiwan’s [East China Sea Peace] initiative with a view to reaching a consensus on a code of conduct for the East China Sea and the establishment of a mechanism allowing all sides to cooperate in the joint exploitation of the region’s natural resources, including capacity for the generation of electricity

from renewable sources.”

Although the government of Japan does not consider the DIG issue a “dispute,” it accepts the spirit, principles and proposals that are laid out in Taiwan’s peace initiative. It seems that what Japan opposes is a three-way dealing with the territorial issue. It also does not like to see the China-Taiwan cooperation on the DIG issue in the East China Sea. On June 6, 2013, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga rejected President Ma’s call for a three-way dialogue with China and Japan on fishery rights and natural resources in the East China Sea, but he added, “We haven’t changed our stance that Japan will promote concrete cooperation with neighboring countries and regions to ensure peace and security in the East China Sea.” The signing of the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement is considered one of the positive responses of Japan to the ECSPI.

On May 7, 2013, Taiwan and Japan established a bilateral fishing commission, which serves as an institutionalized negotiation mechanism for future talks of fisheries cooperation. Taiwan members of the commission include Jen-joe Chang, senior counselor with the Association of East Asian Relations; James Sha, director-general of the Fisheries Agency; officials from the R.O.C. Coast Guard Administration and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and representatives from local fishermen’s associations. Japanese members include Michihiko Komatsu, director-general of Tokyo-based Interchange Association’s General Affairs Department; Kenichi Okada, secretary-general of the Interchange Association’s Taipei Office; officials from Japan’s foreign ministry, coast guard and fisheries agencies; and representatives of an Okinawa fishing committee. During the first session of Taiwan-Japan Fishing Commission, the two sides agreed to finish revising respective laws enabling the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement to take effect on May 10, 2013 and continue



President Ma announces the implementation guidelines of the East China Sea Peace Initiative on Pengjia Islet in September 2012. (Source: MOFA, R.O.C.)

to negotiate on fishing issues with commission meetings scheduled at least once a year.

Both sides agreed to temporarily shelve the sovereignty disputes over the DIG and designated the area between 27° north latitude and Japan's Sakishima Islands as waters where fishing by both Taiwan and Japan vessels would be allowed to operate. Most fishermen welcomed the conclusion of the agreement. The agreement expands the fishing grounds of Taiwanese fishermen by an additional 4,530 square kilometers beyond the so-called "provisional enforcement line." The second meeting is scheduled to be held in July 2013. It was reported that Taiwan catches of yellow fin tuna in waters off northeastern Taiwan have increased 20% in May 2013 compared with the same period last year following the signing of the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement.

The signing of Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement has received positive responses from the international community, including the U.S. Department of State. On April 23, 2013, for example, Raymond Burghardt, the chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), stated that Taiwan and Japan have "well-handled" the fishing rights dispute surrounding the DIG in the East China Sea. He said the agreement "really mapped the interest of both sides in a rather neat way." American scholars such as Douglas Paal, Randall Schriver, Richard Bush, and Bonnie Glaser are also in support of the move and consider a good example of dispute resolution. On June 10, 2013, a resolution was proposed in the U.S. Senate, in which the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement was considered a model for administering fishing resources in the overlapping EEZs in the East China Sea.

In addition to the positive responses from Japan and the U.S. to both the ECSPI and the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement, it seems that China is also moving toward the direction of supporting the initiative. In May 2013, President Ma stated that Taiwan is willing to talk with China about the possibility of signing a bilateral fisheries agreement to help govern fishing activities in waters around the DIG. On June 6, 2013, President Ma said that since there are also fisheries matters between Taiwan and China that need to be settled, Taiwan does not rule out the possibility of signing a fisheries agreement, similar to the one between Taiwan and Japan, to establish a joint fishery conservation and management zone in the East China Sea. In addition, he stressed, just like the 18 agreements that have been signed so far between Taiwan and China, this fisheries agreement can be signed, not between two countries, but under special cross-Strait relations. In response, Fan Liqing, the spokeswoman of Taiwan Affairs Office of Mainland China's State Council stated that the two sides can further study the matter concerning fisheries cooperation.

In June 2013, President Ma said that Taipei would not collaborate with Beijing on the Diaoyutai issue, but Taiwan does not rule out the possibility of establishing a fishery conservation with Mainland China. The fisheries cooperation can be discussed, not between two countries, but under special cross-Strait relations.

Challenges to Making Progress for the Peaceful Proposals

The development and implementation of the peaceful proposals and agreements on maritime cooperation have encountered a number of challenges. One of the biggest challenges concerns the Japanese position that Tokyo does not have any territorial dispute to be solved over the DIG, and that the leaders of China and Japan did not reach consensus on putting aside the DIG issue in 1972 on the occasion of the normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations.

On June 2, 2013, Lieutenant General Qi Jianguo, deputy chief of the general staff of the PLA, stated at the Shangri-La Defense Dialogue in Singapore that "We should put aside disputes, work in the same direction and seek solutions through dialogue and coordination, particularly when it comes to disputes concerning sovereignty as well as maritime rights and interests."

In response, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said on June 3, 2013 that there are no disputes involved with the DIG. He also dismissed the existence of bilateral consensus to put the islands disputes aside. Although the Japanese government has maintained that Tokyo is willing to work with Beijing to prevent individual issues from undermining overall relations from the viewpoint of "mutual beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests" and "Japan always keeps the door to dialogue open," as long as Tokyo continues to insist on its current position on the DIG, it is unlikely for the two countries to move forward to make the East China Sea a "sea of peace, friendship, and cooperation" as they agreed before. It is also unlikely for them to resume talks on joint development of oil and gas resources in the East China Sea in accordance with the 2008 Understanding.



A Mainland China's marine surveillance ship cruises next to Japanese coast guard ships near Diaoyutai Islands in April 2013. (Source: avaxnews.net)

Another challenge for the development and implementation of the peaceful proposals and agreements on maritime cooperation in the East China Sea concerns the sensitive “one China” issue. Both China and Japan have been very careful in responding to President Ma’s ECSPI.

On April 12, 2013, two days after signing the fisheries agreement between Taiwan and Japan, the spokesperson of China’s Foreign Ministry, Hon Lei, stated at a regular press conference that “China opposes Japan’s unilateral actions in relevant waters and urges Japan to properly deal with Taiwan-related issues in strict accordance with the principles and spirit of the China-Japan Joint Statement.” It is clear that China is concerned about a possible revival of Taiwan’s diplomatic status and its political relations with Japan.

At the same time, China considers the Beijing government to be the authoritative defender of Chinese sovereignty over the DIG and Taiwan should work together with China in safeguarding the islands and relevant maritime rights and interests. Fan Liqing, a spokeswoman for Taiwan Affairs of Mainland China’s State Council, also urged that “It is the duty across the Strait to ensure the fishing rights and interest of fishermen from both sides (to operate) in this traditional fishery area on the basis of safeguarding territorial sovereignty.”

Japan considered the agreement it signed with Taiwan to be a private sector fisheries arrangement, instead of a government-to-government agreement between Tokyo and Taipei. On April 18, 2013, in response to a question concerning the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement, Japanese Assistant Press Secretary Masaru Sato stated that

This Taiwan-Japan private sector fisheries arrangement was signed on April 10, and negotiations had been held between private bodies of Japan and Taiwan. . . . the two private

authorities have been negotiating over the fisheries issue for many years since 1996, . . . But it was postponed sometime in 2009, but after the situation concerning the Senkaku Islands intensified since last September, we resumed discussions. And this time the fisheries agreement was successfully made. Although we have not changed our policy in any way regarding the treatment of Taiwan vis-à-vis China, the Japanese Government welcomed the signing as the non-governmental working relations between Taiwan and Japan bearing fruitful results. So it is hoped this will have a positive impact even on the situation concerning the Senkaku Islands.

On June 1, 2013, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the Japanese Minister Itsunori Onodera reiterated the Japanese position on the legal nature of Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement. He said, it is a private sector agreement with Taiwan. But he added, the signing of the agreement “is a benefit for the fishermen and the economies of both countries.”

In February 2013, President Ma gave reasons to explain why Taipei decides not to collaborate with Beijing on the DIG issue. First, he said, because China has never recognized the legitimacy of the Peace Treaty signed between Taiwan and Japan in 1952. Second, the Chinese government has not responded to Taiwan’s ECSPI. And finally, Beijing hoped the sovereignty issue would be kept out of the fishery talks between Taipei and Tokyo. Unless a flexible arrangement between China and Taiwan can be made, it is unlikely for Taipei to be included in any of the future bilateral negotiations between China and Japan for law enforcement mechanisms or agreements on maritime cooperation in the East China Sea. It is also unlikely to see a three-way talk between China, Japan, and Taiwan.

A third challenge is the potential conflicts in the territorial waters 12 nmi measured from the baselines of the DIG that are claimed respectively by China, Japan, and Taiwan. If no agreements can be reached between the three parties in the near future, this body of waters and the air above it will become the site of accidental conflicts between China and Japan as well as between Japan and Taiwan. The chance for conflicts will be bigger between China and Japan, since activists from Japan and from Hong Kong, Macau, and Mainland China will continue to take actions for the purpose of safeguarding sovereignty over the DIG. Actually, it happened twice since the signing of Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement. In April and May 2013, respectively, the Japanese activists and fishermen, guarded by the Japanese coast guard vessels, sailed to the waters near the DIG. In response, China dispatched maritime surveillance vessels to expel the Japanese intruders. The possibility for Chinese and

Taiwanese vessels to enter the 12 nmi zone surrounding the DIG also cannot be ruled out.

A fourth challenge is the increasing call from Japanese fishermen to review the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement and the 2013 Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement. Okinawa fishermen asked the Japanese government to review the fisheries agreement with China because the agreement has led to overfishing of coral reefs and has devastated the habitat of bottom fish. In addition, they complained that the Japanese government failed to take their interests into account as Taiwanese trawlers are given more waters to operate in the maritime zones established under the April 2013 Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement. Okinawa fishermen stated that competition with Taiwanese fishing vessels will intensify and good fishing areas for them will shrink as a result. However, Taiwanese fishermen stated that Japanese authorities are implementing the agreement “too strictly” and they would like to see a buffer zone set up immediately outside the maritime zones covered by the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement.

Challenges to peaceful solution include Japanese position that Tokyo doesn't have territorial disputes over the Diaoyutai Islands, China's stance that Taiwan should work together with Beijing in safeguarding the Islands, as well as Japanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese fishermen's respective demand for larger operating areas.

A fifth challenge is related to the demand from the Chinese fishermen for the right to operate in the maritime zones covered by the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement and the demand from the Taiwanese fishermen for the right to operate in the provisional measures zone established by the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement. This requires cross-Strait negotiations under the ECSPI. In addition, it will be necessary for Japan, Taiwan, and China to enter into trilateral talks that aim to combine the two existing fisheries agreements and come to an agreement for a new agreement between the three parties. In order to avoid the rise of the “one-China” issue, a flexible arrangement similar to the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) or the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) can be made so to allow “Fishing Entity of Taiwan” become a member of the Extended

Commission of the CCSBT or a member of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission as Chinese Taipei. Alternatively, a fisheries agreement can be signed between China Fisheries Association, Japan Fisheries Association, and Taiwan's National Fishermen's Association.

A Need to Turn Words into Deeds

The aforementioned proposals for peace and maritime cooperation have the potential not only to help govern the activities that are related to exploration, exploitation, preservation, or protection of the living and non-living marine resources that lie under the East China Sea, but also to manage potential conflicts arising from the sovereignty and maritime disputes over the Diaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands.

In the long run, it is hoped that these proposals, if carried out faithfully and successfully, can help transform the East China Sea from a sea of confrontation into a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation. At present, unfortunately there is a lack of such needed willingness. Accordingly, it is urged that more actions need be taken by China, Japan and Taiwan so that tensions in the East China Sea can be reduced and maritime cooperation be promoted.

Yann-Huei Song is a research fellow in the Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, R.O.C.

Carving Out a Role in a New Asian Order

Shihoko Goto



To peacefully reaffirm the R.O.C.'s sovereignty, the R.O.C. Coast Guard escorts fishing boats and sails near the Diaoyutai Islands in September 2012. (Source: cga.gov.tw)

Tensions in the East China Sea show no signs of abating, with neither Mainland China (hereinafter referred to as China) nor Japan backing down from their claims of ownership of the disputed islands. While the intrinsic value of the islands themselves can be questioned, the risk of conflict between the region's two biggest powers over them should not be underestimated. In fact, the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands are the single biggest manifestation of a changing dynamic between the two countries, symbolizing how Japan and China are at loggerheads to be identified as the ultimate Asian power. But while the regional giants struggle to balance the need to ensure stability in the Asia-Pacific on the one hand, and ensure their stake in a changing regional balance of power on the other, there is an unprecedented opportunity for the Republic of China on Taiwan (hereinafter referred to as Taiwan) to play a key role as a peace broker and redefine its own identity.

Taipei has already made the opening gambit to find common ground in dealing with the territorial disputes, as President Ma Ying-jeou proposed the East China Sea Peace Initiative in August 2012 which includes a proposal for joint natural resource development. Moreover, despite claiming its own rights to the East China Sea islands, Taiwan signed a fisheries agreement in April with Japan which extends beyond the so-called "provisional enforcement line" and includes additional operating area of 1,400 square nautical

miles for Taiwanese fishing boats. While Beijing has been critical of the latest fishing deal between Tokyo and Taipei in particular, President Ma's government has clearly indicated that it is eyeing a more practical solution to a problem fraught with political tension amid growing irrational nationalistic fervor on both sides. Taiwan is clearly the first among the three governments to focus on an outcome that will be of economic benefit for all.

Taiwan is eyeing a more practical solution to a problem fraught with political tension amid growing irrational nationalistic fervor. Taiwan is clearly the first among the three governments to focus on an outcome that will be of economic benefit for all.

Of course, the question of Taiwan's international status comes into play in this issue as well as too many others. Just as China refutes Japan's claim that Tokyo legally owns the



In April 2013, Taiwan and Japan sign the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement. The two sides reach a consensus on resource sharing without touching sovereignty issues. (Source: mofa.gov.tw)

* To prevent confusion and for reading convenience, in this article, the "Republic of China" is indicated as "Taiwan," while "China" means "Mainland China."



Taiwan plays an important role in the global trade system. Taiwan signs free trade agreement (FTA) with New Zealand in July 2013 and hopes the agreement will pave the way for other FTAs. (Source: moea.gov.tw)

islands, China also readily acknowledges that the territories have historically been under Taiwanese ownership. As such, China's claims to the territories also re-emphasize its adherence to the "one China" principle. At the same time, while Japan, like most of the international community, has diplomatic ties only with China, its latest overture to Taiwan underlines Tokyo's interest in separating political interests from its economic concerns. Such a separation, though, is becoming increasingly difficult as the hunger to parade nationalistic fervor begins to match the thirst for economic growth. Yet a desire to match military might with economic influence is a recipe for sparks to fly still further. Continued tensions in the East China Sea with both Japanese and Chinese vessels and aircraft coming all too close to each other in territorial waters and in the air is too dangerous a game for either side to play indefinitely.

Taiwan certainly sets the precedent of encouraging the two nations to focus more on their common interests, especially in light of the rapidly thawing relations between Taipei and Beijing on the economic front. Taipei's track record epitomizes the fact that national security can be better served when economic security is assured, for while China and Taiwan continue to disagree on the definition of a Chinese state, their commercial interests have pushed the two sides so close together that cross-Strait relations are no longer the single biggest threat to political stability in the region. The East China Sea disputes have taken its place instead.

Yet it is not just military security that is being redefined. So too is economic security in East Asia.

With China overtaking Japan as the world's second-largest economy, the two countries are still grappling with how to compete and to cooperate with one another, and yet interdependence for economic growth must not be optional.

Taiwan too must be part of that equation.

There is significant change underway in the global trade system, not least as 12 countries including the U.S. and Japan negotiate what would become the world's biggest trade pact to date, representing about 40 percent of the global GDP. Granted, neither China nor Taiwan is part of the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. China is, however, a key player in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that Japan is also a part of. RCEP offers an alternative, albeit less stringent, trade deal which may shape the region's commercial landscape in the years to come, while Japan, China, and South Korea are also exploring the possibility of a trilateral trade deal. Whether TPP will be able to conclude in a timely manner remains in question, but there is no doubt of a deep hunger across the region for greater economic integration through trade. That desire has not been eclipsed despite the hostilities seen in the East China Sea.

Taiwan clearly has a stake in any of the trade agreements that come to fruition. Taipei has already set a standard for pushing parties to focus more on common objectives to overcome their differences. It should be ensured that the country's voice is heard in international economic negotiations in the future.

Taiwan clearly has a stake in any of the trade agreements that come to fruition. Closer economic ties between nations will lead to greater security both politically and militarily. Taipei has already set a standard for pushing parties to focus more on common objectives to overcome their differences. Given the close link between economic and military security, it is not only in Taiwan's interest, but in the interest of the region as a whole, to ensure that the country's voice is heard in international economic negotiations.

Shihoko Goto is the Northeast Asia associate at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars based in Washington DC.

Japan's Recent Moves to Strengthen Maritime Security Cooperation with Regional Countries and Their Significance

Ya-Chi Yang

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on May 29, 2013. In a joint statement, the two leaders agreed to strengthen maritime cooperation and set up a joint working group to explore the feasibility of Japan's sale of US-2 amphibian aircraft to India. On July 27, Abe visited the Philippines, the last stop of his tour of three East Asian countries (Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines), and promised the provision of 10 Japanese-made patrol boats through official development assistance (ODA) to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). During the same month, a Vietnamese delegation visited Japan and asked for the provision of patrol boats through ODA to boost Vietnam's maritime law enforcement capabilities.

These are just a few examples of Japan's active outreach regarding maritime cooperation with countries in the region in recent years. As a matter of fact, Japan has been leading regional efforts in ensuring maritime security ever since the emergence of piracy and armed robbery in waters around Asia, particularly the Strait of Malacca. In 2004, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) initiated by Japan was established, and it took effect two years later in 2006. As Asia's first government-to-government agreement against piracy and armed robbery, ReCAAP established the Information Sharing Center (ISC) under its governance to "share information," "help member countries to build capacity in combating piracy and armed robbery," and "arrange cooperation," which are the three objectives of the agreement. For Japan's part, given its superior maritime patrol capabilities, it has been providing training and equipment to regional countries as capacity building measures and also financing regional conferences on maritime affairs. Japanese aid to regional countries for maritime security purpose is mainly provided through ODA, which allocates funds to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to subsidize seminars conducted by the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) to train littoral states in Southeast Asia.

Apart from the fact that piracy and armed robbery have substantially threatened the safety of Japanese ships and crews sailing in Asian waters, Japan's campaign to combat illegal activities at sea has also involved a broader expansion



Initiated by Japan, the ReCAAP was established in 2004. The Photo illustrates delegates present for the Third Annual Meeting of the ReCAAP Governing Council. (Source: recaap.org)

of the nation's interests, such as increasing Japanese presence at sea through anti-piracy efforts to pave the way for the country's normalization, and helping to uphold U.S. security commitment to the region. However, restrained by its peace constitution and taking regional countries' concerns over its intentions into consideration, Japan has assigned the JCG, a maritime security agency independent from the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), to provide assistance and conduct cooperation. By so doing, Japan has ensured an increased willingness from regional countries to cooperate with it in eradicating piracy and armed robbery.

In recent years, however, there seems to have been a shift in Japanese attitudes regarding maritime security. While it still values the importance of anti-piracy missions in the Strait of Malacca, Japan has started to focus more on situations in the East and South China Seas, and the reasons are self-explanatory. Mainland China and Japan have been contesting resources in the East China Sea (ECS) for decades. Despite the fact that numerous negotiations have been held by the two countries in an attempt to solve the disputes, nothing concrete has been achieved. Ever since Japan's unilateral move to nationalize several islets of the Diaoyutai Islands (known in Japan as the Senkaku Islands) in September 2012, Sino-Japanese relations have worsened, and tensions escalated to the brink of military conflict on several occasions. In the meantime, the South China Sea (SCS) has also been a restless area, with multiple claimants

* To prevent confusion and for reading convenience, in this article, the "Republic of China" is indicated as "Taiwan," while "China" means "Mainland China."

competing for sovereignty over numerous islets and engaging in a force build-up. Amidst the uproar in the SCS, almost all claimants have had quarrels with Mainland China. As there are no solutions in sight for the Sino-Japanese disputes in the ECS, teaming up with SCS claimants against Mainland China seems to be a logical and positive choice for Japan.

In this context, Japan has been strengthening its cooperation with SCS claimants, especially with the Philippines. Japan has long been providing training and equipment to the PCG. On September 27, 2011, during Philippines President Benigno Aquino III's visit with the then-Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, the two countries reached a consensus over promoting exchanges between their naval authorities, port calls in the Philippines by JMSDF vessels, and the holding of the Japan-Philippines Maritime Chief of Staff meetings.¹

On January 10, 2013, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida visited his Philippines counterpart, Albert del Rosario, and expressed their common concerns over the situation in the SCS. It was during this visit that several media sources reported that Japan was considering providing the Philippines with 10 patrol boats. On July 27, during his visit to the Philippines, Prime Minister Abe not only promised the provision of 10 patrol boats but also confirmed that the two countries would carry out joint exercises involving defense authorities and coast guard agencies to mark the beginning of practical bilateral cooperation. It is therefore apparent that Japan and the Philippines are preparing to expand their maritime cooperation from non-military coast guard exchanges to naval and defense engagement.

In addition to bilateral efforts, Japan is also seeking to consolidate regional cooperation through a multilateral approach – similar to its approach in establishing ReCAAP – and this time it is targeting the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Several of the ASEAN members are SCS claimants, and as the disputes in the SCS have intensified, the discord among ASEAN members regarding how they should deal with Mainland China to settle these disputes has grown increasingly serious. To Japan, the disadvantage of a split ASEAN facing an increasingly assertive Mainland China is two-fold. First, ASEAN disagreement over SCS issues is counterproductive to the promotion of maritime security. Second, it gives Mainland China more opportunities to obtain individual deals in its favor with ASEAN members.² Based on these concerns, Japan proposed in 2011 that the ASEAN should expand the ASEAN Maritime Forum. This proposal was adopted, and the first Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum was held in October 2012. At this event, all ASEAN members and the U.S., Japan, South Korea, India, Mainland China, Russia, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand discussed issues

such as international maritime regulations, maritime capacity building, and ocean conservation.³

Japan is also reaching out to the Indian Ocean. Since 2000, Japan has been conducting joint anti-piracy exercises and search and rescue missions with India. In January and November, 2012, the maritime security authorities of the two countries held joint exercises in the waters off Chennai and Tokyo respectively.⁴ As for naval cooperation, Japan participated for the first time in Malabar joint naval exercise, which was co-hosted by the U.S. and India, in 2007 (as well as in 2009),⁵ marking the beginning of Japanese-Indian maritime cooperation in areas other than coast guard exchanges.

Japan's maritime security focus has shifted from countering piracy to balancing Mainland China's influence in maritime East Asia through joint efforts with Southeast Asian countries. Japan is also expanding its maritime cooperation from coast guard cooperation to naval exchange.

In November 2011, Indian Defense Minister A. K. Antony visited his Japanese counterpart, Yasuo Ichikawa, and the two agreed to subsequently hold joint naval exercises on a biannual basis. The two countries conducted the first Japan-India Maritime Exercise 12 (JIMEX 12) in June 2012, and this event held significant meaning for the deepening of their maritime cooperation. On May 29, 2013, Indian Prime Minister Singh visited Prime Minister Abe and established a joint working group to work out the sale of US-2 amphibian aircraft to India without violating Japan's three principles on arms exports.

The foregoing moves shed light on several important trends in Japan's maritime cooperation with other countries. First, Japan's maritime security focus has shifted from countering piracy conducted by non-state actors to balancing Mainland China's influence in maritime East Asia through joint efforts with Southeast Asian countries. Taking Japan-Philippines cooperation as an example, although the provision of 10 patrol boats will do very little to change the military landscape in the SCS, through such cooperation, Japan may be able to monitor Mainland China's naval and force build-up activities,⁶ which may promote Japan's presence in the SCS as well.

Second, Japan is expanding its maritime cooperation from coast guard cooperation to naval exchange. From the end of the 19th century to the dawn of the 20th, apart from being the largest economy in Asia, Japan was also Asia's greatest military power. It is therefore reasonable for Japan to have the JCG instead of the JMSS conduct maritime cooperation, given that JMSS may rekindle the fear of Japan's militaristic past. However, Mainland China has replaced Japan as the largest economy in Asia, and it is actively expanding its military might, which worries not only Japan but also other neighboring countries. Because the potential military threat from Mainland China has outpaced that of Japan, some of the regional countries are growing more willing to engage in defense cooperation with Japan. In the future, it is expected to see more defense, particularly naval, exchanges between Japan and other regional countries.

Third, in order not to violate its three principles on arms exports, Japan intends to provide India with US-2 amphibian aircraft as equipment for civilian use. Nevertheless, this will still be a meaningful step forward for Japanese-Indian equipment sales. If Japan decides to loosen its arms exports restrictions, or even abandon its three principles on arms exports – a direction in which it is heading – this would significantly facilitate Japan's maritime cooperation (both coastal guard and naval aspects) with other regional countries.

Finally, one of the possible reasons driving Japan to expand security cooperation with other regional countries is that it aims to develop security mechanisms apart from the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan has grounded much of its national security upon U.S.-Japan alliance since the end of WW II; however, the volatility in international security situations and the decline of U.S. economic and military primacy has forced Japan to seek to strengthen its security cooperation with other countries. Such a move has two potential benefits for the U.S. and Japan: After security relationships between Japan and regional countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, and India mature, the U.S. may be able to further improve its



Officials from participating countries pose for a photo during the opening ceremonies of the First Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum at the Manila Hotel in October 2012. (Source: gov.ph)

own relations with these countries through the U.S.-Japan alliance; moreover, Japan may use these efforts to lay the foundation for future normalization of its military.

From the perspective of the Republic of China on Taiwan (hereinafter referred to as Taiwan), while it would be inappropriate for us to enhance security exchanges with Japan in the form of coast guard or naval activities, we can make use of Track II mechanisms to collectively explore maritime resources and oceanography in the ECS and SCS. We can also work with Japan on issues such as non-traditional security threats and maritime search and rescue. This will help to improve confidence and facilitate cooperation between Taiwan and Japan, a goal which is consistent to our maritime policy of "safeguarding sovereignty, shelving disputes, pursuing peace and reciprocity, and promoting joint exploration and development." Moreover, it will allow us to continue to seize the right to speak on maritime issues in the wake of the proclamation of the East China Sea Peace Initiative.

In addition, we should study the feasibility of cooperating with the coast guards or other maritime security agencies of East Asian countries and India. We may start by holding academic conferences, and then expand our efforts to the sharing of technology and experience, and joint maritime search and rescue activities. In so doing, we will be able to improve our security relations with other regional countries, and increase the opportunities for us to take part in regional mechanisms for the discussion and negotiation of maritime affairs.

Ya-Chi Yang is an associate research fellow at the Office of Defense Studies, MND, R.O.C.

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The Significance of the U.S. Security Commitment to Taiwan

Pei-Yin Chien

As a consequence of the “building a new type of great power relations” policy proposed by Mainland Chinese leader Xi Jinping with the intent of exploring new ways to defuse conflicts between Beijing and Washington, Mainland Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan led a military delegation on a four-day visit to the U.S. in August 2013. During his trip, Chang met the head of America’s Pacific Command and visited the Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. Chang ended his trip in Washington, where he had a 180-minute dialogue with his counterpart, American Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel. According to their joint press conference, the two sides have agreed to further strengthen cooperation and exchanges to boost their military-to-military relationship. This will include stepping up high-level military visits, setting up a communication mechanism between the strategic and policy planning departments of the two militaries, and continuing to discuss rules of behavior for military air and maritime activities. The two also welcomed the recent establishment of a joint cyber working group and looked forward to broadening non-traditional security cooperation in such areas as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy and peacekeeping.

Unsurprisingly, the meeting between Chang and Hagel attracted considerable media attention in Mainland China. After noting the positive signs involving the two militaries, Mainland China’s news press also quoted Guan Youfei, director of the external affairs office of Mainland China’s Defense Ministry, who accompanied Chang on the visit, as saying that Chang proposed to Washington that Beijing will make adjustments to its military deployment if the U.S. agrees to stop selling arms to the Republic of China on Taiwan (hereinafter referred to as Taiwan), and the two can form a joint task force on arms sales. According to reports, Washington made no immediate response concerning the former suggestion, but expressed a positive attitude about the latter.

Guan’s statement immediately prompted public unease in Taiwan due to fear that it would undermine the core values of the *Taiwan Relations Act* (TRA), hollow out TRA’s lawful status, and lead to fundamental change in U.S.-Taiwan relations should Washington agree to discuss arms sales with Beijing. Fortunately, two days after Guan’s statement, the U.S. government reaffirmed its commitment to Taiwan. Jen Psaki,



U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel (Left) and Mainland Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Chang Wanquan (Right) meet at the Pentagon on Aug. 19, 2013. (Source: defense.gov)

spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State, said during a daily press brief that, “consistent with U.S. commitments under the TRA, the U.S. makes available to Taiwan defense articles and services.” U.S. Department of Defense officials also clarified that the U.S. and Mainland China planned to set up a joint task force to deal solely with such issues of mutual concerns as crime prevention, but weapons sales to Taiwan will not be part of the agenda. Officials said the sales would continue under the terms of the TRA and the “Six Assurances.”

The Arms Sales Issue under a “New Type of Great Power Relations”

Despite confirmation by U.S. officials that there will be no change in arms sales to Taiwan, Guan’s comments demonstrated Beijing still considers the Taiwan issue to be the major stumbling block to U.S.-Mainland China ties in the wake of the assumption of power by Xi at the end of 2012. Xi himself had also asked Obama to end arms sales to Taiwan when they met in California in June this year. As the U.S. seeks greater cooperation with Mainland China in an increasing number of fields, it is foreseeable that Beijing will bring up the topic persistently, and cleverly attempt to barter stopping weapon sales to Taiwan for improved U.S.-

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Mainland China relations.

Mainland China's arguments, can be considered problematic in view of the fact that the two sets of bilateral relations are independent of each other, as was proved by the stable expansion of U.S. and Mainland China cooperation since 1979, when the U.S. continued to provide defensive weapons to Taiwan following the termination of diplomatic relations between Washington and Taipei. On the other hand, ending arms sales to Taiwan would not necessarily mean smoother engagement with Mainland China. Washington has frictions with Beijing on a growing list of issues, and making concessions to Beijing concerning Taiwan will not help in resolving any of these issues. Moreover, America's friends and allies will worry that the U.S. might sacrifice their interests for the sake of good relations with Mainland China, leading to economic, political, or even military side effects influencing America's Asia policies.

Guan's statement also highlights that, in the context of the recently announced "new type of great power relations," Mainland China will not attempt to adjust its assertive attitude about its core interests, including U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Thus far, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has remained solid and unchanged. However, the Taiwanese government should closely follow the development of U.S.-Mainland China relations, especially Beijing's proposals concerning the Taiwan issue, in order to make timely and necessary responses. Taipei should also maintain close contact with decision-makers in Washington, and ensure that they firmly recognize the important strategic value of Taiwan and realize the TRA and Six Assurances are important cornerstones of not only U.S.-Taiwan friendship but also of regional security.

The Taiwan Relations Act and Six Assurances

The TRA passed in 1979 authorizes de facto commercial, cultural and other relations between the U.S. and Taiwan. The act provides for Taiwan to be treated under U.S. laws the same as "foreign countries, nations, states, governments or similar entities." In addition, the act stipulates that the U.S. will "consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the U.S." The Act further requires the U.S. "to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability," and "to maintain the capacity of the U.S. to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan." The TRA created a legislative framework in which, despite the absence of diplomatic

relations, the essence of the U.S. political commitment to Taiwan could be applied in different contexts over a period of 30 years.

The Six Assurances were pledged by the Reagan government in 1982 and honored by subsequent U.S. administrations. The conferring of the Six Assurances was intended to alleviate the concerns of Taipei after the U.S. signed Joint Communique with Mainland China, in which the U.S. government stated that "it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan.....and it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan." The content of the Six Assurances is that "in negotiating the third Joint Communique with Mainland China, the U.S.: has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; has not agreed to hold prior consultations with Mainland China regarding arms sales to Taiwan; will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing; has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and will not exert pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with Mainland China." After more than three decades, the Six Assurances appear alive and essentially unchanged, and are still contributing to maintaining Taiwan's defense capabilities and therefore also to peace in the Taiwan Strait.

After the U.S. terminated the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan as well as diplomatic ties, the TRA and Six Assurances have somewhat replaced the abrogated security arrangement, leaving Taiwan as part of the U.S.-centered security architecture in the Asia-Pacific. The TRA and Six Assurances are the foundations of stability in the Taiwan Strait, buttresses of cross-Strait interaction, and the basis of peace in the Western Pacific.



The U.S. Congress holds a reception in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the enactment of the *Taiwan Relations Act*. (Source: taiwanembassy.org)

In the 2010 Shangri-La Dialogue, then-U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates criticized Mainland China's citing arms sales to Taiwan as its reason for breaking off interactions with the U.S. military as "making little sense." He pointed out that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have occurred throughout the decades since 1979, and the U.S. has demonstrated its position of not supporting Taiwan independence. Nothing has changed with regard to these aspects. In addition, because Mainland China's accelerating military buildup has focused largely on Taiwan, Gates added that U.S. arms sales are important to maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait.

Despite the improvement of cross-Strait relations, Mainland China has not renounced the use of force against Taiwan. It continues to expand the deployment of missiles targeting Taiwan, strengthen its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities on the west of the First Island Chain, and develop anti-access capabilities aiming to deny the U.S. from gaining access to the Taiwan Strait. Mainland China also has begun to strongly assert its sovereign rights in the South and East China Seas. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are purely for peaceful and defensive purpose. The TRA and Six Assurances should remain in effect if threats to regional peace exist and remain, which is to say, should Mainland China wish Washington to decrease arms sales, it should think about adjusting its offensive posture first. The uncertainty of the regional situation motivates the U.S. to maintain its commitment to Taiwan and thereby ensure Asia-Pacific security.

Taiwan's Importance in U.S.'s Asia Rebalancing Policy

To reestablish its position of leadership in Asia, the U.S. announced the "Asia Rebalancing" policy, which seeks to renew ties and build new friendships in Asia. This policy has caused Taiwan's value as a strategic partner in Asia to increase.

Geopolitically, Taiwan is positioned between the two main players, Japan and Southeast Asia. It is also located at the strategic frontline of the "Air-Sea Battle," which is an American operational concept countering the PLA's anti-access and area-denial strategy. Taiwan's strategic warning capacity at the First Island Chain could help U.S. enhance its surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in the region. In addition, the recent Asia maritime disputes highlight the importance of naval power. A strong naval force and a sound maritime strategy would support the U.S. rebalancing policy. Taiwan is located in the middle of vital sea lanes linking southeast and northeast Asia. If Taiwan fell under the political domination of Mainland China, Taiwan would be used to strengthen Beijing's naval power access into these

sea lanes, extend its reach to the Second Island Chain, and facilitate its anti-access and area-denial strategy, threatening American power projection and military presence in the region. Furthermore, scholars have noted that Taiwan's east-coast ports would give PLA submarines a means of quickly getting to deep water, where they could not be detected and could proceed to the American west coast. Without Taiwan, there would be a hole in Washington's rebalancing toward Asia.

In addition, Taiwan, as a symbol of democracy, furthers the U.S. cause of promoting democracy, especially at the time when democratization has been in retreat among developing countries. Scholars have warned that America's strategic objective lies in ensuring Taiwan remains a secure democratic state in the region, for losing Taiwan as a symbol of democracy would be a major setback to American soft power in the region.

Abandoning the security commitment to Taiwan enshrined in the TRA and Six Assurances would raise doubts among U.S. friends and allies about the durability of the rebalancing policy and the American alliance structure. In addition, should the U.S. concede to Mainland China's wishes to curb arm sales to Taiwan, this would only whet Beijing's appetite, and Beijing would be less likely to adopt accommodating stances on other issues such as North Korea or maritime disputes in East Asia. This might lead to an unfavorable scenario in which a more assertive Mainland China and an uncertain U.S. security commitment would cause Korea, Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia to change their China policy, with some adopting riskier and more confrontational military policies, and some further accommodating Beijing's demands.

For its part, Taiwan has embarked on a defense transformation to strengthen the country's self-defense with absolute resolution. Rather than engaging in an arms race with Beijing, the R.O.C. Armed Forces are rather focusing on developing innovative and asymmetric capabilities involving advanced technology. U.S. arms sales not only help Taiwan to deter threats, but also strengthen Taipei's confidence in negotiation with Beijing. History has demonstrated that the arms sales contribute to peace in the Taiwan Strait and stability in the Asia-Pacific.

Pei-Yin Chien is an associate research fellow at the Office of Defense Studies, MND, R.O.C.

MND Demonstrates Self-reliant Defense Products at the 2013 Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition



An indigenously-made unmanned helicopter demonstrated at the 2013 Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition (Source: Hsiao-Huang Shu)

The 2013 Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition was held from August 15 to 18 in the 1st Exhibition Hall of the Taipei World Trade Center. Apart from aerospace and defense equipment exhibited by domestic and international manufacturers, many of the latest indigenously-made defense products demonstrated by the Ministry of

National Defense (MND) of the R.O.C. were also big attention-getters. These items included the Hsiung-Feng (Brave Wind) III anti-ship missile, the land-based Tien-Kung (Sky Bow) III surface-to-air missile launching vehicle, PAC-II missile launching vehicle, and a model of the newly-introduced PAC-III missile.

The Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) displayed a bistatic radar system, which uses a passive phased array on a mobile vehicle to receive radar waves generated by other radar sources. Given that it does not send out radar waves, the enemy will be unable to detect its location, and it also has a greater ability to detect stealth aircraft.

Plant 209 of the Materiel Production Center displayed a Cloud Leopard armored vehicle outfitted with an around-view monitoring system. This vehicle is equipped with 16 small cameras able to receive all-round 360° images, which are then segmented for observation. The system is also capable of detecting moving objects such as humans or animals, thus increasing driving safety and allowing rapid detection of dangers during operations.

Mainland China's UAV BZK-005 Makes First Appearance above the East China Sea

On September 9, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) took off from an unknown airport in a coastal area of Mainland China. While approaching the airspace above the Diaoyutai Islands (known to Japan as the Senkaku Islands), it was detected and photographed by an F-15J fighter of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). Based on the photographs taken, it was determined to be a BZK-005 long-range UAV from Mainland China. The BZK-005 was co-designed by the Harbin Aircraft Industry Group and Beijing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics. It is a stealth drone whose maximum take-off weight is about 1,250 kilograms, and it has an endurance of over 40 hours. Its cruising speed ranges from 150 to 180 kilometers an hour, and it can perform reconnaissance and surveillance missions at the high altitude of 8,000 meters.

Since 2012, the JASDF has scrambled a total of over 300 times—nearly once daily—to intercept Mainland Chinese fighters, but this was the first interception of an UAV by the JASDF. According to experts on Mainland China's military affairs, however, this was not the first time that Mainland Chinese UAVs have entered airspace above the East China

Sea (ECS). These experts believe that sending UAVs to the ECS could be Mainland China's new response to disputes involving the ECS. Japan's NHK News has reported that Japan's Ministry of Defense has been keeping a close eye on the activities of Mainland Chinese UAVs above the ECS since that time. Given that Mainland China keeps expanding its area of activity in and above the sea, Japan believes that it is highly likely that Mainland Chinese UAVs will approach Japan's territorial airspace in the future.



Mainland China's BZK-005 UAV (Source: mod.go.jp)

The PLA's Recent Naval Modernization

Recent years have witnessed the rapid growth of Mainland China's naval power and its increasing assertiveness with regard to maritime disputes and sovereignty issues, which has elicited widespread concern and skepticism from the international community. This year, in the face of much international speculation, Mainland China has continued to expand and modernize its Navy, and has been building large numbers of modernized ships, such as Type 052C destroyers equipped with phased array radar, Type 039A submarines with air-independent propulsion (AIP) and Type 052D destroyers with vertical launch systems (VLS). The numbers of ships acquired or built by Beijing in the recent decade (2004-2013) has least been double that



Mainland China's Type 051C (Luzhou class) destroyer.
(Source: mod.go.jp)

of the previous decade (1994-2003), and has contributed to the growing numbers of ships in service. It is estimated that seven major surface combatants will enter service in 2013, which contrasts with the average number of 1.84 in previous years. In addition, Mainland China has developed 7,000-ton destroyers, a huge step forward from its early 4,000-ton-class vessels, and it appears to be heading toward the constructions of warships with displacements of more than 10,000 tons. The PLA is also actively improving its anti-ship missile defense capabilities, and large numbers of its vessels are equipped with indigenously-made CSS-N-8 anti-ship missiles or Russian-made SS-N-22 Sunburn missiles. The reasons for Mainland China's mass force buildup include preventing foreign powers from intervening in regional sovereignty disputes and preparing for triphibious power projection and the future establishment of a fleet strike group. A stronger naval force would put Mainland China in an even more advantageous position and buttress Beijing's claim to disputed islands in the East and South China Seas.

Japan's Military Preparations in the Face of Growing Maritime Disputes with Mainland China

Since September 2012, when Japan announced the "nationalization" of the Diaoyutai Islands, Mainland China has sent ships into the disputed waters at least 61 times, and had entered the zone within 12 nautical miles around the Diaoyutai Islands multiple times by the end of September 2013. During this period, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) has scrambled twice as many times as during previous year in order to respond to situations in which PLA fighters approached Japan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). In addition, the Japanese Coast Guard has been building large patrol ships and seeking to recruit 300 additional personnel to establish a team in charge of Diaoyutai Island patrol missions from Ishigaki Island. Japan's Ministry of Defense has also been improving its defense forces' triphibious operational capabilities and acquiring AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles and V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft. There is also domestic debate concerning whether to establish a preparatory force next year with 3,000 personnel tasked with making amphibious assaults to capture islands and eventually becoming a Japanese version of the U.S. Marines. Furthermore, to strengthen intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities with regard to the Diaoyutai Islands and Western Pacific, Japan's Ministry of Defense plans to send 6 E-2C Hawkeye aircraft to its Naha air base in Okinawa, acquire Global Hawk UAV in 2015, and establish communications facilities on Iwo Jima. The disputes between Tokyo and Beijing show no signal of cooling, resulting in a military buildup which not only does nothing to solve the conflict, but also continues to have a negative effect on regional stability.



V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft. (Source: defense.gov)

Office of Defense Studies Seminar on South Asia Security Environment



The Office of Defense Studies hosts the seminar “South Asia countries’ security situations and strategies” in August 2013.

To better understand the security situation in South Asia, the Office of Defense Studies hosted the seminar of “South Asia countries’ security situations and strategies,” inviting a former diplomat of Taiwan to India Mr. Ong, Dr. Liu from Institute of International Relations at NCCU, Prof. Liu from Ming-Chuan University, Vice Executive Director of the Prospect Foundation, Mr. Yang-Ming Sun, and Prof. Shen from National Defense University to share their insights and analysis concerning the current security environment in South Asia.

Warmer India-Taiwan Relations

The Republic of China (R.O.C.) established the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center in India in 1992 with the aim of strengthening bilateral cooperation. The effort to deepen political engagement, however, was impeded by Mainland China until 2008, at which time the R.O.C. adjusted its diplomatic strategy. With the new principle of “reengaging after long years of estrangement, clarifying doubts to improve mutual trust, starting with education and cultural exchanges to cultivate good will, improving economic and trade relations to achieve mutual benefit, and gradually enhancing policy and strategy involvement,” substantive relations have been successfully established in recent years.

Apart from government level moves, National Tsing-Hua University established a Chinese language training center in India. The Indian government has sought to promote Chinese studies since the 1962 Indian-Chinese

war, and the fact that India has banned Mainland China’s Confucius Institute from entering Indian territory, leaving opportunities for the R.O.C. The Chinese language center teaches traditional Chinese and history of Taiwan, fostering a friendly attitude toward Taiwan among Indian citizens. The presence of this center may also boost Taiwanese companies’ interest in investing in India as they could employ local people who speak Chinese.

In view of the fact that the Indian government has opposed Mainland China in various issues, such as hosting visits of the Dalai Lama, it is worthwhile for the R.O.C. to continue devoting itself to building sound relations with India. The R.O.C. hopes that this emerging power will stay neutral, and not being partial to either side of the Taiwan Strait in international affairs, or even play a positive role in supporting the R.O.C.’s status in the international community.

U.S.-India Strategic Partnership

The U.S. has recently emphasized its partnership with India in view of the latter’s role in maintaining the balance of power in Asia, counter terrorism/extremism, and prevent nuclear proliferation. For its part, India has a long history of conflict with and deep-rooted security concerns toward Mainland China, unsolved boundary disputes being just one example. Trust between India and Mainland China deteriorated further in April of this year, when Mainland China’s troops crossed over the de facto boundary in the Ladakh region of eastern Kashmir without offering any



Mr. Ong, former diplomat of Taiwan to India, shares his experiences in India and expectations of future India-R.O.C. relations.



Prof. Liu from Ming-Chuan University talks about U.S.-India security relations and implications for Mainland China.

explanation. India is insecure about Mainland China's rapid rise, lack of military transparency and its strategic expansion into the Southeast Asia and Indian Ocean regions. India has therefore adjusted its non-aligned position to partner with the U.S. in hope of increasing influence in the Asia-Pacific against Beijing. The U.S. and India have held strategic dialogues on an annual basis since 2010, and are collaboratively searching for ways of deepening their military relations. In addition, responding to America's Asia Rebalancing strategy, India has been more active in joining regional economic and security mechanisms, including participating in military exchanges and conducting drills with regional countries in the South China Sea. The new U.S.-India partnership sends an important signal to Southeast Asian countries, boosting their morale and will to jointly counter Mainland China's unpeaceful rise if necessary. Mainland China, meanwhile, views U.S.-India cooperation as containment with an eye to monitoring Mainland Chinese export and energy import sea routes.

The new U.S.-India partnership may shift the balance of relations between the three countries. However, the U.S. and India face many challenges to establishing closer ties, including divergent attitudes toward Pakistan and friction concerning economic cooperation and outsourcing issues. Additionally, India had not accumulated sufficient mutual trust with the U.S. since the Cold War, and still heavily prioritizes its own national interests. India is therefore unlikely to allow itself to play a manipulable role in the U.S. confrontation with Mainland China at the expense of developing its own security policy. The interactions among the three powers will be worth watching closely in the future.

Strategic Competition between India and Mainland China and Opportunities for the R.O.C.

India's national security policy and Mainland China's South Asia strategy are mostly incompatible. Mainland China intends to build deep water ports in Pakistan and Bangladesh, construct a highway from Pakistan to Chinese territory, and establish a gas pipeline from Bangladesh in order to decrease its reliance on energy transported through the Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Malacca and extend its power into Indian Ocean region, all of which pose threats to India's national security. For its part, India hopes to increase its influence in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Central Asia, as well as join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, although thus far India's intentions have been hindered by Beijing in order to keep India from intervening in Central Asian security issues. Furthermore, considering the size, location and geographical conditions of the two countries, any conflict along their disputed boundaries will be a national security issue threatening the existence of India, but only a regional conflict for Mainland China. This asymmetric sense of crisis has led to India's recent military buildup.

In view of the linguistic and cultural similarities between the R.O.C. and Mainland China, and the R.O.C.'s extensive PLA research capacity, the R.O.C. can help India understand Mainland China's strategic thinking, exchange research experience, and conduct intelligence cooperation. Furthermore, while Russia was formerly India's major arms supplier, the recent sale of Su-35 aircraft to Mainland China has provoked India's discontent. India may therefore consider increasing arms trade with the U.S. in the future. The R.O.C. can thus share its personnel training and logistics experience connected with American weapon systems with India. The future prospects for India-Taiwan relations consequently look positive.



Mr. Yang-Ming Sun, the Vice Executive Director of the Prospect Foundation, articulates the long history of conflict between Mainland China and India.

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For comments or questions about *Defense Security Brief*, please contact us at

Thoughts168@gmail.com

409 Bei-An Road, Taipei, R.O.C.

Tel: (02)2532-7950

Fax: (02)2532-7387

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