

DEFENSE SECURITY BRIEF

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Regional and Global Issues and Their Implications to the R.O.C.

**DEFENSE
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President Ma Calls for the Establishment of East China Sea Code of Conduct

At the opening ceremony of International Conference on Peace and Security in East Asia on February 26, the Republic of China (R.O.C.) President Ma Ying-jeou reaffirmed the R.O.C.'s role as a regional peacemaker and called for multilateral negotiations to establish an East China Sea code of conduct covering both sea and air in response to heightened tensions in the region.

With regard to Mainland China's unilateral announcement of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), President Ma urged all parties concerned to begin bilateral talks at the earliest possible time, adopting temporary arrangements as necessary to avoid conflict or miscalculation and lessen the impact on aviation rights and security.

Based on the spirit of the East China Sea Peace Initiative, Ma made the Statement on East China Sea Air Space Security, advocating all parties to abide by international law and resolve disputes peacefully. The statement includes the following three points:

1. All parties concerned should abide by the principles of international law and to seek peaceful resolutions to disputes in the spirit of East China Sea Peace Initiative, in order to ensure air space security, to safeguard freedom of aviation, and to promote regional peace.
2. Those parties with the overlapping ADIZs should initiate bilateral talks for solutions at the earliest possibility. Provisional arrangements may be taken whenever necessary to avoid conflict and misjudgment, and to reduce the impacts on freedom and safety of aviation.
3. To promote sustainable peace and long-lasting cooperation in the East China Sea and to enhance regional stability and prosperity, the parties concerned should jointly negotiate the formulation of the East China Sea Code of Conduct concerning both maritime space and air space, and the creation of a regional multilateral mechanism on the basis of mutual trust and reciprocity.



President Ma calls on all parties concerned to start negotiation regarding suitable arrangements for maritime and airspace issues in the East China Sea. (Source: president.gov.tw)

The Strategic Implications of China's Air Defense Identification Zone

Benjamin Schreer

In November 2013, the People's Republic of China announced the establishment of a new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). This ADIZ overlaps significantly with the Republic of China's, Japan's and South Korea's ADIZs in the East China Sea. Internationally, the announcement was heavily criticised as a detriment to regional peace and stability. Why the strong response? And what are the strategic implications of the ADIZ, including for Taiwan?


ADIZ with "Chinese Characteristics"

At first glance, it seems perfectly legitimate for Beijing to declare an ADIZ. More than 20 countries have done so, including Taiwan, the United States (U.S.) and Japan. The establishment of an ADIZ is not prohibited under international law and generally applies to civil rather than state aircraft (including military aircraft). As such, an argument could be made that China simply exercised a legitimate right. However, the specifics and the strategic context of the announcement caused concerns in the region and beyond.

For a start, the declaration was made without consultations of regional countries and the U.S. Whilst Beijing can claim that there was no diplomatic need to do so, the unilateral move was widely seen as yet another *fait accompli* when it comes to shaping the regional order. Moreover, China's ADIZ rules are quite assertive. All foreign civilian and military aircraft intending to enter the ADIZ are required to notify plans to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, respond to orders by Chinese authorities during

the flight, and face military action in case of non-compliance. Rule number three specifically states that "China's armed forces will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not cooperate in identification or refuse to follow the instructions."¹ As well, the regulations also apply to aircraft that do not intend to enter China's airspace.

Moreover, China's definition of an ADIZ differs markedly from the U.S. and other countries' more benign understanding. Beijing sees an ADIZ as "an area of air space established by a coastal state



The map indicates that the East China Sea ADIZ, which was unilaterally announced just recently, overlaps with those of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan to different extents.

* To prevent confusion and for reading convenience, in this article, the "Republic of China" is indicated as "Taiwan," while "China" means "Mainland China."

beyond its territorial airspace to timely identify, monitor, control and react to aircraft entering this zone with potential air threats.”² In contrast, the U.S. military for example defines it as “airspace of defined dimensions within which the ready identification, location, and control of airborne vehicles are required.”³

Finally, some analysts also argue that the ADIZ violates the *Law of the Sea Convention*, which ensures high seas freedoms throughout the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) beyond 12 nautical miles, including surface, subsurface, and aerospace activities. In their view, it also breaches the *Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation*, which establishes the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as the sole management authority for international civil aviation. In sum, they contend that Beijing’s ADIZ amounts to an attempt to control international airspace.⁴ Regardless of whether one shares this legalistic interpretation or not, Beijing’s particular understanding of its East China Sea ADIZ conflicts with existing international norms and standards.⁵ As well, the strategic consequences are far from trivial.

Beijing's ADIZ amounts to an attempt to control international airspace; its understanding of the East China Sea ADIZ conflicts with existing international norms and standards. As well, the strategic consequences are far from trivial.

A Challenge for Regional Stability

The ADIZ presents a challenge for security and stability in East Asia. One immediate consequence is a growing potential for accidents and miscalculations between China and Japan and/or the U.S. Put simply, the ADIZ is “an expansion of China’s attempt to exert legal and administrative control over the



Following China's announcement of the ADIZ, the U.S. dispatched two unarmed B-52 through the zone (Source: U.S. Air Force)

Senkaku [or Diaoyutai] Islands...[it] has now laid an additional legal foundation to justify control of contested airspace.”⁶ It can be expected that the skirmishes between Chinese and Japanese forces over the disputed islands – already on a record high in 2013 – will increase. As the U.S. government reconfirmed that the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty covers the disputed islands, a U.S.-Sino escalation is not entirely out of the picture. This is also because in an attempt to avoid looking like a ‘paper tiger,’ China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might decide to attempt to intercept U.S. military plans traversing the ADIZ, with potentially serious consequences. Consequently, the Chief of the U.S. Air Force (USAF), General Mark Welsh, urged better communication between the USAF and its Chinese counterpart.⁷

However, China’s ADIZ also has broader strategic consequences. It is very much a ‘signalling’ exercise to demonstrate that Beijing is a rising power, able and willing to challenge the territorial status quo and American primacy in the Western Pacific. Thus, the ADIZ should be seen as but one element in a larger strategy of Beijing to assert sovereignty in parts of the Western Pacific.⁸ Since the ADIZ announcement, China has not stood still. Instead, it has imposed new “access rules” for foreign vessels in disputed maritime zones in the South China Sea – drawing criticism from Taiwan, the U.S., Vietnam and the Philippines.⁹ There are


also signs that Beijing moves to establish permanent military structure in the Scarborough Shoal, an area also claimed by the Philippines. Thus, the ADIZ can be seen as part of a long-term PRC strategy to “chip away” at the territorial status quo and to assert greater control over the East and South China Seas.¹⁰

Consequently, the U.S. government condemned the defense zone as an “attempt to change the status quo in the East China Sea.”¹¹ Washington understood perfectly well that the ADIZ contributes to Asian allies’ and partners’ concerns about U.S. security commitments and its willingness to resist China’s coercive behaviour. In an attempt to reassure those countries, it sent two (unarmed) B-52 strategic bombers through the ADIZ and warned Beijing about implementing its ADIZ rules and establishing additional zones. However, China has already stated that it “will establish other air defense identification zones at an appropriate time after completing preparations.”¹² And in January of this year, Japanese newspaper claimed that Chinese sources had confirmed plans to establish an ADIZ in the South China Sea to include the Paracel Islands.¹³

Such action would see China in dispute with Taiwan and Vietnam, while the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei would also be increasingly concerned about the PRC’s willing to exert coercive diplomacy to “solve” territorial conflicts in the South China Sea. Beijing vehemently rejected the reports, accusing Tokyo of fuelling regional tensions.¹⁴ However, the U.S. responded pre-emptively by stating that it would regard such an ADIZ as a “provocative and destabilising development that would result in changes in our presence and military posture in the region.”¹⁵ The obvious question is what these changes would practically entail and whether they would be sufficient to deter Beijing from moving ahead with such plans. In sum, China’s ADIZ is detrimental to regional stability.

Implications for Taiwan

What does the ADIZ imply for Taiwan’s security? It could be tempting for Taiwanese decision-makers to regard the ADIZ as largely a problem for Japan and the U.S. Unlike in Japan’s case, China’s ADIZ does not immediately compromise Taiwan’s security or complicate cross-Strait relations. Some political elites in Taipei could even regard the ADIZ as an opportunity to putting pressure on Japan to recognize that there is a territorial dispute over the Diaoyutai/



Japan’s Ministry of Defense closely monitors patterns of Chinese aircraft operating in air-space above the East China Sea. The chart also shows the number of scrambles of Japanese fighters in 2012. (Source: Ministry of Defense of Japan).



Senkaku Islands. A primary motive behind China's ADIZ announcement is to achieve exactly such outcome.

However, Taiwanese policy-makers would be well-advised to consider the long-term consequences of the ADIZ for Taiwan's own position. Analysts have pointed out that the ADIZ further complicates the challenge of defending Taiwan. It not only overlaps with Taiwan's ADIZ but also covers the area that U.S. and Japanese forces would have to traverse to swiftly respond to a Chinese invasion attempt.¹⁶ Already, the R.O.C. Armed Forces have had to increase their activities within Taiwan's ADIZ.¹⁷ Further, China's ADIZ is not only a challenge for Taiwan, the U.S., or Japan. Instead, it raises the broader question for the region and beyond of how to respond to China's unilateral attempts to change the territorial status quo and to disregard of international norms of behavior. In short, it concerns issues regarding the future order in Asia.

As such, the response to the ADIZ should not be left to individual nations such as the U.S., Taiwan, Japan or South Korea. What is required is a coordinated regional response that signals to China that such behavior is not acceptable. Consequently, the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Locklear, recently called for a multilateral approach and dialogue to addressing territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas.¹⁸ As mentioned earlier, the U.S. appears increasingly frustrated with China's provocations and willing to take a stronger stance.

As a result, China's ADIZ provides Taiwan with an opportunity to enhance its relationship with the U.S. and other countries. In early February, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Daniel Russel, voiced the Obama administration's support for Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou's East China Sea Peace Initiative of August 2012 as a means to resolve territorial disputes in the region. The five-point initiative urges all parties involved to (1) refrain from antagonistic actions; (2) shelve controversies and not abandon dialogue; (3) observe international law and resolve

disputes through peaceful means; (4) seek consensus on a code of conduct in the region; and (5) establish a mechanism for cooperation on exploring and developing resources.¹⁹

At this point, it is hard to see how the initiative be utilized to 'resolve' the territorial dispute. The ADIZ announced by China is not aimed at resolving the conflict according to the procedures laid out in President Ma's Peace Initiative. Instead, it is a unilateral action and in violation with established norms and practices governing the use of international airspace. It is designed to put pressure on Japan to recognize China's claim over the islands and, more broadly, to assert greater control in the East China Sea. As such, the ADIZ reflects a conflict 'resolution' on Beijing's terms in an attempt to change the regional status quo. It is also highly antagonistic by raising the risk for miscalculation between Chinese and Japanese/U.S. forces, and by complicating the ability of the U.S. and Japan to come to the defense of Taiwan.

However, the initiative embodies the fundamental principles underlying U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy. Its ideas about peaceful dispute resolution and respective norms defining regional order making are also shared by almost all countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The initiative thus provides like-minded countries with a conceptual blueprint to organise a coordinated response against unilateral efforts to change the territorial status quo. It contains a central message to Beijing on how these disputes should be resolved. Obviously, for Taiwan being part of a regional response carries opportunity costs in terms of its strategic relationship with China. But given what is at stake, Taiwan might need to choose side with other regional players to avoid China's creeping expansionism.

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Mainland China's Contradictory Security Strategy

Denny Roy

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political thought puts great emphasis on identifying and resolving *maodun* (contradictions). It is therefore somewhat ironic that China's strategic policy displays a fundamental contradiction. Perhaps the two most basic strategic goals of China are: (1) to attain and consolidate great power status as the pre-eminent country in East Asia; and (2) to avoid alarming other Asia-Pacific countries into security cooperation against China. Some of the policies Beijing is employing to achieve these distinct goals are working directly against each other.

Two important historical legacies—China's leading role in the region through much of pre-modern history, and the subsequent reversal of Chinese fortunes during the Century of Humiliation—have led to Beijing seeking great power status with Chinese characteristics. China demands what it views as its natural entitlement of respect and security. In practice, this means Chinese insistence on a sphere of influence around the Chinese periphery: the idea that regional governments should recognize China's right to set the rules of international affairs in the areas near Chinese borders, and should not undertake policies Beijing does not approve of in these areas. Although the CCP government has at times recognized certain benefits of U.S. influence in the Western Pacific region, and although Beijing is not now openly demanding a withdrawal of U.S. bases and alliances, there can be little doubt that China's eventual goal is for the U.S. to pull back to Hawaii and to retire from its current position as a major strategic player in Asia. From Beijing's standpoint, it would be better if

America became like the European Union: a major trading partner of Asia, but not a manager of Asian security affairs. China can envision itself handling that job.

In arguing that China seeks a sphere of influence, I am accusing Beijing of an intention that it specifically and frequently denies. Imposing a sphere of influence on unwilling neighbors is an act of great-power bullying. China has always drawn a contrast between the other great powers, which are "hegemonist" or "unilateralist," and itself, which is always defensive.

In China's case, the distinction between self-defense and aggression is blurred. One of China's national myths is that since China is traditionally a peace-loving, Confucian (ruled by moral example, not force), anti-militaristic country, China is always defensive and never aggressive, sometimes a victim but never a victimizer. Even in pre-modern China, this was the official Chinese self-identity, even if its actual practice was different (ancient China didn't become a huge, multi-ethnic empire



China's military buildup is considered by neighboring countries as a threat. The picture illustrates China's first aircraft carrier, *Liaoning*, in the South China Sea. (Source: uscnpm.org.)

* To prevent confusion and for reading convenience, in this article, the "Republic of China" is indicated as "Taiwan," while "China" means "Mainland China."

through solely peaceful means). Since the ideas that China is inherently non-aggressive and that China has suffered terribly from foreign molestation are deeply-rooted, it is possible for Chinese to uncritically accept the notion that all Mainland Chinese policies are defensive. In a sense this is true. Just as the Soviet Union believed it needed to seize half of Poland to protect itself from another German invasion, the search for security can be the source of Chinese demands that seem outrageous to foreign governments. This is not to deny the possibility that some Chinese strategists may cynically use the self-defense argument as a smokescreen for carrying out what they themselves realize is simple great-power greed. So the Mainland Chinese may call their policies defensive, but this is largely irrelevant if the resulting impact on neighboring countries is the same as aggression.

The Mainland Chinese may call their policies defensive, but this is largely irrelevant if the resulting impact on neighboring countries is the same as aggression.

Because of China's many territorial disputes with its neighbors, much of Beijing's strategic policy in recent years falls into a somewhat ambiguous category: although many observers may term it "assertive." This behavior can be explained away as defensive rather than assertive because the Chinese believe they are protecting their own territory when they order Vietnamese fishermen to stop fishing in the South China Sea for part of the year or blockade Filipino vessels from entering a lagoon that lies within what would normally be the Philippines' exclusive economic zone. The excuse of defending what is perceived as national territory might even cover Beijing's implied claim to ownership over almost the entire South China Sea, although this stretches credulity. Most

observers outside of Mainland China and the R.O.C. consider the U-shaped line claim to be absurd. It is unsupported by the *UN Law of the Sea*, to which Beijing is a signatory. The defense that Mainland Chinese officials and scholars frequently raise, which is that they "inherited" this claim from maps commissioned by the R.O.C. government, is facile. It is the CCP leadership that decided to retain this claim and, in a transparently cynical display of political gamesmanship, refuses to clarify it.

On the other hand, some Mainland Chinese behavior is difficult to distinguish from the usual great power avarice—the strong doing what they want, because the weak cannot stop them. When China demanded that a U.S. aircraft carrier not join in naval exercises in the Yellow Sea between allies America and South Korea after the North Korean provocations of 2010, the Chinese demand was not based on a claim to ownership of the Yellow Sea. Rather, China essentially said, "We are a big power now and you must respect our wishes." Similarly, China has complained of "harassment" of its naval vessels by observing Japanese ships while in the Pacific Ocean on the eastern side of the Ryukyu Islands. The underlying attitude seemed to break into public view when an annoyed Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, told his Southeast Asian counterparts in 2010, "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that is just a fact."

Because it extends the zone of Mainland China's control, establishing a regional sphere of influence unavoidably encroaches on the security interests, even vital interests, of neighboring countries. This makes China a threat to them. The natural reaction of countries threatened by a stronger country is to join with other similarly-threatened countries in security cooperation against the threatening country. The exception is when a small country believes its capability to resist a domineering larger country is hopelessly weak because the disparity in strength is too great and because potential allies are unwilling, unable, or too far away to assist. In that case, the weak country may decide to accommodate its



strong antagonist, but some weak countries remain obstinate even in these circumstances (examples are Cuba and North Korea).

By pursuing its first major strategic goal, China appears threatening and thereby defeats its own second major strategic goal. Beijing was remarkably prescient in grasping the historical problem of the “rising power” posing a challenge to an established international system, a situation that historically has often led to war. The war can come about in two ways. The first way has the old, established great power starting the war. This old great power is the founder, sponsor and main beneficiary of the international system (institutions, rules and norms that govern international affairs). Seeing a rising challenger, the aging great power is tempted to start a preventive war to crush the rising challenger before the latter gets too strong. The second path to war is a consequence of impatience by the rising challenger. Seeing that it has closed the power gap with the old dominant power, and anxious to impose a new international system that suits its own interests, the rising power tries to speed up the transition process with a military confrontation.

From the 1990s, when it became clear that China’s post-Mao economic reforms had placed China on a trajectory of extraordinarily rapid economic development, Mainland Chinese officials, diplomats and scholars began tirelessly assuring outsiders that there was no need to treat Mainland China as a security threat. Beijing’s diplomacy indicates the leadership is highly attentive to the risk of preventive war by the old reigning great power. In this case, Beijing’s security policies, however, seem to plunge ahead regardless of that risk, undermining China’s assurance diplomacy.

Even more worrisome, perhaps, is the second path to war. Although China is still weaker than the U.S. in economic strength, military might, technological prowess, and global influence, and with China yet to complete difficult but necessary economic re-balancing, some Mainland Chinese elite groups and nationalistic public opinion are already urging Beijing to abandon Deng Xiaoping’s advice of

calmness and restraint, calling for confrontation with Japan, the U.S. and some of China’s rival claimants for disputed South China Sea territory. The CCP has perhaps succeeded too well in its self-serving campaign to convince the Mainland Chinese people that their country has ascended to the top tier and gained global respect. The imperatives of keeping the CCP in power and preventing large-scale public discontent may make it difficult for the Xi Jinping government to suppress such jingoism, even when the government would prefer to avoid foreign crises.

Some Mainland Chinese elite groups and nationalistic public opinion are already urging Beijing to abandon Deng Xiaoping’s advice of calmness and restraint, calling for confrontation with Japan, the U.S. and rival claimants for disputed territory.

The huge strategic contradiction between demanding a sphere of influence and trying to persuade neighbors not to feel threatened is encapsulated in the Xi government’s continuation of the “new type of great power relationship” rhetoric inherited from the previous set of leaders. The content of the slogan is vague, and there are various interpretations. Nevertheless, a large number of Mainland Chinese scholars and analysts commenting on the slogan identify two key elements. The first is Beijing’s strong hope that China can “rise” without triggering a conflict with the other major powers—a restatement of what I have called Beijing’s first major strategic goal. The second point implied by the slogan is the argument that the way to avoid war is for Beijing and Washington to “respect each other’s core interests.” As a starting point, China does not accept that America can have “core interests” in the Western Pacific because this is China’s neighborhood, and America is an interloper from the other side of the world. Delving more deeply into this idea inevitably produces a list of Chinese grievances that add up to a demand that

America should abandon its strategic leadership role in the region: America should stop surveilling China, should not comment on human rights issues in China, should not accuse the CCP government of involvement in China's massive cyber theft and warfare campaign, should not encourage Japan to strengthen its ability to help defend the international system, should not pressure North Korea to stop its provocations, should not sell arms to Taiwan, should not stand up for the Southeast Asian countries being bullied by China over contending territorial claims, and so on. In other words, China is asserting, probably correctly, that the two great powers can have peaceful relations if America will only stop all of the policies that bother Beijing, quit trying to play regional policeman, and withdraw its military forces and security cooperation agreements back to the Western Hemisphere. In short, the "new type of great power relationship" seems to be offering peace in exchange for a U.S. surrender. That would indeed be "new," but the usual pattern of international politics is that states resist when threatened. The slogan, as I have interpreted it, is as self-contradictory as China demanding a sphere of influence while at the same time hoping this would not appear threatening its neighbors.

Thus far Beijing is not managing its contradictory strategic situation successfully. Regional countries are cooperating with China economically because they cannot resist the opportunity for prosperity. This economic interdependence, however, is not eliminating China's security concerns. The heavy trade with China gives Beijing leverage over these states, and in some cases cause governments to make compromises to avoid offending Beijing. In general, however, two important trends are moving opposite China's desired direction: security cooperation among states that are worried about China's rise (including the United States, Japan, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore, and Australia) is greater than ever; and regional demand for a continued strong U.S. security presence is higher than ever.

Beijing's policy toward the R.O.C. is

contradictory as well. This policy essentially says "You must join us or we will make war against you, but we hope you will trust us and join us willingly." As with China's broader international strategic policy, it is unclear that Beijing's cross-Straits policy will be successful. China has gained limited leverage over Taiwan through economic interdependence, but this alone will not force a majority of the island's people to choose to put their hard-won political liberties in jeopardy. Past experience, both on the island of Taiwan and elsewhere, demonstrates that threatening or using force makes the people defiant. Although the R.O.C.'s situation is unique, it shares with other countries in the region the problem of maintaining its interests in the same neighboring with a China that seemingly cannot avoid resorting to threatening behavior even when it understands the disadvantages of doing so.

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The Implications of the Ukraine Crisis to Taiwan

Chen-Shen J. Yen

Based on the Chinese “Heavenly Stems and Earthly Branches” that runs a cycle of 60 years, 2014 marks the 2nd cycle of the First Sino-Japanese War that took place in 1894. With recent tensions in the East China Sea and the visit of Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the tension has been running high in early 2014 between China and Japan, leading to the speculation that military conflicts might take place again on the 120th anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War.

2014 is also the centennial of the First World War, a war that is supposed to end all wars. We do not believe that history is destined to repeat itself. However, if conflicts in early 2014 are signs to an uneasy year ahead, we are looking at the prospect of geopolitical maneuvering that have not been witnessed for quite a while.

After Ukraine’s parliament ousted the embattled president, Viktor Yanukovich, in late February, the Russian parliament granted its leader, Vladimir Putin, broad authority to use force in Ukraine as a response to the upheavals in that country. The authorization appears to have emboldened Putin, who feels that he has a free hand in Crimea and has conducted military exercise along the Russo-Ukrainian border and intervened in the peninsula without hesitation.

The U.S. and its Western allies expressed their condemnation and insisted that they do not recognize the legality of the Russian actions as well as the subsequent Crimean referendum for independence. Russia on the other hand considered the new Ukrainian government as illegitimate because Yanukovich had been ousted by unconstitutional

means. Putin even called such a transfer of power a coup. As Russian-speaking Crimea citizens felt detached from the new central government, its decision to hold a referendum to decide the political future of the peninsula appeared justified.

Even though the U.S. has mobilized its fleet and entered the Black Sea as a counterbalance force, and President Barack Obama announced possible sanction measures, Putin seemed to be undeterred. However, a repeat of war or conflicts between two powers like the one that took place a century ago appears unlikely. But the scenario reminds people of what happened to Georgia in 2008 when Russians went into its former republic to support the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

During the Georgian crisis, two American policy specialists with previous government



A member of a pro-Russian self-defense force takes down a Ukrainian Navy flag, left, as another raises the Russian flag at Ukrainian Navy headquarters in Crimea, March, 2014. (Source: voa.gov)

* To prevent confusion and for reading convenience, in this article, the “Republic of China” is indicated as “Taiwan,” while “China” means “Mainland China.”

experiences wrote an article entitled “Georgia’s Lesson for Taiwan” that had important implications for Washington, D.C. Basically the arguments from Jeffrey Bader, former senior director for East Asian affairs on the National Security Council (NSC) and Douglas Paal, former director for American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), derived from watching helplessly as Russia intervened in Georgia, a state of the former Soviet Union, almost at will. They offered six lessons of the Russia-Georgia crisis for Taiwan and for U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

First, the Americans should be careful about security commitments. If the U.S. and the European allies did not intend to commit the full force of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) power to Georgia’s defense, do not try to bring this state into NATO. To provide a security commitment and then not back it up would send a message to the world that the U.S. is not serious about its commitments.

Second, smaller countries should not provoke the bear (Russia) or the dragon (China) and expect the eagle (U.S.) to fly to the rescue. Georgia’s former president, Mikheil Saakashvili, and Taiwan’s then president, Chen Shui-bian, both made similar provocative approach, and the U.S. was wise to withdraw support for Chen’s erratic behavior.

Third, the need for the U.S. to have a constructive relationship with major powers is an essential component of security for these smaller vulnerable states. They pointed out that Taiwan benefited from positive relations between the U.S. and China, and Washington should not hold a disdainful attitude toward Russian security interests.

Fourth, geography matters. The authors reminded the smaller nations near large powers that they should not forget who their neighbors are. Fifth, Mr. Bader and Mr. Paal pled that if the U.S. does not plan to carry a big stick, it is wise to speak softly. In the Georgia case, the Russians saw the U.S. warnings as a bluff. Would the U.S. allies consider the American commitment to them prove as empty?

Finally, American credibility is global. The two former government officials insisted that there are no purely local crises, and American commitments

remain critical for a stable international system. Americans need to be clear about their commitments to ensure the credibility of the U.S. in international affairs.

Mr. Bader’s two colleagues in the Brookings Institution, Richard Bush and Kenneth Lieberthal, wrote a piece “From Georgia to Taiwan” for the *Asian Wall Street Journal* that partly concurred with the views of the former. They basically argued that even though Taiwan and Georgia have similar dynamics, but the outcomes for the two are quite different. Messrs. Bush and Lieberthal accused President Bush for misleading President Saakashvili to his confrontation with Russia. He did the same thing when he told a CNN reporter in April 2001 that he was prepared to “do whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan against China. This gave Mr. Chen a carte blanche for his provocative approach, and Washington’s restraining moves finally helped to stabilize the volatile cross-Strait situation. They also believe in and praise the conciliatory approach taken by Ma Ying-jeou toward China. Their conclusion of the comparison is illustrative of the lessons to be learned:

American commitments should be carefully shaped around sober analysis of American capabilities and interest and the competing goals and interests of other major players, and articulated on that basis. Otherwise, the U.S. will create trouble for its friends, its major power relationships, its credibility, and its capacity to manage other critical international issues in the future.

In 2008, Georgia’s defiance of Russia was compared to Taiwan’s provocation against China when the island just emerged from the politics of confrontation by President Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The author’s warning for Taiwan’s optimism that the U.S. would come to the island’s assistance if conflicts broke out across the Strait was well founded. The return of the Kuomintang (KMT) or the Nationalist Party to power and the subsequent conciliatory gestures taken by President Ma Ying-jeou should alleviate American worry that a trouble-making Taiwan

would prompt a military confrontation between the two superpowers.

Instead of feeling optimistic of the cross-Strait relations with Ma at the helm, there appeared few articles arguing that the U.S. should abandon or ditch Taiwan. These “abandonment” works start with Charles Glaser’s article in the prestigious *Foreign Affairs* in the spring of 2011, followed by an op-ed piece of a former National Security Fellow at the Harvard University in the *New York Time* later that year. The former argued for the abandonment of Taiwan to avoid confrontation or possible war with China; the latter advocated the ditching of Taiwan to save the U.S. economy. Some noted specialists refuted such arguments either before these pieces first appeared or responded right after.

Most recently John Mearsheimer, Professor of International Relations from the University of Chicago, published an article on *National Interests* in March 2014 that caused great concerns in Taiwan. In the piece entitled “Say Goodbye to Taiwan,” this theorist best known for his advocating of “Offensive Realism,” argued that the U.S. should view the reunification of Taiwan with Mainland China as inevitable and prepare for this foregone conclusion. Even though his piece was immediately refuted in the same journal just three days later, the events unfolding in Ukraine and Crimea again connected Taiwan to the power politics of the regional hegemons.

If we looked at how the U.S. handled some of the geopolitical issues in the former Soviet Union or even former Yugoslavia, the lack of consistent stance is troubling. For example, the U.S. supported the independence referendum in Kosovo, an autonomous region of Serbia, and overlooked the fact that it was different from the separation of the republics like Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro from former Yugoslavia. The U.S. and its European allies gave formal recognition to Kosovo while Serbia, Russia and China refused to do so.

Then came the Georgia crisis in which two autonomous regions of South Ossetia and

Abkhazia broke away from Georgia and gained de facto independence with the help from Russia. Washington’s lack of punitive actions against Moscow left the impression that the U.S. might be able to impose its will on a smaller state like Serbia but simply could not exert any leverage against a greater power like Russia.

Such a lesson was not learned by pro-European Ukrainians. By ousting a pro-Russian president for the name of “democracy” or “anti-corruption,” they have actually caused grave concerns that this former republic of Soviet Union is being used by the West to contain Russia. Instead of moving into the European Union and NATO, Ukraine has lost its strategic asset of Crimea.

Another lesson we learned from the Ukraine/Crimea crisis is that the U.S. should not condemn other powers to claim their core interests of sphere of influence while maintaining the existence and validity of a dated Monroe Doctrine itself. At the end, Washington simply could not stop Moscow’s gains in the last two crises involving its former republics.

Crimea underwent a referendum requiring to be annexed by Russia. While President Obama and his European allies claimed that this was an illegal move, Putin insisted that the process was in accordance with international law, including Article 11 of the *UN Charter* regarding the principle of self-determination. There was no surprise to Russia’s



Taiwan must learn from the Ukraine crisis and maintain its competitiveness. (Source: rocmp.org)

recognition of the Crimean independence that was approved with more than 96% of the ballot cast and the subsequent annexation. While the U.S. and EU proposed sanctions against Russia, some regions in the eastern part of Ukraine meditate the same path taken by Crimea.

Ukraine's loss of Crimea is not likely to be reversed. The country should concentrate on retaining the eastern part of the country and preventing more secessions and the collapse of territorial integrity. Putin has asserted Russia's sphere of influence in some of the former Soviet republics considered of vital strategic importance to Moscow. The West should contemplate on consolidating the centripetal trend of the existing members of European Union and NATO rather than trying futilely for eastern expansion that would clash with Russia security interests.

If all the U.S. could do in the Ukraine crisis is to "speak loudly but carry a soft stick" and watch Crimea taken by a Russia that is determined to restore its glorious past, what is the lesson to be learned for Taiwan? The challenge of American hegemony by a rising China is at least as serious as that of Russia. Some will argue the threat posed by Beijing is probably greater. If such analogy is applicable to Taiwan, what are the lessons we can learn from this? Let's first look at the similarities of the two.

Despite the similarities between Taiwan and Ukraine, there are also many differences, giving Taiwanese confidence that Ukraine crisis will not be played out here.

First, both Ukraine and Taiwan are economically engaged with a powerful neighbor friendly in trade relations but hostile in political interactions. Both countries are caught between two great powers, European Union and Russia for Ukraine, and the U.S. and China for Taiwan.

Second, both Ukraine and Taiwan are not security allies of the U.S. Kiev aspires to join NATO and Taiwan is excited to be included in the neighboring area of U.S.-Japanese alliance. Both have proclivity towards the West but are not part of the Western camp yet.

Third, Ukraine depends on Russia for its market and the energy supply. China has long replaced the U.S. as Taiwan's biggest export market. Such dependence means any sanction raised by the powerful neighbor is likely to cause huge damage to the economy of the smaller counterpart.

But there are also many differences, giving Taiwanese confidence that the Ukraine crisis will not be played out here. First, the existing of the Taiwan Strait makes it very difficult for the People's Liberation Army to have a quick and effective occupation of the island.

Second, even though there are few people in Taiwan who consider themselves exclusively Chinese and support unification with the mainland, there is very little likelihood that a referendum for unification will be introduced any time soon. Instead, most people on the island support status quo and prefer not to make a decision of cross-Strait political relations now.

Third, Taiwan did experience a scare during the DPP rule when President Chen Shui-bian tried to provoke Beijing to earn some political capital at home. While the U.S. did encourage Kiev to break away from Moscow, its attitude switched from commitment to Taiwan's security in the early years of Bush administration to a restraining force on Chen's move towards independence later. In other words, while supportive of Taiwan because of shared values of freedom and democracy, market economy and respect for basic human rights, the U.S. does not want to see Taipei consider Washington's positive view of Taiwan a carte blanche for defying China.

Finally, while Ukraine is still torn between choosing EU or Russia, Taiwan has been able to maintain a delicate balance between China and the U.S. since President Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008. The KMT government has been able to



achieve political reconciliation and diplomatic truce with the mainland while remains as an important ideological partner of the U.S. In other words, Ma's conciliatory approach toward Beijing and trouble-free attitude in the eyes of Washington have succeeded in reducing tension across the Taiwan Strait.

As to the lessons we learn from the Ukraine crisis, three can be drawn easily. First, big powers usually do not go to war against each other. They may have military confrontation with the smaller countries or even proxies, but no direct conflict is likely to happen. In other words, the U.S. is not likely to fight a war with China on behalf of Taiwan.

Second, if Ukraine falls in Russia's sphere of influence, Taiwan is definitely China's core interests. Geography is fixed. Ukraine made the mistake of trying to leave that sphere of influence. Taiwan should learn the lesson by restraining the separatist sentiment in order to maintain the status quo, which is in the best interests of Taiwanese people.

Finally, Russians in Ukraine reminiscing the good old days of the Soviet Union are likely to support Russia's annexation of Crimea. This is also the fault of the Ukraine government for failing to create an economy and polity that is more attractive

than Russia. Taiwanese will opt for status quo as long as our economy grows at a respective pace and people maintain a better standard of living than the counterparts in the mainland. Maintaining our competitiveness would make it unlikely for the U.S. to abandon Taiwan.

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Taiwan Relations Act: History and Prospects of Security Cooperation between the U.S. and R.O.C.



The 35-year-old *TRA* is a testimony of the long-standing U.S.-R.O.C. relations. (Source: Taiwantoday.tw)

Being the 35th anniversary of the *Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)*, 2014 is a special year. 35 years ago, in 1979, the U.S. and R.O.C. signed the security arrangement, which has now become a solid basis for bilateral military exchanges and serves as a foundation for Asia-Pacific regional peace and stability. For decades, the military cooperation between the U.S. and R.O.C. has been an important background factor, allowing economic growth, peace and prosperity in Asia.

History of U.S.-R.O.C. Military Cooperation

Since the end of WWII, the U.S. has played an important role in ensuring the stability of the Asia-Pacific. From U.S. aid to the R.O.C. during the war against Japan to exchanges and interactions between the two countries at various times, U.S.-R.O.C.

relations have proved able to withstand the test of time.

During the war against Japan, the American military provided training and equipment to the R.O.C. Air Force through organizations such as the American Volunteer Group. The two sides also established the Sino-American Cooperative Organization to conduct missions such as information collection in occupied areas, destruction of enemy resources, and rescue of allied personnel.

After the WWII, the U.S. dispatched the Military Assistance Advisory Group to the R.O.C. in 1951 to assist the R.O.C. Armed Forces with military preparations. In 1954, the two parties signed the *Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty*, which served as the foundation for bilateral military cooperation during that period. In 1979, after the U.S. government severed diplomatic relations with the R.O.C., the U.S. Congress passed the *Taiwan Relations Act* to help the R.O.C. build up its defense capabilities. Until today, the *TRA* has continued to be the main legal basis for the defense exchanges between the two countries.

Reflecting the friendship and treaties between our two nations, the U.S. and the R.O.C. have collectively responded to several crises across the Taiwan Strait. In 1954 and 1955, after the People's Liberation Army (PLA) attacked Kinmen, the American 7th Fleet helped the R.O.C. troops and civilians withdraw from Dachen Island to Taiwan.

During the second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, which is also known as the August 23rd Artillery Bombardment, the U.S. dispatched the 7th Fleet to help the R.O.C. Armed Forces. Not only did the U.S. military carry out amphibious warfare exercises with the R.O.C., it also stationed F-100 fighters in Kinmen and provided the R.O.C. with 8" howitzers.

During the Taiwan Strait missile crisis in 1995 and 1996, Mainland China attempted to sway the R.O.C.'s presidential election with missile tests and amphibious exercises. The U.S. military redeployed two aircraft carrier battle groups in response. The crisis was eventually defused, and the R.O.C. successfully carried out its presidential election.

In addition to military and security cooperation, the U.S. and R.O.C. share the common values of freedom, democracy, and human rights. Moreover, thanks to close cultural and educational exchanges and increasingly frequent visits among officials, U.S.-R.O.C. relations are their strongest and most stable in 30 years.

Because of the lingering hostility between Taipei and Beijing, the R.O.C. Armed Forces have not slackened their military preparations and readiness in the wake of cross-Strait rapprochement.

Changing Cross-Strait Relations, an Unchanging R.O.C. Self-defense Stance

Since President Ma was inaugurated in 2008, the government has maintained its stance of “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” across the Taiwan Strait. In addition, the R.O.C. government has conducted institutional negotiations in accordance with the 1992 consensus of “one China, two interpretations.” For its part, Mainland China has responded with friendly gestures. The two governments are implementing dialogue and cooperation through the Straits Exchange Foundation and Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait, and have signed 21 agreements thus far. The current cross-Strait rapprochement has increased mutual trust between the two parties and greatly reduced tensions, which has been a positive development for the regional security environment.

Moreover, the cross-Strait thaw has also resulted in improvement of R.O.C.'s relations with the U.S. and Japan, as well as expansion of Taipei's participation in international organizations, and these developments have shown the R.O.C. to be a contributor to regional peace and an asset for the international community. The rapprochement with Mainland China has also created positive conditions for R.O.C.'s domestic development and external engagement.

Nevertheless, despite the easing of cross-Strait tension, Mainland China has not yet renounced the use of force against Taiwan. Recent years have witnessed the rapid growth of Mainland China's strength, including increasing military, economic, and diplomatic power. Mainland China's influence in international affairs has put great pressure on the R.O.C. in the political, military, economic, and diplomatic spheres, and its assertive actions have also posed a tremendous threat to regional peace and stability, as well as to the common interests shared by the U.S. and R.O.C.

Militarily, Beijing has continued to deploy missiles against Taiwan, and its various force buildup measures seem aimed at taking Taiwan by force. Because of the lingering hostility between Taipei and Beijing, the R.O.C. Armed Forces have not slackened their military preparations and



R.O.C. representative to the U.S., Mr. Lyu-Shun Shen, holds a banquet to mark the 35th anniversary of the TRA at the Twin Oaks mansion in Washington D.C. (Source: taiwanembassy.org)

readiness in the wake of cross-Strait rapprochement. The R.O.C. Armed Forces are committed to building adequate deterrent power, enhancing self-defense strength, developing innovative/asymmetric capabilities, and promoting volunteer service and a defense transformation.

The R.O.C.'s defense policy aims to build a "Hard ROC" force for the purpose of maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait and stability in the Asia-Pacific. To achieve the military strategy of "resolute defense and credible deterrence," the Ministry of National Defense allocates a reasonable budget to acquire defensive weapons needed to safeguard national security.

Currently, the R.O.C.'s most urgent requirements for arms procurement are a new diesel submarine fleet and next-generation fighters.

Current Development and Future Prospects of U.S.-R.O.C. Security Exchanges

For decades, the R.O.C. has done its utmost to promote regional peace. In contrast, Mainland China's assertive diplomatic behavior and provocative military conduct have seriously threatened regional stability. In view of the fast modernization of the PLA, American support for the R.O.C., such as in the form of arms sales, has been critical to enhancing the nation's defense capabilities. The continuing U.S. sales of advanced defensive weapons to the R.O.C. is helping the nation to maintain the deterrent power needed to prevent Mainland China from initiating a war, and has thereby protected peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific.

The R.O.C. will never embark on an arms race with Mainland China. The weapons we procure from the U.S. are all defensive in nature and reflect our goal of self-defense. However, to



The R.O.C. is committed to building a "Hard ROC" force for national and regional peace and stability. (Source: Military Link Magazine)

hinder R.O.C.'s defense development, Mainland China has continuously interfered with the U.S.-R.O.C. security partnership, protesting against U.S. arms sales to the R.O.C. as well as requesting the U.S. to gradually reduce and eventually stop arms sales. Mainland China's ultimate goal is to increase the military imbalance across the Strait in favor of Beijing and alter the status quo by force. In fact, however, Washington's arms sales to Taipei and cross-Strait détente had best proceeded in parallel. A strong defense can boost the R.O.C.'s confidence in negotiation and engagement with Mainland China, while enhancing cross-Strait stability. Furthermore, should the U.S. give in to Mainland China's wish to curb arms sales to the R.O.C., this would only whet Beijing's appetite, and Beijing would be less likely to adopt accommodating stances on other issues, resulting more harm than good to U.S.-China relations.

The Ministry of National Defense sincerely appreciates the U.S. government's approval of a total of \$12.9 billion in arms sales to the R.O.C. in October 2008 and January 2010. In September 2011, the U.S. also decided to release an F-16A/B retrofit program to the R.O.C. at a total cost of \$5.8 billion. In September 2013, the R.O.C. took delivery of the first of 12 P-3C aircraft from the U.S., and this was followed by the arrival of 6 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters in November 2013 and another 3 P-3C



aircraft in January of this year.

Over the past decade, the R.O.C. has continued to make FMS requests to the U.S. government and allocate an adequate budget for such purchases based on our defense requirements. Currently, our most urgent requirements are a new diesel submarine fleet and next-generation fighters. Submarines are the key to R.O.C. defensive operations and the security of the Taiwan Strait. However, the four submarines the R.O.C. currently possesses are outdated and need to be replaced. The lack of more advanced submarines will seriously weaken our anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which will have an adverse impact on peace in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific. While the U.S. agreed in 2001 to sell the R.O.C. eight diesel submarines through FMS, the plan for this sale is still under review by the U.S. government. The R.O.C. will therefore continue to urge the U.S. to provide us with submarines or assist us to assemble submarines in Taiwan. Whether indigenously-made or procured from foreign countries, the U.S.'s support and assistance are a necessity precondition for the R.O.C.'s submarine plans. Furthermore, with regard to Mainland China's steady development of next-generation fighters, it will be necessary for the R.O.C. to acquire advanced fighters to counter the PLA's threats and maintain an adequate level of air defense capabilities. Our defense budget allows a certain level of flexibility. In the future, should the U.S. approve arms sales to the R.O.C., we will allocate sufficient funds through a special budget or supplementary budget.

The R.O.C.'s Strategic Importance and Democratic Values

The R.O.C. was founded in 1911 as the first democratic republic in Asia. Democracy, freedom and human rights are the core values of the R.O.C. Our political institutions and open society are positive examples for Mainland China, which is currently undergoing rapid economic growth and social development. Our constitutional democracy and social values are assets providing a strong

foundation for the development of soft and smart power. Freedom House has praised the democratic achievements of the R.O.C., noting that they are widely recognized in Southeast Asia. The R.O.C. is not only a democratic country but also a close trading partner to the U.S. A robust U.S.-R.O.C. tie demonstrates American support for our democracy and can boost U.S. allies' confidence.

The R.O.C. plays a vital role in the U.S. alliance structure. Without the R.O.C., there would be a hole in Washington's rebalancing toward Asia and Asia's U.S.-centered security architecture.

The R.O.C. possesses geographical importance and strategic significance. Taiwan is located at the center of the first island chain and can be considered the hinge point of East Asia. Faced with Mainland China's threatening "anti-access/area denial" (A2/AD) capabilities, the R.O.C. has a major role to play in maintaining security in the Western Pacific. Taiwan is situated in the middle of Mainland China's passageway to the Western Pacific and is located in a hub in Asia's U.S.-centered security architecture. Should Mainland China occupy Taiwan, its naval strength would be closer to major sea lines of communication in northeast and southeast Asia, enhancing its capability to remake the military balance in the region and weakening U.S. power projection capabilities. If Taiwan falls under political domination of Mainland China, the regional strategic situation will be adversely impacted, chances of maritime conflict increased, regional arms races aggravated and U.S. security interests threatened.

The R.O.C. is a symbol of democracy, liberty and freedom and plays a vital role in the U.S. alliance structure. Without it., there would be a hole in Washington's rebalancing toward Asia and Asia's U.S.-centered security architecture. If the 21st century is the Asian Century, both the U.S. and R.O.C. have significant roles to play.

The Role of the R.O.C. in the American “Asia-Rebalancing” Policy

A closer U.S.-R.O.C. relationship will underscore U.S. pivot to Asia, consolidate U.S. allies’ confidence, and boost U.S. economic and security interests in the Asia-Pacific.

The Defense Strategic Guidance announced by the American government in January 2012 emphasizes the importance of Asia and proposes to increase military deployment in the region. One of the rationales for the American pivot toward Asia is the need to consolidate its leadership in the Asia-Pacific in response to the rise of Mainland China. Furthermore, to counter the PLA’s A2/AD strategy, the U.S. has developed the “AirSea Battle” concept, to which the R.O.C. can make significant contributions highlighting our geopolitical strategic

importance.

In view of the R.O.C.’s location linking Japan and Southeast Asia, and its close geographical and cultural ties with Mainland China, the R.O.C. can provide the U.S. with intelligence and information assistance. With regard to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) supporting the U.S. AirSea Battle concept, the R.O.C. can deal with cyber-attacks, electromagnetic spectrum threats, and other crises within our exclusive economic zone, including incidents on the ground, in the air, at the sea, and underneath the water. Additionally, the R.O.C. can assist the U.S. with early warning tasks at the initial stages of an Air-Sea Battle.

As for humanitarian assistance, the R.O.C. can conduct search and rescue tasks involving wounded American soldiers or casualties at the sea. Upon receiving an American request, the R.O.C. will start organizing a task force able to arrive promptly at the affected area. We can also offer the U.S. contingency runways for emergency use.

The R.O.C. has accumulated plentiful experience and robust capacity in the area of natural disaster relief. We hope that our existing international disaster relief exchanges can be institutionalized, so that we can better share our experience with regional countries.

In summary, the R.O.C. is located on a strategic fault line. The R.O.C. and U.S. share the common values of democracy and human rights. At a time when the U.S. is adjusting its defense deployment and priorities, a closer U.S.-R.O.C. relationship will underscore America’s pivot to Asia, consolidate U.S. allies’ confidence, and boost U.S. economic and security interests in the Asia-Pacific.



U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator, Gina McCarthy, is the first U.S. cabinet-level official visiting Taiwan in nearly 14 years. (Source: R.O.C. Presidential Office)

Conclusion: Future Prospects of the R.O.C.-U.S. Relationship

The R.O.C.'s security is closely linked with the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and the American security commitment to Asia is a key factor maintaining regional peace. With respect to the long-rooted and solid economic and strategic partnership between the U.S. and R.O.C., as well as their shared belief in democracy, the two countries shall continue to work together to tackle future security challenges and exert a positive influence on regional affairs.

For decades, the R.O.C. is a contributor to regional peace. In the face of maritime disputes in Asia, the R.O.C. insists on responding in a peaceful and rational manner and upholding the principle of “safeguarding sovereignty, shelving disputes, pursuing peace and reciprocity, and promoting joint exploration and development.” In August 2013, President Ma proposed the East China Sea Peace Initiative, calling for all relevant parties to negotiate peacefully and collectively establish an East China Sea Code of Conduct in order to avoid potential conflicts at sea. This proposal has gained widespread praise, including from Japan and the U.S. In addition,



R.O.C.'s C-130 transportation aircraft delivers relief supplies to earthquake-devastated Haiti in 2010. Non-traditional security issues open new opportunities for Taiwan's involvement in regional security cooperation. (Source: taiwanheute.nat.gov.tw)

U.S. support to the R.O.C. will accelerate our military modernization and defense transformation, which can boost our confidence when negotiating with Mainland China.

the Asia-Pacific security situation is complicated and includes not only traditional territorial disputes but also non-traditional security threats. The R.O.C. has utilized its solid economic and technological soft power and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) capacity to fulfill its responsibility as a regional stakeholder. Taking the 2010 Haiti earthquake and 2013 Typhoon Haiyan as examples, the R.O.C. Armed Forces sent multiple sorties of C-130 transport aircraft to carry supplies to disaster-affected areas.

We hope the U.S. will continue to provide defensive weapons and enhance training and software support for the R.O.C. in accordance with the *Taiwan Relations Act* as well as assist us in participating in regional security cooperation such as carrying out multinational HA/DR missions. U.S. support to the R.O.C. will accelerate our military modernization and defense transformation, which can boost our confidence when negotiating with Mainland China. A robust U.S.- R.O.C. relationship is crucial in maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait and enhancing the credibility of the American Asia policy.

Hagel Pushes U.S. Military Ties with China's Neighbor Mongolia

On April 10, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, endorsed stronger military ties with Mongolia as it seeks a U.S. partnership as a counterweight to its powerful neighbors, Russia and Mainland China. Hagel and his Mongolian counterpart, Dashdemberel Bat-Erdene, signed a “joint vision” statement in Ulan Bator, calling for expanding military cooperation through joint training and assistance. “A strong U.S.-Mongolia defense relationship is important as part of the American rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region,” Hagel told a joint press conference. Mongolian



Hagel and Bat-Erdene walk together in a pass-and-review ceremony in Ulan Bator, Mongolia. (Source: U.S. DoD)

troops have been part of the U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, where Ulan Bator now has about 350 troops in its 10th deployment of the war. The U.S. spends about \$2 million a year on military vehicles and communication equipment for Mongolia, along with \$1 million on training of the country’s 10,000 army. Mongolia is Hagel’s final stop on a ten-day Asia tour followed by a three-day visit through Mainland China that was marked by public clashes over Beijing’s territorial disputes with its neighbors and its relations with North Korea. Earlier he attended a meeting of Southeast Asian defense ministers in Hawaii and spent two days in Japan. Throughout his trip, Hagel appealed for a peaceful settlement of territorial disputes that Beijing has with Tokyo in the East China Sea and with the Philippines and other countries in the South China Sea. He also vowed that the U.S. would stand by its military alliance treaties with Japan and the Philippines and said no country should use “coercion” or “intimidation” to try to settle territorial claims.

The R.O.C. Receives Six More Apache Helicopters

Six more AH-64E Apache attack helicopters purchased from the U.S. were being prepped on April 9 to fly to a base in Tainan after arriving in neighboring Kaohsiung the previous evening. The six helicopters are the third shipment in a 30-helicopter package costing Taiwan more than U.S.\$2 billion. With the previously received 12 helicopters, the new ones will later be moved to an Army base in Taoyuan, where all 30 of the Apaches will eventually be stationed. The final 2 shipments of six helicopters each will come with new transmissions already installed. The first is expected in May, followed by the final shipment in July. The model E is the latest in the Apache attack helicopter series. The U.S. and

the R.O.C. are the only two countries to use it so far.



All 30 AH-64Es will be stationed in an Army Aviation base in Taoyuan. (Source: Military Link Magazine)

Japan Fighter Jet Dispatch Highest Since Cold War

Japan dispatched fighter jets more often over the past 12 months than at any time since the Cold War ended, according to government figures, with the sorties mostly aimed at chasing away Mainland China's and Russia's aircraft. Tokyo scrambled fighter jets 810 times in the fiscal year to March, with more than half aimed at Mainland China's planes. Tokyo responded 415 times against Chinese aircraft in the latest fiscal year, up from 306 times in fiscal 2012 and 156 times in fiscal 2011. Mainland Chinese government ships and planes have been seen numerous times near the disputed Daiyutai Islands since Tokyo nationalized some of them in September 2012, which pushed the already chill relations to their lowest level in years. Japanese jets targeted Russian aircraft 359 times in fiscal 2013, up from 248 times a year earlier, the data showed. The neighbors are also



The picture illustrates Japan's F-15J fighter often used to chase away foreign aircraft nearing Japan's airspace. (Source: JASDF)

embroiled in territorial disputes. The tensions have seen Tokyo look to its security alliance with the U.S. and boost ties with India, as well as Southeast Asian nations locked in their own territorial rows with Beijing over much of the South China Sea.

R.O.C. President Calls for U.S. Assistance to Build Submarines



R.O.C. Navy's two outmoded Guppy II submarines are in dire need of replacement. (Source: navy.mnd.gov.tw)

President Ma Ying-jeou on April 9 urged the U.S. to help Taiwan build diesel-electric submarines to strengthen the nation's defense capabilities. Ma said at a video conference hosted by a Washington-based think tank, when asked about Taiwan's weapons procurement plans. The one-hour

conference hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was attended by several American experts and scholars. It was held on the eve of the 35th anniversary of the *Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)*, a key basis for the development of ties between Taipei and Washington. The *TRA* was enacted on April 10, 1979, to maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the U.S. and Taiwan, after Washington switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The statute pledges to help ensure peace, security and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the U.S. It also obliges the U.S. "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character." In the teleconference, Ma pledged to build a small but strong military force, urging the U.S. to provide the nation with necessary weaponry while promising to be a responsible stakeholder in the region.

Current Security Situations in the Asia-Pacific Region and the Role of the Republic of China


On 4 March, the Republic of China's Vice Minister of National Defence, Andrew Li-Yan Hsia, attended a seminar on "Peace and Security in Asia Pacific" in the European Parliament.

As the main speaker of the panel entitled "Regional Security in East Asia", Vice Minister Hsia expressed his opinions on the R.O.C.'s role in advancing the peace process in the Asia-Pacific. According to Hsia, R.O.C. President Ma Ying-jeou's East China Sea Peace Initiative shows that Taiwan is willing to resolve disputes in a peaceful way and encourage other parties involved to exercise restraint and to engage in meaningful dialogues.

Since the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been negotiating the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea for more than ten years without results, Hsia said that in order to obtain tangible outcomes, the R.O.C. should be allowed to join the negotiations. This is especially true as Taiwan holds Taiping Island, the biggest island in the South China Sea. The main points of Mr. Hsia's speech are summarized in the following.

Factors Affecting Regional Security Situations

Behavior of a country is one of the major driving forces shaping the security situations in a region. In the case of the Asia-Pacific region, it means Mainland China, Japan, South and North Korea, ASEAN members, and the United States, which owns important interests in the region. Among all, Mainland China attracts most of the attentions. Driven by its economic growth, Mainland China has seen a surge in its national power and confidence, thus lending it the momentum to expand its so-called "core interests," which it says will guard with armed force if necessary. Taiwan is regarded by Mainland



Vice Minister Hsia speaks on the latest situations in the Asia-Pacific and the R.O.C.'s contributions and role.

China as one of such interests. Though the relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have developed positively recently, and the situation here is comparatively stable, Mainland China has never renounced the use of force as an option against the R.O.C. There are currently over a thousand missiles aimed at Taiwan by Mainland China, and most of its military preparations and exercise scenarios still hold it a primary goal to rapidly invade Taiwan and impede external involvement in conflicts in the Taiwan Strait. Besides military threats, Mainland China also tries to confuse R.O.C. citizens' threat awareness and public opinions with psychological means and the media. In the meantime, it is using its interpretation of international law and laws of war to legitimize and justify a possible war against Taiwan. The means adopted by Mainland China to impose security threats on the R.O.C. have become more diverse.



In addition, challenges from Mainland China to the regional security have gone beyond Taiwan Strait and expanded to the entire Asia-Pacific region. To ensure its “core interests” that are expanding outwards, Mainland China is actively modernizing its military. Over the past two years, under the name that the sovereignty over the East and South China Seas involve in its national security and territorial integrity, Mainland China has been emphasizing its “de jure governance” of the areas concerned and continuing to dispatch ships and aircraft to patrol in these areas, trying to demonstrate its “de facto governance.” For the East China Sea, ships and aircraft from Mainland China and Japan have repeatedly run into and confronted each other, which not only hurts the R.O.C.’s sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands but also intensifies the regional situations. Moreover, Mainland China unilaterally established its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) above the East China Sea on last November 23, requiring all aircraft entering into the zone to provide several identification methods and stating that its armed force would take “defensive emergency measure” to respond to aircraft that do not comply. Given that its ADIZ is a part of the international airspace and any aircraft is entitled to the right of free access into the zone, Mainland China’s requirement does not hold in international law. Its statement of having “armed force” take relevant measures further shows that Mainland China is a major factor threatening the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region.

In September, 2012, Japan unilaterally nationalized three islets of the Diaoyutai Islands, thus infringing the R.O.C.’s sovereignty integrity and disrespecting the fact that the Diaoyutai Islands are a part of our inherent territories. Japan’s conduct has also agitated Mainland China and stimulated the already tense Sino – Japan relations. Issues in the Korean Peninsula are another source of instability for the region. North Korea’s persistence of developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and its barrage of provocative rhetoric to the U.S. and South Korea has an effect in the security of surrounding

countries. Since his coming into power, Kim Jong-un is becoming more assertive in terms of his military and foreign policies. Not only did he order two test launches of rockets that could be used as long-range missiles under the banner of developing satellite technologies, he also ordered North Korea’s third nuclear test in February, 2013, which incurred condemnation from the world.

Non-traditional security threats are not less severe than traditional military challenges imposed by the aforementioned countries. Over the past few years, the non-traditional security threat that affected the region the most are natural disasters, such as the 2004 South Asia tsunami, the 2009 Typhoon Morakot that devastated Taiwan, the 2011 East Japan Earthquake, and the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan that made havoc of the Philippines and Palau. On top of that, maritime security and nuclear proliferation are also great threats to regional security. The influence of these non-traditional security issues goes beyond borders and requires all countries to cooperate and fulfill their responsibilities.

It is thus clear from the aforementioned situations that the diverse security threats faced with the Asia-Pacific region involve all regional members. All shall communicate rationally and restrain themselves to be able to start cooperating.



Vice Minister Hsia is the first governmental official from the Republic of China to deliver a keynote speech in the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium.

The Republic of China's Contributions to Regional Security

(I) Propose East China Sea Peace Initiative and Advocate Dialogues and Cooperation

On August 5, 2012, in light of disputes over the Diaoyutai Islands in the East China Sea, President Ma proposed the East China Sea Peace Initiative. By upholding the R.O.C.'s longstanding stance in the Diaoyutai issues, which are "safeguarding sovereignty, shelving disputes, pursuing peace and reciprocity, and promoting joint exploration and development," this initiative appeals to countries concerned to :

1. Demonstrate restraint and avoid escalating confrontational acts;
2. Shelve controversies and not abandon dialogues;
3. Respect international law and deal with disputes through peaceful means;
4. Seek consensus and draft an East China Sea Code of Conduct; and
5. Establish a mechanism for cooperation on exploring and developing resources in the East China Sea.

The five points include in them a couple of keywords, which are dialogue, peace, and international law. As mentioned earlier, the unrest in the Asia-Pacific region origins from a lack of effective dialogues and communication. The prerequisite for effective dialogues and communication is to include all countries involved in the circle of discussion. There is currently an absence of such a platform for East China Sea issues to allow Mainland China, the R.O.C., and Japan to communicate. Hence, after proposing the East China Sea Peace Initiative, President Ma presented an action plan, which advocates all three parties to start with "three parallel tracks of bilateral dialogues" and move there

toward "one track of trilateral negotiations." "Three parallel tracks of bilateral dialogues" means "R.O.C. – Japan dialogue," "cross-Strait dialogue," and "Sino – Japan dialogue," and "one track of trilateral negotiations" refers to a trilateral negotiation among the R.O.C., Japan, and Mainland China. Following the proposal of the East China Sea Peace Initiative and the action plan, the R.O.C. and Japan signed the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement, with which the two sides shelved sovereignty disputes and reached a consensus in terms of sharing fishing resources in waters around the Diaoyutai Island. After 17 rounds of talks in 17 years, the fisheries negotiation between the R.O.C. and Japan finally bore fruit. Such a peaceful resolution to disputes is in line with the requirements of international law and the *UN Charter*, proving that the East China Sea Peace Initiative is not an empty talk. If it and its action plan can be fully realized, it will help to make the East China Sea "a sea of pace and cooperation."

In the South China Sea, ASEAN's position as a platform leading relevant dialogues and communication is almost confirmed. However, this platform has two drawbacks. First, with some of its members influenced by coercion or lured by benefits from certain country and all of them considering



Vice Minister Hsia with Mr. Krzysztof Lisek, the vice chairman of European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defense, who hosted the panel in which Hsia gave a speech.



only their own interests, ASEAN is thus far unable to reach a consensus on relevant issues. As a result, over a decade has passed since the Declaration of Conduct (DOC) in the South China Sea was agreed in 2002, and no legally binding Code of Conduct (COC) is signed. This makes ASEAN's credibility in the South China Sea being questioned. Second, the R.O.C. is absent from this platform. The R.O.C. literally controls Taiping Island, the largest island in the Spratly Islands, as well as the Pratas Island. There are currently R.O.C. coast guard personnel stationed on the two islands to safeguard the islands and neighboring waters during peacetime. This not only demonstrates the R.O.C.'s de facto management but also our determination to ensure maritime safety in the areas. Therefore, the R.O.C. should not and must not be excluded from the circle of discussion on South China Sea issues. If the R.O.C. participates in relevant talks and infuses the essence of the East China Sea Peace Initiative – namely “dialogue, peace, and international law” – into the talks, it will be helpful to a peaceful resolution to South China Sea disputes.

(II) Participate in HA/DR Nuclear Non-proliferation Efforts

In addition to a peaceful proposal, the R.O.C. has made many specific contributions to the region in terms of non-traditional security threats. In the area of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), the R.O.C. air force dispatched three sorties of C-130 transport aircraft with relief materials to fly via Singapore to Indonesia in the 2004 South Asia tsunami. In 2010, after a huge earthquake hit Haiti, the R.O.C. air force sent a C-130 with relief materials to Haiti's neighbor, the Dominican Republic, before carrying the materials to the affected areas by land transportation. In 2013, when the Philippines was devastated by Typhoon Haiyan, the R.O.C. put aside the unpleasant experience from the tragic shooting of our fishermen by the Philippines and sent up to 18 sorties of C-130 to carry relief materials to the country. The R.O.C. Navy sent a tank landing

ship and a frigate with relief aid to Cebu Harbor. The R.O.C. also reached out a hand of help to Palau, which was also hit by the typhoon, thus demonstrating the spirit of HA/DR. With our armed forces' and civilian agencies' experiences in HA/DR, the R.O.C. will play a greater role in improving the region's HA/DR capabilities, if it can participate in relevant exercises and exchanges in the region.

Promoting Volunteer System and Establish a Small but Credible R.O.C. Armed Force

The R.O.C. is located in an important military strategic position in the Western Pacific Ocean. Strengthening our defense will not only ensure our national security but benefit the strategic arrangement of Japan, South Korea, and the U.S., which will therefore increase regional security. The R.O.C.'s military strategy is “resolute defense, credible deterrence,” meaning that the R.O.C. Armed Forces adopt a defensive posture. We will not initiate a war, and our military development and arms procurement are carried out following the principle of a defensive defense. Only when the enemy insists in invading us and a war is inevitable will we carry out homeland defense operations to protect the country.

To further reinforcing our defense, the R.O.C. is now proceeding with a defense transformation. In addition to measures such as reorganization, building modernized force, and improving the utilization of defense resources, the most important step is to transform our military service system into a volunteer system while maintaining the constitutional obligation of military service. It aims not only to align with the government's financial planning and to respond to a shorter conscription service time and the declining birth rate; rather, its ultimate goal is to attract quality talent to join the military and build a “small but superb, small but strong, small but smart” elite force by means of consolidating military preparation and training as well as improving combatants' skills.

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