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The ROC's Indigenous Defense Policy and Achievements

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The MND's Efforts to Enhance Indigenous Defense Production

Situated at a key position along the first island chain of the western Asia-Pacific region, the Republic of China (ROC) shoulders responsibility for its own security as well as for the stability of the region. As one of the efforts to build a HARD ROC defense capability to fulfill this responsibility, in addition to continuing the process of defense transformation and the establishment of a volunteer system, the ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) also invests a considerable amount of resources in indigenous defense production, and has made remarkable progress in this regard.

In compliance with Article 22 of the *National Defense Act*, the MND upholds the principle of prioritizing indigenous defense production before considering foreign procurement of any necessary weapon systems. It also strives to develop key technologies both on its own and in cooperation with other countries. In the case of advanced defensive weapon systems that cannot be produced domestically, the MND resorts to foreign procurement as it continues to build modern armed forces that meets its defense requirements.

In the case of key defense technologies and weapon systems that are high-tech, sensitive, and not easily acquired from other countries, the MND allocates an R&D budget and acquires defense technology resources from the industrial, official, academic and research sectors to ensure the success and cost-effectiveness of self-



HF-III supersonic anti-ship missile is an important countermeasure against invading enemy warships. This picture shows one of the test flights of the indigenously-made missile. (Source: CSIST)

developed weapon systems. Numerous weapon system projects have been scheduled for the following years, and the focus is on developing “innovative/asymmetric” capabilities that are low cost, highly effective, and easy to acquire.

The MND has already demonstrated its indigenous defense production capabilities through several self-developed weapon systems. In the field of aviation and air defense, it has upgraded its IDFs (indigenous defense fighters), developed an assortment of UASs (unmanned aerial systems), and built the Tien Kung III missile systems for both air and missile defense purposes. In the case of sea control, it has constructed the Kuang Hua VI stealth fast attack craft, the first Hsun Hai stealth corvette with a catamaran design, a multi-purpose AOE (fast combat support ship), Hsiung Feng III supersonic anti-ship missiles, and smart mines. There are also plans to develop support vessels including amphibious ships and minesweepers. The MND is also looking for technical support in the construction of new diesel-electric submarines in Taiwan (for details of the indigenous submarine program, see Volume 4 Issue 4 of the *Defense Security Brief*). To better defend the homeland, the MND has deployed LT-2000 multiple rocket launchers, Cloud Leopard 8x8 wheeled armored vehicles, and a new type of anti-armor rocket. As a defensive countermeasure, it has also deployed Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missiles and Wan Chien joint stand-off weapons (JSOW), which are similar to the US-made AGM-154.

Thanks to sound indigenous defense policies, the efforts of researchers at the National Chungshan Institute of Science & Technology (CSIST), and effective utilization of R&D capacity in the private sector, the MND has been able to successfully develop and deploy numerous types of weapon systems to satisfy its defense requirements. Moreover, through defense outsourcing and the transfer of dual-use technologies, the MND has also nurtured the defense industry in the private sector, which has benefited both the military and civilian society.



The Cloud Leopard wheeled armored vehicle, with sound protection ability, firepower, and maneuverability, has entered into mass production. (Source: Shu Hsiao-huang, ODS staff)



Taiwan's Naval Role in the US Rebalance to Asia

Ian Easton

The Asia-Pacific region is of vital and growing importance for American foreign policy. The Obama Administration recognized this and announced a national “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia in 2011. However, Washington has been slow to fill-in the details of its new strategy. This is disappointing, but it should not be surprising. Large bureaucracies are rarely adept at keeping up with rapidly changing events. Part of the problem is the lack of a consensus and the time it takes leadership circles to build one. Part of the problem is the lack of expertise. After decades of intense focus on Europe, Russia and the Middle East, many American foreign policy elites simply don't understand Asia and find the learning curve steep. Complicating matters, the past few years have witnessed a series of crises, both at home and abroad, that have caught the government and public by surprise. From sequestration and the government shutdown to ISIS and Ebola, unforeseen events have shattered the concentrations of many American decision makers, robbing them of the time needed to conduct long-term strategic thinking.

Perhaps as a result, too little thought has gone into the key role that the United States' Asian allies and security partners could play in making the rebalance a success. Many governments in Asia now view Washington's much anticipated rebalance strategy as more aspirational than real. How can there be a true regional strategy, they ask, if it does not include us? This situation is concerning because so much is at stake. Mainland China* is engaged in an ambitious national armament program, and is pursuing muscular foreign policies that show its emergence as a major military power will come

with attempts to shift power balances. This is not conducive to peace and stability. Historically, power balances that are not carefully measured and maintained have a strong tendency to result in war. The US needs to get its rebalance strategy right, and that means working more closely with allies and friends.

A comprehensive strategy for Asia begins with the region's geography and politics, which directly influence the trends we see unfolding today. Once the geostrategic contours of the region are mapped out, it quickly becomes clear that the Republic of China on Taiwan may be the single most underappreciated asset that the US has for the rebalance. Indeed, Taiwan's strategic location in the heart of East Asia and the Western Pacific gives it an importance that far exceeds its population and geographic size. Moreover, Taiwan is a like-minded democracy, making it a natural partner for the US government. Some Americans view Taiwan as a strategic liability or a “troublemaker” who gets in the way of better US-China relations. They are wrong. Taiwan is a responsible and worthy ally, and one that contributes tremendously to the American goals of establishing a peaceful, prosperous, rules-based order in Asia.

Recent examples of Taiwan's contributions abound. For starters, President Ma Ying-jeou's *East China Sea Peace Initiative* and the subsequent fisheries agreement with Japan in April 2013 represent landmark achievements in regional maritime diplomacy. When Typhoon Haiyan devastated parts of the Philippines in November 2013, it was Taiwan that was first to respond with

* To prevent confusion and for reading convenience, in this article, the Republic of China (ROC) is referred to as “Taiwan,” while Mainland China is referred to as “China.”

boots-on-the-ground humanitarian aid. Taiwan has also worked hard to reduce cross-Strait tensions. After years of steady progress, Taiwan sent an official emissary to Nanjing in March 2014 for its first ever government-to-government summit with China. This relieves the world of its most dangerous flash point—at least temporarily.

Unfortunately, there is little chance that Taiwan's diplomatic gestures of neighborly goodwill will be able to correct Asia's perilous course toward instability. The main problem is China, whose rapid military build-up is fast eroding the defensive positions of numerous states around its periphery, including Taiwan. Beijing has made it clear that the principal long-term objective of its military is attaining the ability to apply overwhelming force against Taiwan during a conflict, and in a manner that would keep American forces out. In the meantime, China is engaging in military and paramilitary operations in the East China Sea and the Philippine Sea to undermine the US-Japan and US-Korea alliances; and it is working along similar lines in the South China Sea as part of its Taiwan policy.

Why do Chinese political and military actions focus so intensely on Taiwan? Because China's authoritarian leadership is deeply insecure. Beijing views Taiwan, which exists as a free and independent sovereign state, to be a grave threat to the communist party's totalitarian grip on power. China refuses to give up the use of force to settle disputes, and its military posturing remains aggressive despite the relative thaw in cross-Strait relations. Recently, for example, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) launched ballistic missiles against mock-up targets resembling homes in a residential district of Taipei. And, on August 25, 2014, PLA intelligence gathering aircraft intruded into the southwestern part of Taiwan's air defense identification zone (ADIZ) four times in a single day. While events in the East and South China Seas distract public attention, China continues to aim its most menacing military activities at Taiwan.

Given the trends, it is time for American

policymakers and strategists to ask: What are Taiwan's self-defense capabilities and how might they help the US prevent or if necessary defeat a Chinese attack? What is the ability of Taiwan to assist American forces during coalition operations? What more can be done? This article provides a brief assessment of Taiwan's defense capabilities and potential role in the US rebalance to Asia. In particular, it will focus on what Taiwan can contribute in the maritime domain and what Washington should do to improve naval coordination with Taipei.

Taiwan has been focusing on improving its military capabilities in maritime domain awareness, sea denial, and air and missile defense. These self-defense capabilities do more than just enhance Taiwan's security; they make it an indispensable partner for the US Navy.

Taiwan's Evolving Maritime Defense Capabilities

Taiwan is an island trading nation that is dependent on the sea for its security and prosperity. To defend itself, Taiwan has been investing heavily in capabilities intended to ensure that China is not able to execute an amphibious assault or blockade against its beaches and ports. This is no easy task. Taiwan faces a Chinese adversary that is close to its territory and equipped with dozens of attack submarines and surface ships; hundreds of strike aircraft, armed drones and cruise missiles; thousands of ballistic missiles; tens of thousands of sea mines; and hundreds of thousands of amphibiously-oriented troops. What's worse, the PLA has an offensive first strike doctrine.

Taiwan's response to its maritime defense challenges, which are arguably the most stressful



All of the ROCN's major warships, such as the Keelung-class destroyer in this picture, serve as an important component in the maritime awareness. (Source: Shu Hsiao-huang, ODS staff)

in the world, has been remarkably thoughtful. Instead of attempting a wasteful naval arms race with China, Taiwan has concluded that, despite the considerable differences in national defense resources available, it can continue to maintain a relatively favorable balance against China if it invests wisely. Taiwan's strategists have carefully studied areas where they have comparative advantages. The principal self-defense advantages Taiwan has are its favorable geography, its professional military, and its singularity of purpose.

As a status quo state that is content with its existing territorial borders, Taiwan can deter conflict simply by convincing China's leadership that the costs of any fight would outweigh the hope for benefits. Taiwan's strong relationship with America gives it a powerful advantage in this regard. While not technically a mutual defense treaty, the *Taiwan Relations Act* (Public Law 96-8) makes it clear that the American military would intervene in the event of Chinese aggression against Taiwan.

To further advance its comparative advantages, Taiwan has been focusing on improving its military capabilities in several key areas. Here we will discuss three: maritime domain awareness, sea denial, and air and missile defense. These self-defense capabilities do more than just enhance Taiwan's security; they make it an indispensable partner for the US Navy.

Maritime Domain Awareness

Taiwan's political and military leaders understand that knowledge of Chinese forces, plans and intentions alone may not be enough to deter war or win a campaign, but it could play a decisive part. Maritime domain awareness, a more comprehensive form of naval intelligence, plays a critically important role in the defense of Taiwan. Related capabilities include a large number of advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. These give Taiwan the ability to track Chinese fleets above, on, and under the surface of its surrounding seas. Taiwan has invested heavily in surface scanning, over-the-horizon, and ultra-high frequency surveillance radars. These work with Taiwanese sonar arrays, listening posts, satellites, early-warning planes, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, cyber units and human agents to monitor Chinese naval activities. Like governments everywhere, Taipei places a premium on vigilance to avoid strategic and operational-level surprise, and the severe naval challenges facing Taiwan greatly heighten the importance of information.

Taiwan's ability to integrate all sources of information gives it a critical advantage. Taiwan's naval maritime domain awareness capabilities have been traditionally unified by its indigenous Ta Cheng command, control, communications, and intelligence network. This high-tech system lets commanders share a common operational picture. First established in the early 1980s, and continually upgraded since, Taiwan's maritime domain awareness architecture is centered at the ROC Navy Headquarters' Combat Operations Center in Taipei. The system's powerful computers receive and process a vast quantity of naval data to produce an integrated picture of the sea area around Taiwan, including the Taiwan Strait and the Chinese coastline. It can operate both independently and jointly with air force, army, and coast guard systems, which together form a national defense information system. This system is centered at the

Tri-Service Command Center, a massive tunnel complex in Taipei near the ROC Navy Headquarters building. According to PLA assessments, Taiwan's maritime domain awareness system has many backups, making it a daunting target. In a war, Taiwan's maritime domain awareness capabilities would be an invaluable source of intelligence for the US Pacific Command in Hawaii.

Sea Denial

Taiwan's navy, ROCN, recognizes that it does not have the resources to match the PLA Navy ship-for-ship or submarine-for-submarine. However, that does not mean Taiwan is losing control over its surrounding waters. To the contrary, Taiwan is using a long-range, missile-centric strategy to ensure that it can deny any Chinese naval fleet access to its territorial waters. The strategy works because Taiwan has home-built the advanced systems needed to see and strike an invasion force from great distances. It also works because Taiwan has decided it would not wait for Chinese troop transport ships to get close to its beaches before it began to sink them.

According to Taiwan's contingency plans, a counter-amphibious operation would likely involve lethal strikes on PLA units at their coastal embarkation points. These strikes would grow in intensity as Chinese ships crossed the Taiwan Strait centerline, and the battle would crescendo decisively 20-30 kilometers away from Taiwan's coast, if not before. In its annual Han Kuang exercises in 2013, Taiwan's military publically demonstrated how it would defend against a Chinese invasion. During the drill, a highly coordinated joint force unleashed a spectacular series of missiles, rockets, artillery, mines, decoys and electronic jammers at a simulated Chinese invasion fleet. As a result, not a single "red team" naval infantryman made it to shore. Taiwan knows that only by refusing to cede the initiative can it keep its heavily populated northwestern coastline from becoming a future battlefield.

In support of its sea denial strategy, Taiwan has developed and acquired land-attack cruise missiles,

which are capable of reaching all the Chinese naval bases from Shanghai to Guangzhou. Taiwan's air force, ROCAF, has begun equipping itself with stealthy glide bombs that can soar hundreds of kilometers into denied airspace to rain penetrating sub-munitions down on targets. Taiwan has further bolstered its coastal defenses by developing supersonic anti-ship missiles. These are deployed in mountainside bunkers, on mobile truck launchers, and aboard surface ships and fast attack boats.

Finally, in case all else fails, Taiwan's army has hundreds of mobile rocket launchers and self-propelled artillery that can "sanitize" large swaths of sea space with guided munitions and shotgun-like projectiles filled with tens of thousands of ball bearings. By creating no-go zones around its critical sea lines of communication, Taiwan can break through any potential Chinese invasion or blockade attempt. Many of the same capabilities would be useful for the US in protecting Okinawa and the Philippines from possible Chinese naval assaults. Taiwan's only major naval weakness is its lack of new submarines. Fortunately, after years of research and development work, Taiwan's government has announced it will soon start building them.

Air and Missile Defense

To make sure China cannot defeat its navy from the air, Taiwan is working with the US to construct the most resilient air and missile defense system



UAVs, such as the Rui Yuan in this picture, also play a critical role in Taiwan's overall maritime awareness and air defense. (Source: Shu Hsiao-huang, ODS staff)



in the world. Taiwan's air and missile defenses protect its critical maritime defense infrastructure, including its naval bases and civilian port facilities. Air surveillance and early-warning is provided by a dense network of radars that are located on mountain peaks to extend their range of view. Taiwan has also built ballistic missile defense (BMD) radars into hardened bunkers or made them mobile to increase their odds of surviving PLA surprise attacks. In 2012, Taiwan introduced a revolutionary new radar into its early-warning system. Known as the Surveillance Radar Program (SRP), this enormous radar is capable of tracking stealth aircraft and cruise missiles in addition to ballistic missiles. Theoretically, the SRP can also track Chinese naval satellites and ships at sea. Taiwan now has the most powerful ground-based radar system ever built, and, with the right software upgrades, it could soon operate at even greater capacity.

In response to China's ballistic missile build-up, Taiwan is investing heavily in BMD missile systems in addition to radars. Taiwan is also improving its air defense systems for countering saturation attacks by cruise missiles, manned aircraft, and UAVs. Taiwan's armed forces currently have three Patriot missile batteries around Taipei, and will soon get seven more for overlapping coverage of central and southern Taiwan. Even more importantly, Taiwan has developed a cutting-edge BMD missile system called the TK-3, and plans to deploy at least 12 new batteries. Taiwan's indigenous missile defenses are comparable to Patriot systems in terms of capability, but more cost effective to buy, maintain, and upgrade. Taiwan also has long-range air defense missile batteries deployed on its outer islands, giving it the ability to shoot at Chinese fighters as soon as they take off from coastal airbases.

ROCN is an important player in Taiwan's air and missile defense system. Taiwan has four guided missile destroyers that are armed with American-made SM-2 air defense missiles. In addition, ROCN has eight guided missile frigates that are armed with SM-1 air defense missiles. Taiwan plans to develop ships with Aegis-like radars and sea-based SM-3

BMD missile capabilities. With China fielding anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) for targeting American aircraft carrier groups in the Western Pacific, Taiwan's defense investments are good news for the US. Chinese ASBMs would have to go through Taiwan's airspace on the way to their targets. With the right combination of high-powered BMD radars and interceptors, Taiwan's military can serve as a shield to help protect deployed American naval task forces during a contingency.

Taiwan has a critical role to play in the maritime component of the US rebalance to Asia. By working together with allies and partners like Taiwan, the US can improve its response to a growing number of potential natural and man-made disasters in Asia.

Policy Recommendations

Taiwan has a critical role to play in the maritime component of the US rebalance to Asia. As a capable naval partner, Taiwan can provide the Pacific Command with intelligence and early-warning information. Taiwan's maritime domain awareness capabilities can be linked with US Navy systems to form a common operational picture. In addition, Taipei can contribute to international efforts in response to natural disasters and humanitarian crises. Given the increasingly unstable regional environment, it is imperative that like-minded maritime states with shared defense interests continue to advance their ability to work together as coalition partners. By working together with allies and partners like Taiwan, the US can improve its response to a growing number of potential natural and man-made disasters in Asia.

The US and Taiwan have a strong defense and security relationship overall, but the relationship is

weak in the naval area. Much more can and should be done. First, the two navies should aim to share their respective maritime domain awareness information. This would allow them to seamlessly work together as coalition partners during a crisis. While shared digital data links are in place, serious human “software” challenges persist. These challenges can only be surmounted through improved government-to-government, military-to-military, and people-to-people contacts. In this regard, Washington bureaucrats should stop isolating Taiwan from bilateral and multilateral exercises in order to appease or “reassure” China. Such a policy, in effect, undermines American maritime security interests in Asia. US Navy ships should visit Taiwanese ports, and the Pentagon should invite Taiwan to the next Rim of the Pacific Exercise in 2016. The stakes are too high for Washington to continue policy behavior that diminishes the Pacific Command’s ability to work with democratic allies.

It is well known that the US has plans for fighting alongside Taiwan in the event that known contingencies occur. To ensure that these plans could be successfully executed, admirals at the two-star rank and above should regularly visit counterparts in Taiwan and learn about the Western Pacific battle space firsthand. Nobody understands the local landscape better than Taiwan. As a further means of building trust and interoperability, the Pacific Command should expand and deepen its military exchanges with Taiwan as part of the rebalance to Asia. Taiwan should be a hub for training personnel in the Chinese language and culture. Taiwan’s National Defense University and other professional military education institutions should be leveraged by American naval officers and civilians studying regional maritime security affairs.

Next, the US government should ensure that Taiwan’s most advanced early-warning radar, the SRP, has software properly enabled so that it has a maritime, air and space tracking capability. This would allow Taiwan to contribute to the shared monitoring of Chinese warships, space debris, and naval ocean surveillance satellites. In addition,

the US Navy should strengthen its relationship with Taiwan in the area of integrated undersea surveillance systems. A joint seabed sonar system could be a key component of an all-hazards situational awareness network in the Western Pacific to monitor earthquakes, tsunamis, illegal-trafficking, adversary surface ships, and submarines.

Finally, Washington should let Taiwan know it intends to approve licensing for American industrial participation in Taiwan’s indigenous defense submarine program. Taiwan has an urgent requirement for new submarines that can conduct anti-surface and anti-submarine operations. Submarines are also a critical part of an integrated intelligence architecture. The strategic benefits of new diesel-electric submarines and the range of missions they could undertake as part of coalition operations, merit full US support for Taiwan’s new submarine program.

Conclusion

There is no way to know if China will attack Taiwan in the coming years. What is certain is that a better defended Taiwan is much less likely to become a target. If Taipei is strong enough, no rational leader in Beijing would attempt to settle sovereignty disputes by force. Taiwan’s maritime defense capabilities, especially in intelligence, sea denial, and air and missile defense, significantly reduce the possibility of a cross-Strait conflict. By enhancing its self-defense capabilities, Taiwan contributes to improved regional stability and supports American security interests in Asia. Going forward, the US needs to make significant improvements in its naval coordination with Taiwan as part of the rebalance to Asia. Doing so will help keep the region peaceful and prosperous for decades to come.

*Ian Easton is a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute. This article builds on his co-authored study with Randall Schriver, *Standing Watch: Taiwan Maritime Domain Awareness in the Western Pacific* (Project 2049 Institute, December 2014).*



A Look at the Current Situation in the South China Sea

Chang Li-te & Yang Ya-chi

For about six months after the serious confrontation in the Paracel Islands from May to July, 2014, between Mainland China and Vietnam over the HD-981 deep-water drilling rig, there have not been major conflicts in the South China Sea. Beneath the seemingly calm surface, however, the strategic moves of both claimants and external powers are still in motion, and may have great impact on future development of the situation in the South China Sea. This article focuses on Mainland China's two-handed approaches in dealing with South China Sea issues.

Mainland China's strategy of using both stick and carrot is expected to impose strong constraints on and offer significant inducements to countries in the South China Sea .

Mainland China's Two-handed Approaches

Mainland China has adopted both hard and soft approaches in response to South China Sea issues. In terms of its tougher approach, since 2014, Mainland China has been expanding reefs under its control, including the Fiery Cross Reef and Johnson South Reef in the Spratlys. In particular, after extensive reclamation efforts, the Fiery Cross Reef now covers an area of 0.96 square kilometers, thus besting the Taiping Island (0.49 square kilometers) as the biggest island in the Spratlys. As reclamation continues, its area may eventually grow to twice its current size. In the future, Mainland China is very likely to build an airstrip for heavy fighters and a port for large

vessels on what is now the Fiery Cross "Island." In addition, Mainland China has extended the airstrip on the Woody Island in the Paracel Islands to about 400 meters, which allows it to accommodate heavy fighters, and makes it comparable with the runways of the PLA's Lingshui Air Force Base in Hainan Province. A port is also built on the Woody Island to accommodate large vessels. All these measures are helping to consolidate Mainland China's projection of naval and air power in the South China Sea, as well as its control of islands and reefs in these waters. Some believe that after completing its reclamation in the area, Mainland China will announce the establishment of a "South China Sea ADIZ."

Mainland China's softer approach included the vigorous promotion of the One Belt One Road (Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road) Initiative proposed by the Chinese leader Xi Jinping, the proposal of the establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with reserves of USD 100 billion, and the provision of USD 40 billion for the Silk Road Fund. Moreover, as a countermeasure to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) proposed by the United States, Mainland China is advocating its Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India and Mainland China itself. At the 2014 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, Mainland China took the further step of proposing the establishment of the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). All these economic incentives appeal to countries in the Central, South and Southeast Asia. Mainland China's strategy of using both stick and carrot is

expected to impose strong constraints on and offer significant inducements to countries in the South China Sea.

The US May Be Distracted from South China Sea Issues

In face of Mainland China's expansion in the South China Sea, Michael Fuchs, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, proposed three suggestions for curbing provocative actions in the region during his speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He called on all claimants not to establish new outposts or seize features that another claimant has occupied since before the November 2002 Declaration on Conduct was signed, not to carry out alterations (except for routine maintenance operations) that fundamentally change the nature, size, or capabilities of islands and reefs, and refrain from unilateral enforcement measures against other claimants' long-standing economic activities that have been taking place in disputed areas. Despite the sound nature of these suggestions, very few countries have explicitly conveyed supports, and Mainland China has bluntly expressed strong opposition.

Furthermore, the US has recently had its hands full due to crises associated with situations in Ukraine, the Ebola epidemic and the Islamic State (IS), and may therefore be left with no leisure

to attend to South China Sea issues in the short run. However, what the US can do in the region is continuing its cooperation with countries such as the Philippines, Singapore and Australia, as well as promoting the TPP as a counterweight to wealthy Mainland China by offering economic and trade incentives in the Asia-Pacific.

Impact of International Arbitration on Mainland China Remains Doubtful

To settle sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea via international arbitration, the Philippines has submitted the matters to an Arbitral Tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague. This process is expected to be completed in mid-2015, and the ruling may be announced in early 2016. However, despite a possible blow to its image as a responsible stakeholder in the region, Beijing has vehemently rejected its participation in this process. Some observers believe that the Court can at best clarify the sovereign rights over territory in the South China Sea but will find it difficult to implement its adjudication. Therefore, even if the Court comes up with a verdict favorable to the Philippines, the complainant country may still be unable to change the current situation in the South China Sea.



The ROC's construction work on the Taiping Island has aimed only to renovate the aging port and resolve supply problems. (Source: Coast Guard Administration, ROC)



The continuing neglect of the ROC's constructive advocacy and contribution to the situation of the South China Sea is not in the benefit of any country genuinely desiring to ensure regional peace and stability.

The ROC's Consistent Advocacy of the Peaceful Resolution of South China Sea Issues

In contrast to the assertive behavior and obvious military preparations of Mainland China and several other South China Sea claimants, the Republic of China (ROC) persists in its call for the peaceful resolution to deal with South China Sea issues, and it does not plan to re-station troops on the Taiping Island or deploy weapons such as short-range surface to air missiles. As a consequence, the ROC is not changing the status quo, threatening other claimants, or attempting to seize islands or reefs occupied by other countries. This is also consistent with US recommendations of not seizing features that another claimant has occupied and not changing the nature, size, or capabilities of islands and reefs. The ROC's recent construction work on the Taiping Island has aimed only to renovate the aging port and resolve supply problems. Such conduct complies with the US stance that routine maintenance operations should be permissible. Moreover, ROC President Ma Ying-jeou has reiterated the importance of applying the spirit of the *East China Sea Peace Initiative* to the South China Sea issues,* which will help ensure a peaceful and sustainable settlement of disputes. It

should be noted, however, that despite the ROC's good will and responsible deeds in the region, very few countries value its role as a peacemaker. The continuing neglect of the ROC's constructive advocacy and contribution to the situation of the South China Sea is not in the benefit of any country genuinely desiring to ensure regional peace and stability. In fact, the unrest in the South China Sea stems from a lack of effective dialogues and communication, and the prerequisite for such dialogues and communication is to include all parties involved into the circle of discussion. At present, however, the incessant reclamation actions and military preparations taken by Mainland China and some other claimants, the lack of US attention to the region, the potentially minor effect of an international arbitration, and the long-stalled signing of a legal-binding Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea have outshined the needs for constructive dialogues and communication and led some observers to worry that the situation in the South China Sea will eventually tilt in Mainland China's favor.

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* The *East China Sea Peace Initiative* was proposed by President Ma on August 5, 2012, in response to the sovereignty disputes among the ROC, Mainland China and Japan concerning the Diaoyutai Islands in the East China Sea. It calls on all claimants to demonstrate restraint and avoid escalating confrontational acts; shelve controversies and not abandon dialogues; respect international law and deal with disputes through peaceful means; seek consensus and draft an East China Sea Code of Conduct; and establish a mechanism for cooperation on exploring and developing resources in the East China Sea.

India's Engagement with Japan and Mainland China in Modi's First Year in Office

Lin Po-chou & Yang Ya-chi

Recent years have seen a re-adjustment of the balance of power among major nations in the Indo-Pacific region. Mainland China, as a rising political and military power, has tried to exclude external powers from participating in regional affairs through the New Asian Security Concept proposed by Mainland Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Moreover, Mainland China has been vigorously promoting a series of economic initiatives, dubbed the Chinese version of Marshall Plan, in an effort to establish a greater sphere of influence in the region. In Japan, the Shinzo Abe administration is taking progressive steps to free the nation from the shackles of its pacifist *Constitution*, has discarded the *Three Principles of Arms Exports*, and is attempting to lift its ban on the right to collective self-defense, in order to move away from a state of military dependency and attain the status of a normal nation.¹ The United States, after thirteen years of the War on Terror, has put forward its policy of Rebalancing toward Asia by means of trade and economics, diplomacy, military engagement and democracy, so as to maintain its leading role in the Asia-Pacific. Russia, attempting to regain its former glory during the Soviet Empire era, is making efforts to nurture relations with countries in the Far East region. As the competition among great powers looms over the strategic landscape of the western Pacific, India, now led by its new Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has become one of the nations that all parties are trying to draw into their own strategic calculations. Unlike the nonalignment policy adopted by his predecessors during the Cold War era, Modi has since assuming office been actively seeking to advance India's cooperation with Mainland China, Japan, the US and Russia. In so doing, he is transforming the "Look East" policy of

former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh into an "Act East" policy. These recent developments may imply that India's strategic choices will be a major factor in the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Of the various developments in the region, this paper focuses specifically on the interactions between India and Japan and between India and Mainland China, and analyzes their implications.

The recent interactions between India and Japan and between India and Mainland China reveal some of the three countries' respective strategic calculations.

India-Japan Cooperation

There have recently been frequent visits between Indian and Japanese leaders. During the period of May 27-30, 2013, former Indian Prime Minister Singh visited Japan, and took this opportunity to issue *Strengthening the Strategic and Global Partnership between India and Japan beyond the 60th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations*. In November of the same year, Japan's Emperor Akihito, who rarely travels abroad, visited India as a state guest. From January 25 to 27, Prime Minister Abe visited India at the nation's independence day, and the two nations signed eight cooperative documents during this visit.² Prime Minister Modi visited Japan in August, 2014, which was not long after his landslide victory against the Indian National Congress Party in the May election. This ongoing

interaction reveals the strong wish of both nations' governments to enhance bilateral relations.

During Modi's visit, Modi and Abe jointly issued the *Tokyo Announcement* and upgraded bilateral relations from a "strategic and global partnership" to a "special strategic and global partnership."³ The leaders also signed agreements or reached consensus regarding cooperation in trade and investment, defense and security, and regional and international affairs. In the case of trade and investment, Japan has pledged investment in India of up to USD 35 billion over the next five years. Japan is also willing to provide funds, technology and operational assistance for high speed rail to India, and seeks to import rare earth minerals from India. With regard to defense and security, the two nations have agreed to continue to hold the annual summit and "2+2 talks" between foreign affairs and defense ministers. Moreover, the two nations will further host joint maritime training sessions, initiate negotiations concerning defense cooperation, and accelerate the talks over the sales of US-2 amphibious aircraft. In terms of regional and international affairs, the two nations have confirmed that they will maintain communication and coordination in the area of maritime security, freedom of air and naval navigation, civilian aviation safety, and settlement of maritime sovereignty disputes based on the



India and Japan have upgraded their bilateral relations to a "special strategic and global partnership." (Source: Indian Ministry of External Affairs)

international law. With regard to the "proactive contribution to peace" proposed by the Abe Administration, and Japan's new security policies, Modi explicitly expressed his support, which has made India one of the most influential countries (in addition to the US, Australia, the Philippines and Vietnam) supporting Japan's security undertakings. Japan also supported India's promotion to become one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and agreed to accelerate negotiations over the export of civilian nuclear technologies to India. All in all, Modi's visit in last August marked a fruitful step forward for both India and Japan.

India's engagement with both Mainland China and Japan, despite the hostile relationship between the two countries, shows Modi's clever diplomatic tactics.

India-China Relations

There has also been considerable progress in India-China relations, especially with regard to economic aspects. During the period of September 17-19, 2014, just one month after Modi's visit to Japan, Xi Jinping visited India and announced the *Joint Statement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Building a Closer Development Partnership*. The two leaders signed twelve agreements, among which the most salient was a five-year development plan that allowed Mainland China to invest USD 20 billion in Indian infrastructure.⁴ Xi also promised to invest USD 6.8 billion to establish industrial parks in India's Gujarat and Maharashtra states,⁵ agreed to import more products to resolve the controversial trade imbalance between the two nations,⁶ and signed a memorandum concerning rail cooperation that calls for Mainland China to help renovate India's aging railway system. To relate his One Belt One

Road initiative (the collective name for the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road) to India's development, Xi advocated the importance for both nations to help accelerate the establishment of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor,⁷ so they could jointly lead the economic development in Asia.

In order to strengthen defense and security ties, during Xi's visit to India, the two leaders agreed to regular reciprocal visits between the two nations' defense ministers and high-ranking military officers. They also agreed to hold the fourth joint military training session and exercise, enhance cooperation in non-traditional security issues, and hold the first round of talk on maritime cooperation.⁸


Nevertheless, prior to Xi's visit, Mainland Chinese and Indian troops had had a new round of stand-off in the Ladakh.⁹ The repeated confrontations between the two militaries, and the fact that there was no specific commitment regarding the negotiations about the line of actual control (LAC) separating the territories of India and Mainland China, expose the persistent contradictions between Mainland China and India.¹⁰ In fact, while Xi was advocating his One Belt One Road initiative, India was said to be preparing its own plan, called *Project Mausam: Maritime Routes and Cultural Landscapes across the Indian Ocean*. This project aims to revive maritime trade in the Indian Ocean and resume cultural connections between countries along the trade routes. Though a cultural initiative, the project can be regarded a measure to counter Mainland China's One Belt One Road initiative. Still, with Xi proposing details about how to realize the initiative (including specific infrastructure construction projects and a Silk Road fund of at least USD 40 billion), the prospect of Modi's project remains to be observed.

Modi's Wily Engagement with Both Mainland China and Japan

The recent interactions between India and Mainland China and between India and Japan reveal some of the three countries' respective strategic

calculations. For Mainland China, the success of its One Belt One Road initiative depends significantly on the support of India, the greatest power in South Asia. Although Xi will push forward the initiative one way or another, India's endorsement will definitely be favorable to the implementation of the initiative. More importantly, if Xi can use trade and investment as incentives to prevent India from getting too close to the US and Japan, this will do much to facilitate Xi's diplomatic and strategic campaign in South Asia. For Japan, which has had chilly relations with South Korea and Mainland China and is eager to secure better diplomatic relations in the region, India is an important democratic partner to Abe's global diplomacy and a potential participant in joint exercises involving the US, Japan and India. If Japan can win support from India and establish a trilateral relationship with the US and India, it may successfully facilitate the US and Japan's goal to balance the rising power of Mainland China. In other words, a partnership with India is something both Mainland China and Japan greatly desire.

However, India has its own calculations. His engagement with both Mainland China and Japan, despite the hostile relationship between the two countries, shows Modi's clever diplomatic tactics. For the new prime minister, one of his priorities is to invigorate the country's weak economy. In



Modi seeks better cooperation in trade and investment with Mainland China to boost India's economy. (Source: Indian Ministry of External Affairs)



fact, Modi's remarkable economic achievement in local states such as the Gujarat was one of the contributors to his victory in the national election. As a consequence, economic development is obviously a major priority in Modi's agenda. Engaging both Mainland China and Japan to maximize economic benefit and investment will help Modi to achieve this priority. Despite the clashing intentions of Mainland China's and Japan's, Modi appears to be in no hurry to choose side among the two. Instead, he will try hard to gain benefits from both of them, which will remind Mainland China and Japan that India is not without alternative sources of economic support. In terms of security, India faces the same threat from Mainland China as does Japan, and Modi seems to hold a firm position regarding border issues with Mainland China. Nevertheless, this does not mean Modi shares Abe's thinking about countering Mainland China militarily. With India open to economic cooperation with Mainland China, the security cooperation between Japan and India may not live up to Abe's expectations. Rory Medcalf, director of the international security program at Australia's Lowy Institute, believes that Modi will simultaneously seek to push forward relations with Mainland China and Japan, and the best way to maintain ties with Mainland China will be to do so

by means of cold peace.¹²

In conclusion, the first year of the Modi Administration revealed that the new Prime Minister's all round diplomatic approach will involve engagement with Mainland China, Japan, the US, and even Russia both in economic and security domains. Modi's efforts to improve his country's economy will provide opportunities for Mainland China and Japan to gain India's support through economic incentives, which will in return give more strategic leverage to India. In the future, a similar situation may play out in the security area, where India will try to gain security benefit through simultaneous engagement with the US and Russia. In the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific, India may play an increasingly critical role.

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US Approves the Transfer of Four Perry-class Frigates to the ROCN

On December 18, 2014, US President Barack Obama signed the S. 1683 *Naval Vessels Transfer Act*, officially approving the transfer of four US Perry-class frigates to the Republic of China (ROC). A bill authorizing the sale had already been passed by the US House and Senate on December 4 and 10. The approval of the sale demonstrates bipartisan US support for Taiwan's security and expresses the solid US-Taiwan relationship and mutual trust.

The four frigates—the *Taylor* (FFG-50), *Gary* (FFG-51), *Carr* (FFG-52), and *Elrod* (FFG-55)—will replace the ROC Navy's (ROCN) nearly fifty-year-old Knox-class frigates. As a first step, the ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) has established a purchase project, and will allocate a budget of approximately NTD 5.5 billion for the purchase of the first two ships, *Taylor* and *Gary*, which are expected to be transferred to the ROCN during 2016 and 2017. Both *Taylor* and *Gary* are active duty ships, meaning that the MND can save a great deal of expenditure for activation, maintenance

and repair that would be required by mothballed vessels. ROCN Vice Admiral (ret.) Lan Ning-li was quoted as saying that throughout the life of these warships, their weapon systems will have at least three upgrades. Costing only one sixth of the price of a newly-built one, a second-hand frigate with new weapon systems is an acceptable option for the ROCN in the face of new threats.

Despite Mainland China's usual protests regarding any defensive arms sales to Taiwan, the US insists on upholding the terms of the *Taiwan Relations Act* by supporting Taiwan's self-defense. Both the MND and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially expressed their sincerest gratitude to the US for this support. The MND stressed that it would keep in close contact with the US with respect to the transfer of the ships and the acquisition of suitable operations systems, which will enhance the ROC's confidence and capabilities for self-defense and the maintenance of regional peace and stability.



USS Taylor (FFG-50, in the front) is one of the four Perry-class frigates in the new package of US arms sales to the ROC to support its self-defense efforts. (Source: US Navy)

The ROCN Receives its First Indigenous Tuo Chiang Stealth Missile Corvette



The Tuo Chiang stealth missile corvette is remarkable for its stealth, speed, and strong firepower. (Source: ROC Navy Command Headquarters)

After several rounds of intensive sea trials, the first indigenously produced stealth missile corvette with a catamaran design was officially handed over to the ROCN on December 23, 2014. A transfer ceremony hosted by former Minister Yen Ming of the MND took place at Suao Commercial Port in northeastern Taiwan, and the corvette sailed to Suao Naval Base after the ceremony.

Built under the Hsun Hai Project, the new corvette, named *Tuo Chiang* and assigned the number 618, is the first of a possibly eight to twelve vessels of its kind to be built by a local shipbuilder. The twin-hull corvette, dubbed an “aircraft carrier killer,” measures 60.4 meters in length and 14 meters in width and accommodates a crew of 41. Despite its small size and a displacement of a mere 500 tons, the corvette is equipped with eight Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missiles, eight Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missiles, two Mk-32 anti-submarine torpedo launchers, one Mk-15 phalanx close-in weapon system, one Otobreda 76 mm gun, four 12.7 mm guns, and FIM-92 stinger missiles, all of which may

be carried during wartime.

The corvette is also remarkable for its stealth and speed. Its irregularly-shaped twin hulls are designed to disperse or reduce reflected radar signals, causing enemies to mistake it for a smaller vessel. The hulls are also designed so as to allow the corvette to pierce waves and move at high speeds even in adverse weather conditions. It has a maximum speed of 38 knots and a cruising range of 2,000 nautical miles.

Minister Yen said in the ceremony that *Tuo Chiang* is the fastest corvette with the strongest firepower in Asia, and the transfer ceremony marked a milestone for the combat capabilities of the ROCN. He also praised that the corvette for setting an example for the ROC’s indigenous defense policy. After the transfer, the ROCN will start training operations to ensure that the crew gains familiarity with the operation of the vessel and its equipment, so that it can shoulder a share of responsibility for maintaining security across the Taiwan Strait.

Mainland China Tests Its Next Generation ICBM with Multiple Warheads



Mainland China has made significant advance of its multiple warhead capabilities. This picture shows the Dong Feng 31, the predecessor of the Dong Feng 41 ICBM. (Source: Asia-Pacific Defense Magazine)

Mainland China successfully carried out the third flight test of the Dong Feng 41 intercontinental ballistic missile on December 13, 2014. The test of Mainland China's longest range missile marks a significant advance of its multiple warhead capabilities, as it used the technology of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The first and second flight tests of the missile were conducted in 2012 and 2013 respectively, according to the US media *Washington Free Beacon*.

The United States has long been keeping a close eye on the development of DF-41, which was mentioned both in the 2014 *Annual Report to Congress* issued by the US Department of Defense (DoD) and the report by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. The DoD report estimated that DF-41 would be able to carry ten MIRVs and was expected to be deployed starting from 2015. From the perspective of the US, the development poses a grave threat to national security not only because it boosts Mainland China's strategic nuclear forces but also because the missile, with the maximum range of about 7,500 miles and multiple warheads, is able to target major cities in the US

all in once. Despite Mainland China's reassurance that it has no intention to use its advanced weapons against any country or target, its unclear motivation still concerns the US. When asked about the development, DoD spokesman Lieutenant General Jeff Pool said the US encouraged greater Mainland Chinese transparency regarding their defense investments and objectives to avoid miscalculation.

Recently, the US and Mainland China signed two memorandums of understanding concerning the notification of major military activities and the code of conduct for safe conduct of naval and air military encounter. Negotiations over details are expected to take place, but according to Bonnie Glaser, a senior adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Mainland China has thus far remained non-committal to US expectation for reciprocal notification of ballistic missile launches. Regarding from the Mainland Chinese government's silence on the details of the flight test, one might wonder how much military trust can be accomplished between the two countries, despite the ongoing bilateral negotiations to build it.

Mainland China Plans to Improve Maritime Awareness through a Comprehensive Maritime Observation Network

According to Mainland Chinese media, the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) has laid out a plan to build a comprehensive maritime observation network before 2020. The coverage of this network will extend from Mainland China's coastal waters to far seas and polar sea areas, thus acquiring the capabilities to observe maritime environment in three dimensions.

The major objectives of the network project will include enhancing the observation capabilities of coastal bases and radar stations, improving the off-shore observation capabilities of underwater and satellite observation systems, and acquiring the observation capabilities in polar seas. According to SOA, the network is important to the understanding of maritime environment and the protection of the nation's maritime interests. Nevertheless, media in other nations suggests it will intensify Mainland China's presence in the East and South China Seas.

The foreign media's suspicions are likely not groundless. Mainland China has long resented the United States' reconnaissance and surveillance activities near its coastal areas. Nevertheless, it still lacks sufficient capabilities to counter these

activities. Understanding the maritime environment and increasing its grasp of marine dynamics have therefore become priorities for Mainland China. Mainland China's possible ambitions extend beyond that, however. For it to control the sea within the first island chain of the Asia-Pacific region, Mainland China needs increased maritime awareness to respond effectively to contingencies and maximize the capabilities of its naval forces. A comprehensive maritime observation network will be helpful in achieving that goal.

Mainland China may try to integrate its existing reconnaissance and surveillance facilities, such as shore-based radars, imaging satellites, the Beidou Navigation Satellite System, various surface and underwater surveillance facilities, electronic intelligence facilities and long-range UAVs, to create all-round pictures of situation in nearby waters. Although it is a common goal of many coastal countries, in view of clear hints that Mainland China intends to establish an ADIZ in the South China Sea, the SOA's decision to build such a network still worries many neighboring countries.



The SOA plans to build a comprehensive maritime observation network and has coordinated Mainland China's various maritime agencies. This picture shows one of the Coast Guard vessels of the SOA. (Source: Wu Chang-hua)

The Ministry of National Defense Moves to a New Complex in Dazhi



The opening of the new MND headquarters, which is adjacent to several other military facilities, marks the beginning of a new era of the more efficient and sophisticated ROC Armed Forces. (Source: Military News Agency)

On December 27, 2014, the new headquarters of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) of the Republic of China (ROC) was officially opened for operation at Dazhi in Taipei City. Covering an area of 19.5 hectares, the Boai Complex nestles under a mountain and sits in front of a river, and it is adjacent to other military facilities, such as the Air Force Command Headquarters, the Navy Command Headquarters, and the Hengshan Command Center.

The Complex consists of three buildings, which are the Boai Building (main building), the Wude Building (for the Military News Agency and other external affairs units), and the Yonggu Building (for medical and leisure facilities and service corps). There are also other living facilities, such as gyms, cafeterias, a post office, barbershops, parking lots, and leisure areas, to satisfy daily needs of MND personnel. The Complex accommodates nearly a hundred of MND departments and divisions as well as roughly 3,000 MND personnel, solving

the problem of scattered MND units over several districts in Taipei City when the old headquarters, located next to the Presidential Office, was in use.

When presiding the first flag raising ceremony on December 8 at the Complex, former Minister Yen Ming introduced that the headquarters integrated state-of-the-art security systems, including electromagnetic pulse protection, explosive detection, and fingerprint scanning in restricted areas. Moreover, the buildings incorporate a number of eco-friendly designs, such as exterior walls made of green building materials, and air conditioning utilizing self-made ices as a cooling agent.

Several former MND ministers, including Tang Fei (the 21st minister), Wu Shi-wen (the 22nd minister), and Li Tian-yu (the 25th minister), were invited to the opening ceremony of the new headquarters on 27 to witness the beginning of a new era of the more efficient and sophisticated ROC Armed Forces.