

論臺灣之政治安全

On Taiwan's Political Security

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臺灣因處於獨特的地緣政治位置，對長期國家生存構成嚴重問題。臺灣距離其主要貿易夥伴、投資對象，也是國家安全威脅的中共約100英里。中共一直聲稱只有一個中國，臺灣是中國的一部分。這一說法從來不符合實際，但中共卻以不同方式迫使這一底線實現。臺灣不變的地緣政治位置，加上其政治自由，使其隨著時間的推移，而與中共出現矛盾及不協調。如果說兩岸關係偶有起伏，描述可能還不夠精準。國防必要性再清楚不過，但是需要捍衛的目標，以及防衛可用資源與其他事項息息相關，且不斷需要審視和調整。例如，海峽兩岸經過十年間的民族主義日益高漲所造成的各種危機之後，2008-2012年臺灣與中共之間形成長達8年的和緩。這一時期的「低盪」，過去緊張局勢和威脅緩和，反而產生自己的不安全感。導致2012年舉行全國選舉時，選民們似乎反對「低盪」，結果使臺灣陷入更脆弱的安全狀態，必須採取更加謹慎的防禦態勢和更創新的外交政策。然而問題是，臺灣是否已為重新定位可能需要面對的嚴峻情勢和犧牲，做好準備。

Taiwan is in a unique geopolitical position posing grave problems concerning its long-term national viability. It is about 100 miles from the Chinese mainland, which is its major trade partner, investment destination, and national security threat. The People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland has consistently claimed that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of that China, a claim that has never been consistent with empirical reality but Beijing has insisted, with varying degrees of force, must come to pass. The island's immutable geopolitical position in combination with its range of policy freedom has over time allowed it to drift in somewhat contradictory and uncoordinated directions. To say the relationship has had its ups and downs would be an understatement. The imperative for national defense is no less clear, but what exactly needs defending, and the resources available to do so, evolves along with everything else, requiring constant review and readjustment. For example, after a decade of escalating cross-Strait polarization fed by growing nationalism on both sides of the Strait, there was in 2008-2012 an eight-year period of rapprochement between Taiwan and the PRC. This period of détente, while bringing welcome relief from tension and threats, generated its own sense of insecurity, leading in 2012 to a national election in which the electorate seemed to turn its back on détente. The results have thrust Taiwan into a more vulnerable security position

calling for a more vigilant defense posture and a more innovative foreign policy. Yet there is a question whether the island is prepared for the rigors and sacrifices its reorientation may require.

什麼原因造成兩岸關係長年的起伏拉扯？主要有四個因素，其中一些因素不會隨時間發生變化，其他因素則不斷的動態變化。第一是軍事創新。創新是軍事科技和戰略融合的結果，彼此具有相互連動的作用。第二是政治經濟，這是一個相對較新，但是強大有力的影響，並為軍事科技創新提供了手段。第三是國家認同，它激勵和驅使民眾支持國家的政治路線走向。第四是三角關係，以臺灣的情況而言，這是非常明顯的。因為臺灣缺乏盟邦支援其防衛。換言之，三角關係必然包括臺灣與美國「曖昧態度」的支持關係，以及臺灣與中共這個主要安全對手間的關係。這四個因素的交會點多少是一個連貫性綜合，也就是「政治」，這一點將在結論中考量。

What drives the perennial cross-Strait push-pull dynamic? Four factors have been predominant, some of them constant over time, others new or changing. The first is military innovation. Innovation is a function of the fusion of military technology and strategy, both of which drive each other reciprocally. The second is political economy, a relatively new but powerful factor that provides the wherewithal for military technological innovation. The third is national identity, which inspires and drives the public to support a national political trajectory. The fourth is triangular, which is unusually clear-cut in Taiwan's case because of the shortage of allies in support of its national self-defense. In other words, the triangle necessarily consists of Taiwan's relationships with the United States (US), Taiwan's “ambiguous” patron, vis-à-vis the PRC, it's principal security threat. At the intersection of these four factors is “politics,” representing a more or less coherent synthesis, to be considered in the conclusion.

軍事創新 Military Innovation

從戰略上而言，海峽兩岸分治四十年來均堅持「一個中國」原則，而這決定了雙方的最終目標是戰勝並吞掉對方，成為統一的中國。在冷戰時期（特別是1972年中國對美國開放之前），這種對抗就是以國民黨軍隊於1949年自中國大陸撤退以來，持續以內戰形式呈現。這一時期臺灣的主要戰略是「保衛臺、澎、金、馬，伺機反攻大陸」。中華民國政府多次向大陸派遣突擊隊和情報人員，在福建海岸和離島與解放軍進行幾次戰鬥，直到1965年。¹ 在大陸方面，官方的立場是「我們一定要解放臺灣」，藉由民族

1 其中最值得注意的是1949年10月25日至27日金門附近的古寧頭戰役（中國人民解放軍入侵部隊被擊敗），同年11月的登步島戰役（導致國軍撤退），1952年4月的南日島戰役，1953年7月的東山島戰役（國軍慘敗，代表了臺灣對大陸進攻的結束），以及1965年5月在東引附近的海戰。參見Eric S. Lin, Yi-hua Wu and Ta-sheng Chou, “Country Survey: Defense Policy and Military Spending in Taiwan, 1952-

解放戰爭來進行。中共發動了兩次攻勢。第一次是1954-55年臺海危機。從1954年9月開始，共軍對金門和馬祖群島的國軍防禦工事進行砲擊，戰火並於11月擴大到大陳島；解放軍在兩次失敗後，於1955年1月奪取了一江山群島。1954年，美國與中華民國政府簽署了一項共同防禦條約（不包括外離島），第一次危機最終於同年內，在美軍威脅對解放軍進行核子攻擊的情況下結束。第二次危機開始於1958年8月下旬，解放軍恢復對金門的密集火炮射擊，而國軍也以炮火回擊，造成了460名解放軍士兵和440名國軍士兵的死亡。美國隨之干預，加強臺灣的空防和砲兵能力。即使在這場危機落幕後，共軍和臺灣部隊直到1979年前，雙方仍每週定期以單打雙不打的方式相互砲擊，砲彈以文宣彈為主。在海峽兩岸全力軍事對抗期間，美國提供總共14.65億美元的援助（其中多為軍事援助）。²

In terms of strategy, the “one China principle,” which was steadfastly embraced on both sides of the Strait for the first four decades of their division, dictated that each side's ultimate goal was the defeat and incorporation of the opposing “side” into a reunited China. In the Cold War period (i.e., before China's opening to the US in 1972), this took the form of continuation of the never technically concluded civil war that had driven Nationalist forces from the mainland in 1949. The main strategy in Taiwan in this period was “defending Taiwan, the Pescadres, Jinmen and Mazu and preparing for opportunities to reclaim mainland China.” The ROC government dispatched shock troops and intelligence agents to the mainland on several occasions and engaged in several pitched battles with the PLA on the Fujian coast and offshore islands up through 1965.

¹ On the mainland side the official position was “We must absolutely liberate Taiwan!” [*women yiding yao jiefang Taiwan!*] via a war of national liberation. In its pursuit the PRC launched two kinetic offensives. The first was the 1954-55 Taiwan Strait crisis, which involved an artillery bombardment of Nationalist fortifications on Jinmen and Mazu Islands beginning in September 1954 and expanding to the Tachens in November; after two failed attempts, the PLA seized the Yijiangshan Islands from Taiwan in January 1955. In 1954 the US signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC (not including the offshore islands) and finally brought the first crisis to a close in 1955 with the public threat of a nuclear attack on PLA forces. The second crisis commenced with a resumption of intense artillery bombardment of Jinmen Island in late August 1958, which was reciprocated by Nationalist artillery resulting in the deaths of an estimated 460 PLA soldiers and 440 ROC soldiers. The US intervened by beefing up Taiwan's air defense and artillery capabilities. Even after this crisis subsided, PRC and Taiwan forces regularly bombarded

2009,” *Defense and Peace Economics*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August, 2012), pp. 343-364.

2 N. H. Jacoby, *Evaluation of US Economic Aid to Free China, 1951-1965* (Washington: Department of State, Agency for International Development, Bureau for the Far East, 1966).

each other on alternate days of the week with shells containing propaganda leaflets until 1979. During this period of active military confrontation across the Strait the US provided a total of US\$1,465 million in aid (mostly military aid) from 1951 to 1965.²

1972年尼克森訪問中國大陸後，特別是1979年臺美外交關係及「中美共同防禦條約」中止後，臺灣所有「光復大陸」的計畫均遭擱置，所有軍事作為以防衛為主。雖然美國在停止對臺軍售一年後，又於1980年根據「臺灣關係法」恢復了武器銷售，但根據美國和中國大陸在「三個公報」中的雙邊協議，軍售僅限於防禦性武器，並將在軍事情況允許下，隨著時間逐漸減少。臺灣的軍事開支因為執行這種防禦部署而下降，從1950年代和1960年代占總預算的44%左右，下降到70年代的29%（仍高於中國大陸軍事預算比例）；以GDP比例而言，武器支出從1980年6.9%的高點下降到2002年的2.3%。³中國大陸也採取了類似的作法。在1979年與美國正常化後的第一個十年期間降低軍費支出，國防在「四個現代化」（工業，農業，科技，國防）中的地位排在最後。這種不強調軍事的作法恰巧配合1979年至1981年間，其對臺政策從武力解放臺灣轉變為「三通」和「一國兩制」，以達到「和平統一」。中共對臺灣提出了「高度自治」、「做為中華人民共和國特別行政區」的條件。雖然蔣經國在1979年以「三不」（不接觸，不妥協，不談判）回應「三通」，且堅持該立場到九十年代，臺灣在李登輝領導下展開更具有前瞻性的兩岸政策。1989年6月4日天安門鎮壓事件之後，中共的預算優先順序出現轉移（主要是出於國內原因），轉以解放軍為主。解放軍在其後26年間，每年的預算年成長率超過已然亮眼的國內生產毛額增長率。反觀臺灣，在1980年代後期，民主化的出現導致預算的優先，從武器支出轉移到福利、衛生、教育和其他政府部門，加上國內生產毛額成長率的長期下降，導致國防預算的整體減少（例如中共2013年國防預算估計為1,170億美元，是臺灣的11倍），使兩岸戰略能力和軍事失衡日益嚴重。2002年至2015年，臺灣國防支出約維持在其GDP的1.9-2.4%之間，遠小於2002迄2015年間的國內生產毛額增加比例。⁴

After the Nixon visit in 1972, and particularly after the suspension of diplomatic relations and rescission of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 1979, all Taiwanese plans to “recover the mainland” were shelved and the island focused its defense efforts exclusively on defense. Although US arms sales were restored by the Taiwan Relations Act after one year's suspension in 1980, these sales were, by bilateral agreement between the US and the PRC in

3 Chien-chiang Lee and Chun-ping Chang, “The Long-run Relationship between Defence Expenditures and GDP in Taiwan,” *Defence and Peace Economics*, vol. 17, no. 4 (August 2006), pp. 361-385.

4 2002年臺灣國防開支為78億美元（以2011年的美元計算），2011年達到89億美元。相比之下，比臺灣小得多的新加坡2011年則花費了83億美元。同年，中國的國防預算為1,293億美元，比臺灣多14倍。SIPRI Yearbook 2012 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012), pp. 198-199.

the Three Communiques, to be limited to defensive weapons only and to gradually decrease over time as the military situation permitted. Military spending in Taiwan also declined for the implementation of this defensive posture from around 44 percent of the budget in the 1950s and 1960s, falling to 29 percent in the 1970s (higher than the corresponding percentage in PRC budgets); as a proportion of GDP, arms spending declined from a high of 6.9 percent in 1980 to a low of 2.³ percent in 2002. ³ The mainland followed a similar course by reducing arms spending during the first decade after normalization with the US in 1979, relegating the military to last place in its “four modernizations” (industry, agriculture, science and technology, and military). This military deemphasis coincided with its Taiwan policy shift from armed liberation of the island to “peaceful reunification” via “three direct links” [san tong] and “one country two systems” in 1979-1981, offering Taiwan a “high degree of autonomy” as a Special Administrative Region in the PRC. Although the “three links” was met by Chiang Ching-kuo's “three nos” (no contact, no compromise, no negotiation) in 1979, it was nevertheless steadfastly maintained until the 1990s, whereupon Taiwan's new leadership under Lee Teng-hui inaugurated a more forthcoming cross-Straits policy. Meanwhile after the Tiananmen crackdown on June 4, 1989, PRC budget priorities shifted (primarily for domestic reasons) in favor of the PLA, which has enjoyed double-digit annual increases exceeding already impressive Chinese GDP growth for the next 26 years. In Taiwan in contrast the advent of democracy in the late 1980s has resulted in a shift of popular priorities from arms spending to welfare, health, education and other government services which, together with a secular decline of GDP growth rates, has resulted in a secular decline in military spending (e.g., Beijing's estimated US\$117 billion defense budget for 2013 was 11 times that of Taiwan) and strategic capability and a growing cross-Straits military imbalance. Taiwan's defense spending has remained in the range of 1.9-2.4% of a much smaller GDP from 2002 to 2015. ⁴

臺灣從1970年代以後的20年間，將攻勢轉為較為被動的守勢，側重於保持足以防禦入侵的防衛武力，注重空軍和海軍軍力的品質，使得中共壓倒性的人口優勢，顯得不切實際。在整個冷戰時期，美國軍事援助不僅包括先進武器，也包括安排人員交流和培訓，使臺灣得以維持質的優勢。但從2000-2010年開始，隨著中國大陸GDP的快速成長，逐漸超越義大利、英國、法國、德國，終於在2010年超越日本，成為世界第二大經濟體（單就名義上的GDP而言；若在PPP方面，中國大陸已經是最大的經濟體），使其軍事實力相應增加。中國大陸不斷增長的軍事能力，導致其戰略轉變。臺灣從攻勢走向守勢，但大陸則從守勢轉變為外交和戰略之攻勢結合，大陸發展短程飛彈已使其從「笑臉攻勢」（例如新加坡會談，1993年汪辜峰會）突然轉變為1995-1996年針對臺灣沿海主要海港發射飛彈的「脅迫性說服」，儘管該企圖受到美國派遣兩個航母艦隊前往臺灣海峽而挫敗，並引起臺灣選舉的反彈，但中國對其挫敗之回應，則是努力發展出新的能力。

Upon shifting from an offensive defense in its first two decades to a more passive defensive position from the 1970s on, Taiwan has focused on maintaining a defense sufficient to deter invasion by focusing on the quality of its air and naval assets, inasmuch as the mainland's overwhelming demographic advantage made any quantitative competition unrealistic. Throughout the Cold War period US military aid, consisting not only of advanced weaponry but personnel exchanges and training arrangements, contributed to maintaining Taiwan's quality edge. But beginning in the 2000-2010 period, as China's very rapid GDP growth led it progressively to outdistance Italy, Great Britain, France, Germany, and finally Japan in 2010 to become the second largest economy in the world (in terms of nominal GDP; in terms of PPP it was already the largest), its military prowess has increased commensurately. China's growing military capability has resulted in some shifts of strategy. As Taiwan shifted from offense to defense the mainland shifted from defense-offense to a combination of diplomatic and strategic offense. Thus the mainland's development of short-range missiles made possible an abrupt switch from cross-Strait "charm offensive" (e.g., the Singapore talks, the 1993 Wang-Koo summit) to the launch of missiles off the coast of Taiwan's major seaports in 1995-1996. Though this attempt at "coercive persuasion" was frustrated by the American dispatch of two carrier fleets to the Taiwan Strait area and provoked an electoral backlash in Taiwan, the PRC has reacted to its setback by developing new capabilities.

自1980年代末中蘇爭端結束以後，解放軍致力現代化，其兵力從北部和西部邊境向福建海岸的轉移，主要是針對臺灣問題，且規模逐漸擴大中。從1990年到1996年，這些現代化的作為僅僅為了應對雙邊的衝突（如果宣布臺灣獨立）或（最好）以政治方式脅迫臺灣，迫使其進行以「一個中國」原則為前提的談判。1996年以後，當美國表現出足以中斷解放軍威懾臺灣企圖的能力時，解放軍現代化出現了兩種形式。首先，持續對臺脅迫，更具體地在政治上全力阻止「臺獨」的想定，更加野心勃勃地消除大陸與臺灣海空軍力在科技上的素質落差。第二，鑑於美國顯示其阻止對臺脅迫的能力，共軍各界一直密切注意所謂「反介入／區域拒止」(A2/AD)能力的發展，也就是要阻止美軍介入，以大幅降低其介入臺海的能力。為了達到擊沉美國航空母艦的具體目的，中共已經開發了具有可重新鎖定目標彈頭的東風21D反艦彈道飛彈(ASBM)，並正研究高超音速滑翔載具。自2010年以來，A2/AD的努力已進一步擴大，動機在於試圖將東海和南中國海的控制權擴大到「第一島鏈」，因為在任何持久的對臺作戰當中，鄰接水域的控制乃重中之重。事實上，這兩項任務有相當程度之重疊性，因為臺灣的武器大多數是自美採購，解放軍要面對的其實是同一批武器。

PLA modernization efforts since the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the late 1980s and the subsequent shift of forces from the northern and western borderlands to the Fujian coast

have been focused preeminently on Taiwan, but in an increasingly broadened perspective. From 1990 to 1996 they were narrowly addressed to the contingency of bilateral conflict (in the event of a declaration of Taiwan independence) or (preferably) political coercion to compel negotiation based on China's "one China principle" terms. After 1996, when the US demonstrated its ability to frustrate bilateral coercive attempts, PLA modernization efforts have taken two forms. First, the attempt at bilateral coercion has continued, now more specifically focused politically on deterring "Taiwan independence" scenarios, but more ambitious technologically in rectifying the qualitative gap between mainland and Taiwan air and naval assets. Second, in view of the demonstrated American ability to block cross-Strait coercion, there has been intense concentration on developing what has been called an "anti-access/area denial" (A2/AD) capability, i.e., to deter US forces from approaching much less intervening in the Strait. For the specific purpose of sinking US aircraft carriers the PRC has developed the DF21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) with retargetable warhead and is working on hypersonic glide vehicles. Since 2010 A2/AD efforts have broadened further in a Chinese attempt to extend control over the East and South China Seas up to the "first island chain," for in any protracted Taiwan confrontation control of the adjacent waters would be essential. In practice these two missions overlap to a considerable extent, as most Taiwan arms are procured from the US the PLA will be preparing to face much the same weaponry.

透過遠遠超過臺灣的軍備預算，且成長速度超過任何國家的實力，解放軍已取得令人刮目相看的進步。權威性刊物《軍事平衡》(*Military Balance*)指出，2013年解放軍空軍有2,400架戰機，包括俄羅斯製造的蘇愷-30MKK「側翼」(Flanker)和蘇-27，以及自製的殲10（性能大致相當於F16）和殲11（中共仿製蘇愷-27之版本）。中共空軍還擁有8架空中預警機(AWAC)以及各種無人機(UAV)。⁵自2011年以來，中共空軍就已試飛了二種第五代的殲20和殲31隱形戰機。2013年，中共雄心勃勃的海軍現代化包括生產70艘主要水面艦艇，包括俄羅斯版本現代級驅逐艦和自製的054型江凱級隱形護衛艦。中共海軍還部署越來越多的飛彈快艇和70艘潛艦，其中部分配備了反艦飛彈。中共於2014年推出了第一艘經過翻修的「遼寧」號航空母艦，並打算在未來自製航空母艦。中國現有核子嚇阻力量包括5艘核動力彈道飛彈潛艦(SSBN)，每艘潛艇可發射12枚具有多目標重返大氣層載具(MIRV)的洲際彈道飛彈，射程為7,400公里。相對而言，臺灣的地面裝甲車是由1,400輛坦克和1,200輛裝甲運兵車組成，技術上已經過時。臺灣空軍戰力則較為一提；2013年部署了485架戰鬥機，包括56架法國幻象2000和87架美國F5E「虎賁」和146架F16A/B戰機；海軍包括4艘美國海軍紀德級驅逐艦，裝備有美國魚叉反艦飛彈和標準防空飛彈，或自製的雄風二型及三型超音速反艦飛彈，還有4艘潛艦，其中兩艘

5 *The Military Balance 2014* (London: International Institute for Strategy Studies, 2014), pp. 235-238.

已過時，另兩艘由荷蘭建造。美國在2001年同意向臺灣供應8艘現代化柴電潛艇，但由於美國停止常規潛艇的生產線，再加上國民黨主導的立法院杯葛預算，這一提案並未實現。2014年投入服役的是一個配備雄風飛彈，載重500噸的迅海級隱形護衛艦艦隊。最後，臺灣新生產的雄2E對地巡弋飛彈，射程600公里，勢將賦予臺灣某種程度的戰術反擊能力。

And banking on an arms budget far larger than Taiwan's and growing faster than either power's, the PLA has made impressive progress. According to the authoritative *Military Balance*, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) in 2013 had 2,400 combat aircraft, including Russian-build Su-30MKK Flankers and Su-27s, the indigenous J10 (roughly equivalent to the F16) and the J11 (China's copy of the Su-27). The PLAAF also boasted 8 Airborne and Control (AWAC) aircraft, as well as a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).⁵ Since 2011, the PLAAF has been flight testing not one but two fifth-generation “stealth” fighters, the J20 and the J31. China's ambitious naval modernization by 2013 included 70 principal surface warships, including Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers and indigenous Type 054 Jiangkai-class stealth frigates. Its navy has also deployed growing numbers of fast missile craft and 70 submarines, some armed with anti-ship missiles. China launched its first aircraft carrier, the refurbished Liaoning, in 2014 and aims to build its own aircraft carriers in the future. China now possesses a nuclear deterrent that includes five nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs, or “boomers”) each of which can launch 12 ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) with a range of 7,400 km. Taiwan's armored forces, consisting of 1,400 tanks and 1,200 APCs, is largely technologically obsolete. Taiwan's air force is more credible; in 2013 it deployed 485 combat aircraft, including 56 French Mirage 2000s as well as 87 US-built F5E Tiger and 146 F16A/B Falcons. Its navy includes 4 ex-US Navy Kidd-class destroyers armed with US Harpoon anti-ship missiles and standard anti-aircraft missiles, or the indigenous Hsiung Feng II and III supersonic anti-ship missiles, as well as four submarines, two of which are outdated, two Dutch built. The US agreed in 2001 to supply eight modern diesel submarines to Taiwan, but this offer has not materialized due to a combination of the US having lost the capability to manufacture conventional submarines and the KMT-dominated legislature blocking funding for the purchase. Entering service in 2014 is a fleet of 500-ton Hsun Hai-class stealth corvettes, armed with Hsiung Feng missiles. Taiwan's new Hsiung Feng 2E land-attack cruise missile, with a range of 600 km, will give Taiwan some counter-strike capability.

雖然解放軍目前在技術上超越國軍，擁有前所未有的能力，但據我看來，臺灣的三軍部隊在這十年中仍然有能力捍衛這座島嶼，因應大部分的突發狀況。大陸的短程飛彈數量約為1,500枚，比1995-1996年所發射的短程飛彈更加精準，不再只是一種威嚇性

武器，而是可用於摧毀機場和其他高價值目標。在1996年海峽危機期間，股市在3天內下跌了1,000點，據傳當時有150億美元的資金流出臺灣。但單靠導彈襲擊應無法使臺灣屈服，必須配合封鎖或入侵。配備性能提升或新建的派里驅逐艦、諾克斯和拉法葉級飛彈巡防艦之臺灣海軍，或許有能力回應任何封鎖。目前還不清楚解放軍海軍是否具有運送入侵部隊抵達島嶼和維持補給的能力，特別是如果美國介入的話。鑑於這種不確定性（如果入侵失敗，中共政權可能會被推翻；即使獲勝，對經濟和軟實力上的負面影響，極具殺傷力），入侵似乎不太可能。國軍的空軍仍然在素質上優於數量較龐大的中共空軍：蘇愷戰機由於缺乏近戰所需的敏捷性和推力，不是F16或幻象2000的對手，此外，臺灣有訓練優良的飛行員。⁶ 有人認為，中共空軍的數千架戰鬥機在很大程度上與海峽空中優勢無關，因為「空域」一次只允許300多架戰機同時飛行和接戰。

Although the PLA is in the process of technologically overtaking the Nationalist military and now has capabilities it did not have before, Taiwan's armed forces are in my estimation still capable of defending the island against most contingencies in this decade. The mainland's short-range missiles, numbering around 1,500 and more accurate and efficient than those launched in 1995-1996, are no longer a mere terror weapon but could be used to destroy airports and other high-value targets. During the 1996 Strait crisis the stock market plunged 1,000 points in three days and US\$15 billion reportedly fled the island. But a missile attack alone should not bring Taiwan to its knees, and would have to be accompanied by a blockade or an invasion. Taiwan's navy, with its upgraded or newly built Perry destroyers and Knox and Lafayette guided-missile frigates, is probably capable of fighting off any blockade. It is still unclear whether the PLAN has the logistic capability to transport an invasion force to the island and to maintain supply, particularly if the US becomes involved; in view of the uncertainty (if the invasion failed, the CCP regime might well be toppled; even if it won the economic and soft power consequences would be very damaging) an invasion seems unlikely. The Nationalist air force is still arguably qualitatively superior to the much larger PLAAF: the Su27s are no match for the F16s or Mirage 2000s, lacking agility and thrust necessary for close combat, and Taiwan's pilots are better trained.⁶ Some argue that the thousands of fighters in the PLAAF would be largely irrelevant to gaining air superiority over the Strait because the “air space accommodation” only permits sufficient room for ca 300 interceptors to maneuver and engage at one time.

最後，我們必須正視一個事實，經過30年的高度發展，預算和技術能力的不對稱，兩岸軍事關係已成為北京即使不入侵，對臺灣造成損害，所耗費的成本，低於臺灣所能

⁶ See David Shambaugh, “A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 119-133.

對大陸造成損害的所需成本，損害程度也遠高於臺灣對大陸所能造成的損害程度。目前估計，如果大陸進行全面攻擊，臺灣只能自行抵抗3至4個星期。美國會在這段時間內去干預一個不再承認的非盟國嗎？中國在A2/AD能力上令人印象深刻的進展，使得干預措施變得更加昂貴，華府也更加謹慎於此。一些政策顧問主張將臺灣視為負債而放棄。臺灣為彌補國防差距而對外採購武器，也受到北京的強烈抵制，認為這是對中國內政的干涉。很顯然，面對中國的壓力，美國武器的對臺銷售，也隨時間減少。經過四年未向臺灣出售武器—自1979年「臺灣關係法」以來最長時間中斷—華盛頓終於在2015年批准了價值18.3億美元的軍售，包括兩艘1980年代生產的老舊派里級巡防艦、12輛兩棲攻擊坦克、刺針防空飛彈、標槍和托式反坦克飛彈。其中不包括可供臺北使用的先進能力，如性能升級的F-16戰鬥機或潛艦—美國甚至不會再提供臺灣建造潛艇的技術援助。

Finally, we must face the fact that in view of three decades of hypergrowth and resulting asymmetries of size, budget, and technological capability, the cross-Strait military relationship has become such that even if it does not invade, Beijing can inflict far more damage on Taiwan at less cost than the latter reciprocate. It is currently estimated that Taiwan could survive only three to four weeks on its own in the event of a full-scale attack. Would the US intervene within that time span on behalf of a non-allied nation it no longer recognizes? Impressive progress in China's A2/AD capabilities have made intervention more expensive, and there is perceptibly greater caution in Washington. Some policy advisors have advocated the abandonment of Taiwan as a net liability. Taiwan's weapons purchases designed to offset the defense gap are vehemently resisted by Beijing as interference in China's internal affairs. And in apparent response to PRC pressure, US arms sales have declined over time. After four years without a U.S. weapons sale to Taiwan--the longest hiatus since the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act--Washington finally approved a deal in 2015 worth \$1.83 billion. Included in the sale are two 1980s-vintage Perry-class frigates and 12 amphibious assault tanks, along with Stinger antiaircraft missiles and Javelin and TOW antitank missiles. Not included are cutting-edge capabilities that Taipei could use, such as upgraded F-16 fighters or submarines--Washington will no longer even give Taipei technological aid to build its own subs.

美國是否會在大陸攻臺的情況下遵守「臺灣關係法」的精神，最終是一個政治問題，取決於衝突的情況、美國領導人的意向，以及美國的民意。如果大陸是在顯然沒有受到挑釁的情況下發動攻擊，我相信干預是可能的，而這樣的干預仍然具有決定性。

	2004-2007 年期間	2008-2011 期間	2011 ⁷
美國同意出售	\$10億	\$65億	\$16億
美國交付	\$43億	\$29億	\$8億

Whether the US would honor the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act in the event of an attack on the island is ultimately a political question depending on the circumstances of the conflict, the disposition of the Washington leadership and the mood of the American public. If the Chinese attack were blatantly unprovoked, I believe intervention would be likely, and that it would still be decisive.

經濟實力 Economic Power

從1949年以來，兩岸經濟實力的平衡變化很大。就平均國內生產總值成長率而言，儘管經歷兩次的油價上漲和隨後的全球經濟衰退，臺灣在1950年代為7.3%，1960年代為8.8%，1970年代為7%。第二次世界經濟衰退期間的成長率降低到5.7%（1981年）和3.3%（1982年），1983年至1988年期間平均增長率為10.2%。在經濟結構方面，農業從1955年34%降至1978年10%，工業部門的比例從21%上升到48%（同一期間）；80%的人口居住於城市。收入不均的程度一直很低：2011年的臺灣基尼係數為0.342，而中國的基尼係數為0.477。臺灣的人均收入比中國的成長更快：國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)的資料顯示，2015年臺灣的人均收入為22,288美元，而中國大陸為7,990美元。臺灣嚴重依賴對外貿易，貿易依賴比率約為70%。但由於不完全明確的原因，臺灣的國內生產毛額成長率自新世紀開始以來已明顯放緩。

The cross-Strait balance of economic power has varied widely since 1949. In terms of average GDP growth rate, Taiwan registered 7.3 percent in the 1950s, 8.8 percent in the 1960s and about 7 percent in the 1970s despite being hit by two oil price hikes and an ensuing world recession. Growth decelerated during a second world recession to 5.7 percent in 1981 and 3.3 percent in 1982, it recovered to average 10.2 percent from 1983 to 1988. In terms of economic structure, the primary sector has been reduced from 34 percent in 1955 to 10 percent in 1978 while the proportion of the industrial sector rose from 21 percent to 48 percent (same time span); 80 percent of the populace is now urban. The degree of inequality has been consistently low: Taiwan's gini coefficient was 0.342 in 2011 compared with China's 0.477. Taiwan's per capita income has risen more steeply than China's: in 2015 it was \$22,288 according to the IMF, compared to China's \$7,990. Taiwan is heavily dependent on foreign trade, with a trade dependency ratio of ca 70 percent. But for reasons that are not entirely clear, Taiwan's GDP growth has slowed appreciably since the turn of the millennium.

7 Shirley A. Kan, "Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990", *Congressional Research Service*, Washington, D.C, July 23, 2013.

在經濟安全方面，臺灣面臨兩種可能令人不安的趨勢。首先，中共的增長使得這種關係越來越不對稱。臺灣的相對GDP已經從1990年相當於中共的43.8%下降到2014年相當於中共10兆美元GDP的5%（總體上，人均計算的對比遭逆轉），軍事平衡有利於中共。⁸ 臺灣的相對增長放緩意味著軍隊是由萎縮中的經濟基礎來支持。我們看到軍備開支隨著GDP增長率下降的比例而呈現下滑。第二，自從八十年代後期兩岸間接貿易以來，臺灣在貿易和投資方面越來越依賴中共。陸委會數據顯示，臺灣對中國的出口比例從1984年的1.4%上升到2011年的29.66%。臺灣在中共對臺出口的份額也從1984年的0.58%增加到2011年的15.52%，也就是說，臺灣從中共進口增加20多倍，在2014年達到2,000億美元。從重商主義的角度來看，貿易依賴可能被視為臺灣的優勢，因為貿易平衡一直是臺灣的利益。但相互依賴是不對稱的，臺灣貿易總額的比例高出中共許多，因此臺灣比中共利益流失比例更大。中共是臺灣最大的貿易夥伴，高達近40%的出口（包括通過香港），但臺灣只是中共第五大貿易夥伴。雖然80%的臺灣國外直接投資是進入中共（從2003年的50%開始上升），但由於法條障礙只有很少一部分中共的外國直接投資進入臺灣。

In terms of economic security, Taiwan faces two potentially troubling trends. First, China's growth has made the relationship increasingly asymmetrical. Taiwan's relative GDP has declined from about 43.8 percent that of China's in 1990 to only 5 percent of PRC's US\$10 trillion GDP in 2014 (in aggregate; in per capita terms the positions are reversed), and the military balance has tilted in the mainland's favor as well.⁸ Taiwan's relative growth slowdown implies that the island has a shrinking economic base to support its military, and as we have seen arms spending has diminished even as a proportion of a declining GDP growth rate. Second, since the advent of indirect trade in the late 1980s Taiwan has become increasingly dependent on the mainland, both in terms of trade and investment. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) data show that Taiwan's share of exports to China increased from 1.4% in 1984 to 29.66% in 2011. Taiwan's share of PRC exports to Taiwan also increased from 0.58% in 1984 to 15.52% in 2011. Both exports to and imports from China have increased more than 20-fold, approaching US\$200 billion by 2014. From a mercantilist perspective trade dependency might be deemed to Taiwan's advantage, as the trade balance has consistently been in Taiwan's favor. But interdependency is asymmetrical, making up a much larger share of Taiwan's total trade than China's, so that Taiwan has proportionately more to lose than the mainland. China is Taiwan's biggest trade partner with nearly 40 percent of its exports (including through Hong Kong) but it is only China's fifth largest

⁸ 參見David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, & Barry A. Wilson, *Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for US Policy* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp, 2000), p. xvi et seq.; see also Scott L. Kastner, "Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point?" *International Security*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Winter 2015-16), pp. 54-92.

trade partner. While 80 percent of Taiwan's FDI goes to the mainland (up from 50 percent in 2003) only a tiny fraction of China's FDI goes to Taiwan, largely due to regulatory barriers.

從北京的角度來看，中國大陸的高速增長紀錄對臺影響見仁見智。臺灣面對壓倒性的強大對手產生兩種可能的反應：(一)最好屈服，抗拒是無望的（即附和大多數的意見），或(二)更加努力抗拒（平衡）。北京自然贊成第一種論述。而這種論述在一定程度上似乎已經在國民黨主流和部分政府軍隊中發酵。臺灣的軍費開銷在國防預算和國內生產總值中所占的比例持續下降，部隊存在嚴重的士氣問題，由於缺乏足夠的新兵，全面實施志願役必須延後兩次，高級將領退役後在大陸打高爾夫球，還發生軍事人員為大陸情蒐事件。第二個反應似乎是臺灣選民的反應，使蔡英文領導的反對黨在2016年1月的選舉中壓倒性獲勝。蔡英文目前委婉地拒絕北京「一個中國」原則，北京的反應是對臺灣逐步增加外交和經濟上的施壓。這將有多大效果，臺灣將如何應對大陸的步步進逼，仍有待觀察。

From Beijing's perspective, China's high-speed growth record has had mixed consequences. Faced with an overwhelmingly powerful adversary there are two possible reactions: (1) better give in, resistance is hopeless (i.e., bandwagon), or (2) fight all the harder (balance). Beijing naturally roots for the first narrative. To some extent that seems to have materialized for much of the KMT mainstream and for the Nationalist military establishment. Military spending has steadily declined as a proportion of budget and GDP, there are serious morale problems, the shift to volunteer army had to be postponed twice for lack of adequate recruits, senior officers retire to play golf on the mainland, and there have been several incidents of intelligence breaches by military agents on behalf of the mainland. The second reaction however seems to have been that of the Taiwanese electorate, which endowed the opposition party led by Tsai Ing-wen with a sweeping mandate in the January 2016 election. Tsai has thus far politely declined Beijing's invitation to endorse the "one China principle," and Beijing's response has been a gradually increasing diplomatic and economic squeeze on Taiwan. How far that will go, and how Taipei will respond as it tightens, remains to be seen.

國家認同 National Identity

臺灣尋求不同的「國家」認同是一個相對比較近期的現象。在冷戰期間，臺灣堅定地停留在西方反共陣營中，做為對抗中國共產主義可能侵略的堡壘，即使國家認同仍然是「中國」，也就是暫時居住在臺灣小島上的中華民國，隨時準備光復大陸。在此同時，中共也聲稱是中國，雙方都不接受任何國家對一方的承認；這種關係是敵對且「零和」的，包括兩岸之間低程度的威脅、攻擊和偶發的危機。此期間，中華民國當局的施

政重點是對半個世紀以來一直處於外國統治下的本土居民灌輸中國認同，而中國大陸卻諷刺地試圖抹去所有中國傳統文化的痕跡，以騰出空間，賦予大陸上的中國人更大的世界性革命特徵。國民黨側重於社會化，認為一個由中央所控制的課程將在臺灣塑造成統一的民族精神，並激發足夠的軍事、經濟、政治和文化實力，能在中國大陸的威脅下生存，且王師重返。

Taiwan's quest for a distinct “national” identity is a relatively recent phenomenon. During the Cold War Taiwan was firmly anchored in the Western anti-communist camp as a bulwark against suspected Chinese Communist aggression, even as its national identity remained “Chinese,” i.e., that of the Republic of China, temporarily resident on the small island of Taiwan but preparing for a triumphant return. Meanwhile the PRC also claimed to be China, and neither country accepted recognition from any state that recognized the other; the relationship was hostile and “zero-sum,” including low-level cross-Strait threats, sorties and occasional crises. The ROC authorities during this period focused on instilling Chinese identity on an indigenous population that had been under alien rule for half a century while the PRC ironically tried to erase all traces of traditional Chinese culture to make room for a more cosmopolitan revolutionary identity among mainland Chinese. The KMT focused on resocialization, believing that a centrally controlled curriculum would forge a unified national spirit in Taiwan and stimulate enough military, economic, political, and cultural strength to survive and recover the mainland.

亞洲結束冷戰大約比歐洲早20年。尼克森在1972年即展開了中美和解，以創新方法解決意識形態框架，為軍備聯盟的僵局帶來突破的機會。中國大陸的「改革開放」到十年後臺灣民主化的開始，臺海雙方都摸索了打破僵局的新思路。中共在鄧小平指導下所提出的倡議，更系統地闡述了周恩來在1950年代所提出的政策，旨在透過鼓勵兩岸結合，特別是提供「三通」來促進中國的認同。儘管蔣經國最初拒絕，他在1988年去世之前，還是開放老兵回大陸故鄉探親，然後擴展到貿易和教育交流，開始向大陸開放。接下來的李登輝政府成立了內閣層級的國家統一委員會，並於1991年頒布了「國家統一綱領」，申明國家統一的最終目標，前提是大陸實現政治民主及經濟自由化。在1990年代初，李登輝宣布終止「國家動員戡亂時期」，承認中華人民共和國不再是「共匪」，而是「一個在事實上統治大陸的治理機關」。臺北和北京先後分別成立了準官方機構，海基會(SEF)和海協會(ARATS)，在香港秘密會談（同意所謂的「九二共識」，即「一個中國，各自表述」）後，在新加坡舉行一系列會議，討論進一步促進商業和其他交流的作法，試圖經由香港，貿易、間接投資和旅遊業穩步成長。（譯者註：以上為作者觀點，實質上並非如此）在這個時期，臺灣對大陸轉變為抱持更為正面的態度，大部分臺灣人繼續認為自己是「中國人」（26.2%，根據陸委會1992年6月資料）；或是「中國人

和臺灣人」(45.4%)。只有17.3%的人認為自己是臺灣人。

The end of the Cold War, which occurred about two decades earlier in Asia than in Europe thanks to the Nixon-initiated Sino-American détente commencing in 1972, opened opportunities for innovative approaches to the impasse untrammelled by the ideological frameworks and alliance networks that previously tethered the issue to bloc solidarity. Beginning with the advent of “reform and opening” in China and the onset of democracy in Taiwan a decade later, both sides explored new ideas for breaking the deadlock. The PRC's initiative under Deng Xiaoping, a more systematic formulation of the policy introduced in the 1950s by Zhou Enlai, aimed at fostering a syncretic Chinese identity by encouraging cross-Strait consociation, specifically by offering “three direct links.” Despite his initial refusal, before his death in 1988 Chiang initiated an opening to the mainland by permitting retired soldiers to visit their home villages on the mainland, later extending this to trade and educational exchanges. The succeeding Lee Teng-hui regime established a cabinet-level National Unification Council which in 1991 issued “National Unification Guidelines” affirming the ultimate goal of national unification premised on prior achievement of political democracy and economic liberalism in the PRC. In the early 1990s Lee Teng-hui announced the termination of the “Period of National Mobilisation for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion,” acknowledging that the PRC was no longer “Communist bandits” (*gongfei*) but “a governing authority that has de facto rule of the mainland,” First Taipei, then Beijing set up quasi-official diplomatic organs, the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) respectively, and after secret talks in Hong Kong (where what became known as the “1992 consensus” was agreed, namely “one China, different interpretations” [*yige Zhongguo gezi biaoshu*, in the Taiwan version] engaged in a series of meetings in Singapore to discuss further steps to facilitate business and other exchanges. Trade, indirect investment and travel accelerated steadily via Hong Kong. This period of relative opening witnessed a shift to more positive attitudes toward the mainland (*dalu re*). At this time most Taiwanese continued to identify themselves as either “Chinese” (26.2 percent in June 1992, according to the Mainland Affairs Council) or “both Chinese and Taiwanese” (45.4 percent); only 17.3 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese.

然而，這種透過三通間接聯繫的新平衡，其相互包容和日益頻繁交往遭到一系列危機打斷。第一次是1995-1996年的海峽危機，由李登輝總統在1996年臺灣第一次民主選舉中的競選過程中追求國際承認臺灣的作為所造成，包括李在母校康乃爾大學對校友的政治性演講。中國大陸發動1995-1996年的海峽危機回應。從北京的觀點來看，持續的負面影響似乎是指向臺灣認同和「未來國家偏好」（獨立、統一或維持現狀，往往

與認同有關)。認為自己是「中國人」和「中國人和臺灣人」的比例從1996年6月的高點66.7%，降低到1998年6月的45.5%，而認為「我是臺灣人」的人則從23.2%上升到35.9%。隨著兩岸高層政治關係在接下來的十年（1995-2005年）停滯不前，臺灣的認同持續攀升。這種趨勢更由於李登輝在1999年提出「兩國論」後所造成的高度緊張關係，以及民進黨總統候選人陳水扁在2000年的3人競爭中當選而得到強化。面對中國的威脅以及隨後暫停的官方交往，自稱為「是中國人也是臺灣人」或「中國人」的人，從2000年6月的56.9%下降到2006年12月的51.6%，只有6.4%的人認為自己是中國人，而自認為是臺灣人的，則上升到45.2%。

This new equilibrium of mutual tolerance and growing intercourse via three indirect links was however punctuated by a series of crises. The first of these was the 1995-1996 Strait Crisis, precipitated by President Lee Teng-hui's drive for international recognition of Taiwan in his campaign for reelection in Taiwan's first democratic election in 1996, including a politicized alumni speech at his (PhD) alma mater, Cornell University. In response, the mainland precipitated the 1995-1996 Strait Crisis. The enduring negative impact from Beijing's perspective seems to have been on Taiwan identity and "future nation preference" (independence, reunification, or status quo, which tends to correlate with identity). From its high point in June 1996 of 66.7 percent, the combined "Chinese" and "both Taiwanese and Chinese" percentage dropped to 45.5 percent in June 1998, while "I am Taiwanese" rose from 23.2 percent to 35.9 percent. And as high-level China-Taiwan political relations froze and stagnated over the ensuing decade (1995-2005) Taiwanese identity continued to climb. This trend was enhanced by further high-level tension surrounding Lee's proposal of a "two-state theory" in 1999, the election of DPP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian despite more PRC threats in a tight three-cornered race in 2000, and by the ensuing suspension of official intercourse. Those identifying themselves as "both" or "Chinese" declined from 56.9 percent in June 2000 to 51.6 percent in December 2006, but only 6.4 percent of the former identified themselves as Chinese only while those identifying themselves as Taiwanese rose to 45.2 percent.


除了危機爆發的轉折點外，還有體制上的因素造成逐漸的改變。民主過渡在兩個相反的勢力之間造成脆弱的結構性平衡：一方面，臺灣本土族群（本省人）經過「大陸」（外省）國民黨實施40年的專制後，自由選舉可能在投票行為上傾向於全面反對中國大陸（和反國民黨）。另一方面，中共藉由有利可圖的兩岸貿易和投資機會爭取臺灣的商業界，後者自1980年代後期以來，正遭遇最大的（美國）海外市場進口抵制。據估計，約200萬臺商（在中國生活和工作的臺灣人）的三分之二投票給國民黨。⁹ 由於90%以上的臺灣人是血緣上的華人，講華語，遵行中國的儀式，北京希望能訴諸於中國民族主義。然而，認同仍不足以與種族起源或經濟相互依賴發生連結。直到李登輝1995年訪

問美國前，雙方都採取迴避，反映出持續的不信任：臺灣與中國和解，但試圖對西方採取同等的外交步驟（「靈活外交」）；接著臺灣於1992年在拉脫維亞成功設立總領事館，並於1992年和1995年與萬那杜和巴布亞新幾內亞進行相互承認，而不使中華人民共和國暫停與這些國家的關係，北京的反制是伴隨著和平統一的承諾，拒絕放棄使用武力，繼續在福建海岸建立導彈發射基地和其他攻擊性武器。因此，雖然經濟互動增長，政治關係仍然冷淡，使政治認同轉向「錯誤」的方向。根據國立政治大學的調查，在1990年代初，較多的受訪者自認為純中國人（約25%），多於自認為是純臺灣人（約20%）者，約一半的受訪者自認為是臺灣人和中國人。到2014年，不到4%的受訪者認為自己是中國人，大多數人（超過60%）的自我認同只有臺灣人（約33%的自我認同為中國人和臺灣人）。

In addition to crises precipitating inflection points there have been institutional factors slanting incremental change. Democratic transition created a tenuous structural balance two opposing forces: on the one side, the electoral emancipation of the indigenous Taiwanese community (bensheng ren) from the four decade dictatorship imposed by the “Chinese” (waisheng ren) KMT dictatorship may have tended to impel the electorate in a blanket anti-Chinese (and anti-KMT) voting disposition. On the other side the profitable cross-Strait trade and investment opportunities were designed to woo Taiwan's business community, which in the late 1980s increasing import resistance from its largest (US) foreign market. It has been estimated that two thirds of the some two million Taishang (Taiwanese living and working in China) vote KMT.⁹ Noting that more than 90 percent of Taiwanese are ethnically Chinese, speak Chinese, and observe Chinese rituals, Beijing hoped to appeal to Chinese nationalism. Yet identification trends puzzlingly failed to correlate with ethnic origins or economic interdependency. Both sides hedged, reflecting continuing distrust: Taiwan engaged in rapprochement with China but tried to match this with equivalent diplomatic steps to the West (“flexible diplomacy”); thus it successfully established a consulate general in Latvia in 1992 and mutual recognition with Vanuatu in 1992 and with Papua New Guinea in 1995 without causing the PRC to suspend its relations with these countries until Lee's 1995 visit to the United States. Beijing's hedge was to accompany its pledges of peaceful reunification with a refusal to renounce the use of force and continuing the buildup of missile launching sites and other offensive weaponry on the Fujian coast. Thus while economic interaction grew, the political relationship remained chilly, and political identities turned in the “wrong” direction. According to NCCU surveys, in the early 1990s more respondents self-identified as solely Chinese (about 25 percent) than as solely

9 參見Shu Keng and Gunter Schubert, “Agents of Unification? The Political Roles of the Taiwanese Businesspeople in Cross-Strait Integration,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (March-April 2010), pp. 287-310).

Taiwanese (about 20 percent), with about half of respondents self-identifying as both Taiwanese and Chinese. By 2014 fewer than 4 percent of respondents self-identified as solely Chinese, with a clear majority (more than 60 percent) self-identifying as solely Taiwanese (with about 33 percent self-identifying as both Chinese and Taiwanese).




這種初步的檢驗趨勢顯示，認同的決定性突破是在飛彈危機時，「臺灣」認同首次超過「中國」認同。然而，在1997-2007的十年期間，分歧仍然很大，但相當穩定。而且，儘管馬英九在2008年的選舉中獲得臺灣選舉歷史上最大的勝選(58%)，並在之後試圖「重新中國化」選民，認同趨勢在他的8年任期內加速。在馬英九執政期間，自認為「只是臺灣人」的人超越了認為自己是「中國人和臺灣人」的人，在2014年和2015年上升到60%左右。

Superficial examination of the trendlines suggests the decisive break in identity came around the time of the missile crisis, when “Taiwanese” first surpassed “Chinese” identifiers. The divergence then remained wide but fairly stable throughout the 1997-2007 decade. And, despite Ma's electoral triumph in 2008, the largest in all of Taiwan's electoral history (58 percent), and Ma's subsequent attempts to “reSinify” the electorate, these trends accelerated during his eight-year term. During the Ma era, those identifying themselves as “Taiwanese only” exceeded

those who identified themselves as “both,” rising to around 60 percent in 2014 and 2015.

臺灣認同對政治態度的影響是什麼？認同轉變最明顯的必然結果是對統一態度的轉變。自1992年以來，國立政治大學的選舉研究中心已詳盡地列出了這些資料，如下圖所示：

What is the impact of Taiwan identity on political attitudes? The most obvious corollary to shifts in identity are shifts in attitudes toward reunification. These have been exhaustively tabulated since 1992 by the Election Study Center at NCCU, as graphically depicted below:



臺灣認同和「未來民族偏好」之間存在著粗略的關聯性，但它絕不是單純的，也不是一對一的。¹⁰ 然而，在1990年代初期冷戰結束時，如果我們把這種對統一興趣的各種選項都加在一起，會發現對臺灣認同的上升恰巧與對於統一的興趣下降相吻合，儘管後者變動緩慢且變化程度不如前者。實際上，問卷顯示對立即統一的興趣向來不高，只有

10 參見Chang Zhuanxian & Huang Chi, “Dǎng jìngzhēng yǔ táiwān zhī jiān de mínzú rèntóng yǔ guójiā rèntóng liànjie” [party competition and the connection between Taiwanese ethnic identity and national identity]之完整數據分析, *Taiwan Zhengzhi Xuekan* (Taiwan politics journal), Vol. 15, No. 1 (June 2011), pp. 3-71.

在1994年超過「立即獨立」，可是那也是最後一次的超過。從2002年開始，朝著獨立的興趣開始超過走向統一的興趣，大約比國家認同從「中國」轉變到「臺灣」的大多數轉變晚了10年。雖然自1990年代初以來獨立超過了統一，但是零和選項（「現在就獨立」與「現在就統一」）的所占比例仍然相對較低。自2007年以來，明確的認同偏好是臺灣人，但未來的國家偏好並不是「獨立」，而是「無限期維持現狀」。這兩者間缺乏明確關聯性的原因之一是，雖然民族認同（是臺灣人也是中國人）在政治上是「安全的」，未來的國家偏好會引起安全焦慮，因為中國強烈反對獨立。Frank Liu在進一步的分析中指出，「臺灣人」的民族認同意味著反對統一，但這並不必然意味著支持獨立。

There is a rough correlation between Taiwan identity and “future nation preference,” but it is by no means simple or one-to-one.¹⁰ True, the upswing of Taiwan identity at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s coincided with a decline of interest in unification, if we conflate all measures of such interest--though the latter is delayed and less precipitous than the identity shift. Actually the interest in immediate unification has never been very high, exceeding the interest in immediate independence for the last and only time in 1994. Beginning in 2002, the interest in moving toward independence began to exceed the interest in moving toward unification, about a decade later than the majority shift of national identity from “Chinese” to “Taiwanese.” While independence exceeded unification since the early 1990s, both zero-sum alternatives (“independence now” vs “unification now”) have remained relatively low. The unambiguous identification preference since 2007 has been Taiwanese, but the future nation preference has not been “independence” but “indefinite status quo.” One of the reasons for the lack of any clear correlation is that while ethnic identity (Taiwanese, Chinese, both) is politically “safe,” future nation preference evokes security anxiety because of China's militant opposition to independence. In a forthcoming analysis Frank Liu thus argues that while a “Taiwanese” ethnic identity implies opposition to unification it does not necessarily imply support for independence.

中共持續把統一一列為既是自己的首要任務，也是外交政策上臺灣議程的首要任務。但是這個路線為何是失敗的？大陸策略結合「棍棒」—武力選項，與「胡蘿蔔」—經濟整合。中國使用棒子和胡蘿蔔的能力比臺灣的抵抗能力增加得更快。鑑於GDP增長率差異，即使大陸經濟增長放緩，這種差距似乎也會進一步擴大。眼前快速成長，共同語言和文化的結合，以及較低的人均工資，使得大陸成為臺灣產業不可抗拒的經濟夥伴。儘管臺灣當局基於安全因素而試圖延緩趨勢，經濟的整合呈現大幅進展。然而，臺灣認同已經越來越偏離中國，雖然這與未來國家偏好的關係是不明確的，但是人們對統一的興趣在減弱當中。1990年代期間發生臺灣認同和未來國家偏好之重大轉變是可以理解的，因為這個階段中國的主要手段在這個時候是「棍棒」，臺灣人對此產生不良反應。在

1995-1996年，中共公開威脅使用武力。反分裂國家法(ASL)由全國人民代表大會一致通過時，是只透過略微增加1995年的威脅微妙手段來達成。然而，大陸同時還邀請反對派政治人物來到大陸，並將其基本策略從促進快速統一轉為反對獨立。國民黨此時做出回應，導致海峽兩岸關係十年的和解，簽署了23項兩岸之間的協定。然而，儘管馬英九在努力將選民「再中國化」，鞏固兩岸關係，並在與習近平2015年11月新加坡峰會上趨於頂點，臺灣認同趨勢仍在繼續，促成民進黨在2016年的選舉中決定性的勝利。

The PRC has persistently made unification a top priority not only on its own but on Taiwan's foreign policy agenda. Why has it failed? The strategy has been to combine “sticks” --the force option--with “carrots” --economic integration. China's capability to apply both sticks and carrots has increased far more swiftly than Taiwan's capability to resist, as in view of discrepant GDP growth rates this gap seems apt to widen still further in the future, even as mainland economic growth slows. The combination of rapid growth, common language and culture, and lower per capita wages has made the mainland an irresistible economic partner for Taiwan industry, and economic integration has proceeded apace despite various attempts by the Taiwan authorities to slow it down for security reasons. Yet Taiwan identity has become increasingly distinct from Chinese identity, and although the relationship to future nation preference is imperfect, interest in unification has also waned. This was understandable enough during the 1990s, when the major shifts in Taiwan's identity and future nation preference occurred, for China's main leverage at this time was “sticks,” to which Taiwanese responded adversely. In 1995-1996 China demonstratively threatened the use of force, reprising that threat only slightly more subtly up through 1995, when the anti-secession law (ASL) was passed unanimously by the National People's Congress. Beginning at the same time however the mainland invited opposition politicians to the mainland and shifted its underlying strategy from promoting swift reunification to deterring independence. The KMT reciprocated, leading to a decade of cross-Strait détente and the signature of 23 cross-Strait accords. Yet despite Ma Ying-jeou's efforts to “re-Sinify” the electorate and consolidate cross-Strait détente, culminating in his November 2015 summit with Xi Jinping in Singapore, the identification trends noted above have continued, contributing to the DPP's decisive victory in the 2016 election.

三角關係 Triangular Relations

中國和美國至少在1970年代初即以戰略三角關係互動。在這樣的三角形中存在不同的角色，其中最令人羨慕的是樞紐的角色，可享有與兩個「翅膀」的良好關係，而這兩個翅膀則相互競爭。最糟糕的角色是被其他兩個玩家拋棄的棄子，反而是兩個玩家「聯姻」。如果玩家之間存在力量差異，那麼對於最弱的玩家而言，擔任棄子的成本

變得高昂，因此照道理各方將做極力擺脫這一角色。從2003年到2008年，陳水扁打臺獨的擦邊球，兩岸關係嚴重緊張，也挑戰著美國是否必須拯救臺灣免受北京威脅之神經。由於已經力不從心的美國擔心在臺灣問題與中國發生衝突，陳水扁的挑釁政策削弱了美臺關係。隨著美國越來越投注於與北京的合作，它積極響應北京所提出，對臺灣的危害兩岸穩定加以約束的要求。在此戰略三角中，所有這三個關係對臺灣不利。此外，臺灣與中國大陸之間的實力差距正在持續擴大，如上所述。在美臺方面，不對稱性甚至更大，1990年為42.78：1，2008年為49.84：1。臺灣與其他兩個國家之間日益擴大的實力差距表明與這兩個國家之間的任何負面關係，將遭具體擴增。總之，臺灣根本無法承擔棄子這個三者當中最弱的角色。

China and the U.S. have been interacting at least since the early 1970s in a strategic triangle. There are different roles to play in such a triangle, the most enviable of which is the pivot, where a player enjoys good relations with both “wings” while those two wings compete with each other. The worst role is the outcast which is shunned by the other two players, who form a “marriage.” If there is a power disparity among players, then the cost of playing the outcast becomes prohibitive for the weakest player. It will rationally do whatever is necessary to extricate itself from that role. From 2003 to 2008, with Chen's brinkmanship on Taiwan independence, cross-Strait relations were severely strained, implicitly challenging the US to rescue Taiwan from Beijing's threats. As the over-stretched US feared conflict with China over the Taiwan issue, Chen's provocative policy also dampened US-Taiwan ties. As the US became increasingly invested in cooperation with Beijing, it responded positively to Beijing's entreaties to discipline Taiwan for jeopardizing cross-Strait stability. In the strategic triangle all three relationships were moving against Taiwan's interest. Furthermore, the power gap between Taiwan and mainland China was steadily widening, as noted above. On the US-Taiwan side, the asymmetry was even greater, at 42.78:1 in 1990 and 49.84:1 in 2008. The increasing power gap between Taiwan and the other two players suggests any negative relationship with either of them, let alone both, would be amplified tremendously. In short, Taiwan simply cannot afford to play the role of the outcast that is also the weakest of the trio.

馬和他的智囊團希望回到1990年代初，臺灣與美國和中共所保持良好的關係，他們認為那是臺灣發展的巔峰時期，¹¹因為「兩岸經濟文化交流進展迅速，軍事對抗減弱，外交競爭緩和，且由於兩岸關係的改善，中華民國可以『站起來走出去』，增加軍事採購，讓政治民主化，繁榮經濟」，¹²當然，彼時環境有很大的不同一天安門事件後，中

11 蘇起，「國際總體兩岸形勢與國家安全」，蔡朝明編，《馬總統執政後的兩岸新局：論兩岸關係新路向》（臺北：遠景基金會，2009），頁4。

共對世界許多地方而言，仍是不透明的，而臺灣的民主仍然處於起步階段，經濟正在蓬勃發展。馬在2008年就職，決定盡可能回到這一時期。¹³ 中國大陸的崛起使得臺灣對中共採取對抗態度，在經濟和戰略都是非常昂貴的。和解被認為是必須的。這對美國而言，也鬆了一口氣，美國無意在臺灣與中共發生戰爭。因此，臺灣—中共的摩擦引起美國對臺灣的支持和對抗中共的冷戰模式，從根本上被修改了：臺灣朝正式獨立的行動可能帶來中美合作。¹⁴ 然而，雖然馬同意以1992年共識為基礎，經中共認定是鼓勵最終統一的作法，但馬政府對其最終目的保持沉默，造成了中共與臺灣選民之間可能的嚴重誤會。

Ma and his strategists yearned for a return to the early 1990's when Taiwan maintained good relations with both the U.S. and the PRC, which they considered the apex (dianfeng shiqi, 顛峰時期) of Taiwan's development,¹¹ for “cross-Strait economic and cultural exchanges progressed rapidly, military confrontation attenuated, and diplomatic competition moderated,” and “Because of the improvement of cross-Strait relations, the Republic of China could ‘stand up and walk out’ (zhan qilai zou chuqu), increasing our military procurements, democratizing our politics, and rapidly growing our economy.”¹² Of course circumstances were quite different at that time--China was still under a cloud in much of the world in the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown while Taiwan's democracy was still fresh and its economy booming. Ma came into office in 2008 determined to return to this period as much as possible.¹³ The rise of mainland China makes it very costly in both economic and strategic terms for Taiwan to take a confrontational attitude toward Beijing. Rapprochement is deemed a must. This was a relief to Washington, which had no interest in a war with China over Taiwan. Thus the Cold War pattern in which Taiwan-China friction elicited US support for Taiwan and confrontation with Beijing was fundamentally revised: Taiwan's moves toward formal independence could bring about Sino-US collusion.¹⁴ Yet while Beijing construes Ma's agreement to talks based on

12 蘇起，危險邊緣：從兩國論到一邊一國（2003年，天下文化，臺北），頁37。

Su Chi, *Weixian bianyuan: cong liangguo lun dao yibian yiguo* (Brinkmanship: from two-states-theory to one-county-on-each-side), (Taipei: Commonwealth, 2003), p. 37.

13 馬英九，「中華民國第十二任總統馬英九就職演說」http://www.president.gov.tw/phpbin/prez/showspeak.php4?issueDate=&issueYY=97&issueMM=5&issueDD=20&title=&content=&_section=12&_pieceLen=50&_orderBy=issueDate%2Crid&_desc=1&_recNo=0, accessed September 20, 2009；及馬英九，2009。「總統主持中華民國九十八年開國紀念典禮團拜致詞」。http://www.president.gov.tw/phpbin/prez/showspeak.php4?issueDate=&issueYY=98&issueMM=1&issueDD=1&title=&content=&_section=12&_pieceLen=50&_orderBy=issueDate%2Crid&_desc=1&_recNo=0, accessed September 20, 2009.

14 因此，布希在2003年12月認為陳水扁的公投提案是一項不必要的挑釁，曾在來訪的中國大陸總理溫家寶面前批評陳總統。

the 1992 Consensus [jiu er gongshi] as encouraging movement toward eventual reunification, the Ma administration maintains a calculated silence about its ultimate destination, creating the possibility of serious misunderstanding between Beijing and the Taiwanese electorate.

雖然臺灣在馬時代的「雙重友好」立場可緩解臺灣在陳水扁執政時代所處的危險，但也有其弱點。首先，中共以臺灣經濟誘惑的政治目標向來明確，而臺灣的目標必須一直隱藏。這是因為臺灣無意放棄國家主權，而接受中共提出的「一國兩制」（因為民意調查數據清楚顯示），為了中共的經濟誘因，它純粹逢場作戲。臺灣自己在遊戲中的目標是真正平等達到中共的自由和民主的統一，正如國家統一綱領中所闡述者，由於兩者之間實力的不平衡，如今已不再經認定是合乎現實的，也就不再提及。臺灣參與中共的聯合(consociation)戰略在某種程度上是玩假的，中共可能在某種程度上試圖假戲成真。第二，由於臺灣決心與大陸保持距離，這場遊戲完全是在大陸上按照大陸的條件進行。中共可以隨時改變規則，臺灣沒有什麼可以發揮的空間。到目前為止，中共沒有對規則進行重大改變（例如沒收臺灣工廠或以貪汙罪名逮捕臺幹），只是對於給「胡蘿蔔」變得越來越小氣，至少這是臺灣的印象，國民黨希望通過「三通」與大陸濟聯繫，加速經濟成長。事實上，除了2010年簽署ECFA的那一年外，臺灣在馬時代的經濟成長仍然相當有限。

Although Taiwan's position of “dual amity” in the Ma era was a relief from Taiwan's dangerously exposed position in the Chen era, it also has its weak points. First, while Beijing's political goal in the economic seduction of Taiwan has been clear, Taiwan's goal must remain hidden. That is because while Taiwan has no inclination to relinquish national sovereignty to accept the mainland's offer of one country two systems (as poll data make clear), it would like to play the game sheerly for the sake of Beijing's economic inducements to play. Taiwan's own goal in the game, a reunification based on genuine equality to a free and democratic PRC, as originally enunciated in the National Unification Guidelines, are no longer deemed realistic and no longer mentioned because of the power imbalance between the two. Taiwan's participation in in Beijing's consociation strategy is in that sense a game of bad faith, which Beijing may at some point try to turn into good faith. Second, as Taiwan is determined to keep the mainland at arm's length, the game is played entirely on the mainland and on mainland terms. Beijing can alter the rules at any time and Taiwan has little room to quibble. Thus far Beijing has made no major change in rules (such as expropriating Taiwan factories, or arresting the managers on corruption charges), it has gradually become more stinting in its allocation of “carrots.” At least this has been the impression in Taiwan, where the KMT hoped to accelerate growth by hitching to the mainland economy via “three direct links.” Actually Taiwan's growth in the Ma era remained quite anemic except in the one year the ECFA was signed (2010).

正是由於這些原因，蔡英文堅決抗拒中共和國民黨重申「九二共識」的壓力，也就引起中共的憤怒，使蔡有可能陷入陳水扁的困境。蔡目前試圖以兩種方式避免這種情況。首先，在拒絕配合中共的作法下，她以相當微妙和禮貌的方式照常承認了1992年達成協議，為可能的進一步談判埋下伏筆，並承諾兌現這些協定。她小心翼翼地避免例如舉行全民公投，以「臺灣共和國」名義加入聯合國等挑釁的行動。第二，她了解臺灣與中共關係不可能有更進一步的進展，她一直很努力與美國保持良好的關係。華府方面並未試圖說服蔡接納中共，部分原因可能是美國與中共在其周邊水域的領土主張問題。因此，臺灣實際上從浪漫三角形中的樞軸位置轉移到婚姻關係的合作夥伴位置。這在本質上仍是一個較弱的地位，因為臺北失去藉由威脅向中共靠攏而敲詐美國的槓桿。但是，雖然馬英九藉由通過ECFA和其他向中共開放的20多項協議，促進貿易和改善聯繫，取得了重大成就，但所付出的代價是美國方面普遍的漠不關心和懷疑，美國的支持仍然至關緊要。

It is for these reasons inter alia that Tsai Ing-wen has steadfastly defied mainland and KMT pressure to reiterate the "1992 Consensus." She has consequently incurred the ire of Beijing, and risks falling into Chen Shui-bian's position of pariah. This she seeks to avoid that in two ways. First, although she refuses to parrot Beijing's formula, she has done so in a relatively subtle and polite manner, acknowledging that agreements were reached in 1992 making possible further talks and promising to honor those agreements. She has carefully avoided provocative moves such as launching a referendum to join the UN as "Republic of Taiwan," etc. Second, understanding that further progress in Taiwan-China relations are not on the cards, she has been assiduous (and thus far successful) in maintaining good relations with the US. Washington, perhaps due to its own problems with Beijing's territorial claims in surrounding waters, has not attempted to persuade Tsai to accommodate Beijing. Taiwan thus in effect shifts from the pivot position in a romantic triangle to that of junior partner in a marriage. That is inherently a weaker position because Taipei loses the leverage to blackmail the US by threatening to move toward the PRC. But although Ma's opening to the East did make substantial achievements by passing the ECFA and over 20 other agreements facilitating trade and improved contacts, the cost incurred was greater indifference and suspicion in Washington, whose support remains critical.

結 語 Conclusions

我們認為，海峽兩岸的安全從根本上基於4個因素：軍事創新、經濟實力、國家認同和三角關係。然而，每個因素的趨勢都朝自己的方向發展，給政治帶來負擔，極難整理出最有利於國家利益的路線。軍事創新目前的趨勢是中共迎頭趕上，超越臺灣的軍事實力；臺灣不會有任何迫在眉睫的攻擊危險，但未來的趨勢往往會降低臺灣的安全，

除非技術或戰略創新能夠加強其實力或引導大陸降低威脅程度。雙方軍事平衡是不對稱的，並且可能變得更加擴大。臺灣的反應是跟從大多數人的意見（軍方在預算的優先程度正在下降，國民黨與中共和解）和平衡（太陽花學運，2016年民進黨選舉勝利），以上相對態勢往往隨選舉週期而產生變化。國民黨的隱性戰略是忽視軍事開支，依靠和解來減輕國防負擔，此舉雖然在外交上取得成功，可以在短期內減輕緊張局勢，但並沒有從根本上降低威脅程度（即使馬在2015年11月要求習近平從海峽中撤除短程彈道飛彈）。中共的保留態度證明是合理的，因為兩個月後臺灣選民反對國民黨的這項和解政策，無法選擇一個無意增加軍事預算或永久取消志願役的政府，其不續守的大陸政策，也可能引起中國進一步壓力和威脅。

We have argued here that cross-Strait security is fundamentally based on four factors: military innovation, economic power, national identity, and triangular relations. Yet the trend of each of these factors moves in its own direction, placing a heavy burden on politics to sort out the trajectory most favorable to the national interest. The trend of military innovation currently sees China catching up and surpassing Taiwan in military capability; the island is in no imminent danger of attack, but future trends are apt to degrade the island's security unless technical or strategic innovations enable it to reinforce its forces or induce the PRC to reduce the threat level. The military balance is asymmetric and is likely to become more so. Taiwan's response has been a combination of bandwagoning (the declining budgetary priority of the military, the KMT détente with the CCP) and balancing (the sunflower movement, the 2016 DPP electoral victory), with the relative emphasis tending to shift with the electoral cycle. The KMT's tacit strategy was to neglect military spending and rely instead on détente to reduce the defense burden, but although this succeeded diplomatically and in short-term tension reduction it did not fundamentally reduce the threat level (even when Ma personally asked Xi in November 2015 to remove SRBMs from the Strait). Of course Beijing's reservations proved justified when two months later Taiwan's electorate turned its back on the KMT détente policy. Taiwan then opted for a government which, despite a cross-Strait policy of noncompliance likely to incur further pressure and threats from the PRC, has no intention to increase the military budget or permanently cancel plans for a volunteer army.

在經濟趨勢預測方面，臺灣與中共之間的經濟實力差距將繼續擴大，雖然或許會隨著中共的成長放緩而減慢；如果中共目前的財政問題造成金融崩潰，其成長可能會放緩，但考慮到兩岸經濟整合的程度，也將拖累臺灣。從安全方面的意涵來看，即使動員政治意志將更大比例的預算分配給國防，軍事國防的經濟資源基礎仍將萎縮。臺灣對大陸不對稱的經濟依賴，其缺口迄今已經由中國大陸技術和管理必須依賴臺灣更先進經濟而有所彌補。但中國大陸的技術正在迅速趕上，使此方面之技術依賴正在下降。中共

的產業已經開始從初級合作夥伴過渡到市場競爭對手，而當它這麼做時，它一直在「法治」的幫助下排除臺灣企業。臺灣的離岸產業可能會面臨「重新靠岸」（亦即「回家」）或離岸前往他處。蔡政府所恢復的新南向政策（即投資東南亞或南亞）現在可能更為適應投資環境：中共的工資現在高於許多南方經濟體，並且鑑於中共在南方更為明確的既定政策，可能更樂於與臺商合作。

The economic trends predict that the economic power gap between Taiwan and China will continue to widen, though perhaps at a slower pace as growth in the mainland slows; if China's current financial problems precipitate a financial collapse, China's growth could decelerate more precipitately, but given the degree of cross-Strait economic integration China could take Taiwan down with it. The security implication is that the economic resource base for military defense shrinks even if the political will is mobilized to allocate a larger share of the budget to defense. Taiwan's asymmetric economic dependency on the mainland has thus far been compensated by China's technological and managerial dependency on Taiwan, which boasts a more advanced economy. But China is rapidly catching up technologically, and as it does its technological dependence on Taiwan will decline. Chinese industry has already begin the transition from junior partner to market competitor, and as it does so it has been pushing Taiwan firms out with the help of "rule by law." Taiwan's offshore industries may then face a choice between "reshoring" (i.e., coming home) or offshoring elsewhere. The Tsai administration's revived policy of going south (i.e., investing in Southeast or South Asia) may now be better attuned to the investment climate: wages are now higher in China than in many southern economies, and in the light of China's more assertive policies in the south may prefer cooperation with Taiwanese business people.

臺灣的國家認同和未來國家偏好未能與中共的統一戰線一致（如1980年代在香港所做的那樣相符），對中共一和國民黨領導人而言一無疑的是困惑和沮喪的根源。海峽兩岸在經濟上匯流，但在政治上，差異一如往常明顯。在這一點上，可以提出幾個非常暫定的假設：（一）在存在的用語中，「臺灣」認同只是對中共在國際上成功壟斷「中國」身分的務實反應。中共企圖禁止國際使用「中華民國」的名稱，因為中華民國被中華人民共和國打敗，不再有合法的存在地位。李登輝試圖以「特殊的國與國關係」（其中一個是中華民國）取回這一身分，但這不僅被中共否決，也被美國否決，陳水扁的「一邊一國」下場也未占便宜。馬英九在「九二共識」的框架內試圖援引「中國」身分，並重提在1991年「國統綱領」中提出的「特殊的非國家關係」或「相互不否認」的概念，將中共與臺灣關係描述為在一個國家內的兩個「地區」之間的關係（因為任何一方的憲法不允許另一方在其各自所聲稱的領土內存在）。馬英九此舉使得臺灣在犧牲聲稱國家地位為代價的前提下，加入了某些國際非政府組織，但取得非常有限的進展。這是因為中國允許臺灣的「中國」身分是只做為整體中國的一個次級部分：「中國臺灣」，甚至是「

中國臺北」。如果擁有中國身分的代價是臣服於中華人民共和國，放棄國家地位，則民眾傾向於喜歡臺灣的身分。(二)大陸繼續聲稱必要時使用武力，以達成統一之主權，對臺灣民心產生疏遠的影響。相較之下，在「一國兩制」比較成功地應用於香港，中共自接收以來從來沒有使用或威脅使用軍事力量，在特別行政區只保留小規模的駐軍，即使有支持民主的示威活動。由於軍力的天秤已向大陸有利傾斜，中共威脅變得更為可信，也強化疏離感，雖然在此議題中並非決定性因素。中共威脅只有在臺灣認為可能動武的情況下才是決定性的，相對地，中共只有在美國干預臺灣的威脅下能使用嚇阻手段，和動用武力。在此之前，中共的威脅只會引起道德風險，誘使臺灣政治家靠近中共的紅線而不越過此紅線（這是美國不樂見的，美國實不願為臺灣而與中共兵戎相見）。然而，中共似乎也相信，如果放棄使用武力，臺灣將宣布獨立。因此，中共不能使用武力，也不能放棄使用武力：武力威脅成為「雙輪」。(三)自1990年代初海峽兩岸開放以來，中共一直處於高速成長期，它是一個有吸引力的貿易夥伴和外國直接投資目的地，有助於刺激臺灣國內經濟。經濟整合是商業界無法抗拒的。但是，由於中共的GDP成長率從2007年的14%巔峰值開始下降，臺灣的成長率則下降得更為驚人。臺灣在2010年通過ECFA，回應中共「早收」刺激措施，達到將近10%飆升後，GDP成長率下降至2-4%，也許更值得一提的是2016年選舉期間的成長率不到1%。由於經濟在前述的「翅膀」組成當中扮演關鍵的驅動因素，一旦成長停滯，經濟整合的動能會迅速減緩。(四)中共的增長速度較快，產生更大規模的經濟。經濟不對稱使臺灣更依賴於這種關係，而其中較不必依賴的伙伴在衝突時損失相對較少。例如，中共是臺灣最大的貿易夥伴，臺灣卻只是中共第五大貿易夥伴。這種不對稱在馬政府時期，中共的國內生產毛額2002-2012年平均年增長10%以上，就比已往任何時候都明顯。在這種不平等的情況下，統一自然會傾向於瓦解較小實體的政治影響力，較大經濟體就不那麼受到政治影響力。(五)最後，馬並未真正有效地促進「再中國化」，因為他體認到臺灣民意反對此項發展，轉而專注於經濟復甦，當他承諾「6-3-3」（年GDP增長6%，年人均收入30,000美元，失業率低於3%）時，似乎是以和大陸更緊密的經濟整合為前提，預期刺激效應的，只是如上所述，未達到預期效果。

The failure of national identification and future nation preferences in Taiwan to align with China's united front reunification scheme, as they did in Hong Kong in the 1980s, is no doubt a source of mystery and frustration to Beijing--and to the KMT leadership. The two sides of the Strait have converged economically but politically the gulf remains as wide as ever. At this point a few very tentative hypotheses may be suggested: 1) In existential terms the "Taiwan" identity is simply a pragmatic reaction to the PRC's successful international monopolization of the "China" identity. The PRC has attempted to prohibit the international use of the title "Republic of China," because the ROC was defeated by the PRC and no longer has any legitimate existence. Lee Teng-hui attempted to retrieve this identity with "two

countries with a special relationship,” (one of which would be the Republic of China) but this was repudiated not only by China but by the US, and Chen Shui-bian's 1991 “one country on each side” (of the Strait) met no better fate. Ma tried to invoke the “China” identity within the 1992 consensus framework and by reviving the notion of “special non-state-to-state relations” or “mutual non-denial” originally coined in the 1991 Guidelines on National Unification. This formula characterized China-Taiwan relations as between two “areas” within one state (because the constitutions of neither allows for another state to exist in their respective claimed territory). This permitted Taiwan to make very limited progress in gaining admission to certain international NGOs, at the price of forfeiting its claim to statehood. China allowed Taiwan a “China” identity only as a subaltern part of the whole: “Taiwan, China,” or even “Taipei, China.” If the price of claiming Chinese identity was subordination to the PRC and renunciation of statehood, the populace tended to prefer Taiwanese identity. 2) The mainland's continued insistence on its sovereign right to use force if necessary to induce reunification clearly has had an alienating effect on public opinion in Taiwan. In contrast, in the relatively successful application of “one country two systems” to Hong Kong, China never used or threatened to use military force and has kept only a small military garrison in the Special Administrative Region since the turnover, which has never been mobilized despite popular demonstrations in support of democracy. The China threat's enhanced credibility as the military balance tilts in the mainland's favor enhances that alienation effect without being decisive in forcing the issue. The threat would be decisive only if Taiwan believes it could be used, and it could be used only if the threat of US intervention on Taiwan's behalf can be deterred. Until that point China's threats invoke moral hazard, tempting Taiwan politicians to walk close to China's red lines without crossing them (to the annoyance of the US, which has no wish to fight China over Taiwan). Yet Beijing seems convinced that if it renounces the use of force Taiwan will declare independence. Thus China cannot use force nor cannot it renounce the use of force: the threat of force becomes a “lose-lose” proposition. 3) The period since the advent of cross-Strait opening in the early 1990s has been a period of high-speed growth in the PRC, and this made it an attractive trade partner and FDI destination, helping to stimulate Taiwan's domestic economy as well. This made economic integration irresistible for the business community. But since China's GDP growth started declining from its 14 percent peak in 2007, Taiwan's growth has declined even more precipitously. After a spike to nearly 10 percent in 2010 in response to China's “early harvest” stimulus after the passage of ECFA, Taiwan's GDP growth rate sank to 2-4 percent--perhaps more to the point, it was below one percent during the 2016 election. Given the pivotal importance of economics as a motivating factor for convergence, once growth stalls momentum flags quickly. 4) China's more rapid growth rate has given rise to a much larger economy. Economic asymmetry makes Taiwan more dependent on the relationship than its larger partner,

which has less to lose from any contraction. Although China is Taiwan's largest trading partner, for instance, Taiwan is only China's 5th largest. And this asymmetry increased more during the Ma era than ever before, as China's GDP averaged more than 10 percent annual growth from 2002-2012. Reunification under such unequal circumstances would naturally tend to mitigate the political influence of the smaller entity relative to the larger. 5) Finally, Ma was really not very effective in promoting “re-Sinicization,” as he recognized that public opinion had turned against it. He focused instead on economic revival, promising “6-3-3” (annual GDP growth of 6 percent, an annual per capita income of US\$30,000 and an unemployment rate of less than 3 percent). Yet it seems that this promise was premised on the expected stimulative effect of closer economic integration with the mainland, and as noted above this fell short of expectations.

臺灣在此三角關係中，是三個安全切身國家中實力最弱的一個，夾在主要的安全威脅和唯一的軍事支持者之間，臺灣沒有犯錯的空間。臺灣需要與這兩大強權中的至少一個保持正面的關係，最好與兩者保持良好的關係。如果臺灣過度傾向於中共，中共便會基於願望實現，認定統一機會到來，並試圖鎖定臺灣，使之成為定局；而美國也將認定如此，並基於風險轉惡之考量而放棄臺灣，臺灣於是變成「芬蘭化」。如果臺灣過度向美國傾斜，美國將退縮，以便與中共保持友好關係，以保持在樞軸位置，因為如果美國退到次等的位置，中共可能變得肆無忌憚和好戰。隨著東海和南海領土爭端的加劇，三角的戰略背景發生了變化，這會使臺灣在此區域中更形孤立。臺灣對這些爭端的立場基本上與中共的立場一致，但即使中共萬一勝訴，我強烈懷疑中共會分給臺灣那怕是一小部分的主張權利。此外，臺灣在釣魚臺上的立場與日本不一致。日本對臺灣的安全沒有責任，但如果臺灣與中共發生衝突，來臺救援的部隊可能會自從日本基地而來。如果中日戰略兩極分化持續，帶來中美兩極分化，臺灣唯一可行的選擇就是轉向「翅膀」的樞紐位置。否則，它會發現自己是在支持無法執行的主權主張，並與那些支持其最需要的生存的國家作對，正如臺灣方面在「東海和平倡議」的案例。誠如先前所指出的，三角形中最小和最弱的一方很難扮演樞軸。在兩極化的背景下，兩邊都將迫使樞軸停止進行中間平衡，必須做出選邊，而弱的樞軸往往難以承受選邊的壓力。如果兩極化持續，壓力將進一步加強。臺灣在經濟和商業方面越來越與中共融合，其安全利益由美國承擔，並得到日本不可或缺の後勤支持。馬政府的長期個人信念是支持中國的領土主張，此立場令日本和美國方面感到失望，而蔡英文竟然重申此一立場。儘管臺灣方面一直試圖以更緩和的條件重新解釋其對主權問題的立場，並維持其安全承諾，但這仍是一個需要費盡心思的平衡。

In its triangular relationships Taiwan has little margin for error as the weakest of the three countries most important to its security: its main security threat and its only military supporter. Taiwan needs to maintain positive relationships with at least one of these powers and preferably

with both. If Taiwan tilts too far in favor of the mainland Beijing is apt on the basis of wish-fulfilment to assume reunification is occurring and try to lock it in; Washington will assume the same thing and abandon Taipei as a bad security risk. Thus Taiwan becomes Finlandized. If Taiwan tilts too far toward the US, the US will back away in order to maintain amicable relations with Beijing and remain in the pivot position, for if backed into a pariah position Beijing may become desperate and belligerent. And with the rise of the East and South China Sea territorial disputes, the strategic context of the triangle has changed in a way to exacerbate Taiwan's regional isolation. Taiwan's position on these disputes is essentially identical to that of China, but even if China should prevail I doubt very much that Beijing would grant Taipei even a fraction of its claim. Moreover Taiwan's position on Diaoyudao places it at odds with Japan. Japan has no responsibility for Taiwan's security, but if Taiwan gets into a conflict with Beijing the forces coming to Taiwan's rescue would come from bases in Japan. If there is continued Sino-Japanese strategic polarization, entailing Sino-US polarization, the only tenable option for Taipei is to move to a pivot position. Otherwise it finds itself in support of unenforceable sovereignty claims and at loggerheads with those countries whose backing it most needs to survive. And with its East China Sea Peace Initiative, that is exactly what Taipei has done. But as noted, it is very difficult for the smallest and weakest actor in a triangle to play pivot. In a context of polarization, both will pressure the pivot to stop equivocating and choose sides, and it is hard for a weak pivot to withstand such pressure. If polarization continues, pressure will further intensify. Taiwan is increasingly integrated with the mainland in economic and commercial terms, while its security interests are underwritten by the US with the indispensable logistic support of Japan. Ma's long-standing personal convictions brought him into support of China's territorial claims, to the dismay of both Tokyo and Washington, and Tsai Ing-wen has amazingly reaffirmed that position. Taipei has been trying to reinterpret its position on sovereignty issues in more conciliatory terms while maintaining its security commitments. But it is a delicate balance.

