



戰爭的第四個層次

The Fourth Level of War

譯者簡介



鄧炘傑備役少校，管院專9期、國防大學政治作戰學院英文正規班、中原大學企管研究所碩士；曾任排長、連長、地區補給庫分庫長、教準部編譯官，現任特約翻譯、華語／英語專業領隊／導遊。

The Fourth Level of War

戰爭的第四個層次

"Civilization began because the beginning of civilization is a military advantage."¹ This observation by Walter Bagehot is not far off the mark. Warfare certainly matured along with civilization as a violent expression of political will and intent. We currently view the art of warfare in three levels-tactical, operational, and strategic-but it was not always so. In the beginning, there were strategy and tactics. Strategy outlined how and to what purpose war might be used to achieve political objectives. Tactics directed how the violence was actually applied on the battlefield. For most of military history, tactical art was able to achieve strategic objectives as tribes, forces, and armies marshaled on the battlefield to destroy the enemy's ability to resist their master's political will. Although much debated, operational art was born

1 Quoted in Richard A. Preston and Sydney Wise, *Men in Arms*(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), 15.

at the end of the 19th century when the size of armies, made possible by the development of the nation-state, rendered tactics unable to bring about political results. Civilization has moved on. From a doctrinal, theoretical, and practical point of view, it is now time to consider a fourth level of war—the theater-strategic level of war.

「文明的開展是由於具有軍事優勢」。¹巴吉哈特(Walter Bagehot)的觀察並沒有錯。因為以暴力展現政治意圖與目的的戰爭，確實和文明與時俱進。我們現在將用兵區分成3個層面——戰術、作戰與戰略——但其實並非一直如此，起初只有戰略與戰術。戰略所強調的是如何透過戰爭以達成哪些政治目的；戰術則是在戰場上應如何運用暴力技巧。對大多數戰史來說，所謂用兵之道是在戰場上集合各部族、各種戰力與大軍摧毀敵人的力量，使敵無法抵抗其政治意志。雖然有很多不同看法，一般都認為作戰之道誕生於19世紀末，其背景是當國家的發展足以支持一支規模夠大的兵力，運用戰術作為來達成其所欲之政治結果。隨著文明的不斷推進，從準則、理論和實務等觀點來看，是該考慮戰爭的第四個層次——戰區戰略的時候了。

Doctrine 準則

There is little written about theater strategy in U.S. doctrine. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, includes only a single paragraph on what would seem an important subject. U.S. doctrine acknowledges the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. However, doctrine also includes a theater-strategic level in an overlapping area that suggests this level bridges the operational and strategic levels.² Yet the operational level is defined as linking "strategy and tactics by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the military end states and strategic objectives."³ So what is the theater-strategic level of war? What is theater strategy? The problem in placing theater strategy in some useful context is that we already have so many kinds of strategy and no real consensus on what they are.

美軍準則有關戰區戰略的篇幅很少。聯戰書刊5-0《聯合作戰計畫作業》也僅有一小段提到這個重要的主題。美軍的準則對戰爭的認知為戰略、作戰與戰術等3個層次；然

2 Joint Publication(JP)3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations(Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2011), I-13.

3 JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States(Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2013), I-8.



而準則也將戰區戰略層次，有所重疊並註明為溝通戰略與作戰階層之橋樑。²不過作戰層次的定義，是指「藉建立軍事目的與戰略目標之各種作戰目標，以連結戰略與戰術者」。³那麼戰區戰略層次為何？何謂戰區戰略？戰區戰略難以定位的問題，在於我們戰略的種類太多，又沒有對其有一定的共識。

On the menu of strategies, we can find grand, national, national security, national military, just plain military, and theater strategies. All of these are harnessed to serve policy, but each varies in its objectives and means. There is a wide range of definitions of strategy, most of which illustrate an attribute rather than its essential nature. They range from the general: Art Lykke's famous "strategy equals ends plus ways plus means"; to Lawrence Freedman's more poetic "a story told in the future tense"; to Colin Gray's more specific "the use or threat of military power for political purposes."⁴ The Department of Defense(DOD) asserts that strategy is "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and multinational objectives."⁵ This suggests that strategy involves the whole weight of the U.S. Government in the pursuit of national policy. Does theater strategy likewise involve all elements of national power?

說到戰略的清單方面，我們發現有大戰略、國家戰略、國家安全戰略、國家軍事戰略、純軍事戰略，以及戰區戰略。全都是為政策服務，但其目的與手段卻各不相同。戰略的定義，範圍非常廣，但解釋大多是在描述其特有情況，而非其本質之精義。其定義之廣泛：從萊克著名的「戰略等於目的加方法與手段」，到費里德曼充滿詩意的「說未來緊張之故事」，再到格瑞比較具體的說法：「以軍事力量的使用或威脅，達成政治目的」。⁴美國國防部主張戰略是：「一種慎重或一系列以同步整合的方式，運用國家力量工具之思維，以達成戰區、國家或多國之目標者，謂之」。⁵意即戰略係舉全美國之力以追求國家之政策者也。戰區戰略是否會涉及到全國的各個部門？

In the pursuit of U.S. national policy, DOD has divided the world into six geographic

4 Arthur F. Lykke, "Defining Military Strategy," *Military Review* 69, no. 5(May 1989); Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History*(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Colin Gray, *Modern Strategy*(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

5 JP 1, I-7.

combatant commands. Combatant commanders oversee these areas of responsibility and develop theater strategies. By doctrine, a theater strategy is "an overarching construct outlining a combatant commander's vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other elements of national power to achieve national strategic objectives."⁶ Combatant commanders can only seek to synchronize and integrate, not to direct other elements of national power in the pursuit of unity of effort. Theater commanders conduct business in the complex environment of national, international, coalition, and alliance policy. The theater is where policy meets the joint force. How is this done and to what purpose?

在達成美國國家政策方面，國防部將全世界區分成6個地緣作戰司令部，各司令官負責監管其責任區，並設定其戰區戰略。依準則來說，所謂戰區戰略就是「指揮官所望將軍事作為和作戰與國家權力其他部門相整合與同步而架構之全般方針，以達成國家戰略目標」。⁶戰區指揮官也可盱衡情勢，僅採同步與整合步驟，而不動用其他非軍事的國家力量以達成目標。戰區指揮官是在國家、國際、聯軍和盟軍政策的複雜環境下指導其工作的。「戰區」是因應聯合戰力政策，是該完成什麼以及其目的為何的所在。

Combatant commanders work for the Secretary of Defense and President through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Charged with geographic responsibilities, they employ "theater strategy to align and focus efforts and resources to mitigate and prepare for conflict and contingencies in their AOR [area of responsibility] to support and advance U.S. interests."⁷ A theater campaign plan details the strategy and usually employs security cooperation, building partner capacity, and force posture, among other activities, to achieve the commander's vision, advance U.S. interests, and prepare for possible contingencies. This is eminently reasonable and desirable and is arguably effective, but it largely addresses steady-state or peacetime requirements. There is no doctrine based on theory or practice for developing or executing theater strategy in war. Specific contingency plans, whether directed by DOD or self-generated by combatant commanders, address specific threats, generally with operational campaign

6 JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms(Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2010, as amended through March 2015), 249.

7 JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning(Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2011), II-7.



planning. Where does theater strategy fit in wartime, particularly with multiple theaters of operations? Does the scale of effort-the intermediate theater objectives as opposed to theater of operations objectives-justify a fourth level of war?

各戰區指揮官透過參謀首長聯席會議主席，向國防部長及美國總統負責。在責付的地緣責任區，他們「運用戰區戰略以調和並集中作為與資源，以在其責任區內降低或準備應付衝突及意外事件，以支持並促進美國利益」。⁷1份戰區戰役計畫，有戰略的細節和一般安全合作之運用，夥伴能量之建立，部隊戰備姿態及其他之作為，以達成指揮官之所望，促進美國利益並準備應付突發事件等。其立意甚佳、面面俱到而可行，但大多只適用於靜態或平時需求。尚無有理論為基礎的準則或擬定之實務及戰時執行之戰區戰略。針對應付特定威脅的應變計畫，無論是由國防部指導或指揮官自行發起的，大多是作戰的戰役計畫。戰區戰略在戰時適切之定位，尤其是多重威脅之行動時為何？其投入之規模－戰區中期目標和戰區之作戰目標相對照－可以成為戰爭的第四個層次嗎？

Theory 理論

The assertion that it is time to consider another level of war directly relates to how these levels are linked and why they now need to be expanded. The oft-quoted Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, helped to establish the relationship between the levels of war when he noted that "the concepts characteristic of time-war, campaign, and battle-are parallel to those of space-country, theater of operations, and positions."⁸ Indeed, the relationship between the levels of war includes time, scale, objectives, effect, and, significantly, the influence of policy. All of these factors are interrelated-that is to say, interactive. For example, there is a temporal relationship between the levels of war. Things happen much faster at the tactical level than at the operational or strategic levels. Likewise, the conduct and results of operational campaigns take less time than the full implementation of national strategies. Indeed, strategic results may take years to fully realize or even manifest.

這樣的主張該是探討與戰爭各層次直接關連，以及何以需要衍伸的時刻了。普魯士

8 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 379.

的兵家克勞塞維茲常被引述的話，有助於戰爭各層次之間關係的建立，他說：「時間特性之概念－戰爭、戰役和戰鬥－與其空間相對應－國家、作戰地區及作戰地點。」⁸的確，戰爭各層次的關係包含了時間、規模、目的、效果，而且，最重要的是對國家政策之影響。以上所有因素都是彼此相關，換言之，即相互為用。例如在戰爭各層次的關係，是與時間有關的；在戰術層次的事物演變，遠比作戰或戰略層次快得多。同樣的，作戰層次戰役的指導和結果所用的時間，也比全面完成國家戰略為少。的確，戰略作為的全面實現，或者即使只是證實，可能都要花上好幾年時間。

Clausewitz pointed out that this is a natural consequence of the scale and objectives-the relationship between battle, campaign, and war. To better illustrate the temporal relationship, the classic diagram of the levels of war should depict wheels of increasing size. At the tactical level, the wheels and events turn much faster than at the larger operational and strategic levels.

Size matters. War is waged in a geographic context. Each level of war has been historically associated with scale and scope of effort. The tyranny of distance contributes to the temporal relationship between the levels. Tactics is the application of technology to the battlefield to defeat the enemy and thereby gain immediate or cumulative military results. Operational art is applied to a spectrum of operations, connecting or synchronizing battles and major operations to achieve strategic effect. This is particularly the case when a single major operation such as Urgent Fury in Grenada(1983)or Just Cause in Panama(1989)can achieve strategic objectives. Theater strategy in war should seek to synchronize and arrange multiple campaigns in a theater of war or area of responsibility to achieve national strategic objectives. In other words, theater strategy synchronizes multiple theaters of operation.

克勞塞維茲指出，以規模和目的來說，戰鬥、戰役和戰爭之關係，是很自然的結果。為了更適切說明時間關係，描繪戰爭層次典型的表格是以輪型圖來代表其規模。在戰術層次，輪型圖會比規模較大的作戰、戰略層次的圖轉得更快。規模大小很重要。戰爭是在地緣環境中進行的。自古以來每一個層次的戰爭都與規模及投入的資源有關。距離讓各作戰層次間有不同的時間關係。戰術層次是將科技運用到戰場上擊敗敵人，藉此獲得立即成效，或累積軍事成果。作戰層次的藝術，是將範圍內的各種作戰，同步連結戰鬥與主要戰役，以利戰略目的之達成。最典型藉著單一主要戰役達成戰略目標的例子是1983年格瑞納達的「緊急狂暴」，以及1989年巴拿馬的「正義之師」作戰。戰區戰略必



須將作戰區和責任區域內的多起戰役統合與安排，以達成國家戰略目標。換句話說，戰區戰略是統合各戰區之作戰。

Levels of war are also distinguished by objectives-how each level contributes to achieving the ultimate policy objectives. In cases where only one theater of operations is engaged in combat operations, there will be almost complete congruence between national, theater, and theater of operations objectives. Theater of operations planning and operations will dominate national attention. Theater of operations objectives and national objectives will be virtually synonymous, and theater strategy will be cast largely in a supporting role. This relationship and the role and function of theater strategy may well change, however, when the theater has multiple theaters of operations conducting military operations.

戰爭的層次也可依據其目的做區分－各層次如何滿足其最終政策目標。假使戰爭只是在單一戰區，那麼全國性或戰區性的目標都會一致，作戰戰區的計畫與軍事行動也因此會吸引全國性的關注。當作戰戰區的目標與國家目標之間沒有差別，戰區戰略就成了輔助的角色。不過，當戰爭不只一個戰區時，戰區戰略的關係、角色與功能，很可能為之丕變。

If, for example, war erupts on the Korean Peninsula, the national, theater of operations, and theater objectives will perfectly align, leading to a victory in Korea. The U.S. Pacific Command(USPACOM)commander will be cast largely in a supporting role while the Korean theater of operations commander garners national attention and, likely, direct or close supervision by the Secretary of Defense and President. In this case, the USPACOM commander will be cast in a supervisory role, although it will be a largely supporting role. If, however, at the same time a conflict erupts with the Chinese over Taiwan or elsewhere in the region, the theater commander must now actively balance, prioritize, and synchronize major operations or campaigns in the theater to achieve national strategic objectives. In this scenario, theater strategy becomes an essential intermediary level of war due to the scope, scale, and nature of the conflict. Despite this critical theater-strategic role, political scrutiny will inevitably gravitate toward the theater of operations with the most domestic and international political consequences. This is an example of the critical role of policy as a distinguishing feature in the

levels of war.

舉例來說，如果朝鮮半島發生戰爭，美國家、各戰區以及戰區目標都會一致，就是贏得戰爭勝利。美軍太平洋司令部司令官將會扮演支援的角色，韓國戰區指揮官才是全國矚目的焦點；而且不免受國防部長和總統的指導或密切督導。在此例中，太平洋司令部司令官擔負的雖然主要是支援任務，同時也扮演指導監管角色。但是，如果此時臺灣海峽或本區其他地方發生衝突，戰區司令就必須主動盱衡情勢，統合重大作戰或戰役，區分優先次序，以謀求國家戰略目標之達成。在這想定中，戰區戰略因為衝突的強度、規模和本質，變成不可或缺的中間層次。雖然戰區戰略的角色事關重大，但政治考量無可避免地會影響到軍事行動，使戰區作戰必須考量國、內外的政治情勢。以上案例說明，政策是區分戰爭層次特性的重要角色。

There is an ascending quality to the role of policy in the levels of war that provides both context and constantly exhibits influence. This, of course, is nothing more than reiterating Clausewitz's most famous insight that war is simply a continuation of policy by other means. But the role of policy varies with the level of war. The tactical art largely involves the application of technology to the battlespace, so technology has more influence than does policy at this level. Progressing from operational to strategic, the influence of policy grows, and at the strategic level, it predominates. Again, Clausewitz anticipated this relationship when he asserted that "Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details. Political considerations do not determine the posting of guards or the employment of patrols. But they are more influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle."⁹

政策角色對作戰內涵和持續影響力與戰爭層次而俱增。這一點跟克勞塞維茲一再重申的著名觀點不謀而合：戰爭是以其他手段達成政策之延續。但是政策的角色，在不同戰爭層次也會有所不同。戰術主要是將科技運用於戰場上，因此在這個層次，科技的影響力比政策要大。戰爭層次升高到作戰，政策的影響力逐步提升；到戰略層次時，政策就全盤掌控了局勢。克勞塞維茲預測這之間的關係時，再次提出他的主張：「當然，政策並不至於將其影響力延伸到作戰時的枝微末節。政治考量不會決定如何布防，但卻會

9 Ibid., 606.



影響一場作戰或戰役計畫的制定」。⁹

The extent of policymaker involvement in operational details has often been a sticking point in civil-military relations. Should the President be picking target points or making tactical decisions from Washington, DC? The answer invariably lies with the question of the potential strategic or political effects of the tactical action. President Lyndon Johnson was famously involved in picking targets in North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.¹⁰ His concern was not tactical effects but the potential of hitting Soviet or Chinese advisors or personnel, which could catastrophically escalate the war. Likewise, President Barack Obama ordered and then watched the tactical raid that took out Osama bin Laden. In both cases, the effects of the action matched to policy objectives determined the relationship between the tactical, operational, and strategic.

決策者介入作戰細節的程度，經常是軍文關係的癥結。美國總統應不應該在華府挑選軍事攻擊目標或下達戰術決策？答案一定是取決於該戰術行動，是否具有潛在的戰略或政治效應。眾所周知，越戰時的詹森總統，會親自挑選北越為攻擊目標。¹⁰他並非著眼於戰術目的，而是這些攻擊行動可能會傷及蘇聯或中國的顧問或相關人員，而讓戰爭情勢升高到難以收拾。歐巴馬總統親自下令，並且監看著突襲賓拉登的戰術突擊，也是同樣道理。以上兩例顯示，作為的效果是否符合政策目標，就決定了該行動是屬於戰術、作戰或戰略層次。

Finally, the levels of war are distinguished by their tactical, operational, theater-strategic, and strategic effect. Chance and the unique nature of violence give war a nonlinear character, but the notion of levels of war enables us to visualize and arrange resources to purpose in a fairly linear or conceptual way. The purpose of each level of war is action-to get things done. In a practical reality, this calls for some orderly approach to thinking, planning, and executing military operations. Bounded, directed, and constrained by policy while wrestling with an

10 See Dennis M. Drew, "Rolling Thunder 1965: Anatomy of Failure," CADRE Paper, Report No. AU-ARI-CP-86-3, October 1986, available at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/drew2.htm ; Sarah Gordon, "Lunch with Robert Caro," Financial Times, January 4, 2013, available at www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/5dae469c-50eb-11e2-b287-00144feab49a.html .

adaptive animate enemy, planners and commanders seek to stack the odds in their favor. The levels of war are a construct that helps them achieve this. The theater-strategic level is no less a tool than the operational or tactical framework for planning and execution.

最後，戰爭之所以被歸類為戰術、作戰、戰區戰略或戰略等層次，端看其所造成的效果。暴力行為的機率與獨特性，賦予了戰爭非線性的特點，但是對戰爭層次如果有所認識，可以讓我們以合理的方式瞭解情況並投入資源應對。戰爭區分各層次的目的，無非是採取適當行動——完成任務。在實務面則需要一連串合理規劃和執行軍事行動。在戰場上被靈活狡詐的敵人困住時，如果還受限於政策，計畫參謀與指揮官就必須尋求化不利為有利。戰爭層次的劃分，正是提供這類達成目標的架構。而戰區戰略這個層次，比起作戰或戰術層次來說，就是另外一種規劃、執行的架構。

What is the relationship of the levels of war in terms of effects? Do we need success at the tactical level to assure success at the operational? Likewise, do we need operational success to achieve theater-strategic or strategic effect? Logic suggests that success at one level makes success at the next level more likely, but it in fact may be insufficient. History is full of cautionary examples where tactical or operational success does not guarantee strategic success. German military history in the 20th century is certainly a case in point. The list of U.S. tactical or even operational success in the limited wars since 1945 leading to equally limited strategic effect might also be cited.

以其達成之效果而言，各戰爭層次之間相互關係為何？我們是否需要戰術層次的成功，以確保在作戰層次之成功？同樣道理，是否必須作戰層次之成功，以達成戰區戰略或戰略層次所要之成效？以邏輯來推論，一個層次獲得勝利，確實有助於達成下一個層次的目標，但事實上不必然如此。戰史上充斥了太多在戰術或作戰層次取得成功，卻無法確保戰略層次之勝利的案例。20世紀德國的戰史就是一個很好的佐證。從1945年以來，美軍在戰術及作戰層次獲得勝利的有限戰爭中，也並非都能獲得相對的戰略效益。

All the levels of war function simultaneously. Some may argue that there is no linear relationship between the levels of war. Indeed, even doctrine recognizes that tactical events may result in immediate strategic effect. This may have increased in recent years due to the



pervasive nature and potential influence of media coverage of world events. As an example, the raid to capture or kill bin Laden certainly comes to mind. This tactical or strategic compression is usually rare and the effects are most likely transitory. Despite the impact on U.S. public morale, al Qaeda and affiliated terrorists fight on without bin Laden. The temporal relationship between the levels of war, if true, would suggest that the most enduring effects at each level of war are most likely cumulative. In the planning and conduct of operations with enduring results, the relationship between the levels of war remains useful in arranging operations, assigning tasks, and allocating resources.

戰爭中，所有層次的運作都是同時進行的。有些人可能認為戰爭各層次中並無線性關係；事實上，即使準則也認為戰術事件會立即影響到戰略。而且這種情況近幾年愈見普遍，主要原因是媒體對國際事件無所不在的報導及其潛在影響力。舉例來說，捕殺賓拉登的突襲行動讓很多人記憶猶新。這次行動不論就戰術或戰略來說都極為罕見，形成的效應也甚為短暫；即使在美國讓很多人士氣為之一振，但是基地組織和其隸屬之恐怖分子，在沒有賓拉登的情況下一樣活躍。如果時間因素與各戰爭層次之間有所關聯為真，那就說明戰爭的每個層次中，是會積小勝為大勝的。作戰時的規劃與指導若有成果累積，在安排任務、指派工作和分配資源時，戰爭各層次間的關係依然是有用的。

Practice 實際面

Theater strategy is as old as empires contending for power and influence in distant corners of their reach. The leaders of the Roman, British, and French empires, as well as of succeeding empires, all sought to tailor strategy to specific regions while harmonizing those actions with the greater national purpose. As war spread around the world, beginning with the rise of the nation-state in Europe, theater strategy became ever more necessary. Some nations were better at it than others. In the 18th century, for example, the British won and retained India but lost the United States. World War I demonstrated-and World War II confirmed-that theater strategy was a critical path to national strategic objectives and success. Much like operational art, however, historians have largely ignored theater-strategic art as a specific area worthy of interest and study. Narratives of battles, campaigns, and national strategies continue to dominate the story

of military history.

戰區戰略的概念，早在古老帝國間爭權奪利、無遠弗屆的時代就已經出現。從羅馬、大英、法蘭西帝國一直到後續帝國的領導者，無不設法針對特定區域修正其戰略，並協調各種作為以獲取更大的國家利益。當歐洲的民族國家興起，戰爭蔓延到世界各地時，戰區戰略變得比以往更為必要。某些國家在這方面手法比較嫻熟。舉18世紀的例子來說，英國成功入侵印度，但在北美卻告失敗。第一次世界大戰顯示—第二次世界大戰證實—戰區戰略乃國家戰略目標達成之要道。然而，就像作戰之用兵，對於特定區域而言甚具潛在利益和研究價值的戰區戰略，卻一直被歷史學家忽略。軍事史的資料仍是以記述戰鬥、戰役和國家戰略為主。

For the U.S. military, current practice is rooted in World War II and postwar solutions to filling the power vacuums left by the destruction of the German and Japanese empires. Even before the war ended, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to retain the unified command system that had proved so successful. In June 1945, the Joint Chiefs issued a directive appointing General Dwight D. Eisenhower as commanding general of U.S. forces in the European theater of operations. In December 1946, President Harry S. Truman approved the Unified Command Plan, which established seven geographic theater commands.¹¹ Over the years, these commands have changed a great deal, but the requirement for geographic responsibilities and the need to plan and orchestrate both daily and potential military activities remain the same. The distinguishing factors among the levels of war-scale, objective, policy, time, and effect-have also been evident at the theater-strategic level of war.

對美國軍方而言，目前很多作為，都是源自於填補第二次世界大戰及戰後被德國和日本帝國摧毀之後的權力真空。早在戰爭結束前，美國參謀首長聯席會議就決定，要保留經驗證非常適用的統一指揮體系。1945年6月，首長聯席會議發布訓令任命艾森豪將軍為美軍歐洲戰區司令官。1946年12月，杜魯門總統簽署了聯合司令部計畫，從此確立了美國的7個地區司令部。¹¹這些年來，這些司令部的組織與運作雖然迭有變更，但是對

11 Ronald H. Cole et al., *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1995), 11.



轄區的責任及規劃日常與應急軍事活動的要求卻未有1日鬆懈。區分戰爭層次的各要素—規模、目的、政策、時間以及效益—也在戰區戰略層次中脈絡分明。

Scale. Over the last decade, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) has been involved in multiple theaters of operations in the war on terror. In terms of scale, USCENTCOM established separate theaters of operations as the war spread across the Middle East, South Central Asia, and Africa. Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa account for three separate theaters of operations. The potential for multiple and simultaneous theaters of operations within the same geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility is obvious, particularly in the case of the Pacific and European commands. These potential separate theaters of operations span the full range of conflict, from state to nonstate to hybrid, in every region.

規模21世紀初時，美國中央司令部，發生過幾次跨區的恐怖攻擊活動。根據規模來劃分，當這些攻擊活動擴散到中東、中亞南部和非洲地區時，中央司令部應該另行設立不同戰區以為因應。阿富汗、伊拉克和非洲之角分別屬於3個不同的戰區，要同時在多個戰區執行反恐，對單一司令部來說風險太高；對太平洋司令部和歐洲司令部來說，更是如此。這些牽涉在內的戰區，必須全面性的應對這些衝突，從每個地區的國家、非國家、半國家組織等。

Time and Effects 時間與效益

The temporal relationship between the tactical, operational, theater-strategic, and strategic levels remains constant. Most of the various campaigns in the Middle East and South Central Asia over the last decade have involved counterinsurgency (COIN), building partner capacity (BPC), and counterterrorism operations. Things still happen quickly at the tactical level, but COIN and BPC are inherently slow and expensive. Counterterrorism operations may be less expensive and more discrete but, like COIN and BPC, the effects are cumulative. The strategic decision to surge troops into Iraq in 2007 enabled the operational decision to first secure Baghdad. The many tactical actions that actually extended security to Iraq's capital took place daily, accumulating to achieve operational effect. The tactical, operational, theater-

strategic, and national-strategic effects were linked but not simultaneous and remain separated in time.

在戰術、作戰、戰區戰略和戰略層次之間，存在時間因素的差異，這是無庸置疑的。過去十幾年發生在中東和中亞南部的各種衝突，基本上可以區分成綏靖(COIN)、建立夥伴關係的能力(BPC)和反恐作戰。如果發生在戰術層次，持續時間會比較短；而綏靖和BPC在本質上就歷時較久，成本也較高。反恐作戰成本可能沒那麼高，每次事件之間的關聯性較弱，但是和綏靖及BPC一樣，效應是會累積的。美國在2007年派兵進入伊拉克的戰略決定，讓保護巴格達的安全，成為最優先的作戰決策。幾乎每天都會發生的戰術行動，確實都是為了保護伊拉克首都的安全，而這些效應累積下來的結果就是達成了作戰目的。戰術、作戰、戰區戰略和國家戰略的效應是環環相扣的，但不見得會同時發生。

The tactical effects were undeniable and came quickly as U.S. forces worked to expand security in the capital region. The operational effects took more time, however, as the number of violent incidents decreased, providing an appearance of incremental progress that did not reflect the reality on the ground.¹² It has also been argued that the troop surge allowed the operational consequence of supporting or enabling the Sunni Awakening that developed over the following year.¹³ Regardless of the debate about the operational effects of the surge, the strategic effects remain contested. Did military operations in Iraq achieve our national objectives of establishing a sustainable, friendly, and democratic Iraq?

當美軍著手保護首都地區時，戰術效應很快就顯現出來。但是得等到暴力事件逐漸減少，情勢已經獲得控制以後才算得到作戰效應。¹²有人認為進軍伊拉克的決策導致遜尼派勢力的崛起。¹³不論這項決策造成何種局面，以戰略效應來說，確實遭致諸多批評。出兵伊拉克的軍事行動，真的對我們建立穩定、友善、民主的伊拉克政權之國家目標有所幫助嗎？

12 Peter R. Mansoor, *Surge: My Journey with General Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War*(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 209.

13 Ibid., 263.



What is missing is a discussion of theater-strategic effects beyond the national objectives. How did our actions stabilize or destabilize the region? What effect did our conduct of operations in Iraq have on the other theaters of operations? How synchronized was our theater strategy? Clearly, the effects of the U.S. campaign in Iraq are still playing out in the region and continue to resonate across the theater.

很少人討論到戰區戰略效應超越國家目標這個問題。我們的行為到底是讓該地區穩定下來，還是更加動盪不安？我們在伊拉克的作為如果運用到其他地區，會產生何種後果？戰區戰略要如何才能做到所謂同步？很明顯，美國出兵伊拉克的事件不算結束，後續影響還在持續發酵。

Objectives and the Role of Policy 目標及政策的角色

The theater commander will rarely be able to prioritize the theaters of operations within his area of responsibility. This is due to the increasing influence of policy at the theater-strategic level. With regard to objectives, the notion that theater and national objectives are absolutely congruent was confirmed as political attention swayed from Afghanistan to Iraq and back to Afghanistan. Domestic and international politics and Presidential and national credibility all circumscribed the theater commander's ability to plan and execute operations over time and across the theater.¹⁴ In other words, the role of policy was certainly evident and increasingly influential at this level of war, so much so that the role of the theater—that is to say, the combatant commander—often seemed eclipsed.

很少戰區指揮官會將自己責任區的作戰任務，列為整個轄區的最優先，主要是因為在戰區戰略層次，政策所扮演的影響力已經越來越重。說到目標，戰區目標和國家目標有一個共通概念，就是政策關注到哪邊，目標就設定在哪邊；猶如常常從阿富汗轉到伊拉克，又會從伊拉克轉回阿富汗一樣。國內暨國際政治，這些因素長期以來都限縮了戰區司令官規劃、執行作戰的能力。¹⁴換句話說，政策的角色在這個層次很明顯的越來越有影響力，也因此使得各戰區的角色越來越重要——也就是說，各地區戰鬥司令官的份量

14 Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 280: "What is militarily possible must be politically possible."

，經常顯得無足輕重。

This has been the case historically. For example, General William Westmoreland, USA, is remembered as the U.S. commander in Vietnam, but few can recall admirals Ulysses S. Sharp, John S. McCain, Jr., or Noel Gayler as USPACOM commanders during the same war. Similarly, few may recall the name of the USCENTCOM commander while General David Petraeus, USA, commanded in Iraq in 2007.¹⁵ To win in Vietnam and Iraq was the theater of operations, theater, and national objective. What, then, is the role of the theater commander? Is he an enabler or a supporter? Someone has to be looking after the region, not just the hot war. What have our military actions in the Middle East, taken as a whole, done for our position and our interests in the region? Did we single-handedly pursue the transitory main effort at the risk of losing perspective and balance in the region as a whole? Did we synchronize and orchestrate multiple campaigns in various theaters of operations across the entire theater?

這在歷史上早有前例可循。美國的魏斯摩蘭將軍，以越戰時期擔任戰場指揮官聞名於世，但與他同時期，擔任太平洋司令部司令官的幾位上將，如夏普、麥肯，或是蓋勒等將軍，卻少有人記住他們的名字。同樣道理，很少人會記得2007年時中央司令部司令官的名字(按：時任司令官約翰·阿比扎伊德，John Philip Abizaid)，但可以記得當時美軍駐伊拉克指揮官名叫大衛彼得雷烏斯上將(按：渠任中央司令部司令期間為2008年10月31日至2010年6月30日)。¹⁵ 要贏得越南及伊拉克戰爭，靠的是戰區作戰、作戰區的運籌帷幄，以及國家目標；司令部司令官的定位在哪裡？算是促進者還是支援者？一定要有人顧全大局，而不只是戰火之處。整體來說，我們在中東地區採取的軍事行動，真的是站在美國的立場，為了維護美國在這個地區的利益？美國是否冒著不顧全大局的風險，只為了獨力在這個地區追求短暫的成就？以整個司令部的角度來說，美軍是否做到在各不同作戰區之間的協調與整合工作？

If we look back at the last decade and ask why we may have failed to achieve our

15 "In beginning a partnership with Dave Petraeus that would last nearly four and half years in two wars, I would tell him that Iraq was his battlespace and Washington was mine." See Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Knopf, 2014), 49.



objectives, there are many possible reasons for the lack of complete success. One that is considered less often than others is the failure to think hard about the doctrine, theory, and practice of theater-strategic art. The theater-strategic level shares the same defining criteria in the relationship between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war—those of scale, time, objectives, effects, and the role of policy. If, in the future, we can expect near-simultaneous challenges or conflicts in multiple theaters of operations within a single combatant command, we may well profit from paying more attention to the fourth level of war.

回顧過去十幾年來，為什麼美國無法達成既定目標，可以檢討出好幾個可能原因。其中一個被忽略的癥結是：我們並未認真思考在準則、理論和實際運作等方面，如何精進戰區戰略層次的技術。不管是從規模、時間、目的、效應和政策定位等各要素來審視，戰區戰略這個層次，各種運作規範都還寄生在所謂戰爭的三大層次—戰術、作戰，以及戰略之中。如果在未來，我們還期待在一個單一司令部轄區的數個不同戰役中，能發揮「準同步」的協調整合能力以爭取戰爭勝利，就必須從專注於提升這第四作戰層次的能力開始做起。

本篇取材自聯合作戰季刊，2016年第一季

作者：馬提尼(Michael R. Matheny)博士，美國陸軍戰爭學院軍事戰略與作戰教授