



Force of the Future

未來戰力

作者簡介



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When Defense Secretary Ash Carter took the reins of the Pentagon in February, he inherited a Pentagon coming out of two prolonged land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, navigating a budgetary drawdown threatened by sequestration, and wrestling with how to remain the dominant military in a fast-changing world. As one of his predecessors Robert Gates noted, since Vietnam, "our record has been perfect" about predicting future wars: "We have never once gotten it right."

當卡特(Ash Carter)在二月份就任美國國防部長時，同時也背負著伊拉克及阿富汗這兩場曠日費時戰役所帶來的後果，飽受預算縮減威脅之餘，仍要在變化莫測的世局中，保有軍事主導之地位；正如美國前國防部長蓋茲(Robert Gates)所說：「自從越戰後，對於預測未來的戰爭，我們從來沒有一次是對的」。

His first speech was expected to signal his new priorities as secretary of defense. Some expected a talk in Silicon Valley, or at one of the service academies to showcase his message. Yet for his inaugural speech, Carter chose to return his alma mater, Abingdon Senior High School in Philadelphia, to speak to teenage students. Billed as a talk about the "Force of the Future," many expected it to be about new technology, the Pentagon's "Third Offset Strategy," or the importance of cyber warfare.

很多人認為他的首度演講，將表明他擔任部長之後的首要任務；某些人則預判卡特會在矽谷或三軍中的任何一所軍校演講；然而，卡特選擇返回母校，費城阿賓頓高中來對莘莘學子做他的就職演講。許多人預判所談的「未來戰力」指的可能是新技術、五角大廈的「第三次抵銷戰略」或網路戰的重要性。

Surprisingly, it was all about people-how to find, get, and keep the best military and civilian talent in the Department of Defense.'

但是，卡特卻跌破大家的眼鏡，內容全部都是有關於人力培育，如何為國防部招募與留住最優秀的人才。

Despite his strong background in the world of technology and defense policy, Carter unequivocally emphasized that his top priority would be to recruit and retain talented young Americans into the Defense Department. In his Abingdon speech, he clearly stated, "I will drive change to build what I call the force of the future: the military and the broader Defense Department that we need to serve and defend our country in the years to come."

雖然卡特在科技界及國防政策上皆有舉足輕重的地位，但他明確強調，其首要任務就是替國防部招募和留住有才華的美國年輕人。在這場演講中，他直言不諱「我將推動變革打造我所謂的未來戰力，也就是能在未來保護我國的軍隊及更壯大的國防部」。

His surprising logic is that winning the unpredictable next war will be less about advanced war machines and silicon chips than about out-thinking the enemy, and having a force chock-full of bright, adaptive leaders who can quickly navigate complex problems under the intense time pressures of modern combat. To Carter, winning the next war is all about talent.

他出人意外的思維邏輯，認為贏得下一場無法預測的戰爭，關鍵不在於高科技武器和矽晶片，而是比敵人優越的思維，在於一支擁有許多聰明、適應力強而且能夠快速解決問題之領導者的部隊。對於卡特來說，贏得下一場戰爭全在於人力的素質。

Tylor Jost人 才的錯用－泰勒·約斯特

Tyler Jost had wanted to be in the military ever since his kindergarten teacher read a children's book about the Gettysburg Address to her young class. Although not from a military family, Jost attended a military high school in a Chicago suburb where he was an exceptional student. When it came time to choose a college, he applied to both the Naval Academy and West Point, and happily enrolled at West Point after receiving his acceptance letter.



自從約斯特聽完幼稚園老師在班上讀了有關林肯總統「蓋茲堡演說」的兒童讀本之後，他就立志從軍；雖然約斯特不是軍事世家，但他決定就讀芝加哥市郊的一所軍事高中，並在校園裡嶄露頭角；在完成高中學業時，他同時申請加入海軍官校及西點軍校，並順利獲得西點軍校的入學許可。

Jost arrived at West Point during the summer of 2004, nearly three years after the 9/11 attacks. The nation and the Army were at war in Iraq and Afghanistan. But Jost took Chinese language classes to fulfill his single year of required language at the academy, and a summer program in China cemented his love of the Chinese language and culture. According to Jost, he gave up his vacation time nearly every summer to study in China, and graduated with a double major in Chinese and International Relations.

約斯特於2004年的夏天也就是911事件3年後進入西點軍校；當時美軍正與伊拉克和阿富汗交戰；然而約斯特選擇學習中文為語文必修的學分，暑期中國遊學交流計畫也更堅定了他對中國語言和文化的熱愛；根據約斯特的說法，他放棄假期，幾乎每個暑假都去中國遊學，畢業時取得中文與國際關係的雙學士學位。

Jost excelled in his studies. He was academically ranked seventh out of 972 cadets in his graduating class, and was commissioned as a military intelligence officer. He won a Rotary scholarship for a graduate degree at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. He became proficient in Mandarin, and earned a master's degree in Chinese studies after a year of intense study. Now it was time to join the Army and use his education. It would be the last time Jost used his Chinese until leaving the service five years later.

約斯特的成績優異，他以全期(972位學生)第七名的學業成績畢業，任命為情報官；他也獲得國際扶輪社獎學金在倫敦大學亞非學院取得碩士學位；同時，精通中文的他，花了一年時間完成中文碩士學位；正是他發揮所長報效國家的時候了，然而，約斯特再次運用中文長才之時，卻是退伍後的5年了。

Losing Talent 人才的流失

The military services today are losing talent. Bright, capable young men and women—almost all combat veterans—are leaving the services in sizable numbers, shifting their lives from khaki and camouflage to chinos and corporate attire. They are entirely of the Millennial generation, those Americans born after 1980, and since 2001 they have only known a military at war. While the ebb and flow of young people into and out of the military is always a steady tide, the ongoing drain of experienced and bright young officers departing service today after

five to 15 years in uniform is a concern. A 2010 survey of Army officers found that only 6 percent of those asked agreed with the statement, "The current military personnel system does a good job retaining the best leaders." The military must always shed leaders since there is only so much room to move up. But it is essential to shed the right people-and not to lose too many of those with the brightest prospects or the most innovative minds. The military needs to know just who is going out the door, and why.

當前的軍隊正面臨人才流失的問題；聰明、有能力的年輕男性、女性和絕大部分經過戰火洗禮的老兵正大量的離開軍隊，脫下卡其和迷彩的團體裝扮，轉業謀生。他們全部都是出生於 1980 年以後的千禧世代，他們只知道軍隊在2001年以後就一直處於戰爭的處境；儘管年輕人加入和離開軍隊的消長始終維持常態，但服役5到15年具備經驗與才智的年輕軍官持續地離開軍中卻令人憂心；根據2010年陸軍軍官的問卷調查，只有6%的人認為現今的人事制度能有效留住優秀領導人才，由於職缺僧多粥少，所以軍方必須汰除一些幹部，但重要的是，軍隊須汰除的人不應該是胸有丘壑或見識不凡的幹部。軍方在汰除任何人時，都必須了解誰該汰除及汰除之原因。

No one expects the U.S. military to redesign itself for its Millennials-to become a camouflaged version of Google or Facebook, or adopt a Silicon Valley start-up culture where Pentagon staff officers ride scooters down the hallways clad in shorts and T-shirts. The U.S. armed forces are instruments of conflict prevention in peacetime, and controlled violence in war. Their culture must reflect the unique demands this places on their members. Few businesses call on their employees to give up their lives if required to get the job done. Partly as a result, military service is often viewed as a calling, not simply as a job or even a career.

沒有人指望美軍會為其千禧世代重新自我塑造成為穿迷彩服版的Google或 Facebook，或者採取矽谷創業文化，讓五角大廈的參謀人員穿著短褲和T恤在中廊騎乘摩托車上班。美國武裝部隊是平時預防衝突、在戰時控制暴力的工具；他們的文化應該依據國家的需求來塑造；很少有企業要求他們的員工在必要時犧牲生命以完成工作；也因為這樣，從軍經常被看作是一種號召，而不只是作為一份工作或甚至是職業生涯。

The U.S. military is in a competition for talent. The best and brightest graduates from American universities are in high demand. According to the Department of Defense, only a half of 1 percent of officers entering the military last year hailed from the top 20 U.S. colleges and universities. Moreover, a recent study determined that 40 percent of today's Marine officers would fail to meet the standards for Marine officer selection in World War II.

美國軍方正面臨人才的競爭。美國各大學優秀的畢業生是非常搶手的；根據國防部資料，去年美國排名前20的大學院校，只有0.5%的人加入軍中；此外，最近一項研究指出現今有40%的陸戰隊軍官都無法達到在第二次世界大戰中陸戰隊軍官的選拔標準。



Today's Military Personnel System 現今的人事制度

The current military personnel system was designed decades ago in large measure to provide interchangeable human parts to fit the diverse requirements of each service. This flexibility was an important virtue in growing the force from several-hundred thousand to 16 million in World War II. That war also provided the impetus for today's "up or out" promotion system, after hundreds of aging officers had to be quickly removed at the war's beginning to bring in energetic younger replacements who could meet the challenges of a global war.

美國目前的人事制度仍然是沿用於幾十年前因應各軍種多元化的需求而產生的可替代性人事制度。對於兵力從幾十萬遽增至一千六百多萬的第二次世界大戰中，這樣的彈性至為重要，這場戰爭為因應全球戰爭的挑戰，必須迅速的以有幹勁的年輕新血汰換過時的官員，也造就了今日「上或下」的升遷制度。

Despite a world that has vastly changed since 1945, many elements of that wartime system remain in place today. The most significant prior reform occurred in 1980, when the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) was signed into law. But even then, large elements of the previous system remained. According to a 1993 RAND report, the 1980 Act "...replaced an existing patchwork of rules and regulations governing the management of military officers... While breaking new ground (permanent grade tables, single promotion system, and augmentation of reserve officers into regular status).

儘管整個世界在1945年後有了很大的改變，當時戰時體制的許多元素仍沿用至今；國防官員人事管理法案在1980年首先大幅修改入法，但是即便如此，仍頗多舊制之餘法；根據1993年蘭德公司的報告，1980年所設立的國防官員人事管理法是將當時的部分條例及軍人管理細則取代為「模組化評分表，單一晉升體系，預備軍官納編數的增加」。

This legacy system is woefully archaic in the 21st century-and far removed from the best talent-management practices of the private sector. It may well be the last untransformed segment of an otherwise modern, flexible, and adaptable U.S. military.

在21世紀時，之前所遺留下來的體系已經嚴重過時了，與私營部門的人才管理政策相去懸殊，對於現代化彈性和臨機應變的美軍而言，這是最後一項仍未改革的部分。

The U.S. military is largely a closed-loop system for talent. Lateral entry is nearly nonexistent outside of unique specialties such as medicine. The four-star generals and admirals who will be the chairman and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 2035 are serving in

uniform today as majors or lieutenant commanders with somewhere between 10 and 16 years of service. Even the members of the JCS in 2045 are already serving in uniform, just starting out as ensigns and lieutenants, most with fewer than four years of service. Losing talented, experienced, and innovative leaders in the first 10 years of their military careers means that those leaders will not be available to serve in ever-more senior military leadership positions during the next the 20 or 30 years. This problem deserves rapt attention because getting the quality of the force wrong- unknowingly keeping in less capable leaders while losing the best and brightest talent-could have debilitating effects on fighting and winning the complex wars of the future.

對於人才的招募，美國軍隊是一個非常封閉的體制，除了像醫學這種極為獨特的專業領域外，平行進入軍中相應等級發展，幾乎是不可能的事。在2035年時，將會成為上將級的參謀長聯席會議之主席和成員，正是現在三軍服役10到16年的少校；甚至在2045年時，參謀長聯合會議的成員，就是服役4年的尉級基層幹部。對於優秀且具經驗的領導者來說；如果錯過了在軍旅生涯前十年的歷練就等同於他們無法晉升到高階領導職。這樣子的一個問題是值得去注意的，如果繼續劣幣逐良幣，我們將無法在未來複雜的戰爭中獲勝。

Unlike its private-industry counterparts, the U.S. military does not track the levels of quality among those who are leaving the force, nor does it have any insight on why they are choosing to leave. There are no exit interviews for departing leaders, no accumulation of data on who is staying or going, no statistical rundowns provided the service chiefs on the percent of each performance quintile by rank (or IQ, or any other measure) who are choosing to leave or stay. The military does not even gather such information.

不像其他私營行業，美軍並未追查這些離職人員的素質水準，也沒有深入瞭解這些人何以選擇離開的原因。沒有約談離職的幹部，也沒有退伍或留營統計，更不會有人整合數據來做離職因素統計表(智商或其他因素)提供給軍種首長們，軍方根本未收集這些資訊。

There are no objective metrics by which to determine whether the military leadership is succeeding-or failing, needing replacement. In the U.S. military, there are no quarterly earnings statements, no public stock prices, no annual profit and loss numbers. However the military performs, it seems simply good enough. During the darkest days of the war in Iraq, from 2004 to 2006, there was little thought given to replacing military leaders, even when the combat effort was clearly failing. Even losing a war -or nearly doing so-seems to be an insufficient impetus to objectively assess military performance and hold leaders accountable. It only becomes worse in peacetime where little can seemingly be measured as related to what the



nation wants from its military during a war. The abject lack of metrics on the performance and skills of those departing the force compared to those remaining reflects a culture that insists the current system works well.

美軍並沒有一套客觀的指標來評估軍隊領導統御是否成功、失敗或是需要汰換。美軍沒有類似股市特有的每季收益報表、公開股票價格、年度損益數據。在2004到2006年這段與伊拉克戰爭的黑暗時期，即便戰鬥成效不彰，也沒有人會想到要汰換軍事幹部。即使在幾乎要輸掉一場戰爭，或幾近於此時，似乎也沒有足夠的誘因來客觀評估領導者之表現與責任。在平時更是每況愈下，似乎沒有相關的量測，戰時國家所需要的究竟是什麼樣子的軍隊。在沒有一定的指標來評估退伍及留營人員的素質狀況下，更造成了許多人認為現在的人事制度是完善的假象。

Millennials in the Military and Beyond 千禧世代

The young men and women coming into the military today share two characteristics in common—all have joined since the attacks of 9/11, and know they are signing on for a military at war, even if at diminished levels. Astonishingly, almost three-quarters of Americans from age 17 to 25 are disqualified from serving in uniform due to obesity, education, criminal records, or medical reasons. But all who do are part of the Millennial generation, those men and women born between 1980 and 2000. Ten years from now, 98 percent of the military will be comprised of Millennials. By definition, the remaining 2 percent will be the senior-most enlisted and officers by age and rank—and these leaders of the force will come from Generation X or even the tail end of the Baby Boomers.

現今入伍的青年男女有兩個共通點；他們都是在 9/11 攻擊之後從軍並知道他們要簽約加入一個正在打仗的軍隊；令人驚訝的是，17到25歲的美國人，有將近3/4的人因為肥胖、學歷、犯罪紀錄或是醫療等因素而未達服役標準，所有符合服役標準的都屬於千禧一代，即1980年至 2000年間出生的男女。10年後，軍隊的98%將由千禧世代組成。也就是說，只有2%高階的士官和軍官還屬於X世代或甚至是嬰兒潮世代的最後一代。

Civilian studies have found that the Millennials share a number of characteristics in common. And although military members may reflect some very different attributes, they inevitably will have some traits in common with their civilian generational peers. Millennials value personal life and family above paychecks. They value diverse work experiences and the ability to change jobs often. They want a bigger say in their career paths and their future, and value higher education. They see themselves as likely to leave jobs, companies, and career fields at a much higher rate as their predecessors. They believe in merit-driven upward

mobility, and are convinced they should be able to compete for any job in their reach. They dislike hierarchy, bureaucracy, and inflexibility in the workplace and private life. But they are also far more interested in public service, in all its forms, than many generations that came before them.

民間研究發現，千禧世代有一些共同的特性。雖然軍方成員可能會有一些極其不同的特性，但他們仍不免與民間同儕一輩有些共同的特徵。千禧世代認為個人生活和家庭比薪水更重要，他們重視多元化的工作經驗及經常更換工作之能力。他們認為自在職業生涯的發展、未來及受較高教育的價值，要有更大的主導權。他們離開工作崗位、公司和職業領域頻率要比他們的前輩高出很多。他們認同用人唯賢的向上流動，並且認為只要他們的能力許可，就可以競爭他們想要的工作職位；他們討厭層層節制、官僚制度和在工作場所及私人生活中的毫無彈性。但比其他之前的各世代，他們對各式各樣的公職更感興趣。

Challenges With the Current System 當前體制的挑戰

Military career paths are governed by a set of highly structured processes that rarely allow any deviations. Promotions, for example, are governed by DOPMA's immutable statutory rules: There are no 35-year-old generals or admirals, no military options to mirror Silicon Valley's penchant for bright young CEOs. Navy destroyers, Marine-helicopter squadrons, Army-infantry battalions, and F-16 fighter squadrons are all commanded by officers with about 16 to 18 years of service. There are no exceptions for the bright light with only six years in; you must wait for 16 to 18 years regardless to even have a chance to compete for command at that level. And if you don't command at that level, your prospects for further advancement are highly constrained. Generals and admirals, with few exceptions, come out of the "command track." Specialists-foreign-area experts, human-resources types-who do not command often have far fewer promotion opportunities, especially to wear stars.

軍旅生涯的規劃是由一套高度結構化，極不允許有例外的流程來管理的，以晉升為例，受國防官員人事管理法永恆不變的法則限制，沒有35歲的將軍，軍方選才不像矽谷喜歡找聰穎的執行長。海軍驅逐艦、陸戰隊直升機中隊長、陸軍步兵營和F-16戰鬥機中隊皆由約服役16~18年的軍官指揮。只有服役6年，即使聰明絕頂也不例外，就算是你有機會爭取那個層級的指揮職，都必須等待16~18年，而且如果沒有那個層級的指揮職，你進一步發展的前景將受到極大的限制；除了少數的例外，所有的將領皆是由「指揮職」出線；此外，專業國外領域專家，人力資源管理沒有指揮歷練的人，通常比較沒有晉升的機會，尤其是晉升將軍的時候。



The military promotion system is also based on the principle of "up or out." Unlike the vast majority of workers in the private sector, military personnel are not permitted to stay in the same job or rank year after year -even if the position may be one for which they are perfectly suited, by skill or disposition. They must continually compete for promotion, and be selected for advancement in order to stay in the military. The military's best F-16 pilot cannot stay in the cockpit her whole career. After approximately eight to 10 years of flying, she must go to broadeningschools, be promoted to major and then lieutenant colonel, and serve on staffs and maybe even in the Pentagon. If she fails to do so, she will fail to be promoted-and multiple failures to be promoted almost always results in a pink slip forcing separation from the military.

軍事晉升制度也基於「升不上去就退伍」的原則。不像私營部門廣大的工作人員，即使某些人非常適合某些職位，軍事人員不能在同一個職務或官階停留太久，他們必須不斷地競爭和晉升以爭取留在軍中機會。最優秀的F-16飛行員不能一直待在座艙中，飛了約8-10年，她必須去讀各種深造學校，晉升為少校，然後是中校，擔任參謀，甚至進入五角大廈工作。如果她不這樣做，她將不能晉升，各種缺失相乘結果，一個解職通知使其面臨被軍隊汰除的命運。

Building the Force of the Future 建構「未來戰力」

Although the final recommendations have not been made public yet, an earlier draft of the report was obtained by several media outlets. According to press reports, the report is likely to include the following reforms:

雖然最後的提案還沒有公諸於世，但有幾家媒體已經獲得先前的草案報告。根據媒體的報導，報告可能包括以下改革方案：

一、Replacing "up or out" with performance criteria.

以績效標準來取代「升不上去就退伍」

Officers would no longer be held to rigid promotion timelines and forced to compete with other officers who happened to join the military the same year that they did. Instead, they would compete for promotion after meeting established performance standards. Not only would this enable officers far more flexibility in managing their careers, but it would also restore the original purpose of the rank system-to provide capable individuals with the authority necessary to execute their responsibilities.

軍官的升遷制度不再堅持僵硬的升遷停年規定，或者是被迫與其他同年入伍的軍官競爭。相反地，只要符合制度所建立的績效標準，人人均可以競爭晉升。軍官不僅能靈活規劃自己的軍旅生涯，也能恢復階級晉升制的本意——將權力賦予更有能力的人來履

行他們的責任。

二、Increasing "permeability."

增加「軍文相互交流性」

Policy changes here would make it far easier for military personnel to shift between the active and reserve components of each service, or to choose to work as a DOD civilian. Officers would also be able to step out of DOD entirely-into the private sector or other parts of the government-while retaining an option to return to the military at a later time. Such moves in and out of uniform would be considered normal and seen as a routine career- development step. This would not only help retain some people that would otherwise leave, but DOD and the services would also benefit from having more officers with a broader set of skills and experiences as they face an increasingly diverse and interconnected world.

這項政策的改革將使軍人在現役及備役的身分轉換更為方便，甚至可選擇在美國國防部當文官。軍官甚至可以在保有隨時回役的條件下，離開軍隊體制到民營企業或是其他政府機構工作。這樣退役及回役的流動性作為可以視為常態，係職業發展的一環。如此一來，不僅有助於留住原本想離開的人員，也能讓國防部及各軍種因為有了許多具備廣泛技術及經驗的幹部，當他們面對這日漸多元及事事相連通的世界時，有更多選擇。

三、Establishing a technical, or enterprise, career track.

建立技術或專業發展的人事經管路線

Requiring all officers to command at ever-higher levels in order to remain competitive for promotion wastes a great deal of human talent- especially since most generals and admirals serve in institutional and staff leadership positions rather than in operational-command positions. Officers would be separated into two parallel career tracks: a command track, whose milestones and performance criteria would remain similar to the current system, and an enterprise track that would enable officers to develop continuity and expertise in specialized areas throughout their careers. Officers choosing the enterprise track might forfeit the opportunity to command troops, but in exchange they would have viable promotion paths up to the most senior levels in their areas of expertise. Of equal value, many of these officers could stay on for much longer duration in positions of senior institutional management for which they have been expressly prepared.

要求所有軍官歷練更高階的層級，目的在維持其晉升的競爭力，極其浪費了人類的聰明才智，尤其是大多數的將級軍官，擔任的是機關及幕僚的主管職，而非作戰指揮職。爾後官員將有兩條平行的經管來發展，指揮職及專業職：指揮職的經管與表現標準和現在的制度差不多；專業職經管則會使幹部在其專業領域上培養其連續性及專業。選擇專業職的人員可能因此喪失歷練指揮職之經管，但其高水平之專業將得以有專業職之晉升途徑。同樣地，不少專業職官員也能因其專業而在高層機關長期擔任高階管理幹



部。

四、Expanding civilian schooling.

擴展民間學校教育

Although the number of officers with advanced degrees continues to grow, the vast majority of those degrees are now being granted by military institutions. Those programs are often less rigorous than their civilian counterparts, and do not provide the broadening intellectual experience that comes from sitting in a classroom with students from truly diverse backgrounds. (This also deprives civilian students from having a military perspective in their classrooms, which only exacerbates the increasing civil-military divide.) DOD could change this balance by requiring that degrees from civilian institutions constitute a set percentage of all advanced degrees earned by personnel within each service.

雖然擁有高學歷的官員日益增加，但絕大多數的學歷來自於軍事院校。這些課程往往比民間學校來的簡單，而且也因為缺少了更多不同背景的學生而喪失獲得拓展學術經驗的機會（而且這也剝奪了平民學生與軍事人員上課的權力，這樣只會導致軍民之間的鴻溝更加嚴重）。國防部可以要求各軍種須有一定比例的官員獲取民間院校之學歷，以改善這樣失衡的情形。

五、Improving parental leave and other family policies.

改善育嬰假制度及其他家庭政策

In July, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that maternity leave for women in the Navy and the Marine Corps would triple, from six to 18 weeks—a number deliberately chosen to match what Google offers. The report will probably recommend making that the new standard across all of the services, and may also increase the amount of leave available to other new parents (regardless of gender).

今年七月，海軍部部長梅伯斯宣布，海軍及海軍陸戰隊女性同仁的產假將增加3倍，從原本的6週變成18週，這樣的產假天數刻意與google一樣。報導說他也將建議各軍種跟進，甚至不論性別都給予新生家庭更多的育嬰假。

Challenges of Force of the Future 創建「未來戰力」所面對的挑戰

The Force of the Future initiative faces a long uphill battle to adoption and implementation, even though Carter has made this issue one of his highest priorities. Many recommendations have already encountered some stiffbureaucratic and cultural resistance as they work their way through the Pentagon. Some of the most important reform ideas will require congressional action (such as revising the "up or out" promotion system enshrined in DOPMA). But these are also some of the most controversial, which means that parts of this battle will play out in the

public square.

即使卡特表明建立「未來戰力」是他首要的任務，這項倡議的調整和運用仍須面對長期且艱苦的挑戰。五角大廈內僵化的官僚文化已經開始抵制了；一些重大的改革觀念則需要國會採取行動(例如修訂國防官員人事管理法的「升不上去就退伍」的晉升制度)。這也代表了這場改革戰將會是公開的角力。

Yet perhaps the greatest challenge facing the Force of the Future is that its proposals will fundamentally confront a deep-rooted culture where "one size fits all"-an approach that the bureaucratic guardians of the half-century-old military personnel system have long seen as adequate to any demand. Many of these entrenched personnel bureaucrats have served for decades, combining time in uniform with subsequent careers as civilian officials in the services' Pentagon personnel offices. They have great pride of ownership in today's structure: For years, they have adjusted the current system with literally tens of thousands of ad hoc modifications. And to be fair, the current system has survived the greatest test to date of the all-volunteer-force: nearly 15 years fighting two sizable, prolonged wars overseas.

然而或許「未來戰力」面對的最大挑戰，來自於根深柢固的「一體適用」文化，也就是一種官僚捍衛了半世紀之久的被視為是以因應所有需求的軍中人事體系。許多人陷入人事官僚的窠臼已久，在國防部人事辦公室中，軍人生涯及文職的時間加起來有幾十年。他們對於現在的人事系統非常滿意，過了這麼多年，他們只做了一點修正。平心而論，現有的人事系統迄今也經過全志願役最大的考驗：近15年來歷經兩場大型的、曠日廢時的海外用兵。

These civilian skeptics are quietly joined by some in the senior ranks of each service who are very comfortable with the system that groomed and selected them for positions of high rank. Implicitly, they are satisfied with the quality of the officer corps because they are that quality. Lesser men and women fell by the wayside. Those that left the military either didn't have the "right stuff" to gut out the hard years and stay for the long haul, or the system deliberately and effectively eliminated them. The military, in this line of reasoning, has always had enough great people.

以上這種文人的保留態度也受到一些在這人事系統下受惠將領們的支持，他們也對現今的制度非常有信心。事實上，他們是對於軍官的素質已經感到非常滿意了，因為他們也就是那塊料。少數的男女會半途而廢，那些離開軍隊的人，不是沒有「真本事、硬工夫」熬過艱苦歲月而不棄，就是制度刻意而有效的將他們汰除，軍隊在如此這般的理由下，總是人才濟濟的。

Many people in the Pentagon and beyond are skeptical about the Force of the Future. They



note that the current system has been tested in war and peace, and delivered a professional and dedicated military leadership that remains the envy of militaries around the globe. "Up or out" has done just that—removed those incapable of performing at the next level while promoting those who can excel. Critics also argue that the military ultimately only needs to select a few hundred generals and admirals from among a very competitive bench of thousands of strong performers who have proven themselves over decades of experience. Nothing in the current system, in their view, suggests that this process is failing.

五角大廈的許多官員對於「未來的戰力」仍抱持著懷疑的態度。他們表示現在的人事體系歷經過許多考驗，而且也孕育出許多讓各國羨慕的軍事領導者。「升不上去就退伍」的功能即在於汰除不能勝任更高層任務者、擢升能勝任者。許多評論家也認為只有少數證明自己有能力且有數十年服役經驗的人有資格參與晉升將軍，就他們看來，目前的體系是非常成功的。

Yet simply surviving the challenges of yesterday or even those of today with the current system is no longer enough. In a world of exponential change, leap-ahead technologies, and a generation entering the military comfortable with both, a World War II-based personnel system at some point will simply be unable to provide a military force that is prepared to deal with the challenges of the future. But overcoming the bureaucratic resistance from those unable to imagine the military of tomorrow remains Carter toughest fight.

不過，對於這多變的世界，單單只是通過以往甚至是現今考驗的制度已經不夠了。在這變化多端，科技領先的世界，這個以二次世界大戰為基礎的人事制度在某些程度方面已經不能夠應付未來的挑戰了；然而，對於卡特來說，最困難的挑戰就是來自這些沒有遠見的國防官員。

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