



美國國防大學之教育轉型

Next Steps for Transforming Education at National Defense University

譯者簡介



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National Defense University (NDU) is implementing major reforms in the graduate-level programs it provides senior military officers and other national security professionals. If all goes as planned, the result will be a transformation in the way the university educates senior national security leaders.¹ This article does not review the status of current change initiatives. Instead, it looks beyond the changes under way for the 2014-2015 academic year and identifies future steps senior leaders might consider in order to maintain momentum for the transformation of joint professional military education.

國防大學為高階軍官及其他國家安全專業人員設立的研究所課程，正進行重大改革。如果一切按計畫執行，將比照民間大學培育高階國家領導人模式轉變。¹本文並不在於檢討目前的變革方案，而是放眼於2014~2015學年以後，領導階層應找出未來能維持其動能讓聯合專業軍事教育可長可久的應走之路。

The basic rationale for the change at NDU is that in a period of declining defense budgets

1 Gregg F. Martin and John W. Yaeger, "'Break Out': A Plan for Better Equipping the Nation's Future Strategic Leaders," *Joint Force Quarterly* 73 (2nd Quarter 2014), 39-43.

and increasingly complex security challenges, the Nation needs the best strategic leadership possible. By extension, we need the best possible educational program for emerging strategic leaders. General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argues that developing capable future leaders is the best hedge against an austere and uncertain future. Good leaders, he notes, can "see us through when our organizational structure is not perfect, when technology comes up short, when training misses the mark, and when guidance is late to need." In the future, leaders who can think through complex problems, out-think adversaries, reconcile context, uncertainty, and surprise, and seek and embrace adaptability will be "our decisive edge."² Producing such leaders is General Dempsey's intent and NDU's current ambition, but there are challenges to overcome.

國防大學改革的基本原因，乃是在預算緊縮而安全環境卻日益複雜的時代，國家需要最優秀的戰略人才。因此，我們必須以最好的教育來培育迫切需要的戰略幹部。參謀長聯席會議主席鄧普西(Martin Dempsey)上將認為培養最優秀的未來領導者，是對付預算緊縮與變動未來的最好方法。他指出：優秀的領導者可以「身處不健全的組織結構時、科技力有未逮時、訓練未達目標水準低落時、指導不能及時之際，都能見人所不見」。在未來，領導者能思考複雜問題，能比敵人想得更透徹，能調和情勢與不確定性，甚或遭遇奇襲時，能迅速應變，這就是「我們克敵致勝的優勢」。²培養這樣的幹部是鄧普西上將的意圖，也是國防大學當前的目標，但尚有諸多挑戰猶待克服。

A substantial body of recent work argues that the traditional approach to joint professional military education needs reform, particularly at the war college level. Criticisms fall into two categories (see table 1). Most attention is paid to immediate institutional issues: namely, who teaches what, how, and with what qualifications, degree of rigor, and efficacy. There are also broader, systemic concerns about the way military culture and leaders manage joint educational institutions and programs. We review these criticisms to better explain how the changes taking place at NDU can improve the educational experience for students and, more importantly, why additional steps to reinforce and extend the changes are necessary.

一個實際負責執行的工作團隊認為，傳統的聯合專業軍事教育方法確實需要加以改革，特別是在戰爭學院的層級。批評概分兩類(見表一)。最受關注的，是直指體制上的問題：授課者、講授內容、講授方式、授課人的資格，及嚴謹的程度和效果。其次，對攸關聯合作戰教育體制及課程的軍中文化，也有更廣泛的系統性批判。我們針對這些批評，詳細說明國防大學如何改革，來提高學生學習成效，更重要的是，說明何以必須採取其他步驟，以加強並擴大這些改革。

2 "From the Chairman: Building Tomorrow's Leaders," Joint Force Quarterly 67 (4th Quarter 2012).



Table 1. Senior War College Problem Areas According to Critics

Sources Evaluating Adequacy of Joint professional Military Education (JPME)	Institutional Problems: Who Teaches What, How, and to What End?				Systemic Problems: Support for and Management of JPME	
	Faculty	Curriculum	Methods	Rigor	Support	Leadership
Cronin(2010)	x	x	x	x	x	x
Government Accountability Office on DOD JPME study (2013)		x				
House Armed Services Committee Study (2010)	x	x	x			x
Johnson-Freese (2012, 2014)	x	x	x	x	x	x
Reed (2011, 2014)	x			x		x
Ricks citing Daniel Hughes (2011)	x			x	x	
Scales (2010)	x		x		x	x
Wiarda (2011)	x	x		x	x	x

Sources : Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades after the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010); Patrick M. Cronin, "PME: A Strategic Education," Marine Corps Gazette 94, no. 6 (2010); Joint Military Education: Actions Needed to Implement DoD Recommendations for Enhancing Leadership Development: Report to Congressional Committees, 2013; Joan Johnson-Freese, "The Reform of Military Education: Twenty Five Years Later," Orbis 56 (Winter 2012); Kevin P. Kelley and Joan Johnson-Freese, "Getting to the Goal in Professional Military Education," Orbis 58, no. 1 (2014), 119–131; George E. Reed, "What's Wrong and What's Right with the War Colleges," DefensePolicy.org, July 1, 2011; George E. Reed, "The Pen and the Sword: Faculty Management Challenges in the Mixed Cultural Environment of a War College," Joint Force Quarterly 72 (1st Quarter 2014); George E. Reed, "Examining the War Colleges: An Administrative Perspective," conference paper presented at the Reforming Professional Military Education: A Clash of Professional Ethics session at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Francisco, CA, April 5, 2013; Thomas Ricks, "Need Budget Cuts? We Probably Can Start by Shutting the Air War College," April 11, 2011; Ricks cited Daniel Hughes chapter in Douglas Higbee, Military Culture and Education (Farnham, United Kingdom: Ashgate, 2010); Robert H. Scales, "Too Busy to Learn," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136, no. 2 (2010); Howard Wiarda, Military Brass vs. Civilian Academics at the National War College: A Clash of Cultures (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011).

War College Critics and Reformers 戰爭學院的批評與改革者

Critics assert that war colleges and universities fail to attract top-flight faculty, teach outdated curricula, no longer pioneer or use innovative teaching methods, and pamper rather than challenge students (see table 2).³ Critics further contend that with a few exceptions, war college classes are pass/fail experiences where everyone passes, and performance at the colleges matters little to parent Services.

批評者認為戰爭學院和各軍事院校無法吸引第一流的師資，教授不符實需的課程，教學方法不夠先進與創新，縱容取代挑戰(見表二)。³更進一步批評直陳，除了少數例外，戰爭學院各班隊採取的合格／不合格評鑑中，幾乎人人過關，各軍種對學官在戰院的表現也並不在意。

3 所謂「戰爭學院」，包括各軍種戰爭學院，及聯合專業學院，如國家戰爭學院、艾森豪國家安全與資源戰略學院，及聯合指參學院之聯合及聯兵作戰所，與高級聯合作戰所。

表一 對戰爭學院的批評

批評來源	制度問題：師資、教學內容、教學方法、效果				系統性問題： 聯戰專長教育之支持與管理	
	師資	課程	方法	嚴謹度	支持	領導
Cronin (2010)	×	×	×	×	×	×
政府監察辦公室對國防部軍事教育之研究報告(2013)		×				
眾議院軍事委員會研究報告 (2010)	×	×	×			×
Johnson-Freese (2012, 2014)	×	×	×	×	×	×
Reed (2011, 2014)	×			×		×
Ricks citing Daniel Hughes (2011)	×			×	×	
Scales (2010)	×		×		×	×
Wiarda (2011)	×	×		×	×	×

來源：Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades after the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010); Patrick M. Cronin, "PME: A Strategic Education," Marine Corps Gazette 94, no. 6 (2010); Joint Military Education: Actions Needed to Implement DoD Recommendations for Enhancing Leadership Development: Report to Congressional Committees, 2013; Joan Johnson-Freese, "The Reform of Military Education: Twenty Five Years Later," Orbis 56 (Winter 2012); Kevin P. Kelley and Joan Johnson-Freese, "Getting to the Goal in Professional Military Education," Orbis 58, no. 1 (2014), 119-131; George E. Reed, "What's Wrong and What's Right with the War Colleges," DefensePolicy.org, July 1, 2011; George E. Reed, "The Pen and the Sword: Faculty Management Challenges in the Mixed Cultural Environment of a War College," Joint Force Quarterly 72 (1st Quarter 2014); George E. Reed, "Examining the War Colleges: An Administrative Perspective," conference paper presented at the Reforming Professional Military Education: A Clash of Professional Ethics session at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Francisco, CA, April 5, 2013; Thomas Ricks, "Need Budget Cuts? We Probably Can Start by Shutting the Air War College," April 11, 2011; Ricks cited Daniel Hughes chapter in Douglas Higbee, Military Culture and Education (Farnham, United Kingdom: Ashgate, 2010); Robert H. Scales, "Too Busy to Learn," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136, no. 2 (2010); Howard Wiarda, Military Brass vs. Civilian Academics at the National War College: A Clash of Cultures (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011).

Most critics argue these conditions persist for reasons beyond the immediate control of the colleges and their faculties. They believe an anti-intellectual military culture devalues education and disinclines students and college administrators to pursue education rigorously.⁴ Major General Robert Scales, USA, for example, argues that Service cultures do not value education enough to send the best and brightest officers to teach and claims the war colleges have become "intellectual backwater[s], lagging far behind the corporate and civilian institutions of higher learning."⁵ The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 makes joint assignments and promotion to general and flag officer contingent upon senior military education, so a steady flow of students to the war colleges is assured. However, longtime war

Table 2. Top performance Issues as Identified by Critics

Summary of Major Criticisms	Institutional Issues: Who Teaches What, How, and to What End?				Systemic Issues: Support and Management of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)	
	Faculty	Curriculum	Methods	Rigor	Value of JPME	Support and Management
	Active Duty: Services do not send top talent; thrown into classes unprepared; have short tenures.	Focus: not enough emphasis on critical thinking and leadership skills.	Innovation: lack of innovative teaching methods. particularly to balance demand for generalists and specialists.	Goals: focus is on social goals, not academic excellence.	Culture: Service cultures biased toward action not reflection training, not education.	Competency: administrators chosen because of former military careers are not qualified for academic administration.
	Former Military: retired military with PhDs lack published research records and area of specialization.	Relevance: weak relationship to follow-on duty assignments.	Thinking skills: more focus on "training" information transmission than on critical thinking.	Level of Difficulty: not challenging: no entry requirements: on year is not enough to cover the material.	Partiality: priority is hiring administrators with military, not academic, experience.	Value: burgeoning administrative ranks impose costs without compensatory value.
	Civilians: not attracting top civilian academic talent.	Balance: generalist and specialist models not reconciled.	Intellectual vibrancy: not sufficiently thought-provoking.	Standards: it is pass/fail, and everyone passes; not rigorous.	Personnel Systems: Service human resource requirements trump educational goals.	Tenure: war college presidents leave too quickly to make needed changes.
	Practitioners: too much emphasis on practitioner perspective.	Theory: topical issues emphasized without sufficient attention to theoretical framework.		Social Dynamic: catering to student preferences at the expense of education.	Academic Inquiry: military culture in general clashes with academic culture.	Proponency: no full-time, senior proponent for military education is up to the task.

college faculty members such as Joan Johnson-Freese of the Naval War College worry that the disdain for education in military culture diminishes student motivation to learn.⁶

大多數的批評稱這些狀況，一直是無法直接掌握學院及其教職員的原因。他們認為反智的軍中文化貶低了教育，使得學生和管理者皆不願意追求嚴格的教育。⁴史奇爾(Robert Scales)少將就認為，軍種文化不重視教育，沒有選派最優秀的軍官擔任教職，並稱戰爭學院已成為「『一潭智力的死水』，遠遠落後於民間企業及機構的高階學習。」⁵1986年「高尼國防部重整法案」(Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act)促使聯合職務之派遣及將級軍官之晉任，必須受過高級軍事教育，使得戰爭學院的

4 Milan Vego撰〈軍事創造力〉一文，對軍事文化、反智及創造性思維，有相當深入觀察。該文刊於《聯合部隊季刊70期》(2013年第三季)，84頁。

5 Robert H. Scales, 〈太過忙碌，無法學習〉，刊於美國海軍學會Proceedings雜誌，第136期(2010年)，第2頁。

表二 綜合表現評估分析

批評重點	制度問題：何人教？教什麼？如何教？效果如何？				系統性問題： 對聯合軍事教育之支持與管理	
	師資	課程	方法	嚴謹度	價值	管理
	軍職：軍種未派遣頂尖者任教職；準備不周；任期太短	重點：對批判性思維及領導統御技巧不夠重視	創新：欠缺創新的教學方法，特別是通才與專才平衡	目的：重視交流目的，而非學術傑出	文化：基於軍種文化傾向實作而非反思；訓練而非教育	競爭力：教育行政人員的選用，偏重於軍隊歷練，而非教育行政專業
	擁有博士學位的退伍軍官：無論文發表，專業能力也不足	相關性：與爾後任職關係薄弱	思維技巧：重視訓練（資訊之傳遞），大於批判性思考	困難程度：不具挑戰性；沒有入學條件；一年的訓期教不了所有課程	偏袒：教育行政人員以軍人優先，而非其學術經驗	價值觀：行政級別快速增加，卻沒有相對價值回饋
	文職：未吸引一流人才任教	平衡：通才與專才教育無法相互調和	智力的活力：不足以發人深思。	標準：採合格／不合格制；且人人都合格；不夠嚴謹	人事制度：軍隊人事需求凌駕教育目的	任期：戰爭學院院長任期太短，甚難有所改革作為
	主事者：過於重視實務方面的觀點	理論：重點議題欠缺理論架構		交流動力：迎合學生的喜好，卻犧牲教育	學術研究：基本上軍事文化與學術文化相互衝突	支持者：由於軍事教育是基於任務而行，故欠缺高層的全面支持

學官來源不絕。然而，在戰爭學院長期任教的教職員，如海軍戰爭學院的詹森－弗里茲 (Joan Johnson-Freese) 等所擔心的，鄙視教育的軍中文化打壓了學官的學習動機。⁶

Moreover, administrators who run military educational institutions come from the same culture and rarely are inclined to challenge it. War college commandants have short tenures and typically retire after their terms, so there is little incentive or opportunity for them to challenge the status quo. These factors make reform from within an unlikely prospect.

此外，運作軍事教育機構的行政人員都來自同一文化，因此甚少願意去挑戰它。戰爭學院院長的任期甚短，通常任滿退休，所以也沒有動力或機會挑戰現狀。這些林林總總的因素，因此不太可能從內部進行改革。

In the past, Congress has intervened to "fix" military education. One consequence is that existing law and written guidance from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs now require the war colleges to provide a "rigorous" educational experience. However, a recent House Armed

6 Joan Johnson-Freese, 〈25年以後，談軍事教育改革〉 (The Reform of Military Education: Twenty-Five Years Later,)，刊於Orbis 56 (Winter 2012).



Services Committee study declined the opportunity to take the side of critics who charge lack of rigor. Instead, perhaps cognizant of criticism that Congress has already legislated too many demands on military education, the committee study noted that pass/fail approaches, when based on objective learning standards and supported by comprehensive and timely feedback, do not necessarily detract from the rigor of the academic programs."⁷ This arguably sets a low bar, considering the weighty, life-and-death responsibilities war college graduates often shoulder.

過去，國會曾經干預「改革」軍事教育。結果現在的法律，與參謀首長聯席會主席頒布的書面指導，無不要求戰爭學院必須提供「嚴謹」的教育，然而，眾議院軍事委員會最近的研究並不認同不夠嚴謹的批評聲浪。反而是，或許基於以往的批評，國會已經立下太多對軍事教育有所要求的法條。該委員會的研究指出，依據客觀的學習標準加上全面及時的回饋，合格／不合格的方式，不見得減損學術課程的嚴謹度。⁷若考慮到戰爭學院的畢業生，往往肩負生死攸關的重任時，這樣的標準似乎就過低。

Comparing Civilian and Military Institutions of Higher Education 軍、民高等教育制度之比較

The critiques of joint education over the past decade did not generate a consensus in favor of reform, much less a specific agenda. In part this is because some of the criticism is misplaced. For example, former National War College Professor Mike Mazarr rightly skewers critics for repeating the canard that war colleges focus on tactics at the expense of strategy, observing that "no one with even a glancing familiarity with National War College's curriculum could possibly [think or] write such a thing."⁸

在過去十年中，對聯合教育的批評並沒有產生改革的共識，更不用說具體議題，部分原因在於某些批評是不合時宜的。前國家戰爭學院教授馬札(Mike Mazarr)將批評戰爭學院只重戰術而忽視戰略的相關批評加以整理後，指出：「對國家戰爭學院的課程設計只有浮光掠影的粗略認識者，很難撰寫出(想出)令人激賞的方案。」⁸

Another reason the reform agenda did not catch on is that critics and proponents of the war colleges tend to talk past one another. The critics start with the assumption that the war colleges should emulate top-tier civilian universities. They recommend tenure for professors,

7 眾議院軍事委員會，調查監督小組，《另一個軍事教育的十字路口？尼高法案20年》(Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades after the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2010), <http://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=d4748d4a-b358-49d7-8c9aaa0ba6f581a6>.

8 Mike Mazarr, "Disruptive Thinkers: The PME Debate Needs More Informed Thinkers," Small Wars Journal, April 13, 2012

more emphasis on faculty research, and cultural changes to better align with academia, which is "open-minded, freewheeling, questioning of authority [and] of any and all established truths."⁹ Some of these prescriptions seem antiquated given changes in higher education. For example, the value of tenure in civilian higher education increasingly is questioned.¹⁰ The percentage of tenured faculty fell from 37 percent in 1975 to 24 percent in 2003, a trend that has continued over the past decade.¹¹ Similarly, the right balance of faculty research and teaching duties is debated. George Reed asserts that the "dirty little secret of top tier civilian universities" is that "great, and sometimes inordinate, emphasis is placed on research and publication that can detract from effective teaching."¹² As for academic freedom, it may be easier to question orthodoxy in a war college than in a typical civilian graduate program. Free thinking at civilian universities increasingly is circumscribed by the vagaries of departmental politics,¹³ institutional review boards,¹⁴ and political correctness from academic disciplines that are overwhelmingly captured by one portion of the political spectrum.¹⁵

另一個改革沒共識的原因，是戰爭學院的批評和支持者都傾向於談論過時的看法。批評者從仿效民間一流大學的假設做起點，建議教授任期採終身制，重視教職的研究，文化應朝與學術界一致的方向改變，也就是「開放心胸，隨心所欲，質疑任何威權和所有既存真理」。⁹對民間高等教育而言，這些看法有的業已過時。例如，終身制的價值在民間高等教育越來越受到質疑。¹⁰終身教職的比例從1975年的37%，到2003年降至24%，過去十年，這一趨勢仍然不變。¹¹同樣地，教師研究和教學兩者要講求平衡，也頗受爭議。里德(George Reed)將其稱作：「民間一流大學裏骯髒的小秘密」是「過度重視研究和論文發表，甚至將其無限上綱，將減損教學效果。」¹²至於學術自由，在戰爭學院比民間研究所課程更容易質疑其正確性。民間大學的自由思考愈來愈受到變幻無常的

9 Howard Wiarda, *Military Brass vs. Civilian Academics at the National War College: A Clash of Cultures* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 153.

10 長久以來針對「終身職」的辯論不斷，其中最具代表性的是James C. Wetherbe撰〈取消終身制的時候到了〉(It's Time for Tenure to Lose Tenure)，刊於 *Harvard Business Review*, March 13, 2013：<<http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/03/its-time-for-tenure-to-lose-tenure/>>.

11 Mark Purcell, "Skilled, Cheap, and Desperate: Non-Tenure-Track Faculty and the Delusion of Meritocracy," *Antipode* 39, no. 1 (2007), 121-143; Robin Wilson, "Tenure, RIP: What the Vanishing Status Means for the Future of Education," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, July 4, 2010; "Faculty Not on Tenure Track Rises Steadily Over Past 4 Decades," *National Public Radio*, February 20, 2014, available at<www.npr.org/2014/02/20/279987644/faculty-not-on-tenure-track-rises-steadily-over-last-4-decades>.

12 George E. Reed, "Examining the War Colleges: An Administrative Perspective," conference paper presented at the Reforming Professional Military Education: A Clash of Professional Ethics session at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Francisco, CA, April 5, 2013, 6.



學系政治、¹³研究所審查委員會的限制，¹⁴學術紀律的政治正確性，也常受到某一部分政治頻譜的左右。¹⁵

Those who defend the traditional war college approach typically start with the opposite assumption: that war colleges are unique institutions that should not be judged by or seek to emulate the best graduate programs at top-tier universities. Reed, with experience in both war colleges and civilian higher education, notes the war college model is "more akin to that of a professional school (for example, law or medicine)." Like lawyers, engineers, and doctors, military officers are sent to senior Service schools to learn a well-established canon of professional knowledge.

那些捍衛傳統戰爭學院的人們，則從相反的假設著手：即戰爭學院是獨一無二的機構，不應該以一流大學裏最優秀的研究所作標準或力求仿效他們的課程。有過戰爭學院和民間大學高等教育經歷的里德指出：戰爭學院的模式「比較像專業學院(如法學院或醫學院)」。

像律師、工程師、醫生在各相關專業學院一樣，軍官要送到軍種的高級院校，各自研習一套行之有效的專業知識。

It is true that war colleges are professional schools, but that does not explain their lack of rigor. On the contrary, the prevailing pass/fail standard at war colleges is not consistent with the professional school model. Professional schools mandate the acquisition and retention of specialized knowledge and are ruthless in testing whether students meet this requirement-and for good reason. Who wants a doctor who graduated from a medical school where everyone passes? Military culture is not a valid excuse for lack of rigor when it comes to education. At the Service academies, for example, cadets are constantly tested, rank-ordered, and not infrequently flunked, and their performance is directly tied to future assignments and career field selection.

戰爭學院的確屬於專業學院，但這不能因此而失去嚴謹性，相反的，戰爭學院的合

13 Here again, tenure is not seen as particularly helpful. As one commentator notes, those seeking tenure are often counseled to "avoid risk, collegial work, and even their students" to improve their chances of acquiring it. See Ernst Benjamin, "Some Implications of Tenure for the Profession and Society," American Association of University Professors, available at <www.aaup.org/issues/tenure/some-implications-tenure-profession-and-society>.

14 Philip Hamburger, "The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards," Supreme Court Review 271 (2004).

15 Tom Bartlett, "Social-Psychology Researchers Are Very Liberal. Is That a Problem?" The Chronicle of Higher Education, July 30, 2014. See also John Tierney, "The Left-Leaning Tower," The New York Times, July 22, 2011, available at <www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/education/edl-24notebook-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>.

格／不合格制度，不符合一般專業學院的模式。專業學院透過不留情面的考試，決定學生是否真正學到並記住了專業知識，這才是合情合理。誰會接受一位從所有人都能合格的醫學院畢業的醫生？既然來受教育，軍中文化不是不嚴謹的藉口。例如即便在各軍種基礎教育院校，學員生也都要接受測驗及等第排序，被淘汰者並不常見，他們的成績表現更直接關係到爾後派職與職業領域的選擇。

War college practices diverge from established norms at professional schools in other respects as well. Professional schools use experienced practitioners with the gravitas and authority to transfer knowledge in their areas of expertise. Critics acknowledge that war college faculties have some extraordinary talents, but they also argue that too many civilian and military instructors have insufficient experience and academic credentials. They claim top-flight civilian academics are not attracted to war college culture and that uniformed instructors lack experience,¹⁶ academic credentials, and sometimes also practical expertise in the subject areas they are asked to teach. These faculty profiles contradict the professional school model, which emphasizes experienced, expert instructors. As Johnson-Freese notes, in the case of the Army, Air Force, and Marines, it actually is "easier and less competitive to be assigned to a War College as a faculty member than it is as a student."¹⁷ In other words, selection as a student to a war college is competitive whereas assignment as an instructor is not, which means instructors may have less credibility with their students. Scales emphasizes the need for the Services to change their ways and populate the war colleges with experienced, upwardly mobile instructors with long-term immersion in a subject.¹⁸

戰爭學院在其他方面的作法上，也偏離專業學院行之有年的規範。專業學院選用實際經驗豐富的教師，以其專業領域的嚴謹與權威傳授知識。批評者承認，戰爭學院的教師中擁有若干非凡的天賦之士，但學、經歷不足的軍、文職教官也比比皆是。他們認為戰爭學院的文化很難吸引一流的文人學者，¹⁶而軍職教官則欠缺經驗、學位，有時甚至對賦予教學任務的領域也並不專業。這些教師完全與專業學院講師，強調經驗的專家模式背道而馳。詹森－弗里茲(Johnson-Freese)指出，實際上在陸軍、空軍、陸戰隊中，「派往戰爭學院擔任教職，比成為戰爭學院學官還要容易，而且競爭也少」。¹⁷換句話說，學官遴選是有競爭的，而派職教官卻不必，意味著教官的可信度並不比學官高。史奇爾少將強調軍種必須改變他們的態度，應該以經驗豐富，長期浸淫在特定領域，力爭上

16 現制度之支持者認為，軍官的領導統御本身就內含著教學；批評者則認為，教學乃是一項專業，並不屬於領導統御的附屬品。一位曾在國防大學半數課程認教八年的教師表示：「軍職教職官並沒有完整的培養計畫。」2014年9月18日，一位國防大學資深教師電郵作者，表示：「他們只能自己摸索，邊做邊學。」

17 Joan Johnson-Freese, *Educating America's Military* (London: Routledge, 2013), 71.



游的人，充實戰爭學院的教官。¹⁸

Another problem with using the professional school model to explain lack of academic rigor is that it overstates the dichotomy between professional schools and research universities. All graduate level programs impart established knowledge and teach critical thinking skills. Medical schools want doctors who know not only the basics but also the results of recent research and how to solve uncommon medical problems. Law schools want lawyers who not only know the law but who can also devise creative ways to assist their clients within the bounds of evolving law. War colleges want strategists who understand not only current doctrine but also how to manage emerging national security problems. Thus, as Steven Metz argues, the purpose of the war colleges is actually a mix of professionalism (that is, sharing a body of knowledge related to the military mission) and higher education, which includes developing critical thinking skills.¹⁹

另一個以專業學院模型來解釋戰爭學院缺乏學術嚴謹性所產生的問題，是誇大了專業學院和研究型大學之間的二分法。所有的研究所層級的課程，旨在傳授既有知識與教導批判性思維的能力。醫學院要求訓練出來的醫生，不但能熟稔基本醫學，也要能涉獵最新的研究成果，以及如何解決罕見的醫療問題。法學院訓練出來的律師，不但要懂得法律，同時要能在不斷演變的法律允許範圍內，為客戶創造出足以打贏官司的新方法。戰爭學院則希望培養出來的戰略家，不僅嫻熟現在的思想，同時必須懂得如何處理新出現的國家安全問題。因此，梅斯(Steven Metz)認為，戰爭學院的目的其實是專業主義(即共享與軍事任務有關的知識體)與高等教育兩者的混合體，其中更包括了批判性思維技巧的培養。¹⁹(譯註1：批判性思維，源自古希臘的字根krinein，即分開或分辨，有人認為應該譯作「明辨式思考」或「思辨能力」。其精神在於強調：根據各種證明的理由及其推導出的結論，對一個信念或假定的知識形式進行主動的、持續的，以及仔細的思考。講求知識的精準嚴謹、公正客觀並具深度與廣度)

At issue is the proper balance between professionalism and higher education. In that regard, the consensus has shifted toward greater emphasis on critical thinking skills and less on transferring an existing body of knowledge. Most observers believe most professional military knowledge is better transferred earlier in officers' careers when they attend command and staff colleges.²⁰ The war colleges are supposed to focus on higher order strategic problems

18 Scales.

19 Steven Metz, "Strategic Horizons: U.S. Professional Military Education on the Chopping Block," World Politics Review, April 17, 2013, available at <www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12879/strategic-horizons-u-s-professional-military-education-on-the-chopping-block>.

and question established ways of doing business, particularly during periods of great change when the value of traditional methods and approaches is suspect.²¹ This is precisely the point that General Dempsey and many other senior leaders have been making in recent years: the war colleges need to impart the critical thinking skills that will allow future leaders to adapt and perform well in a dynamic, complex security environment.

現在的問題落在專業化和高等教育之間，如何取得適當的平衡上。在這方面的共識已經轉向更注重批判性思維能力的培養，而減少現有大量知識的傳授。大多數觀察家相信，最專業的軍事知識應該在其職涯中的指揮參謀學院階段儘早完成。²⁰戰爭學院應該專注於高階的戰略問題，及如何質疑當前的行事方法上，特別是當傳統方法的價值和方法受到懷疑的大變革時期為然。²¹這正是鄧普西上將和許多高階幹部，近年來所努力的：戰爭學院必須傳授批判性思維技巧，使未來的幹部得以如魚得水的適應一種動態的、複雜的安全環境。

Critics argue that innovative methods are needed to impart critical thinking skills. The traditional reliance on the Socratic method of open seminar discussion moderated by faculty has its advantages but falls short as a means of replicating complex problem-solving under stress, an essential requirement for strategic leaders. They believe the customary Socratic approach should be augmented with more advanced simulations and crisis decisionmaking exercises to better prepare students for future strategic leadership challenges.

批評者認為，創新的方法就是傳授批判性思維能力。依賴由教師主持傳統的蘇格拉底式(譯註2：蘇格拉底教學法中，教師只負責提出問題，然後學生在討論與批判之下，不斷地修正觀念，最後學生必須自己提出所有答案。教師用一連串相關的問題，去激發學生思考，建構一條探求真理的路，教師所扮演的是知識接生婆的角色，而不是填鴨者)研討會來進行討論，有其優點，但對一位經常必須在壓力下解決複雜問題的戰略領導者而言，是遠遠不夠的。他們認為，慣常的蘇格拉底式教學法，必須以更先進的模擬，及危機決策演習來強化，期使學官具備肆應未來戰略領導挑戰的能力。

Typically, the deviations from professional school norms and outright contradictions in the traditional war college model are attributed to a military culture that favors its own

20 例如，在《另一個軍事教育的十字路口？》一文中的重要發現，乃是：「軍官在其職涯中，應該儘早教育的聯合作戰及軍種特殊知識日益增加。」

21 政策上，中級軍事專業教育置重點在：「在野戰略藝術範圍下之作戰。」高級學院教育則置重點在：「讓學官在戰略領導職位及周密思維上預作準備。」參閱2009年7月15日頒，參謀首長聯席會主席指導1900.01D,《軍官專業教育指導》(Officer Professional Military Education Policy), CH I,及2011年12月15日版之, A-A-4, A-A-5.



members at the expense of civilian faculty. War colleges often (but not exclusively) hire retired military officers with doctoral degrees as administrators. At NDU in 2014, for example, the chancellors of the College of International Security Affairs and iCollege as well as the deans of the Eisenhower School and National War College were all retired military colonels or Navy captains holding doctorates and having substantial professional military education experience, as were the university provost and director of research. (In addition, the commandants of the National War College, Eisenhower School, and Joint Forces Staff College are Active-duty flag officers.) Critics may see this as favoritism, but military leaders understandably want war college administrators who comprehend military culture, professional requirements, and modes of operation. A natural byproduct is that the war colleges are inclined to give students the maximum latitude to determine how much effort they put into their education rather than "coercing" them with grades, tests, and onerous reading lists. The net effect is an educational experience that, while impressive in some respects, lacks the rigor typically associated with top civilian graduate programs.

基本上，專業學院與戰爭學院傳統模式標準上的差異，歸因於偏袒自身成員的軍中文化，卻犧牲了文職教師。戰爭學院經常(但不限於)聘用具有博士學位的退役軍官任職管理階層。以2014年為例，擁有博士學位，例受專業軍事教育的退役上校，不是在國防大學擔任教務長，就是研究部主任，他們分別獲聘擔任國防大學國際安全事務學院及iCollege的校監、艾森豪學院與國家戰爭學院教育長(國家戰爭學院、艾森豪學院和聯合部隊參謀學院的院長都是現役將官。)批評者會認為這是厚此薄彼，但軍方領導階層希望戰爭學院管理者，必須對軍中文化、專業要求和運作模式有所瞭解。於是自然產生一個副作用，就是戰爭學院傾向於給學生最大的自由度，讓他們自己決定投入多少精力接受教育，而不是被成績、測驗，和繁重的閱讀書目所「脅迫」。淨效應方面，這是一個接受教育的體驗，但對某些方面來說，與頂尖民間研究所相較，就缺乏了嚴謹性。

A Better War College Model 較佳的戰爭學院模式

Powerful cultural factors prevent the war colleges from fully emulating civilian research universities, and in some respects that is a good thing. The war colleges are always going to respect and reflect military service and values, as they should. They also are going to be populated with students who often value practical experience more than reflection and research and who are assigned to the war colleges rather than selected as the most likely to succeed in the halls of higher education. Students at civilian universities compete for positions in graduate programs and pay hefty tuitions to obtain their graduate educations, so they are highly motivated to succeed and exploit their investments.

強烈的文化因素，使戰爭學院很難完全轉變成為與民間研究型大學一致，在某方面來看，也不失為一件好事。戰爭學院自始至終，都必須尊重並反映出各軍種的價值觀。

戰爭學院充滿重視實際經驗，遠多於思考與研究的派訓學官，更不是檢選最有可能在高等教育殿堂中出人頭地的人。民間大學學生經過激烈競爭後，方能進入研究所，而且要付出大筆學費，因此對畢業、成功及賺回當初的投資，這方面動機強烈。

They also have a wide choice of institutions and programs to choose from to best meet their personal needs and goals. Officers assigned to war colleges must attend, and a good percentage—the numbers are debated—may undervalue the opportunity. It is not uncommon to hear war college faculty guesstimate that one-third will end up valuing and profiting from their educational experience, another third will just meet the requirements as necessary, and the final third will never really engage or exploit the opportunity.

學官們可以根據自己的需求和目標，自由地選擇受教育的學院與課目。派赴戰爭學院受訓的軍官，就一定要報到，其中有相當比例並不甚重視此一受訓機會（實際數字上有所爭議）。常聽到戰院教官粗估有三分之一因為重視受訓的歷練，最終因而受惠；另外三分之一只符合基本要求，後三分之一從未真正參與或好好利用機會。

Since most experts on adult education agree student motivation is the greatest single determinant of learning outcomes, any predisposition to doubt the value of higher education is a significant hurdle to learning. This makes the war college professor's job difficult. The onus is on the institution to capture the interest of the students and motivate them to learn. Given these realities, many people who teach at the war colleges believe they must woo students with stellar classroom efforts and hope the inherent professionalism of the U.S. military will incline its charges to get as much from the classroom experience as possible.

既然絕大多數成人教育專家都同意，動機是影響學習成果的最大因素，對高等教育的價值產生的任何懷疑，都會影響學習。這使得戰爭學院教授的工作沉重，他們必須引發學官的興趣並激勵學習動機。基於這樣的現實，許多戰爭學院教授認為他們必須在課堂別出心裁吸引學生，並期望美軍固有的敬業精神能幫助學官儘可能吸收課堂所授。

For example, this is the case Mazarr makes in rebutting the "lack of rigor" charge made against the war colleges. He argues graduate students anywhere can take a half-hearted approach to education: "Graduate school is like that. Really smart folks can sample a little stuff, stay mostly quiet, binge for exams, and get by." He believes the vast majority of U.S. military professionals refuse to do that and consequently get a lot from their war college experience. It is doubtful that graduate students can loaf their way through programs at top universities where entry is extremely competitive and successful completion not at all assured. Fewer than half of all admission applications to master's programs are accepted,²² and fewer than half of all doctoral students finish their degrees.²³ Data for completion rates for master's degrees are harder to come by and tend to focus on science and technology degrees, but one study indicates



a completion rate of about 66 percent.²⁴ By contrast, informal discussions with many who have attended and taught at the war colleges reveal deep skepticism about the assertion that the "vast majority" of military students are too professional to skate through a no-fail system, especially given competing demands on their time and the fact that the program offered to students is not tailored to their specific needs.

馬札反駁對戰爭學院「不夠嚴謹」的批評。他認為任何地方的研究生對學習都可能不夠盡心盡力，他說：「研究所對真正聰明的學生來說，不過是小事一樁，只要乖乖聽課，考試成績好，就能過關。」他相信絕大多數的美國軍事人才拒絕這樣做，而希望從戰爭學院教育得到更多。但很難相信一流大學的研究生可以鬼混，他們申請入學已經相當競爭，也不是人人都保證能畢業。碩士研究生申請通過的不到一半，²²博士班也只有不到一半能完成學位。²³碩士班的畢業率數據不易獲得，而且多集中在科學及技術方面的學位，有一項研究顯示其畢業率約為66%。²⁴相反地，與一些曾在戰爭學院就讀的學官或授課的教授非正式的討論中，他們對「絕大部分」學官在一定時間內，一視同仁的課程內容下，會因為太過專業而無法通過一套「無不合格」(全部畢業)的系統深表懷疑。

One hopes Mazarr is right, but other inside observers have expressed the opposite concern, arguing that "students who maximize the learning experience at the war college are in a decided minority."²⁵ Thus, many conclude we must do better than the traditional war college model, which inconsistently adopts the practitioner focus of professional schools without the faculty and rigor such schools typically demand. General Dempsey holds this view. He charged leaders at NDU to "break out" from established ways of doing business and directed the "transformation of joint professional military education programs."²⁶ The response was a plan that markedly increases student choice and thus student motivation to learn.

我們希望馬札是正確的，但其他內部觀察家們則表達了不同的考量，認為：「將戰爭學院學習的經驗極大化的學官，未來就是握有決策權的少數人。」²⁵因此，結論是我

22 Council of Graduate Schools, "Graduate Enrollment and Degrees 2002 to 2012," available at <www.cgsnet.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/GEDReport_2012.pdf>

23 Council of Graduate Schools, "Ph.D. Completion Project," available at <www.cgsnet.org/phd-completion-project>; see also "U.Va's Ph.D Graduation Rate in Line with National Average," April 29, 2001, available at <www.virginia.edu/insideuva/textonlyarchive/92-04-01/2.txt>.

24 雖然美國的碩士層級教育成長快速，但有關完成學業及淘汰率資料欠缺。請參閱研究所委員會(Council on Graduate Schools)的《碩士學成計畫》(Master's Completion Project)。www.cgsnet.org/masters-completion-project。

25 曾在國家戰院受訓的退休教授。

們必須針對師資與嚴謹度不及一般專業學院要求的戰爭學院傳統模式加以精進。鄧普西上將支持這種觀點。他要求國防大學的領導者，要從現行教育方式中「突破」，並引導「聯合專業軍事教育課程」轉型。²⁶具體作為是一套能明顯地增加學生的選擇，從而提高其學習動機的計畫。

NDU Education Transformation Plan 國防大學教育轉型計畫

National Defense University's education transformation plan is explained elsewhere²⁷ but can be briefly summarized to illustrate how the university is moving forward from the traditional model of military education (see table 3). The plan has six major elements, the first of which is a comprehensive student evaluation that takes into account individual student circumstances, previous education, career paths, and interests. Faculty mentors help students craft an academic program that will meet their individual needs and then work with the student to monitor results over the year. The next three elements restructure curriculum into different phases: a common core curriculum that provides a foundation of knowledge necessary for any graduate-level national security student, a second phase that delivers the core curricula that each of the five colleges specializes in and allows the colleges to offer students greater depth of expertise in those areas of specialization, and a third phase that focuses on electives and research that students can tailor to meet their personalized learning objectives. The fifth element in the overall plan is detailed program evaluations based on student self-evaluations and reviews from the organizations that benefit from receiving war college graduates. These empirically based evaluations would enable better management of the overall educational experience, including faculty development programs. The last element is a common academic calendar that facilitates collaboration across campus and better allows students to attend the many diverse educational opportunities at NDU.

國防大學的教育轉型計畫，容後再詳述，²⁷茲簡單摘要說明國防大學如何從傳統教育模式轉變(參閱表三)。計畫區分6大單元，第一部分，是根據學官的個別條件、以往學歷、經歷、興趣等作全面評估，指導老師協助學官規劃符合學官需要的課程計畫，然後與學官共同努力並加以輔導1年。其次的3個部分，將課程重組成不同階段：第一階段為共同核心科目，是所有國家安全學官研究所層級的必修基礎知識；第二階段，提供5個學院的專業核心課程，在其專業領域中讓學官鑽研更深入的專業知識；第三階段則置重點於選修和研究，學官可以從而滿足其個別的學習目標。全般計畫的第五部分，是根據

26 Martin E. Dempsey, "From the Chairman: Investing in the Minds of Future Leaders," Joint Force Quarterly 74 (2nd Quarter 2014).

27 Martin and Yaeger



Table 3. The NDU Educational Transformation Strategy

Elements	Attributes	Value
Student Assessment	Reviews with faculty mentors across NDU	Tailored experience, motivated students, distributed mentoring burden
	Multiple progressively difficult educational tracks	Meet student demand without watering down rigor
	Topics of individual interest identified	Allows construction of elective schedule tailored to student demand
	Individual learning plans	Self-conscious goal-setting: basis for student learning assessments
	End-of-year student self-assessments	Identifies areas for improvement and continuing education plan
	Continuing learning plan for the student	Students continue to learn after 10-month program
Phase I	NDU-wide core curriculum	Identifies core priorities for national security professionals
	Foundational material	Logical building block: less redundancy
	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff content added	Prepares for complex security environment
	Taught by NDU-wide best talent	Students receive the best NDU can offer
	Students pair with others from different profiles	Expands student learning perspectives from start
	Exploit Washington, DC, location for experiential learning	Gives students memorable practical insights
Phase II	College core curricula	Students benefit as colleges concentrate on core competencies
	Colleges hire/focus faculty on expertise	
Phase III	Tailored to student needs	Individualizes student research experience
	Electives to support research and student careers	Increases chances students can focus on relevant, specialized research topics
	Research projects under direct faculty mentorship	Students demonstrate problem-solving capability using critical learning skills
	Optional travel in support of research projects	Students control research design and maximize ability to generate good products
	Mentors are best experts from across university	Students receive the best that the university has to offer
	Thesis for those pursuing master's degree	Elevates the rigor of a 1-year graduate program for a degree
Program Evaluation	End of year program evaluations	Empirical feedback permits objective program improvements
	Learning-based feedback from students	More objective assessment
	Feedback from "customers"	Provides critical perspective from objective source
	Evaluations managed outside of components	Facilitates objectivity
Common Academic Calendar	Common annual calendar	Permits collaboration among all NDU components
	Common class lengths	Facilitates taking classes in other colleges consistent with student learning plans
	Common times for no classes	Permits students to get the best from full range of activities at NDU

學官自我評鑑及院方審查，基於學官利益所做教育計畫的詳細評估。這些以實證資料為基礎的評估，有助於整體教育經驗更好的管理，其中包括教師的培養計畫。最後一部分是共同教育行事曆，有利於校內院際合作，讓學生可以在國防大學接受各種不同的教育。

The entire NDU transformation plan is intended to be student-centric. Rather than forcing all students into a single, common program irrespective (not taking (something) into account;

表三 國防大學轉型策略

項目	內容	價值
學官評鑑	全體指導老師實施審查	根據經驗，激勵學官，分攤指導負擔
	多重難度進階管道	在不失嚴謹度下，滿足學官需求
	確定各別學官之專精課題	根據學官需求設立選修課程
	各別學官之學習計畫	依據學生學習評估，自我設定學習目標
	年終學官自我評鑑	確認需加強領域，設定後續學習計畫
	學官之後續學習計畫	為期10個月之學程結束後之學習計畫
第一階段	全校共同核心課程	國家安全專業核心課程
	基礎教材	邏輯建立模組；減少重複
	參謀長聯席會議主席添加內容	針對複雜的安全環境
	由國防大學之菁英講授	學官能接受國防大學最精闢的授業
	與不同背景學官配對	從起點就擴充學官視野
	參訪華府相關部會增加經驗學習	讓學官得到最有意義的實際見識
第二階段	各學院之核心課程	增強學官核心競爭力
	各學院之專精教育	
第三階段	依據學官需求量身訂做	各別學官之研究經驗
	幫助學官研究或職涯之選修課程	增加學官專注於研究領域及相關課題之機會
	在指導老師指導下擬定研究計畫	學官以批判性思維方式展現其解決問題之能力
	有助於研究之旅行訪問	學官自我掌控其研究設計及產生最佳效果的能力
	由最具專業素養教授擔任指導老師	學官可以獲得最佳的指導師資
	碩士學位論文	選修為期1年的嚴格碩士學程
課程評鑑	年終評鑑	回饋之實證資料，有助於改客觀性
	學官之學習為基礎的回饋	課程目標之進一步進行評估
	來自「客戶」之評鑑	從客觀的來源提供重要觀點
	由外部管理各項評鑑	教職員之客觀性
共同之教學行事曆	共同年度行事曆	全校各部門得以整合
	共同之課程時間	便於學官依據其學習計畫至其他學院上課
	共同之無課時間	讓學官可以全面參與學校各項活動

regardless of)of their individual career paths, desires, and future objectives, this approach explicitly embraces diversity, expanding the choices available to students and inviting them to participate in managing their own education. The entire approach is consistent with well-acknowledged principles of successful adult education, which emphasize partnering with students, taking their unique circumstances into account, linking the educational experience to their career needs, and tapping the internal as opposed to external factors that typically motivate adults to learn.²⁸



國防大學整個轉型計畫，是朝向以學員為中心的方向轉變。而不是強迫所有學官屈就單一的、共同的課程，而不顧慮到個人的職業發展、期望和未來目標。這種作法明顯擁抱多元化，擴大學官的選擇權，並且讓他們參與管理自己的教育。整個作法符合成人教育所公認的成功原則，注重與學官的夥伴關係，考慮個人特殊的狀況，將教育與未來職業需求相結合。聆聽內在的心聲，來對抗外在因素，是成人學習的最主要鼓勵因素。²⁸

Table 3 depicts the advantages that should accrue from the program as originally envisioned. In practice, the program is being modified during implementation as necessary to accommodate limited resources (such as time, staff, and faculty). Opposition by some teaching faculty has also played a role in diluting or limiting the scope of the transformation effort in its inaugural stages. Reworking the curricula, programs, and standards to give students more choices and instituting systems for empirical feedback on staff and student performance are demanding tasks. The best way to ensure success is to retain sight of the original strategic logic underlying the transformation plan and to carry that logic forward in successive iterations of the academic program.

表三列出計畫最初設想的優點，在實務執行上則必須考量到資源的限制(如時間、工作人員和師資)作一些修改。在整個轉型的初期，若干持反對意見的老師，可以在轉型中，扮演調和或限制轉型範圍的角色。修改後的課程、計畫和標準，給學官更多的選擇。建置對老師與學官表現的實證資料回饋系統，是很重要的工作。確保成功的最好方法，是保持當初擘劃轉型計畫的策略邏輯視野，並在代代相連的學術課程中，實踐此一邏輯。

Extending the Diversity Logic 推廣多元化邏輯

To realize the promise of a better educational experience for students, NDU can advance its change program in three areas. In each case, the university could offer more diversity that will facilitate its burgeoning commitment to a student-centric approach. The new program currently being implemented was designed to enhance diversity by allowing students to have a greater say in structuring their graduate programs. The university needs to reinforce this trend over time.

28 Malcolm S. Knowles, *The Adult Learner: A Neglected Species* (Houston, TX: Gulf Publishing Company, 1990), 57-63. More than two decades later, the principles articulated by Knowles remain the bedrock of adult education theory. See Malcolm S. Knowles, Elwood F. Holton III, and Richard A. Swanson, *The Adult Learner: The Definitive Classic in Adult Education and Human Resource Development* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005).

為了實現讓學官有更佳的教育體驗的承諾，國防大學可以在3個方向推動其改革計畫。在各種狀況下，國防大學邁向多元化，使以學官為中心的作法得以生根茁壯。目前正在實施的新計畫，就旨在讓學官構建自己的研究所課程上，擁有更大的發言權。國防大學必須隨著時間的推移，不斷加強這一趨勢。

First, NDU should create a variety of graduate-level educational tracks for students, including a doctoral program. Doing so would further circumvent find a way around (an obstacle) the contradictions that previously handicapped the ability of the war colleges to offer an exceptional educational experience. Relatively speaking, for many years, professional military education has been "one size fits all" with several negative consequences. A regimented approach inclines the war colleges to treat all faculty the same regardless of qualification, which undermines quality; reduces student motivation by forcing students to devote too much time to material they know is not relevant for their particular career path; and ultimately requires the watering down of educational standards. Standards are kept low to accommodate students who-often for good reasons-cannot manage a typical graduate program full of tests, papers, exams, and other hurdles but who also cannot be allowed to fail. Providing students with multiple educational tracks-directed study, certificate, graduate degree, honors, doctoral candidate-with different levels of difficulty tailored to student needs and interests allows university leaders to set and insist on standards appropriate for each path.

首先，國防大學應為學官設立各種研究所層級的教育管道，包括博士課程。如此可以進一步排除以往對戰爭學院無法提供卓越教育歷練的批評。平心而論，多年來，「一體適用」的專業軍事教育，已經有了若干不良結果。在一致化的制度下，戰爭學院對待全體教職員，不論資格，一視同仁，如此不但有損教學品質，更迫使學官對無關其未來職涯發展的東西投入太多時間，因而降低學官的學習動機，最終降低了教育水準。留住一些——通常都有些道不清楚的理由——無法面對充滿測驗、心得報告、考試的研究所課程及克服其他障礙的人，又無法將其淘汰時，只會讓標準繼續低落。為學官提供多元教育管道：在指導下進行研究、頒發證書、授予研究所學位、榮譽、博士候選人等，依學官的需要與興趣，設計不同難度的教育，也可以讓校方針對不同管道，設定足以堅持的標準。

For example, students interested in particularly challenging issues in their career fields could focus singularly on those issues without being constrained by master's degree requirements. Perhaps these students already have a graduate degree and know they will not become a flag officer, but would value the opportunity to solve a problem that has repeatedly surfaced in their careers. Alternatively, students with no graduate degree who aspire to promotion might want master's degrees in strategy to maximize their chances for advancement.



Still other students already in possession of master's degrees might aspire to publish their theses and ask for honors tracks and chances to compete for scarce slots in doctoral programs. Embracing student choice acknowledges the reality of different student abilities and aspirations and also the preferences of mid-career learners. It balances the need to educate both generalists and specialists, gives war college students a chance to get the most from their graduate experience, and helps mid-career professionals take the next step toward becoming senior leaders. Allowing students to choose the best fit for their circumstances will increase student motivation to learn, which is the key to success in adult education, particularly for seasoned professionals on well-defined career tracks.

以某些對其職涯領域中特別具有挑戰性的問題感興趣的學官為例，可以不必受限碩士學位的要求，專注研究這些議題。對某些自認與晉升將級無緣，又已經具備碩士學位的學官，也可以珍惜此一機會，鑽研一些在其職涯中一再浮現的問題。而沒有碩士學位的學官，則可爭取戰略碩士學位，讓他們未來有更多晉升機會。對一些已經擁有碩士學位的學官，又渴望可以發表他們的論文，名列榮譽榜，就可以爭取神聖的博士班課程。接受學生的選擇權，就是承認不同學生的能力和願望，以及處於職涯中期學習者偏好的現實。這種方式可以在通才與專才培養中，產生必要之平衡，使戰爭學院的學官有機會充分獲得研究所課程的體驗，幫助處於職涯中期的專業人士能邁向下一步，成為高階領導者。允許學官根據自己的情況，自行作最適切的選擇，可以增加學官的學習動機，這是成人教育成功的關鍵，特別是對聲譽良好的職業管道中，經驗豐富的專家。

Second, NDU needs a guiding theory and approach to adult education that informs its graduate programs.²⁹ The Socratic method alone does not constitute an optimum approach to adult education. A hybrid approach that supports a commitment to student-centric graduate education can better serve the target population. The war college foundational approach could and should be a humanist approach that emphasizes the importance of meeting the student's full range of needs: emotional, spiritual, physical, and intellectual. During student assessment, all the factors affecting the students' needs and motivations to learn are considered to craft programs of study that will maximize chances for students to emerge at the end of the year better prepared for their follow-on assignments.

其次，國防大學研究所層級課程，需要成人教育的理論和方法加以導引。²⁹單獨採用蘇格拉底式授課，並不是成人教育最佳方法。但混合式對大多數學官而言，卻最能支持「以學員為中心」的研究所教育承諾。戰爭學院教育基本上，應該是從「人本」作出發，強調滿足學官全方位需求的重要性：情感、精神、體力和智力。在學生評鑑中，所

29 Sharan B. Merriam and Rosemary S. Caffarella, *Learning in Adulthood: A Comprehensive Guide* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1999).

有影響學官學習需求與動機的因素，都納入考量，並據以規劃研究。這樣可以讓學官在一年中努力不懈，為他們未來的職務做好準備。

In the first phase of the curricula, which is short and focused on transferring foundational material (mandated by legislation and Joint Staff guidance) to students, the guiding approach should be social learning where students dialogue with colleagues, network, conduct team projects, and demonstrate they have acquired knowledge of material by passing "no-fail" online exams they can take at their leisure. The idea would be to transfer basic knowledge while exposing the students to other points of view about the significance of the material. During this period, students would have a chance to decompress from the taxing operational assignments they complete prior to arriving at National Defense University.

第一階段課程訓期不長，重點放在基礎學識傳授(依據法規和聯參指導)，採取社會學習方式(譯註3：所謂社會學習理論，在於探討個人的認知、行為與環境因素三者及其交互作用對人類行為的影響，強調：從觀察中學習、重視榜樣的作用、強調自我調整、鼓勵增強自信心)，學官透過與同事、網路之對話，進行團隊研討，同時學官利用個人休閒時間，通過必須及格的網路考試，以證明其確實得到相關知識。此一作法，旨在讓學官接受不同觀點，從而得到基本知識的精要。在此階段，學官得以從進訓前職務中的繁重工作中得到紓壓。

The approach taken in the second phase would depend on the student's educational track, but if the student is pursuing a master's degree, it should be a behaviorist approach with well-identified learning objectives and graded papers and examinations.

在第二階段所採取的方法，取決於學官選擇的教育管道，如果學官選擇攻讀碩士學位，就採取行為主義的作法(譯註4：行為主義學習方法主張，學習的目的是幫助學習者達成行為的改變。教師的職責在提供有利的環境和刺激，幫助學習者行為的改變。教學內容和方法必須經過審慎的設計，以引導學習者行為的改變。學習者行為的改變必須能夠客觀予以測量)而必須明確界定學習目標、論文評審，並參加各項考試。

The third phase, focused on student research, should be administered with a cognitive approach that emphasizes sense-making, problem-solving, and self-directed learning via case studies, projects and simulations, and papers. Mentors should assist students in setting up their research problems and constructing appropriate methodologies to solve the problems, but the level of difficulty would depend on the topics and educational tracks chosen by students. Such a hybrid approach to adult learning would permit university staff and faculty to better administer the new program in a way that supports multiple educational tracks for students.



第三階段，專注於學官的研究，採取認知方法(譯註5：認知學派認為學習是一種內在心理活動的歷程，此一歷程導致新知識的獲得，以及新知識之外在呈現)，強調意義建構(譯註6：意義建構理論著重於發掘個人在面對生活情境中各式問題所產生的資訊需求，主動尋求資訊並提出新的研究方法。從當初理論發展初期由研究結果進而導出理論架構，意義建構理論發展至今，已成為一套研究方法)、問題解決、自我導向學習，進行個案研究、計畫、模擬和論文寫作。導師應該幫助學官建立自己的研究問題，構建解決問題的適當方法論，但其困難程度將取決於學官選擇的議題和教育的管道。這種混合式成人學習，讓大學教職員更能支持新的學官多管道教育方案。

Finally, the university needs to embrace and rationalize its faculty diversity. War colleges, with their relatively generous salary structures, are well positioned to recruit faculty with both impressive practical and academic credentials. However, there will always be a mix of Active-duty military personnel, retired military with academic credentials, and civilians with senior-level experience in the national security system. With rare exceptions, civilians with no practitioner experience ought to be avoided in professional schools such as the war colleges. The main point is that rather than treating all instructors largely as interchangeable cogs in a teaching machine, the university should distinguish between levels of qualifications and categorize faculty and their duties accordingly. The war colleges already distinguish faculty by titles and offer some assistance and mentoring to new instructors thrown into the classroom, but we are suggesting a much tighter alignment of experience and expertise with teaching responsibilities.

最後，國防大學必須接受合理的教師多元化。在相對優渥的待遇下，必能招聘到學、經歷都令人驚艷的教師。未來必然會是現役軍人、擁有學位的退役軍人，與在國家安全體系具備高階經驗文職人員的混合。但是，極少數欠缺相關實際經驗的平民，就應該排除在戰爭學院等專業學院任教之列。重點是不能將教官當成教學機器中可以相互替換的齒輪，而應該根據學歷與職責加以分類。戰爭學院已經根據教師職稱加以分類，並對一些新進教官進入教室前給予必要的輔導，但我們仍然建議經驗和教學責任必須密切結合。

Although there would be exceptions, in general assistant professors would help administer the educational program as team teachers, graders, and program administrators; associate professors would teach the lower level courses; and full professors would teach mostly higher level courses in their area of demonstrated expertise. Full and distinguished professors would mentor doctoral candidates, and so on. Uniformed faculty without academic credentials or exceptional experience in the subject matter would begin in the assistant professor category and move up as they benefit from faculty development efforts,

experience, and research. Deeply experienced practitioners (military and civilian) would lead those classes in which their practical experience is clearly relevant. If they stay on and publish, they could rise and be assigned more traditional academic and research duties. There would be no tenure, but full professors would have more time for research and control over their course content.

雖然或有例外，基本上助理教授將協助教育行政，擔任小組教學、評分，或擔任計畫管理人；副教授負責教授低階課程；正教授負責在其專業領域上的高階課程。博士生由傑出的正教授負責指導，以此類推。沒有學位或在某些題材上欠缺經驗的軍職教官，暫列助理教授分類，然後經過教師培訓、經驗累積和研究表現向上升任。經歷豐富(軍職、文職)教師，將在其最具經驗的相關領域上，帶領整個班隊。如果他們留任並致力發表論文，他們可因而晉任，並分配更多的傳統學術和研究工作。不設立終生教職，但正教授將有更多的時間進行研究，並掌控他們的課程內容。

General Dempsey gave National Defense University a chance to be the first military institution of higher education to break away from the model of military education that critics have been assailing for the past decade. The new program under way at the university is a clear step in the right direction. It requires modifying the curricula, programs, and standards to give students more choices and instituting empirical feedback on staff and student performance—all difficult tasks. It will be tempting to compromise to make the program less stressful for staff and faculty. Change can be hard, but it is important to remember that the first, most difficult steps already have been taken. What is most important now is to maintain momentum toward a better and more challenging war college experience for the next generation of strategic leaders.

鄧普西上將給了國防大學一個機會，成為第一個脫離過去10年備受批評的軍事教育模式的高等軍事教育機構。新的方案是朝正確方向邁出的明確一步。諸如修改課程、計畫、標準，給學官更多的選擇，蒐集教職員與學官回饋的實證資料等，這都不是容易事。妥協可以讓幕僚人員及教職員壓力減輕，往往最具有誘惑力。改變或許困難，但要記住，最困難的一步已經踏出去，如今最重要的是保持衝勁，為下一代戰略領導者提供戰爭學院更好，更具挑戰的學習體驗。

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