

中共全球尋找石油及 強權間的潛在衝突【下】

China's Global Hunt for Oil and Potential Conflicts among the Powers

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（續上期）

胡已經訪問石油輸出國家組織(OPEC)的成員國，其中包含阿爾及利亞、印尼、沙烏地阿拉伯與奈及利亞。他也已經訪問過擁有豐富石油及大量儲備礦產可供出口的國家，其中包括澳洲、紐西蘭、埃及、加彭、羅馬尼亞、烏茲別克、阿根廷、巴西、汶萊、哈薩克、英國、加拿大、墨西哥和美國，^{註一}胡的到訪很明顯的是強化與石油生產國的關係，以及企圖穩固石油供給。的確，透過領袖間的交流，中共不僅強化了雙邊對等的關係，也增加在經濟、石油、能源及其他領域的共同合作。同時中共也透過雙邊協定，在

全球天然資源競爭中獲得有利的地位。

Hu has visited members of OPEC, including Algeria, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria. He has visited other countries that have an abundance of oil, and huge reserves to export, including Australia, New Zealand, Egypt, Gabon, Romania, Uzbekistan, Argentina, Brazil, Brunei, Kazakhstan, the UK, Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. Hu's visits are quite clearly intended to stabilize the oil supply and strengthen relationships with oil producing countries. Indeed, through its head of state's visits, China has not only strength-

^{註一} CIA, 'The World Factbook,' 2006.

ened bilateral strategic relationships but also has increased mutual cooperation in economy, oil, energy, and other fields. China has also gained an advantageous position for competition for natural resources globally through its bilateral agreements.

海德(Haider)認為，脫離西方所編織出的能源網及確保在一個穩定的環境裏面成長與發展，已成為中共的能源戰略中的重要議題。^{註二}中共除了仰賴自己的油田外，其是在極大的壓力下，去爭取適當的具體措施，以確保所需的石油供給。舉例來說，中共已經開始其與外國合作及投資的措施，這些措施可以歸類三種型式：一是透過在俄國、哈薩克、緬甸鋪設油管，以穩定石油供給；二是強化與石油產國的關係；三是以軍事介入非洲石油盛產國內部事務。

Haider argues that escaping the Western-fabricated energy web and ensuring growth and development in a stable environment has become an urgent issue for China's energy strategy. Besides, relying on domestic oilfields, China is under great pressure to take appropriately substantial measures to secure the needed oil supply. For example, China has initiated strategies such as cooperation and investment in foreign countries. These measures can be categorized into three types: the stabilization of oil supply through the construction of pipelines from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Myanmar; the strengthening of relationships with oil-producing countries; and military involvement in Africa's oil rich countries.

一、油田開採及建立全國性的輸送系統

^{註二} Ziad Haider, 'Oil Fuels Beijing's New Power Game,' *Yale Global Online*, 11 March, 2005.

^{註三} Chien Chung, "China's Energy Strategy in the 21st Century," 20 December, 2000, <<http://www.peaceforum.org.tw>>。

^{註四} 張為平，「中國海外能源戰略」，*中國日報*，2005年11月7日。

中共在內陸油田的供需上所面對之難題，從著名的大慶和勝利油田產量已經停滯及減產，華北石油品質差，遼河油田面臨金融困難，以及新疆油田則有把石油運輸至沿海地區給迫切需要消費者的問題等。^{註三}另一個難題是國際市場的石油價格從1998年就不斷的上升，在2005則是徘徊在每桶60~70元的價格。相對於1998僅每桶10~15元的價格，這些增加的石油需求，肇因於世界經濟的復甦，戰前對於伊拉克的制裁及伊拉克戰後緩慢的油田設施重建，以及委內瑞拉和奈及利亞政治上的變動造成出口減少，這些因素都造成價格上升。^{註四}因此，尋求中共境內的新油田及建立一個全國性的運輸系統，對解決中共經濟成長所面對的石油短缺是重要的。

(1) Exploitation of Oilfields and Establishment of a Nationwide Distribution System

As was mentioned above, production from the well-known Daqing and Shengli oilfields is stagnating and declining. Huabei oil production is low quality, Liaohe field faces financial difficulty, and Xingjiang oilfield has a problem shipping its product to the energy hungry consumers in the coastal regions. Another difficulty for China is that the price of oil on the international market has been on the rise since 1998, fluctuating between \$60 and \$70 a barrel in 2005, compared with only \$10-15 a barrel in 1998. The increasing demand for oil as a result of the recovery of the world economy, sanctions against Iraq before the war, slow post-conflict re-establishment of Iraqi oil production, and output drop in Venezuela and Nigeria caused by political upheaval have

all helped exacerbate the price surge. Hence, seeking new oilfields on China's territory and establishing a nationwide distribution system are essential to solve the oil shortage for China's economic growth.

對整個中共石油工業來說，東方油田一直是主要供給者，而西北、新疆維吾爾自治區，縱使有豐富礦藏，卻為一戰略的輔助區，在2005年6月，副總理曾培炎在國家發展改革委員會及國土資源部官員的陪同下，會同中國石油界的巨人，「中國石油暨天然氣有限公司」(China National Petroleum Corporation, CNPC)和「中國石化有限公司」(China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, Sinopec)的主要負責人，出席在新疆舉行針對西藏、新疆的石油和天然氣發展狀況的一場研討會。他們都認為加速新疆能源建設的時機已成熟，並指出在未來幾年內新疆應該建造成為石油和天然氣資源的戰略基地，以用來縮小國家對石油和天然氣需求的不足。^{註五}同時，新疆的石油發展對提升戰略石油儲備到30天的進口量，將會非常重要，而到2010年時，中共戰略石油儲備可達40天的進口量。^{註六}

For the entire history of the Chinese oil industry, the eastern oil fields have been the main contributors to production, while the northwest Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, with its rich reserves, has taken the role of a strategic substitutive zone. In June, 2005, vice premier Zeng Peiyan and officials from the State Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Land Resources, and China's top oil giants CNPC and

Sinopec attended a seminar in Xinjiang on the oil and gas development situation in Tarim, Xinjiang. They all held that the time is now ripe and the conditions are basically ready to speed up energy construction in Xinjiang, saying that Xinjiang should be built into a strategic base for oil and gas resources in the coming few years, so as to narrow the country's oil and gas shortfall. Simultaneously, the development of the Xinjiang oil fields would be crucial to elevate the strategic oil reserve to an amount equivalent to 30 days' imports, and by 2010, 40 days' imports.

2004年，新疆產出2,260萬噸的原油，來自塔里木、準噶爾及吐魯番盆地。相關銷售及獲利達405億人民幣（約50億美元），自1990年起，每年從新疆輸出的油量平均成長為111萬噸，且根據「中國石油暨天然氣有限公司」的初步計畫，2010年時，此區域的石油輸出，會達到3,000萬噸。^{註七}塔里木盆地估計有107億噸的石油存量，以目前證實的速率，塔里木天然氣的產出在2005年就已達1,000萬噸，但是石油含量卻只有8%。準噶爾盆地估計有9億噸重油的存量，其中2億5千萬噸已經證實。照現在產量標準估計，在準噶爾的重油礦藏，仍可開採至少30年，準噶爾盆地每年產出300萬噸重油，創造出中共石油總產量的三分之一，此龐大的石油及重油存量已使新疆成為主要重油和輕油生產及處理基地，^{註八}擁有如此豐富的石油及天然氣礦產，「中國石油暨天然氣有限公司」及「中國石化有限公司」，宣稱在2005年，已投資20億8,500萬人民幣於石油及天然氣

^{註五} Asia Times, "Oil Focus Shifting to Xinjiang," 10 September 2005, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>>.

^{註六} Beijing Times, "China's 21st Century Oil Strategy Outlined," 14 November, 2002, <<http://english.people.com.cn/200211/14>>.

^{註七} Asia Times, "Oil Focus Shifting to Xinjiang," 10 September, 2005.

^{註八} Ibid.

上游的探勘及開採，除了加速石油和天然氣的開採及探勘外，中共也加速建設由新疆到國內其他地方輸送石油和天然氣的設施。^{註九}

In 2004, Xinjiang produced 22.60 million tons of crude oil from Tarim, Junggar, and Turpan-Hami Basins. Related sales and profits hit 40.5 billion yuan (\$5 billion). Since 1990, the oil output in Xinjiang has been increasing on average by 1.11 million tons annually, and according to the preliminary plans of CNPC and Sinopec, the region's oil output will hit 30 million tons by 2010. The Tarim Basin is estimated to have 10.7 billion tons of oil reserves and Tarim's crude output reached 10 million tons in 2005. At present, the verified rate, however, is only 8% for oil. Junggar Basin boasts an estimated 900 million tons of thick oil reserves, with 250 million tons already proven. At the current production level, the thick oil reserves at Junggar can be pumped for at least 30 years. The Junggar Basin produces 3 million tons of thick oil annually, making up one third of China's total output. Its ample reserves of oil and thick oil have made Xinjiang a major thick & thin oil production and processing base in China. Owing to an abundance of petroleum and natural gas in the region, CNPC and Sinopec announced that they had invested 20.85 billion yuan in 2005 in upstream oil and gas prospecting and exploration. Aside from accelerating oil and gas prospecting and exploration, China is also speeding up the construction of facilities for transmitting oil and gas from

Xinjiang to other parts of the country.

此外，《中國商業時報》報導，中共能源開採及建設在西部區域已達到歷史的轉捩點，統計資料指出內蒙、陝西占有2,352億噸石油，以及1,663億噸已證實為境內煤礦的儲藏量，分別在中共排名為第2和第3名，另證實山西和內蒙邊境之13個縣市及區域含有中共60%的煤礦藏，且這些縣市及區域有豐富的石油及天然氣。^{註十}近期，中共在河北唐山市境內的南堡油田探勘出多達10億噸的原油儲量，使得大陸的原油儲量大幅增加兩成，此處發現的油田是一個高效油田，儲量規模大、油層厚度大，隨著開採工作的深入，在未來一段時間冀東油田產量必將快速上升，對於求油迫切的中共可謂是一場及時雨。^{註十一}

Moreover, China Business Times reports that China's energy exploitation and construction in western regions has reached a historical turning point. Statistics indicate that Inner Mongolia and Shaanxi contribute 235.2 billion tons and 166.3 billion tons of proven domestic coal reserves, respectively, ranking second and third in the country, while 13 counties and districts at the border of Shanxi and Inner Mongolia contain 60% of the country's total proven coal reserves. Meanwhile those counties and districts abound with oil and natural gas. Recently, there are more than billion tons of oil reserve were found at Nanbao oilfield which is located in Tongshan City, Hobei Province. The discovery led to China's oil deposit to increase 20%. The new-found oilfield

^{註九} Ibid.

^{註十} Si Chuan Xin Wen Wang, "China's Energy Strategy to Focus on the West," 8 February 2006, <<http://english.newssc.org/system/2006/02/08/000046672.shtml>>.

^{註十一} 彭志平，「發現大油田溫家寶High到失眠」，中國時報，2007年5月5日，<<http://news.chinatimes.com2007cti/2007cti-News>>

is highly efficient, large scale and high density. It is believed that the oil production of the Zhi-tong's oilfield will be increasing in the coming years. Thus, the production is right time for China's oil demand.

另外，「中國海洋石油有限公司」(China National Offshore Corporation, CNOOC)照慣例尋找外國投資近海石油，其在中共石油工業占相對較小比例。該公司在渤海、南海和東海占有45處沿海石油及天然氣資產之股份。近年該公司也因提供許多深海區域給外國公司，從中獲得許多利益，其中美國殼牌石油公司(Husky Oil)率先簽下了協議，而得以探勘在海南島東南方100公里處的12個區塊裏的一塊。此外，「中國海洋石油有限公司」和臺灣的「中國石油公司」簽下歷史性的協定，以共同開採臺灣海峽的石油，但由於兩岸中斷官方會談的緣故，這一步跨海峽的合資企業(joint venture)或許終將淪為政治的犧牲者。^{註1}

In addition, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has traditionally sought foreign investment for offshore oil, which represents a relatively small share of China's oil industry. The company reportedly has interests in 45 maritime oil and gas properties in the Bohai, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. CNOOC has also drawn interest from several foreign companies to its proffered deep-water blocks; an American company, Husky Oil, has been the first to sign an agreement to explore one of these 12 blocks, in an area 100 km southeast of Hainan Island. Moreover, CNOOC and Tai-

wan's state-run China Petroleum Corporation have signed a landmark agreement for joint exploration for oil in the Taiwan Strait. However, this joint venture across the Taiwan Strait may still fall victim to politics because of the discontinuity of official dialogue.

在第二次波灣戰爭之前，中共石油供給主要來源是中東，特別是伊拉克，然而，美伊第二次戰爭讓中共了解到石油的獲得必須分散到來自其他國家的供應以及本國本身的開採，從美、伊戰爭開始，中共即開始著手於戰略石油儲備，在浙江、山東及遼寧各省都有儲存，可以讓中共的油量自給自足長達3個月而不需依賴進口。^{註2}藉由內陸、近海油田的發展及強化戰略石油儲備，中共的努力不僅增加國內石油產量，也使得中共在一段時間內對國外石油供給的依賴程度降低。

By the second Persian Gulf War, China's oil supply mainly came from the Middle-East, in particular, Iraq. However, the war caused China to realize that its oil supply must be decentralized to include other foreign supplies and exploitation on own China's territory. Since the year of the war, China has begun work on a strategic oil reserve in coastal Zhejiang, Shandong, and Liaoning provinces that could allow the country to operate without imports for as long as three months. Through the development of its inland and offshore oilfields and the strengthening of its strategic oil reserve, China has made great efforts not only to increase its domestic oil production but also to reduce its dependence on foreign oil supply to some extent.

^{註1} Bernard D. Cole, "Oil for The Lamps of China: Beijing's 21st Century Search for Energy," pp.16-17.

^{註2} Peter S. Goodman, "Big Shift in China's Oil Policy: With Iraq Deal Dissolved by War, Beijing Looks Elsewhere," Washington Post, 13 July 2005, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>> See also Chietigj Bajpae, 'Energy Cold War,' Asia Times, 2 March, 2005, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>>.

一個完備的全國石油輸送系統能夠讓國內生產更有效率，當前，中共雖已建立了幾個區域分配系統，然而沒有一個完備的全國石油輸送系統的話，產量豐盛的西北方及東北方就無法有效地將石油輸送到經濟蓬勃發展的南方、東南沿海地區。儘管中共已提升來自俄羅斯和中亞之輸油管的建造，但是在缺乏完備的全國石油輸送系統之狀況下，穩定石油供給的目標還是難以達成。^{註四}因此，爲了滿足國內石油需求，北京已開始實施一系列的政策，以促進國內石油探勘及開採，並建立全國性的石油輸送系統。

A sufficient nationwide oil distribution system is required to make domestic production more efficient. Lin Tien-Lung points out that China has already established several regional distribution systems. But without a nationwide distribution system, oil production from oil rich regions like the northwest and the northeast cannot be efficiently delivered to the southern and southwestern coastal areas where the economy is booming. Lack of a sufficient nationwide distribution system renders the goal of oil supply stabilization difficult to achieve, despite advances such as the construction of pipelines from Russia and Central Asia. Therefore, in order to meet its domestic oil demand, Beijing has to implement a range of policies to boost domestic exploration and production and establish a nationwide distribution system.

二、以油管建設穩定外國油源的供給

由於中共的能源補給是個弱點，因此預料中共的石油公司除一方面持續增加對海外石油產業的投資；另一方面2010年中共在海外投資開採後，輸送回國的原油將會倍增。

2005年時，中共的石油公司從海外石油產業進口約5000萬噸的原油，而當年的總進口量是1億2,680萬噸。依據「中國石油暨石化設備協會」理事長趙志明的說法，其中3,500萬噸來自「中國石油暨天然氣有限公司」(CNPC)；1000萬噸來自「中國海洋石油有限公司」(CNOOC)，而其他則來自於「中國石油化學集團」或「中國石油化工有限公司」(Sinopec)。他也預測中共的石油公司在哈薩克、俄國、緬甸這些已有或將輸油管連結至中共的國家，將會增加石油產業的獲得。^{註五}

(2) Stabilization of Foreign Oil Supplies through Pipeline Construction

Owing to the vulnerability of China's energy supply, China's oil companies are expected to double imports of the crude oil they produce overseas by the year 2010, as they increasingly invest in foreign assets. In 2005, China's oil companies imported about 50 million metric tons of crude oil from their overseas assets, out of their total imports of 126.8 million tons in that year. This included 35 million tons by CNPC, 10 million tons by CNOOC, and the rest mainly by China Petroleum & Chemical Group, or Sinopec, according to Zhao Zhiming, president of the China Petroleum & Petrochemical Equipment Industry Association. He also predicts that China's oil companies will increase acquisition of assets in places like Kazakhstan, Russia, and Myanmar, where pipelines have been built or will be built to link to China.

石油及天然氣輸出在非石油輸出國家組織中，尤其是獨立國協，已經穩定地上升。而俄羅斯亦盛產石油及天然氣資源，因此也有巨大潛力成爲世界最大石油及天然氣輸出

^{註四} 林典龍，「中國能源安全的戰略分析」，頁96-97。

^{註五} Dow Jones Energy Service, "China to Double Oil Import from Foreign Assets," 23 April 2006.

國。考慮到輸送問題，俄羅斯及中亞的石油供給已然成為中共方面的主要選擇。^{註共}哈薩克與中共間的輸油管已經完成，並於2006年5月開始運作。在輸油管建設期間，「中國石油暨天然氣有限公司」去年以41億84萬元購得哈薩克石油公司，並正在尋求更多鄰近國家的石油產業。此外，中共及俄羅斯在2006年3月協議在近年內建立1條石油管線及2條天然氣管線。「中國石油暨天然氣有限公司」也與「俄羅斯石油公司」OAO Rosneft (RNT)簽定合約，雙方聯合探索俄羅斯境內油田。就如同趙志明所說，中共會藉由建造中緬油管以減少對於麻六甲海峽的高度依賴。^{註共}但此建設也許會因經費的缺乏，以及兩國因沒有簽訂協定而延緩數年。他進一步主張投資聯結區域間的管線，將有助於避免發生諸如最近發生於俄羅斯與烏克蘭及俄羅斯與歐盟之間的糾紛。^{註大}

Oil and natural gas output in non-OPEC oil producing countries, especially the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), has been rising steadily. Russia, in particular, abounds in oil and gas resources and therefore has a huge potential for growth. It is likely to become the largest oil and gas exporter in the world. Because of transportation concerns, the oil supply from Russia and Central Asian countries has become the primary choice from the Chinese perspective. The Kazakh-China pipeline has been completed and will start operation in May 2006. In line with the pipeline's construction, CNPC acquired Petrokazakhstan Inc. (PKZ) for \$4.18 billion last

year and is seeking more assets in neighboring countries. In addition, China and Russia signed preliminary agreements in March to build an oil pipeline and two gas pipelines in the next few years. CNPC has also made an agreement with Russian oil producer OAO Rosneft (RNT) to set up a joint venture to explore for oil in Russia. As for the feasibility of a Myanmar-China oil pipeline, Zhao said, "China will certainly build the pipeline as it will reduce the country's heavy reliance on the Malacca Strait." But construction may be delayed for a few years, given the unsettled construction costs and the lack of a signed agreement between the two governments. Zhao further argues that investment in pipeline-linked regions could help avoid future disputes like those between Russia and Ukraine and Russia and the European Union recently.

美國駐北京大使館，引述許多中共學者不同的觀點，報告指出中共貿易出口的成長，足以支付更大量的石油及天然氣的進口。而且，與石油生產者的貿易關係（特別是中亞國家）或許將加強，以保證中共長期可靠的能源供應。^{註共}的確，根據上述觀點，輸油管在這些國家內的建設不僅可以保證及時的供應，而且降低投資的風險，例如石油探勘、運輸、不穩定的社會情勢和一些石油輸出國的政權更替。此外，中共沿著湄公河實施石油裝運，已於2006年啟動，為解決麻六甲海峽運輸量壅塞找尋替代方案實驗的一部分，多一條運輸管道對北京而言，亦為確保能源穩定的途徑。根據新華社的官方

^{註共} 張為平，「中國海外能源戰略」，中國日報，2005年11月7日，<<http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/nts54706.htm>>。

^{註共} Ibid.

^{註大} Ibid.

^{註共} The U.S. Embassy in Beijing, "PRC Planners' New Energy Strategy: Oil not Coal," February 2000, <<http://www.usembassy-China.org.cn/sandt/sdpcenergy.html>>.

消息指出，在中共、緬甸、泰國和寮國之間簽署一個新的「決定性協議」，中共將可以從5月到12月沿著這條河，每月最多可載運1,200公噸的石油。雖然這行動與中共總進口1.27億公噸原油相比較，看起來像滄海一粟，但它在某種程度上將緩和石油供給安全的疑慮，惟還是不能解決北京對麻六甲海峽的憂慮。^{註一}由於中共自中東進口石油達58%，相較亞洲進口所占19%的比例，以及非洲進口20%的比例，麻六甲海峽是中共石油進口的重要海上通道，也難怪中共國家主席胡錦濤把這條重要的海上通道稱為「麻六甲困境」(Malacca dilemma)。^{註二}

The U.S. Embassy in Beijing, quoting the views of various Chinese scholars, reports that growing Chinese exports will be able to pay for even very large-scale oil and natural gas imports. Furthermore, trade relations with oil producers (especially the Central Asian countries) will probably strengthen, assuring China of long-term reliable energy supplies. Indeed, from the above viewpoints, the pipeline constructions within these countries can not only guarantee timely supply, but also reduce the risks of investment, such as oil exploration, transportation, unstable social situations, and changes of authorities in some oil exporting countries. Furthermore, China will start shipping processed oil along the Mekong River in May 2006, as part of an experiment to find alternatives to the congested Strait of Malacca, a vital shipping lane which is also a major source of energy security for Beijing. Citing a new "landmark agreement" between Chi-

na, Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos, the official Xinhua News Agency said China will be allowed to ship a monthly maximum of 1,200 tons of oil along the river from May to December. Although this move is like a drop in the bucket compared to the 127 million tons of crude oil China imports, it will ease the concern about oil supply security to some degree, but does not solve Beijing's anxieties over the Strait of Malacca. Because China's oil imports from the Middle East account for 58% of its total imports compared to 19% from Asia and 20% from Africa, the Strait of Malacca is the crucial sea-lane for China's oil imports. It is no wonder that President Hu refers to this crucial sea-lane as the Malacca dilemma.

三、強化與石油供應國的關係

在1996年末期，中共的能源公司與外國締結的契約共達30億美元（幾乎是中共近海探勘發展資金的60%），內容包含「中國石油暨天然氣有限公司」(CNPC)在俄羅斯、巴基斯坦、哈薩克、印尼、緬甸、埃及、厄瓜多爾、委內瑞拉、阿根廷、伊朗、伊拉克、索馬利亞、以及蘇丹等地的油田開發，還有在孟加拉、蘇丹和肯亞的能源轉換與精煉計畫。事實上「中國石油暨天然氣有限公司」總裁馬福財(Ma Fucai)陳述該公司期望能藉由海外產能的獲利占全額之60-70%，迎頭趕上Exxon Mobil公司。^{註三}隸屬於「中國石油暨天然氣有限公司」的「中國國家發展公司」，為此一合約經紀部門，負責與國外陸地石油工業公司之合作部分。中共在國外石油開採、生產的獲利計畫，也是由該公司所帶領。此公司一直保持與哈薩克、委內瑞

註一 洪橋青，「中國下個月經由湄公河運送石油」，海峽日報，2006年8月8日，<<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>>。

註二 藍國忠，「突破麻六甲海峽的難關以確保能源補給」，中國時報，2006年1月16日。

註三 Bernard D. Cole, "Oil for The Lamps of China: Beijing's 21st Century Search for Energy," p.17.

拉、蘇丹等國在石油方面的良好關係。另外，該公司持有股份的「大尼羅河石油營運公司」(Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company)與蘇丹石油也在1999年8月開始出口。此外，該公司雖在伊拉克獲得開採許可，然而由於伊拉克受到經濟制裁而無法實施，必須等到聯合國停止制裁為止，或至少在某種程度聯合國允許外國對伊拉克石油基礎設施的投資，方可執行該計畫。中共也在整個中東、東南亞、俄羅斯、中亞、非洲和拉丁美洲建立能源關係，北京非常清楚國家尋找能源將形成全球能源的爭奪大戰。能源部門在進行中的談判，朝向私營化發展，這無疑對那些倚賴利潤才可持續其商業生存能力的大型公司提高開採的吸引力。^{註三}

(3) Strengthening of Relationships with Oil Suppliers

As of late 1996, foreign commitments by Chinese energy companies totaled nearly \$3 billion (almost 60% of China's offshore exploration and development), including CNPC exploitation of oilfields in Russia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Myanmar, Egypt, Ecuador, Venezuela, Argentina, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, and Sudan, as well as power generation and refining projects in Bangladesh, Kuwait, Sudan, and Kenya. In fact, CNPC president Ma Fucai has stated that the company hopes to emulate ExxonMobil, with "overseas production accounting for 60 to 70% of profits." The China National Development Corporation, a CNPC subsidiary, is the contracting agent for cooperation with foreign companies in the onshore oil industry. China's program to acquire interests in petroleum exploration and production abroad is led by CNPC, which holds oil con-

nections in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Venezuela, Sudan, Iraq, and Peru. The Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, the Sudanese oil project in which CNPC owns a stake, began exports in August 1999. The CNPC concession in Iraq cannot be developed until the UN economic sanctions are lifted, at least to the extent of allowing foreign investment in Iraqi oil infrastructure. China is also establishing energy relationships all across the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Russia, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Beijing clearly is shaping the national search for energy into a massive global campaign, especially for petroleum. The ongoing negotiations of the energy sector are fostering a degree of privatization that undoubtedly makes expanded exploration attractive to the very large companies now dependent on profits for continued commercial viability.

因為中共高度依賴石油供給，所以尋求能源和石油的進展，對中共21世紀的經濟發展特別的重要。因此，改進與產油國家之間的關係是一個重要的第一步。對中共的領導人來說，以能源安全的名義購買外國油田及天然氣田，已經成為一項中心任務。檢視中共與那些產油國家的關係及它獲得石油來源國家的關係，可以最清楚闡明中共石油獲得的核心動力。

The quest for energy and especially oil is essential to boost China's economic development in the 21st century because of its high dependence on oil supply. Hence, improving relations with oil producing countries is a crucial first step. For China's leaders, buying foreign oil and gas fields in the name of energy security has become a cen-

^{註三} Ibid. p.16.

tral mission. Examining China's relationship with those oil producing countries and its acquisition of oil from them can most clearly illuminate the central dynamics of China's oil supply.

從全球能源分布圖來看，中共把焦點放在大約擁有世界三分之二油源的中東，尤其指向產量豐盛的伊拉克。然而，第二次美伊戰爭使中共在伊拉克發展石油產業的希望灰飛煙滅。中共一直都在等待國際制裁結束，以便開採位於伊拉克中部的阿赫代布(Al-Ahdab)油田。早在1997的時候，中共最大的國營企業——「中國石油暨天然氣有限公司」就已簽下了這片油田的合約，該油田產能估計每天約9萬桶。中共同時追求另一個更大的油田——哈發亞(Halfayah)油田，每天可以生產30萬桶。兩個油田相加的總量可以產出相當於中共國內當前約13%的產量。^{註四}

China's view of the global energy map previously focused narrowly on the Middle East, which holds roughly two-thirds of the world's oil. Special attention was directed toward one well-supplied country: Iraq. However, the second Iraq War destroyed China's hopes of developing large assets in Iraq. China has been waiting for the end of sanctions to begin work on the Al-Ahdab field in central Iraq, under a \$1.3 billion contract signed in 1997 by its largest state-owned firm, CNPC. The field's production potential has been estimated at 90,000 barrels a day. China is also pursuing rights to a far bigger field—the Halfayah field, which can produce 300,000

barrels a day. Together, those two fields might deliver quantities equivalent to 13% of China's current domestic production.

然而，伊拉克戰爭對中共帶來更大的衝擊，使中共瞭了到全球能源競賽的規則。國際貿易經濟合作研究院能源專家佟麗霞(Tong Lixia)說：「中國能源策略的轉捩點就在伊拉克戰爭，美伊戰後，政府與企業們瞭解到僅倚賴一個或兩個石油產油區的戰略，可能會危及中國的石油供給。」^{註五}

But the larger impact of the Iraq War was on China's understanding of the rules of the global energy game. "The turning point in China's energy strategy was the Iraq war" says Tong Lixia, an energy expert at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, which is affiliated with China's Commerce Ministry. After the war, both the companies and the government realized that relying on one or two oil production areas was a risky strategy that might endanger China's oil supply.

「中國海洋石油有限公司」(CNOOC)在2002年從西班牙「力豹仕公司」(Repsol YPF SA)買下一個油田之後，便成為在印尼最大的近海石油出產公司。^{註六}在中共國家主席胡錦濤與中共政協全國委員會主席賈慶林分別在2005年及2006年到訪之後，雙方除持續加強政治互信之外，並且在經貿合作中獲得了良好成果。兩個國家已經在能源、資源發展、基礎設施方面開始一連串大規模的計畫。^{註七}汶萊是另一個重要的石油供應國，胡

註四 Peter S. Goodman, "Big Shift in China's Oil Policy: With Iraq Deal Dissolved by War, Beijing Looks Elsewhere," Washington Post, 13 July 2005, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>>.

註五 Ibid.

註六 Ibid.

註七 China View, "Chinese Leader Foresees Better Future of China-Indonesia Relations," 27 March 2006, <http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-03/27/content_4348013.htm>.

錦濤提議中、汶兩國在石油貿易過程中加強合作。在2005年中共每天進口大約20,000桶的石油，大約有十分之一的石油是由汶萊生產的，一般深信兩個國家的石油合作關係將持續增強。中共所需的石油多數仍由中東進口，其中伊朗占大約14-15%，而沙烏地阿拉伯占大約16%。「中國石化」最近也和伊朗簽署一項為期25年，價值700億美元的合約，以便進口液化天然氣(liquefied natural gas, LNG)並投資探勘與生產計畫。^{註六}由於美國與歐洲試圖孤立德黑蘭以迫使其放棄核子武器的緣故，^{註七}該項交易使中共成為伊朗能源的首要進口國。^{註八}

In 2002, CNOOC became the largest off-shore producer in Indonesia, when it bought a field from the Spanish firm Repsol YPF SA. Following visits to Indonesia by President Hu and Senior Leader Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (), in 2005 and 2006 respectively, the two sides have continuously enhanced political trust and achieved good results in trade and economic cooperation. The two countries have started a series of large-scale projects in such fields as energy, resource development, and infrastructure. Brunei is another crucial oil supplier, to whom Hu proposed that the two countries step up cooperation in oil trade. China's daily import of oil from Brunei was about 20,000 barrels in 2005, about one-tenth of Brunei's oil production. It is believed that cooperation in oil

between the two countries will continue to strengthen. The Middle East still accounts for the majority of China's imported oil, with Iran contributing approximately 14-15% and Saudi Arabia accounting for approximately 16% of China's imports. Sinopec also recently signed a 25-year agreement with Iran, worth \$70 billion, to import liquefied natural gas (LNG) and invest in exploration and production projects, undercutting efforts by the U.S. and Europe to isolate Teheran and force it to give up plans for nuclear weapons. The deal makes China the number one importer of Iranian energy.

整個90年代，中共從非洲到拉丁美洲各地進行許多交易以穩固長期的供給與購買設備。在非洲，當中共外交部長李肇星訪問塞內加爾、維德角（非洲大陸最西點，為一半島國家）、賴比瑞亞、馬利和奈及利亞訪問時，能源協定在他的行程具有高度的優先性。^{註三}中共能源和商業投資也在利比亞有了顯著的影響：中共於2004年簽下一個3億美元，1,000萬桶原油的採購協定。「中國石油暨天然氣有限公司」與阿爾及利亞有探勘石油的協定。另外在2006年1月，印度政府決定不加碼奈及利亞海上的Apko油氣田的投標，因此「中國海洋石油有限公司」以20億美元獲得其45%的股份。中共與安哥拉的關係也緊密相連，該國在2001年總出口產量有25%是賣給中共。自從中共在2004年4月提供一個為期17年20億美元石油貸款給安哥拉政府後，安哥拉將來的出口量不可能減

^{註六} China View, "President Hu Proposes Furthering China-Brunei Ties," 21 April 2005, <http://news3.Xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/21/content_2857186.htm>.

^{註七} Peter S. Goodman, "Big Shift in China's Oil Policy: With Iraq Deal Dissolved by War, Beijing Looks Elsewhere," Washington Post, 13 July 2005, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>>.

^{註八} Drew Thompson, "China's Global Strategy for Energy, Security, and Diplomacy," James Foundation, 29 March 2005, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>>.

^{註三} Dvorak Uncensored, "China's World Energy Strategy," 18 January 2006, <<http://www.dvorak.org/blog/?p=3923>>.

少，安哥拉政府將把貸款用來再造因連年內戰而毀壞的國家基礎設施。和中共外交策略一致的是「中國建設和工程公司」將執行大多數工程，例如在羅安達(Luanda，安哥拉首都)建造財經和外交部大樓及復原鐵路，這些計畫皆與中共非洲的能源戰略息息相關。^{註三}非洲產油國家也以增進與中共能源合作達成共識。例如，埃及、加彭、阿爾及利亞、沙烏地阿拉伯和奈及利亞已經全部同意加強他們與中共的石油貿易合作。^{註三}

Throughout the 1990s, China made deals to lock in long-term supplies and buy installations, from Africa to Latin America. In Africa, energy deals will be high on the agenda of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lee Zhaoxing, when he travels to Senegal, Cape Verde, Liberia, Mali, and Nigeria. Chinese energy and trade investments have also made a significant impact in Libya, where China signed a \$300 million, 10 million barrel crude purchase agreement in 2004. In Algeria, the CNPC has agreements to explore for oil and provide loans for Chinese telecom companies to upgrade Algeria's telecom systems. In addition, in January 2006, CNOOC signed a \$2 billion dollar deal to take a 45% stake in the Nigerian offshore Apko oil and gas field after the Indian government decided not to go ahead with its bid. China has also cemented ties with Angola, which exported 25% of its output to China in 2001. Angola's future exports are unlikely to decrease, since China provided a 17-year, \$2 billion oil-backed loan in April 2004, which the Angolan government will utilize to rebuild

national infrastructure ravaged by years of civil war. Consistent with Chinese foreign strategies, Chinese construction and engineering firms will execute many of the projects, such as building the finance and foreign ministry building in Luanda and rehabilitating railroads. Africa's oil producing countries have also reached consensus over increasing energy cooperation. For example, Egypt, Gabon, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria have all agreed to strengthen their oil trade and cooperation.

關於拉丁美洲，在過去的3年中，中共已經在美洲積極尋求能源和原料協議，此舉引起部分美國人的關心，他們認為中共的這些作為，隱約象徵挑戰美國在這個地區長久以來的支配權。除了與加拿大、巴西、哥倫比亞、秘魯、厄瓜多和玻利維亞探討潛在的合作，中共藉由和反美的委內瑞拉總統查維茲(President Chavez)建立關係，在2005年的兩國元首國是訪問(state visits)之後，中共已經簽署多個石油探勘和採購協定。查維茲總統已毫不隱瞞地關切委內瑞拉過度依賴對美國石油的出口，並且在國內不斷透過反美情緒培養他的聲望。他同時利用中共對能源的興趣，以促進貿易關係和穩固信貸限額，並投資基礎建設，包括運輸和電信。^{註四}

In regard to Latin America, in the past three years, China has aggressively pursued energy and raw material agreements in the Americas, raising concerns among some in the U.S., who see China's effort as potentially challenging the U.S.'s historic dominance in the region. Aside from exploring potential partnerships with Cana-

註三 Ibid.

註三 參閱表二。

註四 Drew Thompson, "China's Global Strategy for Energy, Security, and Diplomacy," James Foundation, 29 March 2005.

da, Brazil, Columbia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, China has shown its ability to leverage an opportunity by building relations with anti-American Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez. China has signed multiple oil exploration and purchase agreements after exchanging state visits over the past year. President Chavez has made no secret of his concern about his country's dependence on oil exports to the U.S. and has built his popularity at home by tapping into anti-American sentiment. He is likewise leveraging China's interest in energy to boost trade ties and secure credit lines, and to invest in infrastructure, including transport and telecoms.

2004年11月在胡錦濤訪問期間，中共也同意在阿根廷投資一項50億美元的石油工程。「中國石油暨天然氣有限公司」亦有助於中共的國外石油供應，從2003年起，該公司已經在20份合約上簽定探勘或者在12個國家購買生產設施，包括秘魯、突尼西亞、亞塞拜然和茅利塔尼亞。2004年，該公司利用海外設備所生產的天然氣，較去年同期增加一倍，它的海外石油生產增加五分之一。^{註五}因此，中共與外國所建立的關係，已經達到它的石油供應多元化的目標。

China also agreed to invest \$5 billion in an oil project in Argentina during president Hu's visit in November 2004. CNPC has also contributed to China's foreign oil supply. Since 2003, the company has signed 20 contracts to explore or purchase production facilities in 12 countries, including Peru, Tunisia, Azerbaijan, and Mauritania. In 2004, the company's production of nat-

ural gas at overseas facilities nearly doubled from the previous year at the same time; its overseas oil production increased by a fifth. Thus China's establishment of foreign ties has already achieved the goal of diversification of its oil supply.

四、透過軍事介入尋找石油

中共對非洲最早和最成功的石油投資是在蘇丹。20世紀90年代中期在蘇丹最初的投資，包括派遣大量中共工程和建設隊，蘇丹於1999年開始抽取石油，變成中共第一個成功的海外範例。蘇丹產量現已占「中國石油暨天然氣有限公司」生產大多數的比例。即使查德仍與臺灣有外交關係時，該公司在查德也有生產石油的協定。^{註六}

(4) Hunting for Oil through Military Involvement

China's earliest and the most successful oil investments in Africa were in Sudan. After initial investments in the mid-1990s that included sending large numbers of Chinese engineering and construction teams, Sudanese oil began pumping in 1999, becoming China's first successful overseas effort to produce significant output. Sudanese output now accounts for a majority of CNPC's production. CNPC even has production agreements in Chad, a country that has diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

另外，為了獲得它的石油供給，中共已經大力介入非洲事務。例如，在查德和蘇丹之間的衝突過程中，中共支援蘇丹軍隊對抗查德軍隊。根據瑞士星期日報報導，當蘇丹政府正支援查德叛軍力量時，查德政府也同時支援蘇丹叛亂者的力量。為了支援蘇丹軍

^{註五} Peter S. Goodman, "Big Shift in China's Oil Policy: With Iraq Deal Dissolved by War, Beijing Looks Elsewhere," Washington Post, 13 July 2005.

^{註六} Drew Thompson, "China's Global Strategy for Energy, Security, and Diplomacy," James Foundation, 29 March 2005.

隊，中共給查德叛軍提供彈藥、設備和越野機車。一名匿名的法國官員曾說：「到目前為止，我們仍然不知道中國已經涉入查德-蘇丹衝突有多深」，在衝突過程中十分可能使用擁有中共政府授權在蘇丹生產的彈藥和設備。^{註五}法國國防部長米謝勒·阿利奧——馬里以更公開的方式抨擊中共在非洲的行徑，渠謂：「中國為非洲衝突國家供應太多軍火，此舉助長當地的衝突，並稱中共在非洲的投資是用心險惡」。由此可知中共軍援非洲國家背後的目的就是想瓜分非洲的礦產資源，並在當地發揮政治影響力。^{註六}

In addition, in order to secure its oil supply, China has become deeply involved in African affairs. For example, in the conflict between Chad and Sudan, China supports the Sudanese army against the Chadian army. According to a Swiss newspaper, *Le Journal du Dimanche*, Chad's government is supporting Sudanese rebel forces while the Sudanese government is supporting Chadian rebel forces. In order to support the Sudanese army, China provides ammunition, equipment, and field motorcycles to the Chadian rebels. One anonymous French official has said that up to now we still don't know how deeply China has involved itself in the Chad-Sudan conflict. It is quite possible that the ammunition and equipment used in the conflict were authorized by the Chinese government to be produced in Sudan. French defense minister, Michelle Alio-Mali publicly criticizes China's bad behavior for Africa. He says: "China has provided too much

ammunition to African countries. It has fostered the regional conflicts and China's investment in Africa is vicious. It is clear the real purpose of China's military assistance to the African countries is to carve up Africa's mineral resources and tries to leverage the African affairs.

法國自由報也提及來自蘇丹的石油占中共每年進口量的10%，中共從蘇丹購買的原油超過半數經由輸油管道交付中共。如果查德叛軍由蘇丹軍隊和中共政府支持下贏得政權，長久以來由美國控制的查德石油出口可能被接管。中共便能連接蘇丹和查德間的輸油管，然後查德石油也能透過蘇丹的輸油管運送回中共。「中國石油暨天然氣有限公司」是在蘇丹一個聯合企業的大股東，該企業經營蘇丹大部分的石油生產，蘇丹也被美國指控在其達佛(Darfur)的西部地區實施種族大屠殺。^{註七}如此中共在查德——蘇丹衝突中，對蘇丹政府的支援在某種程度上將削弱中共的國際名聲。

The French newspaper *Libération* (Liberation) also mentions that oil imports from Sudan account for 10% of China's annual imports; more than half of the crude oil China bought from Sudan was delivered through pipelines to China. If the Chadian rebel forces win power under the auspices of the Sudanese Army and the Chinese government, the long-term American-controlled oil exports from Chad might be taken over. China could then connect to the pipeline between Sudan and Chad and then Chadian oil could also be delivered via Sudan's pipelines into China. CNPC is

註五 蔡小英(Cai Xiaoying)，「石油需求優先：中國援助叛軍」，中國時報，2006年5月3日。

註六 張敏，「法國防長稱中國向非洲賣軍火助長當地衝突」，環球時報，2006年12月18日，<<http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2006-12-18/110111821019>>

註七 Peter S. Goodman, "Big Shift in China's Oil Policy: With Iraq Deal Dissolved by War, Beijing Looks Elsewhere," Washington Post, 13 July 2005.

the largest shareholder in a consortium running much of the oil production in Sudan, a country accused by the U.S. of genocide in its western region of Darfur. China's support of the Sudanese government in the Chad-Sudan conflict thus might impair the Chinese international reputation to some degree.

目前，在非洲事務上，中共已經改變其在20世紀70年代到80年代期間對抗蘇聯的戰略。在非洲尋找石油供給過程中，中共已經向安哥拉、尼日、阿爾及利亞、剛果和加彭等石油生產國積極交涉，中共已在非洲地區扮演出一個經濟大國的角色。^{註四}而在鞏固其與非洲國家的關係方面，中共也已經增加對他們的軍事援助，在接下來幾年的中共與非洲各國經濟和軍事合作預計將會持續增加。

Currently, in African affairs, China has shifted away from its strategy of the 1970s and 1980s of acting against Soviet Union. In seeking oil supplies in Africa, China has vigorously engaged with oil producers like Angola, Niger, Algeria, Congo, and Gabon to assume the role of an economic power in the region. In consolidating its relationship with the African countries, China has also increased its military aid to them and this close economic and military cooperation can be expected to increase in the coming years.

肆、區域強權的潛在衝突

中共全球尋找資源對一些國家來說是個利多，特別讓開發中國家迄今仍未開發的資源得以開採，或是擁有籌碼和老客戶談更好的條件。有些政府擔心北京進入他們勢力範

圍或者與他們設法使邊緣化的國家達成協議，^{註四}中共不斷表示它的「和平崛起」與「和平發展」並沒有意圖成為霸權或者造成國際平衡混亂。不過，這並不保證緩和全部的疑慮，因為中共的黑箱交易和不明意圖的行為是被關注的原因，中共正視美國及日本為區域的競爭者。因此，中共不可能明顯地降低日本的經濟影響或是短期內美國的戰略地位。例如，中共一手促成2005年11月舉行的東亞高峰會計畫，排除美國在這地區保有的經濟和戰略力量，這種行為讓美國感覺到北京試圖邊緣化美國，以及在最後把美國擠出亞洲。^{註四}

4. Potential Conflicts among the Regional Powers

China's global hunt for resources has been a boon to some states, especially developing countries, as it has allowed them to exploit as yet untapped resources or gain leverage to negotiate better deals with older customers. Some governments worry as Beijing enters their spheres of influences or strikes deals with states they have tried to marginalize. China has continually expressed its intention not to seek hegemony or disrupt international balances, but simply to maintain its "peaceful rise". However, not all fears are assuaged by its reassurances. While China may not significantly degrade Japan's economic influence or the U.S. strategic position in the near-term, China's opaque transactions and unstated intentions are a cause for concern that China is treating the U.S. and Japan as regional competi-

^{註四} Ibid

^{註四} David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2005, <<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84503/david-zweig-bi-jianhai/china-s-global-hunt>>.

^{註四} Drew Thompson, "China's Global Strategy for Energy, Security, and Diplomacy," *James Foundation*, 29 March 2005, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>>.

tors. For example, China's promotion of an East Asian Summit scheduled in November, 2005 excluded the U.S., which remains the dominant economic and strategic force in the region. This behavior fuels the feeling in Washington that Beijing is attempting to marginalize the U.S. and ultimately push it out of Asia.

印度是亞洲另一個巨大的經濟體，也已經消耗本身充裕的石油資源以支撐其經濟，同時也加入全球的石油競爭。即使中共和印度已經同意合作且不再惡性競爭，但那些在中亞、緬甸、俄羅斯、安哥拉、伊朗和麻六甲海峽的石油利益，可能會在將來密集的競爭中擦出火花。^{註四}根據Chietigj Bajpae說法，因為亞洲主要的強權全部都是重要的能源消費者，可以確定將來亞洲的舞臺是能源競爭的對抗和衝突。^{註四}

India, another giant economy in Asia, has consumed ample oil resources to buttress its economy and has also joined the global oil competition. Even though China and India have agreed not to compete with each by pledging to coordinate and cooperate for joint bidding on a case-by-case basis, the oil competition in Central Asia, Russia, Myanmar, Iran, Angola, and interests in Malacca Strait may become sparks that set off highly intensive future contests for oil. Since all the major Asian powers are significant energy consumers, the energy competition may determine the stages of future confrontation and conflict in Asia.

一、中共與美國

專注於全球反恐戰爭的美國，也開始擔心中共在外交上的進展，會使美國在亞洲和美洲的領導地位被邊緣化。尤其，政治風暴導致美國以超過「中國海洋石油有限公司」(CNOOC)185億美元的標價標下Unocal公司，美國眾議院有效阻止此一有關國家安全的交易，使該公司在去年8月無法得標。加州雪弗龍公司最終標下Unocal公司。在Unocal公司的投標案喧騰一時之後，中共已經轉向別處尋找石油，並在非洲、中東和拉丁美洲作了一系列高風險的能源投資。^{註五}不過，美國早在這些地區已經具有深遠的影響力。中共入侵美國的支配地區，包括美國的「後院」，確實在美國已經引起高度的關注。中共一直有意改進與原來的石油供應國的關係，例如沙烏地阿拉伯和伊朗，藉由出售軍事技術、投資其工業和能源基礎設施，並且用另一種方式檢視他們的人權紀錄。

(1) China vs. the U.S.

The U.S., preoccupied with the global war on terrorism, is also becoming concerned that Chinese diplomatic advances, particularly in Asia and the Americas, could marginalize the U.S. presence in these regions where it has traditionally taken the lead. In particular, a political firestorm resulted in the U.S. over CNOOC's \$18.5 billion bid for Unocal. CNOOC dropped its bid last August after the U.S. House of Representatives effectively blocked the deal on ostensible national security grounds. California-based Chevron ended up acquiring Unocal. After the uproar over the Unocal bid, the Chinese have

^{註四} Ziad Haider, "Oil Fuels Beijing's New Power Game," Yale Global Online, 11 March 2005, <<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5411>>.

^{註四} Chietigj Bajpae, "Energy: The Catalyst for Conflict," Asian Times, 26 August 2005, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>>.

^{註五} Wenran Jiang, "Beijing's New Thinking on Energy Security," James Foundation, 12 April 2006, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>>.

looked elsewhere, making a series of high-risk energy investments in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. However, the U.S. has long influenced these regions. China's encroachment on America's regions of dominance, including its "back yard" has definitely caused great concern in the U.S. China has also attempted to improve relations with its already-established oil suppliers, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, by selling them military technology, investing in their industries and energy infrastructure, and looking the other way with respect to their human rights records.

2004年3月，中共與伊朗簽署一項1億美元的協議，以進口1,000萬公噸液化天然氣的方式，與伊朗交換為期25年以上的石油天然氣探勘、石油化工產品和輸油管道基礎設施的投資。中共與伊朗關係的成長，破壞美國正對伊朗實施的制裁，布希政府懲罰中共的公司達62次，理由是違反美國或者國際公約上對伊朗和其他國家武器技術的轉移。美國中央情報局上呈一份報告至美國國會說明中共對伊朗的援助，使伊朗的能夠自製彈道飛彈。在持續進行對伊朗的鈾濃縮計畫的爭論裏，中共也已經反對將此事提交聯合國安理會(UN Security Council)，並威脅動用否決權，否決任何反制伊朗的決議。^{註四}

In March 2004, China signed a \$100 million deal with Iran to import 10 million tons of LNG over a 25-year period in exchange for Chinese investment in Iran's oil and gas exploration and petrochemical and pipeline infrastructure. Growing Sino-Iranian relations are undermining the U.S. sanctions against Iran. The Bush

administration has sanctioned Chinese companies 62 times for violating the U.S. or international controls on the transfer of weapons technology to Iran and other states. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has submitted a report to the U.S. Congress stating that Chinese companies have "helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles." In the ongoing controversy over Iran's uranium enrichment program, China has also opposed bringing the issue before the UN Secretary Council and has threatened to veto any resolution that is brought against Iran.

當沙烏地阿拉伯與美國關係在911事件後產生變化，沙烏地阿拉伯與美國的戰略夥伴關係可能因為中共與沙烏地阿拉伯的一次合作關係所取代，在沙烏地阿拉伯對中共的石油輸出量增加的同時，運往美國的油輪航次從2004年以來不斷下降。「中國石油公司」已經贏得沙烏地阿拉伯al-Khali盆地的天然氣探勘權，沙烏地阿拉伯也已經同意為福建的天然氣田建造一家精煉廠，以交換中共對沙烏地阿拉伯鋁礬土和磷酸鹽工業的投資。中共也在20世紀80年代於兩伊戰爭期間出售沙烏地阿拉伯蠶式飛彈，且兩個國家都與巴基斯坦關係密切。^{註五}

As Saudi-U.S. relations have soured in the post-9/11 world, the Saudi-U.S. strategic partnership may be supplanted by a Sino-Saudi partnership. Saudi oil shipments to the U.S. have been declining in 2004 while increasing to China. Sinopec has won the right to explore for natural gas in Saudi Arabia's al-Khali Basin and Saudi Arabia has agreed to build a refinery for natural

^{註四} Chietigj Bajpae, "Setting the Stage for a New Cold War: China's Quest for Energy Security," The Power and Interest News Report (PINR), 25 February 2005, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>>.

^{註五} Ibid.

gas in Fujian in exchange for Chinese investment in Saudi Arabia's bauxite and phosphate industry. China also sold Saudi Arabia Silkorm missiles during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, and both states have strong relations with Pakistan.

藉由武器提供和援助以換取石油，中共在能源豐富的非洲國家蘇丹、查德、安哥拉、奈及利亞、加彭和尼日等國努力競爭。因為有些非洲國家有種族大屠殺和人權上嚴重紀錄，所以中共與這些國家的關係引起嚴重的關切。難怪美國副國務卿佐立克(Zoelick)警告說：中共與那些被美國所「討厭的」國家之間的能源協定，會帶來「更大的外交政策衝擊」。^{註四}

China is vying for energy resources in energy-rich African countries like Sudan, Chad, Angola, Nigeria, Gabon, and Niger by offering arms and aid for oil. Some of these relationships have caused grave concern because of the African countries' bad records on genocide and human rights. It is no wonder that the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoelick warned China that its energy deals with states regarded by the U.S. as 'troublesome' would have a 'larger foreign policy impact'.

中共也正在獲取美洲能源。中共國家主席胡錦濤於2004年11月在智利參加年度亞太經合會高峰會議，宣布與巴西簽署價值100億美元的能源協定，建立一條中石化和巴西國有企業石油業集團Petrobras之間2,000公里的天然氣管道，該筆交易價值13億美元。正如同阿根廷境內海洋石油工程的投資，中共同樣也在厄瓜多獲得石油產業。在委內瑞拉

總統查維茲2004年12月的北京之行，以及2005年1月中共國家副主席曾慶紅的委內瑞拉之行期間，中共也藉由投資3.5億美元的油田和6,000萬美元天然氣計畫來開發委內瑞拉的能源建設。

China is also requiring energy resources in the Americas. While attending the Annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Chile in November 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao announced an energy deal with Brazil worth \$10 billion, supplementing a \$1.3 billion deal between Sinopec and Petrobras for a 2000 km natural gas pipeline. China is also acquiring oil assets in Ecuador as well as investing in offshore petroleum projects in Argentina. During Venezuelan President Chavez's visit to Beijing in December and Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong's visit to Venezuela in January 2005, China also committed to develop Venezuela's energy structure by investing \$350 million in oil fields and \$60 million in a gas project in Venezuela.

2005年1月20日，加拿大總理保羅·馬丁在北京訪問期間，兩國也簽署一份能源合作的聯合聲明，其中包括加拿大的石油砂和鈾礦資源的取得。中共日益增長的能源利益也跟著牽涉到美洲的區域安全。2005年10月，中共派遣到海地的聯合國維和部隊，是中共第一個對拉丁美洲的軍事部署。美國正謹慎地旁觀長久以來屬於它的勢力範圍和能源主要供應國家被中共侵入，例如，委內瑞拉和加拿大兩國提供給美國的能源，占美國進口能源的四分之一。^{註五}

^{註四} Tracy Quek, "Fuel Quest No Threat to the World," Strait Times, 14 September 2005, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>>.

^{註五} Chietigi Bajpae, "Setting the Stage for a New Cold War: China's Quest for Energy Security," The Power and Interest news Report (PINR), 25 February 2005, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>>.

On January 20, 2005, during Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin's visit to Beijing, China and Canada also signed a joint statement on energy cooperation that included assessing Canada's oil sands and uranium resources. China's growing energy interests in the Americas have been accompanied by a growing involvement in the region's security. In October, China sent a UN peacekeeping contingent to Haiti in its first military deployment to Latin America. Ironically, Haiti is one of only 25 states that recognize Taiwan rather than China. The U.S. is looking on with caution as China encroaches upon a region that has traditionally been under its sphere of influence and a major supplier of energy resources; for example, Venezuela and Canada together provide the U.S. with a quarter of its energy imports.

經由雙方官員一系列挑釁的聲明，中美關係的緊張也頗有火上加油的意味，在中共方面，於2005年7月中旬解放軍少將朱承虎在香港駐外記者俱樂部說明如果美國介入兩岸紛爭的調停，中共將發動核子第一擊。在美國方面，前國防部長唐納·倫斯斐已經發表許多評論，警告中共軍事能力日益增強和軍費開支完全脫離中共所宣稱的「和平崛起」。這個聲明在美國國防部2005年7月的報告中被引用，中共軍力現代化建設已造成在臺海兩岸的軍力平衡開始傾斜，並破壞長期穩定性。美國及日本在2月也發布一個聯合聲明認為中共和臺灣的爭端為一個共同的安全問題。^{註五}因為這些爭端已成為美、中衝突的潛在因素，而新興石油的競爭問題可能進一步催化彼此間在這些議題的歧見。

Sino-U.S. tensions have also flared over a

series of provocative statements by officials on both sides. On the Chinese side, Major General Zhu Chengfu, in a speech at the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club in mid-July, 2005, stated that China would initiate a nuclear first strike on the U.S. if it were to intervene in conflict over Taiwan. On the U.S. side, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has made numerous remarks warning of China's growing military capability and he stating that China's growing military expenditure was out of step with its claims of "peaceful rise." This statement was made in the context of a U.S. Defense Department report in July 2005 that cited China's growing military modernization as tilting the military balance in the Taiwan Strait and undermining long-term stability in the region. The U.S. and Japan also issued a joint statement in February which identified the Sino-Taiwan dispute as a mutual security concern. Because of these disputes, the potential conflicts between China and the U.S. might be further catalyzed by the emerging oil competition.

二、中共與日本

為了獲得離本國較近的能源，並且在中東之外的地方開拓油源，日本和中共積極為輸油管遊說俄羅斯。北京正爭取建立一條從西伯利亞安加爾斯克(Angarsk)到中共東北黑龍江省大慶2,400公里的輸油管線，而東京則想要建立一條從泰舍特(Taishet)到納霍德卡(Nakhodka)的太平洋港口，約4,000公里的石油管線，2004年末由日本所支持的提案宣佈被採納。不過，日本和俄羅斯有時仍處於緊張關係，日本前首相小泉純一郎曾在2004年9月2日談到有爭議的北方領土與南千島群島的問題。而且日本和俄羅斯之間在第二次

^{註五} Chietigj Bajapee, "Energy: The Catalyst for Conflict," *Asian Times*, 26 August 2005, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>>.

世界大戰結束後並未簽署正式和平條約，所以那些輸油管線的建設仍然可能會延遲，以及中共還沒完全被排除在計畫之外，2020年以前，中共仍會不斷爭取從日本的輸油管線，建造通往大陸的分支管線。^{註五}

(2) China vs. Japan

In an attempt to access energy resources closer to home and diversifying beyond the Middle East, Japan and China have been actively lobbying Moscow for an oil pipeline. Beijing is pursuing a 2,400 kilometer route from Angarsk in Siberia to Daqing in China's northeast Heilongjiang province, while Tokyo favors a 4,000 kilometer pipeline from Taishet to the Pacific port of Nakhodka. The Japanese-backed proposal was announced the winner at the end of 2004. However, with the sometimes tense relations between Japan and Russia, as seen most recently in Koizumi's sail around the disputed Northern Territories/ Southern Kurils on September 2, 2004, and in Japan and Russia's not having signed a formal peace treaty ending World War II, the construction of the pipeline may still experience delays. Furthermore, China is not yet out of the picture as there are discussions to build a branch from the Japanese pipeline to China by 2020.

中共積極地在全世界尋求穩定能源供應，也引起美國及日本的關注及對中共積極活躍的外交產生顧慮，另外能源消耗的增加可能導致未來的衝突。日本完全倚賴國外石油，也特別擔心中共日益增強的國力和軍事力量。最近中共潛艦入侵日本的領海、中共東海的潛在能源問題與西伯利亞的能源獲得所引起的外交衝突，這一切都助長了日本的反華情緒，而前首相小泉也利用反華情緒來

助長他自己在國內的人氣。

China's active quest to build relationships and secure energy supplies around the world has received increased attention in the U.S. and Japan, prompting some to worry that China's proactive diplomacy and growing energy consumption could lead to future conflict. Japan, which is entirely dependent on foreign oil, is particularly concerned about China's growing national strength and military buildup. The recent intrusion and detection of a Chinese submarine in Japanese territorial waters, coupled with diplomatic conflicts over potential energy deposits in the East China Sea and access to Siberian energy, have further propelled an anti-China sentiment in Japan which former Prime Minister Koizumi has capitalized on to increase his popularity at home.

中日兩國日益緊張的情勢是源於，戰後日本從主張和平與防衛態勢(defensive posture)轉型成為地區內活躍的軍事要角，就像現在看到日本派遣自衛隊到伊拉克。而且，日本在2004年12月發布的防衛計畫大綱(National Defense Program Outline)裏第一次認定中共是一個潛在的安全威脅。有三個事項已經被認定為能夠引起在中共和日本之間的衝突：在中共東海具有爭議的自然資源、釣魚臺現狀及日本支持美國就臺灣問題而與中共發生的衝突。源於日本在二次大戰暴行的猜疑和仇恨，加上現在對於如領土和能源有形事件的敵對狀況，再加上兩個國家在世界舞臺上都變得更為主動，雙邊不穩定情勢可謂一觸即發。^{註五}

Adding to these tensions are Japan's shift from its post-war pacifist and defensive pos-

^{註五} Chietigi Baipae, "Energy Cold War," *Asian Times*, 2 March 2005, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>>.

^{註五} Ibid.

ture toward a more active military role in the region, as seen with the current deployment of its Self Defense Forces to Iraq. Furthermore, Japan for the first time identified China as a potential security threat in its National Defense Program Outline, released in December 2004. Three issues have been identified that could spark a conflict between China and Japan: natural resources in the disputed East China Sea, the disputed status of the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands, and Japanese support for the U.S. in a conflict with China over Taiwan. Mistrust and animosities rooted in Japanese atrocities during World War II combine with confrontation over tangible issues, such as territory and energy resources, and a more active role by both states on the world stage, a recipe for a volatile situation.

三、中共與印度

印度和中共處於相似的地位，因為兩個都是國力迅速成長的國家，也看的出兩個國家在合理價格內需要確保多樣的能源來源。在約一年準備的工作之後，兩個國家在5個備忘錄的簽署上，表示瞭解在追求能源安全過程中要如何管理他們的共同競爭與合作模式。^{註五}雙方承認合作是唯一擺脫西方建立能源網絡的方法，並同意為共同利益而行動。印度的石油部長Mani Shankar Aiyar說「印度和中國不必歷經兄弟相殘才能達成共識，要達成共識，最好的方法就是在能源安全上的合作」。^{註六}他也認為：在21世紀，競爭者已經知道合作能比無意義的競爭獲得更大的利益。^{註七}根據亞洲時代雜誌，在2006

年3月，中俄兩國於俄羅斯總統普丁到北京訪問期間，簽署一份備忘錄，內容是每年從西伯利亞的東部和西部透過一條預定2011年開始運作的輸油管，供應中共總計達60到800億立方米的天然氣。中俄能源合作對印度有著深遠的意涵，預料印度將認真地看待俄羅斯輸油管延伸到印度的可行性。這幾年，用簡單的方法以發展從歐亞大陸經中共到印度的油管路線，漸漸地被印度人認為是有必要的。初步的想法現在可能開始要具體化了。^{註八}

(3)China vs. India

India and China are in similar positions in that both are rapidly growing nations, acutely aware of their needs for securing diverse energy resources at affordable prices. After nearly a year of preparatory work, the two countries signed five memoranda of understanding on how to manage their mutual modes of competition and collaboration in the quest for energy security. In agreeing to act for mutual benefit, both sides recognize that cooperation is the only way to escape the Western-fabricated energy web and ensure growth and development in a stable environment. As Mani Shankar Aiyar, India's Petroleum Minister, put it, "India and China don't have to go through fratricide in order to arrive at the conclusion that it is better to cooperate on energy security". He also argues that in the 21st century, players have learned that cooperation can render even greater benefits than mindless competition. According to the Asian Times, during

^{註五} Dovrak Uncensored, "China's World Energy Strategy," <<http://www.dovrak.org/blog/?p=3923>>.

^{註六} Ziad Haider, "Oil Fuels Beijing's New Power Game," Yale Global Online, 11 March, 2005, <<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5411>>.

^{註七} Dovrak Uncensored, "China's World Energy Strategy,".

^{註八} M K Bhadrakumar, "India Plays Catchup with China, Russia," Asian Times, Central Asia, 28 March 2006.

the visit of Russian President Putin to Beijing in March 2006, Russia and China signed a memorandum on Russian gas supplies to China amounting to 60 to 80 billion cubic meters annually from eastern and western Siberia, through pipelines that will be operational by 2011. The Sino-Russian energy cooperation holds deep implications for India. India could be expected to look seriously at the viability of extending these Russian pipelines to India. The need for adopting a schematic approach to developing gas pipeline routes from Eurasia to India via China began permeating Indian thinking in recent years. Inchoate thoughts may now begin to crystallize.

根據印度專家的說法，在俄羅斯石油及天然氣給印度的輸油管工程實際可達到的兩條變通管線，兩條都位於沿著哈薩克和中共新疆地區現有的鐵、道路崎嶇之南北道上。

第一條可從西伯利亞——土庫曼——奧姆斯克(Omsk)——山米(Semey)——鄧茲巴(Dmzhba)——烏魯木齊(Urumchi)——洛里亞(Loria)——庫瓦(Kuqa)——阿克舒(Aksu)——卡什加(Kashgar)——雅喀(Yarkand)——夏普都利亞(Shahuduliah)——印度。第二條是西伯利亞——土庫曼——佩多佩維歐斯克(Petropaviosk)——阿斯塔那(Astana)——畢斯克(Bishkek)——伊斯庫爾(Issyk Kul)——那里(Naryn)——卡什加(Kashgar)。可能選擇替代方案是從Irkusk(俄羅斯)——庫倫(蒙古)——玉門(中共)——敦煌，之後依照傳統的南方絲綢之路到和闐(Khotan)——夏西都拉(Shahidullah)——印度。對任何上述管道來說，中心都位於迪化和在新疆的喀什噶爾。^{註五}

According to Indian experts, there are two possible variants of pipeline project realistical-

ly attainable for bringing Russian oil and gas to India, both located in a rough north-south path along the existing railway lines and roads in Kazakhstan and the Xinjiang region of China. The first variant might run from Siberia-Tyumen-Omsk-Semey-Druzhba-Urumchi-Loria-Kuqa-Aksu-Kashgar-Yarkand-Shahuduliah-India. The second might be from Siberia-Tyumen-Petropaviosk-Astana-Bishkek-Issyk Kul-Naryn-Kashgar. An alternative might run from Irkusk (Russia)-Ulan Ude-Ulan Bator (Mongolia)-Yumen (China)-Dunhuang, thereafter following the southern branch of the traditional Silk Road to Khotan-Shahidullah-India. For any of the above pipeline grids, the hub would be Urumchi and Kashgar in Xinjiang.

如果這個計畫可以實現，除了三大國潛在聯盟的政治意涵外，在這三個國家將可獲得可觀的經濟利益。俄羅斯有兩大市場：中共和印度。印度能保護來自俄羅斯經中共的天然氣和石油；中共能收取新疆和西藏西部的輸油管費用而獲得可觀的收入。輸油管除了能促進和鄰國印度之間的地區或者附屬地區的合作外，更能刺激中共這些地區的經濟發展。可想而知，中共對印度的交易感到興趣。用Sakhalin地區所購買印度的石油、天然氣交換在新疆和哈薩克生產的石油、天然氣。當然，由於經由印度到新疆的塔里木盆地是最短的管道路線，新疆天然氣的儲量也是印度最利於獲得的來源。中共更發現從塔里木盆地到印度提供天然氣比把它運送到華東更為有利。印度提供中共一條通往波斯灣區域的能源走廊，將使中共能夠降低依賴過長且危險的供應線。這條供應線從印度洋經麻六甲海峽到中國南海。中共將有種種理由

註五 Ibid.

歡迎一條通過印度陸上的路線。^{註五}這個提議如果實施，中共、印度、俄羅斯在能源合作上，將更進一步的強化。

If this design can be implemented, aside from the political meaning of a potential alliance of three giants, the economic interests will be huge among these three countries. Russia has these two big markets, China and India; India can secure gas and oil supplies from Russia via China. China could earn considerable income by way of transit fees from pipelines going through Xinjiang and Western Tibet. Pipeline activities could stimulate the economic development of these regions of China, apart from fostering regional or sub-regional cooperation between these regions and neighboring India. Conceivably, China would be interested in swap deals with India: namely, buying India's oil and gas in Sakhalin in exchange for the oil and gas produced in Xinjiang and Kazakhstan. Of course, the Tarim basin deposits in Xinjiang are the most accessible gas deposits for India (other than Iran), with the shortest pipeline routes to India. China might even find it more advantageous to supply gas from Tarim basin to India than to transport it to East China. India could reciprocally offer China an energy corridor to the Gulf region that would enable China to reduce its excessive dependence on the long perilous supply lines from the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. China would have every reason to welcome an overland route via India. If this proposal is carried out, Sino-Indian-Russian collaboration in the energy sphere would be further strengthened.

^{註五} Ibid.

^{註六} Chietigj Bajapee, "Energy: The Catalyst for Conflict," *Asian Times*, 26 August 2005.

因此，可使近期的中、印關係更加樂觀。不過Chietigj Bajapee對於中、印和解有不同的觀點，渠認為他們在阿克賽金(Aksai Chin)及Arunachel Pradesh的領土爭端也將浮現在世界舞臺，而且中共將侵入印度的「勢力範圍」，就如同從前中共與孟加拉、尼泊爾和斯里蘭卡等國關係的改善那樣。中共也試圖參加「南亞區域合作聯盟」(South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, SAARC)，中共日益茁壯的海軍可能讓這兩個亞洲巨人在印度洋形成一個新的緊張情勢。^{註六}

Thus there is reason to be highly optimistic about Sino-Indian relations in the near term. Chietigj Bajapee, however, expresses a different view of Sino-Indian rapprochement. It might also be unraveled by a flare-up over their territorial disputes in Aksai China and Arunachel Pradesh by energy competition on the world stage, and by China's encroachment into India's "sphere of influence", as seen by its improving relations with Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. China's also attempting to join the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and its growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean might bring about a new round of tension between these two Asian giants.

伍、結 論

過去幾年，中共最高決策者強調中共為一發展的經濟體，且正為高漲的石油價格付出昂貴的代價，單單2004年，北京必須因為油價上升額外花費70億美元的外匯，使原油成為國家最大的單一進口項目，中共在石油高漲的損失，西方世界永遠都不會承認。如同「中國石化有限公司」的報告一樣，這對

石油消耗、投資、進出口有負面影響，而且使中共的GDP下降0.8%。西方強權認為全球石油需求增加，特別是來自中共和印度的石油需求，以及減少能源生產量，都是使石油價格維持在高點的原因。北京對於這樣的看法頗不認同，中共懷疑真正的罪犯是其國務院所稱的西方政府支援只尋求利潤的「國際石油鱷魚」在操作石油價格。透過埃克森(Exxon)、美孚(Mobil)、BP和皇家荷蘭殼牌(Royal Dutch Shell)石油公司在最近意外收益成長報告，只增加這樣的認知。^{註卒}

5.Conclusion

In the past year, top Chinese policymakers have emphasized the fact that China, as a developing economy, is paying a huge price for mounting oil prices, a point not always recognized in the West. In 2004 alone, Beijing had to spend an extra \$ 7 billion of its foreign exchange due to climbing oil prices, with a payment totaling over \$ 4.3 billion, making crude oil and refined oil the country's largest single import item. As reported by Sinopec news, this had a negative impact on consumption, investment, export, and import and China's GDP suffered a 0.8% downturn. The dominant Western view holds that the worldwide increase in demand, especially from China and India, and decreasing spare production capacity conspire to keep oil prices high. Beijing sees the issue far differently. The PRC suspects the real culprit is what China's State Council Information Service calls Western government-backed, profit-seeking "international petroleum crocodiles" that manipulate oil prices. Reports in recent weeks of windfall earnings by Exxon,

Mobil, BP, and Royal Dutch Shell only enhance such a perception.

雖然中共已經在全球尋找石油，但是世界不應該由於它迅速的經濟發展，對中共驟增的石油消耗反應過度。因為中共是在石油消耗方面的新參與者，中共早就在被西方支配的國際石油市場裏無法擴大其生存空間。當部分石油蘊藏豐富的國家被美國及西方指控種族大屠殺、違反人權、發展大規模毀滅性武器(Weapons of Mass Destruction, WMD)或者發展核子武器，使得中共尋找石油的空間變得較有彈性。由於上述原因造成這些國家的制裁和批評，提供中共進入這些富產石油國家一次良好的機會。在第二次波灣戰爭之後，中共已經在全世界積極地尋找石油。對中共最有吸引力的地區包括非洲、中東和拉丁美洲地區。目前，伊拉克、伊朗、沙烏地阿拉伯、蘇丹、安哥拉、奈及利亞和委內瑞拉是中共的主要的石油來源。自從中共對石油消耗的需求已經超過它的石油生產量，能源難題可能惡化其與世界各國的脆弱關係，特別是在強權國家之間。

Although China has pursued oil globally, the world should not necessarily overreact to China's rapid oil consumption due to its rapid economic development. Since China is a latecomer in oil consumption, China seems not to have much room to expand in the international oil market that has long been dominated by the West. The space becomes flexible where countries are rich in oil but are accused by the U.S. and the West of the crime of genocide, or of violating human rights, or of developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or of developing nuclear weapons. Sanctions and criticisms for these reasons pro-

^{註卒} Wenran Jiang, "Beijing's New Thinking on Energy Security," James Foundation, 12 April 2006, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/>>.

vide a good opportunity for China to access these oil rich countries. After the second Persian Gulf War, China has vigorously hunted for oil all over the world. The most attractive areas to China include Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, considerably encroaching upon U.S. spheres of influence. Currently, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Angola, Nigeria, and Venezuela are China's major oil sources. Since China's demand for oil consumption has exceeded its oil production, the energy dilemma may well exacerbate volatile relations among nations, especially the big powers.

關於將來中共巨大油量消耗的研究和辯論，呈現既樂觀又悲觀的看法。樂觀者認為中共大規模和迅速的經濟發展，正引起全世界的社會和經濟挑戰。中共如何處理自己的國外關係將影響世界怎麼看待他，一則是和平的障礙，另一則是支持國際體系和全球良好治理的現狀國家。中共全球尋找石油以刺激其國內的經濟成長，並不對其他主要的石油進口國家帶來害處。但是，發展中國家應該以不同國際合作方法，並且應該鼓勵中共促進透明度，良好治理和它的夥伴國家負責任的行為。當身為一個在全球化時代逐漸占有份量的國家時，中共將越來越看見它的核心利益超越其國內經濟，並且會極力與已開發國家密切合作。另一方面，中共與諸如伊朗和蘇丹等國穩固的關係，美國及歐洲可與中共致力促使這些困難且被邊緣化的國家 (difficult and marginalized nations)，改變他們違反國際規範的行為，並且使他們融入國際社會之中。^{註六}國際和平對中共的經濟是當然是重要的。根據自由主義者的遠景，在個別地區國家之間合作的議題上，可以引領其

他地區走向政治整合。如果世界能在反恐怖主義的問題及朝鮮半島核爭論的合作，肯定也可以在區域強權中達成能源的合作。

Behind-the-scenes research and debate about China's huge oil consumption have suggested both optimistic and pessimistic scenarios for the future. Optimists argue that China's sheer size and rapid economic development are causing social and economic challenges around the world. How China handles itself in its foreign relations will affect how the world views it, either as an obstacle to peace, or as a status quo nation that has a vested interest in supporting international systems and global good governance. China's global hunt for energy to fuel its domestic economic growth is not inherently detrimental to other major oil importers. However, developed nations should become reconciled to different approaches to international partnerships and should encourage China to promote transparency, good governance, and responsible behavior with its partner nations. As a nation with a growing stake in globalization, China will increasingly see that its core interests extend beyond its domestic economy and are largely aligned with developed nations. As such, China's strong relationships with nations such as Iran and Sudan present an opportunity for the U.S. and Europe to work with China to bring about a behavioral change in difficult and marginalized nations and bring them into the world community. International peace is of course essential for China's economy. From the liberal's perspective, collaboration between states in one issue area may spill over to other areas and lead to political

^{註六} Drew Thompson, "China's Global Strategy for Energy, Security, and Diplomacy," James Foundation, 29 March 2005.

integration. If the world can cooperate over issues of anti-terrorism and the Korea Peninsular nuclear dispute, surely energy cooperation is also possible among powers.

相較之下，悲觀者認為能源成為衝突的一種催化劑。在中共與西方之間的磨擦迄今仍是問題，有中共低估的匯率、人權紀錄及與「流氓」國家的關係，且在能源上的競爭中正成為另外一個競爭區，中共在國際能源舞臺日益壯大的事實，使它最後進入對抗世界最大能源消費者——美國。當中共與美國已經啟動中美能源戰略對話(U.S.-China Energy Policy Dialogue)，兩個國家也為在俄羅斯、裏海、中東、美洲和非洲的能源從事競爭。這競爭也結合可能具有潛在衝突的其他地區，例如，在中共和臺灣、日本或者印度；中共內部的鎮壓，例如天安門廣場大屠殺歷史重演可能產生的衝突；或者在麻六甲海峽關鍵的海上航道發生衝突，有可能引起一次更廣泛的衝突。中共已經進一步和印度、俄羅斯解決邊境紛爭，然而，中共未能在東海和南海中的領土議題，和日本取得進展。中共宣稱「和平崛起」與「和平發展」的戰略，把意見不合的事項放在一邊，建立穩定的周邊安全環境以利於經濟發展，但範圍僅侷限於中共沒被威脅的重要戰略性利益。^{註空}

By contrast, pessimists argue that energy takes center stage as a catalyst for conflict. Friction between China and the West has so far focused on the question of China's undervalued exchange rate, its human rights record, and relations with "rogue" states, but competition over energy resources is becoming an additional area for competition. China's growing presence on

the international energy stage could ultimately bring it into confrontation with the world's largest energy consumer, the U.S. While China and the U.S. have launched the U.S.-China Energy Policy Dialogue, both states are also engaged in competition for energy resources in Russia, the Caspian Sea, the Middle East, the Americas, and Africa. This competition could potentially combine with other areas of friction, for example, possible conflict between China and Taiwan, Japan, or India, internal repression such as a repeat of the Tiananmen Square massacre, or conflict over vital searoutes in the Strait of Malacca, thus sparking a wider conflict. It is not by coincidence that China has made progress in resolving its border disputes with India and Russia, while failing to make progress on territorial disputes with Japan in the East China Sea and in the South China Sea, given that the latter involves access to potential oil and gas resources. In this context, China's claim to pursue a "peaceful rise" policy, putting aside areas of disagreement in favor of creating a stable environment for economic development, is limited to areas where China's vital strategic interests are not threatened.

柯爾(Bernard Cole)在他的著作「給中國油燈的石油：北京21世紀尋找能源」，提供本篇文章所敘述有關情勢一個公正的評論。他認為當中共透過WTO更整合到國際經濟中，能源部門將在國內、外政策優先事項中起更重要的作用。因此，與中共交手的其他國家將發現他們自己越來越重視與中共的關係，同時中共政府必須在自由化的經濟上反應政治自由化更巨大的壓力。^{註空}

^{註空} Chietigj Bajpae, "Setting the Stage for a New Cold War: China's Quest for Energy Security," The Power and Interest news Report (PINR), 25 February 2005, <<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute>>.

^{註空} Bernard D. Cole, Oil for The Lamps of China: Beijing's 21st Century Search for Energy, 2003, pp.16-17.

Cole's arguments in his book titled "Oil for the Lamps of China: Beijing's 21st Century Search for Energy" provides a fair commentary on the situation that has been outlined in this paper. He argues that as China becomes more integrated into the international economy through the vehicle of the WTO, the energy sector will play a more significant role in both its domestic and foreign policy priorities. Hence, other nations dealing with China will find themselves focusing increasingly on this part of their relationship, while the Chinese government will have to react to greater pressure to liberalize its political rule over a liberalized economy.

簡言之，美國、中共、日本、印度和俄羅斯等大國間在能源的供需上，一定要成立一個全球石油的合作組織，俾能管理石油公平的分配，否則出現的衝突將變得更不穩定，並且可能轉移到軍事對抗。目前，這些國家試圖以雙邊協定獲得新能源，且每一個也都試圖支配越來越有限的資源。因此，在區域強權間的衝突也越有可能，除非某種協商國際治理的形式可以建立，有效仲裁油源紛爭事宜。

In short, in the search for energy among the largest countries, the U.S., China, Japan, India, and Russia, a cooperative global organization must be formed that can manage a fair distribution of oil; otherwise the conflicts that arise will become more volatile and possibly devolve into

military confrontations. At present, these countries are trying to acquire new energy by bilateral agreements and each is trying to dominate the increasingly limited resources. Thus there is great potential for conflict among the powers, unless some form of negotiated international governance can be developed to keep the peace.

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