

改變國防部「設計計劃預算制度」： 第二階段報告（譯稿）之三 Changing the Pentagon's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System: Phase 3 Report

♥熊光明譯

二、調整國防計畫指導

Restructuring the DPG

調整五年國防計畫以明確辨認期望產出（outputs）僅是初步的措施。第二個不可或缺的措施是從產出決定期望的結果（outcomes）。換言之，在確認期望產出之後，每一產出之相對優先順序及高階決策者所願接受的「〔作戰〕能力」與「風險」比例為何？處理這個問題需要藉助更詳細與具體的「國防計畫指導」（DPG）。

Restructuring the FYDP to more clearly identify the outputs desired is just a preliminary step. An indispensable second step is determining the outcomes desired from the outputs. In other words, after identifying the outputs desired, what are the relative priorities of each and what distribution

of capability and risk are acceptable to the senior decision-makers? Addressing this issue requires much more detailed and specific Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

「國防計畫指導」的目的係對各軍種傳達〔作戰〕能力之指導，期能符合既定之國家安全戰略（NNS），藉以強調對特定項目之關切及確認各部門間之優先順序。過去二十年來，「國防計畫指導」的條文內容時而針對計畫定出大幅具體性規範，時而又僅為概括性規範；「國防計畫指導」目前版本則較偏向於後者之方式。由於將國家安全戰略轉換成特定之計畫有其困難，致國防指導的問題亦日形惡化。史坎茲（Lawrence Skanze）將軍（美國空軍退役）最近評論到：「當眾人期望白宮能於1999年12月發表之《新世紀的國家安全戰略》（National Security Strategy



for a New Century) 提供簡明扼要指導時，它卻令人大失所望。更確切的說，它是個漫無方向的文件，對吾人預備要去做的事情絲毫無所限制，對一個軍事計畫者而言毫無半點實用價值。」¹

The intent of the DPG is to transmit to the military services guidance on the capabilities desired to meet the established National Security Strategy (NSS), to highlight items of specific concern, and to identify departmental priorities. Over the past twenty years, the content and context of the DPG has alternated between a document containing a relatively high degree of specificity on programs to be pursued, and a more general document open to broad interpretation. Recent versions of the DPG have more closely followed the latter approach. The defense guidance problem has been exacerbated by the difficulty of translating the NSS into specific programs. General Lawrence Skanze (USAF, Retired) recently observed that, “While one would have expected the White House publication in December 1999 of a National Security Strategy for a New Century to provide crisp guidelines, it did not. Rather it is an amorphous document, without limits on what we seem prepared to do. It is of no practical use to a military planner.”²

目前「國防計畫指導」的格式未能提供充分細節用以述明主要願景、方向，確認立即措施達成預期目的，及區分軍種內或軍種間之計畫優先順序。最近「國防科學委員會」(DSB)有份標題為「國防部作戰轉型」(DOD Warfighting

Transformation) 的報告中提到國防部內部目前國防規劃方面的努力，儘管其中包含了「堅決的字眼」(strong words)和「大膽的願景」(bold vision)，但到底欲將軍種目前作戰能力轉換成何種境界的細節則未詳予交代。³

In its current form the DPG provides insufficient detail to articulate a central vision and direction, identify the intermediate steps necessary to reach a desired goal, and define priorities in a programmatic manner either within or among the services. A recent report by the Defense Science Board (DSB) titled “DOD Warfighting Transformation” expresses the view that current defense planning efforts within the Pentagon, although containing “strong words” and a “bold vision,” do not provide sufficient clarity or detail on what is expected to transform the services’ current capability.⁴

國防部不是唯一未能提供明確指導的單位。民營部門中的規劃通常也犯有常見於公營部門同樣的弊病。如同明芝柏格(Henry Mintzberg)在其《策略規劃之興衰》(The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning)一書中提到：通常公司致力於重要規劃作業之初，均未對其真正企圖完成之事，明確說明其達成之方法。⁵明芝柏格同時又提到：許多公司「不會用超越一般要點之陳述如市場滲透或內部效率，及超越廣義目的如卓越的字眼作為其策略之表述」。⁶而該策略規劃可能淪為「一種形式反復陳述眾人已知的事情，而與現存策略所衍生的一系列目標和標準混為一

談…」。⁷「國防科學委員會」所作之評論認為其所見這些規劃上的不足正是國防部目前戰略規劃的情形。

The failure to provide clear guidance and direction is not unique to the Pentagon. Planning efforts in the private sector frequently fall victim to the same deficiencies widely seen in the public sector. As Henry Mintzberg noted in his book, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, companies very often engage in major planning exercises without having first formulated a clear detailed approach to what precisely they are attempting to accomplish.⁸ Mintzberg also noted that many companies, “do not carry the formulation of strategy much beyond some general statement of thrust such as market penetration or internal efficiency and some generalized goal such as excellence,”⁹ and that strategic planning can degenerate into, “an exercise in repeating what everyone already knows, geared to the generation of a set of targets and standards within the context of existing strategies…”¹⁰ The comments by the DSB suggest that it perceives many of these planning shortfalls are evident in the Pentagon's current strategic planning.

部辦室在準備其「國防計畫指導」時，有兩項基本步驟值得考慮：第一、制定計畫之參謀應投入必要的時間使國家安全與軍事指導更加具體化，以符合高階領導者所期望的產出與結果。此方法能提昇「國防計畫指導」一定程度的明確性，類似1970年代早期和1980年代末期之指導文

件。實質上，這個方法在其他公營部門正日形普遍。¹¹

Two fundamental steps merit consideration by OSD in preparing its DPG. First, the planning staffs should spend the time necessary to add significantly greater specificity to the national security and military guidance reflecting the outputs and outcomes the senior leadership expects. This approach would provide a degree of specificity in the DPG similar to its composition in the early seventies and late 1980s. This is essentially the approach that is increasingly common elsewhere in the public sector.¹²

如同明芝柏格指出有關廣泛的策略規劃：「根據綜合模型理論，組織創始於上層之目標（反映上層管理階層的基本價值），並依目標衍生出層級」¹³本質上，這與源自上級階層以各種形式指導所產生之一連串特定產出期望有關。策略規劃在民營部門特別有用，當其直接影響資源分配時一例如該投資多少在新產品研發、採購及基礎建設方案等；目前國防部戰略規劃上幾乎看不到任何明確的計畫或財政層級上之指導。

As Mintzberg noted regarding comprehensive strategic planning, “According to the comprehensive model, organizations begin with objectives that are supposed to emanate from the top (as a reflection of the basic values of the top management) and flow down a hierarchy in that deductive cascade.”¹⁴ In essence, this refers to a cascade of specific outcome expectations that



have been derived from top-level guidance in various forms. Strategic planning is most useful in the private sector when it directly influences the allocation of resources—how much to invest in which new product developments, acquisitions, and infrastructure projects. Current strategic planning in the Pentagon does not provide nearly the degree of specific programmatic or fiscal guidance seen elsewhere.

檢視了幾個公營部門組織之策略規劃流程後顯示：它們在處理細節規劃與發展效率評量上花費了大量的時間。這些組織策略規劃努力之主要目的在思考組織的使命（mission），宣佈與使命有關之總體目的（goals），建立達成目的之具體目標（objectives）和擬定評量標準（measures）以確定圓滿達成目標之程度。這類例子多得不勝枚舉。

An examination of the strategic planning processes of several public sector organizations indicated that they spend a great deal of their time conducting detailed planning and developing measures of effectiveness. The major purpose of the strategic planning efforts for these organizations is to consider the mission of the organization, enunciate the goals related to the mission, establish objectives for achieving the goals, and develop measures to determine the degree of success in achieving the objectives. There are numerous examples.

第一階段報告中曾提到：馬里蘭州蒙哥馬

利郡公立學校系統（MCPS）研擬了一份詳盡的「確保每位學生成功」（Success for Every Student）策略計畫，計畫中包含有目的、目標及評量標準。遵照校董會和郡委會之指導，該計畫共包含了4個層級目的、8個「核心策略（Core Strategies）」及77個「子策略（Component Strategies）」。¹⁵強納森·沃爾特斯（Jonathan Walters）在其1998年《向上評量》（Measuring Up）書中將這種反映出目的、目標及評量結構之方法形容為「績效評量系統之基礎建構體...」。¹⁶除此之外，該學校系統也評量資深管理者達成既定目的與目標之情形，並致力將目標與預算需求做連結，該系統幕僚認為這個最終連結仍將是一持續性挑戰。

As mentioned in the Phase 1 Report, the “Success for Every Student” program developed by the Montgomery County, Maryland Public School System (MCPS) provides an example of a detailed strategic plan containing goals, objectives, and measures. Following guidance from the School Board and County Council, this plan contained four hierarchical goals, eight “Core Strategies,” and seventy-seven “Component Strategies.”¹⁷ This approach reflects the goals, objectives, measures structure described by Jonathan Walters in his 1998 book Measuring Up as, “the basic building blocks of a performance measurement system...”¹⁸ In addition, senior managers within the school system were evaluated on their success in meeting established goals and objectives, and efforts are

being developed to link the objectives to budgetary requests, a final linkage that the MCPS staff acknowledges is a continuing challenge.

馬里蘭州「成果管理」（Managing for Results—MRF）之提議，該州稱之為「未來導向之策略規劃流程」，也採取同樣方法對政府所有機構內之目的、目標及績效評量均予鉅細靡遺的說明。提供各機構這份核定指導之「成果管理」規劃文件篇幅超過700頁之多，其中包括不同層級的重要細節，且大部分係各機構奉准納編之計畫。上自州長辦公室本身，「成果管理」即為其制定了一長串的目的與目標，藉更有效率、更有效能地滿足馬里蘭州顧客與股東的需求，以增加州政府之責任；並以一進度管制表呈現未來二年州政府機構與計畫層級之目的、目標及主要績效指標從選擇性過渡到強制性之發展情形。¹⁹

The State of Maryland's "Managing for Results" (MFR) initiative, described by the state as a "future-oriented strategic planning process," takes the same approach in its extremely detailed articulation of goals, objectives, and performance measures for all agencies of government. The MFR planning document providing this approved guidance to the various agencies is over 700 pages in length containing significant levels of detail, much of it approved from agency input. Beginning with the Governor's office itself, the MFR establishes a lengthy set of goals and objectives intended to "increase governmental accountability by more effectively and efficiently meeting the needs of the

State of Maryland's customers and stakeholders [emphasis added]." A schedule is provided showing that the development of goals, objectives, and key performance indicators will transition from optional to mandatory at the state agency and program level over the next two years."²⁰

提供州長辦公室進用殘障人士的指導即為最佳例證。州長辦公室4個目的之中，有一個目的要求「為殘障人士創造有利就業機會的氣氛」；這個全體性的期望是由一支援目標主導而達成，「在2000年以前，新闢的雇主網路將遍及全州，開始運作以增加殘障人士就業率。」這個目標附帶著績效評量，詳載著州長辦公室預計的推薦人數、施訓時數、施訓場所及參與企業領導階層網（BLN）計畫的成員。²¹同樣地，在極大不同領域之「自然資源部」（the Department of Natural Resources）有4個目的、5項目標及6項評量標準，包括對實施狩獵泛舟安全計畫數之目標。²²

The guidance provided to the Governor's Office for Individuals with Disabilities is an excellent example. Of the office's four goals, one calls for the creation of a "climate in which meaningful employment opportunities exist for people with disabilities." This general aspiration is refined in a supporting objective directing, "By the year 2000, a network of employers will be in place and active Statewide to increase employment outcomes for individuals with disabilities." This objective is attached to performance measures (metrics) detailing the expected numbers of referrals by the



office, training hours conducted, facilities with projects initiated, and members in the business leadership network.²³ Similarly, in a much different domain the Department of Natural Resources has four goals, with five objectives, and six metrics including objectives on the numbers of hunting and boating safety programs conducted.²⁴

被管理雜誌（Governing Magazine）最近一份調查列為全美最佳管理州之一的維吉尼亞州，也花費相當多時間與努力為全州所有活動制定目的、目標及一套精心設計的評量方法。²⁵該州財務長提供全州各級機關與機構一本有關「規劃與績效」的手冊，針對該州「績效預算流程」提供指導，並將其描述成「策略規劃、績效評量及預算編製技巧的混合體」。²⁶該手冊描述其在該州策略規劃中之角色在於協助各機關瞭解其目前處境，檢視現行與未來趨勢可能對其之影響，並說明如何最佳處理預期挑戰。它是一套精確的概念、程序及工具，協助各機關解釋新的趨勢與議題。²⁷

The State of Virginia, considered one of the best managed in the nation in a recent survey by Governing Magazine, also spends considerable time and effort establishing goals, objectives, and an elaborate set of measures for all of its state activities.²⁸ The State Secretary of Finance provides all state agencies and institutions a handbook on “Planning and Performance” that provides guidance on its “performance budgeting process” described as a “blend of strategic

planning, performance measurement, and budgeting techniques.”²⁹ The handbook describes its role in the state’s strategic planning process that it portrays as helping, “an agency understand its present situation, examine how current and future trends may affect it, and describe how to best manage anticipated challenges. A precise set of concepts, procedures, and tools help an agency interpret emerging trends and issues.”³⁰

國防部投注於準備「國防計畫指導」的時間與努力，及「國防計畫指導」所提供之細節層面與上述情況大為迥異。不像馬里蘭州蒙哥馬利郡公立學校系統和維吉尼亞州的特定指導，國防部之「國防計畫指導」卻非常含糊籠統。「國防計畫指導」的確對諸如兵力結構限制提供部分高層面指導，同時它所提供的個別財務指導也十分明確；但一般實質的指導則付之闕如，致使各軍種多有迴旋空間對何所期待、孰者重要及評量何事等均各持己見；它對預算之優先順序與建立績效評量方面又幾無著墨。相較於馬里蘭州蒙哥馬利郡公立學校系統所設定由學校負責之目的與目標，「國防計畫指導」對軍種參謀長或司令在宏觀兵力結構詳細計畫下所需要運用的指導幾乎盡付闕如，甚至各軍種有權自我定義其基本兵力結構實際所包含的要素。

The time and effort invested in preparing the DPG within the Pentagon, and the level of detail it provides, are quite distinct from this detailed approach. Unlike the specific guidance of MCPS, the State of Maryland, and the State of Virginia,

the Pentagon's DPG is very vague and general. It does provide some top-level guidance on such items as force structure limits, and the fiscal guidance provided separately from the DPG is quite specific, but generally its substantive guidance is sparse leaving significant latitude for interpretation by the military services as to what is expected, what is important, and what is to be measured. It has little to offer in way of priorities for funding, and is almost completely silent on establishing performance measures. Unlike the MCPS that establishes goals and measures to which it holds schools accountable, the DPG offers very little that a service secretary or chief need address below the macro-level specification of force structure, and even here the services are free to define what their fundamental force structure elements actually contain.

如同強納森·沃爾特斯所指出的：發展出是類詳盡的目的與目標正是1993年「政府績效成果法」之精髓。沃爾特斯認為這項規定對國防部是項挑戰：

As Jonathan Walters has pointed out, developing such detailed goals and objectives is the essence of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. Walters suggested that this requirement presents a challenge to DoD :

1993年政府績效成果法規定：聯邦政府裡的每一部門都必須向國會提呈年度績效計畫。當然，其中必須提呈年度績效計畫的部門就是國防部；但如果要國防部遵示照辦，

它首先必須確認其基本職掌為何。必竟，一個組織對其欲達成何事（目標）都不清楚的情況下，其所提呈之績效計畫也就毫無意義可言。³¹

As required under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, every department in the federal government is going to have to submit annual performance plans to Congress. Naturally, one department that is going to have to submit such a performance plan is the Department of Defense. But in order for DoD to do that, it first must figure out what its basic job is. After all, it's pretty pointless to come up with a performance plan in the absence of a clear idea of what it is you're supposed to be achieving as an organization – your purpose in life.³²

顯然地，一個精心撰擬的國防計畫指導一提供目的、目標及具優先順序之特定任務，架構成五年國防計畫中主要兵力計畫內容（亦即國防部主要產出）一將能滿足這項要求。換言之，該國防計畫指導能針對源自國家安全戰略所有五年國防計畫方案之預期績效提供詳盡之指導，並責由各軍種將該國防計畫指導列入其相關計畫中。於是，各軍種方得於準備「計畫目標備忘錄」（POMs）期間，非正式地協調其各項活動，並正式地經由「聯合需求審查委員會」（JROC）審查後，呈報部辦公室進行分析、評估與整合。如此，部辦公室參謀在分析重覆與遺漏時，方能專注於產出（使命），而非投入（各軍種）。



Seemingly, a well crafted DPG that provided goals, objectives, and specific tasks with some relative priority, structured in the context of the FYDP MFPs, the department's major output areas, would fulfill this requirement. In other words, the DPG would provide detailed guidance on its expectations for all of its FYDP programs, derived from the National Security Strategy, and task the services to place this guidance in their own context. They would then coordinate their activities informally during the preparation of their programs (POMs), and more formally through the JROC, and then submit it to OSD for analysis, evaluation, and integration. This would then allow the OSD staff to focus on outputs (the mission areas) rather than inputs (the services) in analyzing duplications and omissions.

國防部現行規劃流程無法達到某些具影響力觀察者所預期的結果。先前第一階段報告中所引用「參議院政府事務委員會」(the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee)的報告曾指出：根據政府績效成果法所提呈的年度績效計畫，國防部在建立「特定與可評量的目的」工作上，需要更加努力；顯示國防部額外要做的工作還很多。³³

The current Pentagon planning process does not meet the outcome expected by certain influential observers. The report of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, cited previously in the Phase 1 Report, which stated that DoD needed to do a more diligent job in establishing “specific and

measurable goals” as required by annual GPRA performance plans, demonstrates that much additional work needs to be done.³⁴

第二個國防部可考慮的基本步驟是捨棄由年度規劃流程導出頒布年度國防計畫指導的慣例。為頒布年度國防計畫指導所做的努力，實質上不但造成國防計畫指導慣性延遲頒布，而且內容含糊空洞。雖然許多人辯稱年度國防計畫指導乃是現行每年預算流程的必要文件，但是它較似官僚政治的習慣而非法令要求下的產物。國防計畫指導並不提送國會，也少見於國防部之外。因此，它是否應該為一年、二年或四年頒布一次，觀念上應不受呈報年度預算所支配。

The second fundamental step the Pentagon might consider is abandoning the practice of an annual planning process leading to the publication of an annual DPG. The effort required to publish an annual DPG contributes substantially to its relative vagueness and superficiality, as well as its chronic tardiness. Although many argue that an annual DPG is required by the current necessity of an annual budget process, it is seemingly more reflective of bureaucratic habits than statutory demands. The DPG is not presented to Congress and is rarely seen outside the Pentagon. Therefore, whether it is produced on an annual, biennial, or quadrennial schedule is conceptually independent of an annual budget submission.

本研究所檢視的公司當中，均無採行一年期的規劃；而通常是每三至五年不定期的針對公司主要規劃、方向及重點實施檢討。受檢視的公

司，甚至公營部門的馬里蘭州蒙哥馬利郡公立學校系統，當高階管理階層認為有所必要時方才進行廣泛的規劃與檢討。他們一致認為，因情況所引發對現行政策與方向再考量而進行廣泛地定期性細節規劃並無實質效用。一旦規劃開始進行，且由上而下的指導供予企業各個部門時，整個規劃則專注於重要精選的議題，同時也針對預期成果與績效評量提供相當多的指導細節與資源分配。

None of the companies examined for this study conducted planning on an annual basis. Instead, major planning efforts and reviews of the company's direction and focus happened at irregular intervals usually over three to five years. The companies examined, and even the MCPS in the public sector, tended to conduct extensive planning and review efforts when there was the belief by senior management that it was required. All expressed the belief that there was little utility in conducting extensive planning on a regular schedule preferring to conduct detailed planning when conditions arose suggesting a reconsideration of existing policies and direction was necessary. When planning was conducted, and top-down guidance provided to various business units, the planning tended to focus on addressing major, selected issues and to provide relatively detailed guidance and resource allocations regarding expectations and performance measures.

三、調整部辦公室參謀群

Restructuring the OSD Staff

假如部長參謀群能作局部調整，且其功能也能與聯參及軍種參謀群充分配合，則調整國防計畫指導對重新定義的主要兵力計畫內容提供詳盡的指導定能實現並廣為接受。為訂定主要兵力計畫之目的與目標，以及分析各軍種呈報「計畫目標備忘錄」與其符合之程度，部辦公室參謀群裡必須有一群特定人員具備有如此傾向與責任感。目前這樣的組織和傾向並不存在。

Restructuring the DPG to provide detailed guidance in the context of newly defined Major Force Programs would best be accomplished and institutionalized if the Secretary of Defense's staff were to be somewhat reconfigured and its functions better synchronized with the Joint and service staffs. In order to determine the goals and objectives of the MFPs, and to analyze the degree to which service POM submissions conform to them, requires that there be specific staff elements within the OSD staff that have such an orientation and responsibility. Currently such organization and orientation do not exist.

部辦公室參謀對特定主要兵力計畫的監督及「業管權責」尚未明確建立。這種情況在部辦公室「計畫分析評估處（PA&E）」尤其擾人，該處前身為艾林·恩索文－韋恩·史密斯系分辦公室（Alain Enthoven and Wayne Smith's Office of Systems Analysis），該處倡導五年國防計畫，其參謀本應負起監督及業管特定主要兵力計畫之職責。計畫分析評估處現有150名成員，比國防部長麥納瑪拉原先所構想的組織為大，係由許多合



約商所支援的分析師及維護人員組成。³⁵該處區分爲四個主要部門，詳如圖3：

Staff oversight and “ownership” of specific MFPs is not clearly established in OSD. This is particularly bothersome in the case of OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), the successor organization to Alain Enthoven and Wayne Smith's Office of Systems Analysis, where

such staff responsibility would be expected given its proponentcy of the FYDP. In its present form, PA&E is an office of nearly one hundred and fifty analysts and support personnel supported by numerous contractors, a larger organization than the one originally conceived by Secretary McNamara.³⁶ The office is organized into four major divisions as shown in figure 3：

圖3




圖3顯示，該組織各部門並未與五年國防計畫中之主要兵力計畫組合；這情況反映出國防部部分人之觀點，認為主要兵力計畫成了官僚體制下的孤兒。³⁷欲補救這情況，部辦室計畫分析評估處則必須稍作重組。亦即將現行五年國防計畫中之十一大主要兵力計畫分派由專責部門業


管，並且保留分析系統成本之重要專業技術，同時也能提供PPB制度流程本身之程序監督，詳如圖4：

As the chart illustrates, this organization does not provide an alignment of its divisions with the FYDP major force programs reflecting the

view of some within the Pentagon that the MFPs are bureaucratically orphaned.³⁸ Remedying this situation would require the OSD PA&E to be somewhat reorganized. A reorganization assigning responsibility for the MFPs reflected in the current

FYDP, while retaining important expertise in analyzing systems costs, and simultaneously providing for procedural oversight of the PPBS process itself might resemble that shown in Figure 4 :

圖4



重整後的組織將戰略部隊、作戰部隊及基礎建設各自歸類，分由三個副處長業管。這種編制不僅讓部辦室計畫分析評估處更能掌握重點與定向，而有別於各軍種與聯參參謀，具有更大監督與整合功能；而且能明確建立基礎建設分析的責任，更能同心協力針對基礎建設評估其必要性、核減，或者一至少一控制其增幅。

This organization would group strategic forces under one deputy director, conventional warfighting forces under another, and infrastructure under a third. This organization would not only give OSD PA&E a focus and orientation distinct from the services and Joint staffs, facilitating greater oversight and integration, but it would clearly



establish responsibility for infrastructure analysis hopefully resulting in a much better coordinated effort at evaluating its necessity, reducing it, or -- at the very least -- controlling its growth.

當談到協調PPB制度流程與整合軍種間之計畫時，部辦室參謀做了彌足珍貴的服務，使部長具備下達決策的能力；然而，這些年來參謀整合的功能已日形萎縮，因為其愈來愈專注於軍種特定之議題。雖然他們的確也執行具橫跨軍種意涵的主要計畫分析－特別是導彈防禦與醫療計畫領域，但軍種間那些需要裁定的其他領域卻往往未乏人問津。因此，如同某位資深軍官坦稱：現行計畫發展與復審流程，比起各軍種呈報其「計畫目標備忘錄」階段，並未產生較大具體的計畫整合。³⁹

When it comes to coordinating the PPBS process, and integrating the program across services, the OSD Staff performs an invaluable service and provides the Secretary with an indispensable, independent capability. Over the years, however, the integration function of the staff has diminished as it has tended to focus on service-specific issues. Although the staff does perform analysis of major programs that have cross-component implications, most notably in the areas of missile defense and the medical program, other areas requiring a degree of adjudication between services are too frequently unattended. Consequently, as one senior service official admitted, the current program development and review process does not result in significantly

greater program integration beyond that which exists when the services submit their POMs.⁴⁰

這是個重要議題，因為各軍種本身幾乎不做計畫協調。如同海軍上將比爾·歐文斯（Bill Owens）－前海軍兵力結構與資源評估處（the Navy's Force Structure and Resource Assessment Directorate（N8））處長及前參謀首長聯席會議副主席－評論到：「當我正在為海軍建案時，我並不清楚陸軍或空軍正在做什麼，或者為什麼他們正這麼做。我聽說陸軍已經有戰術導彈系統（ATACMS），該系統的許多性能正是我們海軍想要的；但是並不知道它扮演何種角色，或者陸軍打算購買多少。」⁴¹總之，如果部辦室與聯參參謀沒有一個用以整合軍種計畫的組織與流程，就算有所整合也將十分有限，而且大部分都是僥倖使然。

This is a significant issue because the services themselves do little program coordination. As Admiral Bill Owens, former Director of the Navy's Force Structure and Resource Assessment Directorate（N8），and the former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has commented, “When I was building the Navy program I had no idea what the Army or Air Force were doing or why they were doing it. I had heard the Army had the ATACMS missile, which had many capabilities we wanted for the Navy, but had no idea what it did or how many the Army was planning to buy.”⁴² In short, if the OSD and Joint Staffs do not have an organization and process for integrating the service programs,

any integration that does occur will be quite modest and largely the result of chance.

將計畫分析評估處參謀與主要兵力計畫（最好如先前重新定義的主要兵力計畫）予以組合，必定能改善整體防禦計畫之整合，同時增進有關軍種重複與罅隙之重大議題發展。因為計畫分析評估處負責撰擬「國防計畫指導」，其合宜的參謀群將詳盡闡述必要的目的與目標以傳達給各軍種；同樣的參謀群也將於其後分析各軍種回應的適當性，同時發展出跨軍種的整合議題供國防資源委員會考量，最後提呈部長裁決。概念上，如此參謀結構的重組，以及職責與觀點的調整將能具體地增進整體國防計畫的整合與均衡。

Organizing the PA&E staff around the MFPs, preferably redefined MFPs as discussed earlier, should both improve defense-wide program integration and the development of significant issues regarding service overlap and under-lap. Since PA&E has proponency for the DPG, the appropriate staff elements would develop the necessary goals and objectives for transmission to the services. The same staff elements would then analyze the adequacy of the services' response, and develop cross-service integration issues for consideration by the Defense Resources Board, and ultimately presentation for decision to the Secretary. Conceptually, such a re-organization of staff structure and re-alignment of responsibility and perspective would significantly enhance efforts to integrate and balance the overall defense program.

除計畫分析評估處參謀重組之外，所有獻身於PPB制度流程中的部辦室編制人員將經由計畫與預算編製功能的強化而酌予精簡。國防部主計次長辦公室有計畫分析評估處的計畫參謀群與一獨立的預算參謀群；分析評估處的計畫參謀群係專責撰擬「國防計畫指導」中之計畫指示，分析軍種「計畫目標備忘錄」投入，主導夏季計畫審查，以及確認軍種計畫之替代方案供部長考量。

Beyond the re-organization of PA&E staff, overall OSD staffing dedicated to the PPBS process might be reduced through a consolidation of the programming and budgeting function. Within the Defense Comptrollers office there is a programming staff, PA&E, and a separate budget staff. The PA&E staff is primarily responsible for drafting the programming instructions of the DPG, analyzing the service POM inputs, conducting the summer program review, and identifying alternatives to the service programs for the consideration of the Secretary.

一旦計畫經由「計畫決策備忘錄」（PDM）調整，該計畫即交由預算參謀審查，並從國會所使用的撥款會計制度觀點予以分析；第二段的預算調整係遵照一長串的調整文件——「計畫預算決策」（PBDs）之指導進行。儘管「計畫預算決策」應該僅處理目標年度預算（或者二個年度預算，因為二年期預算係每隔一年呈報一次），但它們必然會影響到計畫年度。這種情況可能（偶爾的確會）改變與推翻



先前計畫復審期間所作的決策。這印證了1994年「角色與任務委員會」（Commission on Roles and Missions）所作之評論：PPB制度各個階段係「半自主性地，而非支援性地運作；它會造成不必要之紛擾，同時也鼓勵重新檢討先前的決策。」⁴³

Once the program is adjusted by a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM), the program is passed to the Budget staff where it is reviewed and analyzed from the perspective of the appropriations accounting system used by the Congress. A second set of adjustments to the budget are then made using a lengthy series of change documents known as Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). Although PBDs are only supposed to deal with the budget year (or years, since two budget years are submitted every other year), inevitably they impact across the program years. This can, and occasionally does, have the impact of altering and even reversing decisions previously made in the program review phase. This accounts for the comment made by the 1994 Commission on Roles and Missions that the phases of PPBS operated “semi-autonomously rather than supportively, creating unnecessary turbulence and encouraging revisiting of prior decisions.”⁴⁴

分割該兩項功能（計劃與預算），並將其分由不同參謀業管，從官僚政治與管理的觀點而言較有意義，特別是在電腦與資料管理能力來臨之前的這個年代。如同1970年代中期某位卸任參謀

所作之評論：那段期間，陸軍用大型黑板記錄管制奉核定五年國防計畫中之主要計畫，並以黃色條狀圖標示各計畫之金額；值星官奉示每晚須以拍立得相機照下黑板的紀錄，以確保避免一夕之間遭人篡改，或遭天災、失火時資料全毀。⁴⁵顯然地，現代資料管理進展已遠超過那種情況。

Separating these two functions and assigning them to separate staff made much sense from both a bureaucratic and management perspective, especially during the era preceding the arrival of major computing and data management capabilities. As one former staff officer from the mid-1970s commented, during that period the Army dollars assigned to the major programs in the Army FYDP were tracked on a large blackboard covered with yellow stick notes marked to indicate dollar values. The duty officer was charged with the responsibility at the end of day of photographing the board with a Polaroid camera to ensure that it was not tampered with over night, nor completely lost should there be a natural catastrophe or building fire.⁴⁶ Clearly, modern data management has progressed well beyond this point.

如果計劃（階段）進展良好—所有計畫之預算均實際「全額」配賦，替代方案業經全盤分析，決策亦能適時下達—那麼預算編製（階段）應該不僅僅是將五年國防計畫資料重新排序歸類成各項撥款帳目而已。只要鼓勵國防預算決策主要根據分析而非政治條件下達，如此改變則有可能容許部分參謀精簡與合併。這個特點很重要。

一個民主社會中，聯邦預算籌編必然具有顯著的政治成分；但在國家安全領域中必須戮力將是類壓力降至最小。加重強調分析型的計劃則能達成此一目標。

If programming were done well, with the programs contained in it “fully” funded based upon projections that are realistic rather than optimistic, with fully analyzed alternatives, and with decisions made in a timely manner, budgeting should be little more than resorting FYDP data into the various appropriations accounts. Such a change might allow for some staff reductions and consolidations while encouraging defense budget decisions to be grounded primarily in analytical rather than political terms. The distinction is important. In a democratic society, the preparation of a federal budget is certain to have a significant political component, but in the area of national security an effort should be made to keep such pressures to the minimum. Placing greater emphasis on analytical programming serves this objective.

如果冀望PPB制度具有較大彈性與靈活性，那麼精簡參與流程中的部辦室、聯參及軍種的參謀人數可能是必須要做的事。如同某位國防部資深官員的評論：「今天自然要問的問題是：你正和世界上最大的官僚結構與多樣文化打交道，你如何能加速完成？」⁴⁷

If greater flexibility and agility is desired from PPBS, then reducing the numbers and sizes of the various OSD, joint, and service staffs involved in

the process is likely a must. As one senior Pentagon official recently commented, “The natural question to ask today is how can you accelerate implementation given the fact that you are dealing with the world's [largest] bureaucracy and multiple cultures.”⁴⁸

毫無疑問地，那些任職於部辦室、聯參及軍種的參謀都是學有專精、犧牲奉獻、勤勉工作的公僕；他們夜以繼日的工作，企圖滿足其上級多種多樣的期待。在民營部門，資深管理人已經察覺：大型參謀群在面對快速下達決策及適時順應新策略和市場動態等所做之努力，只會使之複雜化；公營部門資深管理階層必須謹慎地考慮這個教訓。再者，考量各軍種在成長動盪的經濟中所面臨招募與人力的問題，精簡非核心功能之人力需求似乎是合宜的。陸軍最近從參謀機構移轉士兵至野戰單位即顯示它認同這個論點。

There is no question that those assigned to the OSD staff, the Joint Staff, and the service staffs are dedicated and diligent public servants who bring great skill to their assigned tasks. All work long hours attempting to meet the expectations of their leadership, expectations which are numerous and diverse. In the private sector, senior managers have discovered that large staffs complicate efforts at quick decision-making and timely adjustment to new strategic and market dynamics. Public sector senior management needs to carefully consider this lesson. Furthermore, given the recruiting and manning problems the military services face in



a growing and vibrant economy, reducing labor demands of non-core functions would seem to be attractive. The recent efforts of the Army to shift soldiers from staff to field positions suggest its recognition of this point.

經重整和合理化後的部辦室計劃與預算流程之最大功能，在於能更有效率地和更有效能地向部長呈現潛在重大決定。任何一位部長用來明確處理資源分配與政策議題（尤其是與那些有國會直接撥款之各軍種觀點相衝突的議題）之熱誠，端視政治立場與政府當局之目的而定。如果政府當局不願或無法認真地質疑那些有國會奧援的軍種提議（或許因為不同政黨控制白宮和國會），即使部辦室裡最佳化的組織結構也僅能提供極有限的協助。

The most a reorganization and streamlining of OSD's programming and budgeting process can do is more efficiently and effectively bring potentially important decisions before the Secretary. The eagerness with which any Secretary will deal explicitly with resource allocation and policy issues, especially those that may conflict with the views of the military services to whom the Congress directly appropriates funding, depends heavily on the political position and goals of the Administration in office. If an Administration is unwilling or unable to seriously question service proposals that have Congressional support (perhaps because different political parties control the White House and Congress), even the best organizational structure

within the OSD will only offer marginal assistance.

四、定義部辦室與聯參參謀角色 Defining OSD and Joint Staff Roles

除了參謀群大小外，參謀群結構也必須予以考量—因為自高華德-尼可斯立法後，參謀首長聯席會主席參謀群被賦予與部辦室參謀群相同的計畫和預算職責。

Beyond staff size, another area of staff structure that needs to be considered regards the division of labor between the Secretary's staff having program and budget responsibilities and the Chairman's staff that has, since the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, been assigned similar responsibilities.

國會1986年通過的高華德-尼可斯法主導過許多先前建議的變革，如密切協調國防計畫進展和以較正式方式聽取地區司令意見。該法案明文規定除任命聯席會議主席為總統與部長首席軍事顧問外，另設置參謀首長聯席會議副主席（VCJCS），凌駕各軍種參謀長為聯席會第二號人物，並負督導聯參之責。高華德-尼可斯法案同時賦予參謀首長聯席會議主席額外重大責任—評估軍事採購與獲得計畫；針對計畫建議與預算提議何者符合戰略計畫中優先順序事宜充當部長顧問；並「在規劃的資源水準與指導範圍內提呈替代計畫建議與預算提議…」⁴⁹

The Goldwater-Nichols Act, passed by Congress in October 1986, directed many reforms and changes that had been recommended previously

to better coordinate the development of the defense program and to include the views of the regional Commanders-in-Chief in a more systemic manner. It statutorily established the position of Vice Chairman of the JCS, made him the second senior military officer above the service chiefs, named the Chairman the principal military advisor to the President and Defense Secretary, and placed the Joint Staff under his “authority and control.” Goldwater-Nichols also gave the Chairman significant additional responsibilities for assessing military requirements for acquisition programs, advising the Secretary on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals conformed with the priorities established in strategic plans, and submitting “alternative program recommendations and budget proposals within projected resource levels and guidance…”⁵⁰

為執行這些新的功能，尤其是那些與獲得計畫有關事宜，現行聯合需求組織因而更名為「聯合需求審查委員會」（JROC—Joint Requirements Oversight Council），同時在參謀首長聯席會議副主席指導下，展開提供聯席會議主席必要的支援以符合這擴大的諮詢功能。為反映各軍種副參謀長現行會員身分，短短一年之內，「聯合需求審查委員會」規章修訂將參謀首長聯席會議副主席列為該委員會的常任主席。

To fulfill these new functions, particularly those that related to acquisition programs, an existing joint requirements body was renamed the Joint

Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and, under the direction of the Vice Chairman, began providing the support the Chairman required for meeting these greatly expanded advisory functions. Within a year, the charter of the JROC was altered to reflect its current membership of the service vice chiefs with the VCJCS as permanent chairman.

「聯合需求審查委員會」最初重點幾乎都專注於「國防採購委員會」（DAB—the Defense Acquisition Board）列入考量的主要武獲系統作需文件的審查與確認；在「國防採購委員會」裡，參謀首長聯席會議副主席充當「獲得副次長」（the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition）的副主席。然而，1994年海軍上將威廉·歐文斯（William Owens）奉派擔任參謀首長聯席會議副主席後，「聯合需求審查委員會」方才快速擴展其領域。

The initial focus of the JROC was almost exclusively on the review and validation of military requirements for major acquisition systems being considered by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) where the VCJCS served as the Vice-Chairman to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. With the appointment of Navy Admiral William Owens to Vice Chairman in 1994, however, the JROC quickly expanded its domain.

歐文斯就任副主席職位後立即採取四項措施：第一、他實質增加「聯合需求審查委員會」會議頻率與時間。各軍種副參謀長頓時查覺他們每週必須定期面對二次會議，會議時間與準備時



間估算約需耗費10小時。第二、歐文斯為「聯合需求審查委員會」制定了一套擴張性議程，使其領域遠超越原先專注於需求與獲得計畫之範疇。這個新議程包括以前被認定是各軍種專屬業管事項，如兵力結構、生活品質、單位戰備整備、甚至訓練與操演。第三、他通知作戰司令部指揮官（CINCs），「聯合需求審查委員會」將與其密切協調，在計畫與預算流程階段充當其傳播媒介，強調其優先與必要性，並為其喉舌清楚表達他們的需求。

Owens took four steps immediately upon assuming his position as Vice Chairman. First, he substantially increased the frequency and length of JROC sessions. Service vice chiefs suddenly found themselves facing two regularly scheduled meetings per week requiring about 10 hours of their time considering meeting length and preparation. Second, Owens established an expansive agenda for the JROC that took it into areas that went well beyond its previously narrower focus on requirements and acquisition programs. This new agenda included areas formerly considered to be exclusive service turf such as force structure, quality of life, unit readiness, even training and exercises. Third, he informed the CINCs that the JROC would be working closely with them and would serve as their vehicle for inputting requirements and priorities into the program and budget process, and their voice for articulating their needs.

最後，或許也是最重要的一點，歐文斯在聯

參裡創立了一個新組織，如同他過去擔任「海軍資源與作戰需求署」（Naval Operations for Resources and Warfare Requirements, N-8）副署長時所成立的組織一樣；他設立「聯合作戰能力評估小組」（JWCA—Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment teams），將現代化作戰劃分為九大功能領域，每一功能領域分由一聯參部門負責，並統由「聯合需求審查委員會」負責監督，以判定每一領域所需求之作戰能力。正如海軍上將歐文斯自己描述：

Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, he created in the Joint Staff a new structure similar to one he had used in the Navy while serving as its Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources and Warfare Requirements, N-8. Breaking modern warfighting into nine functional areas, he established Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) teams, each sponsored by a Joint Staff section and supervised by the JROC, to determine warfighting capabilities needed in each area. As Admiral Owens described it :

我們已經創立了九大評估領域，委由各聯參分別負責互為協調，並廣泛邀請各機構共同參與。矩陣式架構迫使整個組織相互影響；它使原本互不交談的人們開始接觸，同時增強觀念的「橫向」流動。當這一旦發生時，新的見解、創新及腦力激盪通常會激發出概念上的突破，並躍進為問題的解決。⁵¹

We have created nine assessment areas, charged separate elements of the Joint Staff


with coordinating each assessment, and invited participation from a wide range of agencies. Matrices compel interaction across organizations; they engage people who do not normally talk to each other and enhance a horizontal (emphasis added) flow of ideas. When this happens, new insights, innovation, and intellectual synergy often spark conceptual breakthroughs and leaps in problem solving.⁵²

換言之，歐文斯企圖在比較狹窄的作戰能力架構中，重建原本在PPB制度中例行性提供從事國防計畫橫向分析的機制。在闡述其「聯合作

戰能力評估」概念，歐文斯備妥並分發的一份圖例，可想而知，該圖在國防部急速聞名，人稱「輻射圖」（radiator chart）：（詳圖5）

In other words, Owens was seeking to reestablish a mechanism for conducting horizontal analysis of the defense program, within a narrower warfighting construct, which PPBS was intended to provide routinely. In illustrating his JWCA conception, Owens prepared and distributed a graphic (Figure 5) that quickly became known around the Pentagon, for obvious reasons, as the “radiator chart” :

圖5





該段期間至今，「聯合需求審查委員會」的編制與權限已從原先九大聯合作戰能力評估領域擴增至十四大領域。目前許多領域受到「聯合需求審查委員會」與聯參的矚目，似乎是國防部內部常駐分析與作戰功能的翻版。威廉·提康普賽·雪曼將軍(William Tecumseh Sherman)曾指出：「一個龐大參謀群意味著責任分工、行動遲緩及優柔寡斷；反之，一個精小參謀群則意味著敏捷與意志集中。」近來，「聯合需求審查委員會」在滿足既定時限與發展重要議題上所體驗的，在在顯示那是個千古不變的道理。

Since this period, the size and purview of the JROC has grown significantly increasing from the original nine JWCA areas to fourteen. Many of the areas currently receiving JROC and Joint Staff attention appear to be duplicative of analytical and operational functions resident elsewhere within DoD. General William Tecumseh Sherman once noted that, “A bulky staff implies a division of responsibility, slowness of action and indecision, whereas a small staff implies activity and concentration of purpose.” Recent JROC experience in meeting established timelines and developing major issues suggests that this may be a timeless truth.

由於高華德-尼可斯法案通過立法及法規增定賦予參謀首長聯席會議主席參與國防部計畫與預算之職責，因此直接參與PPB制度之參謀人數已大為擴增。這情況非自主地進一步導致PPB制度功能之遲緩與複雜。前任參謀首長聯席會議主

席科林·鮑威爾(Colin Powel)將軍最近針對聯參這種情況發展評論到：

With the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, and the statutory insertion of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs into the program and budget function of the Pentagon, the number of staff elements working directly in PPBS has expanded substantially. In some unintended ways, it has served to further slow and complicate the functioning of the PPBS. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, recently observed about this evolution of the Joint Staff that:

我另外有1,500人任職於聯參。他們為我工作，其畢生唯一的目的是儘可能地使我遠離資訊。他們認為：只提供他們想要給我的，而不是我所想要的。挑戰，對我而言，就是能有非正式的接觸，同時在為我提供資訊的體制之外獲得資訊。⁵³

I had another 1,500 people who were on the Joint staff. They worked for me, and their sole purpose in life was to keep as much information away from me as possible. They'd think: Let's just give him what we want him to have not what he needs. The challenge for me was to have informal contacts and to get information from outside the organization that had been set up to provide me information.⁵⁴

聯參與部辦室參謀編制可能已經到達一定的程度，致使其計劃與預算作為所做之努力多半重複大於協同效用，且對高階領導人而言，可謂

是資訊斷絕和資訊流暢各半。幾乎所有人認為：參謀編制人數使得原本正在奮力跟上迅速改變的戰略和科術環境的流程愈加遲緩。當高階官員認為有必要建立非正式的機制以接收適時的忠告時，這是一個令人不安的實況報導。如同某軍種一位資深官員評論的：「我們設計了一個流程，目的是在不讓任何壞的事情發生太快；當然，這個流程也無法讓任何好的事情太快發生。」⁵⁵

The size of the Joint Staff and the OSD staff may have reached the point where their efforts in programming and budgeting are more duplicative than synergistic, and for senior leaders tend to isolate as much as inform. By nearly all accounts, staff size tends to further slow a process that was already struggling to keep pace in rapidly changing strategic and technological environments. It is a disturbing commentary when a senior official feels the necessity to establish informal mechanism to receive timely advice. As a senior service official commented, “We have a process designed to not let anything bad happen very quickly. Of course, it doesn’t let anything good happen either.”⁵⁶

理論上，為參謀首長聯席會議主席配置大的計畫預算參謀群能給予部長一些額外自主的協助，因此部辦室內容許擁有更多的專業參謀，而精簡其他單位的參謀。這是前所未有的經驗，也意味著應該重新考量針對未來兵力賦予聯參更大的計畫與預算責任。聯參應致力於現行兵力聯合運用的效能與效率分析，以及軍種未來作戰能力的整合，而不僅只是置重點於政策參謀既有的主

要管理領域，如財務與醫療等。

In theory, providing the Chairman with a large program and budget staff would have afforded the Secretary some additional independent help, thus permitting greater staff specialization and possibly staff reductions elsewhere within OSD. This has not been the experience. It may be that assigning broad program and budget responsibilities for future forces to the Joint Staff should be reconsidered. Rather than focusing attention on major management areas where policy staffs already exist, such as in finance and health, the Joint Staff should restrict its efforts to the analysis of efficient and effective joint employment of existing forces and integration of service warfighting capabilities in the future.

如果耽心PPB制度現行實務在處理主要議題與製作替代計畫與預算方案上過於緩慢與繁文縟節，則參謀數量與結構必須針對該等情況特別予以考量。如同詹姆斯·斯勒辛格(James Schlesinger)於1966年指出：「小型團體能迅速予以調整(儘管它們不必要如此做)。只有在相當小的團體裡才有更多彈性的機會；小型團體直到決策制定前能改變計畫，能撤銷承諾，以及能輕易地保有選擇彈性。」⁵⁷鮑威爾將軍的經驗似乎證實這種觀察一直都是正確的。

If there are concerns that the current practice of PPBS is too plodding and bureaucratic in surfacing major issues and shaping alternative program and budget approaches, staff size and structure must be considered a significant contribution to this



condition. As James Schlesinger noted in 1966, “Small groups can adjust quickly (though they need not necessarily do so). Only within relatively small groups is there much opportunity for real flexibility. Small groups can change plans, can avoid commitment, can easily maintain options until decisions point are reached.”⁵⁸ General Powell's experience would seem to substantiate the continuing validity of this observation.

幾乎無人主張增加國防部額外參謀人力，尤其是當民營部門(特別是策略規劃部門)趨向精簡參謀人力時。如同某一大公司的顧問針對此一議題指出：「假如你有『強健的企業單位 (strong pipes)』〔美國通常稱企業單位為火爐的煙囪 stovepipes〕，你必須要有一強健的團隊；但一個強健的團隊並不意味著你必須要有一大堆的成員」。⁵⁹國防部應該審慎檢視其廣大參謀群的勞力分工，同時致全力促使其合作與協調。

There is little point in adding additional staffing to DoD, especially when the trend in the private sector is towards reduced staffing levels, particularly in strategic planning. As one advisor to a major corporation stated the issue, “If you have ‘strong pipes’ [business units commonly called stovepipes] you must have a strong corporate headquarters. But a strong corporate headquarters does not mean you have to have a large corporate headquarters.”⁶⁰ The Pentagon should carefully examine the division of labor of its numerous staff elements and make a concentrated attempt to

coordinate and synergize their efforts.

適時的決策與計畫性的靈活是大部分組織為因應快速變化的世界而想要達成的主要目標；擴增一個結構鬆散且欠缺合作的參謀部門將會使決策效率化的努力變得複雜。在民營部門幕僚人員多寡和其編制一直是個專注的焦點，因為它們通常代表著昂貴的經常費用；在公營部門情況則有所不同，因為內、外在無數監督使然，其人數和編制必須具有一定規模。然而，公營部門資深主管必須再三審慎考量人員編制的目的，同時確保其編成有利於主要議題的適時辨認及重大替代方案的產生。

Timely decision-making and programmatic agility are a major objective of most organizations attempting to deal with the demands of a rapidly changing world. Proliferating staff sections that are not tightly structured and well coordinated complicate efforts to streamline decision-making. Staff size and structure are a constant source of attention in the private sector because they often represent expensive overhead. In the public sector they do not represent such an onerous expense, and must be relatively larger because of the numerous demands for internal and external oversight. Nonetheless, public sector senior management needs to carefully consider, and reconsider, the purpose of staff groupings and ensure they are organized and synergized in ways facilitating the timely identification of major issues and the development of meaningful alternatives.

註釋

1. See Skantze, p. 42.
2. See Skantze, p. 42.
3. See “Warfighting Transformation Strategy Missing, DSB Tells Pentagon,” Aerospace Daily, 19 January 2000, p. 89.
4. See “Warfighting Transformation Strategy Missing, DSB Tells Pentagon,” Aerospace Daily, 19 January 2000, p. 89.
5. Mintzberg, p. 66.
6. Ibid., p. 85.
7. Ibid., p. 86.
8. Mintzberg, p. 66.
9. Ibid., p. 85.
10. Ibid., p. 86.
11. BENS interviews 051999 and 042899.
12. BENS interviews 051999 and 042899.
13. Ibid., p. 68.
14. Ibid., p. 68.
15. See Montgomery County Public Schools, Success for Every Student: The Strategic Plan for MCPS (A Companion Reference), April 1999, pp. 10-15.
16. See Walters, p. 53.
17. See Montgomery County Public Schools, Success for Every Student: The Strategic Plan for MCPS (A Companion Reference), April 1999, pp. 10-15.
18. See Walters, p. 53.
19. See Maryland Department of Budget and Management, Maryland Managing for Results: FY2000 Budget, p. 7.
20. See Maryland Department of Budget and Management, Maryland Managing for Results: FY2000 Budget, p. 7.
21. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
22. Ibid., pp. 240-241.
23. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
24. Ibid., pp. 240-241.
25. Virginia was cited by “The Government Performance Project,” conducted by Governing Magazine in 1999, as one of the nation’s best-managed states. A detailed report is available at www.governing.com.
26. Ronald L. Tillett, Secretary of Finance, and Scott D. Pattison, Director Department of Planning and Budget, Virginia’s Handbook on Planning and Performance (Richmond: Virginia Department of Planning and Budget, 1998), p. 5.
27. Ibid., pp. 21.
28. Virginia was cited by “The Government Performance Project,” conducted by Governing Magazine in 1999, as one of the nation’s best-managed states. A detailed report is available at www.governing.com.
29. Ronald L. Tillett, Secretary of Finance, and Scott D. Pattison, Director Department of Planning and Budget, Virginia's Handbook on Planning and



Performance (Richmond: Virginia Department of Planning and Budget, 1998), p. 5.

30. Ibid., pp. 21.

31. Walters, p. 51.

32. Walters, p. 51.

33. See "Thompson Takes Aim at DoD's FY00 Performance and results Act Plan," Inside the Pentagon, 19 August 1999, p. 1. See the 17 August 1999 letter from Senator Fred Thompson to Secretary of Defense Cohen, and GAO Report B282836, 20 July 1999, Subject: Observations on the Department of defense's Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Plan.

34. See "Thompson Takes Aim at DoD's FY00 Performance and results Act Plan," Inside the Pentagon, 19 August 1999, p. 1. See the 17 August 1999 letter from Senator Fred Thompson to Secretary of Defense Cohen, and GAO Report B282836, 20 July 1999, Subject: Observations on the Department of defense's Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Plan.

35. BENS interview 092199.

36. BENS interview 092199.

37. When asked about structuring the DPG and managing the Summer Program Review by FYDP MFP, and OSD senior staff officer commented that such a move was not feasible because, "Nobody owns the force programs."

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39. BENS interview 052699.

40. BENS interview 052699.

41. Email from Admiral Owens, 12 April 2000, and discussion on 5 April 200.

42. Email from Admiral Owens, 12 April 2000, and discussion on 5 April 200.

43. See the Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, U.S. Department of Defense, May 1995, p. 4-6.

44. See the Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, U.S. Department of Defense, May 1995, p. 4-6.

45. Conversation with Army Major General Stephen Silvasy, a former Army PA&E Staff Officer, Ft. Shafter, Hawaii, 20 June 1996.

46. Conversation with Army Major General Stephen Silvasy, a former Army PA&E Staff Officer, Ft. Shafter, Hawaii, 20 June 1996.

47. See Damian Kemp, "Breaking the Bank," Jane's Defense Weekly, 26 January 2000, p. 26.

48. See Damian Kemp, "Breaking the Bank," Jane's Defense Weekly, 26 January 2000, p. 26.

49. Title 10, U.S. Code, Committee on Armed Services of the House of representatives, U.S. Government printing Office: Washington, D.C, April 1993, Section 153, p. 52.

50. Title 10, U.S. Code, Committee on Armed

Services of the House of representatives, U.S. Government printing Office: Washington, D.C, April 1993, Section 153, p. 52.

51.Quoted from William J. Toti, “It's Broken! Fix It!” Armed Forces Journal International, April 1996, p. 30.

52.Quoted from William J. Toti, “It's Broken! Fix It!” Armed Forces Journal International, April 1996, p. 30.

53.Comments by General Powell at a leadership symposium, contained in email from Lieutenant Colonel Steve Cooper, 4 February 2000.

54.Comments by General Powell at a leadership symposium, contained in email from Lieutenant Colonel Steve Cooper, 4 February 2000.

55.Comments provided by a Senior Air Force Officer at a program briefing.

56.Comments provided by a Senior Air Force Officer at a program briefing.

57.Schlesinger, p. 60.

58.Schlesinger, p. 60.

59.BENS interview 051499.

60.BENS interview 051499.

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